Part IV Culture and Identity

Chapter 15

Nationalism

John Agnew

The best definition of nationalism I have been able to find comes from the historian Robert H. Wiebe (2002: 5), who wants to avoid demonizing nationalism (as is typical among many contemporary intellectuals) but nevertheless take it seriously as a powerful political sentiment and program in the modern world: "Nationalism is the desire among people who believe that they share a common ancestry and a common destiny to live under their own government on land sacred to their history." It is, therefore, the most territorial of political ideologies based on cultural beliefs about a shared space occupied by a kin-like, ethnic, or affinity group who face common dangers and bring to these a social bond forged through the trials and tribulations of a common history brought about by a common geography. The very space occupied by the group is seen as part and parcel of the group's identity in a way that is not the case with the major political ideologies with which nationalism has competed over the past 200 years or so: liberalism and socialism. When economic transactions are powerfully contained by state boundaries, nationalism gains a material basis that the other ideologies lack and which makes them ever vulnerable to collapsing into a nationalist form. It is no coincidence, therefore, that much socialism has been of the "national" or "in-one-country" varieties and that liberalism is usually hedged by claims about individual rights, property claims, and trade relationships that are enforced and defended by national states. Nationalism has benefited immeasurably from its alliance with states, but this has also led to its greatest excesses.

Writing about nationalism is fraught with intellectual and political dangers. On the one hand, there is a tendency to diminish nationalism because of the presumed intemperance it has generated in modern politics or the seemingly irrational challenge it poses to preferred brands of liberalism or socialism. On the other hand, there is a tendency to celebrate it as a means for groups subordinated by others to "liberate" themselves or to see it as reflecting deep-seated or primordial attachments to group and territory that provide "roots" in an otherwise chaotic and disturbing world. The political theorist John Dunn (1979: 55) captures this duality to nationalism eloquently when he writes:

> Nationalism is the starkest political shame of the twentieth century, the deepest, most intractable and yet most unanticipated blot on the political history of the world since the year 1900. But it is also the very tissue of modern political sentiment, the most widespread, the most unthinking and the most immediate political disposition of all at least among the literate populations of the modern world.

Consequently, ignoring it is as dangerous as mindlessly celebrating it.

Defining it is one thing, but how is this explosive sentiment usually regarded? It is often thought of as a political ideology lauding a preference for and the superiority of one's nation and nationality in comparison to those of foreigners. One influential strand of thinking, associated above all with the early nineteenth-century philosopher Hegel and those following in his footsteps, views nationalism as an autonomous force or causal power that brings about the end of history with the emergence of the modern (national) state (Agnew 1989). Nationalism as the "spirit of the people" is a form of consciousness that will come to dominate all others. In fact, its history is intimately connected to the growth of popular sovereignty (the people should rule) in relation to state power and the challenge to state power from liberal and socialist ideologies (Yack 2001). But this history is also one in which nationalism has had to be *articulated* and *organized* as a form of political expression and has had to be *based* on popular support gained from populations with alternative political possibilities. In other words – and this is what a second strand of thinking emphasizes – nationalism is a practical politics and not an autonomous force. It is not just a popular sentiment but also a program of political action. In this light, nationalism's key claims are that (1) those who constitute a nation should have their own state; (2) the nation and the state should map onto one another by means of a common territory that is the historic "homeland" of the nation; and (3) a national identity (or sense of belonging) should win out over other possible political identities (Breuilly 1982; Conversi 1999; Yiftachel 2000).

The two strands of thinking – nationalism as an autonomous force in history and nationalism as practical politics – persist, even if the second is today somewhat ascendant. What is certain is that academic interest in nationalism has exploded since the 1980s after a long period, dating from the 1940s, when interest faded except among those focused on the independence movements in the colonies of Europe's declining empires. An undoubted revival of academic interest in nationalism since the 1980s after a long hiatus can be read as symptomatic of the revival of nationalism in the world at large following the end of the US–Soviet Cold War and the stability it imposed on the world's political map. But even this claim fails to engender consensus. Much of what is today often put down to "nationalism" is in fact either a revival of extreme religious beliefs (as in the usage of Islamic *jihad* by many groups such as *al-Qaeda* and *Hamas*) or an upsurge of local warlordism in the face of weak governments (as in Somalia and Afghanistan) rather than the expression of true national groups in search of or reviving states on their collective behalf (Wiebe 2002). Nevertheless, reports of nationalism's death or decline have proved premature before. Indeed, in contemporary Europe, Asia, and the United States nationalism seems anything but a spent force (e.g. Comaroff & Stern 1995). Perhaps seven specific aspects of nationalism define the main features of contemporary debate and dissent. In this chapter I take each of these in turn to illustrate

the ways in which "nationalism" currently figures in cultural geography and closely allied fields.

Taking Nationalism More Seriously

With nationalism, as opposed to socialism and liberalism, many of those who study or make proclamations about it tend to see the people who subscribe to it as cultural dopes. "They should know better" is the implicit subtext, but they have been fooled or misled into it by self-serving state elites inventing traditions or by their own atavistic attachments to place and linguistic/religious groups. The implication is, obviously, that identifying by social class or pursuing individual interests are rational approaches to self-identification. In this way frequently undeclared and normative commitments to class and individual self as better sources of identification than nationality lead to a dismissal of nationalism as a legitimate type of political ideology.

Three ways of seeming to engage with nationalism but essentially dismissing it have achieved dominance in contemporary Western social and cultural studies. These must be challenged in order to take nationalism seriously as a powerful type of politics in the contemporary world. The first, associated most closely with the widely cited book by Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism* (1983), is that nationalism appeals simply to an "imagined community" that is created by and organized by the spread of books and reading in national vernacular languages. In fact, of course, "print capitalism," as Anderson terms it, is only one of a mass of technological and cultural innovations that have materially ordered the world into national-state spaces – from highways and railways radiating from capital cities, national currencies and economic regulation, and systems of weights and measures to school systems and educational credentials, national churches, government systems, and cultural production of books, films, and music. The appeal of nationalism rests initially and finally in the fact that in many parts of the world the political organization of territory into national states has created real, not simply imagined, *material* communities of interest and identity in which large numbers of residents see their fate tied to that of the national state or, if they do not have one of their own, obtaining one for themselves. The crucial alliance of putative nation (imagined as it certainly is) with state-organized territory, therefore, provides the breeding ground for nationalism (Mann 1992; Miller 1995; Smith 1999; Wiebe 2000).

Second, nationalism is often discussed independently of its ideological competitors, as if its development were separate from that of socialism and liberalism. With remarkably few exceptions, the study of nationalism has become separated from the study of the other great "isms" that took root in late nineteenth-century Europe and spread with it into the rest of the world with European colonialism. Yet, all three grew in the context of the disruption of local peasant societies by industrialization and urbanization, mass migration, and ideologies promising totalistic solutions to contemporary problems of exploitation (socialism), limited citizenship rights (liberalism), and increased economic and military competition (nationalism). Although they were often competitors, after 1914 they also became collaborators, with nationalism as the victor, as socialism and liberalism both came to define their

goals in national-state terms. One important cause of nationalism's success was its ability to combine an appeal to fictive kinship with a clear identification of an "enemy" against whom the nation was embattled for this or that reason (economic, social, religious, etc.) Neither socialism nor liberalism had this mobilizing power: they could appeal to specific interests but not to the lethal combination of identity and interests fused with territory that nationalism encouraged (Dunn 1979; Brustein 1996; Hechter 2000).

Finally, nationalism undoubtedly developed in popular appeal alongside the growth of industrial capitalism and "modernization" in Europe in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Gellner 1983). It received a further boost during the process of decolonization in the years following the Second World War, both in former colonies as they embarked on "nation-building" and in the "home countries" as they adjusted to an unaccustomed smallness (Murray 1997). A good case can be made that in fact European colonialism provided a necessary circumstance for the development of nationalism in Europe in the first place, both with regard to competition between European states for overseas empires' stimulating national enmities and to empire-building's encouraging a sense of national-civilizational (and racial) superiority on the part of European nationalities over the colonized natives within "their" empires (Said 1993; Agnew & Corbridge 1995). But, the conventional wisdom suggests, following the view that nationalism is "caused" by, not just correlated with, modernization or industrial capitalism, that (1) nations are always the product of nationalism and (2) in the face of economic globalization and massive international migration nationalism can be expected to go into decline (e.g. Hobsbawm 1992).

With respect to the first of these points, it is not difficult to show, at least in many European cases, that some kind of proto-nation preexisted the arrival of nationalism (see, e.g., Smith 2002). Though nationalism is a modern phenomenon, therefore, there is no need to presume that nations or nationalities are likewise. This is a fallacy present in much of the contemporary literature. The second point, if anything, is made more insistently but is equally wrong-headed. To Nigel Harris (1990: 284), for example, "migration subverts the artificial cultural homogeneity which states have instilled in their citizens. . . . The greater the movement of peoples, the more that culture will come to be fashioned by people from many other sources." If anything, however, migration has often underwritten nationalism rather than written its epitaph. For example, the rise of Irish nationalism in the mid-nineteenth century is closely connected to emigration to the United States and the radical Irish nationalism of Irish Americans. Likewise, Jewish nationalism or Zionism grew out of large-scale international migration and the search for a Jewish homeland to bring the diaspora together in a single territory. Increased movement, therefore, can stimulate identity with a lost homeland rather than wipe it out. More generally, actually-existing nationalism is complexly related to religious, linguistic, and economic divisions all held in tension by a primary group commitment to occupation and domination of a common space or national territory. It is not and never has been simply a "functional" response to modernization, the rise of the state, or industrial capitalism. As a result, nationalism will not soon decline or disappear (Chatterjee 1986; Mortimer 1999; Peckham 2001; Wiebe 2002).

Nationalism and Territory

To geographers the most outstanding feature of nationalism is its unvarying claim to a territorial homeland (Anderson 1988; Murphy 2002; Yiftachel, 2000, 2002). This is the feature shared by all nationalisms regardless of how they came about or where they are. Many students of nationalism are confused about the relationship between nationalism and territory. Wiebe (2000: 54), for example, misses the point when he states that "nationalist loyalties are . . . geographically indeterminate. They move wherever people move; they do not bounce off boundary walls, as Anderson would have it." Here the fact that supporters of a nationalist movement may be widely scattered is used to deny that nationalism *always* involves claiming a physical national homeland or, in other words, that nationalism is inherently territorial in its central claim, as Wiebe (2002: 5) himself suggests elsewhere, to monopolize for their nation "land sacred to their history." The fusion of a piece of land with the symbolic and mythified history of the nation is what gives nationalism such symbolic power immediately related to the sites and circumstances of everyday life when compared to the often more abstract claims of liberalism and socialism. The Serb nationalist obsession with Kosovo as the "historic core" of Serbia and the competing claims of Zionists and Palestinian nationalists to the same patches of land are only two of the best known cases of this relentless focus by nationalists on "our" territory.

Two questions as to the precise character of the relationship between nationalism and territory have exercised considerable recent interest. One asks: when did the nation-in-its-territory become a subject of veneration? The purpose here is to ascertain how the map-image of the national territory and sense of "territorial destiny" figure in the genesis of nationalism. The other asks: how did nationalism reconfigure understandings of "home" such that the local (and familiar) became part of a nationalist "homeland?" The focus here is on the local production of the nation.

Responses to the first question tend to place the origins in either late medieval/early modern Europe or in Europe in the eighteenth century. Writers in the former camp tend to emphasize the experience of England and France as exemplary (see, e.g., Reynolds 1984; Hastings 1997; Schulze 1994). For example, Scattergood (2001) emphasizes how England was increasingly imagined as a separate space by poets and playwrights over the course of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries in essentially modern terms – trade, merchants, money, networks of exchange. In accounts accepting this sort of genealogy, state elites elsewhere are then alleged to have later imitated the founding nations in pursuit of nationalist "modernity" (Greenfeld 1992). Those in the second group look to the eighteenth century, again largely also to England (now rewritten as "Britain") and France, as the period when popular political association with national territory crystallized (e.g. Colley 1992; Bell 2001). If in the British case wars served as the most important ingredient in promoting a popular British nationalism, in France it was the nationalist project that developed through the Revolution of 1789, notwithstanding the universalistic elements often seen in that moment of political upheaval. Yet, until the end of the century "the sense of a British nation was not geographically tied to

Britain itself" according to Stephen Conway (2001: 893), since it had a strong transatlantic element and was resisted by many in England who feared the rise of a culturally mixed "Britishness" (e.g. Ragussis 2000), and the nation-building project in France is probably better dated to the nineteenth rather than to the eighteenth century (e.g. Weber 1976). Nonetheless, the eighteenth century has a strong case as the founding period for what today would be the recognizably nationalist conception of territorial space. From this point of view, nationalism as a popular political project has its roots in the American and French Revolutions. They stimulated other nationalist projects as new states "invented" (Hobsbawm & Ranger 1983) or promoted (Wallerstein 1991) the nation as the "natural" territorial basis to statehood. With the decolonization of Europe's empires in the second half of the twentieth century nationalism became a worldwide phenomenon.

The second question has been more specifically addressed in contexts other than England and France. Germany and Italy figure particularly prominently. These are cases, perhaps not coincidentally, in which statehood dates only from the mid-nineteenth century but which have had much longer cultural-territorial histories as putative nations. The emphasis is on (1) what can be called the "local life of nationhood" (Applegate 1990; Confino & Skaria 2002); (2) the relation of local and regional to national identities (Agnew 1995; Agnew & Brusa 1999; Kaplan 1999; Núñez 2001); and (3) the "fluid" and "contested" identities of state borderlands (White 2000; Kulczycki 2001; Thaler 2001). The overall focus is on relating national identities to the geographical scales and contexts in which they are embedded rather than presupposing a nationalist "wave" that washes over a territory from either a center or the margins wiping out all other identities in its path. In this view the national is always forged in and through "the local." In Germany, for example, the idea of *Heimat* (homeland) has connected local and regional communities to the nation. In particular, and following the Second World War, "by talking about *Heimat*, Germans found a way to talk about that which was so problematic to talk about, namely the nation" (Confino & Skaria 2002: 11). The nation's territory is not a simple block of space but a complex set of relationships between local, regional, and national levels of social practice and geographical imagination. Nationalism relates to territory, therefore, in more complex ways than most students of nationalism have tended to believe.

Ethnic versus Civic Nationalism

According to the political theorist Bernard Yack (2001: 520), "A large part of the story of the emergence and spread of nationalism lies in the way that these two images of community, the nation and the people, have become entangled in our minds." Indeed, one of the major contemporary disputes about the nature of nationalism and whether there are "better" and "worse" kinds revolves around the interpretations given to the intersections between the two terms. On one side are those who distinguish between "ethnic" and "civic" nationalisms and on the other are those who fail to see the distinction or who see it as a false and misleading one. To the first group ethnic nationalism involves the exclusive identity of the people with the nation whereas civic nationalism involves the inclusive identity of the nation with the people. Thus, if ethnic nationalism is characterized by shared cultural

loyalties, civic nationalism is all about shared political principles and institutions. Some writers, such as Greenfeld (1992, 1996), use the civic/ethnic dichotomy to distinguish more "democratic" (civic) from more "authoritarian" (ethnic) versions of nationalism. In this usage there is little if any ethical commitment to an idealized "civic nationalism." It is merely a taxonomic device to classify varieties of nationalism. Others, however, have attempted to reconcile nationalism with liberalism by arguing for a "civic" nationalism, like that said to exist in the United States, France, or Britain (e.g. Ignatieff 1993; Tamir 1993; Viroli 1995; and Miller 1995). In this understanding, the "main characteristic of the democratic national idea [is]: the effort to transcend the level of concrete identities and ethnic solidarities through citizenship" (Schnapper 1998: 234).

But, as the second group tends to maintain, both types of nationalism rest on claims to popular sovereignty on the part of nations that are necessarily exclusive and politicized. Even if they can be empirically distinguished, doubtful, they share a common historical trajectory: that of popular sovereignty. As Yack (2001: 529) makes the point:

> You need to assume the existence of [territorial] boundaries between peoples before you can exercise the principle of popular sovereignty. Therefore, you cannot use popular sovereignty to determine where the boundaries between peoples should lie. Popular sovereignty can help guide us in determining our political arrangements. It cannot help us decide how to determine the shape of our collective selves.

Nicholas Xenos (1996) makes a somewhat different point in challenging the meaningfulness of the dichotomy. He contrasts the concrete "patriotism" of city-dwelling with the abstract imposition of both civic and ethnic nationalism. The affection displayed for place in classical republican patriotism is that of the city not of the modern nation-state. Thus, those who argue from classical and early-modern authors to justify a modern civic nationalism are guilty of misidentifying the object of patriotism (or belonging) articulated by such authors.

Long-distance Nationalism

Rather than simply a reflection of the association between a nation and its territory, the history of nationalism is also closely related to the experience of large-scale migration. With due regard to its peculiarities, Robert Wiebe (2002: 24) suggestively points to the linkage between migration and Irish nationalism, when following the Famine of the late 1840s:

> While the Irish in Ireland buried the dead, nationalism survived by shifting its center of gravity across the Atlantic. In the years of O'Connell's ascendancy [over the Irish nationalist movement in the years before the Famine], the Irish in America had played only a minor role, cheering his cause and contributing money to it but otherwise simply watching from abroad. Now, as they took the initiative, they gave Irish nationalism its distinctive stamp: secular, public, and violent.

Typically, however, the influence of migration and more recent impacts of "space–time compression" due to the technological "shrinking" of the world are

left out of both nationalist narratives and scholarly accounts of them (Mulligan 2002). In the stories of nationalists such external ties would undermine the seemingly natural connection between nation and territory; each begets the other. Scholarly accounts are similarly place-bound and often simply accept the claims of nationalist stories at face value. To the extent that the "long-distance nationalism" of "absent patriots" is taken seriously it is as a novel phenomenon tied to the nationalist proclivities of groups of recent immigrants from formerly colonial countries to the countries of Western Europe and North America. This is undoubtedly an important feature of contemporary world politics (see, e.g. Goulborne 1991 on Sikhs and Guyanese in Britain, or Schiller & Fouron 2001 on Haitians in the United States) but its novelty is exaggerated and the long-standing relationship between long-distance migration, romanticism about the land and people "left behind," and nationalism, is obscured. Long-distance nationalism did not arrive with the fax.

The erstwhile American radical, Tom Hayden (2002), is neither alone nor the first in adopting a romantic nativism in which his American "outside" disguises the fact that he is "Irish on the inside." All of the clichés of absent patriotism are present in his account, from the Irish sages who say that Irish culture is very ancient, older, of course, "than the English," and that the Irish soul is "like an ancient forest" to the "mystical courage" of the martyrs to the Irish cause. But this is not a joke. Rather, it is the essential core of the romanticism that inspires long-distance nationalism, even many generations and much intermarriage beyond the original migrants, many of whom often wanted to forget about where they came from. Of course, the "search for roots" in distant places need not always end up with the essentialized national identities that Hayden evokes. Catherine Nash (2002) shows nicely how investigations into personal genealogies can produce unsettling and complicated family pasts when the roots turn out to be less "purely" Irish than family lore might have suggested. Similarly, heritage tourism not only reproduces convenient national stories but also can offer local correctives that open to question dominant understandings of the national past particularly prevalent among absent patriots (Johnson 1999). If somewhat overstated, however, Ian Buruma's (2002: 14) commentary on Hayden's book captures what has often been at stake with the romantic nationalism of absent patriots: "Hayden is haunted by blood-thirsty ghosts. He is not alone. There are Sikhs in Toronto, Muslims in Britain and France, Jews in Brooklyn, and many others in far-flung places who seek to sooth ancestral voices by encouraging barbarism far from home. Some are prepared to die for their causes. Most are content to let others do the dying, while they work on their identities at home."

Religion and Nationalism

There are cases where religion and nationalism have been almost complete partners, as with the Greek and other Orthodox Christian churches, Iranian Shi'ite Islam, Orthodox Judaism, and the state churches of England and other northern European countries, on the one hand, and powerful nationalist movements and sentiments, on the other. In England, for example, the Protestant Reformation and the threat to it from the Catholic states served to unify the English into a national enterprise that was lacking in those states where church and state did not become mutually supportive. But there are others, as in many Moslem and predominantly Roman

Catholic countries where religious identities either compete with national ones or have complex relations to them. In Italy, for example, from 1870 until 1929 the Pope refused to recognize the Italian state because, in his view, it had usurped his temporal powers when it had annexed the papal territories of central Italy. Under threat of excommunication, active Catholics were required to abstain from active involvement in national politics and in the life of the nation.

At one time nationalism was seen as largely reflective of religious, linguistic and other cultural cleavages. Obviously this is problematic in an evident empirical sense. It is also problematic, however, because religion is frequently a banner for a wide range of differences and resentments that are only at most secondarily religious, in the sense of commitment to doctrines and beliefs: access to political power, availability of public offices, etc. (Harris 1990: 11). Indeed, and today, religious identities, particularly in the Moslem world, often cut across nationalist lines, except in the Iranian and Palestinian cases. The universalistic claims of Islam and Catholic Christianity have frequently coexisted uneasily with the particularistic claims of nationalist movements. Sometimes the character of religious belief, in the sense of popular as opposed to officially sanctioned belief, can also undermine national identities and nationalism in the interest of privileging local identities (see, e.g., on popular Catholicism in Italy, Carroll 1996).

Yet, there are two ways in which religion has intersected powerfully with nationalism down the years. The first is emphasized by Benedict Anderson (1983: 12) when he proposes that "nationalism has to be understood by aligning it, not with self-consciously held political ideologies [although I have challenged this assertion earlier], but with the large cultural systems that preceded it, out of which – as well as against which – it came into being." In this understanding, sacred languages such as Latin, Arabic, and Mandarin Chinese provided the core element to the civilizations that increasingly decomposed into "national" parts as vernacular languages replaced the sacred as the main media for popular literacy and public communication. Religion, by means of sacred languages, thus provided the common foundation (along with dynastic politics) upon which nationalism's "imagined communities" came to be imagined. The second has been religion's role in providing the material for the "tyranny of small differences" upon which most nationalist movements have relied to distinguish their nation from others. As Daniele Conversi (1994) has claimed, using even minor distinctions (in global terms) to define boundaries with the Other against whom you are defining yourself (e.g., the English for the Irish, the Germans for the French, the Pakistanis for Indians, etc.) is as if not more important to nationalist movements than is defining what makes you special without benefit of comparison and contrast. It is clear that religious differences have often played this role, for example in Irish, Welsh, and Scottish nationalism (Pope 2001).

Gender and Nationalism

Nationalism is frequently seen as the most masculinist or male-dominated type of politics. Not only did women's roles in politics seem to decline along with the rise of nationalism (e.g. Radhakrishnan 1992), nationalist ideologies seem to rest on a peculiarly gendered division of political labor with women allocated the role of

nurturing the Motherland (or standing in for it symbolically as with the French national symbols of Joan of Arc [for the right] and Marianne [for the left]) by producing future generations, while men are given the directing role and charged with defending the homeland against or liberating it from its foreign enemies (Sharp 1996; Blom et al. 2000). In this understanding, and in the direst of circumstances, such as the bloody nationalist wars in the Balkans in the 1990s, women's bodies come to represent the very territory to be conquered or claimed and thus subject to rape and defilement (Skjelsbaek 2001). More mundanely, the metaphor of the nation as a "family" has carried much weight, sometimes to obscure the degree to which patriarchy is operative at multiple geographical scales but often, as in the late nineteenth century, to refocus the social life of the nation around an idealized household with men and women holding quite different social roles (Eley 2000).

In the light of recent research, however, this perspective on gender and nationalism seems not so much incorrect as overstated. Matters seem much more complicated than it suggests. First of all, women have not been simply passive bystanders to and symbols for nationalist movements even when seemingly marginalized within them. As Catherine Nash (1997) shows with respect to Ireland, it was not just exceptional and "famous" women, such as Maud Gonne and Countess Markievicz, but also a multitude of "ordinary" women who played a key part in the political protests of the nineteenth- and early twentieth-century nationalist movements. At the same time, questions of gender, sexual, and national identity are never simply linear and additive. Male–female and sexual identity differences do not line up on a single axis of nationalist politics with men and women and gays and heterosexuals on opposite sides and with competing roles (Dowler 2002; Marston 2002). As Nash (1997: 1234) concludes: "The history of Ireland and women's activism in contemporary Northern Ireland both point to the limitations of neat oppositions and single visions."

In the second place, sexual violence in the context of nationalist conflict, such as that directed at women in particular in the Balkans and elsewhere, seems related to the fear and advent of territorial partition rather than to nationalist politics per se. Mass rape as a weapon of war seems to occur almost entirely in specific settings in which partition of contested territory is under way, such as South Asia in 1947 and the Balkans in the 1990s. As the anthropologist Robert Hayden (2000: 33) plausibly claims:

> Partition . . . is not only a liminal state but a time when the state itself is liminal, and the questions of whose state it is, and how the population will be defined are open. . . . After these issues are settled, mass rape will no longer be likely, because either coexistence will have been reconstituted or the newly consolidated groups will have separated.

Finally, women who have organized themselves in political organizations have sometimes been major independent proponents of nationalism. In the United States, for example, in the years between the Civil War and the First World War, women's organizations played a central part in generating American nationalism. Groups such as the Women's Relief Corps emerged in the aftermath of the US Civil War to insist adamantly that "patriotism knows no sex" (quoted in O'Leary 1999: 92; also see Rowbotham 1992). As O'Leary (1999) shows in detail, most members endorsed the idea of women's moral superiority to men and were opposed to limiting their

work to serving veterans or staying within the bounds of domesticity. But just as they connected in the 1890s with the more partisan women's movement they also became major sponsors of patriotic events such as Memorial Day, the campaign to fly the flag at every school, petitioned for flag-desecration laws, and lobbied to include the pledge of allegiance in the public (state) schools (O'Leary 1999: 97). In sum, it turns out that nationalism has not consistently discriminated on the basis of sex after all.

Nationalism and Landscape

Tying the nation to territory has often involved identifying a prototypical landscape as representative of the collective identity. In this way the natural environment can be recruited for the national cause not only to naturalize the connection between nation and territory but also visually to communicate and reinforce identity with the nation. The physical images, buildings, monuments, and scenes encountered in everyday life come to provide a mundane or "banal" element to nationalism itself (Billig 1995; also see, e.g., Crameri 2000). The very familiarity of symbols seen on a daily basis makes the nation the "daily plebiscite" that Ernest Renan famously described it as being. Monumental spaces and other "places of memory" have been of particular significance in potentially bonding current residents to a common past (Till 2003). Through the landscape the memory of the nation is given concrete form as a reminder of what "we" have been through and why "we" need to remember.

More generally, however, a national landscape "imagery" is a visual technique that naturalizes particular images into a national narrative (Häyrynen 2000). Published and disseminated over long periods of time these images make the national territory concrete as a distinctive block of space and elicit shared values and meanings. If in some countries identification of a "national landscape" seems to have met with considerable success, in England, Finland, and Switzerland, for example, elsewhere this proved more elusive. In Switzerland after the founding of the modern federation in 1848, Alpine scenery not surprisingly provided both a geographical icon for the new state and, when combined with the image of virtuous peasants fruitfully tilling what soil there was, a "powerful symbol of republican will and cultural mediation" peculiar to Switzerland (Zimmer 2001). In Italy, however, attempts at using either Tuscan rural scenery or Roman ruins after unification to represent an idealized national landscape for the new nation-state came largely to naught (Agnew 2002: ch. 3). The combination of fragmented political identities in a physically divided peninsula, strong church–state tensions, the ambiguous legacy of ancient Rome, and the political incoherence of both liberal and Fascist regimes made crafting a national landscape ideal extremely difficult. Nationalism, therefore, is not invariably naturalized successfully through the creation of a national landscape imagery.

Conclusion

The self-sacrifice of the New York City firefighters who entered the twin towers of the World Trade Center as they were collapsing in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 has come to symbolize the popular American

reaction to the events of the day. The towers themselves have had somewhat less resonance in the American popular imagination. The memory of the firefighters as giving up their lives for others has gained a powerful hold, particularly in media re-creations. At the end of the day, it is sacrifice such as this, or interpreted as such, whatever any individual firefighter might have been thinking, that nationalism has to offer. It is also this focus on the sacrificial that other political ideologies find particularly offensive about nationalism. If its appeal still remains elusive, we nevertheless understand that nationalism is far from a spent force. If anything, nationalism has achieved even greater success recently than anyone would have predicted 10 or 20 years ago. From India to Ireland, Israel, and Indonesia nationalism is a powerful element in everyday politics. Understanding the contemporary world, therefore, requires understanding nationalism as best we can. And we should remember that in many places it is still deeply rooted, wired into the routines and ephemera of everyday life. The poet and writer Patricia Storace (1996: 10) tells the story of Greek high school students who refused to read Virgil's *Aeneid*. "These particular students held it as dogma that the *Aeneid* was a cheap [Roman] imitation of the [ancient Greek] Homer, responding with a popular Platonism, present in both the ancient Greek preoccupation with sculpture and the modern Greek preoccupation with icons, that insisted there was one ideal original, and the rest of the genre was increasingly false and bloodless." The ideal original, of course had to be Greek. Whether that Greek would recognize himself in modern Greece is, for the nationalist, entirely beside the point.

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