

Chapter 19

Capitalizing on Havana: The Return of the Repressed in a Late Socialist City

Charles Rutheiser

For much of the twentieth century, cities in socialist societies received a fraction of the attention devoted to examining the urban process under capitalism. Over the last 20 years, however, a growing body of international scholars have documented how centralized planning, the absence of market forces, and other features of a socialist “regime of urbanization” (Angotti 1993) created a variety of distinctive metropolitan forms (e.g. French and Hamilton 1979; Szelenyi 1983; D. M. Smith 1989; among others). In the 1990s the transition to postsocialist regimes intensified scholarly interest in the cities of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe (see Andrusz, Harloe, and Szelenyi 1996; Hegedüs and Tosics 1991). However, with the notable exception of a burgeoning literature on China (e.g. Chan 1994; Davis 1995; Gaubatz 1996; Wu 1997), the discourse of urbanization in the so-called socialist third world (Forbes and Thrift 1987) remains comparatively underdeveloped.

This chapter is intended as a modest contribution towards filling this discursive void by exploring the changing patterns of sociospatial organization in Havana, Cuba. Although in many respects a classic example of a primate city produced by the processes of dependent urbanization, in other aspects Havana resembles both the cosmopolitan cities of the American mainland and the erstwhile workers’ paradises of the former Eastern bloc. Its built environment is the product of a syncretic blending of five centuries of European, North American, and Latin American urban forms, and the city’s singularity is a dominant theme in the popular, scholarly, and artistic images generated by both native and foreigner alike. In short, Havana is characterized by an irreducible particularity that confounds simple generalization and classification.

The distinctive place-fullness of Havana’s imagined and physical landscapes contrasts markedly with the increasing place-lessness of many contemporary urban environments (e.g. Zukin 1991; Sorkin 1992; Rutheiser 1996). Although by no means a command and control center of the regional, much less global economy, Havana is – if not a “world city” (Knox and Taylor 1995) – at least a city in the world-historical sense. In 1982, the historic center of Havana was designated a World Heritage Center by UNESCO. Since then, the Cuban government has made

extensive efforts to restore and preserve what has been acknowledged to be part of the “cultural patrimony of humankind.”

Given the internationally recognized importance of Habana Vieja, not to mention the limited resources of the Cuban state, it is perhaps not surprising that many of the current restoration efforts are financed from abroad. Foreign investment in tourism and urban redevelopment are part of the profound socioeconomic changes taking place during what Cubans refer to as “The Special Period in Time of Peace.” Unlike other socialist societies that have withstood the demise of the Soviet bloc, such as China and Vietnam, Cuba has steadfastly resisted the turn towards large-scale market reforms of its centralized command economy. Instead, the Cuban state has sought to develop what it calls “islands of capitalism in a sea of socialism” (Eckstein 1994) through joint ventures with foreign corporate partners in select sectors of the economy, such as mining, manufacturing, and, above all, tourism, while at the same time discouraging private entrepreneurial activity by Cuban citizens. This new economic policy is known unofficially as *sociocapitalismo* or *socio-cap*.

Although foreign investment has been by no means limited to Havana – the touristic enclaves of Varadero Beach and Cayo Coco and the nickel works at Moa/Nicora are notable beneficiaries of the influx of foreign capital – sociocapitalist development has been most intensively concentrated in Havana, which remains home to one out of every five Cubans, and which continues to dominate the country’s political, economic, and sociocultural life. By contrast, the effect of foreign investment on Cuba’s secondary urban centers has been minimal.

This chapter looks at some of the effects that foreign investment and touristic-related development are having on the social and built form of Havana. Although current policies are viewed officially as a logical continuation of previous urban development strategies, sociocapitalism represents a sharp break from the urban policies and practices of the last four decades. In the argument that follows, I first briefly sketch the history of urban development in pre- and postrevolutionary Havana, before moving on to discuss some of the principal features and unintended consequences of this new regime of urbanization.

The Colonial Period, 1519–1898

For the first two and a half centuries of existence, *San Cristobal de la Habana* remained a relatively compact urban settlement oriented to maritime trade rather than its undeveloped hinterland. In the nineteenth century, trade and profits from the development of vast sugar and tobacco plantations in the interior stimulated the construction of new, extramural neighborhoods that resembled the contemporaneous urban environments then arising in Vienna, Paris, Barcelona, and other European cities (see Venegas 1990). The most characteristic features of this New Havana – celebrated by novelist Alejo Carpentier in his *Ciudad de las Columnas* (1970) – were the columned pedestrian arcades, or *portales*, that lined its major streets, as well as an architectural eclecticism that fused elements of Neoclassicism with Moorish, Baroque, Romanesque, Gothic, and even Art Nouveau (Venegas 1996). After 1868, however, Havana’s growth was slowed by three decades of nearly continuous civil war, which ended with the establishment of a US protectorate in 1898 and a nominally independent Cuba in 1902.




Figure 19.1 Havana and its neighborhoods

The Pseudo-Republic, 1898–1958

Havana's nineteenth-century growth was merely a harbinger of a more dramatic expansion during the first six decades of the twentieth century. Two distinct periods of frenzied development – the first between 1900 and 1929, the second, from 1940 to 1959 – triggered by windfall profits from the sugar industry and sustained by the complementary activities of local elites and foreign, mostly US, interests, stoked the construction of suburban subdivisions, high-rise office towers, and an extensive infrastructure to service the hundreds of thousands of US tourists that flocked annually to the island beginning in the 1920s.

With expansion came both a transformation in the use of urban space and an intensification of already existing patterns of socioeconomic specialization and segregation. As the city's more prosperous elements moved from the central districts of Habana, Centro, and Cerro to the peripheries, the former mansions of the elite and apartment buildings of the middle classes were intensively subdivided to house a growing influx of poor rural migrants, who by the 1950s arrived at a rate of more than 20,000 persons per year (Segre et al. 1997). During the latter part of the 1950s, commerce and government joined the exodus from the center. Domestic and foreign capital redeveloped the northern third of Vedado into a modernistic high-rise and high-status residential, commercial, and hotel district (see Lacey 1991: 281–301; Segre et al. 1997: 74–126), while just to the south, the Batista regime constructed a new ceremonial-administrative center around the Plaza Cívica. Built in the grandiose “modern-monumental” style favored by authoritarian regimes (Segre 1989), the plaza was appropriated by the new government and was renamed the Plaza de Revolución in 1959.

On the eve of the Revolution, nearly one-third of Havana's population lived in substandard, overcrowded, and aged dwellings located, for the most part, in the older parts of the urban core. The dense concentration of poverty in the center attracted the attention of the Batista regime, which commissioned plans to raze most of the depressed central area for a complex of high-modernist hotels, office buildings, and expressways that would connect the city to vast new speculative developments on the hitherto undeveloped lands in *Habana del Este* or East Havana (see Bastlund 1967; Segre 1989).

Enter the Revolution, 1959–1990

The advent of the Revolution halted the proposed refiguring of Havana and inadvertently preserved the historic core of the city from the uncreative destructions visited upon dozens of other American cities during the 1960s. However, the aims of the regime were not preservation, but transformation of the social order. Havana was viewed as a symbol of all that was wrong with Cuban society, and in keeping to Castro's maxim “a minimum of urbanism and a maximum of ruralism” (Gugler 1980), state investment during the 1960s focused on improving conditions in rural areas and secondary urban centers.

Within Havana itself numerous measures were taken to equalize conditions and erase class divides. The signature institutions of capitalist urbanity – real-estate

speculation, landlordism, private commerce, gambling, and prostitution – were banned, although private home ownership was not. Under a series of urban reform laws, tens of thousands of renters received title to their residences. The city's most squalid squatter settlements were demolished and their inhabitants housed in new developments (see Butterworth 1980). Most residents, however, remained in place – there was no large-scale residential resettlement of the population. Private clubs and beaches were nationalized and the glitzy, modernist hotels and office buildings of Vedado were taken over by official mass organizations. In a move that symbolized the government's new priorities, the partially completed National Bank of Cuba tower was converted into the country's largest hospital.

By the end of the 1960s, nearly all of Havana's pre-Revolutionary elite had emigrated, along with many professional and middle-class families (Eckstein 1994: 152). The emigration led to the vacancy of thousands of homes and apartments, with the heaviest concentration in the posh neighborhoods west of the Almendares River. From the outset, the government decided that these areas would not be used to rehouse the city's poor. Instead, they declared these neighborhoods to be a "frozen zone" (*zona congelada*) that would be used instead by foreign embassies, government officials, schools, and cultural institutions. Despite the freezing out of formal residential uses, some areas of the frozen zone were thoroughly "de-bourgeoisified" (Eckstein 1977) through the conversion of housing stock into dormitories for students from the provinces. The Miramar neighborhood was perhaps the most radically affected. Prior to 1959 it had been an exclusive all-white neighbourhood, but by the mid-1960s it was inhabited by a mix of foreign technicians and Cubans from all ethno-racial and socioeconomic backgrounds, including thousands from what the older residents referred to as the "lower cultural levels" (see Lewis et al. 1978).

Still, not all parts of the frozen zone experienced such a dramatic cultural leveling. The most sumptuous of the pre-Revolutionary neighborhoods, such as El Country Club and Biltmore Estates, were renamed to honor the pre-Hispanic inhabitants of the island (Cubanacan and Siboney, respectively) and, symbolically cleansed of their former associations, were used to house high government officials and foreign dignitaries. In the 1980s and 1990s, these areas were further privileged by the construction of research facilities for Cuba's emergent biotechnology industry, an international convention center, and a series of luxury hotels for foreign visitors.

Although the anti-Havana ethos of the first years of the Revolution eased somewhat after the early 1970s, the city continued to atrophy on the greatly reduced resources allocated to it. As in many other socialist countries, the state's provision of housing lagged considerably behind demand (Hamberg 1986; Eckstein 1994). Even more importantly, the government also lacked the means to maintain old buildings and infrastructure. By the late 1980s the state reluctantly acknowledged that Havana suffered from many of the same problems that beset capitalist cities. According to official sources, 14 percent of the population lived in slums or unhealthy areas and no less than 20 percent of Havana's dwelling units lacked electricity or running water. In the mid-1980s, the Cuban government estimated the cost of needed repairs to the city's buildings, roads, sewers, and other infrastructure at between 10 billion and US\$14 billion, or an amount almost equal to Cuba's annual GDP at that time (Segre et al. 1997: 181). More than a decade later, the total cost defies logical estimation.

The official recognition of Havana's problematic state during the late 1980s was part of a general campaign of "rectification of errors." Responsibility for land-use planning was partially decentralized and distributed among the planning and urban design directorates of the dozen municipalities that comprised the greater Havana Metropolitan Area. At the same time, a new entity, the Group for the Integrated Development of the Capital, or GDIC, was created to develop new ways of dealing with the problems created by three decades of neglect (GDIC 1990). These included developing a series of neighborhood workshops that would assist localities in designing and executing their own redevelopment activities, albeit within the general dictates of the state-sanctioned master plan (Coyula et al. 1995). The collapse of the Cuban economy in the early 1990s, however, radically transformed the scope and nature of the problems that urban planners had to deal with.

A Very Special Period, 1991–present

Following the dissolution of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA or Comecon) and the loss of massive subsidies to its economy, Cuba was obliged to slash state spending and court foreign investment. Between 1991 and 1997, Cuban state entities entered into more than 240 joint-venture agreements with corporate partners from Canada, Spain, Italy, France, Germany, Britain, and 37 other countries – even Israel. In 1993 the government legalized the possession of US dollars by Cuban citizens, and developed various means to "recapture" this much-needed hard currency from its population. Between 1994 and 1997, the Cuban economy grew at an average annual rate of 6 percent, with the most dramatic increases coming in tourism. In 1996, tourism was second only to remittances from abroad as a generator of hard currency, contributing more than US\$1 billion to the Cuban economy (Martin 1997: 10).

The Cuban courting of foreign capital precedes the exigencies of the Special Period. The first decree law allowing for joint ventures between Cuban state corporations and foreign companies dates from 1982. Under this arrangement, the Cuban state entity would contribute land and guarantee access to low-cost labor and the ability to repatriate profits, while the foreign partner – which could own no more than 49 percent of the joint venture – would provide investment capital, technology, and managerial expertise (Eckstein 1994). In 1995 the law was amended to allow foreign partners majority ownership as well as the ability to participate in real-estate development ventures, provided that these projects were limited to hotels and other facilities for the sole use of tourists and foreigners.

Since 1995, the government has fielded hundreds of proposals for real-estate projects between foreign investors and the handful of corporate entities established by the state for that purpose (see GDIC, 1990). In the Miramar district, dozens of old mansions have been converted into offices for state corporations and joint ventures, in addition to restaurants and stores that recapture hard currency by selling scarce goods to those Cubans with access to dollars. Miramar is also the preferred locale for foreign investors seeking to build condominiums for foreigners. One recently completed luxury project sold all of its units at an average price of US\$149 per square foot, which is comparable to real estate on Miami's Brickell Avenue (Reyes 1998). Two other projects with equivalent levels of amenity, totaling

some 250 units, are under construction, and two new joint ventures have proposed to build several hundred more units nearby.

The Vedado district has also drawn the attention of foreign investors. Many of the Batista era luxury hotels have been extensively renovated and are managed by foreign corporations. In addition, more than a dozen new restaurants and nightclubs have opened up in recent years. In late 1997, one of the largest Cuban state entities opened a US-style shopping mall on the eastern edge of Vedado. Several other projects have been proposed, including a major renovation of the Focsa Building, once Havana's most luxurious apartment complex.

Although Miramar and Vedado are the choicest sites for new and future projects, the processes of sociocapitalist redevelopment have been so far most advanced in the *Casco Historico*, or Historic Center. Also referred to as *Habana Vieja*, the Historic Center is perceived to be something of a model for this new mode of urbanization, as it is the only area of the city that possesses a master plan to coordinate foreign investment and touristic projects with historic preservation and redevelopment of residential neighborhoods.

The Historic Center is home to some of Havana's most important civic monuments and places of touristic interest, as well as some of its most decayed and densely populated residential districts. By 1958, only 500 of the area's more than 4,000 buildings were considered to be in good repair. Since then, lack of maintenance and a shortage of housing has led to increased deterioration, especially in the southern part of the former walled city, such as the San Isidro neighborhood.

Preservation efforts in the Historic Center date from the early 1930s, although these were very modest in scope and only a few of the area's most significant monuments were partially restored. Hundreds of historic buildings were razed in subsequent decades and much of the area was slated for wholesale demolition in the late 1950s. Largely ignored for the first two decades of the Revolution, it was not until 1981 that the central government allocated major funds to the City Historian's Office for restoration purposes (see Argona 1981; Ministerio de Cultura 1983). In 1982, the area's designation as a World Heritage Site brought limited technical and financial aid from UNESCO and prompted an intensification of restoration efforts under the auspices of the National Center for Conservation, Restoration, and Museology, or CENCREM (Hernandez et al. 1990).

During the 1990s the economic crisis and the enhanced importance of tourism spurred a major reorganization of efforts in the Historic Center. Since 1994, redevelopment in the area has been overseen by a state corporation, Habaguanex, SA, an adjunct of the City Historian's Office. Although the Historian's Office receives a direct appropriation from state coffers, and must return some of its profit to the central government, the income generated by Habaguanex allows it to be a largely self-financed "island of capitalism." In 1996, Habaguanex grossed US\$20 million in earnings (*Opciones* 1997); the following year it grossed approximately \$40 million. More than 70 rehabilitation projects are currently underway, or have been recently completed. Many of these projects were financed with capital from Spanish concerns. Spanish corporations and state agencies are so ubiquitous in redevelopment activities as to prompt many Cubans to speak of the *Re-conquista*, or Reconquest. However, a number of the most recent hotel projects have been funded by French, Dutch, and British firms.




Figure 19.2 Historic Center of Havana

Under the direction of City Historian Eusebio Leal Spengler, Cuban and Spanish planners have devised a scheme to redevelop only certain areas for exclusively touristic purposes, while leaving much of the rest of the area in the hands of residents. More importantly, profits from the redevelopment of the touristic areas are to be used to rehabilitate substandard housing and build new community service facilities in other parts of Habana Vieja. Given the emphasis on improvement rather

than displacement, those responsible for the redevelopment of the Historic Center have strenuously argued that their plans are much different from the rampant gentrification taking place in many capitalist and postsocialist cities (see N. Smith 1996). The Historian's Office has completed, or is in the process of completing, a library, a senior citizens home, and several pocket parks – the latter located on the sites of collapsed buildings. It has also started a pilot project to improve the living conditions in the San Isidro neighborhood, one of the old city's poorest. Begun in late 1996, the first phase focused on fixing roofs, shoring up walls, and providing proper toilets for one hundred dwellings. As Habaguanex's profits increase, it is expected that more funds will be directed towards residential improvements.

Still, the sheer scale of Habana Vieja's problems dwarf even the most exuberant profit estimates. More than one-third of the Historic Center's 22,516 dwelling units lack both running water and sanitary facilities, and more than one-half have serious structural problems (Rodríguez Aloma 1996: 29). Moreover, the salutary benefits of 100 new toilets are limited if the sewer system is near collapse. The rest of the Historic Center's – and city's – infrastructure is in a similar state, and requires intervention on greater than a neighborhood scale, as well as the expenditure of hundreds of millions of dollars.

The Historic Center is sometimes touted as a model for the redevelopment of Havana as a whole. However, the district is not completely comparable to other areas of the city. The redevelopment process in the Historic Center is both closely tied to, and limited by, concerns for historic preservation. No such constraints exist in other parts of the city which, while they have not been designated as historic by UNESCO, are characterized by a rich array of twentieth-century architectural styles. Critics claim that the reluctance to extend historical protection to areas outside the UNESCO-designated zone reflects the regime's anticapitalist bias. However, the limitation on historic preservation seems to be more than a matter of political ideology, of valorizing the colonial era while consigning the material reminders of capitalism to the rubbish tip of history. Indeed, the first building in the Historic Center to be restored with foreign funds was the former Stock Exchange, and several other structures slated for restoration such as the Bacardi Building and the Manzana Gómez shopping arcade, are key symbols of the arch-capitalist era. The lack of emphasis on historic preservation outside the Historic Center might be less an issue of socialist ideology than a matter of not wishing to place undue restrictions on investor prerogative.

While preservation of the city's unique architectural legacy is important, it is far from being the most pressing problem confronting *habaneros* (residents of the city of Havana). Rather, a more daunting problem is posed by the sheer magnitude of the deterioration of the city's physical infrastructure. In 1997, the government estimated that more than half of the city's buildings were in no better than poor condition and perhaps as many as 80,000 structures were too decayed to be rehabilitated (Lee 1997a). Between 1993 and 1996 alone, more than 5,300 structures experienced partial or total collapse, and many of the city's older sections resembled Beirut, Sarajevo, or London during the Blitz.

One of the ironies of *sociocapitalismo* is that it is leading to the revival of some of Havana's formerly most bourgeois neighborhoods, while promising to do very little for the remainder of the city. Unlike the Historic Center, there is at present no

mechanism for leveraging foreign investment in Vedado and Miramar for the benefit of the residents of those neighborhoods, or any prospect of allowing significant foreign investment in projects for the end use of Cubans, rather than foreigners. While a number of foreign NGO-funded projects have been announced to rehabilitate tenements in the overcrowded Centro district, the amounts constitute a fraction of the sums being invested in touristic projects (*Granma Internacional*, August 3, 1997). The prognosis is even bleaker for other areas of the city with little or no touristic interest.

Tourism and Socio-spatial Segregation

The separation between foreigners and residents is not just a matter of the touristic enclaves being set apart from the remainder of the city; it also characterizes life within the touristic zones themselves. Many recent travelers to Cuba have remarked on the “tourist apartheid” that is to be found there. That is, the only Cubans who may set foot in the new or newly renovated hotels, cafes, and restaurants are those who work there or those who are accompanied by a foreign guest. There is also a more insidious segregation at work, because even if Cubans are allowed unaccompanied entrance, most generally cannot afford to purchase even a soft drink at many of these establishments, which accept payment only in US dollars.

This double segregation has sparked considerable resentment from many Cubans. While government authorities have not gone to the extent of putting the streets of touristic areas off-limits to citizens, they have deployed a very visible security apparatus to ensure that the tourists are safe. Indeed, thanks to large numbers of police on the streets, Havana is easily the safest city in Latin America for tourists. However, crime, especially robbery, has increased considerably in recent years.

Despite the official separation between tourist and resident, the boundaries between citizen and guest are more permeable than not, and the “islands of capitalism in a sea of socialism” are merely the exposed promontories of a vast subterranean continent of un- and semisanctioned market activities. Although “la bolsa negra” (the informal economy) has existed for as long as the Revolution, the exigencies of the Special Period have stimulated creative survival strategies and an unprecedented amount of private entrepreneurial activity, especially in the provision of foodstuffs and services. Together with an estimated annual influx of more than \$1 billion in remittances from abroad, the profits realized from dollar-denominated informal economic activities has led to increasing social divisions between those Cubans who have access to dollars and those who do not.

A good deal, although certainly not all, of the new informal economy is directly connected with the expansion of tourism. In the touristic zones of Vedado, Miramar, and the Historic Center, many households have turned their dining rooms into small restaurants called *paladares* and/or rent spare bedrooms to tourists at rates considerably below that charged by state and joint venture-owned operations (see Segre et al. 1997: 230–9). Faced with widespread evasion of the law prohibiting such illegal activities, in 1995 the government legalized and began to tax these unofficial purveyors of food and lodging. The legalization of these activities has in turn set in motion another kind of decidedly nonsocialist economic activity, as prospective

entrepreneurs try to obtain space in prime touristic areas, such as Vedado, through swapping, rental, or outright but illegal purchase arrangements.

The most ubiquitous forms of entrepreneurial activity are still illegal. Those *habaneros* with access to cars and informal-sector gasoline have created an extensive fleet of taxis that compete with state-sanctioned operations, and often steer visitors to *paladares* and apartments for rent. Thousands of *jineteros* and *jineteras* (literally “jockeys”) provide foreign visitors with black-market rum, cigars (usually counterfeit), and, especially, sex. Indeed, a revived sex trade is one of Havana’s (and Cuba’s) most compelling attractions in the eyes of many male visitors. While the traffic in sex is nowhere as large, complex, and organized as it was during the decadent extremes of the Batista era (see Greene 1980; Lacey 1991; Ragano et al. 1994), Havana has developed a well-earned reputation as the “Bangkok of the Caribbean.” Frequent government crackdowns on taxis, prostitution, and hustling of goods have not succeeded in eradicating these activities, but have merely raised the prices charged to compensate for fines levied in dollars. While distasteful, the fines also provide the state with yet another means of recapturing hard currency.

Largely owing to the economic opportunities to be found there, the flow of migration to Havana has increased in recent years to the highest levels seen since the first years after the Revolution. In 1996, an estimated 28,000 persons migrated to the capital, a figure roughly equivalent to the latter years of the Batista regime (Lee 1997b). While the increase is partially offset by a significant out-migration (Segre et al. 1997), if this trend continues, it may begin to reverse one of the few accomplishments of the Revolution’s urban policy, the reduction of Havana’s rate of growth compared to other urban centers.

Conclusion

As the above-mentioned examples indicate, the Cuban government has not been successful in limiting capitalism to a handful of state-controlled enclaves. Rather, the growth of the informal economy and the success of tourist/foreigner-oriented enclaves has in turn stimulated the expansion of unsanctioned economic activities and the increasing social differentiation between those Cubans who possess dollars and those who lack access to them. Workers in the illegal tourist service trades can easily make more in one day, in dollars, than a highly trained professional earns in a month, in pesos. The social consequences of this inversion of status and income are only beginning to manifest themselves and demand further ethnographic investigation.

The further expansion of facilities for tourists and other foreigners promises only to intensify the social and spatial divide between the Historic Center, Vedado, Miramar, and the remainder of Greater Havana. The recommodification of land in the former three neighborhoods constitute dramatic eruptions of unequal value in an otherwise uniform land-rent surface. Without a comprehensive redevelopment plan and an entity to enforce it, as in the case of the Historic Center, the vast differential between current and potential land values constitutes a “rent gap” (N. Smith 1996) that will generate powerful pressures for the redevelopment of large areas of Miramar and Vedado for the exclusive use of foreigners and state entities. Despite the decentralization of land-use planning in the late 1980s,

municipal and city authorities have played a very marginal role in the approval of joint-venture real-estate projects. The partial recommodification of land, the removal of certain areas from the control of local planning entities, and the creation of exclusive and exclusionary socio-spatial zones, all constitute serious breaks from the urban policies and practices of the last 40 years. Likewise, the reintegration of Cuba into the world economy as a purveyor of sun, sex, and cigars for foreigners stands in stark contrast to 40 years of revolutionary rhetoric. Despite the proliferation of billboards that boast: "We have, and will always have Socialism," this seems a questionable assertion. If current trends continue, the result is likely to be a city and national society as "dual" and unevenly developed as those found in other dependent societies in Latin America.

REFERENCES

- Andruz, G., Harloe, M., and Szelenyi, I. (eds.) 1996: *Cities After Socialism*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
- Angotti, T. 1993: *Metropolis 2000: People, Poverty, and Planning*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Argona, M. 1981: *La Habana Vieja: Restauración y revitalización*. La Habana: Departamento de Monumentos, Dirección de Patrimonio Cultural, Ministerio de Cultura.
- Bastlund, K. 1967: *Jose Luis Sert: Architecture, City Planning, Urban Design*. London: Thames and Hudson.
- Butterworth, D. 1980: *The People of Buena Ventura*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
- Carpentier, A. 1970: *La ciudad de las columnas*. Barcelona: Editorial Lumen.
- Chan, K. 1994: *Cities with Invisible Walls: Reinterpreting Urbanization in Post-1949 China*. Hong Kong and New York: Oxford University Press.
- Coyula, M., Cabrera, M., and R. Oliveras. 1995: *Los Talleres de Transformación Integral de los Barrios*. La Habana: Grupo para el Desarrollo Integral de la Capital.
- Davis, D. (ed.) 1995: *Urban Spaces in Contemporary China*. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Eckstein, S. 1977: The debourgeoisment of Cuban cities. In I. Horowitz (ed.), *Cuban Communism*, New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, pp. 443–75.
- 1994: *Back From the Future: Cuba Under Castro*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Enyedi, G. 1996: Urbanization under socialism. In G. Andruz et al., *Cities After Socialism*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, pp. 100–18.
- Forbes, D. and Thrift, N. (eds.) 1987: *The Socialist Third World*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- French, R., and Hamilton, F. (eds.) 1979: *The Socialist City Spatial Structure and Urban Policy*. Chichester and New York: John Wiley and Sons.
- Gaubatz, P. 1996: *Beyond the Great Wall: Urban Form and Transformation on the Chinese Frontiers*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- GDIC, 1990: Estudio urbano sobre el Tema Inmobiliario en la ciudad de la Habana. Habana: Grupo para el Desarrollo Integral de la Capital y la Dirección Provincial de Planamiento Física y Arquitectura.
- Granma Internacional*. Agreement for Reconstruction of Tenements, August 3, 4.
- Greene, G. 1980: *Ways of Escape*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- Gugler, J. 1980: A minimum of urbanism and a maximum of ruralism: the Cuban experience. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 4 (4), 516–35.
- Hamberg, J. 1986: *Under Construction: Housing Policy in Revolutionary Cuba*. New York: Center for Cuban Studies.

- Hegedüs, J., and Tosics, I. 1991: Gentrification in Eastern Europe: the case of Budapest. In J. van Weesep and S. Musterd (eds.), *Urban Housing for the Better-Off: Gentrification in Europe*. Utrecht: Stedelijke Netwerken.
- Hernandez, T., Lores, R. and Mendez, L. 1990: *La Nueva Habana Vieja*. Lima: Camblo y Desarrollo, Instituto de Investigaciones.
- Knox, P. and Taylor, P. (ed.) 1995: *World Cities in a World-System*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Lacey, R. 1991: *Little Man: Meyer Lansky and the Gangster Life*. New York: LB Books.
- Lee, S. 1997a: Migraciones incontroladas hacia la capital (2). *Granma*, May 13, 6.
- Lee, S. 1997b: Migraciones incontroladas hacia la capital (1). *Granma*, May 10, 8.
- Lewis, O., Lewis, R., and Rigdon, S. 1978: *Neighbors: Living the Revolution: An Oral History of Contemporary Cuba*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
- Martin, F. 1997: Foreign Real Estate Ventures and the Economy – 1996. *Negocios en Cuba*, July, 1 (1), 10.
- Ministerio de Cultura 1983: *La Plaza Vieja*. La Habana: Plaza Vieja.
- Opciones*. Resurge La Habana Vieja, April 6, 3.
- Provincial de Planamiento Física y Arquitectura 1990: *Estrategia*. Habana: Grupo para el Desarrollo Integral de la Capital.
- Ragano, F., Ragano, N., and Raab, S. 1994: *Mob Lawyer*. New York: Scribner's.
- Reyes, G. 1998: Luxury apartments rise in Havana, attract foreign investors. *Miami Herald*, October 4, A7.
- Rodriguez Aloma, P. 1996: *Vieja en la memoria: apuntes para tin acercamiento a la habana vieja*. La Habana y Pamplona: Oficina de la Historador de la Ciudad de Habana y Colegio Oficial de Arquitectos Vasco Navarro.
- Rutheiser, C. 1996: *Imagineering Atlanta: The Politics of Place in the City of Dreams*. London and New York: Verso.
- Segre, R. 1989: *Arquitectura y urbanismo de la revolución cubana*. La Habana: Editorial Pueblo y Educación.
- Segre, R., Coyula, M., and Scarpacl, J., 1997: *Havana: Two Faces of the Antillean Metropolis*. Chicester and New York: John Wiley and Sons.
- Smith, D. M. 1989: *Urban Inequality Under State Socialism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Smith, N. 1996: *The New Urban Frontier: Gentrification and the Revanchist City*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Sorkin, M. (ed.) 1992: *Variations on a Theme Park*. New York: Hill and Wang.
- Szelenyi, I. 1983: *Urban Inequalities Under State Socialism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Venegas, C. 1990: *La Urbanización de las murallas: dependencia y modernidad*. La Habana: Editorial Letras Cubanas.
- 1996: Havana between two centuries. Tr. N. Menocal and E. Shaw, *Journal of Decorative and Propaganda Arts*, 22, 12–34.
- Wu, F. 1997: Urban restructuring in China's emerging market economy. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 14 (2), 218–42.
- Zukin, S. 1991: *Landscapes of Power*. Berkeley: University of California Press.