Chapter 1

G. W. F. Hegel: The Phenomenology of Spirit

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Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831) is one of the greatest (though also least studied) philosophers of the Western tradition. His thought spawned both Marxism and existentialism, and exercised considerable influence on many of the major philosophers of the twentieth century, including Dewey, Gadamer, Sartre, Derrida, and Habermas. It is true that many regard Hegel's work as too difficult and obscure to merit close scrutiny. Those who do take the trouble to study his work carefully, however, encounter a thinker whose richness and subtlety, in my view, is matched only by that of Plato, Aristotle and Kant.

Hegel was born in Stuttgart on August 27, 1770. He studied philosophy and theology at Tübingen, becoming friends there with Hölderlin and Schelling, and sharing their enthusiasm for Rousseau, Kant, and (initially at least) the French Revolution. From 1793 to 1800 he worked as a house tutor, first in Berne and then in Frankfurt-am-Main, and wrote several manuscripts on religion and love that remained unpublished until the early twentieth century. In 1801 he moved to Jena where, under the influence of Schelling, he began to develop his philosophical system. The distinctive introduction to that system, the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, which contains the famous analyses of the master/slave relation, the unhappy consciousness, and Sophocles' *Antigone*, was published in 1807. While he was rector of a school in Nuremberg, Hegel completed the first part of the system itself, the monumental *Science of Logic* (published in three volumes from 1812 to 1816).

In 1816 Hegel became professor of philosophy at Heidelberg and in 1817 published, under the title *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, an outline of his whole system, including, in addition to logic, the philosophy of nature and the philosophy of mind or spirit (*Geist*). During his years in Berlin from 1818 to 1831, Hegel then published the works and delivered the lectures that would make him the most famous and influential philosopher in Germany. The *Elements of the Philosophy of Right* appeared in 1820, and two further, revised editions of the *Encyclopaedia* were published in 1827 and 1830. When he died on November 14, 1831, Hegel left behind not only his wife, Marie, and two sons, Karl and Immanuel, but also a body of thought that would inspire and provoke numerous philosophers, theologians, and

social theorists right up to the present day (despite being neglected by much of the philosophical establishment in Britain and the USA).

Freedom and Mutual Recognition

Hegel has been treated by some philosophers not just with indifference, but with outright hostility and suspicion. Karl Popper, for example, famously counted him (with Plato and Marx) among the most potent enemies of the "open society." Such a judgment is, however, hard to sustain when one reads carefully what Hegel actually wrote and taught. His texts and lectures make it clear that he was in fact an unceasing advocate of freedom and rationality, and no friend of totalitarianism or obscurantism.

In the *Philosophy of Right*, Hegel argues that freedom entails exercising choice, owning property, and working to satisfy one's manifold needs. Freedom cannot, however, consist simply in doing what I want, because it is secured only when it is *recognized* by other individuals. I may insist that I am free to take possession of the objects of my desire, but I can do so in fact only when others acknowledge my right to own those objects.

For Hegel, rights are first established by the very concept of freedom itself, since that concept determines what freedom requires, and whatever *must* fall to me as a free being thereby constitutes my *right*. As a free being I have the right to own property or engage in work, whether or not others recognize that right. That is why I can demand of others that they respect my rights, whenever they fail to do so; if rights did not come first, they could not command recognition in this way. Yet the recognition afforded me by others is what allows me to *exercise* my rights. I may well have the inalienable right to own property, but I can become the rightful owner of this or that particular house only if others respect my right to do so. Accordingly, as Robert Williams puts it, "right is not actual or objective until it is recognized."[1]

For Hegel, therefore, concrete human freedom is inseparable from recognition. We demand that our freedom be recognized as our right, and we need the respect of others if our freedom is to be more than a dream. Furthermore, the very idea to which we appeal – that right commands recognition – requires of us that we respect the rights and freedoms of others in turn. To be free, therefore, we must be accorded recognition by those whose freedom we ourselves are bound to recognize: true freedom requires mutual respect and recognition between people. As Hegel states in the *Encyclopaedia Philosophy of Mind* (1830), "I am only truly free when the other is also free and is recognized by me as free."[2]

According to Hegel, human beings recognize and respect one another as free within communities, such as the estate or corporation in which they work and the state of which they are citizens. Hegel does, therefore, believe that human beings are born to live in the state, as many of his critics have charged. Yet this is not because he "worships" the state in any sinister, totalitarian manner. It is because he understands the state – at least when it is free and rational – to be the community in which mutual recognition is guaranteed both by the civic disposition of people and by the

law. Hegel sets out the close connection between recognition, law and the state in these lines from the *Encyclopaedia Philosophy of Mind*:

> What dominates in the State is the spirit of the people, custom, and law. There man is recognized [*anerkannt*] and treated as a *rational* being, as free, as a person; and the individual, on his side, makes himself worthy of this recognition by overcoming the natural state of his self-consciousness and obeying a universal, the will that is in essence and actuality will, the *law*; he behaves, therefore, towards others in a manner that is universally valid, recognizing them – as he wishes others to recognize him – as free, as persons.[3]

States often fail to guarantee that citizens respect the law and one another, and often violate citizens' rights themselves. A rational state, however, is one that is held together precisely by a common respect for the law that requires people to show respect for one another.

Consciousness, Self-Consciousness, and Desire

Recognition may be found within society and the state, but is there anything to prevent our withdrawal from society, which would enable us to enjoy the untrammeled freedom of the hermit and so be relieved of the need to gain recognition? Physically, there may be nothing to prevent us; but in so doing, Hegel believes, we would deprive ourselves of the opportunity to acquire genuine *self-consciousness*. According to Hegel, I cannot fully understand who I am, if I remain alone by myself with only the objects of nature to attend to. I gain a proper consciousness of myself only when my self-understanding is recognized and confirmed by others.

This is not to say that in the absence of such recognition I would lack any self-awareness whatsoever. For Hegel, simple consciousness of an object, such as a house or tree, already incorporates the awareness that the object is distinct from *me*. Similarly, all perception brings with it the awareness that I, as perceiver, am capable of error. Yet such self-awareness falls short of articulated, objective self-consciousness and self-understanding: the latter, Hegel argues, requires the recognition by others of who we are. As Loewenberg (or, rather, his fictional creation, Hardith) puts it, Hegel thus "discover[s] an incipient social consciousness within the very bosom of self-consciousness."[4] A hermit's life is ultimately not for us: for we are born to understand who we are, and that means that we are born to be social and political beings. To learn precisely why this is the case, we must turn to Hegel's *Phenomenology*.

The *Phenomenology* describes, in prose both tortuous and elegant, the development of consciousness from its most primitive or naïve form – which Hegel names "sensuous certainty" – to its most mature form – self-knowing spirit or "absolute knowing." This development is to be understood not as historical, but as *logical*. The book does not examine how human consciousness has actually changed through time into modern self-understanding, but shows how certain general "shapes" of consciousness necessarily transform themselves, because of their very structure, into

further shapes. The development traced by Hegel overlaps in certain parts with European history (for example, in the analysis of "Stoic" consciousness), but what gives Hegel's book its unity is the fact that it renders explicit what is logically entailed by being conscious.

Consciousness develops, according to Hegel, as it takes cognizance of what is implicit in its own experience, though initially hidden from view. Sensuous certainty, with which Hegel begins, is the form of consciousness that takes itself to be aware of the simple, immediate presence of things. It eschews all mediating categories and is quite certain in its own mind that what it has before it is nothing but *this*, *here*, *now* in all its simplicity. Its experience reveals, however, that what it is actually conscious of is not just simple immediacy after all, but a complex unity of different moments: a "now" that stretches back in time through other nows and a "here" that is spatially related to other heres. When sensuous consciousness accepts that its object is more complex than it initially thought, it transforms itself logically into a new shape: perception. This is not to say that every historical individual wedded to the immediate certainties of sensory experience will accept that he or she is actually conscious of complex objects of perception. It is to argue that the more developed standpoint of perception is *logically* implicit in that of sense certainty, and that those wedded to immediate sensuous certainty should acknowledge that the objects they relate to are more complex than they first think.

How does this process of logical development lead to self-consciousness? Hegel argues that perception grasps its object as a complex unity of many "nows" and many "heres," but that it cannot decide whether the true nature of the object lies more in its unity or in its multiplicity. Perception ends up distinguishing between the manifold character and the *inner* unity of the object. As soon as it regards its object as having an inner unity, however, it ceases to be mere perception and becomes understanding. Understanding then learns that the inner unity of the thing actually consists in lawfulness, reason, and life. When this happens, Hegel claims, understanding proves to be not just consciousness of objects, but also *self*-consciousness – because it finds in its objects the very qualities that constitute its own nature. Prior to its mutation into self-consciousness, understanding already incorporates an element of self-understanding: it knows that it is precisely the *understanding*, rather than mere perception, of objects. Yet only when it encounters in the objects themselves nothing but qualities belonging to itself does it come to be self-consciousness in the full sense, that is, consciousness of itself *above all else*.

Hegel points out that understanding always takes itself to be conscious of what is other than it and does not realize that it is self-conscious. It is we phenomenologists, not understanding itself, who recognize that understanding is in fact conscious of itself. In Hegel's own words, "it is only *for us* that this truth exists, not yet for consciousness." Nevertheless, in understanding something else to be rational and lawlike, understanding is, indeed, "communing directly with itself, enjoying only itself"; this, Hegel notes, is why understanding affords such satisfaction.[5] Self-consciousness is thus not merely an accident of nature, but is logically entailed by the structure of consciousness itself. Hegel's next task is to examine what is involved in being *explicitly* self-conscious, or "*what consciousness knows in knowing itself*."[6] We become explicitly self-conscious, in Hegel's view, when we make our selves and our own

identity the explicit (and all-consuming) object of our concern, that is, when we become wholly and overtly absorbed by ourselves. As we shall see, such self-consciousness proves to be more complex and contradictory than it imagines.

The first thing to note is that consciousness comes to be wholly absorbed by itself while remaining conscious of what is *other* than it. Hegel's phenomenological method has shown that self-consciousness arises in our very consciousness of objects. When consciousness wakes up to the fact that it is primarily conscious of and concerned with itself, the objects of perception and understanding do not suddenly disappear from view. On the contrary, they remain before us as the external objects *in relation to which* we are principally conscious of ourselves. For Hegel, self-consciousness is thus not exclusively consciousness of oneself; it is a relation to something other than me in which I relate to myself above all.

This is not to deny that, like Descartes in the *Meditations*, I can "shut my eyes, stop my ears, withdraw all my senses" and "converse with myself" in total separation from things.[7] What can be reached through Cartesian doubt, however, is no more than *abstract* self-consciousness, because such doubt abstracts from the conditions under which alone concrete, all-embracing self-consciousness is possible: namely, consciousness of an external world in relation to which we find ourselves. As we shall see below, Hegel acknowledges that such abstract self-consciousness is possible and is an important moment of true, concrete self-consciousness. He claims, however, that true self-consciousness itself does not merely abstract from but (to borrow Kant's term) "accompanies" our consciousness of objects.

From Hegel's point of view, Descartes overlooks the moment of other-relatedness that is essential to true consciousness of oneself. Yet there is nevertheless something to be learned from Descartes about true self-consciousness: for in remaining conscious of real, external objects, self-consciousness must also seek to *negate* those objects. Consciousness finds itself in what is other than it; but the very otherness of the objects I encounter inevitably prevents me from relating wholly to myself. In order to achieve unalloyed self-consciousness, therefore, I must regard the object before me as something that is *not* essentially other than or independent of me after all, but there merely *for* me. I continue to consider the object to be real, and (unlike Descartes) do not declare it to be a figment of my imagination; but I deem it to offer no resistance to me and to yield to my ability to negate or consume it for my own satisfaction and self-enjoyment. Insofar as self-consciousness relates to itself through negating objects around it, it is, in Hegel's word, *desire* (*Begierde*). Self-consciousness necessarily takes the form of desire, therefore, because Descartes is half-right: consciousness does enhance its sense of itself by negating the objects around it, but it directs its activity of negation at a realm of objects whose reality is not in doubt and that, consequently, forever *remains* to be negated.

Note that desire arises at this point in the *Phenomenology* not (or, rather, not just) because we are organic, embodied beings, but because of the very nature of self-consciousness itself. Concrete self-consciousness is not immediate self-awareness, but self-awareness mediated by and inseparable from the awareness of what is other. Self-consciousness is interested in itself above all, and yet, as a complex form of *consciousness*, it is necessarily related to external things. If it is to attain an undiluted consciousness of *itself*, it must thus negate and destroy the other things it encoun-

ters. As this activity of negating what is other than itself, self-consciousness is desire. In Hegel's own words, the origin of desire is thus the fact that "self-consciousness is . . . essentially the return from *otherness*." Note that what we desire, in Hegel's view, is not the object as such, but rather, as Jean Hyppolite puts it, "the unity of the I with itself." If Hegel is right, in seeking to enjoy the object, we are in fact seeking to enjoy *ourselves*.[8]

The idea that desire is the practical activity of negating objects forms the cornerstone of the influential interpretation of Hegel's *Phenomenology* presented by Alexandre Kojève. Kojève lectured on Hegel's *Phenomenology* at the École des Hautes Études in Paris from 1933 to 1939 and counted in his audience many of the leading French intellectuals of the mid-twentieth century, including Merleau-Ponty, Bataille, Klossowski, Breton, and Queneau.[9] His lectures were published in 1947 and, together with the extensive commentary on the *Phenomenology* by Hyppolite which appeared in 1946, set the standard for reading Hegel in France (and beyond) for the following 50 years.

In my view, however, Kojève seriously distorts Hegel's account of self-consciousness in the *Phenomenology* by conflating the idea that desire is the activity of negation with the further idea that the subject of desire is essentially "empty." According to Kojève, the desiring subject is "an *emptiness* (*vide*) greedy for content; an emptiness that wants to be filled by what is full"; that is to say, "desire is *absence* of being" that seeks to fill itself "with a *natural*, biological content." To my mind, this distinctively Kojèvian conception of desire finds no place in Hegel's account. Desire does, indeed, negate the object. Yet it does so not to fill a void in the subject, but rather to confirm and enhance the subject's sense of self: desire, Hegel writes, is simply the movement of consciousness whereby its "identity of itself with itself becomes explicit for it." *Pace* Kojève, the desiring self in the *Phenomenology* does not lack a sense of its own being. If anything, it is rather too full of itself, for it regards everything around it as there for it alone. In so doing, desire considers the other to be nothing but an opportunity for desire itself to negate it. Desire is thus for Hegel "certain of the nothingness of this other," but it is by no means clear that desire takes itself to be sheer "absence" or "emptiness."[10]

From Desire to Mutual Recognition

Explicit self-consciousness must take the form of practical activity or desire. Hegel points out, however, that the self-certainty achieved in the satisfaction of desire is in fact not quite as unalloyed as it initially appears to be. This is because desire is satisfied only by negating and consuming something else. In the absence of other things, there is no satisfaction and no certainty of oneself. As Hegel writes, "desire and the self-certainty obtained in its gratification are conditioned by the object, for self-certainty comes from superseding this other." Consequently, "in order that this supersession (*Aufheben*) can take place, there must be this other."[11] Desire, for Hegel, is intrinsically contradictory: it needs the *other* so that it can enjoy itself *alone*.

Self-consciousness can therefore never revel undisturbed in its satisfaction and self-certainty. Whenever it is satisfied, it must once again seek out new objects that arouse its desire and enjoy itself in consuming them. As Hegel puts it, self-consciousness necessarily "produces the object again, and the desire as well," and it does so over and over again. This is why desire can never afford us the undiluted self-consciousness it promises: its certainty of itself is always interrupted by its renewed encounter with the other things it needs in order to enjoy itself. In Judith Butler's words, desire thus "affirms *itself as an impossible project*"; or, as Hegel himself states (in this somewhat ungainly sentence), "it is in fact something other than self-consciousness that is the essence of desire."[12] Yet Hegel does not conclude from this that genuine self-consciousness as such is impossible. Rather, he goes on to examine what is needed – beyond desire – for such self-consciousness to be achieved.

Desire fails to secure pure self-certainty because it always has to seek out new objects that are *other* than consciousness. In negating such objects, desire does find satisfaction and enjoys itself; but it ceases to be certain of itself as soon as it encounters the otherness and independence of things once again. A more secure self-consciousness would be achieved, however, if consciousness were able to preserve its certainty of itself in its very awareness of the independence of things. How might it do this?

Hegel's answer is clear: by turning its attention specifically toward things that in their very independence *negate themselves* and thereby allow consciousness to be certain only of itself. Simply eliminating all consciousness of other things is not an option for self-consciousness. Hegel has shown that self-consciousness first arises in our consciousness of other things, and that such consciousness of otherness remains an integral part of the consciousness that is explicitly concerned with itself. That is why self-consciousness must be desire. If consciousness is not to be restricted to being perennially renewed desire, therefore, the only logical alternative is for it to relate to something independent that negates itself for the sake of self-consciousness: "on account of the independence of the object, . . . it can achieve satisfaction only when the object itself effects the negation within itself."[13]

What kinds of objects perform such an independent negation of themselves? One possible candidate is the *living* object, or organism. In his account of understanding, Hegel argued that the objects of understanding include not just those that are law-governed but also those that are alive. Living beings thus belong among the objects that desire seeks to consume. Furthermore, as Hegel construes it, life is the explicit process of self-negation: death does not just descend on living organisms from the outside, but is immanent in life from the start, because "the simple substance of Life is the splitting up of itself into shapes and at the same time the dissolution of these existent differences."[14]

So, do living things afford us the opportunity of being conscious only of ourselves in being conscious of that which is independent of us? Almost, but not quite. The problem is that living things do not preserve their independence when they negate themselves: when they die, they simply cease to be. As Hegel puts it, "the differentiated, merely *living*, shape does indeed also supersede its independence in the process of Life, but it ceases with its distinctive difference to be what it is."[15] (The same is true of inorganic objects: insofar as they "negate themselves," they do so only by ceasing to be what they are.)

The logic of self-consciousness demands, however, that we achieve self-certainty in relating to objects that retain their independence from us. We can satisfy this demand only by relating to an object that negates itself but that is "equally independent in this negativity of itself." Such an object, Hegel maintains, cannot merely be a living thing (or an inorganic object), but must be another consciousness or self-consciousness. Consequently, "*self-consciousness achieves its satisfaction only in another self-consciousness.*"[16]

At this point Hegel appears no longer to be just a critic of Descartes, but to draw a positive lesson from the latter's meditations (though Hegel does not mention him by name). We do not learn from Descartes what it is to be concretely self-conscious; only phenomenology can teach us that. Nevertheless, in his *cogito* argument Descartes proves that consciousness retains an abstract awareness of its own independent identity and existence even when it calls into question and abstracts from every particular aspect of itself. The logic of self-consciousness demands that we achieve concrete self-certainty in relating to another thing that negates itself for our sake and that retains its independent identity in so doing. As Hans-Georg Gadamer writes, "only consciousness is able to . . . cancel itself in such a fashion that it does not cease to exist."[17] This fact, I would suggest, we learn from Descartes (as well, of course, as from Fichte).

It is important not to lose sight of the point at issue here. Descartes himself fails to see that concrete self-consciousness is to be gained in a relation to what is irreducibly *other* than consciousness. Yet he helps us to see that that very other cannot just take the form of an inanimate or animate thing, but must also take the form of another *self-consciousness*, for he shows that self-consciousness alone is able to negate every aspect of itself and preserve itself in so doing. Of course, to be genuinely and concretely self-conscious, that other self-consciousness must in turn be related to what is other than it, and so must itself be desire and relate to another self-consciousness. The specific point that Hegel is making here, however, is that the other, to which any concrete self-consciousness relates, must at least be capable of *abstract* self-consciousness: for only in this way can it thoroughly negate itself and at the same time retain its identity.

The desire to be certain of ourselves in our very relation to others is fulfilled not by consuming things, but by interacting with another self-consciousness – one that is not only capable of abstract self-awareness, but also takes the form of desire and relates to a self-consciousness other than itself. Self-consciousness is thus necessarily social or "spiritual": it is "'I' that is 'We' and 'We' that is 'I'." In this social relation, Hegel remarks, I find my own identity out there in an objective form: "just as much 'I' as 'object'." This is because I find my identity *recognized* by something other than and independent of me. This moment of recognition is built into the act of independent self-negation performed by the other self-consciousness: for by negating itself the other declares itself to be nothing in and for itself – it "posits its otherness . . . as a nothingness" – and so *makes way for me*. The other thus allows me to relate wholly to *myself* in relating to another, because all I see in the other is his or her recognition of my identity.[18]

If we are to enjoy full self-consciousness, the hermit's existence cannot be an option for us, for we can become properly self-conscious only in the society of others

who recognize us. Of course, we could try to turn our backs on self-consciousness. Hegel would point out, however, that self-consciousness is logically entailed by consciousness itself. Insofar as we are conscious at all, we must therefore seek to become fully self-conscious. The hermit, it seems, lives at odds with the logic inherent in consciousness itself.

Kojève provides a very different explanation for the social character of self-consciousness. As noted above, Kojève understands desire to be "emptiness" or the "absence of being." Such emptiness is filled, we are told, by "destroying, transforming, and 'assimilating' the desired non-I." Kojève goes on to say that "the I created by the active satisfaction of such a Desire will have the same nature as the things toward which that Desire is directed." If it desires merely living things, it will thus become "a 'thingish' I, a merely living I, an animal I." In this way, however, desire cannot become explicitly conscious of its own essential emptiness; it cannot be, as it were, filled with non-being. Desire becomes explicitly and self-consciously "empty" and "negative" only when it negates and assimilates *another empty desire*. This is because the I that feeds on the desires of others comes to be nothing but desire and negativity through and through: there is nothing about it that is given, natural, and "thing-like." Furthermore, not only does desire seek to incorporate the desires of others; it also seeks to be *desired* and *recognized* by those others as free, negative desire. It is thus the "desire for 'recognition'." Society is human, therefore, "only as a set of Desires mutually desiring one another as Desires." Indeed, for Kojève, human history is nothing but the "history of desired Desires."[19]

Kojève's account of Hegelian desire is imaginative and influential (it impressed Sartre, especially), but it misses the crux of Hegel's argument. For Kojève, what drives desire to become social (through desiring another's desire) is the desire to be nothing but pure "*negating* Desire, and hence *Action* that *transforms* the given being," or the desire to be free from being determined by what is given.[20] In my view, this desire to be (and to be recognized as) *pure* negativity certainly plays a role later in Hegel's account; indeed, as Kojève himself points out, it is what gives rise to the life and death struggle. It does not, however, feature in the account of desire that we have been considering so far.

Hegel's own account shows not how desire seeks to become pure desire, freed from determination by independent objects, but how self-certainty is attained by a consciousness that considers independent otherness to be *irreducible*. Unlike Kojèvian desire, Hegelian desire learns that we are always conscious of what is other than and independent of us, and that we can never fulfill the desire to be purely free. For Hegel, if I am to be conscious of myself alone, I can thus do so only in relation to what is and remains independent of me. But how is this possible? Only if the other, in its very independence, negates itself and puts itself at my disposal. This in turn is possible only when another self-consciousness thinks of itself as nothing, recognizes me alone, and thereby enables me to find nothing but myself reflected in it. Gadamer puts the point perfectly: "if self-consciousness is to become true self-consciousness, then it must . . . find another self-consciousness that is willing to be 'for it'."[21]

To recapitulate: for Kojève, what drives self-consciousness to become social is its desire to *assimilate* (as well as be desired by) another's desire; for Hegel, by contrast, what renders self-consciousness social is its acceptance of the other as an *independ-*

ent source of recognition for itself. This significant difference between Kojève and Hegel leads them to very different views of what is implicit in and made necessary by social life.

According to Kojève, the direct consequence of desire's entrance into social relations is struggle and conflict. Each desire, Kojève insists, "wants to negate, to assimilate, to make its own, to subjugate, the other Desire as Desire." Furthermore, each seeks to have its exclusive right to satisfaction recognized by all other desires. "If . . . there is a *multiplicity* of these Desires for universal Recognition," Kojève concludes, "it is obvious that the Action that is born of these Desires can – at least in the beginning – be nothing but a life and death *Fight*."[22] This "fight" or struggle in turn leads to the creation of masters and slaves. Human social and historical existence is thus distinguished principally by fighting, slavery and work.

For Kojève (or, rather, for Kojève's Hegel), there is a point at which historical development stops: namely, when a community of mutual recognition is produced that puts an end to struggle and domination. (Kojève's Hegel identifies this "universal" state – somewhat bizarrely – with Napoleon's Empire.[23]) Nevertheless, what has prevailed throughout history prior to this point is nothing but struggle and domination, because these are generated by the very desire that gives rise to social interaction in the first place.

By placing struggle at the heart of social interaction (even though he believes it can be overcome), Kojève in my view paves the way (perhaps along with Nietzsche) for Sartre's bleak claim that "the essence of the relations between consciousnesses is . . . conflict." It is on the basis of this claim that Sartre then accuses Hegel of "optimism" for believing that genuinely mutual recognition is possible. Hegel is praised for his "brilliant intuition" that I "depend on the Other *in my being*"; but he is castigated for thinking "that an objective agreement can be realized between consciousnesses – by authority of the Other's recognition of me and of my recognition of the Other."[24]

Sartre's emphasis in *Being and Nothingness* on the inevitability of social conflict is notoriously uncompromising, but he is not alone in challenging what Jay Bernstein calls Hegel's "worrying 'reconciliations'."[25] Many post-Hegelians balk at Hegel's suggestion that mutual recognition is a real possibility in modern society (or perhaps even already achieved), and prefer to follow Kant in regarding recognition and respect as at most moral ideals in an essentially imperfect world. Some have even argued that the very idea of successful mutual recognition is unsustainable. Recently, for example, Alexander García Düttmann has claimed that "recognition is always embedded in a destabilizing tension . . . [and] is *always* an improper, dissimilar, one-sided recognition." Indeed, if one follows Hegel, Düttmann maintains, "recognition can become what is meant by its concept only in a struggle for life and death."[26] As we have seen, Kojève would not endorse such a definitive judgment. There is little doubt, however, that he opens the door to such judgments by claiming that the life and death struggle arises directly from the very nature of social interaction between self-consciousnesses.

In contrast to Kojève, Hegel argues that what is made necessary by the interaction between self-consciousnesses is mutual recognition rather than conflict. This does not mean that social and historical existence will in fact always be characterized

by respect and love for one's fellow human beings; Hegel is not that naïve. It means that *logically*, when all that it entails has been rendered fully explicit, genuine social interaction turns out to require mutual recognition. Hegel does not deny that social conflict constantly arises. His claim, however, is that it arises not because we are social beings as such, but because we fail to understand properly what social interaction demands.

Note that, on this interpretation, there is nothing particularly "optimistic" about Hegel's belief that mutual recognition is a real possibility for human beings. That belief is grounded in a subtle comprehension of the form that genuine intersubjectivity logically must take: if social life is to fulfill its purpose and enable us to become conscious of ourselves in relation to what is other than us, there is nothing it can be *but* mutual recognition. For the Hegelian, it is actually Sartre who has lost sight of the truth: for the assertion that social life is in essence riven with conflict – the assertion on the basis of which Sartre accuses Hegel of "optimism" – can only be made by one who himself misunderstands what true intersubjectivity entails.

For Hegel, self-consciousness must be desire; but we achieve a fully objective sense of ourselves only by relating to something irreducibly independent in which we find our own identity reflected. Such a thing can only be another self-consciousness that *recognizes* us. Logically, therefore, concrete self-consciousness must be social and intersubjective. But why should the fact that I require recognition from another mean that our relation must be one of *mutual* recognition? Hegel's answer is to be found in §§178–84 of the *Phenomenology*.[27]

Genuine self-consciousness, Hegel writes, is faced by another self-consciousness by which it finds itself recognized. It has thus "come *out of itself*": it is not just enclosed within its own interiority, but sees its identity located, as it were, "over there." In such a relation, self-consciousness certainly gains a sense of self through being recognized. Yet at the same time, Hegel maintains, it feels that it has "lost itself," precisely because it finds its own identity over there in the eyes of the other. Equally, however, self-consciousness lacks any real sense that the other is genuinely *other* than it, since it sees in the other nothing but its own self. Insofar as self-consciousness does no more than find itself recognized by another, therefore, its consciousness of both itself and the other actually remains deficient.

To remedy this situation, Hegel argues, self-consciousness must "proceed to supersede (*aufheben*) the other independent being in order thereby to become certain of *itself* as the essential being." Self-consciousness does so by withdrawing itself from the other, locating its true identity within *itself* (as it were, "over here"), and thereby overcoming its previous sense of being what it is only in and through the *other*. In making this move, however, self-consciousness loses what has been shown to be a crucial ingredient of any concrete sense of self, and thus, as Hegel puts it, "proceeds to supersede its *own* self": for by insisting that its own identity resides wholly within itself, it abandons the idea that its identity is to be found reflected in another and so is something objective.

Yet all is not lost: for, as Hegel immediately points out, this withdrawal of self-consciousness out of the other into itself is in fact ambiguous. In withdrawing into itself, consciousness does indeed recover the certainty that it is what it is in itself. In Hegel's own words, "it receives back its own self . . . [and] again becomes equal to

itself." At the same time, however, self-consciousness restores the other self-consciousness to its own proper otherness. It no longer sees the other merely as a mirror reflecting it, but "equally gives the other self-consciousness back again to itself . . . and thus lets the other again go free (*entläßt also das Andere wieder frei*)."[28] That is to say, self-consciousness *recognizes* the other as another free and independent self-consciousness. The action of self-consciousness is ambiguous for this reason: by withdrawing out of the other wholly into *itself*, self-consciousness lets the other go free, and thereby unwittingly affords itself for the first time the opportunity to be recognized by, and to find itself in, another that it knows to be genuinely *other* than it.

To begin with, self-consciousness did not "see the other as an essential being," because in the other it saw only itself. Yet it did not enjoy an unalloyed sense of self either, since it found itself "over there" in another (that it did not properly recognize). Now, by contrast, self-consciousness has a clear sense of its own identity and recognizes that the other is something wholly other than and independent of itself. Consequently, it can at last fulfill the condition required for concrete self-consciousness: for it can find *itself* recognized by and reflected in another that is known to be truly *other*.

Achieving self-consciousness, as we have seen, requires that I relate to myself in relating to that which is other than me. This means that I must relate to another self-consciousness that recognizes me alone. Self-consciousness must, therefore, be social and intersubjective. We now know that by itself recognition accorded to me by the other is not sufficient to enable me to be concretely self-conscious. To attain that end I must be recognized by another that I recognize in turn as a free and independent other. Genuine self-consciousness thus requires not just recognition of my identity by the other, but *mutual* recognition by each of us of the other. Self-consciousness must be a "double movement of the two self-consciousnesses" working freely together. In such a movement, Hegel writes, "each sees the *other* do the same as it does; each does itself what it demands of the other, and therefore also does what it does only in so far as the other does the same. Action by one side only would be useless because what is to happen can only be brought about by both."

Mutual recognition, for Hegel, requires the uncoerced cooperation of the two (or more) self-consciousnesses involved. Indeed, not only must the two self-consciousnesses freely recognize one another; in fact, they must both *recognize* that their mutual recognition and cooperation is needed for either to be concretely and objectively self-conscious. In Hegel's own words, they must "*recognize* themselves as *mutually recognizing* one another."

As Williams points out, genuine self-consciousness involves much more than mere desire (though it must also incorporate desire). Whereas desire "seiz[es] upon and negat[es] the object," genuine self-consciousness requires recognition from the other, which in turn entails "allowing the other to be what it is" and "letting the other go free." Self-consciousness would like to know only *itself* in the other and be the sole object of the other's recognition. Such self-certainty can be achieved, however, only "through membership or partnership with Other."[29] For one person to have a concrete and objective understanding of himself, he must join together with somebody else.

Note that, in the paragraphs we have been considering, Hegel is not merely setting out a moral ideal for humanity. He is unfolding with uncompromising rigor the necessary conditions for concrete self-consciousness. He shows that, as beings who are by necessity conscious of what is other than ourselves, we can achieve certainty of ourselves only when we are recognized by another whom we recognize as free in turn. This conception of mutual recognition, I contend, lies at the heart of Hegel's whole social and political philosophy.

The Dialectic of Master and Slave

According to Hegel, conflict is not produced by the logic that renders social interaction necessary in the first place. It is generated, however, by a primitive self-consciousness that fails to appreciate the importance of mutual recognition. Indeed, it is generated when self-consciousness is animated by a desire similar to that described by Kojève: the desire to be recognized as the activity of pure *negating*. Such desire is not sheer, self-absorbed desire as such, since it seeks recognition from another. Nevertheless, it wants to be recognized as "self-equal through the exclusion from itself of everything else" and thus as "the purely negative being of self-identical consciousness."[30] As Hegel demonstrates, this desire is profoundly contradictory.

Such self-consciousness wants to show that it is not bound to or limited by anything it is given to be by nature, that its identity is not tied to its sex, age, skin color, or anything to do with its body. Indeed, it wants to show that it is not even attached to life. It also wants to prove that it is not restricted by anything or anybody outside it. Such self-consciousness thus regards itself as absolutely free from determination or limitation by anything given to or other than itself. It tries to demonstrate this freedom in two ways: by seeking the death of the other and by ostentatiously risking its own life in the process. In this way, it shows that it values nothing except its own freedom or pure "being-for-self." Indeed, it shows that, in its own eyes, its own identity consists in nothing but the pure activity of *negating* anything given to or other than itself. Nowhere in his account does Hegel suggest that primitive self-consciousness thinks of itself as an "emptiness" that seeks to be "filled." Kojève is, however, right to say that it takes itself to be pure "negating-negativity." It is this desire to prove itself to be pure freedom and negativity by killing the other – a desire that animates each self-consciousness – that leads to the life and death struggle. This struggle is thus generated not by any scarcity of resources – or, as Paul Redding suggests, by the desire to "preserve life" – but, rather, by a primitive *idea* of freedom.[31]

Primitive self-consciousness not only wants to be free, it also wants to be recognized by the other as free. It wants the other to see that it is trying to kill the other and risking its own life in so doing. This desire for recognition is what plunges such self-consciousness into self-contradiction. Robert Solomon puts the point well: "insofar as one's identity arises and is defined only with other people, killing the others is self-defeating, for one loses precisely that source of recognition that one has come to require."[32] If either self-consciousness is to attain recognition, therefore, one of them must back down. This is not to say that in every such struggle one party

will in fact back down, but that the *logic* of the situation requires that one capitulate. The one that does so shows thereby that it is not absolutely free after all. It is actually attached to life and afraid of death, and accepts that its identity is (at least in part) determined and limited by what is given to and other than it. This consciousness thus acknowledges that its identity *depends* on its own body and the realm of natural things around it, and in consciousness of this dependence it becomes the servant, bondsman, or slave of the other. The other self-consciousness, having succeeded in proving itself to be absolutely free and fearless, is recognized by the slave as his (or her) lord and master. The life and death struggle thus leads logically – if not always in fact – to the relation of master and slave.

This relation – Hegel's famous account of which profoundly influenced Marx – is not intrinsic to social life. It is not to be encountered, for example, where there is genuine mutual recognition. It is the result of a struggle for recognition by two (or more) *primitive* self-consciousnesses, one of which – the slave – finally accepts what Tom Rockmore rightly calls the "deep truth" that "life is as essential to it as pure self-consciousness" and thereby lets the other enjoy the feeling of unencumbered freedom.[33]

The relation between the master and the slave is complex. The master, Hegel says, dominates the slave indirectly, insofar as he exercises power over the very things in the world on which the slave acknowledges himself to be dependent. Yet the master also wields direct power over the slave and – both literally and figuratively – interposes the slave between himself and the things he plans to appropriate. This fact, that "the lord relates himself mediately to the thing through the bondsman," is especially important, because it explains why the master finds a level of satisfaction that eludes simple desire.[34]

Desire, we recall, negates and consumes things; but it also runs up against the independence of things, and so fails to "have done with the thing altogether" and thereby to achieve complete satisfaction. By interposing the slave between himself and things, the master succeeds in separating these two sides of desire from one another. He leaves the slave to deal with the independence and resistant "thereness" of the thing, and reserves for himself "the pure enjoyment of it." With the help of the slave, the master thus frees himself from the frustrations of desire and revels in the pure joy of consuming.[35]

By contrast, the slave faces what he regards as a world of unyielding independent objects. Yet the slave is still self-conscious desire himself and, as such, enjoys a degree of freedom to negate things. His activity of negation cannot, however, go so far as the consuming and destroying of things, but must restrict itself to transforming things that continue to be regarded as independent. This activity of transformative negation Hegel calls *work* or *labor*. (Hegel's point, by the way, is not that slaves may only ever work and never eat, but that they understand their distinctive activity *qua* slaves – rather than human beings as such – to be labor.) Labor, for Hegel, is thus desiring activity that meets resistance from things and so is "held in check" (*gehemmt*).[36] It does not negate the thing completely but reworks it – by, say, cooking it or giving it a new shape – into an object for the master's pleasure. The master is thus able to appropriate an object that is no longer regarded as wholly independent but looked upon merely as a means to his enjoyment. In the master/slave relation, therefore,

desire is split into the distinct activities of production and consumption: one person labors and produces so that the other may consume and in so doing enjoy *himself* thoroughly.

A similar division between production and consumption is, of course, judged by Marx later in the nineteenth century to be inherent in capitalism. Whereas Marx, however, points to what he regards as an objective division in bourgeois society, Hegel – at least in the *Phenomenology* – is interested purely in the way in which certain forms of consciousness understand themselves. He is not claiming that the master is in fact free to do nothing but consume, but only that he takes himself to be free in this way (and that the slave reinforces this by taking himself to be bound to never-ending labor). Hegel immediately points out, however, that the master's own experience undermines the cosy conception that he has of himself.

The problem faced by the master is twofold. On the one hand, though he receives recognition from the slave, the master does not recognize the slave in turn, and so cannot find true value in the slave's recognition of him. The outcome, Hegel writes, "is a recognition that is one-sided and unequal."[37] On the other hand, the very relation that embodies for the master his absolute freedom – his dominance over the slave – also reminds him that in his freedom he is actually dependent on another. As Loewenberg's fictional characters, Hardith and Meredy, put it, the master's "need for recognition . . . is inimical to his self-sufficiency," and he "comes in the end to be haunted by a consciousness of dependence not dissimilar to that of the slave."[38] In this sense, the master sees the *truth* of his own situation expressed in the slave, and that truth proves to be uncomfortably double-edged: the absolute dominance of one person over another always *depends* on the subservience of the latter.

There is a further sense, however, in which "the *truth* of the independent consciousness" – the master – is to be found by looking to the slave: for in the slave we begin to see what the freedom and independence to which the master lays exclusive claim are *in truth*. "Just as lordship showed that its essential nature is the reverse of what it wants to be," Hegel writes, "so too servitude in its consummation will really turn into the opposite of what it immediately is . . . and be transformed into a truly independent consciousness." This does *not* mean, as Hyppolite famously suggests, that the master turns out to be "the slave of the slave, and that the slave is revealed to be the master of the master." It means, rather, as Solomon recognizes, that "the master becomes dependent on the slave; [and] the slave becomes *independent* of the master."[39]

How, then, does the slave prove to be free? First of all, through his labor: for, even though he is forced to work by the master, his labor is nonetheless his *own* activity. Furthermore, unlike the master's unchecked desire, which consumes the object and leaves nothing behind to mark its activity, labor enables the slave to give enduring objective expression to his freedom. The very independence of the thing for the slave preserves the work that the slave has done on it; so, "in fashioning the thing, the bondsman's own negativity, his being-for-self, becomes an object for him."[40] The slave may not find himself recognized by the other self-consciousness, but he does find his freedom *embodied* in the object of his labor.

Equally important to the slave's freedom is his fear of death. In the original life and death struggle, both self-consciousnesses seek recognition for themselves as

"purely negative being" – being that is "self-identical" yet not tied to being anything in particular.[41] The master succeeds in gaining such recognition for himself, and gives expression to his sense of being "purely negative" in the unceasing consumption of objects around him. The slave, on the other hand, regards himself as bound to and defined by the given particularities of nature, and so appears to have no sense of being purely negative. Hegel points out, however, that in the fear of death the slave does in fact conceive of himself as sheer negativity after all: for in the moment of fear he envisages himself being *dead* and so being *nothing*. The slave does not merely register the fact that he will die at some time in the future; he thinks of himself as *being* dead and *being* nothing *now*. That, indeed, is what terrifies him: he sees everything about himself "inwardly dissolved" (*innerlich aufgelöst*) and "shaken to its foundations," and he trembles at the thought of actually being nothing whatsoever. Even though he shudders at it, the slave at this point entertains the thought of himself as *being*, yet being nothing in particular. He thus thinks of himself in a way that seemed to be reserved for the master alone, namely, as "pure negativity." As Kojève puts it, the slave in his fear catches "a glimpse of himself as nothingness."[42]

Fear by itself, Hegel remarks, is "inward and mute": it causes the slave to quake inside, but not to go out and actively negate the things around him.[43] Nevertheless, fear is not simply debilitating, for it deepens the sense of freedom that the slave gains through labor. Fear is sometimes understood by commentators merely to be that which forces the slave to labor in the service of the master in the first place. Hegel's point, however, is more subtle than that: it is that fear alters the slave's understanding of the meaning of labor itself.

The slave has to labor because he is subservient to the master. Through his labor, however, the slave discovers that he has the freedom to transform things himself and, indeed, to transform them according to his own will and intention. In working on things, he thus acquires what Hegel calls "a mind of his own" (*eigener Sinn*). The slave's freedom, however, is the freedom to transform the *particular* things that he encounters: to turn this piece of wood into a chair or these ingredients into bread. Accordingly, the slave develops *particular* skills, depending on what he is required to work on. The freedom that he exhibits in his labor is thus still a limited freedom: it consists in the *particular* ability to give new shape to these *particular* objects, and bears witness to the fact that the slave's consciousness is still mired in the world of given particularities (or, as Hegel puts it, that "determinate being still *in principle* attaches to it").

If the slave's freedom were to lie only in his ability to labor, then his identity would be defined solely by the particular skills that he possesses. They would be everything to him, and he would insist on being able to exercise them. The "mind of his own" that he acquires through his labor would thus slip into stubborn "self-will" or *Eigensinn*. Furthermore, he would show himself to be wholly dependent on – and slave to – his particular skills. His freedom would thus be "a freedom which is still enmeshed in servitude." He would evince "a skill which is master (*mächtig*) over some things, but not over . . . the whole of objective being."[44]

The character of the slave's labor is quite different, however, when it is preceded by the fear of death. In the fear of death, the slave quakes at the thought of being nothing at all; yet at the same time, Hegel suggests, the slave in his fear experiences

his own "essential nature." The slave discovers that he retains a consciousness of *himself*, even when he understands everything about himself to have been "dissolved." He learns thereby that, ultimately, his being as a self-consciousness is not tied to being anything in particular. The slave thus realizes that the essential nature of self-consciousness is "*pure being for self*" (and in so doing somewhat resembles Descartes at the beginning of the second Meditation). It is this new understanding of himself, gained in the fear of death, that transforms the slave's understanding of his labor: for he can now understand his labor, not just as the exercise of a particular skill, but as the outward, active expression of the fact that his being as self-consciousness is *not tied to being anything in particular*. In other words, his labor can be regarded as a particular expression of his essential freedom *from* particularity and determinacy. Without the fear of death, the slave understands his labor to be nothing more than a particular skill; with the fear of death, however, he can understand his labor to be the work of his "negativity *per se*" or his "universal formative activity." He can thus see himself as master not just over some things, but over "the whole of objective being."[45]

Kojève recognizes that in the fear of death the slave confronts his own nothingness. Yet he does not appear to note Hegel's principal point: the slave's consciousness that his essence lies in being nothing in particular affords him a profound sense of freedom by allowing him to uncouple his identity from the particular labor he undertakes. The Hegelian slave does not regard his particular skills as defining who he is, but sees them as particular expressions of his *general* ability to negate and transform things. He is thus not just a one- (or two- or three-) dimensional being but, rather, a multidimensional being who knows that he can engage in all kinds of labor and is not tied to this or that particular job. Indeed, Hegel's slave may be said to share a similar vision to Marx. In the slave's world, as in communist society, no one is restricted to "one exclusive sphere of activity but each can become accomplished in any branch he wishes"; as a result, "there are no painters but at most people who engage in painting among other activities."[46] The significant difference between Hegel's slave and Marx, however, is that the slave acquires his sense of inner freedom through envisaging his own death, whereas Marx appears to neglect the topic of death altogether.

Death, Forgiveness, and Mutual Recognition

The master's claim to absolute self-sufficiency was vitiated by his sense of dependence; the slave, by contrast, turns out to enjoy a profound sense of freedom through his labor. The slave also feels himself to be pure negativity, though unlike the master he gives expression to this feeling in his labor rather than in consumption. The slave does not, however, attain complete freedom or self-consciousness, since he remains – outwardly, at least – subservient to his master and does not participate in a community of mutual recognition (which, by definition, requires the abolition of slavery). Nevertheless, there is much to be learned about true freedom from the slave.

Besides enjoying and conferring recognition (and having desires), the truly free self-consciousness must acknowledge that life and embodiment are essential to it and that it must engage in labor. It must also bring to mind its own death: for in envisaging itself being dead, it discovers that it retains a consciousness of itself, even in seeing everything about itself dissolved. It thus learns that its identity as a self-consciousness is not tied to being anything in particular, and that it does not need to cling on to its particularity in order to *be*. Bringing death to mind thus teaches us that we can let go of our particularity and still retain a consciousness of ourselves. We can give up this work or that and still retain the freedom to engage in other kinds of labor. This is not to deny that the particular identity we acquire in our chosen profession may be very important to us. It is simply to point out that that particular identity is not *absolutely* essential to our sense of selfhood, because it is always possible for us to find freedom in doing something else.

In a community of true freedom and mutual recognition, it will no longer be necessary to seek certainty of oneself through a struggle for recognition, or for some people to become slaves through fear of dying violently at the hands of another. Yet we will still need to be taught to let go of ourselves through being kept mindful of our mortality. The task of doing so, Hegel believes, falls to religion. An essential part of religious life, for Hegel, is thus keeping death in mind. This is not meant to lead to indifference, recklessness, or the actual desire to die. Religious faith trusts, rather, that we can be brought to a simple and honest acceptance of the fact that we are born to die, and that with that acceptance we will cease trying to cling on insistently to who we are. That in turn will afford us – within life – a sense of inner freedom, and will free us especially to love and forgive others.

In his 1821 manuscript for his *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, Hegel maintains that the intimate connection between the acceptance of death and love for others is revealed supremely in the figure of Christ. "Love," Hegel writes, consists

> in giving up one's personality, all that is one's own, etc. [It is] a self-conscious activity, the supreme surrender [of oneself] in the other, even in this most extrinsic other-being of death . . . . The death of Christ [is] the vision of this love itself.[47]

The true religious life is thus one spent not in pursuit of other-worldly salvation, but in seeking to be infused here and now with the spirit of Christ – the spirit that lets death come and so lets itself be displaced, and in so doing shows love and forgiveness to others.

For the religious believer, therefore, death is not simply an object of fear (though the fear of death will never be completely removed); nor is it in any way an object of eager desire. Death is the utter negation of the self, the openness to and humble acceptance of which frees us to let go of ourselves and "forgive those who sin against us." In the *Phenomenology*, Hegel writes that forgiveness of others involves the "renunciation" of oneself: it entails ceasing to cling on to oneself and one's own "hard-hearted" judgment and giving the other a second chance. Forgiveness, for Hegel, thereby becomes the ground of reconciliation between individuals. Indeed, it makes possible the "reciprocal recognition which is *absolute* Spirit." In forgiving the other, I do not insist on subjecting the other to my own self-righteous judgment,

but "let the other again go free"; I recognize thereby that, whatever he or she may have done, the other is always free to love, forgive and so recognize others in turn, including me. By making forgiveness possible, the open acceptance of death thus turns out to lead to the mutual recognition that is the condition of true freedom and self-consciousness.[48]

Mutual recognition must take the secular form of life in a state that guarantees rights under law. In Hegel's view, however, mutual recognition also requires a *religious* ground: for we need to know that it is compatible with the existential fact that we are born to die. Georges Bataille maintains that death or "dismemberment" is "not easily reconciled with the desire for recognition."[49] Religious faith, by contrast, knows that this is not unambiguously true. Death itself certainly destroys life and so removes the possibility of giving or receiving recognition (as the slave well understands). Yet an openness to and acceptance of death *within the very life we seek to preserve* makes possible forgiveness and with it mutual love and respect. For this reason, religion puts the acceptance of death at the heart of human life and understands such life (with all the labor and toil that it involves) to be renewed or "reborn" through it.

For Hegel, religion is thus integral to the community that is to be held together by loving, respectful unity with others, rather than by force and enslavement. It is in such a community that we find ourselves recognized as free and so gain genuine self-consciousness. Hegel's argument also suggests that such a community is the place in which genuine "life after death" is to be found. To my mind, this Hegelian idea that self-consciousness, recognition, and the acceptance of death are inseparably connected is one of the most profound in the history of Western philosophy, and it is one we would do well to pay heed to today.

Notes

1 Williams (1997), p. 101.
2 Hegel (1971), p. 171 (§431 Addition).
3 Hegel (1971), p. 172 (§432 Addition).
4 Loewenberg (1965), p. 83.
5 Hegel (1977), pp. 101–2 (§§163–4).
6 Hegel (1977), p. 103 (§165).
7 Descartes (1984), vol. 2, p. 24.
8 Hegel (1977), p. 105 (§167); Hyppolite (1974), p. 160.
9 Rosen (1998), p. 237.
10 Kojève (1980), pp. 38–40; Hegel (1977), pp. 105, 109 (§§167, 174).
11 Hegel (1977), p. 109 (§175).
12 Butler (1987), p. 91; Hegel (1977), p. 109 (§175).
13 Hegel (1977), p. 109 (§175). See also Lauer (1976, p. 99) and Pinkard (1994, p. 52).
14 Hegel (1977), p. 108 (§171).
15 Hegel (1977), p. 110 (§176).
16 Hegel (1977), p. 110 (§§175–6).
17 Gadamer (1976), p. 61.

18 Hegel (1977), p. 110 (§§176–7).
19 Kojève (1980), pp. 4, 6–7, 40.
20 Kojève (1980), p. 38.
21 Gadamer (1976), pp. 61–2.
22 Kojève (1980), p. 40.
23 Kojève (1980), pp. 58, 69.
24 Sartre (1958), pp. 237, 240, 429.
25 Bernstein (1984), p. 14.
26 Düttmann (2000), p. 191.
27 Hegel (1977), pp. 111–12.
28 Translation emended.
29 Williams (1992), p. 155.
30 Hegel (1977), p. 113 (§186).
31 Kojève (1980), pp. 4–5; Redding (1991), p. 182; Hegel (1977), pp. 113–14 (§§186–7).
32 Solomon (1983), p. 450.
33 Rockmore (1997), p. 69; Hegel (1977), p. 115 (§189).
34 Hegel (1977), p. 115 (§190).
35 Hegel (1977), p. 116 (§190).
36 Hegel (1977), p. 118 (§195).
37 Hegel (1977), p. 116 (§191).
38 Loewenberg (1965), p. 88.
39 Hegel (1977), p. 117 (§193); Hyppolite (1974), p. 172; Solomon (1983), p. 451, my emphasis.
40 Hegel (1977), p. 118 (§196).
41 Hegel (1977), p. 113 (§186).
42 Kojève (1980), p. 47; Hegel (1977), p. 117 (§194). Miller translates "*innerlich aufgelöst*" as "quite unmanned."
43 Hegel (1977), p. 119 (§196).
44 Hegel (1977), p. 119 (§196).
45 Hegel (1977), pp. 117, 119 (§§194, 196).
46 Marx (1977), pp. 169, 190.
47 Hegel (1984–7), vol. 3, 125.
48 Hegel (1977), pp. 407–8 (§670).
49 Bataille (1997), p. 289.

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