Prejudice and Intergroup Relations

Thomas Kessler and Amélie Mummendey

KEY CONCEPTS

authoritarian personality
category salience
common ingroup identity
contact hypothesis
decategorization
ethnocentrism
ingroup favouritism
intergroup anxiety
intergroup behaviour
minimal group paradigm
mutual distinctiveness
positive and negative interdependence
positive distinctiveness
prejudice
reverse discrimination
social categorization
social discrimination
social dominance orientation
superordinate goals
tokenism
CHAPTER OUTLINE

This chapter introduces prejudice and social discrimination together with explanations of their causes. After a brief discussion of prejudice at the level of the individual, the chapter focuses mainly on prejudice and social discrimination as intergroup phenomena. We present classic and contemporary intergroup explanations of intergroup conflict such as realistic conflict theory and social identity theory. Furthermore, we introduce basic psychological processes such as social categorization, identification with a social group, group evaluation and group-based emotions, and consider the intergroup motivations regulating intergroup behaviour. The remainder of the chapter presents various approaches explaining when and how prejudice and intergroup conflict can be reduced.

Introduction

As in most parts of the modern world, social and economic change in Europe is currently characterized by an internationalization of all domains of life. Consequently, countries are forced to deal with a permanent and increasing flow of migration of people with different cultural, religious or ethnic backgrounds. We find ourselves confronted with people who appear to be different from us. Obviously, societal changes such as migration are not the only way in which different others are introduced into our social contexts. We are already used to differentiating between people on the basis of gender, sexual orientation or nationality.

These ‘others’ enter into various areas of our lives. We have to deal with those who are different from us. We form impressions and judgements about what sort of people they are, and we experience feelings and emotions towards them:

‘Catholics are bigots; Protestants are uptight.’ ‘Women are born to support and maintain the family, they’re not cut out for top management positions.’ ‘Men are not really competent to rear children.’ ‘Homosexuals should not be parents and cannot raise children in an appropriate way.’ ‘East Germans are always complaining; they are incompetent.’ ‘West Germans are arrogant and cold.’ ‘Muslims are conservative and sexist; they threaten the fundamental values of modern Europe.’

What information do we gain from this list of impressions and judgements?

Firstly, in all examples, the content of judgement is connected with negative feelings. Secondly, our behaviour towards these groups of people tends to be in line with our judgements and emotions. Given the above statements, female applicants are unlikely to be shortlisted for senior managerial positions. Turkish families are also unlikely to be openly welcomed into new neighbourhoods. Thirdly, our judgements, emotions and behaviour obviously apply to both social groups as a whole and to individual members of the particular group. We approach these ‘others’ in a generalized way and neglect interindividual differences.
An integration of the individual aspects listed above leads us to a more comprehensive picture, and ultimately to the concepts of prejudice and discrimination. Although both prejudice and discrimination can, in principle, occur in positive forms, the literature on intergroup relations (and hence this chapter) focuses on their negative forms. **Prejudice** can be defined as an antipathy, or a derogatory social attitude, towards particular social groups or their members, combined with the feeling and expression of negative affect. **Social discrimination** refers to the explicit display of negative or disadvantaging behaviour towards particular social groups or their members (Allport, 1954b; Brown, 1995; Hewstone, Rubin & Willis, 2002).

The selection of social groups appearing in the statements above consists of groups who are often made a target of prejudice. Groups defined in terms of religious beliefs, gender, sexual orientation and ethnicity prove to be chronic victims of prejudice. This may be due to the fact that these groups are all formed on the basis of categories which are meaningful for defining the self and for differentiating between the self and others in many social contexts.

Prejudice is often expressed in various forms of discrimination against the target group or any of its members. Discrimination can take the form of underprivilege, disadvantage, social exclusion, maltreatment or even physical extermination (in its most extreme forms, ‘ethnic cleansing’ and genocide). In everyday life, these forms of overt and blatantly negative treatment are, however, less frequent than more subtle forms such as tokenism or reverse discrimination.

**Tokenism** involves conceding a minor favour to a minority in order to justify negative discrimination on a broader scale. For example, employers hiring a woman or a black person on the basis of their gender or race, and not their individual competence, can use this ‘token minority’ to demonstrate that they do not discriminate against minorities, and that there is no need for more fundamental changes in equal opportunity policy (see Pettigrew & Martin, 1987).

Sometimes, prejudiced individuals act against their prejudice and show **reverse discrimination**: they systematically evaluate or treat members of a target group more favourably than non-members (e.g., Dutton & Lake, 1973). For those individuals engaging in reverse discrimination, such subtle forms of discrimination offer protection against public accusations of bias in a society where prejudice may be deemed unacceptable. For the targets of reverse discrimination, however, it is not only extremely blatant forms of discrimination but also the more subtle forms that pose a problem. They may experience detrimental effects to their self-esteem and self-worth and internalize negative evaluations and low expectations of their own competence, because they attribute positive feedback and success to their category membership rather than to their personal merits.

**SUMMARY**

Prejudice consists of a derogatory attitude towards social groups or their members. Social discrimination is the behavioural manifestation of prejudice ranging from explicit negative treatment of others based on their group membership to tokenism and reverse discrimination.
EXPLANATIONS OF PREJUDICE AND DISCRIMINATION

Do personality factors contribute to prejudice and intergroup conflict? How does the relationship between ingroup and outgroup influence attitudes and behaviours of group members? What are the minimal conditions for intergroup conflict to develop? How do group members manage their social identity?

The destructive consequences of extremely negative forms of prejudice and discrimination such as devaluation, hostile aggression, dehumanization and even genocide lead us to ask why people are prejudiced and how social discrimination can be explained. Whilst prejudice and discrimination are widespread phenomena, not all individuals express prejudiced views in the same way and to the same degree. The question of interest is therefore how the pervasiveness and ubiquity of prejudice can be explained.

The prejudiced personality

During the final victory against the German Third Reich in 1945, the Allied troops uncovered crimes committed against millions of men, women and children whom the Nazi Germans had identified as belonging to certain groups and who, according to the Nazi ideology, were a threat to the purity of the German or Aryan race. These were principally but not exclusively Jews. Gypsies such as the Sintis and Romanies, homosexuals, communists, and physically and mentally handicapped people also belonged to those groups identified as ‘inferior’. The dimensions of these crimes in terms of numbers of victims and perpetrators involved, administrative and organizational sophistication, cruelty and brutality clearly exceed anything ever experienced or imagined thus far in history. It might, then, be thought that the extent of these atrocities was so great that those individuals who were willing and able to commit them must be considered to have been people with dysfunctional personalities. In their famous book The Authoritarian Personality, published in 1950, Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson and Sanford took exactly this approach to explaining the Nazi Holocaust, and presented the first personality-based approach to prejudice. The authoritarian personality is conceived as a syndrome made up of a number of basic personality dimensions. These dimensions determine the degree to which individuals would be generally prone to prejudice and susceptible to fascist ideologies prevalent in a given society within a certain era. The primary personality dimension is authoritarianism. Authoritarianism relates to an overly subservient attitude towards authority figures as well as an authoritarian attitude towards lower-status minorities. Such personality characteristics are presumed to originate from a particular style of socialization in families, with authoritarian repressive parents using extremely harsh punishments to discipline their children into strict conformity with conventional norms.

As a result the children are subject to conflicting tendencies of admiration and aggression towards their parents. The children do not, however, dare to act upon their hostile impulses towards the parental authorities. Instead, the children’s negative feelings and aggressive tendencies are displaced and directed at ‘scapegoats’; these are groups which deviate from prevalent societal conventions, for example social minorities, against whom derogation and even aggression are socially sanctioned.

Based on these theoretical assumptions, Adorno and colleagues developed a personality inventory to assess the various dimensions of the authoritarian personality. These dimensions included: attitudes towards minorities (e.g., anti-Semitism); admiration for authorities; political and economic conservatism; and a cognitive style of thinking, whereby the world is simply divided into good and bad. The central scale within this inventory is the well known Fascism scale (F-scale) measuring the potential for fascism and distinguishing those individuals who are susceptible to fascist propaganda from those with democratic and tolerant attitudes. Since the Nazis adhered to an extreme right-wing conservative ideology, the authors of the authoritarian personality restricted their personality inventory to right-wing political attitudes (for a more recent interpretation of authoritarianism, see Altemeyer, 1998).

The concept of the authoritarian personality was originally very influential, but later provoked severe methodological as well as conceptual criticism. The neglect of the influence of current social situations, prevailing norms and socio-cultural conditions on the degree of prejudice was at the centre of the conceptual critique. In a most important series of studies carried out in South Africa and in the southern and northern United States, Pettigrew (1958) showed, that – as expected – the level of racial prejudice against black people was lower in the northern states than in both the southern states and South Africa. With respect to their authoritarian personality, however, the three samples did not differ. Pettigrew’s data showed that personality had less of an impact on whether white individuals expressed anti-black prejudice than did conformity to the contemporary social norms of the segregated and non-segregated societies.

As mentioned above, the authoritarian personality approach as an explanation of the causes of prejudice had been instigated by the extreme crimes of Nazi Germany. A more recent approach that includes an individual difference explanation of prejudice and its causes is social dominance theory (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Although this is a wide-ranging theory, including a focus on ideological and societal factors, it also highlights the importance of social dominance orientation (SDO), an individual difference measure of individuals’ acceptance of general cultural ideologies concerning equality or inequality in societies (Pratto, 1999; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; see Individual differences 14.1). Facing widespread status and power differences between social groups in our societies, some individuals accept or even favour a clear stratification of dominant and subordinate groups.
as being just and consistent with a natural order. Individuals who score highly on SDO have a strong desire to promote intergroup hierarchies and for their ingroups to dominate their outgroups; they also reject policies aimed at establishing equality. Those with low SDO scores, in contrast, argue that inequality is unjust and support views and political programs against inequality between social groups. At the centre of the more general construct of SDO are various legitimizing myths, defined as consensually held values, attitudes, beliefs, stereotypes or cultural ideologies that provide moral and intellectual justification for group-based oppression and inequality. They serve to justify the oppression of some groups by others, hence status differences between powerful and less powerful groups in a society are made acceptable. Ultimately, social dominance theory offers an evolutionary-psychological explanation for the organization of human societies as group-based hierarchies.

The SDO-scale includes statements that support or reject such legitimizing myths (see Individual Differences 14.1). Interindividual differences in agreement or disagreement with these myths are measured, whereby agreement is assumed to represent a desire for group-based dominance and an opposition to equality. Several studies have shown that SDO relates to non-egalitarian political and social attitudes, including sexism, racism and nationalism (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth & Malle, 1994; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; Sidanius, Pratto & Bobo, 1996). However, there is less evidence that people with high SDO engage in specific instances of intergroup bias in order to achieve or maintain ingroup dominance (Sidanius et al., 1996). Even if we accept the idea of a dysfunctional personality syndrome or individual orientation as explaining the causes of prejudice and discrimination, the pervasiveness and ubiquity of prejudice towards particular groups such as the Jews in Nazi Germany or blacks in South Africa and the United States remain unexplained. It is hard to believe that millions of citizens all share a certain dysfunctional personality structure or a specific individual orientation. Even if this were the case, how can we explain that specific groups are selected as targets within one country and one historical period but not in another? Pettigrew’s evidence has already demonstrated that the content of a societal norm and consensus about how to behave leads ordinary people, irrespective of their individual differences, to adopt and express prejudice to a higher or lower degree.

**INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 14.1**

The Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) Scale (Pratto et al., 1994; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999)

Social dominance theory (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) proposes that society contains ideologies that either promote or attenuate intergroup hierarchies. Individual differences in the extent to which these competing ideologies are accepted are represented by social dominance orientation (SDO). This scale, developed by Sidanius and Pratto (1999), measures the extent to which individuals have a strong desire to promote intergroup hierarchies and for their ingroups to dominate their outgroups.

**Instructions for completion:** Below is a series of statements with which you may either agree or disagree. For each statement, please indicate the degree of your agreement/disagreement by circling the appropriate number from ‘1’ to ‘7’.

1. Some groups of people are just more worthy than others.
2. In getting what your group wants, it is sometimes necessary to use force against other groups.
3. It’s OK if some groups have more of a chance in life than others.
4. To get ahead in life, it is sometimes necessary to step on other groups.
5. If certain groups of people stayed in their place, we would have fewer problems.
6. It’s probably a good thing that certain groups are at the top and other groups are at the bottom.
7. Inferior groups should stay in their place.
8. Sometimes other groups must be kept in their place.
9. It would be good if all groups could be equal.
10. Group equality should be our ideal.
11. All groups should be given an equal chance in life.
12. We should do what we can to equalize conditions for different groups.
13. We should increase social equality.
14. We would have fewer problems if we treated different groups more equally.
15. We should strive to make incomes more equal.
16. No one group should dominate in society.

**Instructions for scoring:** Items 9–16 (which should not be presented in a block, as they are shown here) should be reverse coded.
A further limitation of the personality approach must also be mentioned: prejudice is a socially pervasive phenomenon. However, whilst individuals broadly share cognitions, emotions and behavioural dispositions towards target groups, not everybody, and not even every prejudiced individual, carries the entire range of prejudices known to exist. Moreover, the groups which we ourselves belong to define, in turn, which groups appear to be the other. Depending on how we view the characteristics of our own group, we perceive and evaluate in what respect ‘others’ are seen as different. Thus, to return to the stereotypes we introduced earlier, although it is almost never true that all members of one group hold the same stereotype about an outgroup, the stereotypes held are always views of an outgroup from a specific perspective. Thus East Germans are often judged incompetent from a West German perspective. Catholics may be judged to be bigots from a Protestant perspective, and homosexuals might be judged inadequate parents from a heterosexual perspective.

In order to overcome the limitations of personality approaches and increase our understanding of prejudice as a social phenomenon, we must therefore consider the intergroup context within which the prejudice is embedded. This entails examining not only the target group but also the complementary group expressing the prejudice and carrying out the acts of social discrimination.

Realistic conflict theory

According to individual difference explanations of the causes of prejudice, positive and negative attitudes towards other groups are based on characteristics of the individual personality. These attitudes determine whether relations between one’s own group and other groups are positive or negative. The social pervasiveness of prejudice and discrimination is explained by the coming together of large numbers of authoritarian or SDO personalities. They, in turn, will disseminate prejudice, and the result will be a relationship to members of outgroups that is characterized by conflict. The difficulty with this theory is that it does not seem likely that, just by chance, a selection of equally prejudiced personalities will appear in a certain context at a certain time. Sherif (1966) proposed a radically different view. Instead of beginning with individual attitudes, which then lead to acceptance or rejection of others, he postulated that the reverse sequence explains the origins of prejudice and discrimination. He suggested that it is the particular relationship between social groups which influences the attitudes and behaviour of its members.

This basic assumption led Sherif to develop his realistic conflict theory (RCT) (Campbell, 1965; Sherif, 1966). Imagine that a group of social psychology students and a group of neuropsychology students have succeeded in reaching the final of a competition for the most innovative and socially relevant research project in the field of psychology. The award is highly prestigious and carries a considerable amount of prize money; your group definitely wants to win. So, however, does the other group. Only one group can win and the other must lose. You compete with the other group; to reach the goal of winning, both your group and the other group are negatively dependent on one another. In contrast, imagine that the award is advertised for the most innovative and socially relevant interdisciplinary research project. Now both groups from different disciplines have a common goal; neither you nor the other group could win the prize on its own. Both groups can only achieve their goal by mutual cooperation. They share a superordinate goal and both groups are therefore positively dependent on one another.

Under the condition of negative interdependence between own and other group, the other group is a barrier to achieving the own group’s goals. Accordingly, members will devalue, dislike and reject the other group. In contrast, positive interdependence means that the other group is necessary and therefore highly functional for the achievement of the ingroup’s goal. Positive interdependence leads to more positive evaluations and greater acceptance of the other group. The type of intergroup interdependence reflects the structural conditions in which the groups can achieve their goals, such as obtaining valued goods or necessary resources.

According to RCT, it is these structural intergroup conditions, for example the type of interdependence relationship between groups, that determine the attitudes and behaviour of group members. Examples of specific attitudes and behaviours include: identification with ingroup, solidarity within groups (van Vugt & Hart, 2004) and the respective evaluation of ingroup and outgroup (Blake & Mouton, 1986; Campbell, 1965).

In several famous field studies based at summer camps for boys in the USA, Sherif and colleagues examined the basic assumptions of RCT concerning the influence of functional relationships between groups on intergroup attitudes and behaviour (Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood & Sherif, 1961; Sherif & Sherif, 1953; Sherif, White & Harvey, 1955). They aimed to test the hypotheses that
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reduce conflict and enhance positive intergroup attitudes. In order to test their hypotheses rigorously, Sherif and colleagues ruled out all other explanations for expected effects, including personality differences, prior personal ties and pronounced differences in socio-economic background and physical appearance, and concentrated solely on functional intergroup relationships. They carefully selected their participants: recruiting white middle-class American boys who were approximately 12 years old, psychologically well adjusted, and who did not know each other prior to the camp. In addition, to control for interpersonal attraction, the first summer camp studies included an initial phase in which the boys could form friendships. These friendships were split up in a later phase when the boys were divided into two groups.

Let us take a closer look at the most famous study, conducted at Robbers Cave, Oklahoma. This study consisted of three different phases. In the first phase of group formation, the boys were divided into two groups matched for boys’ size and skills. The two groups were unaware of the presence of the other group: they lived in separate areas and engaged separately in activities such as cooking, constructing areas for swimming and transporting canoes over rough terrain. During the days, which were filled with these kinds of segregated activities, each group developed its own norms and symbols (e.g., they created group names such as the ‘Eagles’ and the ‘Rattlers’). Each group developed a status hierarchy, with some boys moving to higher positions of respect and power and others landing at the bottom of the heap. The boy who came up with the best ideas and proved most efficient at coordinating the group’s endeavours became group leader. After a while, both groups became aware of the presence of the other group in the same summer camp. Both groups then increasingly began to make references to the other group, and suggested that contests such as tug of war. Members of the winning group received highly attractive rewards, for example a pennknife; members of the losing group received nothing. Not surprisingly, these contests produced fierce competition. The boys became more and more attached to their own group, and cohesiveness and solidarity within groups increased. At the same time, the boys became increasingly hostile and aggressive towards the respective outgroup, which rapidly generalized beyond competition situations. For instance, the boys began to call outgroup members ‘stinkers’, ‘cheats’ or ‘sneaks’; they produced threatening posters, planned raids and collected secret hoards of green apples as ammunition. After only a few days, the intergroup conflict escalated so dramatically that the experimenters were forced to hastily end this phase.

In the second phase of intergroup competition, the experimenters arranged a series of such direct competitive encounters, all designed to establish negative interdependence between the groups: they participated in sports contests and other competitive activities such as tug of war. Members of the winning group received highly attractive rewards, for example a pennknife; members of the losing group received nothing. Not surprisingly, these contests produced fierce competition. The boys became more and more attached to their own group, and cohesiveness and solidarity within groups increased. At the same time, the boys became increasingly hostile and aggressive towards the respective outgroup, which rapidly generalized beyond competition situations. For instance, the boys began to call outgroup members ‘stinkers’, ‘cheats’ or ‘sneaks’; they produced threatening posters, planned raids and collected secret hoards of green apples as ammunition. After only a few days, the intergroup conflict escalated so dramatically that the experimenters were forced to hastily end this phase.

In the third phase of intergroup cooperation, the experimenters established positive interdependence between both groups by introducing superordinate goals, goals which were desired by both groups, but which could only be achieved by them acting together, and not by either group on its own. After a breakdown of the water supply, the two groups had to cooperate in finding a solution to restore water to the camp. In another case, the boys learned that a truck that was supposed to bring their lunch was stuck in the mud. In order to receive their lunch, the boys from both groups had to join forces to pull the truck out of the mud. Interestingly, they now cooperatively used the same rope which they had previously used competitively in a tug-of-war. These joint efforts to achieve superordinate goals did not immediately reduce the hostility between the groups. However, a series of activities, all designed to achieve a superordinate goal, gradually led to a reduction in intergroup conflict and the development of increasing intergroup acceptance accompanied by more friendly attitudes towards one another.

It is worth mentioning several points in connection with Sherif’s experiment. (1) The experimenters observed some signs of negative intergroup attitudes even before the groups were drawn into competition with one another. Sherif and colleagues did not rate this observation as important. (2) Ingroup solidarity, ingroup identification and negative outgroup attitudes increased with intergroup competition. (3) Individual factors were ruled out as explanatory factors for intergroup conflict because the members of both groups were normal in terms of their personality and psychological make-up at pre-test. Moreover, both groups, the proud winners and the frustrated losers, developed hostile intergroup attitudes and opposition. Hence, frustration at losing the contest cannot be the major explanatory variable (see Chapter 8, this volume). (4) It took several joint and positive interdependent activities to reduce intergroup hostility.

Realistic conflict theory (Campbell, 1965; Sherif, 1966) identifies social groups and their goal relations as the basis for cooperation and conflict. Accordingly, it is the type of intergroup relationship which explains intergroup attitudes and behaviours. For Sherif, intergroup cooperation and conflict are rational, with each group striving to maximize its share of real resources.

Mere categorization

RCT proposes that realistic conflict between groups is the necessary condition for prejudice and discrimination between group members. However, later research within the theoretical framework of RCT, but also evidence from Sherif’s own studies, raised some doubts about this assumption. As mentioned above, the boys asked for competitive games as soon as they had become aware of the outgroup and before negative interdependence had been established. Furthermore, competitive intergroup behaviour has been shown to emerge between groups that are not interdependent groups (Rabbie & Horowitz, 1969), between groups in explicitly non-competitive relations (Ferguson & Kelley, 1964; Rabbie & Wilkins, 1971) and even between
members show intergroup discrimination. The typical characteristics of a minimal group situation were (1) meaningless or even arbitrary categorization into ingroup and outgroup; (2) complete anonymity of individual group membership; (3) no face-to-face interaction between members within and between groups; (4) no personal benefit of behavioural decisions concerning ingroup and outgroup members; and (5) explicit importance of the decisions for the recipients.

Based on these characteristics of the minimal group paradigm, the researchers allocated participants into two groups according to an arbitrary criterion. For instance, in one experiment, Tajfel and colleagues allegedly divided the participants according to their preference for paintings by the two artists Paul Klee or Vassilij Kandinsky. The participants in these minimal group paradigms were, however, randomly assigned to the groups. Other ingroup and outgroup members were denoted only by a code number indicating their group membership. Participants worked on their experimental task in individually separated cubicles. They were instructed to distribute money (or another resource of some importance, such as ’points’) to ingroup and outgroup members but explicitly never to themselves.

In order to measure intergroup behaviour, the researchers studied the extent to which participants used one or more of several strategies for distributing the money between ingroup and outgroup members. Participants could adopt a fairness strategy and distribute equal amounts of money between ingroup and outgroup; or they could maximize ingroup profit by allocating the most money to ingroup members; or they could maximize joint profit by choosing the highest possible amount of money, irrespective of whether it went to ingroup or outgroup; finally, they could maximize the difference between ingroup and outgroup.

Given that the baseline was such a meaningless distinction between the ingroup and outgroup, it was not surprising that participants tended to be fair and distributed the money fairly equally between members of their ingroup and outgroup. But they also used the other strategies. Beyond the tendency towards fairness, participants also significantly favoured the ingroup over the outgroup. The most challenging result from a rational or instrumental perspective was that participants were prepared to sacrifice absolute gains for their ingroup (and for both groups together) in order to maximize the difference between their ingroup and the outgroup in favour of the ingroup. Numerous studies have replicated these results: it appears to be a robust finding that mere categorization is sufficient for the emergence of competitive intergroup behaviour (Brewer, 1979; Brown & Brewer, 1998; Tajfel, 1978).

Social identity theory

The minimal group paradigm and its findings pose two challenges. Firstly, why do people begin to show competitive intergroup behaviour in such a trivial intergroup situation where there is neither meaningful categorization nor conflict or competition between ingroup and outgroup? Secondly, why do individuals favour their ingroup by maximizing not only the outcome for their ingroup but also the difference between ingroup and outgroup? Tajfel and Turner (1986) developed social identity theory (SIT) to explain the findings of the minimal group paradigm and, more generally, to address the central phenomena of intergroup relations, by means of studies both within and beyond the laboratory. The theory builds upon four interrelated concepts: social categorization, social comparison, social identity and positive distinctiveness.

Social categorization allows individuals to gain information concerning their position
in the world; they get to know both who they are and who they are not. As members of certain social categories, individuals do not perceive themselves or others as unique individuals, but rather in terms of their category membership. The more important and meaningful the category membership, the more it constitutes the basis for individuals’ social identity, a key part of their self-concept.

Individuals generally strive for a positive self-concept. Accordingly, they strive for a positive social identity (the view of oneself derived from one’s group membership; see Chapter 5, p. 104). Social comparisons between own and other groups on valued dimensions provide the information which individuals require for the formation of a positive or negative social identity. For example, many of you reading this chapter may have a positive social identity as a psychology student when compared with social work students, but not so positive when compared with medical students (based, in each case, on social status, prestige and salaries of the respective graduates in each field). If, however, social competence and not prestige is the dimension of comparison, then the comparison outcome involving psychology students and social work students, and its effect on social identity, would possibly be reversed.

The need for a positive social identity is satisfied when a social comparison outcome is clearly in favour of the ingroup and the ingroup is positively distinct from comparison outgroups. From the perspective of SIT, intergroup behaviour serves the need to establish, maintain and defend positive ingroup distinctiveness. In the minimal group paradigm, distribution of money between ingroup and outgroup is the only form of intergroup behaviour available for serving positive ingroup distinctiveness: by maximizing the difference between groups in favour of the ingroup, the positive distinctiveness of the ingroup is explicitly established and underlined.

Beyond the minimal group situation, in the real social world outside the laboratory, social groups are usually not of a minimal nature and group members use more information about the social context and the characteristics of the relationship between groups than mere categorization. Imagine the following situation. In many countries primary school teachers currently enjoy lower public prestige and are paid less than secondary school teachers. Primary school teachers have a lower status than secondary school teachers and are therefore forced to face an unfavourable outcome when comparing their own group with the other group. Given their striving for positive social distinctiveness, how will members of the lower-status group deal with this status quo? The first question asked will be whether group members can imagine alternatives to the status quo: are the boundaries between the groups permeable, and is it possible to move upwards by becoming a member of the higher-status group? Or can the relationship between groups as a whole be changed, are they stable or unstable? And should the relationships be changed or not, are they legitimate or illegitimate?

**Figure 14.1** Social identity theory: motivation, comparison and appraisal processes and types of intergroup behaviour.
If the boundaries between own and other group are permeable, a primary school teacher might try to leave her low-status group and move into the high-status group in order to re-establish positive ingroup distinctiveness. She can return to university, try to obtain a higher qualification entitling her to the position of a secondary school teacher, and thus use social mobility to move into the higher-status group.

If, however, even given boundaries which seem permeable, the primary school teacher conceives the status relationship to be unstable and illegitimate, she will engage in social competition and will attempt to demonstrate the superiority of her group of primary school teachers in comparison to secondary school teachers. All this seems unlikely when the status relationship is perceived as stable and legitimate. In this case, our primary school teacher will be more likely to use social creativity to re-evaluate her group. Social creativity comprises attempts to change the nature of the comparison context such as finding other outgroups (e.g., kindergarten teachers) for which intergroup comparison leads to favourable outcomes. Moreover, she can also change the comparison dimension (e.g., ‘it is not public recognition that is important, but the basic education of children’), which may also lead to a more positive evaluation of her ingroup.

The strategies of social mobility, social competition and social creativity are means of restoring a positively distinct view of the ingroup compared with outgroups. The selection of these various forms of intergroup behaviour is determined by group members’ evaluation of intergroup comparisons. These evaluations are, in turn, based upon characteristics of status relationships such as stability and legitimacy as well as permeability of group boundaries (Ellemers, 1993; Mummendey, Kessler, Klink & Mielke, 1999; see Figure 14.1 for a flow chart of social identity processes).

**SUMMARY**

Authoritarian personality and social dominance orientation are personality-based explanations of prejudice. Realistic conflict theory posits that it is not personality but the relationship between social groups that determines the attitudes and behaviour of group members. Mere categorization into ingroup and outgroup, however, is sometimes sufficient to elicit ingroup favouritism. Social identity explains how striving for a positive social identity leads to various intergroup behaviours including prejudice.

**INTERGROUP BEHAVIOUR: BASIC PROCESSES**

What psychological processes guide intergroup behaviour?
How are individuals and social groups connected?
What motivates a more favourable treatment of an ingroup compared to an outgroup?

In analysing and explaining the causes of prejudice and discrimination as intergroup behaviour, it will be useful to take a closer look at the general nature of intergroup behaviour, including its basic concepts and processes. Imagine two people, Meltem and Karola. Both women are in their mid-twenties and study psychology in Munich. They have joined a common work group to prepare for their exams. They are also members of different political students’ communities: Meltem works for the Muslim, Karola for the Catholic student community. Imagine both women, firstly, in the work group situation and, secondly, in a public political discussion about headscarves for Muslim women. In the work group, Meltem and Karola support each other in studying the various issues of their degree subject. They share their personal feelings of anxiety before an exam; they exchange their individual aspirations and their personal views about their professors. And now imagine switching to the topic of Muslim and Christian culture and religion in a European country.

Within the first context, Meltem and Karola view and interact with each other in terms of their idiosyncratic personal characteristics as unique individuals. When it comes to the topic of different religions, their opinions and statements will be strongly determined by the beliefs they share with other members of the religious community they each belong to. This will be even more true the more meaningful it is for Meltem and Karola to be members of their groups, that is, the stronger their distinct social identities. Each will act together with other members of their respective groups regardless of their personal differences. More generally speaking, intergroup behaviour takes place whenever persons individually or collectively interact in terms of their group identification (Sherif, 1966).

Individuals derive their identity from their membership in a particular ingroup relative to an outgroup. They act as group members and like other members of the category they belong to when in a given social situation a particular social categorization becomes meaningful. This may even be the case when a person is alone and perhaps thinking about whether to sign a petition in favour of her own group or against other groups; it may also occur within dyadic interactions (e.g., when Meltem and Karola discuss issues concerning their respective religions); or it may arise in social situations with larger numbers of individuals belonging to different groups.

Individuals demonstrate intergroup behaviour whenever they categorize themselves and others into ingroup and outgroups and when they identify themselves with their own group. The basic processes of categorization and identification influence the way in which individuals perceive and evaluate both themselves and others. Furthermore, these processes have an important impact on motivational processes and behaviour. Based on evidence from current research, Figure 14.2 summarizes which basic processes are important and how they relate to one another in regulating intergroup behaviour.

In the following parts of this chapter, we will describe the processes that are relevant for the regulation of intergroup behaviour in more detail.

**Social categorization**

Social categorization and knowledge One of the basic abilities we possess is to categorize objects, events or people into
similar clusters and differentiate between dissimilar clusters. For instance, we categorize apples or oranges as fruits and differentiate them from vegetables. The central function of categorization is to gain knowledge about things identified as elements of a particular category (Millikan, 1998). Having, for example, categorized a person as being Catholic or Muslim, we can then relate everything we have learned about Catholics or Muslims to the person belonging to this category. Categorization structures our social and non-social environment and gives meaning to things because it relates category-based knowledge to actual perception (Smith & Medin, 1981; see Chapter 4, this volume). Categories involve inductive and deductive processes. Induction involves going from the particular to the general. For instance, if we meet a person from Norway and discover that he eats a lot of fish, drinks a lot of spirits and wears a warm woollen sweater, we may, on the basis of this individual, draw conclusions about Norwegians in general. Deduction involves going from the general to the particular. Thus we may use our category-based knowledge to infer the characteristics of any Norwegian we meet in the future.

**Assimilation and contrast** Categorization not only organizes our knowledge but also affects the way we perceive and remember information about objects or people. Taylor, Fiske, et al. (1978) designed the ‘who said what?’ paradigm to study this effect. Participants hear or read statements from several target persons allegedly involved in a discussion about a particular topic. Participants additionally receive information regarding the group membership of each target person (e.g., half the people are black and the other half white; or four are female and two are male). In a second phase, participants read through the statements in a scrambled order, this time without group membership information. Their task is to identify who said what in the previous phase.

There are three kinds of possible response in this paradigm. First, participants can correctly assign a particular statement to a particular individual (but they rarely do, because the task seems to be quite difficult). Second, they can make a ‘within-category error’, assigning the statement to a member of the correct category but to the wrong individual within the category. Third, they can make a ‘between-category error’, assigning the statement to someone from the wrong category (e.g., it was said by a black person but the participant erred in attributing it to a white person). Participants tend to make many more within-category than between-category errors, which indicates that they organize their knowledge categorically (e.g., van Knippenberg, van Twuyver & Pepels, 1994). Generally, when individuals are categorized, this leads to both an underestimation of differences within categories (assimilation) and an overestimation of differences between categories (contrast; Corneille, Klein, Lambert & Judd, 2002; Krueger & Clement, 1994; Tajfel & Wilkes, 1963).

**Salience of social categories** The ‘who said what?’ paradigm demonstrates the effects of categorization on perception and person memory. We must next address the question: when does a particular categorization become salient? Consider, for instance, several long queues of people waiting at an airport. You could categorize the people in the queues simply according to the type of queue, i.e., those who are travelling first, business or economy class. You could also use profession (business people or workers), origin (foreigners or locals), age (younger or older) and so on. Obviously, objects or persons can be categorized in many different ways. The question arises: which factors determine which category you will use, which one will become salient in a particular situation? **Category salience** refers to the activation and attraction of attention that leads a particular category to stand out compared to other categories. According to an influential early approach (Bruner, 1957), category salience depends both on the perceivers’ readiness to use a particular category and on the fit of a particular category in the current social context (Oakes, 1987; Oakes, Haslam & Turner, 1994).

**Perceiver’s readiness**, also referred to as the accessibility of categories to the perceiver, pertains to the perceiver’s goals and motivation within a specific situation, or more generally across many situations. The use of a category is more likely if a perceiver uses

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**Figure 14.2** Flow chart of basic psychological processes regulating intergroup behaviour.
it habitually (Bruner, 1957; Higgins, 1996; see also Chapter 4, this volume). For example, individuals who are used to structuring their world according to gender tend also in a particular situation to use gender as a basis for categorization (Stangor, Lynch, Dunn & Glass, 1992). A particular category will also be used if it matches the current goals and motives of the perceiver. Imagine yourself in a big department store trying to get some advice about where to find a certain product: you will categorize people as being either employees or customers in order to approach the right person in pursuit of your goal.

It is not, however, only the perceiver’s readiness or category accessibility that determines whether a category is likely to be used; there are also conditions of the situational context which contribute to category salience. These are the conditions of category fit. According to Campbell (1958), people use factors such as similarity, proximity and common fate to group entities such as persons in their social environment. Several studies by Gaertner and colleagues (e.g., Gaertner, Mann, Murrell & Dovidio, 1989) illustrate clever manipulations of these factors.

They first divided participants experimentally into two groups by giving them either red or blue labels. In a second step, they induced three different group conditions by varying the way in which individuals were seated (‘two groups’, ‘one group’ and ‘individuals’). In the ‘two groups’ condition, members wore the original labels of their respective groups (similarity), they sat together with their group at the opposite side of the table from the other group (proximity), and each group expected to win a prize for the best solution in an experimental task (common fate within groups). In the ‘one group’ condition, participants received a new common label; they were seated alternately around one table and were told that there was a single prize for the best common solution. Finally, in the ‘individual condition’, each participant sat at a separate table, had to create a new individual name, and expected to win a prize for the best individual solution.

The factors of similarity, proximity and common fate determine the comparative fit of a category. Comparative fit depicts how well a given category fits to the perceived entities within the current social context. Comparative fit is based on the meta-contrast principle. This principle looks at how much categories differentiate between observed stimuli, thereby minimizing the differences within a category (assimilation) and maximizing the differences between the categories (contrast). The notion of comparative fit can easily be applied to the ‘who said what?’ paradigm (Taylor et al., 1978). Assume a group discussion in which all male participants defend one position (e.g., pro-affirmative action policies for women) whereas all females defend the opposite position (e.g., anti-affirmative action policies for women). In such a case, the gender category would differentiate perfectly between opposing positions in the discussion (Klauer & Wegener, 1998; van Knippenberg & van Knippenberg, 1994).

In addition to comparative fit, normative fit refers to the background knowledge of the perceiver that specifies which similarities and differences are relevant in a current context. Let us go back to the discussion concerning gender equality. In our example given above, if men happened to be contra and women happened to be pro affirmative action policies, this would fit our expectations and we would be even more likely to use gender in order to categorize the members of the discussion parties. Hence, a higher normative fit enhances the salience of categories.

**Self-categories** Try to answer the question ‘who am I?’ Several answers will come into your mind: ‘I’m Karola Schmidt, I’m from Germany and I’m a psychology student.’ In categorizing people, we don’t refer only to others but very often also include ourselves. Self-categories are part of our self-concept; they tell us who we are and where our position is relative to various categories (see Chapter 5, this volume). Self-categories constitute our personal and social identity. Categories are organized in a hierarchical structure (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher & Wetherell, 1987). We can categorize ourselves as ‘I, Karola,’ that is, as a unique individual distinct from all others, or on a more inclusive level as ‘We, West Germans,’ that is, as a member of a social category who is similar to other ingroup members and at the same time distinct from individuals belonging to a salient outgroup such as East Germans. This categorization into ingroup and outgroup could be dissolved by moving up to a superordinate level and to a more comprehensive category, ‘We (are all) Germans’, as one common ingroup that may, however, then be contrasted to a new outgroup, e.g., Belgians (see Figure 14.3).

**Identification and its components**

Just as categories and categorization give meaning to a particular situation, self-categories give meaning to the self, whereby not all categories are equally relevant for self-identity. The concept of identification denotes the relationship of the self to a particular social category. Generally, if individuals do identify with a particular social category, they will be affected by issues related to this category. If I am from Germany and this is significant to me and I care about German customs, language or traditions, then I will be concerned about events or actions affecting Germans as a whole, such as derogatory statements aimed at German people.

Identification with a social category leads individuals to perceive and evaluate events with respect to their implications for this particular social category. They also tend to be motivated to act according to the goals and values that they associate with the category. The notion of identity is closely related to identification. Identity comprises the content of a social category such as knowledge about that particular category. Identification denotes the relation of self to the social category which is, globally, the strength of this particular identity. Initially, Tajfel (1978, p. 63) conceived identification as a multi-component construct including the particular knowledge of group membership and the value and the emotional significance attached to this group membership. More recent research has suggested that we should explore identification in more detail as a multi-component construct (e.g., Ashmore, Deaux & McLaughlin-Volpe, 2003; Ellemers, Kortekaas & Ouwkerk, 1999).

Ashmore et al. (2003) have provided a comprehensive review of the various components of identification which have been mentioned in the literature, including, amongst others, categorization, evaluation, importance and attachment (see Table 14.1 for definitions and examples of measures of each of the components of...
identification). However, research on this topic is in its early stages and the number of components of identification which can be distinguished and the diverse effects these components have are not yet known.

The most central and basic aspect of identification is self-categorization, that is, the definition of the self in terms of a social group. For instance, without self-categorization as a member of a particular group, one cannot feel proud about the achievements of one’s social group compared to those of another group. Another important component of identification is evaluation, that is, how the group is evaluated in relation to a relevant other group on an important dimension. The ingroup can be positively or negatively evaluated depending on the comparison outcome. Importance of identity refers to whether group membership and the associated attributes are central to the self. Attachment denotes the affective involvement a person feels with a social category and the degree to which the fate of the group is perceived as their own. Finally, strong identification leads individuals to perceive those things which are good for the group as being their own preferences. When group issues come to be seen also as personal preferences

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**Figure 14.3** Hierarchical structure of social categories with individuals as the least inclusive category, regional and national categorizations as moderately inclusive levels, and European categorization as the most inclusive level.

**Table 14.1** Components of identification, definition and measurement examples (based on Ashmore et al., 2003)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Measurement example</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Self-categorization</td>
<td>Identifying self with a social category</td>
<td>‘I identify myself as being East German’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation</td>
<td>Positive or negative attitude towards the category</td>
<td>‘I like being East German’ (positive)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>‘I am angry about being East German’ (negative)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Importance</td>
<td>Importance of a particular group membership for an individual’s overall self-concept</td>
<td>‘Being an East German is an important reflection of who I am’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attachment or emotional involvement</td>
<td>Emotional involvement felt with a particular social group</td>
<td>‘I have a strong sense of belonging to East Germans’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social embeddedness</td>
<td>Degree to which a group membership is embedded in the person’s everyday social relations</td>
<td>‘I am often involved in issues related to East Germans’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Behavioural involvement</td>
<td>Degree to which an individual engages in actions on behalf of a social group</td>
<td>‘I often engage in actions that improve the situation of East Germans’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Content and meaning</td>
<td>Attributes and traits associated with a social group, beliefs about one’s group’s experience, history and position in society</td>
<td>‘East Germans are … [e.g., tolerant, active, etc.]’</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
and goals, this explains why group members engage in various intergroup behaviours including collective action and participation in social movements (Simon & Klandermans, 2001).

**Intergroup perception**

**Group homogeneity** Self-categorization and identification as a member of a particular group have important consequences for the way we perceive own and other groups. We have already outlined assimilation and contrast as general effects of categorization. When examining various types of intergroup relations more closely, the picture appears to be more differentiated: assimilation and contrast do not necessarily affect both groups symmetrically.

A number of studies have consistently shown that people perceive outgroups as more homogeneous than their ingroup: ‘they’ are all the same, but ‘we’ are all different (Judd & Park, 1988; Quattrone & Jones, 1980). Several explanations for this ‘outgroup homogeneity effect’ have been proposed. For example, if individuals are more familiar with their own group than with an outgroup or they know more ingroup than outgroup members, then this should lead to a more differentiated and complex representation of the ingroup than of an outgroup (Linville, Fischer & Salovey, 1989). Alternatively, the effect may not only be due to the more detailed knowledge about various other ingroup members, but rather to the fact that the self is always included in the ingroup: the ingroup is more important and more concrete because at least one of its members is very well known – the self. This gives the individual access to greater knowledge of the range of behaviours and expressed beliefs within the ingroup (e.g., we know that we ourselves sometimes behave differently and even express different views across different social situations).

Simon and Brown (1987) presented a series of experimental studies challenging the outgroup homogeneity effect and its explanations by demonstrating an ingroup homogeneity effect. A review of the evidence on the outgroup homogeneity effect clearly showed that minority groups are perceived as homogeneous on highly relevant dimensions, irrespective of whether this was an outgroup or ingroup (Brown & Smith, 1989; Kelly, 1989; Simon, 1992). An active minority preparing to engage in a social movement, for instance, perceives itself as more homogeneous than the majority, in particular on group-relevant attributes that differentiate the minority from the majority.

Recent studies have also analysed the effects of power on perceived group variability (see Guinote, 2004, for a review). Positions of power and control over important outcomes are often held by members of social majorities rather than minorities. It would make sense for less powerful minority members to perceive greater variability in a more powerful majority outgroup, because they should attend carefully to how they behave. However, powerful groups are in fact objectively more variable than powerless groups (Brauer, 2001; Guinote, Judd & Brauer, 2002). Members of high-status groups tend to seek gains from their advantaged position, thereby more easily violating group norms. In contrast, minority members tend to avoid offending others because of their disadvantaged position, thereby showing more norm-conforming behaviour (Keltner, Gruenfeld & Anderson, 2003).

**Varieties of prejudice**

So far we have discussed prejudice as a derogatory social attitude towards a social group. Prejudice can be conceived as a special case of the multicomponent model of attitudes (see Chapter 6, Figure 6.1, p. 115), with stereotypes as the cognitive component, prejudice as the affective component and social discrimination as the behavioural component. The affect felt towards own and other groups (Smith, 1993), be it positive, negative or mixed (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick & Xu, 2002), results from intergroup comparisons. A prejudice, being a negative judgement of a whole group, can be perceived as fair or unfair, accurate or unjustified. Importantly, like stereotypes, prejudices are socially shared evaluations showing a close relation to societal norms (Crandall, Eshleman & O’Brien, 2002).

As already noted, gender, race and age are among the most prevalent bases of stereotyping and therefore also of prejudice (Fiske, 1998; Mackie, Hamilton, Susskind & Rosselli, 1996). However, at least in today’s modern western societies, it is no longer socially acceptable to express overt prejudice against minority groups. This does not automatically mean that prejudice has vanished: it is merely expressed less frequently in a direct and blatant form, and more often in subtle forms that are more compatible with modern norms (see also Chapter 6, this volume).

Several concepts of modern prejudice have been proposed (see Table 14.2), for example aversive racism (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986; see Research close-up 14.1), ambivalent racism (Katz & Hass, 1988) and modern racism (Sears & Henry, 2003). These concepts all share the common assumption of an uncomfortable internal conflict associated with attitudes towards target groups. Individuals hold a prejudice against particular groups, yet at the same time they accept and want to comply with the societal norms of tolerance and egalitarianism, both of which demand positive evaluations of the target groups.

As a consequence of the change from blatant to more subtle forms of prejudice, researchers have had to change how they

**Plate 14.2** Gender, race and age are among the most prevalent bases of stereotyping and prejudice.
measure prejudice. They have developed new ‘implicit’ measures of prejudice that tap unintentional bias of which well-intentioned individuals are largely unaware. These implicit measures include indirect self-report measures (e.g., Maass, 1999; von Hippel, Sekaquaptewa & Vargas, 1997) and response-latency measures following priming procedures (e.g., Dovidio, Kawakami, Johnson, Johnson & Howard, 1997).

For instance, Wittenbrink, Judd and Park (1997) used a semantic priming paradigm (see Chapter 4, this volume). Their results showed that the prime word ‘black’ led to faster response latencies for negative stereotypic attributes of African Americans than the prime word ‘white’. In contrast, the prime word ‘white’ led to faster responses to positive stereotypic attributes of white Americans than the prime word ‘black’. Wittenbrink and colleagues (1997) interpret this pattern as evidence for implicit prejudice. Moreover, additional scales assessing explicit prejudice were only moderately related to the measure of implicit prejudice. This provides some validation that the implicit measure does indeed assess prejudice, but demonstrates also that the explicit and implicit measures tap different aspects of prejudice.

More recently, researchers have turned to the developing area of social neuroscience to investigate brain activity involved in prejudice. Phelps et al. (2000, Study 1) measured activity in the amygdala (an area of the brain involved in processing fear-related information) when white participants viewed unfamiliar black and white faces. Although there was no overall difference in amygdala activation as a function of stimulus race, differences in amygdala activation to own- and other-race faces were significantly correlated with implicit racial prejudice (as measured by the Implicit Association Test (IAT); Greenwald, McGhee & Schwartz, 1998; see Chapter 6, this volume), but not with an explicit measure of racial attitudes. White participants with the most negative implicit attitudes towards blacks showed greatest amygdala activation responses to black versus white faces. These effects disappeared, however, when participants viewed faces of famous and well-liked black and white individuals (Phelps et al., 2000, Study 2).

A different way of exploring varieties of prejudice involves conceiving prejudice as both an attitude and a group-based emotion (see Figure 14.4). Smith (1993) developed a new conception of prejudice as group-based emotions. Conceptualizing prejudice in this way has several advantages. Firstly, prejudice is more complex than the evaluation along a single dimension ranging from positive to negative. For instance, the emotions of anger and fear are both negative in valence but have different meanings. Secondly, group-based emotions are conceptualized as evaluations of in- and outgroups from a particular ingroup perspective, in other words, the particular intergroup situation is taken into account. Hence prejudice is less static and may vary, depending on the social context. Moreover, intergroup attitudes are seen to represent more permanent intergroup evaluations, whereas intergroup emotions reflect more transient evaluations.

The concept of prejudice as group-based emotion has some thought-provoking implications. Whilst the level of prejudice aimed at two different target groups might be identical when measured on a positive–negative scale, it is possible that the emotions associated with evaluations of the two different targets are completely different. In a recent study, Cottrell and Neuberg (2005) showed that whilst the level of general prejudice is roughly the same across several groups, the underlying emotions differ considerably. Moreover, patterns of intergroup evaluation on dimensions of threat consistently predict these emotions, and the emotions lead to different behavioural tendencies. For instance, Cottrell and Neuberg showed that prejudice in terms of an attitude held by white American participants towards African Americans, Asian

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**Table 14.2 Modern forms of prejudice**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Prejudice</th>
<th>Characteristics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aversive racism (e.g., Gaertner &amp; Dovidio, 1986)</td>
<td>Represents the endorsement of egalitarian values, fairness and justice for all social groups. It comprises a strong self-image of being non-prejudiced. At the same time, it is associated with negative feelings towards minority groups.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambivalent racism (e.g., Katz &amp; Hass, 1988)</td>
<td>Involves ambivalent feelings towards minority groups, implying simultaneously strong positive and negative feelings.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modern racism (Sears &amp; Henry, 2003)</td>
<td>Replaces mostly old-fashioned, openly racist attitudes because open expression of negative intergroup attitudes (e.g., racial attitudes) is frowned upon socially.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Modern racism is weak, the guidelines of appropriate behaviour are vague and the bases of social judgement are ambiguous. Aversive racists will not discriminate in situations in which their prejudice would be revealed, thereby threatening their non-prejudiced self-image. However, discrimination against minority groups is likely in all situations in which the normative structure is weak, the guidelines of appropriate behaviour are vague and the bases of social judgement are ambiguous. Ambivalent racism involves ambivalent feelings towards minority groups, implying simultaneously strong positive and negative feelings. Ambivalent racism leads to response amplification: positive actions and achievements of minority group members lead to extremely positive evaluations (i.e., reverse discrimination), whereas negative actions and failures lead to extremely negative evaluations.

Modern racism replaces mostly old-fashioned, openly racist attitudes because open expression of negative intergroup attitudes (e.g., racial attitudes) is frowned upon socially. Negative affect is no longer attached to race per se but to newly emerging racial issues such as affirmative action and welfare programs. For instance, modern racists deny the existence of social discrimination and thus claim that affirmative action is an unfair gain for minority groups.
**Race and helping: Subtle forms of aversive prejudice**


**Introduction**

In a series of papers, Gaertner and colleagues (Gaertner, 1975; Gaertner & Bickman, 1971) examined the effects of race on helping behaviour. Experimental evidence showed that victims’ race influenced the likelihood of helping behaviour. On the one hand, victims of the same race as potential helpers more readily elicited helping behaviour. For instance, white participants tended to offer help (or show a lower bystander effect) more often to white than to black victims. On the other hand, however, several studies showed no differential bystander effect or even that white participants behaved more favourably towards black than white victims.

Dutton and colleagues (e.g., Dutton & Lake, 1973) showed that whites may be more favourable towards blacks in order to avoid the self-attribution of bigotry (i.e., being prejudiced). Gaertner (1976) suggested that people who claim not to be prejudiced may nonetheless have negative feelings towards black people, leading to an aversive state in which they dissociate the negative feelings from a non-prejudiced self-image. The basic thesis examined in this research was that people with this aversive type of prejudice may avoid behaviour that reveals their prejudice. However, they are more likely to discriminate against black people (i.e., will not help) in situations in which their failure to help could be attributed to factors other than race.

**Method**

**Participants**

Seventy-five white female students participated in the study.

**Design and procedure**

The design of the study was a 2 (race of the victim: white vs. black) × 2 (diffusion of responsibility: alone vs. presence of others) factorial design. Participants assumed that they communicated via intercom with the target person in another room. The race of the target person was manipulated by showing a student identification card revealing either a white or a black female. In the ‘alone’ condition, participants knew that they were the only person interacting with the target person. In the ‘presence of others’ condition, participants learned that two other participants (in separate rooms) also interacted with the target person. During the experiment, participants heard sounds of falling chairs and the target person screaming, indicating an emergency. Then, within the next 3 minutes, the helping behaviour and how long the participant took to intervene (i.e., time taken to stand up, time taken to open the door) were recorded.

**Results**

The results (see Table 14.3) showed the typical bystander effect; that is, participants in the ‘alone’ condition helped more than those in the ‘presence of others’ condition for whom responsibility could be diffused across three people. Results showed no main effect of race of the victim. However, there was a significant interaction between race of the victim and diffusion of responsibility. Participants in the ‘alone’ condition were more likely to help a black than a white victim, and they did so more quickly. In contrast, participants in the ‘presence of others’ condition offered significantly less help to the black compared to the white victim and they took more time to offer this help.

**Discussion**

The study showed that prejudice can express itself in subtle ways. Whites offered less help to black than white victims only when diffusion of responsibility provided them with a plausible alternative explanation for their prejudice (i.e., they could still claim that the reason they did not help the black victim was that there were two other people who could also have helped). This study, together with other similar studies, gave rise to the development of the concept of aversive racism. Aversive racists endorse fair and just treatment of all groups whilst occasion-ally (sometimes unconsciously) harbouring negative feelings towards particular groups (e.g., blacks) and therefore avoiding intergroup interaction. These individuals also avoid unfair behaviour in intergroup situations. However, they manifest their prejudice in subtle and rationalizable ways.

**Table 14.3** Effects of diffusion of responsibility and race of the victim on the likelihood of helping, time taken to stand up and time taken to open the door

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>N</th>
<th>% help</th>
<th>Time taken to stand up (sec.)</th>
<th>Time taken to open door (sec.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Alone</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black victim</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>93.8</td>
<td>36.6</td>
<td>45.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White victim</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>81.3</td>
<td>55.0</td>
<td>62.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Presence of others</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black victim</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>124.9</td>
<td>128.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White victim</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>75.0</td>
<td>72.4</td>
<td>89.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Prejudice as attitude

**Stereotype:**
Members of group A are lazy, less intelligent, cheaters . . .

**Prejudice:**
I don’t like group A and its members

**Discrimination:**
I try to avoid As, exclude them from jobs

**Intergroup appraisal:**
Compared to us, members of group A receive unjustified advantages . . .

**Emotion:**
I feel anger and resentment towards members of group A

**Discrimination:**
I want to harm group A by removing their advantages

![Figure 14.4 Prejudice as attitude and prejudice as group-based emotion.](image)

**Intergroup motivation**

**Different motives**
In previous parts of this chapter we discussed prejudice as being both an important determinant and an outcome of intergroup relations. We examined the central effects of intergroup identification on prejudice as perception and emotion associated with groups to which we either belong or do not belong. We have already seen some of the consequences of conceiving ourselves to be members of a group and identifying ourselves with this group. Let us now turn to the question of the motivation of prejudice. What motivates individuals to engage in intergroup behaviour such as favouring their ingroup? One way to answer the question of why people are prejudiced is to propose several motives. Tajfel and Turner (1986), the pioneers of social identity theory, postulate that group members are motivated to establish, maintain and foster a positive distinctiveness for their ingroup in relation to an important outgroup (see p. 298). If intergroup comparisons do not support positive distinctiveness for the ingroup, either because of a negative comparison outcome or because others question the positive outcome, the motive for positive distinctiveness becomes active and instigates actions to change the status quo and re-establish positive distinctiveness. Intergroup behaviour is driven by the motive of positive ingroup distinctiveness and responds when this is threatened or challenged.

Hogg (2000) proposed that individuals are also motivated to reduce subjective uncertainty, and he proposed the uncertainty reduction hypothesis. In joining a group and defining and identifying the self in terms of group membership, individuals reduce subjective uncertainty about themselves, their attitudes, beliefs and their position in the social world. They join social groups because these provide clear normative prescriptions that structure the social environment and help to predict the actions of others. Experimental evidence shows that under high compared to low subjective uncertainty, both identification with and positive evaluation of the ingroup increase (Grieve & Hogg, 1999).

Brewer (1991) addressed the question of why individuals choose a certain level of self-categorization and proposed her theory of *optimal distinctiveness*. She assumes that individuals tend to find an optimal solution for the trade-off between two concurrent needs, namely the need to be like others (to ‘belong’) and the need to be distinguishable from others (to ‘be distinct’). Individuals will choose self-categorizations which simultaneously enable them to be connected to some people whilst remaining different from others. For example, as a student you may feel that the identity of ‘student at the university of X’ is too broad and inclusive, and does not satisfy your need for exclusivity. In contrast, the identity of a ‘student in professor Y’s class’ may be too exclusive. An optimally distinct identity may be conveyed by the identity of being a ‘psychology student’, which is often how you will feel, and be treated, during your time as a student.

Social identities that simultaneously meet the needs for affiliation and differentiation are termed optimally distinct; when one need is not met, these identities are termed non-optimal. Optimal identities are those that provide sufficient inclusiveness within the group and sufficient differentiation between ingroup and outgroups.
Leonardelli and Brewer (2001) provided evidence for both motives in several experiments. Members of optimally distinctive groups show greater ingroup identification, greater satisfaction with their group, higher ingroup favouritism and higher self-esteem than members of less optimally distinct groups.

Other motivational theories such as terror management theory (Greenberg, Solomon & Pyszczynski, 1997) have also been used to explain ingroup favouritism. This theory is based on the general assumption that people strive for self-preservation. When people, for one reason or another, contemplate their own
mortality, a feeling of existential terror is elicited (‘what will happen to me when I die?’). One way to cope with this feeling is to foster one’s own world view. World views buffer against terror and anxiety by giving assurance that the universe is meaningful and orderly and that immortality is attainable, be it literally (e.g., through the concept of a soul and afterlife) or symbolically (e.g., through potential accomplishments and culture). By conforming strongly to the norms and values of their cultural world view, individuals additionally become particularly valuable members of their group within a meaningful universe and thus enhance their self-esteem.

Outgroup members who do not share the adopted world view pose a challenge to both the ingroup members’ world view and their self-esteem and will therefore be devalued. In a series of experiments testing terror management theory, participants in experimental conditions were asked to think about their own death (a ‘mortality salience’ manipulation). After a short distractor task, they then evaluated events which violated either ingroup or outgroup norms. For instance, Harmon-Jones, Greenberg, Solomon and Simon (1996) demonstrated that when mortality was salient, participants in a minimal group experiment showed stronger ingroup favouritism than when mortality was not salient (see also Castano, Yzerbyt, Paladino & Sacchi, 2002).

We have discussed various motives which have been proposed as triggers of identification, evaluation and behaviour related to own and other groups. However, research has not yet shed light on the question of how these motives function, or what motivational process might control intergroup behaviour. One approach to investigating underlying motivational processes was the self-esteem hypothesis (Hogg & Abrams, 1988). This hypothesis comprises two corollaries. Firstly, group members will enhance their self-esteem by discriminating against a relevant outgroup on important dimensions. Secondly, group members will show an enhanced tendency to discriminate against an outgroup when their self-esteem is low. In an insightful review, Rubin and Hewstone (1998) showed that the first corollary of the self-esteem hypothesis, wherein favouring the ingroup increases self-esteem, is generally well supported by several studies. However, the second corollary, wherein low self-esteem enhances ingroup-favouring behaviour, not only received less support but was also actually contradicted by several studies showing that high self-esteem enhances ingroup favouritism (e.g., Crocker, Thompson, McGraw & Ingerman, 1987). This failure to provide a convincing explanation of motivational processes of positive distinctiveness leads us to further direct our attention towards processes regulating intergroup behaviour.

**Ingroup favouritism and outgroup derogation**  Let us return to the assumption of a motive for positive ingroup distinctiveness. Positive distinctiveness refers to the value difference between ingroup and outgroup. It can be established either by upgrading the ingroup above the outgroup or by downgrading the outgroup (or both). Some evidence suggests, however, that ingroup favouritism and outgroup derogation are driven by different psychological processes: ingroup favouritism is well predicted by the strength of ingroup identification, and outgroup derogation is predicted by perceived threat towards the ingroup (Struch & Schwartz, 1989). Applied to the minimal group situation, ingroup favouritism means that more positive outcomes are distributed to the ingroup, whereas outgroup derogation means that more negative outcomes will be distributed to the outgroup. Research has shown a positive–negative asymmetry based on whether participants assign positive or negative outcomes to ingroup and outgroups. Individuals favour their ingroup over outgroups in terms of positive outcomes, but they do not generally disfavour outgroups by assigning them more negative outcomes than they do to the ingroup (Mummendey & Otten, 1998). Indeed, generally ingroup-favouring responses are more common than outgroup derogation, and ‘aggravating conditions’ such as negative intergroup emotions, threat or insult are required before group members demonstrate outgroup derogation (see Hewstone, Fincham & Jaspar, 1981).

The question now arises as to why people prefer to strive for positive distinctiveness through the distribution of positive rather than negative outcomes. Are positive outcomes more functional in fulfilling the need for positive distinctiveness than negative outcomes? One explanation for this asymmetry is the motivational orientation indicating how goals guide an individual’s behaviour in a certain situation. These orientations may be focused either on gains and positive events or on losses and negative events. Higgins (1997) conceptualized these general goal orientations as promotion vs. prevention focus.

Based on Higgins’s theory of motivational processes, Sassenberg, Kessler and Mummendey (2003) manipulated promotion focus within a gain/non-gain frame and prevention focus within a non-loss/loss frame concerning the money to be distributed between the groups. Moreover, valence of outcomes was manipulated by describing them as either an increment or a decrement in money for ingroup and outgroup. The results showed the predicted interaction between promotion/prevention and valence of outcomes. Group members with a promotion focus established positive distinctiveness only by distributing positive outcomes in favour of their ingroup. Group members with a prevention focus established positive distinctiveness only by distributing negative outcomes in favour of their ingroup (i.e., the ingroup receives less negative outcomes). Hence, group members attempt to establish positive distinctiveness only when their general motivational orientation fits the opportunities for differentiation. This could explain the positive–negative asymmetry in social discrimination if we assume that participants in previous experiments have been predominantly promotion focused. Arguably, in most psychological experiments, participants are made to expect gains (e.g., more or less money or course credits) or are even chronically promotion focused, which has been shown to be prevalent in western culture (Lee, Aaker & Gardner, 2000).

**SUMMARY**

The basic psychological processes guiding intergroup behaviour comprise social categorization, identification, intergroup perception and intergroup motivation. Identification connects individuals to social groups. Various motives (e.g., positive distinctiveness, uncertainty reduction) explain why group members favour their ingroup over an outgroup, but this more often takes the form of ingroup favouritism than outgroup derogation.
REDUCTION OF INTERGROUP CONFLICT

How can intergroup conflict be reduced?
What role does social categorization play in the reduction of prejudice?
What psychological processes improve attitudes towards outgroups and their members?

Prejudice, social discrimination and intergroup conflict are some of the most pressing current societal problems. How can social psychology contribute towards improving intergroup relations?

According to Pettigrew (1998), these four conditions were initially conceived as being necessary for contact to reduce prejudice. It was thought that if one of these conditions was not fulfilled, then contact between members of different groups might not only fail to reduce prejudice, it might even confirm and strengthen prejudice.

Gordon Willard Allport (1897–1967) was born in Montezuma, Indiana. He received his PhD in psychology in 1922 from Harvard, following in the footsteps of his brother Floyd, who also became an important social psychologist (see Chapter 1, this volume). He completed additional studies in Berlin, Hamburg and Cambridge before returning to Harvard. His career was spent examining social issues such as prejudice and developing personality tests. Allport’s most significant books are *Pattern and Growth in Personality* (1965), *The Person in Psychology* (1968) and *The Nature of Prejudice* (1954). His work on contact between social groups has inspired a huge amount of research on ways to reduce prejudice and decrease conflict in intergroup relations. In commenting on his 1954 book, he considered that it ‘had done something good in the world’.

Allport’s conjectures stimulated a vast number of empirical studies concerning the effect of contact on prejudice as well as numerous policy-making programs concerned with improving ethnic relations in schools and workplaces. In a meta-analysis of more than 500 studies, Pettigrew and Tropp (2000, 2006) found that the greater the contact between groups, the lower the prejudice expressed. Only about 6 per cent of the studies showed the reverse effect of more contact being associated with increased prejudice. For the various studies included in the meta-analysis, Allport’s conditions for contact were sometimes fulfilled, sometimes only to a lesser extent, and sometimes not at all. Nevertheless, across all studies there was a substantial positive effect of contact on the reduction of prejudice. Pettigrew and Tropp (2000, 2006) therefore conclude that Allport’s original contact conditions are not necessary for positive contact effects to occur, but are facilitating conditions that are likely to make contact more effective. Confirming this view, studies that realized Allport’s conditions showed stronger effects of contact than those that did not.

In many of the studies analysed by Pettigrew and Tropp, contact and prejudice were assessed at the same time using cross-sectional designs. It is therefore not clear whether contact reduces prejudice or whether perhaps less prejudiced individuals simply seek more contact with outgroup members whereas more prejudiced individuals avoid contact with outgroup members. Experimental studies and longitudinal studies have, however, now resolved this issue. Experimental studies (e.g., Wilder, 1986) have shown that participants who engage in positive intergroup contact show less prejudice than those in control conditions. Longitudinal studies have revealed that contact assessed at earlier points in time reduces prejudice at later points in time (e.g., Levin, van Laar & Sidanius, 2003).

A detailed analysis of those few studies which show that contact is associated with increased prejudice indicates that there may be ‘negative contact conditions’ that must be avoided if contact is to have a positive effect. Negative contact conditions include when contact is not frequent enough for acquaintanceship to develop, or when the contact situation is threatening or even anxiety provoking. Based on their analysis, Pettigrew and Tropp (2006) proposed a
reformulation of the contact hypothesis, moving away from conditions necessary for positive contact towards negative conditions that must be avoided in order that positive contact effects are not wiped out. Contact opportunities should occur frequently enough and particular attention should be given to ensuring that the contact situation will not stimulate feelings of threat and anxiety in the participants. Pettigrew and Tropp placed great emphasis on the importance of developing cross-group friendships. In general, this reformulation of the contact hypothesis leads to a much more optimistic view of contact than the original formulation, since preconditions for positive effects can now be met more easily.

Three models of contact between social groups

When considering positive effects of contact on intergroup relations, we obviously want to see these effects reach beyond those group members involved in the particular situation where contact was established. We are interested in generalizing the positive effects of contact beyond the specific situation to as many other situations as possible and beyond specific group members to the outgroup as a whole.

Precisely this issue of generalization lead to the development of three different models of intergroup contact: The decategorization model (Brewer & Miller, 1984), the common ingroup identity model (Gaertner et al., 1989) and the mutual distinctiveness model (Brown & Hewstone, 2005; Hewstone & Brown, 1986).

Although all three models are built on the same foundation of social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986), they yield very different predictions. According to social identity theory, categorization into ingroup and outgroup with its assimilation and contrast effects (see above) often enforces ingroup favouritism and lessens outgroup acceptance. Therefore, Brewer and Miller (1984) suggested that contact situations should be created in which categorization between groups is prevented, whilst encouraging group members to perceive differences between all individuals irrespective of their group membership. In their decategorization model, the contact situation is designed to provide conditions in which participants can interact more in terms of their personal identity (i.e., as individuals) than in terms of their social identity (i.e., as group members). The original categorization is designed to become less and less meaningful as well as less useful. Brewer and Miller consider Allport’s original contact conditions to provide support for their model. They claim that the conditions expected to strengthen the potential of interpersonal friendships specifically function by strengthening decategorization.

Several studies support the decategorization model (e.g., Bettencourt, Brewer, Croak & Miller, 1992). In these studies, participants, having been categorized into two groups, had to interact. In an interpersonal focus condition, participants were instructed to form an accurate impression of their co-workers as individuals; in a task-oriented condition, they had to focus on the characteristics of the task. The results show that an interpersonal focus leads to more individuated perceptions of outgroup members, more positive evaluation of outgroup members, and less bias between ingroup and outgroup compared to the task-focus condition (see also Ensari & Miller, 2002). Decategorized contact reduces prejudice because former outgroup members are perceived in a more differentiated manner. Another form of differentiation can be achieved by introducing cross-cutting social categories (see Crisp & Hewstone, 1999, for a review). Bias can be reduced when members belonging to ingroup and outgroup on one dimension (e.g., an Asian vs. a white person) are simultaneously made to be ingroup members on a second dimension (e.g., an Asian and a white person who both support the same political party). Because people simultaneously belong to multiple groups, there ought to be great potential to find cross-cutting categorizations that can be used to provide individuals with some form of shared group membership. However, there are limits to this approach because, outside the laboratory, it is so difficult to find cross-cutting categorizations that are of equal importance to the pre-existing categorizations (e.g., race in the United States, or religion in Northern Ireland).

Interventions based on the decategorization model provide conditions whereby individuals no longer approach others in terms of group membership, but instead recognize them as individuals. The next question to be addressed is, how might processes of decategorization be generalized beyond individuals in a particular contact situation, thus more generally reducing intergroup bias and prejudice? The answer to this question does not involve generalizing the particular attitude or evaluation represented by a particular individual who was encountered in a particular contact situation. What must be generalized is a new habit of ignoring categories and focusing on interindividual differences when evaluating and interacting with others.

This would mean that in order to reduce prejudice and increase acceptance of outgroups, individuals would have to abandon their ingroup and their social identity. Realistically, however, individuals very often cherish their specific group memberships and social identities. Gaertner, Dovidio and their colleagues therefore...
order to foster generalization of contact keeping group memberships salient in recommendation members identity at a superordinate level that subordinate level with a common ingroup ingroup–outgroup distinctions at a intergroup contact which replaces salient model of common ingroup identity. They proposed the common ingroup identity model (e.g., Gaertner et al., 1989). In contrast to decategorization, they proposed replacing existing categorizations with recategorization on a higher, superordinate level. The problematic distinction between ingroup and outgroup is thus replaced by a new common ingroup, which makes the former outgroup part of an extended new ingroup. The former outgroup now profits from ingroup favouritism and former outgroup members are correspondingly evaluated more positively.

Several studies have demonstrated that recategorization of ingroup and outgroup members and forming a common ingroup identity actually improve the evaluation of former outgroup members, whereas decategorization led to less favourable evaluations of former ingroup members (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000; Gaertner, Dovidio, Nier, Ward & Banker, 1999). Thus conditions of contact between members of different groups which increase the salience of a common ingroup identity decrease prejudice against former outgroups.

Unfortunately, the blessing of a common identity for the former outgroup may be accompanied by perils for a new outgroup. The former intergroup categorization may simply be replaced by a new one, and prejudice and devaluation of the new outgroups may resurface (Kessler & Mummendey, 2001). For example, enlargement of the European Union may promote more positive attitudes of Germans towards Poles (both share membership of the EU), but it may worsen attitudes towards Americans as a new outgroup (at this new level of categorization). The decategorization and recategorization models predict that contact will have positive effects by reducing the salience of prior social categorizations. Although there is empirical support for both approaches, people are in many cases reluctant to give up their social identity outside the laboratory. Does this lead to the conclusion that intergroup prejudice and discrimination are therefore inevitable?

Hewstone and Brown (1986; Brown, Vivian & Hewstone, 1999) searched for a solution to this dilemma and proposed their mutual distinctiveness model. This model assumes that neither interpersonal (i.e., decategorization) nor intragroup (i.e., recategorization) contact has the potential to reduce negative attitudes and emotions towards a particular outgroup. Neither model is able to repair the problematic relationship between ingroup and outgroup; instead, they both avoid it, either by decategorizing or by recategorizing as a new identity. The mutual distinctiveness model, in contrast, explicitly addresses and aims to improve the problematic intergroup relationship.

Earlier studies on intergroup evaluations demonstrated that overall ingroup favouritism could be eradicated if ingroups could make intergroup comparisons on more than one dimension and create positive ingroup distinctiveness on ingroup-relevant dimensions at the same time as conceding outgroup superiority on other dimensions (Mummendey & Schreiber, 1983; Mummendey & Simon, 1989). For example, university lecturers might acknowledge that they earn lower salaries than lawyers, but they could emphasize that their jobs are more interesting and satisfying.

Corresponding to this principle, Hewstone and Brown stress the importance of members of both groups developing their positive distinctiveness by recognizing the mutual superiority of groups when evaluated across various dimensions. This model was supported by evidence from several lines of empirical research. Most importantly, there is now extensive evidence that intergroup contact has a stronger effect on prejudice reduction when group members’ social categories are salient than when they are not (see Brown & Hewstone, 2005, for a review). In a series of studies, Wilder (1986) led participants to interact with an individual who was allegedly an outgroup member (actually she was a confederate) who behaved in either a positive or negative manner, and who was either typical or atypical of the outgroup. As one would expect, the outgroup member was evaluated more positively when she behaved in a positive and cooperative manner. However, the evaluation of the outgroup as a whole was moderated by the perceived typicality of the outgroup member: it was only when the outgroup member was seen as typical that the positive contact experience led to a significantly more positive evaluation of the outgroup as a whole (see also González & Brown, in press; Harwood, Hewstone, Paolini & Voci, 2005; Voci & Hewstone, 2003).

A potential problem of the mutual distinctiveness model is that it could be especially difficult to achieve positive intergroup contact experiences when intergroup categorization remains salient (e.g., Islam & Hewstone, 1993). In the meantime, however, several studies have shown that positive contact experiences are, as a general rule, found even under high salience of group membership (see Brown & Hewstone, 2005, for a review).

Obviously, all three approaches (decategorization, recategorization and mutual distinctiveness) carry their respective benefits. Pettigrew (1998) proposed that the three models, each with its individual advantages, can be integrated into a more comprehensive approach by ordering them on a time scale. He suggested that contact might be much more easily initiated under conditions of decategorization, especially if the groups involved find themselves in strong conflict. Only after individuals from the two groups have experienced a certain degree of positive contact would their group memberships then be made increasingly salient, thereby leading to the generalization of positive contact experiences to the outgroup as a whole. In a final step, members of the two groups could be made not only to recognize their mutual superiority, but also to perceive ingroup and outgroup as belonging to one superordinate group with complete assimilation of prior ingroup and outgroup into one common identity. Pettigrew (1998) pointed out, however, that this sequence may terminate before all three stages have been achieved. This may be especially likely when original group memberships are not easily abandoned and recategorization is resisted. In this case, group members may prefer to maintain mutual recognition as separate groups, but also to acknowledge that they share a common group identity at a superordinate level.
RESEARCH CLOSE-UP 14.2

Some of my best friends have friends who are . . . :
Effects of direct and indirect contact


Introduction
Contact between members of rival social groups can reduce prejudice between them. Friendships across the group divide (so-called direct friendships) are a particularly powerful way of reducing prejudice (Pettigrew, 1998). In addition, the indirect friendship hypothesis suggests that simply knowing other ingroup members who have friendships with outgroup members can also lead to a reduction in prejudice (Wright, Aron, McLaughlin-Volpe & Ropp, 1997). A survey study tested these two hypotheses in the context of the long and continuing intergroup conflict between Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland, where the vast majority of school pupils attend schools with members of the same religious groups as themselves, but those who go on to university experience a desegregated social environment. The study focused on the reduction of prejudice and an increase in perceived outgroup variability as a further indicator of improvement of intergroup relations. It also assessed intergroup anxiety as a potential mediator variable between direct and indirect friendship experiences and outcome measures.

Method
A survey study measured direct and indirect friendship as predictor variables, intergroup anxiety as a mediator, and prejudice and perceived outgroup variability as criterion variables.

Participants
Three hundred and forty-one students in Northern Ireland participated in the survey. The sample involved 148 male and 190 female participants with a mean age of 23.13 years (three respondents did not report their gender). Participants identified themselves as belonging to either the Catholic (N = 178) or the Protestant (N = 163) community.

Design and procedure
Students participated voluntarily in the study. The questionnaires included the following main items: (1) direct cross-group friendships (number of close outgroup friends at home and at university); (2) indirect cross-group friendships (number of ingroup friends who had close friendships with members of the other community); (3) intergroup anxiety (‘imagine you meet members of the other community that are complete strangers to you; how would you feel compared to an occasion where you meet members of your own community?’); participants rated feelings such as awkward, relaxed, defensive, etc.; (4) prejudice (a ‘feeling thermometer’, ranging from extremely unfavourable to extremely favourable feelings towards the outgroup); and (5) perceived outgroup variability (e.g., ‘there are many different types of people in the other community’).

Results
As predicted, both direct and extended contact were associated with lower levels of prejudice and with increased perceived outgroup variability. Moreover, both contact variables were also substantially and negatively correlated with intergroup anxiety, which itself was negatively associated with prejudice and positively associated with outgroup variability. Further analyses revealed that anxiety completely mediated the relationship between direct contact and perceived variability and between extended contact and prejudice. Anxiety partially mediated the link between direct contact and prejudice and between extended contact and variability.

Discussion
The results of the study demonstrate a positive association between both direct and indirect cross-group friendships and improved intergroup relations. Moreover, the research identified intergroup anxiety as a strong mediating variable between outgroup friendships and the outcome variables. Hence, intergroup contact is associated with reduced anxiety; reduced anxiety, in turn, is associated with lower prejudice and greater perceived outgroup variability. These results were replicated in a second survey reported in the same paper, based on a representative sample of the population of Northern Ireland.

Although very compelling, the authors point out that the findings should be read with some caution due to the cross-sectional design of their research, which cannot demonstrate causal relationships between variables. Thus, it may be equally plausible that higher prejudice also relates to higher intergroup anxiety and to fewer direct and indirect outgroup friendships. Research on intergroup contact in general, however, shows a stronger effect from contact to prejudice than vice versa (see Brown & Hewstone, 2005; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006) and effects of contact have been confirmed in experimental and longitudinal studies.
(e.g., the English, Welsh and Scots who are all also British). Gaertner and Dovidio refer to this as a ‘dual identity’ model.

**Psychological processes in prejudice reduction**

In his initial presentation of the contact hypothesis, Allport (1954b) did not explicitly describe the psychological processes involved in the reduction of prejudice. How, then, does contact reduce prejudice? What psychological processes mediate the effect of the contact situation on prejudice reduction? Pettigrew (1998) proposes four main classes of psychological processes that may mediate the influence of contact on prejudice reduction: (1) increased information about the outgroup; (2) changing behaviour; (3) affective ties; and (4) reappraisal of the ingroup.

In contact situations it is possible to gather new information about the outgroup and its members, thereby changing initial stereotypes. According to Rothbart and John’s (1985) cognitive analysis, modifying stereotypes is difficult because stereotype-inconsistent information only changes existing stereotypes under certain conditions. An outgroup member who strongly contradicts a particular stereotype is easily explained away as an exception (a process known as ‘subtyping’; see Chapter 4, this volume). For example, a female who has all the qualities of a manager (such as assertive and confident, i.e., stereotype-disconfirming information for a woman) may be subcategorized as a ‘career woman’, thereby leaving the stereotype of ‘women’ unchanged. Stereotype-disconfirming information will most effectively change an existing stereotype if it is distributed across many exemplars who are generally seen to be typical members of the group (Hewstone, 1994; Richards & Hewstone, 2001). This is consistent with the idea that group membership must be salient during contact for existing stereotypes to be changed.

According to Pettigrew (1998), alternative psychological processes of prejudice reduction are guided by behavioural changes. When prejudiced individuals have contact with outgroups and experience this contact positively (or, at least, less negatively than expected), they will experience a feeling of ‘cognitive dissonance’ due to the fact that their behaviour is inconsistent with their pre-existing attitude (see Chapter 7, this volume). This dissonance may, in turn, lead to a subsequent reduction in prejudice (Aronson & Patnoe, 1997). In addition, according to self-perception theory (Bem, 1972; see Chapter 6, this volume), individuals without strong prejudices may simply observe themselves in new contact situations and thereby infer from their own friendly behaviour that they are not prejudiced.

Research has recently redirected the focus away from cognitive towards affective processes in reducing prejudice (see Brown & Hewstone, 2005), and Pettigrew and Tropp (2006) reveal that contact has markedly strong effects on affective measures. Emotions are clearly critical when it comes to intergroup contact. As a prime example, *intergroup anxiety* is a negative affective reaction that plays a central role in contact situations (Greenland & Brown, 1999; Stephan & Stephan, 1985). Initial intergroup encounters carry an especially strong potential for intergroup anxiety. Several studies have underlined the role of intergroup anxiety within contact settings, typically showing a positive relationship between anxiety and prejudice (Islam & Hewstone, 1993; Voci & Hewstone, 2003). Thus, research on contact between Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland (see Research close-up 14.2) has shown that quality and quantity of outgroup contact are associated with reduced intergroup anxiety, which, in turn, is associated with more positive views of the outgroup (Paolini et al., 2004). Sustained contact typically reduces intergroup anxiety. Moreover, recent research indicates that not only direct contact but also ‘indirect’ or ‘extended’ contact (knowing other ingroup members who have outgroup friends) reduces negative attitudes towards the outgroup (Liebkind & McAllister, 1999; Wright et al., 1997).

A final broad psychological process through which contact may reduce prejudice is that of ingroup reappraisal (Pettigrew, 1998). Intergroup contact leads to new insights not only concerning the outgroup but also regarding the ingroup. Positive contact with members of outgroups can lead to a reappraisal of the ingroup and a weakening of the conviction that the ingroup is the standard against which other groups must be compared. Pettigrew (1997) showed that outgroup friendship reduces ingroup pride and produces more generally positive attitudes towards outgroups. Moreover, the positive experiences of intergroup contact with members of one outgroup (e.g., contact between white and black people) can lead to more positive evaluations of quite different outgroups whose members one has not even encountered (e.g., immigrants).

Finally, as pointed out by Hewstone (2003), an important question remains as to why contact does not always prevent intergroup conflict. There are abundant examples of intergroup conflicts that emerge after a long period of contact between groups (e.g., Yugoslavia, Rwanda). Why did previous contact not prevent these conflict?
conflicts? One possible answer can be found in the previous pages of this chapter. As soon as changes in structural conditions result in negative interdependence concerning valuable resources, or as soon as a group recognizes a threat to its values posed by an out-group (which may well have remained undetected over a long period of time), then intergroup conflicts can re-emerge. Intense negative emotions towards the outgroup can quickly escalate the conflict. Intergroup anxiety reduces trust and enhances a group’s or group member’s need for safety. And resentment towards an outgroup leads to collective actions aimed at changing intergroup relations perceived as unjust.

**SUMMARY**

Contact between members of different social groups can help to reduce prejudice and intergroup conflict. Three models of intergroup contact (i.e., decategorization, recategorization and mutual distinctiveness) propose ways in which the contact situation should be structured in order to improve intergroup relations. This can occur via a number of mediating psychological processes, especially reduced intergroup anxiety.

**SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS**

- Prejudice is a negative and hostile attitude towards a social group and its members based on their group membership.
- The authoritarian personality approach and social dominance theory attempt to explain prejudice by focusing on the prejudiced individual.
- The relations between social groups determine the attitudes and behaviours of group members: negative interdependence leads to intergroup conflict, whereas positive interdependence carries the potential for harmonious relations.
- Intergroup behaviour under minimal conditions can be explained by social categorization, identification, social comparison and the need for positive distinctiveness.
- Social categorization leads to assimilation of individuals within and contrast of individuals between categories.
- Ingroup identification associates the self with a particular social group, thereby conveying psychological relevance to this social category.
- Intergroup comparisons lead to the evaluation of an ingroup relative to an outgroup on valued dimensions.
- Prejudice is the outcome of intergroup evaluation, which can be conceptualized as either an attitude or a group-based emotion.
- Intergroup contact is very effective in reducing prejudice and intergroup conflict.
- Allport’s conditions for positive contact are not essential but, rather, facilitate positive contact effects. The reformulated contact hypothesis suggests that contact should be frequent enough and neither threatening nor anxiety-provoking. Under these conditions, contact tends to reduce prejudice, especially where cross-group friendships occur.
- Affective ties and the reduction of intergroup anxiety are powerful processes of prejudice reduction.

**Suggestions for further reading**


