Teacher's Guide - Class Planning Guide

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The Contract
Part 1 - [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] | Part 2 - [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] | Part 3 - [12[13] [14] [15]

Chapter 6 - Comments on Sections

6.1 This section just puts the chapter into perspective. It should be clear without classroom explanation, but students should read it.

6.2 This is an exposition of Hume, trying to elicit sympathy for his position. It goes with 6.3, which works through actual short passages of Hume.

6.3 Hume's English is old enough for students to have to read it slowly. When working through this section in class have the students go directly to the modernized paraphrases in [square brackets]. (My scholarly colleagues would not have forgiven me for leaving out Hume's actual words, though I can choose translations of Plato or Descartes into clear modern English.) The correlations between (a) to (d) and the passages should be no problem. The very abstract arguments (2) and (4) seem to me to have force against the general line in A, though they don't connect with it very specifically; (3) is a line that could be taken, but Hume has an obvious reply to it ("some people want pain; what's so unreasonable about that?" (1) is a quibble that could be avoided by rephrasing the example. (5) is to my mind the most forceful: is Hume saying you can rationally want just anything, including, for example, wanting A or B but wanting neither A nor B, or wanting A more than B and B more than C and B more than A? (6.4 develops this point.)

Of (i) to (iv), (iii) seems to me the only defensible choice.

In using this section to prompt a discussion I would first have the class read the passages and then very quickly check comprehension with (a)-(d) , explicitly or informally, before focusing on (A). I'd pose the question "Is A right?" and hope that things developed from there. (1) to (5) would be brought in only if the discussion needed some shaping. (It would be best to have asked the class to read the section in advance, thinking about the (1) to (5) activity in particular.) This could then lead on to a discussion of how (A) relates to the other passages. What is the attitude to thought and reasoning that it expresses? And after that had got going you could ask if any of (i) to (iv) are good expressions of the possibilities raised.

6.4 This section makes an important subtle point, that the fact that reasoning rarely gives certain conclusions doesn't prevent us from distinguishing good from bad reasoning. It makes this point under the cover of making a cruder point, that there is good and bad reasoning, but the examples it uses are ones where certainty doesn't apply.
It is a mixed exposition and activity section. The examples at the beginning of the section are not linked to any formal activity, though you could easily focus on one or another example and ask for their reactions to it and what they think it illustrates. The activity with (A) to (H) is much more structured. I think the way to make it work is to raise the examples one by one and ask what is wrong with the thinking of the person in question, eliciting informal descriptions, which you then link to (1) to (6). The intended links are (A)-(1), (B)-(5) or (6), (C)-(4), (D)-(2) or (5), (E)-(1) or (2), (F)-(3), (5), or (6), (G)-(5), (H)-(1). As the alternatives suggest, I don't think it's obvious what labels to apply. Perhaps the students can come up with some better ones. I expect it to be uncontroversial that the people in (A), (C), (D), (E) are exhibiting some kind of irrationality - and that is enough to make the main point. Other cases are going to be controversial. (H) is interesting in showing that a belief can be logically flawed but the person holding it might be described as just making a mistake rather than being irrational. What would we have to add to the description to make Henrik irrational?

6.5 Although this is a short exposition which students should be able to take in without classroom explanation, this section is important to the overall argument of the chapter. It makes the connection between reason's surviving the loss of certainty about facts and its surviving the loss of certainty about values. It is definitely not obvious that this symmetry holds. All the chapter argues is that some naïve reasons for thinking that when certainty goes reason is powerless are not convincing in either case. Some students may want to argue that although we have good inductive and other methods for getting conclusions about the world which we can reasonably believe, though they will sometimes have to be revised, we do not have anything analogous for values. Encourage these students. Ask them to find out exactly how much of this chapter, and of chapter 11, they have to disagree with.

6.6 This is to be read in advance of a classroom session in which 6.7 is worked through.

6.7 Although this section is on the surface a test of tolerance (and most students will think that toleration is a virtue, and its opposite is bigotry) a less apparent purpose is to distinguish kinds and reasons for giving and withholding tolerance, so that it is no longer so obvious that it is a virtue to tolerate all alien values, however deeply held.
The important thing in this activity is to react to the examples, so you should allow time for the point of each one to emerge, rather than rushing to the point-scoring. In (6) the class may not find good examples of acts that are (arguably) harmless to others which someone might consider immoral. Suicide by terminally ill people is one example; consenting homosexual activity is another. Examples (6) and (7) link with issues arising in 6.8, so you can curtail the discussion of them if it is taking too much time and you will later be getting to 6.8. Example (5) links to issues in 6.9, so the same applies. The examples do not contain descriptions of really repulsive values: no religions based on child abuse, no brainwashed subservient women, no public burning of widows, no racist theology. The discussion should be lively without these, if the pulls in different directions implicit in the examples are exploited. But if things seem too bland and disagreements are not emerging, you could always spice things up by asking if the reactions to (3) or (6) are unchanged if a suitably higher-charged example is used instead.

If the discussion has gone well, there is no need to linger over the scoring. You should have students score themselves quickly, and soon after rate themselves as type 1 or type 2 tolerant or intolerant. If the discussion has dragged, you may linger on whether the labelings produced by the scoring are fair or accurate, what "tolerant" and "intolerant" mean, and whether the type 1/2 tolerant/intolerant diagnoses do catch the reasons behind individuals' patterns of response. (See the note above for section 1.2.)

The activity at the end of the section is directed at a large class that can be broken down into smaller groups. It won't work if examples (6) and (7) have already been talked out, so you have to anticipate doing it, or keep it in your mind to do if you have time.

6.8 There is no preceding expositional section for this largely activity-based section, because the quote from Mill with which it begins is clear enough on its own. So if you are working through this section in class you should first make sure that the quote has been read and digested. In a small group you could then go first to (i)-(vi) and ask each of them what problems it makes for the harm principle, after a short discussion of each, fitting (A) or (B) to it (or deciding that neither fits.) My answers would be that (A) fits (ii), (iv), (v), (B) fits (i), (iii), (vi). That is not to say that they are all equally powerful objections to the principle. To my mind (v) has no force: some may disagree. (vi) may seem cryptic It could be filled out with an example of someone spying on his neighbors' love-making: he could be argued to be doing them no harm, except inasmuch as they object. One thing to be careful of is the direction in which (B) objects to the principle. The problem is not that the principle ignores the harm done, e.g. to atheists at the thought that others worship gods, but rather that it includes this distress as harm, thus giving a ground for interfering with religious (or irreligious) activity.

In a larger group you must either explicitly ask for each of (i) to (vi) which of (A), (B) it fits best, or divide the group into subgroups with instructions to discuss each of (i) to (vi) and then fit it to (A) or (B).

The first thing to do in discussing the revisions (1) to (3) is to be clear about how they differ from the original. It shouldn't be hard to elicit from the class that (1) adds a rationality requirement, (2) specifies kinds of damage, excluding those that arise just because of people's attitudes, and (3) combines the amendments of (1) and (3). After quickly discussing the content of (1) to (3) you could ask which of the four possibilities - Mill's original principle and the three modifications - is too strong - allows too much to be forbidden too much - and which is too weak - doesn't permit us to forbid things we might have good reason to.

The second half of the section discusses Mill's attempt to give motivation for toleration. Again the quote is clear on its own, and you need only briefly make sure it has been understood, in which case you should include the clarifying paragraph I have added, leading down to (I) and (II). Your aim then is to get a discussion going on whether in fact it is in the public interest to have free discussions. Consider each of (a) to (d) and whether there should be unrestrained discussion on such topics. Then ask whether the reasons for unrestrained discussion look like (I) or (II). It might help to cite the example of societies such as China, where the government has the aim of producing a sophisticated, technologically advanced society but without allowing open discussion of political or religious matters. Is it obvious that this cannot succeed? If not, does this suggest that free discussion is pointless, or that it is justified on some other grounds than general benefits to society? It might also help to pose explicitly the question of whether open discussion of religious questions will lead to agreement on true religious beliefs. It is easy to doubt this, but also easy to think that freedom of expression on religious matters is still a good thing. This suggests that its justification is something other than (II) (and something other than (I) in that monolithic religious societies are often harmonious and efficient).

The last part of the section is subtle, but important in that it makes the link with certainty. The Mill quote here is not as clear as the previous two, and needs the gloss I provide. If there is time, an open discussion of the issues raised in the final paragraph of the section could make many things fall into place. If there is no time for this, it is a good idea to ask the class to read through the last part of the section on their own.

6.9 The aim of this section is to suggest that when we have strong scientific reasons for believing something this does limit the resources we are willing to commit to investigating alternatives, and this can be a kind of intolerance of them. So when discussion or investigation has a cost we use our best estimates of probability to help decide whether the cost is worth incurring. I would work through this section simply by taking each example in turn and discussing it, in the class as a whole or divided into smaller groups, guided by the questions I pose. Then ask the whole class whether their (individual or group) reactions to (C) are different from their reactions to (A) and (B). The difference could take many forms besides the degree of disagreement mentioned in the text. It could be that different reasons for action are relevant in the different cases. For example, the desire to have a society in which different cultures and beliefs flourish may be relevant to (C) but not to (A) and (B). Or there may be variations on (C) which contrast more sharply with (B). For example, suppose that what the newcomers in (C) need to stay in business is use of a resource such as the park, and you are chair of the committee that decides access to it. Variations on (B) are also possible: suppose that the request is not from some religious group but from supporters of some scientific theory which is not completely impossible but which the majority of scientists think is wrong.

6.10 This section rounds off the chapter. It is not necessary to discuss it in class, but it would be desirable for the class to read it.

Chapter 6 - Test
(This test is based on the objectives stated at the beginning of the chapter.)

For each of the questions below circle two acceptable answers:

(1) The reason that Hume thought that many beliefs are not based on reasoning is that he
thought that :
(a) most people are irrational; (b) induction is not an operation of reason but of
habit; (c) many beliefs are not based on anything that makes them certain; (d) anyone
can reasonably believe anything.

(2) Hume thought that any desire is as reasonable as any other because:
(a) reasoning tells you how to satisfy your desires, not which desires to have; (b) no
one satisfies very many of their desires, whatever they are; (c) any desire can be
based on any true assessment of the facts; (d) evil people are more rational than
virtuous ones.

(3) Hume's understanding of reason leaves out the following factors:
(a) reason is an emotion; (b) beliefs can be inconsistent; (d) desires can be incoherent
(d) there are better and worse ways of handling data that is not certain.

(4) It can be objected to Mill's harm principle that:
(a) it allows my actions to be restricted by your reactions to them; (b) it allows
people to do themselves harm as long as no one else is affected; (c) it encourages
libel; (d) it permits people to hold views which are offensive.

(5) Reasons for tolerating views which you think are wrong are:
(a) in the end no belief is right or wrong; (b) the open discussion of these views
may harm no one but those who choose to discuss them; (c) discussion of them may
show that they are true after all; (d) the people holding these views are not evil but
just mistaken.