






# PART I

## THE VALUE OF TRUTH: "REVALUING OUR HIGHEST VALUES"





## INTRODUCTION

Nietzsche and James are responsible for posing the hardest and most crucial questions that subsequent philosophical debates on truth will have to answer. Their radical critical questions concern the very *value* of truth, which is commonly taken for granted both in philosophy and in ordinary life when we assume that it is our obligation to seek the truth, to tell the truth, to acknowledge the truth, etc. The questions Nietzsche and James pose call for more than the aseptic tasks of analysis and theory building. In their hands the discussion of truth becomes a critical endeavor: it becomes, in Nietzsche's words, the critical enterprise of "revaluing our highest values". The Nietzschean and Jamesian critical questioning of the value of truth opens up a set of issues and concerns that can be grouped under three headings relating to different aspects of truth: the *normativity*, the *performativity*, and the *relativity* of truth.

The brief discussion that follows tries to bring to the fore the similarities and differences between Nietzsche's and James's elucidations of these aspects. We try to make explicit both the convergence and the divergence between their views of truth. For although Nietzsche and James are of one mind in posing very similar questions and in setting the agenda for the philosophical debate on truth around the same themes, there are substantive disagreements between them stemming from the crucial differences in the philosophical orientations underlying the positions they defend. So by juxtaposing these texts we hope to create a dialogue between Nietzsche and James, as well as a dialogue with a common interlocutor, namely, *absolutism*, the view of truth as an absolute, unquestionable value. In this twofold dialogue Nietzsche and James appear both as dissenting voices and as kindred voices fighting against a common enemy.

There are other voices that, being both distinctive and akin, can naturally join Nietzsche and James in their critical enterprise of "revaluing our highest values": Marx, Freud, Husserl, F. C. S. Schiller, and Dewey, to name a few critical philosophers who are, roughly, their contemporaries (see *Suggested Readings*).

Why should we value truth rather than falsity? Why should we hold people responsible for respecting the truth and complying with it? Why should we do so ourselves? These questions raised by Nietzsche and James make us critically conscious of a crucial aspect of the concept of truth that traditionally had been either assumed or denied in philosophy:<sup>1</sup> namely, *the normativity of truth*. As Allen (1993) has pointed out, Nietzsche and James warn us that we should be suspicious when it is built into the very notion of something that that thing is valuable. They both encourage a skeptical attitude towards any alleged *built-in normativity*. Nietzsche denounces the virtues associated with truth (such as honesty) as "occult qualities" that explain nothing and are supported by nothing. On the other hand, James criticizes the appeal to truth as "an end in itself," which turns truth into an arbitrary stopping point of explanation and justification. In this way Nietzsche and James both warn us to beware of those properties that are said to have intrinsic value, a value that cannot be called into question; for making a value absolute and self-evident is the best way of protecting it while hiding a dogmatic attitude towards it. Rejecting the absolutist conception of truth, Nietzsche and James argue that truths are desired for their consequences, for the impact they can have on our life-experiences and practices. So, in a general sense,

both Nietzsche and James can be characterized as consequentialists, but their *alethic consequentialism* could not be more different. For, although they both tie the value of truth to its practical consequences, they assess these consequences, and hence truth's value, in very different ways.

Nietzsche's alethic consequentialism brings with it a *skeptical* and *deconstructive* approach. He draws a contrast between "the will to truth" and "the will to falsehood," which he characterizes as being at the service of two opposed goals: the preservation of the herd and the preservation of the individual, respectively. His genealogical account tries to show that there is nothing natural about the will to truth, that rather than being a human tendency that arises naturally and spontaneously, it is a duty that society imposes on us: "the duty to lie according to a fixed convention" (p. 17 below). Moreover, he calls attention to the "petty benefits" and the "high costs" associated with the will to truth: it can give us repose, security, and consistency, but at the price of "petrification" and "forgetfulness." The socially enforced will to truth coagulates the prodigious dynamism and diversity of which our life and thought are capable; and it makes us *forget* all those other ways of thinking and acting that are not in conformity with the herd, thus making us lose our creativity and originality. Nietzsche contends that we must overcome the herd mentality and transcend the will to truth. This liberation is the emancipatory goal that, on his view, the critical activity of "revaluing our highest values" should have.

James arrives at very different conclusions in his critical examination of the normativity of truth. Rather than aiming at a nihilistic view through a deconstructive genealogy, he develops a *reconstructive* account whose goal is the rehabilitation of the value of truth on pragmatic grounds. Following Schiller and Dewey in viewing truth as "a species of the good" (i.e. the good in the way of belief), James characterizes truth as what is "expedient in the way of our thinking" (p. 33 below). Denouncing the idealizations and abstractions of rationalism which have led philosophers to despise "the muddy particulars of experience" (p. 36 below), he wants to explain "the cash-value of truth" in experiential terms. His empiricist and pragmatist view tries to bring the concept of truth back to the world of concrete experience and praxis (to the *life-world*) in which it functions. It is important to note that in his experiential and pragmatic justification of the value of truth, James depicts our obligation towards truth as "tremendously conditioned" – that is, as "part of our general obligation to do what pays" (p. 36 below). On James's view, truths are reliable guides in our life and practice. As he puts it, the value of true ideas lies in their "useful leading": they lead to consistency, stability, and solidarity, and away from "eccentricity and isolation."

This is, of course, where James and Nietzsche part company. For although they offer converging accounts of the practical consequences of truth, where James sees only valuable benefits, Nietzsche sees "high costs" that outweigh "petty benefits." Far from assessing eccentricity and isolation negatively, as James does, Nietzsche considers them the source of the creativity and originality that are at the core of human existence. We would like to suggest, however, that within a Nietzschean perspective there is still room to reinstate the value of truth in a new sense: namely, by focusing on the *disruptive*, *subversive*, and ultimately *affirmative* potential of truth, which neither Nietzsche nor James considers explicitly in these selections. As a wolf in sheep's clothing, the will to truth can be subverted and put at the service of the life-affirming

power of creativity. The valorization of these disruptive truths, truths that break agreement and interrupt the social life of the community, is indeed compatible with Nietzsche's critique of the herd mentality. But it is important to note that this disruptive dimension of truth does not merely stand in opposition to standard norms: it is more than a simple (masked) negation of the will to truth that accepts established conventions; it is a subversion of this conformist will that displaces it, destabilizes it, and opens up the possibility of a new affirmation. This Nietzschean valorization of an orientation towards truth that embraces disruption, subversion, and affirmation may be more urgent than ever as modern democracies enter into a new phase.<sup>2</sup> We will revisit this issue in part VII.

A second set of questions raised by the critical discussions of Nietzsche and James concerns *the performativity of truth*. Both Nietzsche and James call attention to the things we do, the actions we perform, with the truth (telling it, hiding it, twisting it, confessing it, etc.). The performative dimension of truth has two different senses: an *instrumental* and a *constitutive* sense (which will be the focus of Part V below). In its instrumental sense, the performative power of truth consists in the consequences it can bring about. In a constitutive sense, truths themselves (and not just their consequences) have a performative character, because they are produced by our alethic discursive acts: they are formed and enacted, constituted and performed, in discursive practices. (This could not be otherwise, for, as James puts it, "All human thinking gets discursified [. . .] by means of social intercourse" (p. 31 below).

Both Nietzsche and James emphasize that truths are not just there, inert and given; they have to be produced. In his critique of the copy theory of truth, James argues that true ideas and thoughts are not mere copies, but symbols, and that therefore they involve more than a passive mirroring: they require an active making. In a similar vein, Nietzsche argues that truths have to be manufactured linguistically. He describes the discursive production of truth as the making of an illusion, for it requires the *forgetfulness* of its own genesis in discursive practices: to believe in the truth, according to Nietzsche, we have to forget how things have been *made* true. Both Nietzsche and James describe truths as symbolic *events* or *processes*, insisting that ideas and thoughts are not veridical in themselves (veridicality is never an intrinsic quality), but that they have to be *made* true. In this sense the focus of their discussions is on making true, rather than on being true (see also Parts II and III below).

The performative character of truth brings to the fore the crucial dependence of truth on our practices and interests (which will be explored and discussed in different ways in all subsequent parts of this book). And this brings us to the last aspect of truth that Nietzsche and James call our attention to: namely, its *relativity*. Both Nietzsche and James reject any philosophical view of truth as an *absolute* property. Emphasizing the holistic and dynamic nature of truth, James describes truths as relative in a twofold sense: truths are relative to the always changeable reality we cope with in our experiences and practices; and they are also relative to the always changeable frameworks or belief systems in which they are inscribed. On the other hand, Nietzsche argues that there are always contingent and arbitrary, "anthropomorphic" elements<sup>3</sup> in any alleged truth which get forgotten: "truths are illusions that we have forgotten are illusions" (p. 17 below). The absolute perspective on truth is an ideological cover-up that makes us oblivious to this forgetfulness and to the illusory nature

of truths, which are presented as absolute and final realities. However, although both Nietzsche and James call into question any sharp boundary between what is true and what passes for true in our practices, James does not share the skepticism and thoroughgoing relativism of Nietzsche. James is certainly a pluralist, but is he also a relativist?<sup>4</sup> He defends the diversification of truth according to plural practices and plural interests, arguing that we should always talk about truths in the plural, for they are realized *in rebus*. But no matter how diverse human practical interests may be, James contends that there is always the possibility of convergence provided by the general interests of mankind – that is, by the interests that relate to adaptation and the survival of the species. These general interests constitute the ground for what James calls our “general obligation to do what pays,” which is what brings us all together as truth-seekers. On this naturalistic perspective, truth is viewed as what proves to be reliable and adaptive in the long run. Given this neo-Darwinian naturalism, it is doubtful that James should be considered a radical relativist. Although he calls attention to the relativistic elements in our assessments of truth, his empiricist and pragmatic relativism in conjunction with his naturalism make room for a strong notion of objectivity. By contrast, Nietzsche’s life-affirming relativism eschews this notion, emphasizing that there is only an aesthetic relation between different spheres of discourse and their different truths. He remarks that, unlike the enslaved “*rational* man,” the “*liberated intuitive* man” is bound only by aesthetic criteria. This relativism is quite alien to James’s pragmatic view of truth (although they are both based on a critique of rationalism). The issue of objectivity and relativism will be revisited in Part III.

#### Notes

- 1 In many discussions of truth in the history of philosophy its normative dimension was simply ignored, but in many others it was considered and denied. The latter is the case in so-called *descriptivist* views of truth. Relying on a strong separation between the factual and the normative, these views treat “true” as a purely descriptive predicate. Although the fact-value distinction has come under heavy attack on various fronts, descriptivism still survives in naturalist approaches defended in the contemporary literature (see e.g. Field 1994).
- 2 Nietzsche’s “disruptive” impact on twentieth-century French and German philosophy has been extraordinary, and particularly on many of the figures selected in this volume. The best-known treatments of Nietzsche – including books by Deleuze, Derrida, Foucault, Irigaray, and Heidegger – are listed here: Gilles Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, trans. Hugh Tomlinson (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983); Jacques Derrida, *The Ear of the Other: Otobiography*, trans. Peggy Kamuf (New York: Schocken Books, 1985); Jacques Derrida, *Spurs: Nietzsche’s Styles*, trans. Barbara Harlow (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979); Michel Foucault, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” in *The Foucault Reader* (New York: Random House, 1984), pp. 76–100; Martin Heidegger, *Nietzsche*, vol. 1: *The Will to Power as Art*, trans. David F. Krell (New York: Harper & Row, 1979); vol. 2: *The Eternal Recurrence of the Same*, trans. David F. Krell (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1984); vol. 3: *Will to Power as Knowledge and as Metaphysics*, trans. Joan Stambaugh and Frank Capuzzi (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1986); vol. 4: *Nihilism*, trans. David F. Krell (New York: Harper & Row, 1982); Martin Heidegger, *What is Called Thinking?* (New York: Harper & Row, 1976); Luce Irigaray, *Marine Lover of Friedrich Nietzsche*, trans. Gillian C. Gill (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991); Karl Jaspers, *Nietzsche: An Introduction to the*

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*Understanding of His Philosophical Activity*, trans. Charles F. Wallraff and Frederick J. Schmitz (South Bend, IN: Regentry/Gateway, Inc., 1979); Carl G. Jung, *Nietzsche's "Zarathustra,"* ed. James L. Jarrett (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988); Pierre Klossowski, *Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle* (London: Athlone, 1993); Sarah Kofman, *Nietzsche and Metaphor*, trans. Duncan Large (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993).

- 3 On Nietzsche's view, these elements are unavoidable given the fact that human symbolization is always based on contingent and optional metaphors.
- 4 F. C. S. Schiller, who had a great influence on James, thought that pragmatism vindicates the Protagorean dictum "Man is the measure of all things," of which he said: "Fairly interpreted, this is the truest and most important thing that any thinker has ever propounded" (*Humanism* (London: Macmillan, 1912), p. xxi). An analysis and defense of Protagoras's dictum will be offered by Feyerabend in Part III.

## 1

# ON TRUTH AND LIES IN A NONMORAL SENSE<sup>1</sup>

## and Other Readings

Friedrich Nietzsche

## 1

Once upon a time, in some out of the way corner of that universe which is dispersed into numberless twinkling solar systems, there was a star upon which clever beasts invented knowing. That was the most arrogant and mendacious minute of “world history,” but nevertheless, it was only a minute. After nature had drawn a few breaths, the star cooled and congealed, and the clever beasts had to die. – One might invent such a fable, and yet he still would not have adequately illustrated how miserable, how shadowy and transient, how aimless and arbitrary the human intellect looks within nature. There were eternities during which it did not exist. And when it is all over with the human intellect, nothing will have happened. For this intellect has no additional mission which would lead it beyond human life. Rather, it is human, and only its possessor and begetter takes it so solemnly – as though the world’s axis turned within it. But if we could communicate with the gnat, we would learn that he likewise flies through the air with the same solemnity,<sup>2</sup> that he feels the flying center of the universe within himself. There is nothing so reprehensible and unimportant in nature that it would not immediately swell up like a balloon at the slightest puff of this power of knowing. And just as every porter wants to have an admirer, so even the proudest of men, the philosopher, supposes that he sees on all sides the eyes of the universe telescopically focused upon his action and thought.

Friedrich Nietzsche, “On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense,” pp. 79–91 in *Philosophy and Truth: Selections from Nietzsche’s Notebooks of the Early 1870s*, ed. and trans. Daniel Breazeals (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1979). © by Daniel Breazeale. Reprinted with permission.

Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, trans. Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale (New York: Vintage Books, 1968), pp. 289, 292. Reprinted by permission of the publisher.

Friedrich Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, trans. Helen Zimmern (Edinburgh and London: T. N. Foulis, 1909), pp. 5–6.

Friedrich Nietzsche, *Twilight of the Idols*, trans. R. J. Hollingdale (London: Penguin, 1968), p. 41. Reprinted by permission of Penguin Books Ltd.

It is remarkable that this was brought about by the intellect, which was certainly allotted to these most unfortunate, delicate, and ephemeral beings merely as a device for detaining them a minute within existence. For without this addition they would have every reason to flee this existence as quickly as Lessing's son.<sup>3</sup> The pride connected with knowing and sensing lies like a blinding fog over the eyes and senses of men, thus deceiving them concerning the value of existence. For this pride contains within itself the most flattering estimation of the value of knowing. Deception is the most general effect of such pride, but even its most particular effects contain within themselves something of the same deceitful character.

As a means for the preserving of the individual, the intellect unfolds its principle powers in dissimulation, which is the means by which weaker, less robust individuals preserve themselves – since they have been denied the chance to wage the battle for existence with horns or with the sharp teeth of beasts of prey. This art of dissimulation reaches its peak in man. Deception, flattering, lying, deluding, talking behind the back, putting up a false front, living in borrowed splendor, wearing a mask, hiding behind convention, playing a role for others and for oneself – in short, a continuous fluttering around the *solitary* flame of vanity – is so much the rule and the law among men that there is almost nothing which is less comprehensible than how an honest and pure drive for truth could have arisen among them. They are deeply immersed in illusions and in dream images; their eyes merely glide over the surface of things and see “forms.” Their senses nowhere lead to truth; on the contrary, they are content to receive stimuli and, as it were, to engage in a groping game on the backs of things. Moreover, man permits himself to be deceived in his dreams every night of his life. His moral sentiment does not even make an attempt to prevent this, whereas there are supposed to be men who have stopped snoring through sheer will power. What does man actually know about himself? Is he, indeed, ever able to perceive himself completely, as if laid out in a lighted display case? Does nature not conceal most things from him – even concerning his own body – in order to confine and lock him within a proud, deceptive consciousness, aloof from the coils of the bowels, the rapid flow of the blood stream, and the intricate quivering of the fibers! She threw away the key. And woe to that fatal curiosity which might one day have the power to peer out and down through a crack in the chamber of consciousness and then suspect that man is sustained in the indifference of his ignorance by that which is pitiless, greedy, insatiable, and murderous – as if hanging in dreams on the back of a tiger. Given this situation, where in the world could the drive for truth have come from?

Insofar as the individual wants to maintain himself against other individuals, he will under natural circumstances employ the intellect mainly for dissimulation. But at the same time, from boredom and necessity, man wishes to exist socially and with the herd; therefore, he needs to make peace and strives accordingly to banish from his world at least the most flagrant *bellum omni contra omnes*.<sup>4</sup> This peace treaty brings in its wake something which appears to be the first step toward acquiring that puzzling truth drive: to wit, *that* which shall count as “truth” from now on is established. That is to say, a uniformly valid and binding designation is invented for things, and this legislation of language likewise establishes the first laws of truth. For the contrast between truth and lie arises here for the first time. The liar is a person who uses the

valid designations, the words, in order to make something which is unreal appear to be real. He says, for example, "I am rich," when the proper designation for his condition would be "poor." He misuses fixed conventions by means of arbitrary substitutions or even reversals of names. If he does this in a selfish and moreover harmful manner, society will cease to trust him and will thereby exclude him. What men avoid by excluding the liar is not so much being defrauded as it is being harmed by means of fraud. Thus, even at this stage, what they hate is basically not deception itself, but rather the unpleasant, hated consequences of certain sorts of deception. It is in a similarly restricted sense that man now wants nothing but truth: he desires the pleasant, life-preserving consequences of truth. He is indifferent toward pure knowledge which has no consequences; toward those truths which are possibly harmful and destructive he is even hostilely inclined. And besides, what about these linguistic conventions themselves? Are they perhaps products of knowledge, that is, of the sense of truth? Are designations congruent with things? Is language the adequate expression of all realities?

It is only by means of forgetfulness that man can ever reach the point of fancying himself to possess a "truth" of the grade just indicated. If he will not be satisfied with truth in the form of tautology, that is to say, if he will not be content with empty husks, then he will always exchange truths for illusions. What is a word? It is the copy in sound of a nerve stimulus. But the further inference from the nerve stimulus to a cause outside of us is already the result of a false and unjustifiable application of the principle of sufficient reason.<sup>5</sup> If truth alone had been the deciding factor in the genesis of language, and if the standpoint of certainty had been decisive for designations, then how could we still dare to say "the stone is hard," as if "hard" were something otherwise familiar to us, and not merely a totally subjective stimulation! We separate things according to gender, designating the tree as masculine and the plant as feminine. What arbitrary assignments!<sup>6</sup> How far this oversteps the canons of certainty! We speak of a "snake": this designation touches only upon its ability to twist itself and could therefore also fit a worm.<sup>7</sup> What arbitrary differentiations! What one-sided preferences, first for this, then for that property of a thing! The various languages placed side by side show that with words it is never a question of truth, never a question of adequate expression; otherwise, there would not be so many languages.<sup>8</sup> The "thing in itself" (which is precisely what the pure truth, apart from any of its consequences, would be) is likewise something quite incomprehensible to the creator of language and something not in the least worth striving for. This creator only designates the relations of things to men, and for expressing these relations he lays hold of the boldest metaphors. To begin with, a nerve stimulus is transferred into an image:<sup>9</sup> first metaphor. The image, in turn, is imitated in a sound: second metaphor. And each time there is a complete overleaping of one sphere, right into the middle of an entirely new and different one. One can imagine a man who is totally deaf and has never had a sensation of sound and music. Perhaps such a person will gaze with astonishment at Chladni's sound figures; perhaps he will discover their causes in the vibrations of the string and will now swear that he must know what men mean by "sound." It is this way with all of us concerning language: we believe that we know something about the things themselves when we speak of trees, colors, snow, and flowers; and yet we possess nothing but metaphors for things – metaphors which correspond

in no way to the original entities.<sup>10</sup> In the same way that the sound appears as a sand figure, so the mysterious X of the thing in itself first appears as a nerve stimulus, then as an image, and finally as a sound. Thus the genesis of language does not proceed logically in any case, and all the material within and with which the man of truth, the scientist, and the philosopher later work and build, if not derived from never-never land,<sup>11</sup> is at least not derived from the essence of things.

In particular, let us further consider the formation of concepts. Every word instantly becomes a concept precisely insofar as it is not supposed to serve as a reminder of the unique and entirely individual original experience to which it owes its origin; but rather, a word becomes a concept insofar as it simultaneously has to fit countless more or less similar cases – which means, purely and simply, cases which are never equal and thus altogether unequal. Every concept arises from the equation of unequal things. Just as it is certain that one leaf is never totally the same as another, so it is certain that the concept “leaf” is formed by arbitrarily discarding these individual differences and by forgetting the distinguishing aspects. This awakens the idea that, in addition to the leaves, there exists in nature the “leaf”: the original model according to which all the leaves were perhaps woven, sketched, measured, colored, curled, and painted – but by incompetent hands, so that no specimen has turned out to be a correct, trustworthy, and faithful likeness of the original model. We call a person “honest,” and then we ask “why has he behaved so honestly today?” Our usual answer is, “on account of his honesty.” Honesty! This in turn means that the leaf is the cause of the leaves. We know nothing whatsoever about an essential quality called “honesty”; but we do know of countless individualized and consequently unequal actions which we equate by omitting the aspects in which they are unequal and which we now designate as “honest” actions. Finally we formulate from them a *qualitas occulta*<sup>12</sup> which has the name “honesty.” We obtain the concept, as we do the form, by overlooking what is individual and actual; whereas nature is acquainted with no forms and no concepts, and likewise with no species, but only with an X which remains inaccessible and undefinable for us. For even our contrast between individual and species is something anthropomorphic and does not originate in the essence of things; although we should not presume to claim that this contrast does not correspond to the essence of things: that would of course be a dogmatic assertion and, as such, would be just as indemonstrable as its opposite.

What then is truth? A movable host of metaphors, metonymies, and anthropomorphisms: in short, a sum of human relations which have been poetically and rhetorically intensified, transferred, and embellished, and which, after long usage, seem to a people to be fixed, canonical, and binding. Truths are illusions which we have forgotten are illusions; they are metaphors that have become worn out and have been drained of sensuous force, coins which have lost their embossing and are now considered as metal and no longer as coins.

We still do not yet know where the drive for truth comes from. For so far we have heard only of the duty which society imposes in order to exist: to be truthful means to employ the usual metaphors. Thus, to express it morally, this is the duty to lie according to a fixed convention, to lie with the herd and in a manner binding upon everyone. Now man of course forgets that this is the way things stand for him. Thus he lies in the manner indicated, unconsciously and in accordance with habits

which are centuries old; and precisely *by means of this unconsciousness* and forgetfulness he arrives at his sense of truth. From the sense that one is obliged to designate one thing as “red,” another as “cold,” and a third as “mute,” there arises a moral impulse in regard to truth. The venerability, reliability, and utility of truth is something which a person demonstrates for himself from the contrast with the liar, whom no one trusts and everyone excludes. As a “*rational*” being, he now places his behavior under the control of abstractions. He will no longer tolerate being carried away by sudden impressions, by intuitions. First he universalizes all these impressions into less colorful, cooler concepts, so that he can entrust the guidance of his life and conduct to them. Everything which distinguishes man from the animals depends upon this ability to volatilize perceptual metaphors<sup>13</sup> in a schema, and thus to dissolve an image into a concept. For something is possible in the realm of these schemata which could never be achieved with the vivid first impressions: the construction of a pyramidal order according to castes and degrees, the creation of a new world of laws, privileges, subordinations, and clearly marked boundaries – a new world, one which now confronts that other vivid world of first impressions as more solid, more universal, better known, and more human than the immediately perceived world, and thus as the regulative and imperative world. Whereas each perceptual metaphor is individual and without equals and is therefore able to elude all classification, the great edifice of concepts displays the rigid regularity of a Roman columbarium<sup>14</sup> and exhales in logic that strength and coolness which is characteristic of mathematics. Anyone who has felt this cool breath [of logic] will hardly believe that even the concept – which is as bony, foursquare, and transposable as a die – is nevertheless merely the *residue of a metaphor*, and that the illusion which is involved in the artistic transference of a nerve stimulus into images is, if not the mother, then the grandmother of every single concept.<sup>15</sup> But in this conceptual crap game “truth” means using every die in the designated manner, counting its spots accurately, fashioning the right categories, and never violating the order of caste and class rank. Just as the Romans and Etruscans cut up the heavens with rigid mathematical lines and confined a god within each of the spaces thereby delimited, as within a *templum*,<sup>16</sup> so every people has a similarly mathematically divided conceptual heaven above themselves and henceforth thinks that truth demands that each conceptual god be sought only within *his own* sphere. Here one may certainly admire man as a mighty genius of construction, who succeeds in piling up an infinitely complicated dome of concepts upon an unstable foundation, and, as it were, on running water. Of course, in order to be supported by such a foundation, his construction must be like one constructed of spiders’ webs: delicate enough to be carried along by the waves, strong enough not to be blown apart by every wind. As a genius of construction man raises himself far above the bee in the following way: whereas the bee builds with wax that he gathers from nature, man builds with the far more delicate conceptual material which he first has to manufacture from himself. In this he is greatly to be admired, but not on account of his drive for truth or for pure knowledge of things. When someone hides something behind a bush and looks for it again in the same place and finds it there as well, there is not much to praise in such seeking and finding. Yet this is how matters stand regarding seeking and finding “truth” within the realm of reason. If I make up the definition of a mammal, and then, after inspecting a camel, declare “look, a mammal,” I have indeed brought a

truth to light in this way, but it is a truth of limited value. That is to say, it is a thoroughly anthropomorphic truth which contains not a single point which would be “true in itself” or really and universally valid apart from man. At bottom, what the investigator of such truths is seeking is only the metamorphosis of the world into man. He strives to understand the world as something analogous to man, and at best he achieves by his struggles the feeling of assimilation. Similar to the way in which astrologers considered the stars to be in man’s service and connected with his happiness and sorrow, such an investigator considers the entire universe in connection with man: the entire universe as the infinitely fractured echo of one original sound – man; the entire universe as the infinitely multiplied copy of one original picture – man. His method is to treat man as the measure of all things, but in doing so he again proceeds from the error of believing that he has these things [which he intends to measure] immediately before him as mere objects. He forgets that the original perceptual metaphors are metaphors and takes them to be the things themselves.

Only by forgetting this primitive world of metaphor can one live with any repose, security, and consistency: only by means of the petrification and coagulation of a mass of images which originally streamed from the primal faculty of human imagination like a fiery liquid, only in the invincible faith that *this sun, this window, this table* is a truth in itself, in short, only by forgetting that he himself is an *artistically creating* subject, does man live with any repose, security, and consistency. If but for an instant he could escape from the prison walls of this faith, his “self consciousness” would be immediately destroyed. It is even a difficult thing for him to admit to himself that the insect or the bird perceives an entirely different world from the one that man does, and that the question of which of these perceptions of the world is the more correct one is quite meaningless, for this would have to have been decided previously in accordance with the criterion of the *correct perception*, which means, in accordance with a criterion which is *not available*. But in any case it seems to me that “the correct perception” – which would mean “the adequate expression of an object in the subject” – is a contradictory impossibility.<sup>17</sup> For between two absolutely different spheres, as between subject and object, there is no causality, no correctness, and no expression; there is, at most, an *aesthetic* relation:<sup>18</sup> I mean, a suggestive transference, a stammering translation into a completely foreign tongue – for which there is required, in any case, a freely inventive intermediate sphere and mediating force. “Appearance” is a word that contains many temptations, which is why I avoid it as much as possible. For it is not true that the essence of things “appears” in the empirical world. A painter without hands who wished to express in song the picture before his mind would, by means of this substitution of spheres, still reveal more about the essence of things than does the empirical world. Even the relationship of a nerve stimulus to the generated image is not a necessary one. But when the same image has been generated millions of times and has been handed down for many generations and finally appears on the same occasion every time for all mankind, then it acquires at last the same meaning for men it would have if it were the sole necessary image and if the relationship of the original nerve stimulus to the generated image were a strictly causal one. In the same manner, an eternally repeated dream would certainly be felt and judged to be reality. But the hardening and congealing of a metaphor guarantees absolutely nothing concerning its necessity and exclusive justification.

Every person who is familiar with such considerations has no doubt felt a deep mistrust of all idealism of this sort: just as often as he has quite clearly convinced himself of the eternal consistency, omnipresence, and infallibility of the laws of nature. He has concluded that so far as we can penetrate here – from the telescopic heights to the microscopic depths – everything is secure, complete, infinite, regular, and without any gaps. Science will be able to dig successfully in this shaft forever, and all the things that are discovered will harmonize with and not contradict each other. How little does this resemble a product of the imagination, for if it were such, there should be some place where the illusion and unreality can be divined. Against this, the following must be said: if each of us had a different kind of sense perception – if we could only perceive things now as a bird, now as a worm, now as a plant, or if one of us saw a stimulus as red, another as blue, while a third even heard the same stimulus as a sound – then no one would speak of such a regularity of nature, rather, nature would be grasped only as a creation which is subjective in the highest degree. After all, what is a law of nature as such for us? We are not acquainted with it in itself, but only with its effects, which means in its relation to other laws of nature – which, in turn, are known to us only as sums of relations. Therefore all these relations always refer again to others and are thoroughly incomprehensible to us in their essence. All that we actually know about these laws of nature is what we ourselves bring to them – time and space, and therefore relationships of succession and number. But everything marvelous about the laws of nature, everything that quite astonishes us therein and seems to demand our explanation, everything that might lead us to distrust idealism: all this is completely and solely contained within the mathematical strictness and inviolability of our representations of time and space. But we produce these representations in and from ourselves with the same necessity with which the spider spins. If we are forced to comprehend all things only under these forms, then it ceases to be amazing that in all things we actually comprehend nothing but these forms. For they must all bear within themselves the laws of number, and it is precisely number which is most astonishing in things. All that conformity to law, which impresses us so much in the movement of the stars and in chemical processes, coincides at bottom with those properties which we bring to things. Thus it is we who impress ourselves in this way. In conjunction with this it of course follows that the artistic process of metaphor formation with which every sensation begins in us already presupposes these forms and thus occurs within them. The only way in which the possibility of subsequently constructing a new conceptual edifice from metaphors themselves can be explained is by the firm persistence of these original forms. That is to say, this conceptual edifice is an imitation of temporal, spatial, and numerical relationships in the domain of metaphor.<sup>19</sup>

## 2

We have seen how it is originally *language* which works on the construction of concepts, a labor taken over in later ages by *science*.<sup>20</sup> Just as the bee simultaneously constructs cells and fills them with honey, so science works unceasingly on this great columbarium of concepts, the graveyard of perceptions. It is always building new,

higher stories and shoring up, cleaning, and renovating the old cells; above all, it takes pains to fill up this monstrosly towering framework and to arrange therein the entire empirical world, which is to say, the anthropomorphic world. Whereas the man of action binds his life to reason and its concepts so that he will not be swept away and lost, the scientific investigator builds his hut right next to the tower of science so that he will be able to work on it and to find shelter for himself beneath those bulwarks which presently exist. And he requires shelter, for there are frightful powers which continuously break in upon him, powers which oppose scientific "truth" with completely different kinds of "truths" which bear on their shields the most varied sorts of emblems.

The drive toward the formation of metaphors is the fundamental human drive, which one cannot for a single instant dispense with in thought, for one would thereby dispense with man himself. This drive is not truly vanquished and scarcely subdued by the fact that a regular and rigid new world is constructed as its prison from its own ephemeral products, the concepts. It seeks a new realm and another channel for its activity, and it finds this in *myth* and in *art* generally. This drive continually confuses the conceptual categories and cells by bringing forward new transferences, metaphors, and metonymies. It continually manifests an ardent desire to refashion the world which presents itself to waking man, so that it will be as colorful, irregular, lacking in results and coherence, charming, and eternally new as the world of dreams. Indeed, it is only by means of the rigid and regular web of concepts that the waking man clearly sees that he is awake; and it is precisely because of this that he sometimes thinks that he must be dreaming when this web of concepts is torn by art. Pascal is right in maintaining that if the same dream came to us every night we would be just as occupied with it as we are with the things that we see every day. "If a workman were sure to dream for twelve straight hours every night that he was king," said Pascal, "I believe that he would be just as happy as a king who dreamt for twelve hours every night that he was a workman."<sup>21</sup> In fact, because of the way that myth takes it for granted that miracles are always happening, the waking life of a mythically inspired people – the ancient Greeks, for instance – more closely resembles a dream than it does the waking world of a scientifically disenchanting thinker. When every tree can suddenly speak as a nymph, when a god in the shape of a bull can drag away maidens, when even the goddess Athena herself is suddenly seen in the company of Peisistratus driving through the market place of Athens with a beautiful team of horses<sup>22</sup> – and this is what the honest Athenian believed – then, as in a dream, anything is possible at each moment, and all of nature swarms around man as if it were nothing but a masquerade of the gods, who were merely amusing themselves by deceiving men in all these shapes.

But man has an invincible inclination to allow himself to be deceived and is, as it were, enchanted with happiness when the rhapsodist tells him epic fables as if they were true, or when the actor in the theater acts more royally than any real king. So long as it is able to deceive without *injuring*, that master of deception, the intellect, is free; it is released from its former slavery and celebrates its Saturnalia. It is never more luxuriant, richer, prouder, more clever and more daring. With creative pleasure it throws metaphors into confusion and displaces the boundary stones of abstractions, so that, for example, it designates the stream as "the moving path which carries man

where he would otherwise walk.” The intellect has now thrown the token of bondage from itself. At other times it endeavors, with gloomy officiousness, to show the way and to demonstrate the tools to a poor individual who covets existence; it is like a servant who goes in search of booty and prey for his master. But now it has become the master and it dares to wipe from its face the expression of indigence. In comparison with its previous conduct, everything that it now does bears the mark of dissimulation,<sup>23</sup> just as that previous conduct did of distortion.<sup>24</sup> The free intellect copies human life, but it considers this life to be something good and seems to be quite satisfied with it. That immense framework and planking of concepts to which the needy man clings his whole life long in order to preserve himself is nothing but a scaffolding and toy for the most audacious feats of the liberated intellect. And when it smashes this framework to pieces, throws it into confusion, and puts it back together in an ironic fashion, pairing the most alien things and separating the closest, it is demonstrating that it has no need of these makeshifts of indigence and that it will now be guided by intuitions rather than by concepts. There is no regular path which leads from these intuitions into the land of ghostly schemata, the land of abstractions. There exists no word for these intuitions; when man sees them he grows dumb, or else he speaks only in forbidden metaphors and in unheard-of combinations of concepts. He does this so that by shattering and mocking the old conceptual barriers he may at least correspond creatively to the impression of the powerful present intuition.

There are ages in which the rational man and the intuitive man stand side by side, the one in fear of intuition, the other with scorn for abstraction. The latter is just as irrational as the former is inartistic. They both desire to rule over life: the former, by knowing how to meet his principle needs by means of foresight, prudence, and regularity; the latter, by disregarding these needs and, as an “overjoyed hero,” counting as real only that life which has been disguised as illusion and beauty. Whenever, as was perhaps the case in ancient Greece, the intuitive man handles his weapons more authoritatively and victoriously than his opponent, then, under favorable circumstances, a culture can take shape and art’s mastery over life can be established. All the manifestations of such a life will be accompanied by this dissimulation, this disavowal of indigence, this glitter of metaphorical intuitions, and, in general, this immediacy of deception: neither the house, nor the gait, nor the clothes, nor the clay jugs give evidence of having been invented because of a pressing need. It seems as if they were all intended to express an exalted happiness, an Olympian cloudlessness, and, as it were, a playing with seriousness. The man who is guided by concepts and abstractions only succeeds by such means in warding off misfortune, without ever gaining any happiness for himself from these abstractions. And while he aims for the greatest possible freedom from pain, the intuitive man, standing in the midst of a culture, already reaps from his intuition a harvest of continually inflowing illumination, cheer, and redemption – in addition to obtaining a defense against misfortune. To be sure, he suffers more intensely, *when* he suffers; he even suffers more frequently, since he does not understand how to learn from experience and keeps falling over and over again into the same ditch. He is then just as irrational in sorrow as he is in happiness: he cries aloud and will not be consoled. How differently the stoical man who learns from experience and governs himself by concepts is affected by the same misfortunes! This man, who at other times seeks nothing but sincerity, truth, freedom

from deception, and protection against ensnaring surprise attacks, now executes a masterpiece of deception: he executes his masterpiece of deception in misfortune, as the other type of man executes his in times of happiness. He wears no quivering and changeable human face, but, as it were, a mask with dignified, symmetrical features. He does not cry; he does not even alter his voice. When a real storm cloud thunders above him, he wraps himself in his cloak, and with slow steps he walks from beneath it.

#### Notes

- 1 A more literal, though less English, translation of *Über Wahrheit und Lüge im aussermoralischen Sinne* might be “On Truth and Lie in the Extramoral Sense.”
- 2 *Pathos*.
- 3 A reference to the offspring of Lessing and Eva König, who died on the day of his birth.
- 4 “War of each against all.”
- 5 Note that Nietzsche is here engaged in an implicit critique of Schopenhauer, who had been guilty of precisely this misapplication of the principle of sufficient reason in his first book, *The Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason*. It is quite wrong to think that Nietzsche was ever wholly uncritical of Schopenhauer’s philosophy (see, for example, the little essay, *Kritik der Schopenhauerischen Philosophie* from 1867, in *MA*, I, pp. 392–401).
- 6 *welche willkürlichen Übertragungen*. The specific sense of this passage depends upon the fact that all ordinary nouns in the German language are assigned a gender: the tree is *der Baum*; the plant is *die Pflanze*. This assignment of an original sexual property to all things is the “transference” in question.
- 7 This passage depends upon the etymological relation between the German words *Schlange* (snake) and *schlingen* (to wind or twist), both of which are related to the old High German *slango*.
- 8 What Nietzsche is rejecting here is the theory that there is a sort of “naturally appropriate” connection between certain words (or sounds) and things. Such a theory is defended by Socrates in Plato’s *Cratylus*.
- 9 *Ein Nervenreiz, zuerst übertragen in ein Bild*. The “image” in this case is the visual image, what we “see.”
- 10 *Wesenheiten*.
- 11 *Wolkenkuckuksheim*: literally, “cloud-cuckoo-land.”
- 12 “Occult quality.”
- 13 *die anschaulichen Metaphern*. The adjective *anschaulich* has the additional sense of “vivid” – as in the next sentence (“vivid first impressions”).
- 14 A columbarium is a vault with niches for funeral urns containing the ashes of cremated bodies.
- 15 I.e. concepts are derived from images, which are, in turn, derived from nerve stimuli.
- 16 A delimited space restricted to a particular purpose, especially a religiously sanctified area.
- 17 *ein widerspruchsvolles Unding*.
- 18 *ein ästhetisches Verhalten*. A more literal translation of *Verhalten* is “behavior,” “attitude,” or perhaps “disposition.”
- 19 This is where section 2 of the fair copy made by von Cersdorff ends. But according to Schlechta (in Schlechta/Anders, pp. 14–15) Nietzsche’s preliminary version continued as follows:

“Empty space and empty time are ideas which are possible at any time. Every concept, thus an empty metaphor, is only an imitation of these first ideas: space, time, and causality. Afterwards, the original imaginative act of transference into images: the first provides the matter, the second the qualities which we believe in. Comparison to music. How can one speak of it?”

20 *Wissenschaft*.

21 *Pensées*, number 386. Actually, Pascal says that the workman would be “almost as happy” as the king in this case!

22 According to the story told by Herodotus (*Histories* I, 60) the tyrant Peisistratus adopted the following ruse to secure his popular acceptance upon his return from exile: he entered Athens in a chariot accompanied by a woman named Phye who was dressed in the costume of Athena. Thus the people were supposed to have been convinced that it was the goddess herself who was conducting the tyrant back to the Acropolis.

23 *Verstellung*.

24 *Verzerrung*.

### From *The Will to Power*

“No matter how strongly a thing may be believed, strength of belief is no criterion of truth.” But what is truth? Perhaps a kind of belief that has become a condition of life? In that case . . . strength could be a criterion.

[. . .]

If the character of existence should be false – which would be possible – what would truth, all our truth, be then? – An unconscionable falsification of the false? The false raised to a higher power.

In a world that is essentially false, truthfulness would be an antinatural tendency: such a tendency could have meaning only as a means to a higher power of falsehood. In order for a world of the true, of being, to be invented, the truthful man would first have to be created (including the fact that such a man believes himself “truthful”).

Simple, transparent, not in contradiction with himself, durable, remaining always the same, without wrinkle, volt, concealment, form: a man of this kind conceives a world of being as “God” in his own image.

For truthfulness to be possible, the whole sphere of man must be very clean, small and, respectable; advantage in every sense must be with the truthful man. – Lies, deception, dissimulation must arouse astonishment –

### From *Beyond Good and Evil*

*What* really is this “Will to Truth” in us? In fact we made a long halt at the question as to the origin of this Will – until at last we came to an absolute standstill before a yet more fundamental question. We inquired about the *value* of this Will. Granted that we want the truth: *why not rather* untruth? And uncertainty? Even

ignorance? The problem of the value of truth presented itself before us – or was it we who presented ourselves before the problem? Which of us is the Œdipus here? Which the Sphinx?

“*How could* anything originate out of its opposite? For example, truth out of error? or the Will to Truth out of the will to deception? or the generous deed out of selfishness? or the pure sun-bright vision of the wise man out of covetousness? Such genesis is impossible; whoever dreams of it is . . . worse than a fool; things of the highest value must have a different origin, an origin of *their own* – in this transitory, seductive, illusory, paltry world, in this turmoil of delusion and cupidity, they cannot have their source.” [. . .] [T]hrough this “belief” of theirs, they exert themselves for their “knowledge,” for something that is in the end solemnly christened “the Truth.”

### **From *Twilight of the Idols***

*How the ‘Real World’ at last Became a Myth* (“History of an Error”)

6. We have abolished the real world: what world is left? the apparent world perhaps? . . . But no! *with the real world we have also abolished the apparent world!* (Mid-day; moment of the shortest shadow; end of the longest error; zenith of mankind; INCIPIIT ZARATHUSTRA).