1

The Varieties of Terrorism

The September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington, DC catapulted terrorism to the top of the US political agenda and produced immediate and profound global consequences, not only politically and militarily, but also economically. There have been a number of subsequent specific terrorist bombings of civilians, including in Bali in 2002, Madrid in 2004, London in 2005, New Delhi in 2005 and Mumbai in 2006. In addition, there have been ongoing terrorist attacks in a number of theatres of internecine war, including in Iraq, Kashmir, Sri Lanka and in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict in the Middle East. In some of these contexts there appears to be a ratcheting up of a given terrorist group's lethal capability, e.g., in 2006 the Lebanon-based terrorist organization Hezbollah for the first time launched a series of rocket attacks on Israeli cities from Lebanon (to which the Israelis responded with bombing raids on Beirut and other cities in Lebanon). These specific and ongoing attacks have ensured that terrorism remains in the international media headlines and at the world's political centre stage.

No one denies the reality and impact of terrorism in the contemporary world. But when it comes to defining terrorism, and especially to combating terrorism, there is much disagreement. If Al-Qaeda is a paradigm of a terrorist network, what of the African National Congress (ANC) in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s? The ANC was branded a terrorist organization by the South African apartheid government. However, the ANC and its supporters claimed that they were not a terrorist organization, but rather a liberation movement engaged in an armed struggle. State actors, e.g., the US government, often deny the existence

of state terrorism.[1] Terrorism, they claim, is an activity only undertaken by sub-state groups. But was not the Soviet Union under Stalin a terrorist state? Certainly, it routinely used a great many of the methods of terrorism. Again, many Israelis will argue that when Israeli forces engage in targeted assassinations of members of Hamas and the like, they are not engaged in terrorism but rather are using morally justified counter-terrorist tactics. (See Chapter 5.) By contrast, Palestinians proclaim these and other acts of the Israeli state to be acts of terrorism perpetrated against the Palestinian people. Liberal humanists decry the use of some counter-terrorism measures, such as the indefinite detention without trial of alleged terrorists, as a violation of human rights. But many conservatives in liberal democracies hold such measures to be necessary in the so-called 'war against terrorism'.

Prior to attempting to provide answers to these and related questions, we need to traverse the landscape of terrorism, or at least what has been regarded as terrorism.[2] Historically, terrorist organizations and campaigns have typically been identified not so much by their political motivations as by their methods; the methods they use to achieve their political ends are ones deployed in order to instil fear, i.e., quite literally to terrorize. These methods include assassination, indiscriminate killing, torture, kidnapping and hostage taking, bombing civilian targets (including suicide bombing) and ethnic cleansing. Some of these methods are necessarily acts of terror, e.g., torture. However, some of them are not necessarily methods of terror. The attempted assassination of Hitler by elements of the German military, for example, was not undertaken to terrorize Hitler or anyone else, but simply to eliminate the person chiefly responsible for (among other things) continuing to prosecute a hugely destructive and unwinnable war. Further, some of these methods invariably instil fear, but this might not be a primary motivation for their use in all contexts. Ethnic cleansing, for example, might be undertaken simply to ensure that a population is relocated (albeit against their will), as was presumably the case in apartheid South Africa.[3] Nevertheless, ethnic cleansing invariably involves the instilling of high levels of fear. Again, genocide is invariably preceded by terror, e.g., the Hutu militias (Interahamwe) in Rwanda certainly terrorized the Tutsi population prior to slaughtering

---

[1]   US State Department definition quoted in D.J. Whittaker (ed.), *The Terrorism Reader*, 2nd edn, London: Routledge, 2003, p. 3.

[2]   For useful introductions see ibid., and C. Townshend, *Terrorism: A Very Short Introduction*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.

[3]   In some contexts, e.g., at Srebrenica in Bosnia in 1995, ethnic cleansing has meant mass slaughter, and not simply forcible removal.

approximately one million of its members.[4] However, conceptually speaking, the instilling of fear is not necessarily a primary motivation in genocide. And genocide goes beyond terrorism; the point is not simply to terrorize the target population, but to eliminate it.[5]

I will assume in what follows that terrorism, or at least the species under consideration in this book, is politically motivated. (This is not to say that it might not have additional motivations, e.g., religious ends.) Moreover, I will further assume that terrorism involves the methods mentioned above (at least), and that these methods are used with the intention of terrorizing or instilling fear in a target population.

So much by way of a preliminary description of the phenomenon of terrorism. Prior to offering a definition of terrorism, we need to try further to demarcate its boundaries by recourse to actual contemporary examples.

The approach to be taken here in relation to the further demarcation of terrorism is in large part empirical-comparative. In doing so I concede that terrorism is an essentially contested concept and that, therefore, there is inevitably a degree of stipulation involved in any definition on offer. I first provide a number of contemporary case studies of organizations and campaigns widely referred to as being terrorist in nature. I do so with a view to providing a set of descriptions of salient contemporary instances of terrorism – or what are widely alleged to be instances of terrorism – that are sufficiently rich to enable the derivation of the key defining features of modern terrorism, or at least of the key criteria of terrorism. However, I should make it clear that my main interest in this book is with the implications of terrorism for contemporary liberal democracy. Hence I will not focus much attention on the terrorist and counter-terrorist campaigns of totalitarian or authoritarian states, but rather concentrate on those campaigns either mounted against or by liberal-democratic states, or pursued by groups seeking to establish liberal-democratic states.

Here I use the notion of a liberal-democratic state somewhat loosely to mean representative democracies committed (in theory and to a large extent in practice) to the protection of basic political, civil and human rights for their citizens. I do not mean to imply that liberal democracies thus characterized are necessarily communal exemplars of moral rectitude, or even of human well-being broadly conceived. For example, gross economic inequality, domination and exploitation of other weaker nation-states, and an impoverished 'junk' culture are consistent with this

---

[4]   F. Keane, *Season of Blood: A Rwandan Journey*, London: Viking, 1995, p. 29.

[5]   On some definitions of genocide, mass murder of an ethnic or social group is not necessary; rather what is necessary is elimination of the identity of members of the group, e.g., by destruction of the group's language and culture.

notion of a liberal-democratic state; thus, although the US is the world's leading liberal democracy, arguably it also has just such an array of morally repugnant features. However, I do mean to imply the view that democracy and the protection of basic political, civil and human rights are, or ought to be, among the fundamental values embodied in contemporary nation-states, whatever their other ethical, cultural or religious commitments might be. Accordingly, I do not rule out the possibility of an Islamic liberal democracy any more than I rule out the possibility of a Christian one or a Jewish one.[6] Indeed, I note that a majority of the world's Muslims currently live in democracies committed (at least in theory) to individual rights, namely, India, Indonesia and Turkey.

I take the US, the UK, Israel, India and the post-apartheid South African state to be liberal-democratic states, albeit (in different ways) flawed ones.[7] These liberal-democratic states are flawed by virtue of the fact that, for example, their security agencies have at least on occasion, if not on a regular basis, resorted to terrorist tactics such as torture. I also take it that some of these states are closer to the liberal-democratic paradigm than others. It is self-evident, for example, that neither India-controlled Kashmir nor the West Bank (currently under *de facto*, albeit indirect, Israeli control) is governed in accordance with liberal-democratic principles.

The terrorist groups and campaigns that I have chosen are as follows: (1) Al-Qaeda; (2) the Irish Republican Army's (IRA) campaign of violence in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s; (3) the ANC's campaign of violence against the apartheid state in South Africa in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s; (4) terrorism and counter-terrorism in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict; and (5) terrorism and counter-terrorism in India in recent times.

Al-Qaeda

The terrorism practised by Osama bin Laden's Al-Qaeda is a species of non-state terrorism directed principally at non-Muslim western states, especially the US, the UK and Israel, that are alleged to be attacking Islam. While bin Laden and Al-Qaeda found a natural home and ally among the fundamentalist Islamist Taliban in Afghanistan (initially supported by Pakistan), his organization – and the ideological movement it has in part

---

[6] On liberal democratic aspects of an Islamic state, namely, Iran post-Shah, see A. Saikal, *Islam and the West: Conflict or Cooperation?* London: Palgrave, 2003, pp. 84–8.

[7] For a contrary view in relation to Israel, see B. Kimmerling, *Politicide: Ariel Sharon's War against the Palestinians*, London: Verso, 2003, p. 175.

spawned – is global in character.[8] Bin Laden's organization is an important element of a loose coalition of extremist Islamist groups based in a variety of locations, including Egypt, Algeria, Afghanistan, Indonesia, Sudan and Pakistan. Peter Bergen refers to it as 'Holy War Inc.'.[9] The global nature of this coalition is evidenced by such terrorist campaigns as that being waged in Algeria by the Al-Qaeda-linked Islamic Salvation Front (ISF), in which there have been over 100,000 victims of terrorism since 1992, as well as by the September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon (c. 3,000 deaths), by the Bali bombing in 2002, in which around 200 people, including 88 Australians (mainly tourists), were killed by terrorists almost certainly linked to Al-Qaeda, and by the London bombings in 2005, in which some 50 train commuters were killed by terrorists who were British citizens heavily influenced by, if not directly connected to, the Al-Qaeda movement.

It is important, however, to distinguish the brand of Islam propounded by bin Laden from the more moderate forms of Islam to be found throughout the Muslim world in places such as Indonesia, India and, for that matter, the Middle East and North Africa.[10] For example, bin Laden is anti-democratic, opposed to the emancipation of women, and opposed to the modern secular state with its division between religious institutions and the institutions of government. So bin Laden is opposed to secular governments operating in predominantly Muslim countries, such as is the case in Turkey and Indonesia. And he is implacably opposed to pro-western Muslim governments such as Saudi Arabia, no matter how religiously conservative they are. Indeed, on some accounts,[11] extremist Islamists such as bin Laden not only reject moderate forms of Islam, they also embrace a form of religious totalitarianism according to which all individuals in all aspects of their lives ought to be completely subjected to God-ordained laws as interpreted and applied by the Muslim vanguard. According to Berman,[12] one manifestation of this ideology is the religious fervour for martyrdom and, more specifically, for engaging in mass suicides such as the 'human wave' attacks orchestrated by Ayatollah Khomeini in the Iran–Iraq war. Another manifestation of this ideology is its alleged (e.g., by Berman) wholesale rejection of, and attacks on, liberal

---

[8]   K. Greenberg (ed.), *Al Qaeda Now: Understanding Today's Terrorists*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. xii.

[9]   P.L. Bergen, *Holy War Inc.: Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden*, New York: Free Press, 2001.

[10]   On this issue see, e.g., Saikal, *Islam and the West*, chap. 1.

[11]   P. Berman, *Terror and Liberalism*, New York: Norton, 2004, p. 99.

[12]   Ibid., p. 108.

values, especially individual freedom. By contrast with such accounts, other writers, such as Mohammad-Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou,[13] stress the 'hegemonic attitudes' of the US to Muslims and Arabs, and the corresponding increase in conflict between the two.[14] The issue is not, on this kind of view, Islamic fundamentalism or religious extremism, but rather US hegemony and injustice, including US support for Israel and the expanded US military role in the Middle East.

In light of these differences of viewpoint among commentators regarding, so to speak, the ideological essence of Al-Qaeda, it is pertinent to consider bin Laden's pronouncements concerning Al-Qaeda's military and political objectives. Bin Laden has stated that Al-Qaeda has as an aim not simply the self-defence of Muslim lands in the face of US hegemony, but also the destruction of the evil empire that the US constitutes, and the establishment of an Islamist caliphate (presumably) comprising the existing nation-states of North Africa, the Middle East, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Indonesia, and so on, and based on his particular brand of Islamic fundamentalism.[15] Accordingly, Al-Qaeda's political and military objectives are not restricted to mere self-defence. Moreover, these political and military objectives are far more ambitious than those of groups such as the PLO, the IRA or the ANC. The latter have, or had, essentially local, i.e., national, aims of a restricted and more or less feasible kind. By comparison, Al-Qaeda's ultimate aim appears to be grandiose in the extreme and, therefore, highly unlikely ever to be achieved.

The preparedness of bin Laden's followers to commit suicide, and thereby supposedly achieve martyrdom, is an enormous advantage for a terrorist organization. Moreover, Al-Qaeda's cause is greatly facilitated not only by

---

[13]   Mohammad-Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou, *Understanding Al-Qaeda: The Transformation of War*, London: Pluto Press, 2007.

[14]   Ibid., pp. 8–10.

[15]   Greenberg (ed.), *Al Qaeda Now*, p. 229:

It is He Who has sent His Messenger (Muhammed peace be upon him) with guidance and the religion of truth (Islam) to make it victorious over all other religions. . . . The Islamic Nation that was able to dismiss and destroy the previous Evil empires like yourself; the Nation that rejects your attacks, wishes to remove your evils, and is prepared to fight you.

See also pp. 230–1:

Since the fall of the Islamic Caliphate state, regimes that do not rule according to the Koran have arisen. If truth be told, these regimes are fighting against the law of Allah. . . . I say that I am convinced that thanks to Allah, this [Islamic] nation has sufficient forces to establish the Islamic state and the Islamic Caliphate but we must tell these forces that this is their obligation.

real and perceived injustices (including western economic and political domination, and – alleged – western disrespect for Islamic cultural and religious institutions), and already existing national, ethnic and religious conflict, but also by global financial interdependence and modern technology, such as the global communication system and the nuclear, chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction that bin Laden has been seeking to develop. Perhaps Al-Qaeda's success is not ultimately dependent on widespread political and popular support for its goals, although it is certainly reliant on a widely accepted core set of ideological commitments and disaffection with corrupt and authoritarian Arab governments, and with US policies in the Middle East, e.g., US support for an authoritarian government in Saudi Arabia in order to secure US strategic interests in oil, ongoing economic and military assistance to Israel in the context of the Israel–Palestinian conflict, and the US-led invasion and occupation of Iraq. Rather, Al-Qaeda's success might largely be a function of its psychological preparedness and logistical capacity to perpetrate acts of terror, coupled with the technological capacity to communicate those acts worldwide, and thereby wreak havoc in a globally economically interdependent world. Its methods have proved extremely effective in relation to the goal of destabilization.

That said, Al-Qaeda's methods clearly involve the intentional killing of the innocent, and are not constrained by principles of the proportional use of force or minimally necessary force; principles enshrined not only in the Christian-based Just War Theory, but also in mainstream Islamic teachings.[16] Indeed, bin Laden's aim is to maximize the loss of human life in populations he regards as enemies, i.e., western and other non-Muslim communities. In short, bin Laden's terrorist campaign is essentially a form of mass murder. Accordingly, there is some reason to fear the possibility of Al-Qaeda acquiring and deploying weapons of mass destruction, whether they be nuclear, radiological, chemical or biological.[17] Al-Qaeda is known to have such intentions, and the acquiring and weaponization of biological agents, in particular, is apparently becoming relatively easy. (See Chapter 7.) In this respect there is an important difference between Al-Qaeda and most other terrorist groups, such as the PLO and the IRA, who do not have mass murder as a strategy.

Notwithstanding the murderous nature of the September 11 attacks, they were performed in the name of moral righteousness by people prepared to give up their own lives, as well as the lives of those whom they

---

[16] Saikal, *Islam and the West*, p. 27.
[17] See Paul Wilkinson, for example (*Terrorism versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response*, 2nd edn, London: Routledge, 2006, p. xv).

murdered. Osama bin Laden and like-minded religious extremists have managed to mobilize Muslim moral outrage at western – especially US – political and military intervention in the Middle East and elsewhere to their cause, and they have done so on a significant scale. Indeed, here they appear to be tapping into a rich vein of long held, and deeply felt, Muslim resentment and suspicion of the US and its western allies. Doubtless, given the history of British and (later) US intervention in, and domination of, the Middle East, in particular, such feelings are not entirely without justification.[18] At any rate, in this respect Al-Qaeda is, of course, not unique among terrorist groups. Terrorist groups typically come into existence because of, and are sustained by, some real or imagined injustice.

Moreover, in order for Osama bin Laden and his group to mobilize moral sentiment they have had to overcome, at least in the minds of their followers, what might be regarded as more or less universally held – including in Muslim societies – principles of moral acceptability, including the principle according to which only those responsible for injustice or harm should be targeted. Yet the majority of those killed, and intended to be killed, by the September 11 terrorists were – according to more or less universally held principles of moral responsibility – innocent victims. They included not only civilians, but also children, visiting foreign nationals, and so on. This being so, what moral justification is offered by the terrorists and their supporters?

Bin Laden at one point offers a retaliatory justification for the killing of innocents: if you kill our innocents, we are entitled to kill yours. This argument is, of course, spurious. The killing of one set of innocents does not morally justify the killing of another set of innocents; it merely compounds the evil. (I discuss these, and related issues, more fully in Chapter 3.)

At any rate, in response to this kind of question from al Jazeera correspondent, Tayseer Alouni, bin Laden had this to say:

> I agree that the Prophet Mohammed forbade the killing of babies and women. That is true, but this is not absolute. There is a saying, 'If the infidels kill women and children on purpose, we shouldn't shy way from treating them in the same way to stop them from doing it again'. The men that God helped [attack, on September 11] did not intend to kill babies; they intended to destroy the strongest military power in the world, to attack the Pentagon that houses more than 64,000 employees, a military center that houses the strength and the military intelligence. . . . The towers are an economic power

---

[18] See Edward Said's work (e.g., *Orientalism*, New York: Vintage Books, 1979) for a generalized critique of western domination in this regard.

and not a children's school. Those that were there are men that supported the biggest economic power in the world. They have to review their books. We will do as they do. If they kill our women and our innocent people, we will kill their women and their innocent people until they stop.[19]

In other places bin Laden denies, at least implicitly, that so-called 'innocent' victims of his terrorist attacks are in fact innocent. For example, on 22 February 1998 in announcing the formation of the World Islamic Front for Jihad against the Jews and the Crusaders he said:

> All those crimes and calamities are an explicit declaration by the Americans of war on Allah, His Prophet, and Muslims. . . . Based upon this and in order to obey the Almighty, we hereby give Muslims the following judgment: The judgment to kill and fight Americans and their allies, whether civilians or military, is an obligation for every Muslim who is able to do so in any country.[20]

Accordingly, perhaps bin Laden believes that his brand of terrorism is both likely to succeed and morally acceptable by virtue of the guilt of its victims; it is essentially self-defence against terrorism. The former belief is false by virtue of the fact that many of the victims of the September 11 attacks on the Twin Towers were, on any rational account of the matter, innocent, e.g., children, visitors, members of ordinary civilian occupational groups. What are his grounds for the latter belief?

Osama bin Laden and thousands of other Arab Muslims went to Afghanistan in the 1980s to join the Afghans in their fight against the (so-called) godless, Communist invaders from Russia. According to bin Laden, Islam won a great victory against the Russian superpower. He apparently thinks that he can repeat the same feat in relation to the US. Certainly, Afghanistan (and nearby Pakistan) has provided a breeding ground for terrorism specifically directed at the US and its allies, as well as for the terrorism exported to other Muslim states. As far as the latter is concerned, militant Muslims from many nations came to fight the Afghanistan war (often using bases in Pakistan), and then returned to their home countries, including Algeria, Egypt and the like, to wage terrorist campaigns against their own governments. In doing so they have had an overall destabilizing effect in the Middle East and elsewhere, and greatly enhanced the global influence of Al-Qaeda.

Now bin Laden claims that Al-Qaeda is fighting the US in order to defend Islam against the threats to its existence posed by America,

---

[19] Greenberg, ed., *Al Qaeda Now*, p. 200.
[20] Quoted in Bergen, *Holy War Inc.*, p. 105.

specifically through the latter's ongoing support of Israel, its military bases in Saudi Arabia (where the two most holy Islamic sites, Mecca and Medina, are located) and its invasion and occupation of Iraq. Whatever the rights and wrongs of the generalized self-defence claim, and of associated specific claims, there is no doubt that the US role in the Middle East is susceptible to pejorative moral critique.[21] The US regards the oil-rich Middle East as of great strategic importance, and has historically been prepared to intervene politically and militarily to promote its strategic interests as it views them, including by taking a one-sided, pro-Israeli stand in the Israel–Palestinian conflict, and by supporting corrupt and authoritarian governments when it suits, e.g., Saddam Hussein prior to his invasion of Kuwait.

The counter-terrorist response to Al-Qaeda on the part of the US and its allies has taken place at a number of levels.[22] (See Chapters 4 and 5.) There has been increased resourcing and restructuring of security forces, e.g., the new Department of Homeland Security in the US. There has been a ramping up of security measures and an increase in police powers. For example, airport security has been tightened, there has been an increase in data collection and in monitoring and surveillance (some of it apparently unlawfully undertaken by the National Security Agency after being authorized by President Bush in breach of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act which prohibits warrantless domestic wiretappings[23]), and police have been given wider powers to detain without trial suspects or even non-suspects who might have information. In addition, foreign nationals suspected of being terrorists have been incarcerated indefinitely, e.g., at Guantánamo Bay in Cuba. At a strategic military level, meanwhile, the US has invaded Iraq and sent armed forces into Afghanistan to combat Al-Qaeda and its supporters in the Taliban.

The overall effects of these measures are difficult to determine (with some notable exceptions). It now seems clear that the US has exacerbated, rather than reduced, the problem of global Islamic terrorism by invading and occupying Iraq. At the time of writing, the anti-US insurgency

---

[21]   For a sustained, if somewhat one-sided, critique see N. Chomsky, *Power and Prospects: Reflections on Human Nature and the Social Order*, Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1996, chap. 6.

[22]   Some have argued it has been an incompetent response. For example, James Risen (*State of War: The Secret History of the CIA and the Bush Administration*, New York: Free Press, 2006) details a long list of sins of omission – e.g., lack of CIA understanding of Iraq prior to the US-led invasion, failure to pursue Al-Qaeda connections with the Saudi power elite (p. 179) – and of commission – such as rogue operations, e.g., torture and rendition, or the episode in which virtually the entire CIA spy network in Iran was in effect inadvertly disclosed to the Iranian security agencies (p. 193).

[23]   First reported in the *New York Times* in December 2005.

is far from being under control and Iraqi security forces are far from being in a position to provide law and order without very substantial US assistance; indeed, Iraq has become a potent symbol of the US–Islam confrontation as expressed by bin Laden and a breeding ground for terrorists. Second, liberal-democratic values have been compromised to an extent by these measures. For example, the absolute ban on torture has been questioned by the Bush administration and, indeed, torture has been practised by the US military in Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. In the UK there is provision for indefinite detention of suspects without bringing them to trial if they do not have British citizenship and expelling them would present a real risk of their being tortured.[24] In Australia, new anti-terrorist legislation (ASIO Bill [No. 2]) permits ASIO (the Australian Security Intelligence Organization) to detain and question persons who are not even suspects, if it is believed these innocents could provide relevant information.[25]

Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism in the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict

The Israeli–Palestinian conflict is in large part a struggle over land.[26] A century ago the population of Palestine was less than 10 per cent Jewish. However, the Jews had an historical claim to occupancy since biblical times. At any rate, in the early part of the twentieth century the British rulers of Palestine acceded to the establishment of a national Jewish home in Palestine, and the population of Jews increased to one third of the two million people in Palestine in 1948 (the last year of British rule). Official Zionism proclaimed the view that Jews and Arabs could live side by side in Palestine. However, David Ben-Gurion (Israel's first Prime Minister)

---

[24] Sections 21 to 32 of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Emergency Bill 2001 now allow detention without trial where the option of deportation is not available. Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights, to which the UK is a signatory, forbids torture and inhuman treatment. See D. Haubrich, 'September 11, anti-terror laws and civil liberties: Britain, France and Germany compared', *Government and Opposition* 38(1), 2003, p. 15.

[25] A. Lynch and G. Williams, *What Price Security? Taking Stock of Australia's Anti-Terror Laws*, Sydney: University of New South Wales Press, 2006, pp. 33–4.

[26] See (including for factual material used here) T. Kapitan, 'Terrorism in the Arab–Israeli conflict', in I. Primoratz (ed.), *Terrorism: The Philosophical Issues*, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004; and I. Primoratz, 'Terrorism in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict: a case study in applied ethics', *Iyyun: The Jerusalem Philosophical Quarterly* 55, 2006, pp. 27–48. For a detailed historical account of a journalistic kind, see R. Fisk, *The Great War for Civilisation: The Conquest of the Middle East*, London: HarperCollins, 2005.

and others embraced the concept of forcible removal (ethnic cleansing) as the solution to the problem of one land and two peoples. Moreover, the Arabs themselves were opposed to Zionism and, in particular, to the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine. A policy of forcible removal was clearly going to trigger a violent response, as in fact happened.

Inter-communal violence took place in Palestine during the period of British rule, as did acts of terrorism, e.g., planting of bombs in Arab marketplaces by Irgun (a Jewish underground group). Arab groups responded in kind, bombing Jewish civilians. In 1939 Britain abandoned its policy of establishing a Jewish state. This met with Jewish opposition, including terrorist attacks, e.g., the bombing of the King David Hotel in Jerusalem. In 1947 the United Nations General Assembly recommended partition of Palestine into two states, and inter-communal violence and terrorism between Jews and Arabs increased. However, the Jewish forces were better armed and organized and ended up controlling most of Palestine and expelling most of the Arabs from what, just two years later, was to become the Jewish state of Israel. The Palestinians outside Israel ended up for the most part in refugee camps. The parts of Palestine not comprising Israel were taken over by Jordan (the West Bank) and Egypt (Gaza Strip). Some 700,000 Palestinians were ethnically cleansed from what is now Israel.[27]

In the 1967 war, Israel conquered the West Bank and Gaza Strip and some 200,000 Palestinians were expelled or fled. Israel began settling Jews in these territories. Arabs within Israel are an ethnic minority with the status of second-class citizens. Post-1967 Israel has exercised political control over the West Bank and Gaza Strip (indirectly since 1994) and yet denied Palestinians living in these areas their political rights.[28]

As mentioned above, both Arabs and Israelis have resorted to terrorism. Since the 1960s, armed and organized resistance on the part of the Palestinians has taken place on a significant scale. Organizations such as the PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization) and especially Hamas have undertaken a systematic campaign of bombings of Israeli civilian targets, such as buses, restaurants and marketplaces. Notable here has been the use of so-called 'suicide bombers' (more aptly called 'homicide-suicide bombers'). They have also engaged in plane hijacking and hostage taking. The Munich Olympic Games in 1972 witnessed the taking of Israeli athletes as hostages.

For their part, the Israelis have responded with extra-judicial killing of suspected terrorists (see Chapter 5), and bombing raids on suspected

---

[27] Kimmerling, *Politicide*, p. 25.
[28] Ibid., p. 39. Evidently, the setting up of the Palestinian Authority in 1994 only relinquished Israeli *direct* control. As of June 2007, Gaza is under the control of Hamas.

terrorist-occupied buildings in civilian areas. Two methods of terror deployed by the Israelis are torture (see Chapter 6) and bombing of civilian areas, e.g., of Beirut in 1982.[29] In addition, there have been several massacres of civilians, notably in 1982, when the Israeli Defence Minister Ariel Sharon sanctioned and facilitated the slaughter of over 2,000 civilian Palestinians in the Sabra and Shatilla refugee camps in Beirut; Israeli tanks surrounded the camps and provided flares at night while Lebanese militia carried out the massacre.[30]

Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism and the IRA in Northern Ireland

In 1969 the Irish Republican Army (IRA) commenced a campaign of violence that did not end until a peace agreement was signed in 1998.[31] The IRA's protagonists were rival Protestant groups, e.g., the Ulster Defence Association (UDA), Northern Ireland's police force, the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), and the occupying British army. The IRA campaign included targeted assassinations, punishment beatings and civilian bombings not only in Northern Ireland, but also in the Republic of Ireland and in mainland Britain. The IRA also engaged in robberies and kidnappings to finance their activities. During this thirty-year period 3,500 civilians lost their lives, and 300 RUC officers were killed – a high total considering the IRA's membership was only several hundred. The IRA's practice of bombing pubs and the like in which innocent lives were lost was a quintessentially terrorist method. On the other hand, the IRA typically issued a warning immediately prior to a bombing attack, thereby lessening the scale of deaths; in this respect they were unlike, say, Al-Qaeda.

The political context of this is as follows. The whole of Ireland was under British rule until it was partitioned into north and south (1922). The north (Northern Ireland) remained within Great Britain, the south emerged as the Republic of Ireland. The north had its own parliament (Stormont); however, direct British rule was imposed on a number of occasions, e.g., 1974, in the context of insurrectionary activity. The north

---

[29] Ibid., p. 91.

[30] Ibid., p. 94.

[31] See (including for factual material used here) Whittaker (ed.), *The Terrorism Reader*, chap. 8; P. Simpson, 'Violence and terrorism in Northern Ireland', in Primoratz (ed.), *Terrorism: The Philosophical Issues*; and also M.L.R. Smith, *Fighting for Ireland: Military Strategy of the Irish Republican Movement*, London: Routledge, 1995.

was dominated politically and economically by Protestants, the south by Catholics.

Irish nationalists, such as the IRA, had never accepted the partition of Ireland and British rule in any part of Ireland. On the other hand, Protestants in the north sought to protect their political and economic interests by constructing an enclave in Ireland under British protection. In this enclave, Protestants dominated political and economic life, and Catholics were largely excluded from it, e.g., elections were gerrymandered, the RUC was largely Protestant, Catholics were discriminated against in employment (including Belfast shipyards), education and housing; hence there was an issue of socio-economic rights of Catholics in Northern Ireland, as well as the religious divide and the issue of nationalism.

Like many terrorist groups, the IRA presented itself as engaged in a war and argued that its members were political and military personnel, and should not be treated as common criminals. The British sought to treat them as criminals, and the issue came to a head in the famous hunger strikes in the early 1980s on the part of Bobby Sands and others held in gaols.

Criminalizing the IRA was problematic from the point of view of some of the counter-terrorist operations mounted by the British and the RUC. For example, the latter on occasion (unlawfully) ambushed and killed IRA members when they arrived at an arms cache. Such an ambush would be regarded as an acceptable military tactic in time of war; however, it is not an acceptable police practice in relation to suspected criminals. Other (unlawful) counter-terrorist responses included targeted assassination and torture.

The African National Congress's Armed Struggle in Apartheid South Africa

The armed struggle of the ANC against the apartheid government in South Africa commenced in 1961 when it abandoned its commitment to a principle of non-violence.[32] The armed struggle continued until the early 1990s. The key events here were the 1990 release from prison of Nelson Mandela and his election in 1994 as South Africa's first black President. The context for the ANC's armed struggle was the failure of non-violent strategies in the face of systematic, ongoing and widespread human rights violations. The latter took the following form.

---

[32]   Material here is taken from S. Miller, 'Just War theory: the case of South Africa', *Philosophical Papers* 19(2), 1990, pp. 143–61.

There was unequal, racially based segregation in the Republic of South Africa (as distinct from the so-called 'Independent States'). In accordance with the Group Areas Act, blacks were required by law to live in black-only areas, whites in white-only areas, coloureds in coloured-only areas, Indians in Indian-only areas, and so on. State schools were by law either blacks only, or whites only, etc., and hospital wards were racially segregated. Moreover, the facilities and living areas provided for blacks were inferior to those provided for whites. The so-called 'Independent States' (Ciskei, Transkei, etc.) should have been – and in fact were, internationally – regarded as (partially autonomous) racially segregated areas of South Africa, rather than as distinct countries resulting from genuine and legitimate political division. Their creation involved the forcible removal (ethnic cleansing) of millions of people; they were hugely overcrowded, poverty-stricken and dependent on South Africa for handouts; and their continued existence depended on the South African government.

Social and economic goods are notoriously difficult to measure. However, it is clear that: black unemployment was very high in South Africa and the so-called 'homelands', and most of these unemployed people did not have the safety net of unemployment benefits; many black workers – especially those outside industries served by strong unions – received wages below the minimum level required to keep themselves and their families above what advanced western countries consider to be the poverty line; the majority of blacks did not receive adequate primary and secondary education, and had to take the lowest paid and most menial jobs; there was a massive housing shortage for blacks; and millions of blacks did not receive basic services such as water, electricity, and sewerage. In short, in general social and economic terms the majority of blacks were essentially in a third world situation. Whites, by contrast, earned wages, received education and experienced general living conditions comparable with people in advanced western countries. Moreover – and this was one of the most striking features of the South African situation – that this degree of inequality existed, and largely continues to this day, is to a significant extent due not simply to cultural differences, or even neglect, but to the deliberate policies of the apartheid South African government over many decades. These policies included: the dumping of millions of people onto areas that the government's own investigative commissions had told them could not possibly sustain even the existing population; an official policy of not educating black people beyond primary school level; and policies of job reservation for whites so that blacks were left to perform only the most menial tasks at very low wage levels.

Political control rested firmly in the hands of the white-minority government. Blacks in particular – and they constituted 75 per cent of

the population – had no political rights in the central government; they could not vote or hold office. Moreover, this political control, underwritten by economic power and, in the last analysis, military power, was used to maintain the system under which whites were hugely socially, economically and politically advantaged at the expense of blacks.

From its formation in 1912 up until it was banned in 1960, the ANC, an organization that was entitled to claim the support of the majority, or at least a very large minority, of black South Africans, pursued certain non-violent strategies. In 1961 in the face of evident failure – if anything, violation of rights increased over this period, particularly with the coming to power of the Nationalist Party in 1948 – the strategy of violent resistance was adopted. This consisted initially of bombing strategic installations, and then widened to include military and police personnel, together with certain other categories of civilian personnel. On the face of it a strategy that restricted itself to non-violent resistance alone had been tried and had failed. Now this is not to say that non-violent means of resistance, including strikes and boycotts, were not necessary. The claim is rather that they had not been sufficient, for the South African state had responded ruthlessly and effectively whenever such non-violent resistance had begun to look as though it might challenge the basic power structure of the status quo.

It might be claimed that in fact it was certain sorts of non-violent strategies deployed by external countries, especially economic sanctions, that were the most effective in the struggle against the apartheid system, and ultimately in bringing the South African government to the negotiating table. Such strategies did not operate in a vacuum, however. Concerning economic sanctions, in the first place, the drying up of the capital inflow, the divestment, and so on, were to a considerable extent caused by a perception of political instability, which in turn was largely due to internal insurrectionary activity, and especially internal violence. In the second place, these sanctions would hardly have been imposed if internal insurrectionary activity had not riveted the world's attention on South Africa.

Here we can distinguish three sorts of violence. Firstly, there is the more or less spontaneous violence of mass action, crowds of people out of control, killing, burning, etc. Secondly, there is premeditated, disciplined terrorism. This involves tactics such as bombing civilian areas, torture, etc. Thirdly, there is premeditated, disciplined violence which is not terrorism.

Violence can be directed at property or at persons. Presumably, the ANC was entitled to destroy buildings and installations, as distinct from their occupants, in so far as they were used by personnel performing tasks that constituted violations of the rights of ANC members and supporters. What of violence directed at persons? Here we need to distinguish between types

of violence and types of persons at whom violence is directed. Certain forms of violence such as 'necklacing' (burning someone to death by placing a burning car tyre around his or her neck) and bombing civilian areas clearly count as instances of terrorism. Moreover, some of these forms were employed at times by the ANC, or at least by persons trained by, and supporters of, the ANC. (There was for a period some dispute in respect of *de facto* ANC policy in this regard. In fact the ANC on a number of occasions dissociated itself from such acts. And historically it demonstrated a concern in respect of loss of innocent life.)

A final mention should be made of violence directed by the apartheid South African state at members of the ANC and ordinary black South Africans. This included numerous instances of torture, assassination, shooting protesters in the back as they fled, and forcible removal.

Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism in India

India experienced terrorism in the Punjab state in the 1980s and early 1990s at the hands of Sikh separatist/militants, and is continuing to face the problem in Jammu and Kashmir.[33] Both of these states share borders with Pakistan, and terrorists have operated from bases in Pakistan with the tacit support (at times) of the Pakistani government (or at least of elements of the Pakistan security agencies, e.g., the Inter-Services Intelligence Agency (ISI)). There has been terrorism of a different nature in various states of the northeast, namely, Nagaland, Manipur, Assam and Mizoram. All these states have borders with either Myanmar or Bangladesh. A further kind of terrorism is that of Naxalism (Maoist revolutionary groups). In March 2007, for example, Naxalites shot dead some 60 security personnel in Chattisgarh. Having originated in West Bengal, Naxalism has since spread to the states of Bihar, bordering Nepal, and to some interior states, such as Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Chattisgarh, Jharkhand, Maharastra and Orissa.

Apart from these major movements, there have been terrorist attacks of a sporadic nature in different parts of the country. Most of these have been expressions of religious fundamentalism. These include the explosions in Mumbai on March 1993, which killed about 250 civilians, and again in Mumbai in October 2006, and explosions in Coimbatore, Tamil

---

[33] The material in this section is derived in large part from S. Miller, S. Sen, P. Mishra and J. Blackler, *Ethical Issues in the Policing of India*, Hyderabad: National Institute for Policing, 2005; and K. Dhillon, *Police and Politics in India: Colonial Concepts, Democratic Compulsions: Indian Police 1947–2002*, New Delhi: Manohar, 2005.

Nadu, in February 1998. There have also been the activities of the LTTE in Tamil Nadu, which culminated in the assassination of Sri Rajiv Gandhi in 1991.

There are various underlying causes for these forms of terrorism. The major causes can be categorized under the following headings:

- *Ethnic causes*: These causes are evident in Nagaland, Mizoram and Manipur, and have led to movements to establish separate homeland states.
- *Religious fundamentalism*: Religious fundamentalism played a major role in the terrorist activities in Punjab and in Jammu and Kashmir in the initial phase. This manifested itself in selective killings of members of particular religious communities, leading to migration of members of that particular community to other safer places.
- *Political causes*: Political reasons played a significant role in terrorist activities in Assam and Tripura. Large-scale migration from Bangladesh led to a change in the composition of the population in these states. The segment of the population that lost out politically as well as economically because of this altered ratio reacted with violence. The conflict in Jammu and Kashmir is also in part politically motivated, with rival groups supporting the status quo against those who want a separate state or incorporation into Pakistan. Moreover, some of the terrorist groups operating in Jammu and Kashmir are linked to Al-Qaeda and, in recent times, have carried out terrorist attacks beyond the region in New Delhi and Mumbai, e.g., Lashkar-e-Toiba.
- *Economic causes*: Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Chattisgarh Orissa, Jharkhand and Bihar are prime examples of economically based terrorism. Economic inequality, lack of development, non-implementation of land reforms, and atrocities by the police and other government functionaries are all reasons for the alienation of various groups of (especially) lower caste people in these states. In this context, an alternative political and social system being put forward by leftist-Maoist organizations, generally termed 'Naxalites', has gained acceptance in some quarters.

Most of the terrorist incidents leading to the deaths of innocent civilians have been the consequence of religious terrorism. Terrorism has involved the use of sophisticated improvised explosive devices (IEDs), suicide bombings, as well as hand-held weapons, and has involved resort to hijacking, hostage taking, and the like. Terrorists have engaged in kidnapping for ransom or for the release of fellow terrorists being held prisoner. However, it is security personnel who are the main targets of terrorist attacks in India.

- *Counter-terrorism agencies*: Under India's Federal Constitution, the principal responsibility for policing and maintenance of law and order lies with the individual states. The central government gives the states advice, financial help, training, intelligence and other assistance. Moreover, there are a number of central police agencies that assist the states. These include the following:
- *Physical security agencies*: These include: the Central Industrial Security Force, responsible for physical security at airports and sensitive establishments; the National Security Guards, a specially trained intervention force to deal with terrorist situations, such as hijacking, hostage taking, etc.; and the Special Protection Group, responsible for the security of the Prime Minister, former Prime Ministers and other VIPs.
- *Paramilitary forces*: These include the Central Reserve Police Force and the Border Security Force, which assist the police in counter-terrorism operations when called upon to do so.
- *The army*: Their assistance is sought as a last resort when the police and paramilitary forces are not able to cope with a terrorist threat or attack.

All these agencies have to work in close coordination and mount special operations. This aspect of policing is very different from normal day-to-day policing. All such operations have to be strongly supported by a sound intelligence back-up.

In the course of anti-terrorism operations there have been many police excesses, including torture and 'disappearances'. Consider torture. Scientific methods of interrogation take time and require a lot of patience. Terrorists are themselves the perpetrators of heinous crimes. Hence, the police frequently have (unlawfully) employed torture. While mounting a special operation, either to apprehend terrorists or to deter them from doing certain acts, excessive force leading to death is not unusual. In particular, fake encounters (ambushes in which terrorists are unlawfully killed when they could have been captured) have become an issue in Indian policing.

These excesses are in part a function of the view held by the security forces that lawful policing methods are quite ineffective in dealing with the threat of terrorism. In most of the terrorist-affected areas, courts do not function normally, witnesses are terrified and will not provide sworn evidence, and, more generally, people are unwilling to cooperate with the security agencies for fear of reprisals. All this makes the task of the security agencies difficult. In this context, police have come to rely on the use of unlawful methods.

In India, as elsewhere, some special laws to combat terrorism have been enacted from time to time. For example, the Terrorist and Disruptive

Activities Prevention Act (TADA) was in use for quite a few years. However, strong and vociferous criticism of its draconian provisions and misuse in some cases led to it being repealed. The Prevention of Terrorists Activities Act (POTA) was introduced in its place. But that Act is no longer in force either, and at the time of writing there is no special law to deal with terrorist activities in India.

Conclusion

While all terrorist groups have (by definition) political and military aims, there are important differences between the aims of terrorist groups. Some are essentially ethno-nationalist groups engaged in a struggle for land and self-determination, e.g., the PLO. Others have religious aims: e.g., Hezbollah is seeking to establish an Islamic state in Lebanon. Still others are essentially secular and nationalist, e.g., the IRA, or socialist-revolutionary, e.g., Naxalites in India.[34] Notwithstanding Marxist and ethnically focused elements in its ranks, the ANC is perhaps best understood as having the aim of establishing a liberal-democratic state in place of an authoritarian apartheid state; certainly, this was the outcome of its efforts. Al-Qaeda is different from most other contemporary terrorist groups in terms of the scope of its aims; the establishment of a pan-Islamic caliphate is a far more ambitious aim than, say, the establishment of a Palestinian state.

Given the diverse political aims of terrorist groups, the search for a definition of terrorism might be thought to be more usefully focused on the methods of terrorist groups rather than their aims. (The definition of terrorism is discussed in Chapter 2.) As we have seen, these methods include indiscriminate killings, assassination and hostage taking. A particular feature of terrorist groups is their targeting of innocent people. Here one thinks of bombs placed on buses or in marketplaces. However some, perhaps most, terrorist groups have also – indeed, principally – targeted individuals and groups that are not innocent in the required sense, e.g., politicians responsible for the injustices (real or imagined) the terrorist group is seeking to redress, or police and military personnel enforcing these 'unjust' policies. This was true of the IRA, for example. Moreover, a small number of so-called 'terrorist' groups, notably the ANC, have eschewed the policy of targeting innocents (in the above sense). This has led many to dispute the proposition that the ANC was in fact a terrorist organization at all. The ANC did, however, employ violence to instil fear,

---

[34] I say 'essentially', because many of these secular groups, nevertheless, have religious aspects, e.g., the IRA; many nationalist groups have a strong class-based ideological gloss, e.g., Naxalites.

e.g., targeting apartheid officials. To this extent it employed a strategy of terror. In response it might reasonably be claimed that the fact that a group makes limited use of a strategy of terror – especially one that is relatively morally discriminating by, for example, refraining from targeting innocents – does not make it a terrorist organization *per se*.

Some terrorist groups, e.g., Al-Qaeda, seek to maximize the loss of innocent life of the populations of 'enemy' states or groups: that is, they have a policy of mass murder, unlike most terrorist groups. Accordingly, and notwithstanding the commonality of methods used by terrorists, there are differences between terrorist groups with respect to the methods that they employ.

These differences between terrorist groups have implications for counter-terrorism measures. In the case of those terrorist groups pursuing politically feasible and manifestly just causes (albeit using morally unacceptable *methods*), the most important counter-terrorist measure – if I can use this mode of description for political solutions to terrorism – is simply to rectify the injustice or otherwise address the grievance that is motivating their terrorist activities. The most obvious recent example of this is South Africa, albeit the ANC might not – depending on one's definition – be regarded as a terrorist organization. However, there are a number of other national liberation struggles that could be pointed to here in which the armed forces of liberation engaged in terrorism on anyone's definition of the term, e.g., the EOKA in Cyprus, or the Mau Mau in Kenya.

Let us assume that the cases of Northern Ireland, Kashmir and the Israeli–Palestinian conflict are more complex in that there is far more disagreement about the justice or reasonableness of the causes being pursued by the terrorist groups in question, i.e., by the IRA, Lashkar-e-Toiba (et al.) and the PLO (et al.), respectively. (Here I am bracketing the issue of the putative terrorist tactics deployed as counter-terrorism measures against these terrorist groups by the nation-states in question.) Nevertheless, it is evident that what is called for in each of these cases – and in the case of Northern Ireland, appears at the time of writing to have been provided – is a political solution that addresses the real (as well as, perhaps, some of the imagined) injustices motivating these terrorist groups and their supporters. In short, it is not simply a matter of holding the line against terrorism – 'we don't negotiate with terrorists' – much less of winning 'the war against terrorism', for sometimes there are real grievances motivating terrorists that need to be addressed. To be effective, counter-terrorism measures need to address the real grievances that provide an important motivation for some, indeed many, terrorist groups. In the case of the Israel–Palestine conflict, presumably what is called for is the establishment of a Palestinian state (and recognition by

it of the existing Israeli state) and agreement on the difficult and com-
plex matter of partition of territory. At the very least, counter-terrorism
measures need to avoid exacerbating the problem that they are seeking
to redress or, indeed, creating a problem in the first place. Arguably, the
Israeli counter-terrorist responses to terrorism perpetrated by Palestinian
groups have, cumulatively and in the longer term, simply exacerbated
the problem: consider, for example, the current and apparently growing
strength of Hamas in the Gaza Strip. As for the US-led invasion of
Iraq – presented in part as a counter-terrorist response to an (alleged)
connection between Al-Qaeda and Saddam Hussein's regime – it appears
to be an instance of creating a terrorist problem where none existed
(or, at least, where none existed for the US – there were many Iraqis
being subjected to the state terrorism of Saddam Hussein).

It goes without saying that accepting the justice of the cause pursued
by a particular terrorist group, or the reality for political solutions to conflicts
involving terrorism, is not to condone terrorism as a method; far from
it, as will become evident in my detailed discussions of these matters in
the chapters following this one. Moreover, it needs to be stressed that
some terrorist groups are not actually pursuing just causes; even their goals
(let alone their methods) are morally repugnant. Al-Qaeda, as we have
seen, is a case in point. Here there is no question of acknowledging the
morality of their ends, let alone seeking to assist in the implementation
of their political goals. However, even in such cases as these there may
well be a need to address underlying grievances and injustices that are
exacerbating matters by providing fertile soil for the inculcation of the
ideology of these forms of terrorism, e.g., jihad, martyrdom, etc., and
that are, as a consequence, facilitating the establishment of terrorist
recruitment and training programmes, financial support bases, and the like.

The general point I want to insist on here is that in so far as some par-
ticular terrorist campaign is underpinned by real or imagined injustices,
it constitutes a moral problem calling for moral input into its (presumably
political) solution. It is not simply a matter of calibrating and exercising
power in the service of one's strategic interests within an overarching
conceptual framework of Realpolitik. Indeed, it is becoming increasingly
clear that in the contemporary globalizing world, at least, Realpolitik
does not even serve one's narrow, national self-interest in the relatively
short term, let alone provide morally justifiable, long-term solutions to
terrorism. Is not the US now experiencing 'blowback' as a consequence
of its one-sided support of Israel, its large-scale covert CIA funding of
extremist fundamentalist groups in Afghanistan via the Inter Services
Intelligence Agency (ISI) – the Pakistani Secret Service – during the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan in the 1980s, and its policy of supporting and

then invading Saddam Hussein's Iraq? More generally, is not the US experiencing blowback in part as a consequence of its longstanding and unprincipled policy in the Middle East and Central Asia of supporting authoritarianism and religious extremism when it suited its own narrow, national self-interest, e.g., in relation to Middle East oil, and promoting liberal-democratic values only sporadically, e.g., in post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, and (again) only when it suited its own narrow, national self-interest (or was believed to do so), rhetoric notwithstanding? In an increasingly globalizing and, therefore, economically, politically and communicatively interdependent world, moral principles and values, rather than simply Realpolitik, need to be emphasized, including in relation to combating international terrorism. Nor is an emphasis on moral principle and values simply an exercise in so-called 'ideological warfare'. For example, it is now evident that the radicalization of Muslim youth is a key tactic within the overall strategic framework of extremist Islamist groups, such as Al-Qaeda. Accordingly, countering radicalization is of fundamental importance.[35] However, the process of countering radicalization ought to consist in an attempt to educate and to address real practical problems rather than to set in train a competing process of indoctrination and manipulation (albeit one in the service of one's own favoured ends).

Notwithstanding the validity of these above points concerning political solutions and addressing underlying grievances and injustices, terrorism, if it is to be successfully combated, requires specific military and policing counter-terrorism measures. These will vary from one context to another, but might involve military interventions of the sort undertaken by the US in Afghanistan, and will certainly include addressing the issue of terrorist recruitment, increases in intelligence and evidence-gathering activities (e.g., building and accessing of databases, profiling, communication interception, surveillance and use of informants), additional checks and controls in relation to border security (e.g., at airports), greater scrutiny and control over financial (including international) transactions, enhanced physical security of key installations, and the like. If, and under what circumstances, these measures might need to involve infringements of basic moral rights are matters to be discussed in detail in the following chapters.

I have described a number of salient terrorist groups and settings, and identified a number of features of these groups. I have also introduced the issue of counter-terrorism. However, I have not yet explicitly discussed the definition of terrorism. To this task I now turn.

---

[35] See, for example, T.H.J. Joustra, *Radicalisation in Broader Perspective*, National Coordinator for Counterterrorism, The Hague, 2007.