

# The Course of Research into the Economic Consequences of German Works Councils

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## Abstract

*In her recent survey, Carola Frege concludes that economic analysis of the works council has reached a 'dead end'. The present paper offers a very different assessment. The evolving economic literature is shown to follow three distinct phases, the last of which contains some of the most positive evaluations to date of works council impact on establishment performance. Although these estimates are exaggerated, and the effects of works councils are likely to be small on average, the new literature redirects our research focus towards factors producing swings around this average, including differences in works council types and their workplace environments.*

## 1. Introduction

Research into the impact of works councils on firm performance dates from the mid to late-1980s, with a series of articles by FitzRoy and Kraft (1985, 1987, 1990) that strongly rejected any positive general association between works councils and firm performance. Until then it had largely been taken for granted that what was good for workplace relations necessarily benefited firm performance. FitzRoy and Kraft's altogether more pessimistic evaluation served to stimulate the economic analysis of works councils, even if progress was to be fitful because of data limitations.

Almost from the outset, analysis of the likely economic consequences of works councils attracted considerable interest outside Germany. This was due primarily to the points of contact between this work and two important strands of (Anglo-Saxon) industrial relations and labour economics research:

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namely, the literature concerning the economic consequences of unions on the one hand, and that dealing with the performance effects of employee involvement on the other. These links were reinforced by Freeman and Medoff's (1984) application to the labour market of Hirschman's (1970) exit-voice paradigm (see also Addison and Belfield 2003), as these authors' ideas gradually took root.

The survey article by Frege (2002) in this Journal is indicative of the sustained interest in the institution of the *Betriebsrat* outside of Germany. In her review, Frege offers an assessment of research on works councils from the perspective of several disciplines. And, in addressing the ontology, practice and transformation of works councils, she usefully locates the economics component into wider research relief. None the less, we contend that her summary of the labour economics research is seriously incomplete. In the first place, there are a number of factual errors in her treatment.<sup>1</sup> Second, within the time frame of her review (covering developments up to 2000), Frege does not sufficiently consider the diversity of research or the manner of its evolution. She discusses just four of the mainstream economic studies, while citing eight. In contrast, our review of this literature will address (cite) 17 (22) empirical studies, as well as a wider range of performance outcomes. Third, Frege misses the latest German research based on the nationally representative Establishment Panel of the Institute for Labour Market Research (of the Federal Labour Office). This omission is unavoidable, because the studies in question were mostly written after the publication of Frege's review; but interestingly this particular phase of economics research contains some of the most optimistic evaluations of works council impact on firm performance.

Ultimately, Frege (2002: 239) concludes that the economic analysis of the works council is at a 'dead end'. In the light of the preceding criticisms, we think it necessary to offer both a restatement and an update of the economic effects of the German works council. In this endeavour, the three phases of research that we identify provide an indispensable guide to the developing economic literature. Contrary to Frege, we will conclude that continued disputation in the literature is a sign of vitality rather than an indication of its having reached a dead end, although a new research agenda is now necessary.

## **2. The three phases of economics research**

Research into the association between works councils and firm performance conforms to three distinct phases, defined by differences in the type of data sets investigated, explanatory variables used and econometric methods deployed. The first phase is marked by the investigation of small samples of firms in cross section. The second phase largely corresponds to the analysis of much larger data sets of a regional or industry-specific nature (with one exception, noted below). The third phase is characterized by the use of truly nationally representative data. The second and third phases are based on

panel data, although it has proved difficult fully to exploit the longitudinal nature of the new data sets because very few plants introduce or abandon works councils over the life of the panel. Also, as we shall see, the findings of works council effect differ between and within phases.

### *Phase I: Small Sample Studies*

Results of what we have termed the first phase of research are contained in Table 1. Apart from their being based on small samples of firms, the hallmark of these Phase I studies is the often unfavourable association between works council presence and the particular economic outcome investigated. This is most obviously the case in the key studies by FitzRoy and Kraft (rows 1–3), which are also notable for their technical sophistication (i.e. their use of systems of equations).

As can be seen from the table, FitzRoy and Kraft exploit a common data set to investigate three outcome indicators: profitability (row 1), total factor productivity (row 2), and innovation (row 3). The unifying theme of all three studies is a 'managerial pressure/managerial competence' model. Hard-driving managers are said to elicit greater effort from their workers and are rewarded with higher salaries and profits. This pressure exerted by management causes workers to join unions, and unionized workers get higher wages even if this is only partial compensation for their greater effort. Workers are also more likely to form a works council to protect themselves from management actions that affect them adversely, including upward pressure on the effort levels required of employees. Yet efficient managers, so the argument runs, can institute adequate systems of communication and decision-making without the impediment of autonomous works councils. (In other words, works councils are viewed as a constraint, not a potential source of efficiency gain.) Managerial competence is thus expressed in a reduced probability of works council presence, partly because efficient managers pay higher wages.

In testing this managerial pressure/managerial competence model, FitzRoy and Kraft seek to explain and model the existence of works councils and/or union density. In their profitability study (row 1) the authors are concerned to explain the association between workplace union density and profitability, and in particular the line of causation running from performance to workplace density as workers react to the higher demands made of them by managers in a defensive fashion. In their productivity study (row 2) it is works council presence that is estimated simultaneously with total factor productivity, with the expectation that causation will run in two directions: partly from higher performance to workplace representation (the defensive mechanism), as in the case of union membership/density, but also from works council presence to output, as this form of workplace representation is held to impact performance adversely by limiting management prerogative. Finally, in their study of firm innovation (row 3), FitzRoy and Kraft argue that the impact of union density may be direct after all and may serve to

TABLE 1  
The Economic Impact of the Works Council: Phase I Studies

<i>Study</i>	<i>Data</i>	<i>Dependent variable(s)</i>	<i>Methodology</i>	<i>Findings</i>
1. FitzRoy and Kraft (1985)	Pooled data for 1977 and 1979 on 61/62 firms in the metalworking industry	Profitability, union density, wages, and salaries	Four-equation system estimated by 3SLS. Detailed firm controls. Works council presence not endogenized.	Union density has a positive and statistically significant effect on profitability (and on wages and salaries). Coefficient estimate for works council dummy is negative and statistically significant in the profit equation.
2. FitzRoy and Kraft (1987)	As above	Total factor productivity and works council presence	Two-equation system	Work council presence associated with a significant reduction in productivity. Union density effects positive and statistically significant throughout.
3. FitzRoy and Kraft (1990)	57 metal-working firms, 1979	Innovation, as proxied by the proportion of sales consisting of new products introduced in the preceding five years, and an 'organized labour' measure derived from the interaction of the works council dummy and union density	Two-equation system	Organized labour covariate is associated with a statistically significant reduction in innovative activity.

<p>4. Schnabel and Wagner (1994)</p>	<p>31 manufacturing establishments in two German states, 1990</p>	<p>Proportion of revenues spent on R&amp;D in 1979</p>	<p>Single-equation Tobit model. Parsimonious specification</p>	<p>Coefficient estimate for works council dummy is positive and marginally statistically significant. Union density has strongly negative effect on R&amp;D intensity.</p>
<p>5. Addison <i>et al.</i> (1993)</p>	<p>c. 50 establishment sample from same data as in row 4 study above</p>	<p>Profitability, value added, and investment</p>	<p>Single-equation specifications estimated by least median of squares/reweighted least squares</p>	<p>Mixed pattern of generally statistically insignificant coefficient estimates for the works council dummy variable. But the works council effect is negative and statistically significant in the case of investment in physical capital.</p>
<p>6. Addison and Wagner (1997)</p>	<p>74 manufacturing establishments in one German state, 1993</p>	<p>Subjective measure of 'high profitability' and an innovation measure (introduction of a new product in 1992)</p>	<p>Probit models. Three works council indicators: works council presence, degree of participation or voice of the works council, and an instrument for the presence of a works council</p>	<p>Mixed pattern of generally statistically insignificant coefficient estimates for all three works council variables. The exception is the degree of works council involvement measure, which is negatively associated with high profitability, albeit only at the 10% level.</p>
<p>7. Kraft (1986)</p>	<p>As for the studies in rows 1 and 2</p>	<p>Subjective measure of 'high quits' and a synthetic measure of 'individual voice', in each case for unskilled workers</p>	<p>Simultaneous system of probit equations</p>	<p>Individual voice, but not collective voice (as proxied by works council presence), serves to significantly reduce high turnover.</p>

reinforce the negative effect of the works council; that is, a works council is supposed to carry more weight in negotiations where workplace union density is high and will be more likely to take a hard line in conflict situations. (In addition, FitzRoy and Kraft posit that a more highly unionized work-force is more likely to elect a council.) Accordingly, in this study they combine works council presence with union density to form an 'organized labour' variable which is then jointly estimated with the level of innovative activity.

What do FitzRoy and Kraft find from their attempt to take account of the non-random distribution of works councils (and/or workplace unionization) when modelling the determinants of firm performance? In their study of financial performance, works councils are found to be associated with sharply reduced profitability (row 1). In this case, however, observe that works council presence is taken to be exogenous, so that only the non-random distribution of union density is modelled. As noted in the table, the effect of works council presence is negative, while that of unionism is positive but indirect (i.e. the line of causality runs from higher profitability to greater workplace density). In their productivity analysis (row 2), works council presence leads to lower total factor productivity. That is to say, purged of any (positive) feedback effect from productivity to works council presence, works councils are associated with lower productivity.

To repeat, in both these studies the effect of unions is positive but indirect. However, as we have seen, in the case of the study in row 3 the role of the union is direct and is now held to operate in tandem with works council presence to impede efficiency. FitzRoy and Kraft's simultaneous equation estimates of innovation (as proxied by the proportion of sales of new products introduced over a five-year interval) and the organized labour variable point to a strongly negative effect running from organization to innovation, and with no reverse causality operating.

Most of the other studies of Phase I provide single-equation estimates. The major exception is the study by Kraft (1986) in row 7 (see below). Together, they fail to tell as consistent a story of works council impact as do the analyses of FitzRoy and Kraft. But of all the studies, only Schnabel and Wagner (1994) report a favourable impact of the works council (row 4). In an analysis of innovative activity, this time measured by R&D intensity, these authors find a marginally significant positive relation between works council presence and innovation among their sample of 31 establishments in a 1990 cross section. Any such favourable impact is sensitive to workplace union density. The tipping point here is 51 per cent unionization. Once this threshold is breached, the positive impact of the works council is reversed and the association becomes increasingly negative.

Only one of the Phase I studies looks at investment in physical capital. In an analysis of investment — as measured by the ratio of gross capital formation to the capital stock — for a sample of over 50 manufacturing establishments in two German *Länder* in 1990/1, Addison *et al.* (1993) report that plants with works councils undertake significantly less investment than their co-determination-free counterparts (row 5). But if works council presence

yields less favourable investment, this negative result does not apparently carry over to value added or to pretax profits, also examined in the same study.

Works council effects on a subjective measure of profitability, as well as on a measure of product innovation, are also found to be generally statistically insignificant in a study of industrial firms in Lower Saxony by Addison and Wagner (1997), based on a telephone interview of an initial sample of 175 establishments in 1993 (row 6 of the table). This study is notable for its being the first attempt to gauge the degree of influence of the works council. The authors derive an index of works council voice according to its reported involvement in four areas of decision making. A marginally significant negative association is found between the extent of works council voice and the achievement of high profitability, again as assessed by the manager respondent. By contrast, the coefficient estimates for a conventional works council measure are statistically significant throughout, whether works council presence is endogenized or not.

The last study in row 7 of Table 1 (Kraft 1986) is noteworthy for its attempt to inquire into the black box of mechanisms through which works councils are supposed to achieve the benefits attributed to them. Pooling two years of data on metalworking firms (i.e. the same sample as subsequently used by FitzRoy and Kraft in the studies summarized in rows 1 and 2 of Table 1), Kraft regresses a dummy variable capturing low/high turnover among unskilled workers — manager respondents to the study questionnaire were asked whether the quit rates of unskilled workers were ‘high’ or ‘low’ — on an index of individual voice, works council presence (i.e. collective voice), a measure of training opportunities, firm size and variables capturing production techniques and organization structure. The novel individual voice argument is constructed on the basis of replies to questions as to the decision possibilities open to blue-collar workers in the areas of investment and rationalization, co-ordination of work groups, and the determination of job design. Kraft finds that turnover is materially reduced, the greater the opportunities for the exercise of individual voice. The coefficient estimate for collective voice/works council presence is positive but not statistically significant, while all the other covariates are shown to have their expected effect on turnover.

One obvious cause for concern with the Phase I studies is the issue of sample size. The use of small samples should reduce the precision of the works council coefficient estimate and thus predispose any test against finding a works council effect. At the same time, problems of omitted variables bias are elevated by the limited number of control variables and cloud even ‘well determined’ (i.e. statistically significant) associations in the data. In any event, we see that there is little overt support for the institution of the works council and some seemingly strong adverse effects.

Another issue concerns the works council variable. As we have seen, the above studies typically recoup the works council effect from the coefficient estimate for a variable indicating actual or, less commonly, predicted works

council presence. An immediate concern is that most establishments over a certain size have works councils, while most plants under a certain size do not. In 2000, for example, just 9.1 per cent of German establishments employing between five and 20 employees had works councils, whereas in plants with between 201 and 500 (over 500) employees the corresponding incidence was 80.6 (91.7) per cent. In other words, over certain ranges of employment one cannot hope to identify a works council effect using a measure based on presence of the entity alone. Therefore one should use samples containing a good number of establishments both with and without works councils. In this regard, there is no obvious indication of 'imbalance' in the Phase I studies. Moreover, whatever the general disadvantage of small samples of firms from the perspective of statistical inference, some of the Phase I data sets have been rich enough to allow the researcher to fashion measures of the degree of involvement of the works council in decision-making (the row 6 study) or to examine the relationship between the works council and workplace union density (rows 3 and 4). As we shall see, the parsimony of larger data sets in this regard has required alternative solutions to works council 'definition', such as prior structuring by sample size (i.e. examining size ranges within which the power of the works council is a datum), as well as reformulation of the 'collective bargaining' variable.

Finally, observe that not all performance outcomes have received equal treatment in Phase I. In particular, there is an apparent neglect of employment indicators. That being said, employment is a more ambiguous performance measure than outcomes such as productivity or investment. Take the case of employment change. Reduced employment growth might well indicate inferior performance. On the other hand, successful attempts to recast outmoded workplace organization into a form more adaptable to technical change, or the abandonment of restrictive work practices, might also be reflected in slowed employment growth. In any event, just one of the Phase I studies examines employment (row 7), and it is unconventional in focusing on a subjective measure of quits rather than an objective, continuous measure of turnover. However, the use of a subjective indicator can be informative. For example, objective data may not be available for individual skill categories. More important, absent formalization of what constitutes an optimal quit rate, a manager's identification of 'excessive' quits — or lack thereof — might usefully supplement objective data; in particular, indications of higher quit rates in plants without works councils may have no implications for efficiency when subjective data fail to identify turnover as problematic or 'high'.

Despite some real data strengths — including information on establishment variables — the fact remains that the findings of the early research literature may not be representative by reason of sample size and sector and region covered. As a result, the associations revealed in Phase I studies cannot be generalized beyond the samples investigated, and do not offer a solid basis for making inferences about the efficacy of works councils for the firm or the economy.

*Phase II: Some New Large-Scale Data Sets*

Studies of the next phase are able to exploit large-scale data sets, principally the Hannover Firm Panel and the NIFA Panel. The population of the former data set is all manufacturing establishments with at least five employees in the state of Lower Saxony. The actual sample of plants is stratified according to firm size and industry. It comprises around 1000 establishments in 1994, declining to a little over 700 establishments by the time of the fourth wave in 1997 because of sample attrition. (For a description of this data set, see Brand *et al.* 1996; Gerlach *et al.* 2003.) The second survey is of all establishments in the German machine-tool industry and covers the period 1989–99. This panel has eight waves, the data for which were collected via a mail questionnaire. The sample base is approximately 6000 companies, and the realized sample approximates 1500 per wave (see Schmidt and Widmaier 1992; Widmaier 2001).

There is also a third data set, in the form of a nationally representative but older and employment-based survey of 2392 private-sector firms, conducted in 1987 (see Büchtemann and Höland 1989). Reflecting its narrower focus on employment issues, use of this data set has been restricted to the analysis of labour fluctuations.

A summary of results from selected Phase II studies is provided in Table 2. The overall picture is that works councils now appear in rather more favourable light. The jury is still out today on whether this difference reflects the unrepresentativeness of the Phase I studies, or is instead a practical manifestation of the improvement in, or maturation of, the relationship between firms and their works councils flagged in the German industrial relations literature (in particular, see Kotthoff 1994).

Four distinguishing characteristics of the Phase II studies can usefully be identified. First, there is a tendency to look for differences in works council impact by establishment size. There are several reasons for this. One is the point made earlier that very large plants almost always have works councils and small plants seldom do. Another reason is that works council authority (number of councillors, number of paid councillors, entitlements to information, input into matters of personnel selection, etc.) is as a matter of law increasing in establishment size. When a dummy variable indicating the presence or otherwise of a works council at the establishment is used in a regression model, that variable can be expected to pick up the effect of a works council only if two conditions are met: first, establishments with and without works councils need to be present in reasonable numbers; second, the rights of the works council must be the same in all establishments. If only a tiny number of firms in a sample have (do not have) a council, we cannot expect to be able to estimate the effect of the entity with any precision. And if the legal rights of a council are not held constant over the establishments in the sample, a simple dummy variable cannot, as a matter of construction, take care of this variation or any related variation in the economic impact of works councils in firms of different size. Therefore, some of the Phase II

TABLE 2  
The Economic Impact of the Works Council: Phase II Studies

<i>Study</i>	<i>Data</i>	<i>Dependent variable(s)</i>	<i>Methodology</i>	<i>Findings</i>
1. Frick and Sadowski (1995) <sup>a</sup>	1616 firms taken from a nationally representative survey of 2392 for-profit enterprises in the manufacturing and service sectors Data cover the interval May 1985–April 1987	Quit and dismissal rates	Single-equation log-odds model estimated by OLS	Works council presence associated with statistically significant reductions in quits and dismissals (2.4 and 2.9 percentage points, respectively)
2. Addison <i>et al.</i> (2001) <sup>b</sup>	c. 900 establishments from the 1994 wave of the Hannover Firm Panel (see text) Detailed establishment and industry controls	Value-added per worker; subjective measure(s) of financial performance; wages and salaries per employee (and the percentage 'wage gap'); three labour turnover measures (hires, separations, and gross turnover); and two measures of innovation (introduction of new processes/products)	Single-equation estimates Separate results for all establishments and a subset of plants with 21–100 employees	Works council presence associated with higher labour productivity overall, but not for establishments with 21–100 employees. Profitability systematically lower in the presence of works councils. Wages are higher when there are works councils but the sources of these higher earnings are not transparent. All labour turnover measures are reduced in the presence of works councils other than for the subset of smaller establishments. Neither process nor product innovation is materially influenced by works council presence.

<p>3. Hübler and Jirjahn (2003)</p>	<p>Pooled data from the 1994 and 1996 waves of the Hannover Firm Panel (see text). Detailed establishment and industry controls, including whether or not the plant is covered by an (external) collective agreement</p>	<p>Value added per worker, and wages and salaries per employee</p>	<p>Bivariate probit maximum likelihood estimates of works council presence and coverage by a collective agreement to form selection arguments in the outcome equations</p>	<p>Positive effect of works council on productivity measure is statistically significant only where the plant is covered by a collective agreement. But wages are higher in works council regimes irrespective of collective agreement coverage.</p>
<p>4. Jirjahn (2003)</p>	<p>As above. Detailed establishment and industry controls, including whether or not plant management covered by a profit sharing arrangement.</p>	<p>Value added per employee</p>	<p>Single-equation OLS model (auxiliary probit model of works council presence provided, but not used to provide selectivity-adjusted estimates). Separate estimates for all establishments and a subset of plants with 21–100 employees.</p>	<p>Across all establishments and the subset of smaller plants, the effect of works council presence is positive and statistically significant (in all but one specification). Executive profit-sharing schemes are also pro-productive throughout, although the interaction effect is negative and significant for the all-establishment case.</p>

Table 2 (cont'd)

Study	Data	Dependent variable(s)	Methodology	Findings
5. Frick (2001)	c. 1700 establishments from the 6th (1996) wave of the NIFA Panel. This data set identifies five high-performance work practices (HPWP). It also distinguishes five types of works council as assessed by management (ranging from 'antagonistic' to 'excluded') and a variable identifying greater involvement of the works council in processes of technological and/or organizational change than laid down under the law or collective agreements.	Number of HPWP practices	Descriptive analysis: gives number of HPWP used in plants by works council presence. The five HPWPs are: reductions in hierarchies; delegation of decision-making; work groups with independent budgets; group or team-work; and flexible working time. Multiple classification analysis: uses same categories as for descriptive treatment and five covariates (viz., log number of employees, log sales per employee, stock of orders, and the degrees of capacity and manpower utilization).	Establishments with works councils use more HPWP than plants without works councils, although this difference is not statistically significant in the multivariate analysis. Establishments with works council involvement in technological and organisational change exceeding that set down by law or collective agreement also have more HPWP than do plants with less involved councils. But the number of HPWP is highest in establishments where the works council is rated 'antagonistic'. HPWP are reported to have a positive effect on establishment performance but a negative influence on labour demand.

6. Diger (2002)	<p>NIFA Panel, as above, but supplemented with information on works council presence from the 4th (1994) wave. Three works council measures identified: a simple dummy variable indicating presence or otherwise of the entity, a set of dummy variables for the various types of works council (see row 5 above), and the change in works council status, 1994–6. Detailed establishment-level controls.</p>	<p>Quit, hire and labour fluctuation rates; flexible working time; product innovation; and financial performance (a dummy variable indicating the achievement of at least a 'sufficient' rate of return)</p>	<p>Single-equation cross-section OLS regressions for quit, hire and labour fluctuation rates. Single-equation, cross-section Logit models for flexible working time, product innovation and financial performance. Models for flexible working time, product innovation and profitability are also estimated separately for plants with 21–100 employees. Multinomial Logit models for the determinants of flexible working time use the three works council measures and detailed plant-level controls.</p>	<p>Works councils consistently reduce all measures of personnel fluctuation, but the coefficient estimates for some types of works council are not statistically significant at conventional levels. Works councils promote the use of flexible working time (in both the all-establishment sample and the subset of plants with 21–100 employees), but the effects by type of council are not always well determined. Although works councils do not in general influence product innovation, where their involvement in technological and organizational changes exceeds that laid down by law or collective agreement, the effect is positive and weakly statistically significant. The impact of works councils on financial performance is negative for all establishments and smaller establishments, but is not statistically significant where the degree of engagement of the council in technological/organisational change exceeds benchmark levels.</p>
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Notes: <sup>a</sup> See also Backes-Gellner *et al.* (1997); Frick (1997); Gerlach and Jirjahn (2001).

<sup>b</sup> See also Addison *et al.* (1996, 1998, 2001).

studies seek *ab initio* to estimate the association between works councils and various performance outcomes by looking at firms with between 21 and 100 employees, within which employment range the legal rights of the works council are a datum and the number of plants with and without a council is roughly equal. A separate and more general size-related issue is that there are practical grounds for believing that the costs of the co-determination apparatus may be greater and the benefits smaller for specific categories of plant. In this latter context, using data from the first wave of the Hannover Firm Panel, Addison *et al.* (2001) caution that, where beneficial outcomes are observed, these tend to be confined to establishments with more than 100 employees (row 2 of Table 2).

Second, more attention is paid in the Phase II literature to labour turnover. Here the findings are seemingly at odds with the evidence from the single Phase I turnover study reviewed earlier. In her review, Frege (2002: 237–8) chooses to emphasize the turnover issue, focusing on a Phase II study by Backes-Gellner *et al.* (1997) that uses data from the Büchtemann–Höland (1989) data set. Backes-Gellner *et al.* argue that skills formation and acquisition are a precondition for the success of the German model, and that the works council promotes reliance investments (termed ‘effective skill utilization’) by fostering co-operation between the two sides and safeguarding employment security. Their evidence is indirect, however, reflecting the lack of data on training in this data set. That is to say, rather than examining training investments directly, these authors mainly look to evidence on quit rates and dismissals, both of which are found to be materially reduced in the presence of works councils. Since the facts on these associations were first reported by Frick and Sadowski (1995), the details given in row 1 of Table 2 pertain to this study.

Although data from the much richer Hannover Firm Panel do not always point to reduced quits in works council regimes — while also indicating that management in works council plants is more prone to complain that employment levels are excessive — they do none the less tell much the same employment story. Thus, for example, Addison *et al.* (2001) find that hires, quits and dismissals are all reduced in works council settings (row 2). The same tendency is evident in Dilger’s (2002) analysis of personnel fluctuation using the NIFA Panel (row 6).

Since lower quit rates increase the time horizon over which training investments may be recouped, they imply greater training, so Frege is quite correct to rehearse the training argument. Indeed, in a recent study using the Hannover Firm Panel, not summarized in Table 2, Gerlach and Jirjahn (2001) report that works council establishments provide further training than their co-determination-free counterparts. But real progress in identifying the work council role in this area optimally requires matched employee and employer data. Such information would assist in identifying the effect of works councils on quit rates over and above the contribution of wages. Also, recalling our earlier observation that the reduction in quits/increase in training investments under works councils might be excessive, it would also be useful as a

first step to include either quits or training intensity in a production function test. Pending such analyses, the role of this key collective voice route to improved performance remains opaque.

Third, a rather interesting development in this stage of the developing literature is the inclusion of a collective bargaining variable proper. Unlike their Phase I precursors, either the large-scale data sets of Phase II fail to contain information on union density, or that information is unreliable. The new studies instead use the presence or otherwise of a collective bargaining agreement at regional or industry level, namely, a 'union coverage' variable, which reflects the dual system of industrial relations in Germany. In its fullest application, the new variable is interacted with works council presence, so that works council impact (*inter alia*) is examined separately by collective bargaining regime. In particular, the study by Hübler and Jirjahn (2003) in row 3 of the table offers a formal test of Freeman and Lazear's (1995) argument that, where a works council is embedded in an external collective bargaining framework, this will serve to dissipate distributional squabbles at the workplace, thereby enhancing any pro-productive effect of the works council. Hübler and Jirjahn test the model using pooled data from two waves of the Hannover Firm Panel. Both works council presence and collective bargaining coverage are treated as endogenous and modelled in separate productivity and wage equations. The productivity results in particular offer support for the model: labour productivity is higher in works council regimes, but only where the establishment is covered by a collective agreement. The wage results are less compelling. That is to say, the idea that collective agreements can police rent-seeking behaviour is undercut by the finding of higher wages in all works council establishments, irrespective of their collective bargaining coverage.<sup>2</sup>

The notion that strong collective bargaining can be beneficial is also encountered in Britain, where it has been argued that unions need to be strong if they are to be effective agents of collective voice (see Bryson 2001). In the German case, as we have seen, the argument is particularly interesting because of the intriguing prospect of a decoupling of distribution from production issues, even if only partial. Since this application seems to hinge on bargaining external to the firm, a real issue is raised by the growing tendency towards company-level collective agreements. The number of German firms bargaining at the company level has tripled since 1990. We are unaware of any analysis of this development on performance outcomes, but as part of a future research agenda it would certainly be interesting to see — in the manner of the Phase I literature — whether the effects on workplace economic performance are differentiated when both the union and the works council are active at the company level.

The fourth theme of the Phase II literature is the inclusion of employee involvement mechanisms and so-called 'high performance work practices'. As can be seen from the entry in row 5 of Table 2, the latter include elements of the former, such as teamwork. In one sense, research on the role of such personnel practices provides a link between Phase I and Phase II studies. In

particular, in a follow-up of their earlier study (see row 2 of Table 1), FitzRoy and Kraft (1995) qualify their harsh interpretation of works council impact on establishment performance. They report evidence of a well determined positive association between works councils and productivity in profit-sharing regimes. Among firms that do not practice profit sharing, however, the works council effect on productivity is still negative and statistically significant.

The main Phase II studies covering employee involvement/high performance work practices are reported in rows 5 and 6 of Table 2. But we should preface our review of this material with some remarks on the study in row 4 of the table, which focuses on the interaction between works councils and profit-sharing schemes for managers. In his analysis of data from the Hannover Firm Panel, Jirjahn (2003) finds that works councils are generally associated with higher labour productivity, and that this effect is strengthened after allowing for management incentive schemes that are themselves pro-productive. However, as can be seen from the table, the coefficient estimate for the interaction term is negative, which the author interprets as consistent with one of two hypotheses: either the profit-sharing management reduces the commitment value of agency in circumstances where the works council cannot foster trust and loyalty absent the co-operation of management, or management rent seeking is curbed by profit sharing and the works council is not so important for building co-operation in situations of reduced opportunism on the part of management. Although ultimately empirically inconclusive, conceptually this study represents a further development of the underlying collective voice model in which improvements in firm performance are potential rather than guaranteed (see Addison and Belfield 2003).

The last two studies in Table 2 return us to the issue of non-executive employee involvement mechanisms/high performance workplace practices. Each exploits the NIFA Panel for the machine-tool industry. This data set is of interest for three main reasons. First, it identifies a set of five such practices. Second, it contains management's assessment of the working relationship with the works council, albeit only for the sixth wave in 1996; specifically, the NIFA survey asks the management respondent to rate the works council entity as (a) 'mostly antagonistic', (b) 'sometimes difficult', (c) 'unreservedly co-operative', (d) 'passive' and (e) 'excluded by management'. Third, the data set also records additional information on the degree of involvement of the works council. It can be seen from the table that the results of using this additional material are mixed. Thus, from the row 5 study it is the case that firms with works councils tend to use more high-performance workplace practices than their works-council-free counterparts, but that the number of such practices is highest where the institution is described by management as 'antagonistic'. More positively, from the more extensive study in the last row of the table, it can be seen that, although the general tendency is for works council plants to record lower profitability, this effect can apparently be negated by greater works council involvement. In addition, some beneficial

effect of the works council on product innovation is detected in circumstances where its degree of involvement is above normal.

Even if they contain few if any technical innovations, the studies of Phase II are noteworthy for their creative use of both existing and new variables, such as establishment size, collective bargaining and employee involvement. The use of these variables in performance equations has revealed the works council in more favourable light than the Phase I studies. As cases in point, recall the findings that works councils may be associated with higher productivity in larger plants; that the dual industrial relations system may allow the pro-productive potential of works councils to be realized; and that works council effects may be positive when taken in conjunction with other forms of employee involvement. To be sure, there remain a number of inconsistencies and ambiguities in the literature. One example is provided by establishment profitability. Nearly all studies point to poorer financial performance in works council regimes, but what is the source of this deficit if — as is seemingly the case — (higher) wages and (lower) productivity do not emerge as consistent culprits? Another is the issue of whether employee involvement and other workplace practices complement or substitute for works councils. The literature tilts towards acceptance of complementarity, but this issue too is not settled.<sup>3</sup>

Almost all the research summarized in Table 2 is cross-sectional. Problems of statistical inference may arise if the determinants of the key independent variable — works council presence (or type, or intensity) — are not accounted for. For example, works councils may be introduced in circumstances of economic difficulty or advantage. Also, their introduction may reflect unobserved differences in the costs and benefits of the institution at plant level which may in turn be linked to the outcomes in which we are interested. As in the Phase I literature, there have been some attempts to endogenize works councils presence, although identification is particularly difficult in this case. Further, if some permanent unobserved plant characteristic is associated with works council presence (*inter alia*) and the outcome indicator, then accounting for the non-random distribution of the works council in cross section will not suffice. In short, biases may attach to these Phase II estimates, and causality continues to be an issue. A final question is whether the above findings are representative given the regional and industrial composition of the two main data sets — or are still representative, given their vintage. This is the issue of external validity. Fortunately, in each of the above respects this is not the end of the story, as economists have most recently been able to use an unambiguously nationally representative data set with greater longitudinal capacity.

### *Phase III: The IAB Establishment Panel*

The latest data set to be used by researchers is the Establishment Panel of the Institute for Labour Market Research (Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung/IAB) of the Federal Labour Office (Bundesanstalt für Arbeit).

Beginning in 1993, the IAB Establishment Panel surveyed several thousand establishments from all sectors of the economy in the former West Germany and, since 1996, in the unified Germany. The Establishment Panel is based on a stratified random sample — the strata are for 16 industries and 10 employment size classes — from the population of all establishments with at least one employee covered by social insurance. To correct for panel mortality, exits and newly founded units, the data are augmented regularly. Familiarly, the data are collected in personal interviews with the owners or senior management of the establishment. The purpose of the panel is to serve the needs of the Federal Labour Office, and so its focus is employment-related matters such as labour turnover, level and composition of employment, apprenticeship training, investments and subsidies (see Kölling 2000).

Although information on most variables is collected for each wave of the panel, the works council question was asked of all establishments only in 1993, 1996, 1998 and 2000, and in the ‘missing’ years only of panel accessions. A few other questions have been asked on a less regular basis. Examples include questions on employee share ownership and profit sharing, teamworking and devolved decision-making, as well as additional information on training and the goals of training programmes (all of which arguments have variously been used to identify employee involvement/high-performance work practices).

Table 3 provides a snapshot of some of the most recent research using the Establishment Panel. The information in the first two rows of the table indicates a strongly positive general association between works council presence and economic performance. This is particularly true of the studies by Frick (2002a, b), summarized in row 1 of the table. Prior to Frick’s estimates, there were just two formal production function studies for Germany: the Phase I studies by FitzRoy and Kraft (1987) and by Addison *et al.* (1993) — see rows 2 and 5 of Table 1, respectively — and none for a large data base. Frick uses the question in the Establishment Panel asking for information on ‘replacement investment’ (i.e. depreciation) as a rough proxy for the value of the capital stock. He estimates production functions for two cross sections of data (1998 and 2000), and reports that labour productivity is as much as 25–30 per cent higher in works council regimes.

The production function study by Wolf and Zwick (2002) in row 2 of Table 3 also offers a very positive view of works council impact. Thus, for the 1999 cross section of the Establishment Panel, the authors obtain positive and statistically significant coefficient estimates for the works council dummy variable, albeit of somewhat smaller magnitude than reported by Frick. However, Wolf and Zwick are more concerned with the consequences of high-performance workplace practices for output than with the effects of co-determination on performance. The authors identify two bundles of workplace practices: ‘organizational changes’, comprising the delegation of responsibility and decisions to lower levels of the hierarchy, teamwork and workgroups with an independent budget; and ‘incentives’, which include employee share ownership and profit sharing.

TABLE 3  
The Economic Impact of the Works Council: Phase III Studies<sup>a</sup>

Study	Data	Dependent variable(s)	Methodology	Findings
1. Frick (2002a, b)	IAB Establishment Panel, using data on 2640 western German and 2119 eastern German establishments	Log value added	A works-council-in-the-production-function test (Cobb-Douglas, CES and translog specifications). Separate results given for eastern and western Germany in two cross sections (1998 and 2000). Establishment controls include capital, as proxied by replacement investment.	Works council presence is associated with sharply higher labour productivity of 25% (30%) for western (eastern) Germany. Disaggregations by broad sector (i.e. manufacturing and services) confirm this basic result for eastern Germany, and for services (although not manufacturing industry) in western Germany.
2. Wolf and Zwick (2002) <sup>b</sup>	As above, 1999 and 1996-9 Gross sample contains 6397 establishments	Log value added	Production function test. Main focus of study is on the output effects of (six) high performance workplace practices (HPWPs) rather than co-determination <i>per se</i> . Cross-section estimates — with and without correction for selection into (grouped) HPWP arrangement — are provided for the 1999 wave. Panel estimates, again controlling for the endogeneity of the broad HPWP arrangement, follow a two-stage procedure, and use data from the 1996-9 waves. Detailed plant controls.	The coefficient estimate for works council presence is positive and highly statistically significant in the basic cross-section model. But the point estimate is not robust with correction for selection on the personnel measures in one specification. In the panel estimates, works council presence has a strongly positive impact on the establishment-specific fixed effect.

Table 3 (cont'd)

<i>Study</i>	<i>Data</i>	<i>Dependent variable(s)</i>	<i>Methodology</i>	<i>Findings</i>
3. Schank <i>et al.</i> (2002) <sup>c</sup>	As above, 1993–2000. Unbalanced ( $n = 2,301$ ) and balanced ( $n = 592$ ) sample of west German establishments with 21–100 employees	Log total sales	Fixed effects estimation of a stochastic frontier production function. The comparison is between the technical efficiency estimates — and their 95% confidence intervals — of the median works council plant and its works-council-free counterpart.	There are no statistically significant differences in efficiency between establishments with and without work councils. Results are robust to outliers.
4. Addison <i>et al.</i> (2004b)	As above, 1996–2000. Initial sample of 1544 establishments, all without works councils in 1996	Changes in quits, sales per employee, employment, and profitability	Nonparametric propensity score matching model. ‘Treated’ group comprises all plants in which a works council was set up between 1996 and 1998. Matched plants derived from the 1513 controls	Mean values for the performance indicators in establishments that introduced works councils are not statistically different from those of comparator plants that remained works council free. Results are robust to outliers.

*Note:* <sup>a</sup> See also Addison *et al.* (2004a); Frick and Möller (2003).

<sup>b</sup> See also Zwick (2003).

<sup>c</sup> See also Addison *et al.* (2003).

Wolf and Zwick are especially concerned with the methodological problems that arise from the endogeneity of the decision to introduce these practices and from unobserved establishment characteristics. In recognition of these potential selection biases, Wolf and Zwick use a two-step panel estimation procedure, after Black and Lynch (2001). In the first step, a Cobb–Douglas production function is estimated for 1996–9 to calculate an unobserved time-invariant fixed effect for each establishment in the sample, where the equation includes just the time-varying input factors as regressors. In the second step, these fixed effects are regressed on the high-performance workplace practices and other (nearly) time-invariant determinants, including the presence or otherwise of a works council, controlling and not controlling for the endogeneity of the workplace practices. For its part, the coefficient estimate for the works council dummy variable is reported to be strongly positive and statistically significant.<sup>4</sup> But this result is based on a cross-section test; and, to the extent that the fixed component of the unobserved heterogeneity in the second stage is correlated with the observed firm-level characteristics, the finding of a positive works council effect may have no causal interpretation.

In contrast to the above, each of the two other Phase III studies summarized in Table 3 suggests that establishments with and without a works council do not exhibit statistically significant differences in efficiency. In the row 3 study, Schank *et al.* (2002) estimate a fixed-effects frontier production function separately for each of the two workplace regimes and then compare technical efficiencies of median plants in the two regimes. Only plants with between 21 and 100 employees (throughout the 1993–2000 sample period) are included, on the grounds that over this size interval the powers of the works council are a datum, and in order to avoid any potential bias in the estimated impact of a works council arising from size effects, reflecting the fact that very large plants almost always have a works council whereas small plants seldom do. The confidence intervals of the reported technical efficiency estimates for the two types of plant overlap, leading the authors to conclude that there is no evidence that works council plants are any more efficient than their works-council-free counterparts.

In the row 4 study, Addison *et al.* (2004b) formally exploit changes in works council status through time. Since this study focuses on recent changes in the law facilitating works council formation — namely, the 2001 Works Constitution Reform Act — its concern is with the introduction of works councils rather than with their introduction *and* dissolution. The authors' empirical strategy reflects their concern with the selection problem. They use a formal matching model to compare establishments that subsequently experienced the election of a works council with their closest counterparts from among the firmament of (1513) plants that remained continuously free of works councils over the sample period. Unlike the other studies in Table 3 that focus exclusively on productivity, this study also considers changes in the quit rate, in employment and in the profit situation between 1996 and 2000. Note that the change in productivity is proxied by the change in sales per employee

rather than by the more familiar value added per head measures, as the Establishment Panel set has an unusually large number of missing values for purchases of intermediate products — a crucially important consideration given the small number of plants with new councils — although the two measures are highly correlated over the sample period. No statistically significant differences between the treatment group and the controls are reported for any of the four performance outcomes. In short, the establishment of a works council does not appear to have a causal effect on mainstream economic performance outcomes.

Two other studies take their cue from the above analyses, and are referred to but not summarized in the table. Thus, Zwick (2003) examines one of the two bundles of high-performance workplace practices earlier identified in Wolf and Zwick (2002) — namely, ‘organizational changes’ — and investigates whether its effects on establishment productivity differ as between plants with and without works councils since he finds that the production functions differ in the two settings. In addition to modelling the endogeneity of this bundle of workplace practices, as in the row 2 study, he also allows for the endogeneity of works council presence using an endogenous switching regression model. Zwick reports that the pro-productive effects of such organizational changes are confined to workplaces with works councils. His estimates of the independent influence of works councils on productivity closely correspond to those reported in the row 2 study.

A final paper by Addison *et al.* (2003) provides a sensitivity analysis of the works council productivity effect. It is shown that the large positive coefficient estimates for the works council variable reported in some of the literature are sensitive not only to sector and region (as suggested in the row 1 studies) but also and especially to establishment size. In establishments with 21–100 employees — where, to repeat, works council powers are a datum and where there is a balanced representation of both types of workplace regime — the coefficient estimates for the works council dummy plummet and are typically statistically insignificant. These and other of the results found in this study support the notion that there are likely to be few differences on average between plants with works councils and plants without them, consistent with the findings of the studies in rows 3 and 4 of Table 3.

In outlining some key Phase III results, we have evidently travelled a long way from our starting point. The Phase I literature points to some really rather alarming adverse consequences of works council presence. Phase II studies for their part, while by no means uniformly supportive of works councils, none the less identify a number of circumstances in which beneficial net works council effects might obtain. And, initially at least, the Phase III research using nationally representative data seems unreservedly favourable to works councils. Although we have argued that the latter estimates are inflated and that the effects of works councils on productivity are likely to be small on average, even this attenuated conclusion is of course a far cry from the tenor of the Phase I studies.

### **3. Conclusion**

In this overview of a burgeoning body of empirical research into the economic consequences of works councils, we have characterized the developments as conforming to three distinct stages. Although the empirical findings are not tidy, it would be a mistake to conclude that research into the economic consequences of works councils has stalled or otherwise reached a dead end. Three points will help clarify this interpretation.

First, it would appear to be the case that, on net, either the early literature encouraged an overly negative view of the impact of works councils, or else the functioning of works councils has improved since then. Second, from the subsequent literature, the average works council effect would appear to obscure some systematic differences by establishment size, collective bargaining coverage and employee involvement mechanism. Thus, even if smaller establishments may be hampered by, say, slowed decision making under works councils, it might also be true that large plants would have had to invent something akin to the entity in the absence of a legal mandate to that effect. For its part, collective bargaining coverage may assist in decoupling distribution from production issues, and help focus the attention of the works council on the latter. And some forms of employee involvement/high-performance workplace practices may be highly productive in works council regimes. Third, excessive admiration of the institution is as misplaced as excessive revulsion towards it. Some of the latest, Phase III, estimates of the effect of works councils on labour productivity are likely to seduce. But we have argued that they need to be taken with more than a pinch of statistical salt, and have countered with evidence suggesting that the works council effect may be zero on average.

Enough has been said to indicate that we do not intend this attenuated but important conclusion to be read as establishing a (German) case for works councils, although we recognize that those who have always viewed the economic case for works councils as secondary to the requirements of equity (i.e. industrial democracy) may well regard it as decisive. Rather, our conclusion would be that research should now focus on the factors that produce shifts around this average relation.

As a next step, research into the effects of works councils should perhaps concentrate on firms with newly established councils, with a view to determining why they were introduced and to identifying their effects on firm performance. Here a matching approach comparing quasi-identical firms with and without a new council might usefully be applied. This procedure can be accomplished with longitudinal data sets such as the IAB Establishment Panel used in the Phase III studies, provided the number of plants in which a works council is introduced is large enough. In this latter context, recent changes in the Works Constitution Act may be helpful in that they portend an increase in the formation of new works councils. A more ambitious and necessarily longer-term research goal would require that we go beyond 'the

dummy variable approach' and use in-depth case studies to examine different types of works council operating in different environments. Ideally, these case studies should be informed by the first procedure; that is, they should seek to compare firms in which works councils were elected with otherwise identical firms in which they were not.

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### Notes

1. First, Frege (2002: 236) incorrectly attributes the 'management pressure/competence' argument (see below) to Addison *et al.* (1993) rather than to FitzRoy and Kraft (1985, 1987, 1990). Second, she argues that the study by Addison *et al.* (1993) does not have a sufficiently large control group of firms without works councils; gives no information on the size of firms in the sample; and indeed fails to indicate whether size is controlled for (Frege 2002: 237). In fact, Addison *et al.* state that co-determination-free establishments make up 40 per cent of this particular sample; provide descriptive statistics on firm size (measured by employment) in an appendix table; and in each of their regressions provide the coefficient estimates for this size variable. Third, in addressing the findings of Addison *et al.* (1997), Frege (2002: 237) is in fact referring to findings from Addison *et al.* (2000). We do not further address either of these studies here, other than to note that the former estimates a linear probability model of works council presence for Germany, while the latter offers a *cross-country* test of the Freeman-Lazear (1995) model discussed by Frege (2002: 234–5).
2. An earlier version of this paper also inquired into the works council–profitability nexus. Anomalously, the authors reported a positive, albeit statistically insignificant, association between their profit measure and works council presence irrespective of collective bargaining regime.
3. It was an alleged shortfall of worker representation on the basis of statistics on works council incidence and coverage that prompted the recent reform of the Works Constitution Act; see Addison *et al.* (2004b).
4. Interestingly, the effects on productivity of the two sets of high-performance workplace practices identified in the study are reversed once unobserved plant heterogeneity and selection are accounted for. Specifically, those practices fostering employee involvement (e.g. teamworking) now have a significantly positive impact on productivity, whereas the incentive bundles (e.g. profit sharing) turn statistically

insignificant. The former measures appear to be introduced when firms confront structural problems, whereas the latter emerge as more a feature of good times.

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