Chapter 34

With Child to See any Strange Thing: Everyday Life in the City

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The question is not so much do we notice (attend to) the city? No doubt we do. Rather the point is, how do we notice it? For long periods of time, I suspect we notice very little at all, at least in the accepted sense of the term. Rather "we" are very small parts of a "transhuman" field of activity which ebbs and flows. Our urban world, in other words, is rather like Musil's monuments, there and not there, only fitfully attended to.

> There is nothing in the world as invisible as a monument. They are no doubt erected to be seen – indeed to attract attention. But at the same time they are impregnated with something that repels attention, causing the glance to roll right off, like water droplets off an oil cloth, without even pausing for a moment. You can walk down the street for months, know every address, every shop window, every policeman along the way, and you would even miss a coin that someone dropped on the sidewalk; but you are very surprised when, one day, staring up at a pretty chambermaid on the first floor of a building, you notice a not-at-all tiny plaque on which, engraved in indelible letters, you read that from eighteen hundred and a little more the unforgettable so-and-so lived and created here. Many people have the same experience even with larger than life-sized statues . . . You never look at them, and do not usually have the slightest notion of whom they are supposed to represent, except that maybe you know if it's a man or a woman (Musil cited in Anderson 1998: 61).

Over the years, one literature has tried to understand how we notice the city – and, I might add, how it notices us – and it is this literature that I aim to summarize in this chapter. It is a strange literature, attempting to bring something into the light yet well aware of the shadowy necessity of dreams and superstitions, deeply intellectual yet desperate to capture the sensuous bend and sway of bodies in motion, cleaving to the notion of the chance encounter yet just as strongly attached to notions of predestination. It is a literature about the city as experienced – the murmurs, the glances, the song, and the dance – yet the nature of that experience, and how, and even if it can be represented, is precisely what is at issue.

This mainly twentieth-century literature is usually referred to as a literature on "everyday life" in the city and it takes in tangled surrealist authors like Breton (e.g. Cohen 1993), lonely visionaries like Benjamin (e.g. Buck-Morss 1989; Gilloch 1997; Caygill 1998), perpetual revolutionaries like Debord and the other situationists (Sadler 1998), forensic romantics like de Certeau (Ahearne 1996), and Marxists becoming something else like Henri Lefebvre (Shields 1998). For this motley crew, the city is more than just a "pragmatic disruption of singularities" (Benjamin 1915: 37, cited in Caygill 1998: 9). Rather, it is a place in which it is possible to press the bounds of experience, find redemption, make new dreams. It is a lost and found place which, rather like Peter Ackroyd's sequence of London novels, always contains something hidden which we can just touch, if we but try.

For those writers, the city makes philosophically inclined theory into a new political site within which conduct can gather and be transformed. Nice work, if you can get it. But can you? In this short chapter, I want to provide a synthetic account of these writers' work which is sympathetic but also critical. I will suggest that they are engaged in an analysis of the city which is double-edged and that this tension in their works is never resolved.

But I will argue that this work can be used to produce new and productive readings of the city. Therefore, in what follows, I will begin to clear the ground by attending to the side of these writers' urban encounters which has not stood the test of time. Then I will attend to that side of these writers' work that has continued to resonate. In the third part of the chapter I will consider the new work which has taken up the challenge that these writers offer.

The Case for the Prosecution

There is a dark side to these authors' urban writings which seems to elide precisely the object of their sympathy: ongoing practices of going on. Thus an account of the city is too often produced which is as exclusionary as the forces these writers intend to combat. Why might this be? There are, I think, three reasons. The first is, quite simply, location. The cities that these writers consider are doubly centered. They are nearly all important urban centers – pivots of the world – and, more than that, their writing nearly all concerns the central cores of such cities. It is difficult to think of the situationists in Stevenage, de Certeau in Catford, or Lefebvre in Lewisham – though it is a beguiling prospect. In particular, where suburbs exist in their writings – if they exist at all – they are rejected as inert, conformist, and oppressive, the haunts of the intellectually challenged (Silverstone 1997).

The second and more complex reason is that these writers want to pull in cities – or at least the parts of cities that count – as their prime exemplars of the commodification of everyday life in modernity. According to most of these accounts there has been a remorseless drive to commodification which leaves precious little room for anything but a homogenized conformity. Consumption is but a mirror of mass production, valuing objects simply because they are new. Consumption therefore becomes conformist drudgery. Contact between people is swallowed up by commodities which become animated as a result. But this Old Testament depiction, and its corresponding desire for complete historical immanence, has become harder to bear as a New Testament of commodities and consumption has been written over

the last 20 years or so which understands the process of commodification in rather different and more variegated ways which can grasp hold of the "thinginess" of things. Developments like actor-network theory have recoded the object world, producing an account which points to the sheer density of practices in which objects and humans are involved and which regards objects as conditions of possibility for thinking the world, even as means of authentication, just as much as a means of the erasure of "humanity."

The third reason is what we might call a snobbish romanticism about the city and its inhabitants. These authors want to believe that the city is an all-consuming capitalist machine, a space of superordinate strategies, and, at the same time, a treasure trove of chance encounters which allow us to see round the dominant system, a subordinate space of tactics. Following nineteenth-century writers like Baudelaire, the city is therefore able to function as a means of administering shocks which can disrupt situated forms of perception and affect the subject's ability to represent her- or himself. The city therefore promises precious moments of epiphany. At its worst, this stance can become a kind of macho heroism; the *flâneur* wanders the streets "au hasard, allowing the eye to roam randomly across the urban scene" (Prendergast 1992: 149), sometimes feeling a frisson of fear, but essentially safe to experience what may turn up. Or such a stance may be generalized out, as in the work of de Certeau, into an esthetic of resistance which writes the city as a "forest" of marginalized (and unexplained), "unplanned and unconnected," acts of resistance that conjure up "a migrational or metaphorical city" which "eludes discipline without being outside the field in which it is exercised" (de Certeau 1984: 96). But, as Bennett (1998: 75) puts it, in taking this tack de Certeau manages to make "nothing out of something," by producing an account of everyday urban life which resolutely opposes the systematic spaces of strategy to the timely acts of the weak, the visual register of survey from afar to the tactile register of feeling near to and the legitimated to the illegitimate. He erases all spaces outside the spaces of power and is therefore left to plaintively conjure up an outside to the dominant urban text without the aid of the sociological spaces – with their political hum – which have been obliterated by this move.

In other words, de Certeau illustrates the chief problem with so many accounts of everyday life in the city; they seek – often while proclaiming the exact opposite – a ground, a legitimate space of legitimate being which can be opposed to a "larger" illegitimate system. Everyday life becomes a kind of authentic "second nature," the thing itself – alive, real, immediate – which can be both celebrated and can become an object of acute nostalgia (Thrift 1996; Crook 1998). Of course, these are hardly the first accounts in social theory to do this, but they seem to be particularly prone to this vice. It is as if the very size and complexity of the modern city defeats them and they are only able to function by portraying everyday life as a kind of wonderful defeat.

To summarize, too often in work on everyday life in cities, the inhabitants of the city became ciphers caught in the swirl of modernity, condemned to endlessly repeat "new time" (Osborne 1995) by a more or less enveloping historical force – capitalism – which transforms time into "a dynamic and historical force in its own right" (Koselleck 1985: 246, cited in Osborne 1995: 11). The city is simultaneously open to the future and closed. The city is in permanent transition but to only one end.

No wonder, then, that these writers tended to fix on the particular registers of urban experience which confirmed this vision, and, indeed, in the nineteenth-century were used to create it: speed, shock, chance, bustle, noise, unsettling encounters. The city becomes a blur.

Yet, at the same time, it would be foolish to argue that these writers embody only an impulse "to reduce every order of reality to a unique vocabulary" (Hennion and Latour 1997: 4). In their desire to make the city come alive they also provide a case for their defense, to which I now turn.

The Case for the Defense

It doesn't have to be like this and in these authors' writings one can find another world than the command performance I have so briefly sketched above. This world is based, I think, on three principles.

Thus, first of all, there is the notion of experience. What each of these writers attempts to do is to understand the city as possibility. Cities shine with the light of possibility and happenstance. Granted this light may be blotted out but the resources are there. This sense of the city as a field of possibility, borne out of chance encounters, new forms of experience based, for example, on new technologies, and on the production of new more open subjectivities can be found in all these authors to at least some degree. For example, Benjamin's recasting of Kant's category of experience as a notion of speculative experience – though it might well "be judged a cautionary failure" (Caygill 1998: 3) – provides a means of opening up a new kind of reading of the city which by redefining reading more broadly also redefined what could be read. Thus

> configuration is regarded as the condition of legibility: to be legible (ie to conform to the conditions of possible reading as experience) is not the congruence of an intended meaning, but is rather the discovery of a "non sensuous similarity" between confined patterns. As the example of the dance suggests, these patterns are not exclusively spatial – for space in itself is but a particular form of "non sensuous similarity" or patterning – but can also be temporal, emphasised in accent, metre and rhythm. Indeed it is crucial for Benjamin's argument that space and time (Kant's forms of intuition) be regarded as modes of configuration whose plasticity, or openness to other forms of patterning, can "decay" or be "transformed". Space and time will feature as the givens of transcendental philosophy become modes of configuration which can be understood as providing the contours of but one among many possible configurations of experience (Caygill 1998: 5).

It follows that, on such a reading of reading, experience is constantly being redefined by modes of perambulation through the city (walking, driving, phoning, e-mailing, and so on) and by the new microclimates of movement and communication (the airport, the highway, and so on) that these perambulations demand and supply. These are the new highways and byways of experience which in turn provide all manner of expressive potentials (in the media, art and so on) which seep gradually into the general culture (Cubitt 1998).

Another way to consider the constant generation of new forms of experience is as new apprehensions of time, which the city both manifests and generates. In the work of the surrealists Benjamin and Lefebvre this is a constant theme. In Lefebvre's later

work on rhythmanalysis, experience of the city depends upon attention to rhythms whose "characteristic features are really temporal and rhythmical, not visual" (Lefebvre 1996: 223). The city is a symphony of rhythms, a perpetual renewal.

Whatever the means, the attempt is quite clear: to acknowledge the expressive potential of the city arising out of the play of possibility. These authors want to speak to the bubbling urban imaginary.

Second, this sense of how the city is experienced privileges different kinds of knowledge, and most specifically, the practical knowledges which provide the means by which cities keep going. These are the "great underground" (Taussig 1992: 26) of habitual and yet improvisational knowledges which produce most of the city's daily routine. Yet these are also the minor knowledges which have been least examined.[1] What each of these authors provides – each in their different ways – is the beginnings of a gazetteer of these knowledges based upon some clearly interconnected principles. One of these is the immense importance of embodiment, of the power of bodies to get a hold of the world through their ability to conjure up virtual "as-if" worlds and so make possibilities possible. Here, in particular, we can point to Benjamin's emphasis on mimesis, on getting hold of something by means of its likeness. But, in turn, this emphasis on the tactile appropriation of embodiment generates two further impulses. Thus, embodiment articulates and is articulated by a whole range of senses. Its tactility operates in the many registers of sensate life which can combine in many different ways. In Benjamin's terms, embodiment is "chromatic" and excessive in that as a medium it provides an almost infinite number of definitions, a constantly multiplying multiplicity. And cities both amplify and arrest the sensory load. Take sight and sound.

> Below, towards the right, a traffic light: on red, the cars stop, pedestrians cross, soft hummings, a babble of voices. One does not converse while crossing a dangerous intersection, threatened by wild animals and elephants about to leap, taxis, buses, trucks and various cars. So there is a relative silence in this crowd. A kind of soft murmur and sometimes a cry, a call.
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> Therefore, when the cars stop, people produce a completely different sound: feet and words. From left to right and vice versa and on the pavements along the perpendicular street. At the green light, step and voices stop. A second of silence and its the surge, the burst of speed of tens of cars accelerating as fast as possible (Lefebvre 1996: 220).

Then embodiment makes no sense taken apart from the "object world." Things are such a vital part of the world that they cannot be separated: they are a vital part of embodied perception. There is "a palpable, sensuous connection between the very body of the perceiver and the perceived" (Taussig 1992: 21). Objects are not inanimate; they are a part of what it is to be animate and this process is an "unstoppable merging" (Taussig 1992: 25). Thus, to quote the early Benjamin, "they perceive us; their gaze propels us into the future, since we do not respond to them but instead step among them" (Benjamin 1914, cited in Caygill 1998: 8). In other words, "the passage from the subject to the object requires neither a leap of analysis, nor the crossing of the desert" (Lefebvre 1996: 227). Close to practice such distinctions became all but meaningless. Indeed in Lefebvre's notion of rhythm, the idea is clearly to produce a term which passes between such distinctions. It gives a positive role to the material presence of objects and, in doing so, it does not allow them to become just commodities.

> Continue and you will see this [courtyard] garden and the objects (which have nothing to do with things) polyrhythmically, or, if you prefer, symphonically. Instead of a collection of congealed things, you will follow each being, each body, as having above all, its time. Each therefore having its place, its rhythms, with its immediate past, a near future and hereafter (Lefebvre 1996: 223–4).

Then, third, each of these writers wants to write the city in new ways. Most particularly they want to write the city in such a way as to make it clear that the city is not only about writing. And writing is not just about the mechanics of capturing the city in print. The ambition goes much farther than that. To begin with, it is an attempt to make the city legible in a whole series of registers. Benjamin's agonized organization and reorganization of the *Passagen Werk*, de Certeau's poetics, Lefebvre's rhythmanalysis – these are all attempts to free the city to perform across the spectrum of possibilities. Then, the inclination is to write the city as a complex entity, able to hold many different and ongoing projects in tension, able to encompass numerous spaces and times in continual transformation, able to admit of other possible features. Thus, for Lefebvre (1985: 110), for example:

> To think about the city is to hold and maintain its conflictual aspects: constraints and possibilities, peacefulness and violence, meetings and solitude, gatherings and separation, the trivial and the poetic, brutal fundamentalism and surprising improvisation . . . One can hope that it will turn out well but the urban can become the centre of barbarity, domination, dependence, and exploitation . . . In thinking about these perspectives, let us leave a place for events, initiatives, decisions. All the hands have not been played. The sense of history does not suppose any historic determinism, any destiny.

Expressing this complexity may involve metaphors, such as Benjamin's notion of porosity, crucial to the rendering of Naples; or it may involve an understanding of the different rhythms which punctuate daily life, as in Lefebvre's rhythmanalysis of Mediterranean cities. The point is that the ambition to write complexity complexly, means that it is not possible to either "meticulously [describe] a privileged and known place, or throw ourselves into a lyricism aroused by the splendour of the cities evoked" (Lefebvre 1996: 240). Something else is needed. Then, the desire to write the city may often involve capturing the role, the ache, of speculative moments, of situations, by attempting to produce situations. Thus writing becomes something ever wider, something theatrical, and performative. What is clear, then, is that writing the city can be approached in many ways, through poetry, through novels, through theater, through situationist setups. Writing, becomes, in other words, a more general practice of inscription and citation.

Coda

The theorists of everyday life in the city have continued to provide stimulation for those studying the city. But, increasingly, these ideas now form a platform from which their work has been taken in other directions, directions which they may or may not have dreamed of. In this third section, I want to argue that the intellectual and practical boost given by the theorists of everyday life has now become general across the social sciences and promises – in the fullness of time – to produce new senses of how the city can be noticed.

In particular, I will argue that a whole brew of new ideas on the three most positive elements of the work of theorists of everyday life in the city – from the vitalist pragmatics of writers like Deleuze, through feminist accounts of poiesis, through actor-network theory, to so-called discursive psychology, all of which stress the nonrepresentational – has put a powerful spin on these ideas.

Thus, to begin with, the emphasis on the city as a field of possibility has been invigorated by chance encounters with other theoretical traditions – for example, the social psychology of Bakhtin, Voloshinov and others – which have extended our understanding of the city as a skilled accomplishment, based on the improvisatory "fictions" of practical knowledges which constitute the lore of the city. These fictions are dialogical phenomena which

> constitute a third sphere of events, distant from both action and behaviour: (i) they cannot be accounted simply as actions (for they are not done by individuals, thus they cannot be explained by giving a person's reasons); neither (ii) can they be treated as simply "just happening" behaviour (to be explained by discovering their causes); (iii) they occur in a chaotic zone of indeterminacy or uncertainty in between the other two spheres. And as such, although continuing aspects of each, occurrence in this sphere do not seem amenable to any clear characterisations at all. Indeed, although not wholly unspecified, it is their very lack of any final specificity, their lack of a completely predetermined structure, and thus their openness to being determined further by those involved in them, in practice . . . that is their central defining feature (Shotter and Billig 1998: 27).

In particular, this open sense of possibility has led to a consideration of embodied activity which is intent on understanding bodies' ability to conjure up "virtual" urban worlds – play, dreams, daydreams, and the like – which through their own imaginary mutability are able to both confirm and extend the city's own constant metamorphosis (Bowlby 1998; Steedman 1998). Thus it is that the city finds expression; "streets in perpetual motions as in dreams, where it's the city which dreams itself, navigating in all directions through the strata of rock, life and meaning which make up its layers, progressively re-inventing the laws of its unstable gravitation" (Réda 1986, cited in Sheringham 1996: 105). Thus, as Sheringham (1996) so nicely puts it, there is a shift from the imaginary city to the imaginative city, actively caught up in self-invention. In Réda's (1977, 1987, 1982) works for example, the subject is absorbed into the city, like one of the leaves on a tree shivering in the breeze, or what Réda (1987) calls a "reflective antenna," becoming a small part of spaces which possess sufficient practical resemblances – "emptiness, theatricality, darkness, alternatives of frenetic activity and quiescence, noise and silence, endless repetitions and series – of gestures (in the theatre), objects (in the library), financial transactions (in the Bourse), messages (at the post offices)" (Sheringham 1996: 109) – to provide a kind of imaginative resonance which is itself a crucial urban resource. The cities' practices echo through each other producing ghostly lines of interference.

Of course, none of this is to suggest that practices of oppression don't exist in the city: this is not a naive or a utopian vision. Rather it is to suggest two things. One is that practices of oppression are themselves created by skilled improvisations. They are as anthropologically charged and as dialogical as any other aspect of culture: they too are a part of everyday life. Then, much of the power of practices to dictate the course of events comes from the remorseless buildup of small and fleeting detail

in speech and objects which "points" towards certain conclusions without requiring conscious articulation, what Shotter and Billig (1998) have argued operates as a "dialogic unconscious." For example, "in the gaps between and within words, involving the dialogic gaps filled by the little unnoticed words, ideology inserts itself and so is reproduced while speakers direct their consciousness on to matters where the dialectics of justification and altruism can be safely limited" (Shotter and Billig 1998: 21).

Then, to pass on to the second important element of the work of the theorists of everyday life, cities must be seen as repositories of practical knowledge but this practical knowledge is constantly transmuting. One of these transmutations is that cities have become repositories of "objectivity"; they are – increasingly – crowded with objects which – increasingly – "speak back." Objects become more "person"-like, just as persons have become more "object"-like (Gell 1998; Boyne 1998). However, cities are not therefore assuming a "posthuman" character, as argued in some of the more fraught and exaggerated interpretations of information technologies now current, such as Virilio's writings on the city (e.g. Virilio 1991), but rather a transhuman one, in which we dwell among badly analyzed composites – networks of flesh and machines – and are ourselves badly analyzed composites, to paraphrase Deleuze (1994). What is clear is that in this world of weak subjectivity (Guattari 1997),

> It is not a question of humanizing the universe of machines so that everywhere one sees only the mirror image of our own desire for control, influence, design, and mastery. Human thought clearly plays a major role in the evolution of a machinic phylogenesis, but it is hubris which leads them to the positioning of the human, all too human as the meaning and telos of this machinism. For the greater part of evolution human thought has relied on the mediation of technical machines – an ongoing mnemotechnics is constitutive of human thinking – but this cannot mean that the thought that is generated can be characterised as solely or strictly "human" in terms of some ethic of possessive individualism. Thought is "transhuman" in all the senses of the word one cares to think of. The music which these machines speak does not provide access to a single, unsocial truth of Being, as if *techne* possessed an essence available only to humans as part of their supposed unique and privileged residency in the cosmos; rather, machines provide pathic and cartographic access to a plurality of beings and of worlds (Ansell-Pearson 1998: 6).

In turn this transhuman order is constantly multiplying time and spaces[2]. The city becomes a series of silhouettes of silhouettes which "overlook" each other, an "oligopticon" (Latour and Hermant 1998).

Another transmutation is that practical knowledges have thus become increasingly concerned, as a result of the general expansion of these transhuman actor-networks (or actant-rhizomes, to use the Deleuzian nomenclature), with the oblique, the transparent, and the haunted; the latent, if you like. Practical knowledge of cities is haunted by apparitions which are the unintended consequences of the complexity of modern cities, cities in which multiple time-spaces are being produced, which overlap, interact, and interfere, producing hybrids which change the structure of urban experience as they are gathered in by practical knowledges.

These are knowledges of what is permitted and prohibited, present and absent, surprising and unsurprising. These are the knowledges of the gaps and the in and

betweens. These are the "flashing half-signs" (Gordon 1997: 204) which prefigure new urban topologies.

> The way of the ghost is haunting, and haunting is a very particular way of knowing what has happened or is happening. Being haunted draws us affectively, sometimes against our will and always a bit marginally, into the structure of feeling of a reality we come to experience, not as cold knowledge, but as transformative recognition (Gordon 1997: 8).

Or, to put it another way,

> A structure of feeling "actualises presence" (Williams 1977: 135) as the tangled exchange of noisy silences and seething absences. Such a tangle – of object and experience – is haunting. And haunting describes a practical consciousness that is "always more than a handling of fixed forms and units." Haunting describes just those "experiences to which the fixed forms do not speak at all, they do not recognise" (p. 130).

Or, to put it one more way, cities do not add up. Rather, they accumulate[3].

There is, then, one more positive element of the work of theorists of everyday life to build upon. That is the matter of writing. Writing cities has become an endeavor which is manifold. There has been an explosion of means of communicating the city which, nowadays, is concentrated around the term "performance." The current "performative turn" across the social sciences and humanities has provided those who are trying to communicate cities with a whole reservoir full of practices of production and disclosure of situations which have heretofore been neglected (cf. Thrift 2000). Various forms of theater, opera, concert and dance, performance art, multimedia, all have something important to contribute to an understanding of the precarious emptiness of the "now" in which practical knowledges must operate. They are, if you like, a means of conjuring up the imaginary edge of cities, both in terms of the risks all cities involve and the representations that every now and then break through and become a part of the common cultural hoard (Finnegan 1998).

Of course, performance is still irrefutably bound up with the written word. Certainly, many who are interested in performance have tried to work towards a model of "performative writing" which can capture some of the travails of performance and can constitute a performance in its own right, often taking models from poetry. But again, much performance is written in different scripts which can better capture embodied practices. For example, in television and movies there are elaborate forms of movement notation based in the mechanics of production. Similarly in dance there are movement scripts like Labanotation. But, fundamentally, much performance cannot be written down. It is unwritable, and unsayable and has to be communicated in other registers. And that is its fascination so far as the study of everyday life in the city goes; it is a living demonstration of those skills we have but cannot firmly cultivate in the linguistic domain, and it can – in the best work – provide a sense of new styles of urban living which might simultaneously produce new senses of how the world is. Indeed, in that performance is orientated towards relationally responsive events rather than referential representative forms of rationality, it can furnish us with methodologies which can banish the urge to mastery and control. After all, "only if we are prepared to change our hierarchically ordered centripetal ways, and to dialogically balance them with ones of a more centrifugal

and relational kind, can we ever hope to arrive at a psychology properly respectful of the 'little details' of people's 'inner lives', and to overcome some of the seemingly basic ideological methods of our time" (Shotter and Billig 1998: 27). In other words, the performative turn can help to plumb the meanings of democracy in ways which can be written into practice (Spinosa, Flores, and Dreyfus 1997).

Let me, then, conclude. The magical but wounded power of the city does not lie in great theatrical urban landscapes, but in the slow accumulation of skill and intuition that is the best means of coping with the elusive, phantasmic, emergent and often only just there fabric of everyday life. This "problematic" rather than "theorematic" (Deleuze and Guattari 1987) knowledge of practice provides a different means of knowing and writing the social world, one which makes common cause with the subjects and objects of its analysis by "understanding . . . the representation as contiguous with that being represented and not as suspended above and distant from the represented" (Taussig 1992: 10). Perhaps the most heartening aspect, then, of current work on everyday life in the city is its commitment to democratic methods of exploring the urban, from the detailed exigencies of relational pedagogy (e.g. McNamee and Gergen 1998; Newman and Holzman 1997) through to the grander projects of legislative theater and the like (e.g. Boal 1998). Such developments are a means of satisfying the longing for a riper, less diminished urban future by boosting the horizons of what is possible – through noticing the city in new ways.

NOTES

1. These practical knowledges have numerous minor elements, especially of gender and ethnicity, but, as I point out later, they cannot be seen as simply or even mainly transgressive (cf. Butler 1993). But, for example, women are relatively often associated with the nonvisual senses that characterize much of the literature on everyday life in the city (Classen 1998).
2. Information technology is clearly producing new times and spaces (see Cubitt 1998), but it is unwise to assume that these times and spaces are in some way transcendental. Most of them are still ad hoc assemblages.
3. Georges Perec's urban writing is a wonderful example of these kinds of insights (e.g. Perec 1987). Perec was, for a time, associated with Henri Lefebvre (Ed Soja, personal communication).

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