

Intertextuality

If Kristeva is openly acknowledged for coining the term intertextuality in the late 1960s, this recognition is surprisingly fleeting and dismissive.¹ However supportive critics may be of its semiotics contexts, they glide rapidly over Kristeva's term, to concentrate on its more illustrious theorists such as Barthes.² Indeed it was he, not Kristeva, who wrote the definition for intertextuality in the *Encyclopédie universalis* in 1973. In arenas outside semiotics, critics of intertextuality also relegate Kristeva's contribution and its French contexts, but as derivative of the work of Bakhtin and the Bakhtin circle.³ A notable exception is provided by Worton and Still (1990), who focus extensively in their introduction on Kristeva's part in a French high-cultural, avant-garde and intellectual tradition that combined experimental writing, literary theory, Saussurian linguistics and left-wing politics. By placing Kristeva firmly within the French critical and intellectual elite of *Tel Quel*, however, they separate her brand of intertextuality, as specifically highbrow, from similar modes of cultural borrowing practised by popular culture. Film and popular music had quickly adopted recycling and sampling in distinctly non-French, and non-theoretical, ways.⁴ While these critical snapshots of Kristevan intertextuality focus on very different issues, they have all contributed to one outcome, marginalization of Kristeva's contributions to the 'real' work and texts on intertextuality:

Kristeva's first published work in France is on Mikhail Bakhtin's literary writings, Roland Barthes' seminar is the place where this first substantial part of the Kristevan *oeuvre* would be presented. Roland

Barthes is not there in the writing, but he is, in part, its precondition. Or perhaps it is more accurate to say that Barthes is there, but only in a displaced form. [. . .] Kristeva will not take up Barthes' theories as such in her work, but it was Barthes' writings from *Le Degré zéro de l'écriture* (1953) onward, which opened up the whole terrain for studies in semiotics. Roland Barthes, then, is Kristeva's Parisian mother, as it were; there is nothing Oedipal here.⁵

There is, however, some sinister transference at work. Why has Kristeva's version of intertextuality been sidelined, even actively discredited, whereas Barthes's among others has not? Is such discrediting of Kristeva as coiner and theorist of intertextuality deliberate, or justifiable? This chapter seeks to answer these questions as central to the wider importance of intertextuality's ongoing justification as term, especially in view of its rivals. These are not only the rival French theories of intertextuality proffered by Barthes, Riffaterre or Genette. Newer contenders, such as 'interdiscursivity', 'interdisciplinarity' and 'hypertext', provide possible replacements of intertextuality as concept. In the twenty-first century, are these not better, less elitist and more inclusive ways of describing cultural recycling than intertextuality in whatever French guise?

Kristeva's term in context

By default, Anglo-American as well as French critics of intertextuality base their understanding of it on Kristeva's essay 'Word, dialogue, novel', the fourth chapter of *Semiotikè*, published in Paris in 1969, but not translated into English until 1980.⁶ The classic definition, enshrined in critical readers in English and French, is taken from a sentence early in the essay: intertextuality is 'a mosaic of quotations; any text is the absorption and transformation of another. The notion of *intertextuality* replaces that of intersubjectivity, and poetic language is read as at least double.'⁷ While reappraisals of intertextuality as critical term in English, French and German highlight the imprecision or overgeneralizations generated by this 'definition',⁸ these may have less to do with the 'theory' itself than with the practical circumstances and parameters of its reception and circulation. In non-French-speaking intellectual circles, particularly Anglo-American academe, the early production of translations of 'French' critical theory has been crucial to its inclusion in key debates, and its dissemination via conferences, publications and university curricula. Barthes's *oeuvre*, particularly the early texts pertinent to intertextuality and semiotics, was immediately accessible in translation,

whereas Kristeva's work was very belatedly, and often only partially, translated.⁹ Obviously, by 1980, Kristeva's ideas then appeared very similar to those of the already familiar Barthes and Derrida. From this alone, it is unsurprising that 'intertextuality' rapidly elided with the Barthesian notion of the 'death of the author', adapted readily as another version of (Derridean) deferral of text, or was subsumed by the larger theoretical framework of postmodernism and deconstruction. 'Intertextuality', then, was the linguistic Big Bang, the deconstruction of 'Text' into texts and intertexts where these two terms ultimately become synonymous. On every count, Kristeva's coinage was but a pre-semiotic moment in the ensuing deferrals of (inter)text in semiotic space.

While the problems and influences of translations will be the subject of the fourth chapter, the relevant and central point here is that translation, or the lack of it, has created a 'Kristeva' of Anglo-American critical theory that we will discover is not the Kristeva of *Semeiotikè*.¹⁰ If the reader has remained crucial as a 'clearinghouse' outside the text and intertext for Kristeva's French-speaking critics,¹¹ whether fellow theorists such as Barthes and Riffaterre or German and Canadian bi- or trilingual critics, reception of 'Kristeva' in translation and in the critical reader industry has never been questioned. No doubt is ever cast on the authority of her 'text' as other than a completely reliable and transparent cultural transfer. Since the original essay in French is never compared, any distortions, misappropriations or blatant misrepresentations of 'Kristeva's' theory of intertextuality in translation remain invisible.¹² Moreover, since *Semeiotikè* is in fact still inaccessible in its entirety to all but French speakers, no one has ever questioned whether 'Word, dialogue, novel' is in fact 'the intertextuality essay', let alone whether Kristeva's work in *Semeiotikè* as a whole might inform it or, indeed, pre-empt and outstrip ideas found later in deconstruction. Even more radically, Kristeva's wider *Semeiotikè* as other prefiguration of deconstruction has received no critical re-evaluation as a whole, not even in France or within French-speaking critical communities, such that it might then also offer a solution to thinking various ways out of its impasses and the so-called crisis in postmodernism.

If inaccessibility to the French language or to *Semeiotikè* as a whole provides some excuse as to why Kristeva's intertextuality has been marginalized in Anglo-American critical theory, more puzzling is why her term has fared equally badly in France. French critical guides to intertextuality seem unanimous, and surprisingly consistent with the Anglo-American version of the story. Kristeva is again seen as coiner, but, as the quotation from Lechte above endorses, this time her term becomes tantamount to a recuperation or a French version of

Bakhtin's 'dialogism'. Hence, because the more concerted theorization of intertextuality by a Barthes, Riffaterre or Genette brought the critical rigour her original work was deemed to lack, French critical guides eclipse Kristeva's version and concentrate on theirs. Consequently, French guides to intertextuality, like their English counterparts, once again ignore *Semeiotikè* as a collection of supporting essays to the fourth, 'Bakhtin', chapter. Within France, critical guides then only reinforce a French intellectual hierarchy and critical canon of 'intertextuality' which allows no voice, least of all a female one, to question such constructs.

Marginalization of Kristeva in France extends beyond her theory of intertextuality, however. Although she was part of the *Tel Quel* intellectual establishment alongside Sollers, Derrida and Lyotard, her enormous contribution (*via Semeiotikè*) to intertextuality's wider theoretical contexts in linguistics, poetics, psychoanalysis, comparative religion and philosophy of language has always been perceived derivatively, and differently, to theirs. In France, because the philosophical tradition is ingrained – it has been integral to the curriculum in boys' lycées, and only recently taught to girls – tacit demarcations about its status and seriousness obtain. Thus, Derrida is obviously a philosopher, and stratospherically so, whereas women thinkers, without a lineage of philosopher foremothers behind them, rank in the arena only of ideas about emotions such as psychoanalysis, not of pure thinking. Kristeva cannot then be a philosopher in French intellectual terms (or league), whether with or without the 'feminist' qualification that her work (in translation) after *Semeiotikè* enjoys in some Anglo-American academic feminist and critical theory circles. If these have recuperated Kristeva's importance as post-modern thinker, and widened access to her work through monograph studies and readers, they have unwittingly downplayed her primary contributions to the philosophy of language. This is because her work in linguistics and intertextuality is severed from her later work within psychoanalysis and poetics.¹³ In France, critical occlusion of Kristeva is further compounded by her approach, epitomized in fact by *Semeiotikè*, which we would now name interdisciplinary, but which was clearly and strikingly at odds with the 'pure' research pursued by her male *Tel Quel* contemporaries in the late 1960s. At the very least what follows will rescue Kristeva's *oeuvre* as symbiosis, not suture into 'periods' or shifts of disciplinary loyalty, to allow her most recent work to be read in the light of *Semeiotikè*.

If 'Kristevan' and Kristevan intertextuality are not to be doomed to an honorable mention in literary and critical history, rereading *Semeiotikè* is of paramount importance in the recuperation of a major figure in its double sense: for Kristeva's intertextuality in literary and

cultural theory, and for Kristeva as woman intellectual. Full rereading of *Semeiotikè* is a study in its own right, but this chapter can offer no better beginning than to elucidate what Kristeva's intertextuality is. How *Semeiotikè* attempted to navigate it between the Scylla of the death of the unified subject and the Charybdis of the non-existence of any outside of the text will be elucidated. Returning to *Semeiotikè* as a whole can then reopen two key questions. The first reconsiders Kristeva's role in transposing Bakhtin's work on dialogism and the polyphonic novel. The second concerns her theorization of the dynamics of intertextual production. The way will then be cleared to reassess those sections of *Semeiotikè* that have not seen the critical light of day for want of translations or critical consideration, but which also bear enormously on translation as model for intertextual work.

Kristeva's intertextuality and *Semeiotikè*

If there is one word to sum up Kristeva's striking interdisciplinarity of approach, both regarding intertextuality and its encompassing *Semeiotikè* and since, it is interconnection of ideas where previously none existed. The roots of all Kristeva's interests can be found in her doctoral thesis (1966) in linguistics from an at least double tradition. As a linguist and translator, Kristeva brought hitherto unknown work in Russian to bear on French intellectual inquiry into linguistics and language as meta-system. What was original about Kristeva's doctoral work was her combinatory exploration of Russian Formalist and structuralist ideas (not least Bakhtin's), and the grafting of these within Saussurian linguistics and the Barthes/*Tel Quel* politics of post-Marxist materialism to envisage a theory of intersubjectivity as text. While Todorov is usually credited with launching Bakhtin's European and thence American reception, Kristeva's much earlier part in *Semeiotikè* has yet to be fully mapped.¹⁴ She has too often been assumed as 'French' in French and Anglo-American criticism, and her rich Eastern European heritage has mainly been sidelined, although it was clearly noted as early as 1978 by Plottel and Charney:

Cultural historians might trace the concept of intertextuality in [Kristeva's] work to the Eastern European formalist tradition of the early twentieth century. Although Kristeva's present audience is primarily an audience steeped in the most recent developments of the critical model emerging through Franco-American transatlantic commuting, the issues that she tackles appear also in many pages of Soviet semioticians, especially Iouri Lotman, for whom intertextuality is the public domain of culture itself.¹⁵

'Word, dialogue, text', therefore, may be less Kristeva's manifesto for 'intertextuality' than her advocacy of various aspects of Bakhtin's extensive *oeuvre* within Russian semiotics channelled specifically towards a range of similar questions that were current in intellectual circles in France.¹⁶ In other words, Kristeva's essay is primarily a 'translation' of Bakhtin as informed transposition. Source- and target-text traverse a space that is mediated by a translator-interpreter of two languages, and expert in two frames of reference in linguistics. Credit has therefore rarely been given to Kristeva's legitimate and transparent reworking, even 'proselytizing', of Bakhtin.¹⁷ One reason may be because the translation is particularly 'unfaithful' to Kristeva's original essay on this very subject.

The original essay in *Semeiotikè*, written in 1966, appends to the end of its title an all-important footnote. This directly acknowledges that Kristeva's ensuing study is based on, and emerges from, Bakhtin's two recent literary studies, on Dostoyevsky (Moscow, 1963) and Rabelais (Moscow, 1965). Furthermore, Kristeva notes how Bakhtin visibly influenced Soviet theoreticians of language and literature of the 1930s (Voloshinov and Medvedev), and announces that Bakhtin is working on a study of genres of discourse. Kristeva can only have had access to this material in the original Russian. This footnote is transposed in the translation to the end of the first sentence (where it is of tangential relevance). It is also pared down to a bald reference to the *translations* of *Rabelais and his World* (translated in 1965) and *Problems of Dostoyevsky's Poetics* (translated in 1973). The translation then crowns this first note not with the additional information on Bakhtin's influence, but with a reference to his death in 1975 and to the publication (Todorov's) of some of his essays in French in 1978. Elsewhere, the translation elides often partial renditions of the notes in Kristeva's original essay with glosses for an Anglo-American readership. While it may seem a point of pedantry, such improper referencing and acknowledgement in the first footnote of the Bakhtinian context in its rich multiplicity has led to unjustifiable assessments of Kristeva's essay. Its import has been reduced either by suggesting that, retrospectively, it is tantamount to a plagiarism of Bakhtin,¹⁸ or, inversely, that Kristeva's reworking of intertextuality falls painfully short of the precisions in 'Bakhtin's' original work.¹⁹

By contrast, and from its outset, Kristeva's original essay signals how *belated* the French intellectual scene in linguistics is when compared to work already well developed in the 1930s in Russia. Secondly, Bakhtin's double place in the transformation of issues to do solely with linguistics derives from his role in and outside Formalism, and his calling into question of science as meta-structural

term. Kristeva's scrupulousness (unlike Barthes or Derrida for example) in citing or referencing ideas gleaned from elsewhere, because unrecorded, or unnoticed in French-speaking circles, has in fact played against her work being seen as highly informed transformation. What ensues in her 'Word, dialogue, text' essay is the planting out of Bakhtin's various concepts, such as dialogism, carnival, poetic language, as various seedlings in the French seedbed of Saussurian linguistics. At each planting out, Kristeva begins overtly with reference to Bakhtin, such that her own contribution can then also be inserted. Bakhtin is in fact mentioned seven times in the first six pages of Kristeva's essay, as well as indirectly through his works. Most significantly for our analysis, the famous 'definition' of 'intertextuality' is the second half of a longer sentence prefaced by a reference to Bakhtin as originator: 'Yet what appears as a lack of rigour is in fact an insight first introduced into literary theory by Bakhtin: any text etc.' The mosaic of quotations phrase is then a *gloss* and transposition of Bakhtin's thought. This is doubly obvious in that this sentence is itself appositional and expands a prior idea also fully attributed to Bakhtin. It is worth quoting it in full: 'In Bakhtin's work, these two axes, which he calls *dialogue* and *ambivalence*, are not clearly distinguished.'²⁰ The two axes in question are horizontal (subject-addressee) and vertical (text-context). It goes without saying that subjects, addressees and exterior texts are all very alive in Kristeva's Bakhtin, which she renders faithfully, and in Kristeva's intertextuality developed from these Bakhtinian co-ordinates in the *following* paragraph. Indeed, both Bakhtin and Kristeva honour the author as funnel, so that textuality enters into dialogue with other determining elements. Together, these produce in the novel its polyphony. Neither Bakhtin nor Kristeva, therefore, posits the reader as pivot of interpretability within or outside the text. It is on the question of mediation, however, that Kristeva opens up space for her own concept of intertextuality:

The word as minimal textual unit thus turns out to occupy the status of *mediator*, linking structural models of cultural (historical) environment, as well as that of *regulator*, controlling mutations from diachrony to synchrony, i.e., to literary structure. The word is spatialized: through the very notion of status, it functions in three dimensions (subject-addressee-context) as a set of *dialogical*, semic elements or as a set of *ambivalent* elements. Consequently the task of literary semiotics is to discover other formalisms corresponding to different modalities of word-joining (sequences) within the dialogical space of texts.²¹

For Kristeva, the novel exteriorizes this linguistic dialogue and is at the same time the expansion of the horizontal and vertical axes above

through two interconnected operations of the ‘translinguistic’. This is the spatialization of both the condensation of words transmitted in a language (as ‘langue’ and ‘discours’) and the elaboration of language within generic formalizations which ever renew and transform socially marked instances of words (dialogism and carnival). The remainder of Kristeva’s essay reads Bakhtin to rewrite it into *French*, not as ‘translation’ of ‘langues’, but as translinguistic dialogue between two intercultural situations. Combining gloss, interpretation, résumé or elaboration of *Bakhtin’s* key terms – the ensuing and clearly designated subsections of Kristeva’s essay make this again abundantly clear – Kristeva is precisely this *mediator-regulator* of textual dialogue. Moreover, French cultural heritage is returned via the ‘strangeness’ of reading it proleptically through Bakhtin’s *Rabelais* (carnival, the grotesque). It is from such (Bakhtinian) ‘double-voiced’ critical dialogue that Kristeva’s essay takes its cue so that her own translingual project can be integrated within the French intellectual climate of left-wing *Tel Quel* and structural (post-Formalist) notions of morphology. What is therefore so stunningly new in Kristeva’s work here is the advancing of a theory of *translinguistics*, and the transformative operations at work in any cultural transfer, whether intra- or interlingually. It is but a short step from this to notions of transference and counter-transference and the realm of the pre-linguistic and pre-semiotic in her later ‘psychoanalytic’ works.

This leaves us with a problem, however. If much of ‘Word, dialogue, novel’ is a revision of Bakhtin for the rather different French context of Saussurian linguistics, what, in short, is Kristeva’s intertextuality? Within *Semeiotikè* as a whole, the term is first mentioned in the preceding essay, ‘Le Texte clos’ (‘The closed text’, 1966–7):

The text is therefore *productivity*, meaning that (1) its relation to the language in which it is sited is redistributive (destructive-constructive) and consequently it can be approached by means of logical categories other than purely linguistic ones; (2) it is a permutation of texts, an intertextuality: in the space of a text, many utterances taken from other texts intersect with one another and neutralize one another.²²

While the full significance of this definition will be made even more apparent in the next part of the chapter, the key phrase is ‘a permutation of texts, an intertextuality’, but in apposition to the text’s quality as ‘productivity’. Text is the translinguistic arena of language (as ‘langue’, ‘parole’, and their logical reformations in writing and other cultural productions) in active and constant redistribution. Intertextuality thus names this interactive, permutational production of text, its constant intersecting and neutralizing processes. While the

final verbs might best be rendered in the passive in English, their reflexive form in French ('se croisent et se neutralisent') underlines the dynamic mode of such 'productivity' in language. Reflexivity is indeed the essential motor of language itself for its own rejuvenation. Thus, neutralization is not so much a cancelling out as an interactive levelling. Prior text materials lose special status by permutation with others in the intertextual exchange because all intertexts are of equal importance in the intertextual *process*.

Moreover, it is at this point of permutation (intertextuality) that the ideological implications of text (and its various ideologemes) are materialized even as the new text is also transformed by its contexts.²³ Such translinguistic and transformational productions, such as the novel, allow ideologemes on a number of levels, including the extra-textual, to appear. Historical or national referents are one example, but socio-temporal evolutions of language as archaism or dialect are also recoverable. The ideological is thus constantly threading and rethreading the textual fabric, not outside it in hermeneutical or critical analysis. Kristevan intertextuality as permutation, like Bakhtin's 'dialogism' before it, amply allows for socio-historical, 'polyphonic' and 'carnavalesque' ideologemes in order that the status quo will be challenged.²⁴ There can be no authoritative fixity for interactive, permutational (inter)text. Hence, 'intertextuality' as static, all-encompassing network, with no outside of the text, is not Kristevan.

While admittedly abstract, the remainder of 'Le Texte clos' elaborates the key ideas of its opening paragraphs and also prepares the ground for the sixth essay, 'La Productivité dite texte', where Kristeva does battle with, and brings together, Marxist notions of dialectical materialism and literary notions of verisimilitude.²⁵ Kristeva ultimately wants to avoid both a science model, where matter and simulacra converge, and a mimetic function for art (whether it imitates nature or the world). We will return to these questions in the context of mimesis in chapter 3. These two concerns (language modelled on science, signifiers potentially eliding with signifieds) are of course central also to debates in Eastern European linguistics and for Bakhtin. I leave specialists in these fields to explore Kristeva's work in 'Le Texte clos' comparatively. At the very least, what needs to be recognized is that the observations of this essay, especially on the polyphonic nature of the translinguistic, reveal it as the hitherto hidden interlocutor with the more famous fourth 'intertextuality' essay. 'Le Texte clos' offers the French half of Kristeva's French-Russian dialogue on translinguistics.

Kristeva's retransplantation of Bakhtin's negotiation of Rabelais (the carnivalesque) for the context of French Saussurian linguistics allows her theory of intertextuality as permutation to avoid the Scylla

of the death of the author and the Charybdis of the non-existence of any outside of the text. As oppositional to 'productivity', however, intertextuality as permutation still requires some generator to ensure that its redistributive, intersecting and levelling processes continue. Pressure by Barthes and Riffaterre on exactly this *lacuna* in Kristeva's theory, and their various reader response solutions, will be examined below. Kristeva's own theory, however, already tackles the problem and from within the semiotics of *Semeiotikè*. As the quotation above from 'Le Texte clos' intimates, 'logical categories other than purely linguistic ones' are where such productivity occurs. What might these logical categories be?

In the opening paragraph of the first essay in *Semeiotikè*, 'Le Texte et sa science' (The text and its science), Kristeva sets out her thesis for what becomes the amplified subtitle for the volume as a whole, 'recherches pour une sémanalyse' (research towards a seme-analysis), in which intertextuality plays an integral part. This opening paragraph functions rather like the innermost knot of a concentricity of ideas which *Semeiotikè* expands outwards. This incipit is arguably also essential to understanding the ensuing development of Kristeva's theoretical work as a whole.

To make language an operator [. . .] at work in the materiality of that which, for society, is a means of contact and understanding, does this not make of it immediately an outsider to language? The so-called literary act, by dint of its not admitting to an ideal distance in relation to the that which it signifies, introduces radical otherness in relation to what language is claimed to be: a bearer of meanings. Strangely close and intimately foreign to the substance of our discourse and dreams, 'literature' today appears to be the very act which grasps how language works and signals what it has the power tomorrow to transform.²⁶

In this dense and allusive passage, there are two clusters of key ideas. Work ('faire', 'travail', 'oeuvrer', 'se faire') is integrally connected to ideas about being outside, foreign, other ('étranger', étrangeté, 'étrangement'). Productivity is the conjunction in language of 'acts' or enactments and their transformations as different from themselves. A hyphen after the prefix, 'trans-formation', would underpin Kristeva's attempt to describe language form that makes itself foreign to itself, a notion already common currency within Russian Formalism, as the 'making strange'. The hyphen also serves to highlight the logical or mathematical relation at work here. This is the relation of 'x and not x', or binary number systems, which should not be confused with binary oppositions or Hegelian dialectics. These nodal terms, 'work', 'outsideness' and 'trans-formation', can then be seen

as foreshadowings of the terms in the title of the fourth ‘intertextuality’ essay, ‘Word, dialogue, novel’. Neither diachronic (duration) nor synchronic (a point in time), they allow reflexive synergy to flow both ways between them. From its very incipit, *Semeiotikè* thus attempts to uncover the method and process of these terms as seme-analysis, and the role of translinguistic and trans-formative permutation in producing a ‘materialist gnoseology’. The theoretical model undergirding this is not science, but a larger model of *text* where science participates alongside sociology, mathematics, psycho-analysis, linguistics and logic. This decentring of science as primary model for all other disciplines also reworks the science/philosophy dichotomy.²⁷ For Kristeva, text of any kind is not a vehicle of information (‘the *that* which it signifies’), but so many forms of reflexive and hence ‘poetic’ language (including science) in co-operation.

The focus on ‘strangeness’, ‘foreignness’, ‘being outside’ in the introit to *Semeiotikè* meshes with and is expanded in the seventh essay, ‘Poésie et négativité’ (Poetry and negativity), published later in 1968. Here, particularly in its third section, where there is explicit development of her theory of intertextuality as permutation, ‘étranger’ is the key word, and, as above, ‘négativité’ is not oppositional, but appositional levelling. It is in the active translation/transformation in poetic language of discourse that the text’s infinite ‘anotherness’ (an-otherness) can best be glimpsed.²⁸ The intertextual is the pinpointing of this ontogenetic signifying trail whereby language can question itself in its strangeness and unfamiliarities to itself. Stepping alongside itself (‘intimement étranger’), word/text is neither outside itself through a transcendent signifier, nor inside itself as ontological identity.²⁹ It is always allogamous, disjunct.³⁰ Early in ‘Le Texte et sa science’, Kristeva names this as a ‘polyvalency of non-unity’, altogether synonymous with her later intertextuality as permutation.³¹ As translation studies and Kristeva’s later essay on translation, ‘L’Autre Langue ou traduire le sensible’,³² endorse, the signified can never be a one-to-one relationship (either as the repetition of a noun in the same language or the equivalent in another). At best, it will be an approximation because context and nuance come with accretions in time, whether intra- or interlingually. This incomplete and uncompletable position for the text is tantamount to the speaker’s experience of a self-in-translation where one is the other of the same in another language, or in one’s own language from different, adjacent, perspectives.³³ Meaning and subject are therefore never unified, but share the space of insider–outsider to language. For Kristeva, persons contribute to the process, but as unimportant mediators of the text’s alterior trans-formations and translations into writing, ideas to which the fourth chapter will return. In other words,

trans-formativity in Kristeva's work highlights permutationality as signifying practices not of orders (such as systems or mosaics), but of constant, logical *disordering*. What Kristeva's *Semeiotikè* so richly heralds here, and which her later deliberations on psychoanalysis will theorize, is the interface between translation and the pre-semiotic and their disorders.³⁴

The corollary of the alignment of disorders and disordering principles is that Kristeva's theory of language and intertextuality does not envisage chaos, the inchoate or abyssal deferral as negative, but as reconstitutive synergies of text. Her essay 'Le Texte et sa science' is again richly indicative of her later work. It is not a theory of a science of language or an attempt to validate poetic language by scientific or mechanistic/formalistic means. Neither is it a theory of the inchoate *other* of science, whether of madness, psychedelia, psychic or psychotic phenomena, or of avant-garde experimental texts. Rather, through permutations of order, disorder and transformation, Kristeva's is the attempt to theorize another text ('étranger') of science. In the first essay, and as hints throughout *Semeiotikè*, what appears is what I can only call a 'quantum theory of translinguistics' (as opposed to mechanics).³⁵ In the section of 'Poésie et négativité' (the seventh essay), directly following her cogitation of the strange, the foreign, Kristeva describes texts in intertextual permutations as the observable poetic meaning effects of semes and lexemes in play as unobservable because unfixable particles and waves.³⁶ It is a short step from here to psychoanalytic free association and stages of psychic development, or its absence, a Brownian movement of internal or external stimuli blending together.³⁷

From this rereading of Kristeva, the theories of semiology, deconstruction and 'intertextuality' of Barthes, Derrida and the Anglo-American 'Kristeva' emerge as much less accommodating of the other, as *other*. Strangeness, alienation and foreignness are not the Other, or other, but (an)other of the self, seen in cameo in Kristeva's own experience as translated into her works from *Semeiotikè* on. Clearly, there is then no epistemic 'break' between the two periods of her writing. Her personal positioning as Bulgarian émigrée and the alterity she discovered in her work in and through the medium of French, particularly her contributions to *French* linguistic, pre-linguistic and translinguistic theories, as well as her position *vis-à-vis* Russian Formalism, are what inform her theory, whether intertextuality as permutation, or disorders as reconstitutive of new productivity. Her own subject position as same and another through language that is and is not her own crystallizes the seme-analytical dialogue at work in text in general, whether mono- or multilingual. Similarly, writing as poetic language is a translation and trans-

formation (beside itself) of the negative–positive tow of language as ‘langue’, ‘parole’ and other texts. Moreover, *Semeiotikè* as blueprint for a ‘materialist gnoseology’ challenges science as meta-model for knowledge, by aligning ways of knowing by sojourning, encountering and passing on into text. Kristeva’s theory of intertextuality as permutation of texts, as her introduction of Bakhtin into France, is then best summed up as ‘strangers to ourselves’.³⁸ The author is not dead, but *in rememoriā*.³⁹ Otherwise, as the double erasure of ‘Kristeva’/Kristeva through translation or its lack has demonstrated, sexed, gendered and ethnically different bodies are all too easily dis-inherited by becoming de-unified subjects, or by being denied a signature. Kristevan intertextuality is therefore not a mosaic,⁴⁰ or a limitless web of deferred meanings, but a logical relationship of ‘X and/or not X’, an ‘an(d)other’. It is at the point of translinguistic permutability that borders are drawn even as they are crossed, because the trans-formativity of words within and between language(s) cannot but be at work together.⁴¹ Thus, while some of the same problems that have been charged against the intertextuality of ‘Kristeva’ as ‘mosaic of texts’ remain, as we will see below, there seems much in *Semeiotikè* that bears more than a second glance, however unpolished or tangential some of the rich fusion and interplay of ideas appear. In the concluding deliberations of the chapter we will weigh up the usefulness of Kristevan intertextuality as critical term now revised by our reading of *Semeiotikè* as a whole rather than as belatedly translated fragment. To do so, however, the ‘strangers to herself’ need first to be considered.

Barthes

If Kristeva opened intertextuality up to all its borders and permutations, Barthes and Riffaterre directly address its blind spots as theory of text as productivity. As Tilottama Rajan points out, such a conception:

requires us to posit this reader as an extratextual subject, even in cases where the text consciously inscribes itself as a reading. For such a text can reread the anterior corpus and can situate its own reading, but in order to make this situatedness dialectical, it is necessary that transposition also be conceived as a communicative transfer to a subsequent reader. The positing of a reader [. . .] is also a corollary of Kristeva’s failure to negotiate the problem of intention.⁴²

How both Barthes and Riffaterre reread and overwrite Kristeva in the 1970s, as Genette will also do later in 1982 (as chapter 3 more

fully investigates), brings us to a central issue of intertextuality however it is envisaged, the authority of quotations and citations. It is not only who signs them, but also who circulates them. The example to hand is the major part Kristeva played in Barthes's seminars in the late 1960s, which, like her coinage of intertextuality, is mentioned by critics (as Lechte above) only in passing. What is rarely questioned is her importance for Barthes's theory, rather than the reverse, and why and how hers has been suppressed. Aside from the availability or not of translations as contributory factor, it is the power of a certain authority (even though authors are 'dead' according to Barthes) as cult figure or familiar brand name that is the issue in the ensuing reassessment of Barthes's contribution to 'intertextuality', in both its semiotics and non-semiotics contexts. Some very strange Oedipal rivalries will be seen to be at work, and to play for, in Barthes's treatment of Kristeva.

One of the most 'authoritative' sites for definition and assertion is the dictionary or the encyclopaedia, and it was Barthes, not Kristeva, who provided the entry for 'Texte (théorie du)', in the *Encyclopédie universalis* in 1973. In the following sections taken from it, note the unmistakable echoes and reworkings of Kristeva's phrases, even plagiarisms if one has prior access to *Semeiotikè*:

The text is a productivity. Not in the sense that it is a product of being worked (as narrative technique or the mastery of style would demand), but as the very theatre of a production where the producer of the text and the reader come together: the text 'works' whenever and however it is taken up; even in written fixed form, the text does not stop working, or undertaking a process of production. The text deconstructs the language of communication, representation or expression [. . .] and reconstructs another language. [. . .] Every text is an intertext; other texts are present within it to varying degrees and in more or less recognisable forms. [. . .] Every text is a new tissue of recycled citations. Fragments of codes, formulae, model rhythms, bits of social discourse pass into the text and are redistributed within it. [. . .] The intertext is a field of anonymous formulae whose origin is rarely recoverable, of unconscious or automatic citations without speech marks.

This definition, with its subversive reworkings of what Barthes would see as 'public' language, offers in cameo 'his' theory of *text*. While it is blatantly similar to Kristeva's intertextuality, it is equally an overtly different graft of it. What results is that Barthes's formulation goes against the grain at precisely those points where direct lifting of Kristeva's words could be seen to occur. Barthes, therefore, subverts 'authority' even as he eschews authors to whom certain words can be attributed. The pressure point here is 'the theatre of production'

so that Barthes, as impresario, may rechoreograph the lines of the Kristevan script. That he is cognizant of it is, however, quite clear from his backhanded tribute in the revised foreword to the *Essais critiques* of 1971. The 'defraction' of semiology Barthes notes from 1967 onwards is illustrated in a list beginning with Derrida's writing ('livres'), the action of *Tel Quel* and last (and least?) the work ('travail' not 'livres') of Julia Kristeva.⁴³ It is against her work as labour that Barthes can derive an intertextuality of play. For those familiar with Kristeva's later *Pouvoirs de l'horreur* (1980), the very Oedipal work here is the 'abjectification' of the mother's body. Only by making this other can the child become separate. Thus, whether as the unrecorded voice from his seminar, or the overwriting of her 'mother' terms in the definition above, Barthes's sleight of hand makes her *work*, as labour in both senses, secondary. Similarly, *Le Plaisir du texte* (also published in 1973) trades her idea of 'writing aloud' as his grain of the voice.⁴⁴ It is by the elliptical use of Kristeva's 'phéno-texte' and 'géno-texte' that Barthes diverts her work on the polyphonic into the more performative and libidinous channels of his own. Thus, as theatre of the text of pleasure, *Le Plaisir du texte* (also quickly available in translation in 1975) elucidates inter-textuality as a theory of reading:

I savour the reign of formulas, the reversing of origins, the offhand manner in which the anterior text is made to come after the ulterior one. [. . .] A bit of Proust is what comes to me, not what I call on; it is not an 'authority', simply a *circular memory*. The inter-text is just that: the impossibility of life outside the infinite text – whether the text is Proust, the daily paper, or what's on TV: the book makes the meaning, the meaning makes life.⁴⁵

To pick up the all-important hyphen in Barthes's inter-textuality, the reader is not the absent mediator-translator as in Kristeva,⁴⁶ but body of mediation or medium for the text's effect or, more important for Barthes, affect to come into play. In Barthes, theatrical metaphors and similes abound, and his earliest essays dealt specifically with French theatre (*Sur Racine*, 1963), costume (*Système de la mode*, 1967), the staging of the persona (*S/Z*, 1970).⁴⁷ The drama of play in a variety of senses leaves its traces in this passage. Play is not causal or goal related, but impromptu, improper, unexpected pleasure and, on rare occasion, *jouissance*. It is outside the adult world of responsibility and 'authority' with its attendant patriarchal institutions, including the author.⁴⁸ It is also mime, dressing up in another's clothes, borrowing or being invaded by the other like a character by an actor. Dialogue is then taken up as the staging, the reiteration of

another's words, as one's own in reading. The reader is therefore no passive vehicle, or echo chamber, but the *reagent* of the text. Depending on how arresting, pleasurable, seductive the text is, a whole gamut of potential reactions could then occur, from quixotic, whimsical, perverse, blasphemous, philistine, erudite to bored and distracted like a child. Since there is no authority or intention to regulate this playtime or its responses, the writer becomes impresario, the one who stages in the text the possibility of its pleasure or *jouissance*.⁴⁹ As go-between of text and reception in the interval that is the inter-text, the writer remains apparent only by double trace as the spider implied by the web woven by *this* text.⁵⁰ Judgement of writing, a writer, or text in whatever form by the Barthesian reader will therefore necessarily be 'fickle', playful towards moral orders, aesthetic systems or ideological application. Only the affect or '*brio*' of a text, and at certain pitches, counts as laudable.⁵¹ Necessarily, such qualifiers put uppermost emotive response, entertainment, the arts of seduction (immediacy, fascination, repetition), and banish critical and impersonal criteria of taste (beauty), morality (the good) or correctness (truth). Barthes thereby neatly circumnavigates the old chestnut whether allusions or quotations in a text are intentional or non-intentional and therefore faithful or unfaithful to the original.⁵² This move also releases the reader from the stigma of not spotting either kind. The one-upmanship of successful source-hunting, the search for hidden references to, or influences on, the author's life or context are everywhere anathema and irrelevant for Barthes. Since authorities of any kind are actively disregarded, this theory cannot offer an ethics of reading, whether good or bad. Yet, the intellectual or the culturally highbrow text is then not demoted *per se*. If the reader finds it erotic or libidinous, it may provoke physiological or intellectual pleasure, *jouissance* and epistemophilia.⁵³

If Barthes's inter-textuality is then everywhere divergence and diversion, reader satisfaction with the text's seduction and siren call is of paramount importance.⁵⁴ Indeed, one of the key terms Barthes employs to describe this state is '*dérive*', usually translated as drift (as for ships off course, or continents).⁵⁵ Since it also means a diversion of a river, it usefully offers a direct negation of the concept of influence in two ways. First, like a piece of flotsam and jetsam fragmented from some former whole and floating at the limit of its potential undoing, the '*dérive*' is lack of fixity and direction. Second, it is a move going directly against the flow. As Bloom's 'anxiety of influence' in the next chapter will also demonstrate, the Barthesian '*dérive*' ultimately describes the very pleasure of the text going against the (Kristevan) grain, or writing aloud, with all the incestuous, Oedipal titillations of totem and taboo. What has not been noted,

however, is that such phonetic stereophony of articulation is made out of the skins of other texts.⁵⁶ While Barthes's move has been read as a kind of sexual politics, bringing what others label as the deviant into a wider 'theory' for all reworking of text, there are distinctly narcissistic and misogynistic undercurrents.⁵⁷ Not least, the stereophonic articulations of pleasure, whether of Proust, Bataille, Montaigne, Lyotard and many others, constitute an almost exclusively *male* chorus in *Le Plaisir du texte*. Unlike the use of the palimpsest (particularly by Genette, as we shall see in chapter 3), this scratching on others' 'vellum' is the desire to put one's mark on, and all over, it. Unlike a forger or plagiarist, Barthes is then everywhere a graffiti artist scribbling over the flaunted texts of others.⁵⁸ For too long his seductive analyses of advertising, with its affects and semi-aphoristic and fragmentary catchphrases that critics have upheld at face value, have not been applied back to Barthes's own writing as self-advertisement, even exhibitionism. It is not the other that counts but the bruise of the other's skin, which marks where the *self* has passed, invisibly visible.

The Barthesian model of the reader, chasing the pleasure principle through the most deviatory of routes, and playing with other texts in a cavalier or counter-directional manner, cannot therefore offer a paradigm for reader response theory, except perhaps one of reader irresponsibility.⁵⁹ Barthes's theory does, however, display the intertext's ludic function at its most performative, entertaining, entrancing, seductive, erotic or gratuitous. As one of art's oldest rationales for storytelling, entertainment including Barthes's spin on it ('plaire') cannot, however, ignore art's other rationale, to instruct ('instruire'). It is precisely this missing heuristic dimension that Riffaterre adopts as his, not least to distinguish his theories of reader response and intertextuality from Barthes's:

The implicit intertext must therefore be carefully distinguished from R. Barthes's concept of intertext [...] which proclaims the reader's freedom to associate texts at random, as dictated by his culture or personal idiosyncracies – a response by definition personal, shared with others only by chance: this is hardly the disciplined reading the text in its structured entirety demands of the reader; it hardly gives the text a physiognomy readers *must* agree on.⁶⁰

With stress here on discipline, concerted channelling of reader attention and coerciveness, is Riffaterre's version the serious unpleasuring and unleisuring of the text and its intertexts? Is his countenancing of textual directives a new didacticism? Or is Riffaterre's theory of textual self-discipline, surveillance and sanction another kind of eroticism of reading?

Riffaterre

Where the seductions and impostures of Barthes's inter-textuality of play have mostly generated positive critical response, Riffaterre's concerted and sober restoration of the (guided) reader to the text, and its intertexts, has elicited only faint praise.⁶¹ Bruce (1995) is among few French-speaking critics to have actively compared Kristeva's and Riffaterre's theories of intertextuality.⁶² However, Riffaterre's own bilingualism has gone unnoted, as, too, his very French training in close reading or 'explication de texte'. It is this context which is crucial to understanding Riffaterre's model for the intertext as *syllipsis* (as against Barthesian ellipsis). Syllipsis, the use of a single construction that has two syntactic functions, pinpoints Riffaterre's shared interests with Kristeva concerning the doubling of discourse that is poetic language on the one hand, and, on the other, their mutual regard for Saussure's fascination with anagrams. 'To perceive the text as a transform of an intertext is to perceive it as the ultimate word game, that is, as literary.'⁶³ While Kristeva takes up Saussure's original term, the paragram in the fifth essay of *Semeiotikè*, Riffaterre transmutes it as hypogram.⁶⁴ The main difference is that Riffaterre focuses on the 'perceiver' and language code-breaker (the reader), not on the accretive text. Almost more important, Riffaterre develops a theory of reading that foregrounds the various kinds of textual logic and binary matrices we discovered above in Kristeva's theory of intertextuality as productivity and permutation.

In contradistinction to play to derive pleasure (Barthes), Riffaterre sees game-playing as skilful decoding within complex sets of rules, leading to the delight of recognition, or the victory of successful negotiation of a textual maze.⁶⁵ What is so striking about Riffaterre's work is its none the less engaging and provocative qualities that align it much more with storytelling than with didacticism or dry criticism and theory. While Riffaterre's method is altogether that which Barthes most abhors, the Socratic,⁶⁶ Riffaterre's particular skill in 'explication de texte' is no less seductive, but intellectually and maieutically so. Reader attention is teasingly controlled so that s/he is led through the textual elements towards the 'plot' that links them differently from their purely grammatical connections.⁶⁷ It is primarily to the reading plot of poetry that Riffaterre attends, not narratives reliant on intricate plots and sub-plots, whether the serial realist or naturalist novel, formalist bricolage, postmodern collage, or prose sub-genres of intrigue such as the fairy-tale collection, mystery stories, detective fiction or the campus novel. For Riffaterre, poetry not only remains the most clearly framed genre by its long self-

exclusion from 'ordinary' prose language, it also 'expresses concepts and things by indirection. To put it simply, a poem says one thing and means another.'⁶⁸ It is 'indirection', the production of meaning by displacement, that solves Riffaterre's main concern regarding significance, which is not text in endless deferral or literature's mimetic representations of reality. It is, 'rather, the reader's praxis of transformation, a realization that it is akin to playing, to acting out the liturgy of a ritual – the experience of a circuitous sequence, a way of speaking that keeps revolving around a key word or matrix reduced to a marker.'⁶⁹ 'Intertextuality' names these markers, made visible to the reader of the poem as a whole by various 'ungrammaticalities' that belie them as a nexus of significations, not single lexical items. Included are the remodelling of poetic paradigms, conventions of versification, stock images and epithets (conceits and blasons), or rhetorical overdeterminations such as paronomasia (the playing out of meanings of words that sound alike), catachresis (the improper use of terms in a given context), anaphora (repetition of certain words in subsequent clauses, extended metaphors), syllepses (words pertinent to two or more registers), hypograms proper (puns, anagrams, homophones, homonyms) and symbols. In short, poetry is always 'anagrammatical', naming its artifice as 'already a stylistic structure, hot with intensified connotations, overloaded discourse'.⁷⁰

While thus also circumventing source-hunting or authorial intention as modes of criticism or interpretation, Riffaterre's *Semiotics of Poetry* (1978) is much more than a virtuoso reader response to some of the most complex and enigmatic poetry in French, the advocacy of high-cultural mastery, or example of master-reading.⁷¹ Riffaterre pinpoints the ambivalence present in Kristeva's intertextuality, that (all) writing is poetics or the literary translation of language, but foregrounds the adept reader as arbiter of what makes language poetry and not prose. To clarify both of these, Riffaterre looks not to increasingly hermetic, self-sufficient or self-referential poems, but to a genre no other theorist has properly tackled, the prose poem. Its interest for intertextuality is that it has indirection (lack of pre-determined frame), interpretative chiaroscuro dependent on 'ungrammaticalities' and readerly praxis; it has communicability yet remains ultimately a word game. In line with Riffaterre's understanding of significance above, it is the prose poem's move from prosaic form, representationality and mimetic delivery that openly reveals its anti-mimetic plot as such because it pushes even harder on its *prosody*.⁷² The reader sees (at least) two things at once, but can also interpret them analogously and with some certainty since the clues relate to the overall second-level interpretation. All the postmodern and deconstructive aporias, such as undecidability, irony or ambivalence, are therefore

not part of Riffaterre's theory of intertextuality since they constitute subjective responses. His intertextual syllepsis claims verifiability by intersubjective response: a number of readers will join up the dots and find a similar resulting pattern of *expansion* of meanings, not a limited pre-determination such as satire or allegory.⁷³ Unlike the postmodern text revelling in black holes and gaps, then, the prose poem opens towards plenitude since it also allows for subsequent and finer-meshed readings.

How can such refinements be evaluated? Rather than providing a solution to the problems in Kristeva's theory of intertextuality as permutation of texts, Riffaterre's theory of reader response is equally problematic. Prior knowledge, whether by readers or texts, remains the nub of a problem for intertextual research in general, and one which Worton and Still (1990) signal as primordial:

a text is available only through some process of reading; what is produced at the moment of reading is due to the cross-fertilization of the packaged material [. . .] by all the texts which the reader brings to it. A delicate allusion to a work unknown to the reader, which therefore goes unnoticed, will have a dormant existence in that reading. On the other hand, the reader's experience of some practice or theory unknown to the author may lead to a fresh interpretation.⁷⁴

Clearly the reader of the prose poem rather than prose requires a high(er) degree of intertextual experience and micro-attention to indirections and ungrammaticalities. S/he cannot then be some 'ordinary' reader, but a super-sleuth. While endless permutations (Kristevan intertextuality) exist hypothetically, particularization must be at work to overrule certain readings as arbitrary, subjective or nonsensical.⁷⁵ Riffaterre's reader is therefore no apprentice or youthful enthusiast, nor even someone highly informed in rhetoric or linguistics,⁷⁶ but a well-equipped reader formed in the school of accumulated experience of *reading*. Although Riffaterre calls such reader formation simply 'competence', his version of intertextuality as syllepsis is not merely experience of the *déjà lu*, but quantified and qualified by terms such as 'widely read', 'well-educated', 'erudite'.⁷⁷ His 'reader' is then also highly problematic as universal, or some transnational self outside the particularities of gender, race, class, creed.⁷⁸ Responsibility for such elements in the pattern arrived at is squarely returned to determinations within the text.⁷⁹ Riffaterre thus delimits intertextuality to a heuristic-hermeneutic grid where the reader traces threads in its web to find not a minotaur in the labyrinth of meaning, but resolution of consistent patterns. The last word of his chapter on the prose poem sums this up in true Socratic fashion. His is the theory of intertextuality as riddle, or logogriph.⁸⁰

Riddles and matrices, sieves and grids, however logical or mathematical (scientific) they may be, are not without their own specific cultural heritage. Riffaterre's method is not universal or singular. Although it shares much with New Criticism, it remains firmly, though not explicitly, rooted in a French education in 'explication de texte' and its application to canonical works. However, Riffaterre is a bilingual critic between the French and New Critical Schools, and his theory adds understanding of the role of the reader as transmitter and refiner of cultural transfer. For all its immediate charisma, Barthes's range by contrast is limited to intertextual play with very French samplers, even though they are taken from high and low culture, or appeal to the cultural snobbery of non-French speakers. Barthes's brilliance is then the choreography of the intertext as ephemeral and sensate, the white heat of pyrotechnics. Kristeva, behind this display, already saw the laws of 'translingua-physics', the particles and waves of the 'Big Bang' of (inter)textuality. Ever her matching opposite, Riffaterre then takes her to task by explaining the *nucleus*, or nexus, the 'text' in intertextuality.⁸¹ Unlike the monolingual Barthes, their bi- or trilingualism opens the 'inter-' and 'text' of intertextuality to properly translinguistic applications and dimensions. It is in these, however, that lie the shadowlands of communication practice. By looking now at speech and discourse rather than text and writing, the way will be paved to question in the remainder of the chapter how cultural hierarchies and their ideological frameworks reinforce fixity and pattern over instance, variation, improvisation and change.

Interdiscursivity

In what was the first of several 'second-wave' responses to theories of intertextuality in France from the 1960s and 1970s, Marc Angenot (1983a) offered a critical survey of its theorists and its workability as term.⁸² Not only was he among the first critics to highlight the far-reaching problems that intertextuality posed for textual criticism *per se*. He was also far-sighted in his appraisal of intertextuality's own critical future, as well as aware of other ideas in circulation concurrently with it:

The idea of intertextuality has come to trouble all sorts of epistemological schemas and vectors which connected the author to the work, empirical reference to expression in language, source to influence undergone, part to whole, code to performance and, in the text, to question its linearity and closure. [. . .] To all these models, inter-

textuality opposes a problematic of multiplicity, heterogeneity and exteriority which is, it seems to me, beyond certain misconceptions [. . .] the essence of *our* problem for years to come.⁸³

While eschewing notions of textual productivity, the fetishism of the text for itself or as system, and the ambivalence of multiplying and fragmenting the subject by a text-based revision of the notion of intersubjectivity, Angenot highlighted the positively oppositional forces of multiplicity, heterogeneity and exteriority that Kristeva's version of intertextuality demonstrates. Angenot's 'exteriority', which he does not in fact explore further, names what we found to be the 'an-otherness' and 'outside-ness' in *Semeiotikè*. Crucially, Angenot takes this same triad as blueprint for, and watershed between, Kristevan intertextuality and his own work within socio-criticism, not least that of J.-P. Faye. Because Angenot's article is not translated, and is thus rarely cited in Anglo-American criticism, its full force, and critical development as theory of interdiscursivity (Angenot, 1983b), is little known.⁸⁴ Multiplicity, heterogeneity and exteriorization are here returned to communication with the world, not to textual interrelationships. Thus, where Kristeva's *Semeiotikè* detached Bakhtinian dialogism from its communicative context to concentrate on the polyphony of poetic language, Angenot reattaches Bakhtin's 'heteroglossia' as *social* discourse to interdiscursivity, in order to highlight ideological manifestations and articulations. Ideological transmission is then the key problem for interdiscursivity, one overlapping with Barthes's interest in the semiotics of popular culture of *Mythologies* (1957), but without the loss of exterior points of reference. As Peter Nesselroth puts it, 'the framework of the argument has to be much broader, [. . .] the difference is not between ordinary *language* and literary *language* but between everyday *communication* and literary *communication*.'⁸⁵ Re-emphasis on social discourse automatically overturns the primacy of writing within deconstructive remodelling of Kristevan intertextuality to uncover another of its shadowlands, oral heritage. What distinguishes Angenot from theorists such as Walter Ong (1982), however, is advocacy of specifically social, rather than individual, universal or transcendental theorizations of literacy and orality.

The test of interdiscursivity as more than a variant of discourse analysis or speech-act theory is its application.⁸⁶ Donald Bruce has been Angenot's most concerted proponent, not least as his student, but as critic of intertextuality because it cannot accommodate ideological texts as such. Bruce's main work to date, entitled *De l'intertextualité à l'interdiscursivité: histoire d'une double émergence* (1995), overtly borrows key terms from Angenot's seminal article on

intertextuality (Angenot, 1983a). Following Angenot, it demolishes Kristevan intertextuality and its subsequent reworking by Riffaterre and Genette, before opening up interdiscursivity as theory and practice in the wake of Bakhtin. The case study is the tracing of the range of discourses that operate in the ideological, symbolic and socio-historical strands of Jules Vallès's trilogy set during the Paris Commune of 1871. Where Bruce diverges from Angenot, however, is his cavil with intertextuality, which he reads less as Kristevan than 'Kristevan' and postmodern.⁸⁷ By negating Angenot's positive evaluations of intertextuality's multiplicity, heterogeneity and exteriority, Bruce makes these weaknesses, against which the strengths of interdiscursivity are only made more manifest.⁸⁸ By emphasizing what makes discourses specific or performative in their interplay (interdiscursivity) within past and present history and culture, the lived aspect of change, including ideological counter-movements, can be countenanced.⁸⁹

Interdiscursivity, in short, recalls the Bakhtinian chronotope from its intertextual exile. This move, however, would seem to make of interdiscursivity but another variant (like Kristeva's intertextuality) of Bakhtin's concept of dialogism, albeit maintained firmly within socio-criticism. Bruce would then appear to be resorting to exactly the same revisionist tactics as Kristeva, but in order to reframe the Bakhtin of the later *Speech Genres* (1986). If this is the case, the further problem with interdiscursivity is that it seems to replicate Lachmann's earlier and arguably more sophisticated developments of Bakhtin in the 1980s in exactly the same directions, all of which Bruce seems unaware.⁹⁰ While Angenot's and Bruce's interdiscursivity then seems to have nothing to redeem or recommend it, let alone make it a rival term for intertextuality, it is its shift of emphasis that is all important. Where Bakhtinian dialogism concerns speech genres, it is mainly the manifestations of these as ideologemes and sociolects within literary and hence poetic language and text (especially the polyphonic novel) that is of primary focus.⁹¹ The proper aegis for interdiscursivity, on the other hand, is not experimental poetic texts, but communicative and often intersubjective discourses, as recorded for example in newspapers, tracts, recorded conversations, witness reports and documentaries. The tracking of ideology is a more specific task for interdiscursivity than in the work of Bakhtin or Kristeva. For Bakhtin, every speech-act betrays an *ideology* or ideologies issuing from individual speakers in the ideological context of a given dialogue. Kristeva revises Bakhtin's 'ideologeme' to see the production of text through intertexts as the diffusion of the *ideological*. Interdiscursivity is the concerted effort to probe and pinpoint the ideological dimensions of communication principally in its *intersub-*

jective interlocutory contexts, to ascertain and separate strands from their interconnections. It is thus concerned with a dynamic of contingent discourses and contexts, not merely contiguous ones. In so doing, interdiscursivity attempts to return cognition, the knowledge acquired by social dialogue and ordinary language as opposed to intellectual or 'book' knowledge, to the forefront of how meanings are conveyed. Interdiscursivity thus permits the separation of 'text' and 'discourse' from their often interchangeable or elided positions within intertextuality, both on the micro-level of individual linguistic samples and on the wider level of speech genres. By recognizing multiple social contexts of enunciation, interdiscursivity also firmly embraces meanings, or the third term, referentiality, that the binarist, Saussurian, linguistic model (and its related theories) actively rejects.⁹² Interdiscursivity can then say something about how discourse is actualized and can change, not least as retrospective or prospective possibility, whether as imagination, hypothesis, virtual or historical re-presentation of experience. This is not the infamous and maligned authorial intention, but the intentionality or orientation process of discourse that any grammatical sequence of tenses configures in everyday speech. Moreover, interdiscursivity's embrace of multiple meanings makes it amply able to accommodate explicit and implicit levels of interlocation, not least irony, sarcasm or humour. It can also examine speech-acts and oral traditions that may be prior to, or appropriated into, writing.

If interdiscursivity challenges intertextuality precisely where text replaced intersubjectivity, and can unpack historico-cultural particulars where intertextuality's synchronicity is unable to do this, it cannot, however, provide the same meta-level of interrogation as Kristevan or postmodern intertextuality, which easily accommodates 'ordinary' and 'poetic' language as 'text'. Whereas intertextuality accommodates genres connected to *durée* (myth, ceremonial, ritual, religion, poetry) interdiscursivity can only discuss *temps* (instances of mythic, ceremonial, poetic or other utterance) in specific socio-critical frames. Hence, however capable interdiscursivity is in identifying ideological discourses, it cannot scrutinize hidden prejudice or agendas behind such investigations. To put it simply, how can we know where the interdiscursive critic is situated *ideologically vis-à-vis* the ideologies under scrutiny? For interdiscursivity, then, part and partiality must ever be prioritized over the whole, or meta-critical, stance, a move that seems simply to reverse the allegedly impartial textual operations of postmodern intertextuality. The 'text' versus 'discourse' roots of intertextuality and interdiscursivity both transcend the other's limitations, but fail equally to transcend themselves. The prefix 'inter-' is perhaps the problem that frees and imprisons

them both. It is the meta-critical level of ideological scrutiny that is equally a problem for intertextuality (in whatever manifestation), for issues of gender, race, creed or class *prejudice* may go unnoticed not because they are excluded, but because they are always potentially included categories. An example will make the case. A feminist scholar can apply both intertextuality and interdiscursivity as methods to unpack patriarchal paradigms or discourses in a nineteenth-century novel penned by a woman. To speak of patriarchal hegemony, however, is outside the aegis of interdiscursivity, for ideologies and hegemony are indistinguishable concepts, requiring a further critical vantage point to separate them. Intertextuality, in the same vein, cannot distinguish the novel *per se* as feminist or non-feminist.

Interdiscursivity would, however, argue that such overview perspectives have never been its aegis. Rather, it is via interdisciplinarity that such meta-discursive and critical perspectives come into play, precisely to guard against and highlight disciplinary ideological bias, or intertextual misreadings, already caught up within their practices. Gender studies and postcolonial criticism are two powerful and competing interdisciplinary approaches that have found hegemonic theories of text wanting. We will now investigate interdisciplinarity to see if it is up to the task of discriminating between 'bad' or 'good' interdiscursivity, or intertextuality, and thus potentially able to surpass both as derivative and expendable critical terms.

Interdisciplinarity

As rival meta-critical and umbrella configurations, interdisciplinarity and intertextuality both operate by means of comparison, contrast and accumulation to produce new permutations and alignments. The manifestation of the synthesizing drives behind their 'inter-' prefix is of course possible only because of prior, and established, definitions of disciplines or kinds of text respectively. Albeit anti-humanist, post-modernism (as Kristevan intertextuality) shares the same humanist ideological heritage as the supra-humanist interdisciplinarity. Both eschew and reformulate the Enlightenment encyclopaedic, and nineteenth-century positivist, promise of some future universal science by instead stressing heterogeneity and recombination.⁹³ The world as either the playground of 'science' or anonymous 'text' can then be traced back to the role that nineteenth-century science and industrialization took on as arbiters of criteria for intellectual validation, disciplinary status or subsequent disciplinary subdivisions. Not

least, the established orders of knowledge of the eighteenth century were redefined. The faith versus reason categorizations of the eighteenth century, all-important for severing science cleanly from myth, and the devalued 'arts' such as literature, art and music were revalued by nineteenth-century rationalist inquiry. It was concerted investigation of world history, archaeology and non-European languages that spawned the social sciences, while from the reasoned study of comparative religions it was a short step to the burgeoning of anthropology and ethnography as distinct disciplines. Tocqueville, Gobineau and Freud among others provided a second path for the language of myth to be relabelled as 'sciences'. Psychoanalysis, structuralist linguistics, post-structuralism and deconstruction are but the latest versions of these language-orientated (human) sciences, where *scientia* (as knowledge) elides with the concept of (hard) science and programmed technology. While the next section will take up the importance of computer technology as a further means of removing discipline distinctions in the forms of the internet and hypertext as post-textual rivals of intertextuality, the methodological assumptions behind both intertextuality and interdisciplinarity as synthetic need first to be examined. What leverage does either have to reconfigure orders of knowledge?

The card that intertextuality holds to trump interdisciplinarity is comprehensiveness and inclusivity of constituent texts. As we have seen, intertextuality thus levels hierarchy between scientific and non-scientific, high- or low-cultural text. However, it is none the less the 'text' in intertextuality that largely delimits its methodologies to those of reading words (textuality), such as literature, history, philosophy, however hard it has tried to envisage 'text' as any kind of sign system, including numbers. Consequently there can be no outside of the text if language is its paradigm. Yet how this thinking can be done is problematic, since any such self-reflexive move requires some degree of transcendence of limits or reliance on metaphor where, strictly, any such *a priori* positions should be rejected. The logic of intertextuality certainly breaks down old boundaries concerning taxonomies of items, and can rearrange them, but it can make no value judgements *per se*. It can neither evaluate their efficacy nor assess alternative taxonomies for (positive) change or (more invidious) control. 'Good' intertextuality cannot then readily be determined from 'bad': it is quite simply summative, redistributive and relative.

Interdisciplinarity, on the other hand, has never displaced its humanistic core, only rethought it in the light of the shifting boundaries of individual human disciplines. While interdisciplinarity's bias has been towards the same scientific paradigms that largely determined the disciplines that preceded it, its concerns are less with

orders of things than with second-order modes of knowledge, that is the re-examination of how such frames of reference are drawn up in the first place.⁹⁴ Interdisciplinarity can then examine itself through its disciplines and also as 'meta-discipline', because its dynamic emerges from combinations not only of fields of knowledge, but of what determining methodologies pertained to prior individual fields. Consequently, any discipline is enabled to consider its methodological blind spots through reference to adjacent disciplines or interdisciplinary collaboration. By the same token, any discipline or interdisciplinary grouping can redefine how its methods and substance are discrete from others. Indeed, this 'how' may reveal previously hidden agendas within disciplines and their traditions within humanist and Enlightenment endeavour. As Julie Thompson Klein has pointed out, 'Interdisciplinarity and specialization are parallel, mutually reinforcing strategies. The relationship between disciplinarity and interdisciplinarity is not a paradox but a productive tension characterized by complexity and hybridity.'⁹⁵ The dynamic is played out between increased disciplinary specialization (greater specific methodological complexity) and increasingly complex integration and combination of methodologies (interdisciplinarity). Ultimately, interdisciplinarity has the potential to combine studies in the science of culture and the culture of science into one mega-discipline and thus to allow all disciplines to enjoy a greater self-validation outside old arts versus sciences dichotomies.

In terms of active promotion of second-order thinking, interdisciplinarity has clearly greater potential leverage than intertextuality to discriminate and arbitrate between practices, as well as evaluate outcomes of its work. As self-evaluative, its second-order thinking allows for self-corrective strategies either inwards to its disciplines or outwards to its interdisciplinarity. However, the very paradox that Klein discounts is extremely apparent here: inclusiveness for some is necessarily exclusiveness for others and cannot work in both directions equally or at once. This is because two second-order modes are confused. For sake of simplicity, let us call them quality and quantity. The theoretical power of both interdisciplinarity and greater discipline distinctiveness is further constrained by pragmatic limits on their power. These are the *institutional* structures that ultimately support and verify such second-order intellectual activity, whether disciplinary or interdisciplinary. The ideological assumptions behind these may be at odds with any changes at second-order level since these institutions are largely the very bodies that originally controlled the encyclopaedic or scientific projects of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries – universities, academies and societies. Hence, as

tertiary-level arbiters, and keepers of certain unquestioned ideological values, these bodies continue to determine the knowledge economy – what is or is not taught and transmitted, and to whom. They also arbitrate in the economics of knowledge by funding and promoting, or demoting, fields of study. Intertextuality as inclusive study of ‘all text’ therefore presents no marketable field of study for itself and so is reabsorbed in the conventional practices and individual disciplines it sought to overturn. It has unsurprisingly as yet to emerge in the context of the hard sciences from which so much of its rationale is drawn. Interdisciplinarity, because methodologically and economically more robust – it is collaborative, competitive, dynamic, often also highly dependent on computer literacy, innovative, responsive to complex forms of knowledge – fares better, but is none the less delimited because too dangerously collaborative. In its ideal, meta-disciplinary, form, interdisciplinarity also poses too much of a challenge to institutions both financially and conceptually, not least because it questions by its second-order remit their very operational rationale. The economics of institutional power – funding, profitability, marketability of the outcomes of research – thus overrides any ‘pure’ motivation for interdisciplinarity as principle. Yet as label to enfold newer disciplines that would otherwise remain homeless within the institutional structure, interdisciplinarity provides a ready way of administering such studies so as to window-dress the institution’s modernity, while at the same time leaving its (hard) core untouched. Interdisciplinarity is therefore embraced to maximize knowledge production, but is refused support in terms of institutional organization or recruitment.⁹⁶ Indeed, for many ‘pure’ researchers, and not only in the sciences, interdisciplinarity represents a double burden (quality and quantity of specialist expertise), which spells the end not only of individual disciplines, but ultimately of interdisciplinarity as well.⁹⁷ Institutions such as the university therefore incorporate interdisciplinarity as paradigm for modern, efficient knowledge production, yet justify and financially underpin their nineteenth-century ideological legacy by continuing to sustain and support a hierarchy of disciplines. ‘Chalk and talk’ subjects (text) lose out to laboratory-based disciplines (numbers and machines), even though new technologies in mixed (interdisciplinary) fields such as the social sciences, modern languages and, latterly, media and gender studies undermine such neat and old-fashioned teleologies. Contrary to its theoretical aims, interdisciplinarity paradoxically is of greatest use not to second-order knowledge, but to institutions to ground divisive, hierarchical, undemocratic and utilitarian value systems in a market-driven knowledge economy.

Intertextuality and interdisciplinarity both fail, then, to provide a meta-critical frame to discuss connections, not between media ('text') or disciplines, but between these and power. Intertextuality fails first and therefore fails less as tool to disarm hegemony (in whatever form) since it cannot appraise it in the first place. Interdisciplinarity promises and delivers more, but is disarmed because it provides ammunition to the very enemies it would seek to overcome. Where intertextuality denies agency in any form from the outset, interdisciplinarity finds too late that it is a double agent, as potentially revolutionary as it is reactionary, depending on whose hands hold the purse strings.

Initial, optimistic response to intertextuality and interdisciplinarity as salvific, 'postcolonial' terms quickly deflates before economic reality. At best they may both be recognized as localized configurations of late twentieth-century forms of knowledge fledged by post-modernism. At worst, hybridity as value (the 'inter-' prefix) has, like others, a shelf life before it implodes as too vague and catch-all a term (as some deem intertextuality) or becomes the dynamic of a new territorialism.⁹⁸ In the final analysis, interdisciplinarity can ask hard questions about discursive practices and determine prejudice or imbalance for interdiscursivity. In examining discipline boundaries, interdisciplinarity can also flush out the occluded economic motives in the gap between theory and practice. What this then spearheads is the necessity to address this gap before various orthodoxies are fuelled, whether economic arguments within institutions or exclusionist, purist rationales within academies. Outside its brief, interdisciplinarity cannot take control over how institutional power can be turned from such outcomes, or legislate against future abuses of such power. '[T]he structures that organize how we know are not eliminated by interdisciplinarity, but relocated.'⁹⁹ Is it in what was relocated by the scientific method prior to any reorganization of sciences by interdisciplinarity that the answer lies? Are the shadowlands to both of these post-Enlightenment forms so-called esoteric domains of knowledge – astrology, alchemy, wisdom literature – precisely because their modes of understanding (prophetic vision, revelation, inspiration) challenge the empiricism of the Enlightenment project and its university? By its necessary inclusiveness, intertextuality can at least put texts from 'aberrant' fields back on the map. Can the wizardry of digitalization then recall them, as ethnography did religious rite, so that structural anthropology could become a forerunner of intertextuality itself? The final part of this chapter turns to the 'magic' of computer-generated text as 'pure' *techne* to find out, and to assess how intertextuality as term then fares alongside hypertext and the web as allies or rivals.

Internet and hypertext

There is no doubt that new computer technologies have revolutionized knowledge transfer and its textual and disciplinary categories. Digital media, as postmodern intertextuality, are inclusive of all forms of 'text', encouraging free play and maximum circulation. Indeed, this mobilization has permitted popular forms not only to be fully inserted into cultural production, but to enjoy equal status with the highbrow. Similarly, new technologies have spearheaded interdisciplinary activity to an unprecedented degree. It could even be argued that, under the auspices of information technology, the previously polarized arts and (hard) sciences are but part of one mega-discipline, the social sciences. The worldwide web also circumnavigates institutional control and censorship at local levels due to global access to electronic materials and internationally available means to explore them. Gone, too, is elitist ownership of knowledge by only the rich or the educated. Does this elitist ownership in fact include intertextuality and interdisciplinarity, so that their electronic versions will replace them?

As powerful research tool and metaphor, the internet has often been compared to intertextuality as tissue of texts (Barthes) because of their similarly connective structures.¹⁰⁰ Yet electronic inclusiveness and facility with textual manipulation makes both postmodern intertextuality and Kristevan intertextuality as permutation pale by comparison. Automatically, microchip makes 'translatable' every branch of human understanding and its textual productions since the interstices and interface between domains of knowledge are no longer relevant concepts. In terms of information range, speed of access and ease of update, electronic media outstrip the reach of print forms. Such democratic and instantaneous production, reproduction, dissemination and reception thus make potentially for global dialogue, and for expansion of knowledge both quantitatively and qualitatively. Indeed, as Caxton with his printing press before him, Tim Berners-Lee set up the worldwide web specifically as a democratic way of maximizing knowledge by linking people, cultures, information, data, without the need for specialized education. In short, he envisaged an electronic extension to the summa of all dictionaries, encyclopaedias and specialist studies by means of a gadget with small financial and learning cost and spanning the whole gamut from ordinary to extraordinary users, from the computer as pastime or research tool.

As with any instrument, its test is its practicality as well as usefulness. With microchip facilitation of programming and information storage, knowledge availability depends on access to powerful enough

computers and computer memory. As with interdisciplinarity, the one limit is then economic. Powerful super-computers or portable power-books are expensive, and rely on connections to information super-highways to be of most benefit.¹⁰¹ In comparison to the eulogistic arguments proffered by early hypertext advocates and exponents, James Annesley has rightly pointed out more nefarious, even dystopian, aspects caused by the internet and IT. His concern is the creation of new social divisions ‘between the technology haves and the have nots. The feared result is an “outernet”, a “cyberghetto” inhabited by the “datapoor” [and] a new era of intensified surveillance [a] networked panopticon [. . .] able to monitor and punish deviance with an unseen rigour and efficiency.’¹⁰²

Like postmodern intertextuality, electronic hypertext and the internet operate to counter notions of origination and nefarious authority. Like intertextuality, the term ‘hypertext’ was also coined in the late 1960s (1967/8), by T. H. Nelson, and enjoyed an equally rapturous initial reception as liberating and inclusive. Nelson’s term should immediately be distinguished from Gérard Genette’s imitative revamp in 1982 of Kristeva’s, to which we will return in chapter 3.¹⁰³ Genette’s is firmly print-text based and of specialist usage, whereas Nelson’s is electronic, subsumes print text, and is largely common currency. (Nelson’s) hypertext merely develops the status of ‘text’ that is intertextuality’s motor through digitalization. The vocabulary central to hypertext endorses this delightfully: electronic *documents* (including facsimile manuscript) of all kinds are *scrolled* within frames and manipulated by the functions that were central to scribal reproduction and production of new works, copying, cutting and pasting other’s texts. We shall be examining in the third and fourth chapters how paradoxically close are hypertext procedure and older forms of imitation and their copy-transmission processes. At the same time, however, hypertext and the web reveal the shadowlands or traces of intertextuality’s conceptual base as in fact lodged in the ideology of writing and the printed book. Whatever effort Derrida and others have made to make possible a non-representational account of signs, hypertext trumps these by being the simulacrum of postmodern theory itself.¹⁰⁴ As the experimental texts of the surrealists and *nouveaux romans* as boxes of unpaginated sheets tried unsuccessfully to do, hypertext does so by simply erasing the page.¹⁰⁵ By removing print text’s fundamental boundary and format, hypertext challenges two key ordering principles in the logic of print and its theories: firstly, the (hierarchical) status of main text to note, foreword, title or index is removed; secondly, the (authoritative) order of reading the page and manipulating what comes where in textual reception is subverted. Hypertext can then also handle the

most complex of *hypermedia* interactivity in ways that the Romantic *Gesamtkunstwerk* only dreamed of. Moreover, through hard-drive *memory* (a further scribal prerequisite) hypertext economically solves the biggest problem of all, the enormity and cost of procuring, buying and storing millions of pages, tapes, films, scores, CD-ROMs, etc., or retrieving one from such a collection. In its resources and resourcefulness, hypertext takes the triad 'multiplicity', 'heterogeneity' and 'exteriority', variously developed by Angenot and Kristeva, and transforms it as 'virtual texts', 'intercultural discourses' and 'users'.

This hypertext triad, then, returns reception and communication-orientated frameworks such as interdiscursivity and interdisciplinarity visibly to the equation. The hypertext triad, however, makes clear distinction between 'user' and 'reader' (in the sense both of person reading and anthology). In so doing, it again challenges ideologies of writing and text, not least Barthes's or Riffaterre's versions of intertextuality dependent on reader response, whether deriving pleasure from or bringing acumen to the text. Hypertext has no ideal, intellectual, highly self-conscious or pleasure-seeking user in view. Surfers may be in any of these categories or merely dabblers. Hypertext thus conjures the ordinary or general user from the shadowlands of print-generated culture, whether high or popular, since the qualifications of expert or competent literacy need not pertain. Clicking is even less taxing than two-finger typing or holding the pen.

However positive are the landmark contributions of the web, video or hypertext to the late twentieth-century global media revolution, no revolution, however virtual, is bloodless.¹⁰⁶ What does the double shift to virtual reality and its representations cover? The first answer to this ambiguously framed question is not negative and does not run contrary to the initial, utopian, educational vision of Nelson or Berners-Lee. The entry of reader or user to the screen of non-hierarchized material in the hypertext mosaic or web is by default the very energy of possibility which prevents any form of closure occurring, regardless of competence or interactivity. For the more academic or knowledge-agile user, response will be more positive to this plethora of choice where any word or image will have links to a more complex network of contexts which shape and inform it: historical, sociological, political, linguistic, national, generic, each of which open out centripetally and can themselves be chosen as the main, rather than subsidiary, path forwards. For less gymnastic users, sheer information overload, and the maze of pathways available, may present not a theme park experience, but a nightmare vortex. Given the exponential nature of hypertext linkage, the provision of orientation, assistance and exit links are recognized as

essential features of good web design, and as ways of facilitating user competency.¹⁰⁷

The cover is now blown, however, on the previously hidden controls and manipulations behind any web or hypertext design and its usage. Links or linking do not happen spontaneously, and are therefore not as fortuitous, innocuous or free as a user might first believe.¹⁰⁸ As the spider lures the fly, the power of the visual capitalized by advertising is magnified by electronic visual media, and rapidly becomes harnessed for economic gain, either by general 'consumer engineering', as Black terms it,¹⁰⁹ or for more nefarious trading, of pornography, arms or official secrets. Moreover, access to sites is not unlimited. Given the ease of copying, cutting and pasting inherent in electronic text manipulation, copyright law, originally devised for print text, has had to evolve to cover legitimate design, and to counter negative user activity such as illegal copying, counterfeit sampling or versioning. And the new acts of bloodless electronic terrorism are computer hacking or sabotage of a site, where the changing of crucial details may be more detrimental than the putting up of bigoted materials. As at once unifying means for all, digitalized text in all its forms is none the less divided as to its ends, reduced to the old cliché 'pure', or 'applied', but in a double helix. If essentially set up as media applied for profit, hypertext and the web will inevitably be developed along certain, not all, pathways and the richness of expanding inter-hypertextual diversity will be threatened. As purest, and most ecological, form of technology to date, IT as artificial intelligence and the creation of super-computers stand to eliminate the messy applications of the human altogether, whether as mind or matter. Such Manichean dreams surpass even the anti-metaphysical limits of late postmodernism.

Ends, aims or intentionality were the *bête noire* of Barthesian and postmodern intertextuality, to be removed for good by the death of the author and the assurance that there was nothing outside the text. Yet intention is the one question that splits artificial intelligence research and philosophy of mind.¹¹⁰ By getting behind the hype of the 'hyper-' in hypertext, intention also provides an evaluative way of questioning the aims and objectives of the electronic media revolution as also deceptive, or exaggerated. In an unprecedented way, this evaluative role falls to the 'user' as strategic, both within the system and as the producer or employer of it. More than was required of the responsible (or irresponsible Barthesian) reader in the intertextual labyrinth of print texts, the hypertext or internet user is required to be a guarantor and arbiter of 'good' usage. Behind seeming serendipity or play lie choice, preference and decision. These imply a combination of utilitarian and non-utilitarian value systems,

not least ethical and aesthetic. If the proper etymology of ‘hyper-’ meaning ‘in excess’ is recalled, the initial euphoria surrounding hypertext and postmodern intertextuality can be ‘de-hyped’ to weigh the relative achievements of electronic and print texts. The issue is then not the battle of the Moderns and the Ancients in new guise, computer versus print-text advocates, but the pinpointing of a scale of quality applicable to both. To choose canonicity or heritage already militates against newer media: criteria of relevance or accessibility stack the odds against older works. Equally, aesthetic or ethical value may depend more on temporal or national parameters and contexts. A more universal value system is to rate quality as the job hypertextuality and intertextuality perform at their best – extension of knowledge. How do hypertext and the web fare in distinguishing search and research as tasks and users as searchers or researchers?

In non-fictional texts, the table of contents and index are the equivalent of the electronic ‘search’ facility, where as yet, although Boolean searching can be sophisticated, there is no ‘research’ button. As with print texts, electronic searching works effectively only within a well-constructed, multi-use system, and only as well as the pertinence of the search question asked. Searchers of print and electronic resources ask questions that pertain primarily to information gathering or verification. If few direct answers or ‘hits’ are generated, searchers become researchers, asking lateral or other ‘how?’ and ‘why’ questions of the text or site, not least *via* other bibliographical and proper name links. To ask such questions, however, the researcher will need prior general and specialist knowledge to gauge whether particular responses are irrelevant, incomplete or ambiguous, or if the initial search question asked was too complex or requires modification. Due to multiple links to other sites, electronic searching has one perceived advantage over certain print texts – range. This may, however, have the counter-productive result of throwing up a longer list of irrelevant ‘hits’. To determine relevant from irrelevant, reader/user sophistication and familiarity with multiple contexts are essential to whatever medium.¹¹¹ In neither print nor electronic media, therefore, can simple word strings be the basis of more complex research. A test case is how ideological import, irony or parody can be ascertained in a given word string. As with translation, much more context will be required than finding all instances in a document of one word or word group. Theories of text, including intertextuality, deal with all these without difficulty since it is the paragraph or page which is automatically and unconsciously called upon. Indeed, postmodernist texts have taken irony to highly sophisticated levels, as magic realism has offered a powerful critique of oppressive regimes.

Another unquestioned assumption about electronic media is that, because they are immediate (up-to-date), information available on screen is somehow more accurate or unbiased than in (fixed) textual forms. What is forgotten, probably because sites are often anonymous, is that behind any material put up on the web, or included by links, lies the constructor, who fulfils exactly the same functions as the author or writer of a print text. S/he is responsible for selecting materials and presenting them in particular ways. It is the reader's memory, knowledge or interest which collates and sorts contents and form. Hypertext usage and its user are not essentially different. What is perhaps more invidious for searchers in internet sites as opposed to print-text-based ones is that poor quality, fallacious or out-of-date information will be less apparently indistinguishable from pertinent, correct, well-researched material. Print texts all have copyright dates: electronic sites do not always inform the user when they were last updated. It then falls to more sophisticated user-researchers to validate or correct false information because of access to other specialist resources not only *for themselves*, but also for subsequent general users of that site.

Ultimately, then, the 'user' of any medium is not merely an epistemological adjunct, enabling the extension of information (searcher) or knowledge (researcher), but is its quality controller. Accuracy (truth), fair or prejudicial presentation (ethical standards) and major flaws (aesthetic and moral values) such as missing texts or approaches (links) must all be evaluated. Print-text-based researchers have long undertaken such roles and published their re-evaluations. Hypertext research, due to its speed and immediacy, operates in a much shorter time frame. While this is advantageous for rapid updating, it is even more detrimental to material deemed 'irrelevant', and hence not included in the site.¹¹² As Gaggi remarks, 'For a *text* to be excluded from hypertext is likely to be even more crippling than its being excluded from the "canon" as presently constituted. The ease and speed of navigating between texts embedded in hypertextual networks has its flip side, a tendency to ignore texts that are not included, as if they did not exist at all.'¹¹³ Only a specialist hypertext researcher can make good this gap, and, preferably, also check necessary links from any insertion to its site, and related ones. In strangely existentialist vein, then, the choice whether to change or ignore erroneous or biased electronic information is weightier than for print-text researchers, since obligation to users is more pressing in numerical and qualitative terms. The knowledge and information economies of electronic media therefore show no inherent advantage over print media, either to users or in their usefulness. For all its alleged democracy and openness, virtual reality

and information technology paradoxically throw up the need for even greater 'censorship', but of the unreliable and the irrelevant. A website's authority in contents and presentation stops with the person of the expert as constructor and user. More than was betrayed by intertextuality, justice and truth in hypertext cannot be disconnected from utility or pastime. The now uncovered hidden agendas thus return some very old, humanist questions. Should poets and philosophers be part of good knowledge government? What is hypertext ultimately for, and for whom?

While cyberfiction already explores electronic hypermedia as dystopia and utopia,¹¹⁴ their presence is set to expand, not contract. If this is not to be an increasingly barren, uniform or utilitarian knowledge environment, strategic lessons from print culture need to be incorporated into web and hypertext design. Models do not, however, have to begin with the ideal of all-inclusiveness, like some super-scanner system indiscriminately hoovering up and storing all texts.¹¹⁵ More discerning models already exist and therefore offer good precedents to hypertext. As the fourth chapter will more fully explore, the literary translator is one such model of the kinds of encyclopaedic and specialist knowledge required by a hypertext designer.¹¹⁶ Electronic hypertext has indeed proved particularly successful in mounting texts, variants and 'parallel' translations. The past, especially pre-Enlightenment texts and ways of thinking, can also furnish alternative models. Some of the most innovative hypertext sites – on the Bible, the classics, Shakespeare, medieval studies – build precisely on long-established, textual and interdisciplinary research traditions, including translations.¹¹⁷

It may, in fact, be pre-printing press cultures, which were as multi-cultural and diverse as postmodern ones, and their *summa* library fictions recorded on scrolls, that have most to teach and challenge electronic hypertext, especially at the interface between oral and scribal heritage. While hypertext will be significant in restoring pre-print materials to hard-drive memory, oral-scribal heritage questions how human memory works, not least its principles of storage, recognition and retrieval. As Douglas Hofstadter says, 'It is the organization of memory that defines what concepts are.'¹¹⁸ Machine memory may in fact not be an analogue of human memory, or its organization, as is evident in machine-memory users of hypertext. They frequently become disorientated, fail to rediscover digressions made previously, or cannot ascertain how to plot their position back to wider maps, not least because print and electronic information recovery has made active memory lazy. Oral heritage memory is altogether active, although it still needs signposts and recognized markers to guide listeners towards further complexity of plot or ideas. Epics,

virtuoso mnemonics, mythical poem cycles, aboriginal song lines, dramatic repertoires in a number of cultural heritages all suggest the richness of memory and its value. In its recovery of pre-print vocabulary such as 'scrolling', electronic hypertext also needs to 're-member' the context of the original adepts of scroll and codex cultures, and how they solved the problems of being 'walking libraries'.¹¹⁹ Exceptional memory was actually only one of several important skills that constituted true critical acumen and good 'librarianship'. Adepts (like hypertext expert arbiters) had to discern cultural value, discriminate real from fake texts, and provide a back-up system should retrieval fail (by fire, or pure geography), as well as locate items of knowledge in contexts seemingly unrelated to the problem in hand. As they were often specialist collectors across vast areas of knowledge that included bizarre rarities and arcania, theirs was not a role of knowledge censorship. Unlike the isolated academic scholar-bibliophile or scientific genius of post-Enlightenment models, these scholars worked in community, as part of schools. It was group debate that was the 'search engine' to channel thematic, generic, lexicographical, linguistic, analogical, rhetorical and other questions, to enable and reactivate the mind of each contributor. By 'scrolling' his [*sic*] personal memory and collection of papyri, and collective readings, an agreed wisdom on the matter in hand was arrived at and then recorded on a new papyrus, which might indeed begin with sophisticated *lemmata* and *capita rerum*, prefiguring Renaissance commonplace books.¹²⁰ The process of corporate assembly was thus self-correcting of human error and half-memories or intuitions, as well as receptive to more diverse approaches and multiple perspectives. Athenaeus was an exemplar and embodiment of the walking library re-created as a new text, the *Deipnosophistae*.¹²¹ Yet this is no encyclopaedia or encomium of scholarly pursuits or of knowledge in the library of Greek culture and its scrolls (as proto-hypertext). It is primarily a creative composition about a banquet, with all the (pre-Barthesian) pleasure and seduction, humour and playfulness, that lie outside the treatise (*magnum opus*) or reconstruction of cultural fragments (postmodern hypermedia). Athenaeus' fiction combines virtuoso cultural and mental performance, entertainment and paedictics, organization by complex thought and playful combination of ideas, while losing nothing of the specifically Alexandrian and Greek cultural context and its expectations. This is therefore no digest or consumer text or modern 'reader'. It distinguishes itself by being truly a *hyper-text* in its Greek order of excess, in the superfluity, abundance and profligacy of banqueting as metaphor for a joyful sharing of knowledge. In the era of late-capitalist consumer culture, there are telling lessons here, then,

concerning the ‘aims and objectives’ of hypertext and the role and acumen of its compositor. There are also morals of the story. Possessive or passive consumption of information may lead only to knowledge obesity or regurgitation. It is the combined pleasure and exercise of a mind fed on a very mixed diet of things, not least of familiar and unfamiliar ‘foods’ for further thought. As Proust so readily reminds his readers, memory is active and human, at the place between fiction and desire, experience and imagination, poetry and history, science and the world, *techne* and creativity.¹²²

The researcher-constructor of hypertext is then not without models in the new Alexandria, which may be less the successor of the old than a belated recuperation of the latter’s adept handling of knowledge. Unless such acquisition of learning, the celebration of extensive and eclectic scholarship, from ‘old’ schools of memory, is combined with information technology, the transformational, communicational aspects of active knowledge transfer will be lost. Hypertext is therefore not some huge electronic memory storage bin, or a non-canonical form to replace elitist print forms of thinking culture and its works.¹²³ Neither should it be envisaged as serving some memorial function, to preserve or store ‘dead’ text, but leave it relatively inaccessible on the outer reaches or links.¹²⁴ Rather its ideal task is to extend and deepen the impetus of pre- as well as post-Enlightenment knowledge accumulation, so as to uncover the elitisms and hegemonic exclusions exonerated by the ‘scientific’, technological and postmodern theory age. In these functions, then, hypertext and the web are media, not methodological, variations of Kristeva’s intertextuality. Textual strategies have not been superseded, only reprocessed. Kristeva’s emphasis on the work of intertextuality also applies to hypertext, to ensure the necessary permutation, heterogeneity and outsider–insider awareness of cultural productions for their future.

* * *

In the particular debates and history of intertextuality as upheld by critical readers and guides, the case of ‘Kristeva’ (in English and in French) spearheads some salient and wider questions for this chapter and this book. From close readings of Kristeva’s text on intertextuality in the original French, it is now clear that her double erasure through translation and French philosophical tradition puts in wider context some of the ways in which sexed, gendered and ethnically different bodies are disinherited by becoming de-unified subjects, not least through critical reception.¹²⁵ It is also clear in the light of Barthes’s or Riffaterre’s versions that Kristeva’s is the more mal-

leable, and suitable for remanipulation in electronic hypertext or other media from its premise of translinguistic transfer. Indeed, the ways in which 'intertext' or 'the intertextual' are used in common parlance are precisely those glossed by Kristeva herself at the end of *Semeiotikè*:

Intertextuality: supplants intersubjectivity; intersection of utterances taken from other texts; transposition in speech communicative of previous or synchronic utterances; polyphonic text; multiplicity of codes levelling out one another; removal revives and destroys discursive structures outside the text.¹²⁶

There is much, however, for hypertext designers to learn from the strategically different spin put on Kristeva's term by Barthes and Riffaterre, not least how the user may respond (or not). In the era of the sound byte, a bored, disaffected, narrowly focused user or the super-nerd need both to be considered, if not encouraged to play or learn more extensively within the site. At the same time, the challenge to intertextuality brought by interdiscursivity and interdisciplinarity by Angenot, Bruce and others reveals the blind spots in all postmodern theories based on relative meanings or kinds of meaninglessness. The return of the chronotope and the politics of meaning-making we uncovered in the often conservative institutions upholding interdisciplinarity also apply to deconstruction, and where it has been permitted to sit *within* the academy. As subsequent chapters will explore, reaction and counter-reaction (or Kristevan 'levelling out') prove to be the perennial motor of intertextuality, whether dressed as recycling, influence, imitation or reinvention, or the emperor's new clothes. Reiteration and repetition in 'other' words seem quintessentially part of the reformulation process that any cultural generation engages in. Kristevan intertextuality, if perhaps among its most complex theorizations, when distilled to its permutational motor, says no more than the old adage 'there is nothing new under the sun'.¹²⁷

The vogueish and modish, as Barthes highlights, are backwash and swash of a necessary cultural consumerism, and are not without a certain, and subversive, fascination.¹²⁸ They are also essential to the critical machine: 'the new and vogueish "intertextuality" has served as a generational marker for younger critics who end up doing very much what their elders do with "influence" and its partners like "context", "allusion" and "tradition".'¹²⁹ The urgent question that hypertext raises is what happens when technological speeding up of such recycling ('inter-hypertextuality') increases? Can virtual media really generate completely new cultural forms? The New Alexandria

has a lot to lose if it fails to address textuality's heritage in its fullest translanguag, and transcultural, imagination.¹³⁰ It will create its own future only by faithful and hence unfaithful 'translation' of what has gone before.

This brings us full circle to Kristeva's introduction of *her* version of Bakhtin to Paris. Her transposition of his key ideas demonstrates the complexities of following and deviating from any text or precursor, and how any successor's contribution is never a new idea but a reinterpretation. Critical guides and 'readers' are also not exempt, although they purport to maintain fair representation, as Lear towards his daughters. Because blinded by deconstructive and postmodern premises, not least the metaphor of language as text, Kristeva and other theorists have been sidestepped, thereby leaving the all-inclusive middle of *intertextuality* as much these theories' aporia as their meta-critical structure. In the case of Kristeva, however, we have shown the more positive principle of the shadowland in action. Exclusion by default (lack of translations) or uncritical, even misguided, appraisal of the received 'canon' keeps the outsider firmly on the outside. This is, however, exactly where *intertextuality* may begin, like Cordelia, to speak again, in spite of her rival sisters, the 'inter-' terms interdisciplinarity and interdiscursivity.

Intertextuality, then, shows a tenacity for the critical present, but also hints of a strong survival rate, proved through textual time, but in different guises. Because it has already been fractured and pulled in different and conflicting directions since it was 'coined', it may prove to be of most use as a primary identifier, of text-to-text or reading-to-reading relationships and the complex transmissions at work in text and reading in the first place. From identification must come clarification, as Lear also reminds us, for its secondary and fuller implications to emerge. The remainder of this book will examine these as existing but shadowland vocabularies, conceptual and critical terminologies that will ground aspects of *intertextuality* as their loftier sweep. Occlusion of the past is the necessary enlightenment of the present. It is to influence that we now turn as concept that *intertextuality* most had to inter to answer Susan Friedman's pertinent questions: 'Does the "birth" of *intertextuality* as a critical term insist upon the "death" of influence as its conceptual precursor? Is the "death of the author" as writer the precondition for the "birth" of the critic as reader?'¹³¹