'A sacrament is a sign of divine things.' Why was this early definition eventually realized to be inadequate?

Sacramental theology is notoriously difficult for contemporary non-Catholic or Orthodox Christians to understand due in part to the strong remnant of positivism inherent in western Protestant theology. Originally the term, as coined by Tertullian, was expansive in scope and meaning. The Greek word 'mysterion' was used by Tertullian to indicate the general mystery of salvation (and our participation in it) as associated with already existing rites in the early Church that joined the believer to Christ. Augustine enhanced this definition by including the notion of 'sign and signifier' (a sign refers (or bridges) to what it signifies) and articulating the belief that sacraments do not merely signify or point towards God's gracious action but actually invoke or enable what is signified. Augustine, as in Tertullian, has a fairly broad understanding of things that are sacramental including the creeds, the incarnation and even the Lord's Prayer. It was this broadness of definition that became problematic as the original intent of sacramental theology, to articulate ways or means by which the believer is lifted into the divine life, became more institutionalized and restricted. It is the double movement of institutionalization and restriction that developed sacramental theology (see the Donatist controversy pp 514-516); that is, who can administer and where does one find the 'visible forms of grace' thought by Augustine to be sacramental.

Augustine's dispute with the Donatist reinforces this double process. His claim is that the efficacy of a sacrament lies in its nature as a sign (ex opere operato) and not as a result of the one or agent who performs the sacramental rite (ex opere operantis). Any sacrament is dependent on the grace of Christ for its efficacy and not the human agent. The Donatist position thought that the effect of a sacrament resided, in part, on the status of the human agent. However, Augustine is also clear to note that the 'right' to perform any sacrament exists (where one can find grace) only within the church (remember it is a mixed or fallen body for him see p 479) and by those ordained in it for that end. The basis for this 'right' is the dominical command and succession to the apostles. Augustine holds two tensions in mind, which explains in part his common source for both Catholic and Protestant sacramental theologies, with his understanding that any sacrament must be grounded in the word of God (dominical authority) and also found only in the true church (see functions of sacraments p 516-522). The question becomes, despite agreement in general function, 'what are the sacraments of dominical authority and if one has too many or too few, then it is a true church any longer?'

Hugh of St Victor added some important developments to the definition. His insistence that a sacrament have a physical or material element is a fulfilment of Augustine's sign and signifier claim. Physical things refer or point to spiritual realities. This leads to the second point of definition, that the sign really represents the thing signified (important for transubstantiation p 524). Hugh also claimed that the sacrament must be authorized in order to signify the spiritual reality. This, initially, is rooted in the dominical authority of Jesus himself but can be understood as given to the church through the Vicar of Christ in Rome. Roman Catholicism, then, is the only location of the administration of sacraments as given by dominical authority. This becomes a thorny issue for the magisterial Protestants and frames Luther's move to place dominical authority as only that which is given in Scripture explicitly. Finally, Hugh insisted as did Augustine, that a sacrament is effective in conferring its benefits. This was helpful in distinguishing between Old Testament and New Testament rites such as circumcision and so forth. Hugh believed the Old Testament rites merely signified spiritual realities but, unlike the New Testament, could not actualize them. The problem with Hugh's definition was his insistence on materiality in the definition of sacrament as this excluded the sacrament of penance.

Lombard omitted the material qualification and enhances the Augustinian motif of not only signification but of sanctification. A sacrament is an effective sign that brings to the participant the promised grace of God as enjoyed by the institutional church. The development of sacramental theology restricted the broad base of possible modes of participation found in Tertullian to those forms associated and given authority in the institutional church.

Name the seven sacraments recognized by the medieval church.

The medieval church recognized seven sacraments (affirming the Council of Florence) as having dominical authority, either given directly through the commands of Christ or indirectly through the apostolic tradition. The directly given sacraments are baptism and the Eucharist. The five indirect, meaning no explicit biblical reference as given by Jesus, are confirmation, penance, marriage, ordination and extreme unction. Two of the seven, marriage and ordination, of course, are mutually exclusive post-1100, except in very unique canonical circumstances.

Identify the criteria used by the reformers to reduce the number of the sacraments from seven to two.

The contention between the magisterial Reformers and the Roman Catholic church centered on the restriction of a sacrament as that given dominical authority. The church that followed true dominical authority was, in turn, the truly 'holy, catholic and apostolic' Church. Luther reduced the criteria of dominical authority as being traced directly to the words or commands of Jesus. Thus, only baptism and the Eucharist had true dominical authority. This became the bedrock criteria of reduction. However, another factor also served to exclude five of the medieval sacraments, and especially Luther's rejection of penance that he initially included as a sacrament. This criterion was a return to Hugh of St Victor's claim of materiality or outward sign. Only those things that have an outward or public sign could serve as evidences of the internal efficacy of God's grace. Why Luther made this second criterion important has been a focus of debate with the answers being multiple in response. What is clear, however, especially in his introduction of the communicatio idiomatum as a means to understand the Eucharist over the Zwinglian memoria model, is that Luther has a metaphysical basis to his sacramental theology and not merely a biblical criterion.

On what grounds did Zwingli reject the idea of a 'real presence' of Christ in the Eucharist?

The easiest answer is that Luther was a literalist in his understanding of the Eucharist. The Matthew 26:26 phrase 'this is my body' (hoc est meum corpus) was argued by Luther to be a statement of the real presence of Christ in the Eucharist (consubstantiation p 527), akin to the Roman Catholic view of transubstantiation (hence, his famous 'I would rather drink blood with Rome than wine with the Swiss'). Zwingli, on the other hand, was a symbolist in that he understood the 'is' of Jesus' words to mean 'signifies' or as metaphor. His argument is that the 'this' of the phrase means the 'bread' but that Jesus is really referring to his upcoming sacrifice of his body. A semantic or logical problem occurs that can only be solved by using a metaphorical (a common literary device in the bible) understanding of the text. However, this is a trite understanding of a deeper theological issue to which we now turn.

Zwingli's understanding of a sacrament was largely informed by his understanding of 'oath', particularly in terms of a community into which one finds oneself placed and with which one must decide whether to continue to identify or not (Tertullian also used the notion of oath in describing sacraments). Some scholars have gone so far as to suggest that Zwingli is more informed by his socio-political humanist convictions or experience (the Helvetic victory of 1388 see p 520) than his theological convictions. The point is that Zwingli understood the purpose of a sacrament as confirming the believer's public allegiance to God or to the church regardless of its origin. Baptism was the public introduction of a believer into the community of faith which must be demonstrated as valid through the adult participation of communion. Thus, he agrees with both of Luther's restrictions that sacraments must be dominically derived (biblical) and outward (i.e., public) signs but varies in his theological understanding as Luther stressed that a sacrament was a sign of God's allegiance to us, not of ours to God. Zwingli understands the sacraments as an enhancement of unity and commitment, public professions or acts of cohesion done throughout one's lifetime, within the church. Ostensibly, this would preclude any understanding of a sacrament as conveying grace, strengthening faith and of reassuring us of God's promises as it places the stress on the human side of the salvific equation. Luther's charge against Zwingli's 'real absence' understanding of the Eucharist in particular as a rhetorical parable or memory of the historical event of Christ restricted God's action towards us and created a Nestorian Christology (p 365).

In what ways does the concept of 'transsignification' relate to 'transubstantiation'? Can the former be maintained without the later?

'Real presence', the affirmation of Jesus as really present in the Eucharist, is a doctrine traceable to Cyril of Jerusalem (c 350) and traceable in its threefold trajectory of transubstantiation, transsignification and real absence as early as 844 in the work of the Corbie monks. For example, Radbertus of Corbie argued for a form of transubstantiation that would be later codified in 1215 and Trent. Transubstantiation holds that the accidents of the bread and wine, namely properties of outward appearance, remain as bread and wine but that, by miracle, the elements of the Eucharist are substantially (in essence or nature) transformed into the real body and blood of Christ. Luther's consubstantiation, simultaneous presence of both bread and wine and the mystical body of Christ, is a refusal to acknowledge that somehow mystery can be understood in Aristotelian accidental terms. Transsignification is seen in rudimentary form in Ratramnus of Corbie who held that the difference between consecrated and unconsecrated bread-wine was in the manner in which the believer perceived them, that the believer perceived the sign of a greater reality or a change of meaning in the act of consecration. Finally, a German monk, Candidus of Fulda, represents the 'real absence' trajectory in which participation in the Eucharist is a memorial of the union of the church as founded in Christ's sacrifice. There is nothing of Christ per se in the Eucharist except its use as a token to remember Him by. The relationship of transubstantiation and transsignification, according to 1965's Mysterium Fidei, is such that one does not seemingly discount the other. The question as raised in this encyclical depends on stress.

Transsignification argues that meaning cannot be excused from use or the context of use. The importance of the nature of an object, its essence or substance, is secondary to its associations in use. Context gives meaning, by transferring meaning or signification to a new location that in itself opens new vistas of understanding. At this point it seems that transsignification must necessarily detract from transubstantiation and its subsequent stress on ontological meaning over symbol or referential meaning. Catholic theologians such as E Schillebeeckx tried to mitigate this dialectic by adding another conceptual motif to the equation that argued for a 'real presence' of Jesus, if not ontologically in the bread, at least in terms of relation and authority behind the symbol. Schillebeeckx thought that what occurs in the context of consecration is the establishment of a new meaning authorized by the dominical command to the church which points to Christ's ongoing presence in the church. Meaning, unlike Zwingli, is not given as a memory of Christ, but is actually constituted by the 'real presence' of Christ in 'behind' the symbol of the Eucharist itself. Meaning, such as it is, is therefore found in the presence of Christ within the church as it celebrates the Eucharist. The bread is other than mere bread because its meaning is given a significance above the usual pale due to the real presence of Christ 'behind' it. Jesus Christ, then, sacramentally is present without the need for a metaphysical account of change. The 1965 encyclical thought this to be acceptable within the context of transubstantiation by stressing that not only is the goal and signification of the bread changed, but so must the bread itself be changed. The reader can adjudicate whether there is agreement or not. For the transubstantiationist, the stress is that while sign and context are important, what is truly important is the ontological stress on change in real presence. For the transsignificationist, the stress is that while change might be important, what is truly important is the presence of the agent behind the sign giving value to the symbol.

Give a brief summary of the main arguments for and against the baptism of infants. Does it make any difference to the infant concerned?

The issue of infant baptism has been problematic since Tertullian to Barth. The biblical evidence is ambiguous but the practice was widespread very early in the church and given a Protestant imprimatur in the great reformers Luther and Calvin, despite a significant Anabaptist movement. The arguments for the practice center on two issues: the nature of original sin and the nature of the covenant established by God to the church. In regard to both of these foci the sacrament of baptism has a causative effect in the life of the Christian. The rejection of the practice, particularly in the Reformation by the Anabaptists, derived from an understanding that sacraments, as in Zwingli, are declarations of faith. However, it must be stated that Zwingli did support infant baptism and that difference between him and Anabaptists is that baptism, for him, is the declaration of the parent's faith later confirmed by the adult in participation in the Eucharist. The Anabaptist understands baptism as a declaration of personal faith, not that of a parent initiating one into a community.

The doctrine of original sin is important in shaping one's understanding of baptism. As early as Cyprian of Carthage it was commonly held that baptism procured remission of sinful acts and original sin. By the time of Augustine, the thorny issue of post-baptism sin was answered with his distinction that infant baptism remitted the guilt of original sin but did not rid the effects of sin. The baptized was no longer guilty before God but still had the 'old nature' clinging to the new person that needed to be eliminated by a life of grace. What Augustine was keen to preserve, with limited success, was the notion that God's sovereignty could be impinged on by human action. It is no accident that the issue of infant baptism arose during the Pelagian controversy (pp 443-449). For Augustine, that a person's assent was somehow needed to effect or validate the sacrament was Pelagianism.

The doctrine of the covenant is another location for the affirmation of infant baptism. The problem of original guilt (and its popular restatement by Lombard in purgatory, see p 559) left the practice unfounded for the magisterial reformers. To reformulate the practice, a move to understand the sacrament as a covenant was made. To be baptized, in analogy to the Hebrew practice of circumcision, was to acknowledge belonging, due to God's action, to a covenant community. The practice of infant baptism was both more inclusive (open to both males and females) and gentle as it didn't require bloodshed. However, and more centrally for Luther and Calvin, it also upheld the centrality of 'faith alone' with its correlation that God is the sole agent in effecting our salvation. Whereas Zwingli opted for a memorial or initiation motif in covenant, Luther and Calvin opted for a theological response grounded in the doctrines of sovereignty, election and Christology. To baptize is to recognize the presence of God in maintaining the grounds and promise of the divine unilateral covenant to the church.

The Anabaptist position rejects both of the above theological reasons for infant baptism by stressing that baptism is the affirmation of a personal faith or conversion. While there is some difference in the actual practice (i.e., mode and administration) what is common is the stress that baptism is a symbolic action that cannot be understood as effective in the process of conversion. A natural and common, but not necessary, egress of this position is the possibility of multiple baptisms of the same individual, dependent on their continued (or lack of) success in maintaining fellowship or a moral lifestyle. Ironically, the position suffers the same charge as the Augustinian position in regard to original sin in regard to the exclusionary nature of the actual practice. To wit, those not baptized can be understood as not saved, as they have not demonstrated conversion. This is somewhat mitigated by the premise that conversion itself is the guarantee of salvation but confused by the insistence that baptism must follow in due course. For example, some Anabaptist groups refused to baptize its membership until near death lest a sinful relapse demonstrate a lack of salvation. The issue of eternal security is a problem in the Anabaptist position. Finally, the Anabaptist notion is loaded not only with moral overtones as seen above but also can be understood as restrictive to certain groups as it makes assent a co-factor in salvation. This, as some modern theologians argue (notably Barth in regard to Brunner), eliminates the infirm, mentally challenged and very young from salvation. Curiously, however, and hotly debated in reasoning, Barth came to reject infant baptism despite his criticism of Brunner's voluntarism.

To answer whether the practice makes a difference to the infant is begging the question. One could well argue that both positions share the desire that children of Christians be actively engaged with the community in order that Christ is tangibly manifest in fellowship and sacrament to the child, leading to a life of Christian discipleship. The point of 'entry' is the community as a manifestation of Christ and whether one 'confirms' that as an adult or affirms that by being baptized as an adult is irrelevant. However, this undercuts the theological reasons of Augustine, Luther and Calvin. For these writers (and the early Barth) the issue is not how the community is faithful but how God is faithful to the church. Infant baptism is a demonstration of that faithful action, and here I argue as a theologian but also as a father hopeful of and celebrating God's grace towards my own son.