

Part I

Challenges to Democracy

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Democracy and Citizenship

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Citizenship has become a major problem for liberal democracies. A growing disillusionment with electoral politics has accompanied declining participation in, and commitment to, liberal democratic institutions. At the same time, many groups that have suffered discrimination – women, gays, indigenous peoples and the disabled – have called both for full citizenship rights, and also ‘special’ rights appropriate to their distinctive needs or position in society. Against this background, since the 1980s, citizenship has become a major field of inquiry.¹ This chapter sketches a few of the main lines of thought related to citizenship and democracy.² The analysis raises questions about whether current theories of democratic citizenship provide sufficient resources for dealing with the problems in liberal democratic polities. A method for evaluating theories of democratic citizenship is thus proposed that focuses upon civic identity and the capacity for critique. This method is then used to evaluate four different normative models of democracy: liberal minimalism, civic republicanism, developmental democracy and deliberative democracy. It is argued that, on balance, deliberative democracy has the potential to provide a more comprehensive response to the challenges of participation, inclusion and critique confronting democracy and citizenship.

Citizenship as a Practical and Theoretical Problem

How one formulates a problem depends upon what value perspectives are adopted, and these may align with very different political purposes.

Citizenship, for example, may be understood in at least two ways, as a legal or administrative status and as a normative political concept or theory. Both understandings involve articulating a particular civic identity, as well as preferred political practices. Legal and administrative notions of civic identity primarily focus upon qualifications for citizenship and the codification of civic rights and obligations. The latter are usually determined by formal laws and regulations that reflect government policy, and generally operate to confirm the status quo. Normative conceptions of civic identity, while also indicating rights and obligations, are expressions of political possibility and imagination that transcend current practices. Furthermore, the normative concepts usually derive from democratic political theory.³ The question ‘What is the good citizen?’ is therefore generally understood to mean ‘What is the good citizen within a democracy?’⁴ Nevertheless, normative conceptions of the democratic citizen may not always correspond to actual legal and administrative requirements. In many countries citizenship has been primarily a practice of political opposition and radical critique, oriented towards establishing or improving democratic norms, laws and institutions. Here, however, we shall consider briefly the challenges raised by ‘democratic disenchantment’, the politics of identity, and citizenship as critical practice within liberal representative democracies.

From the standpoint of government and political elites, the first problem with citizenship is a practical one, namely, that of a steady decline in those casting a vote in elections. On one view, this disenchantment with democracy, or ‘civic deficit’, is the result of citizens requiring much more of government and becoming radically disappointed when their demands are not delivered.⁵ Such tendencies may have their sources in the growth of economic globalization, which has steadily undermined the sovereignty of nation-states and their capacities to control their affairs.⁶ Where global markets and capitalism are dominant, the practical capacity and the normative claims of citizens to influence economic policy decisions are necessarily weakened.⁷

For liberal democratic governments, one of the proposed solutions to the problem of disenchantment is to revitalize liberal democratic citizenship. The practice of citizenship is supposed to supply a defence against the growth of authoritarianism and bolster governmental legitimacy. In this context, citizenship is often conceived as a method for promoting loyalty to the state that is not based upon nationalist sentiments or ethnicity. Such civic commitments and obligations to the larger political community are intended to help protect liberal democracy against racial or religious conflict and thus to reduce the scope for fragmentation of the nation. Accordingly, citizenship here is also a device for social

control and assimilation. The argument is that strengthening a civic culture, in which citizens are more aware of their rights and responsibilities, will reinvigorate democracy. It is thought that such a political culture will insulate democracy from the threats of democratic disenchantment and ethnic conflict. Civic education is commonly proposed as an instrument for promoting citizenship values and enhancing democratic practices.⁸ In this scenario, governments recognize that citizenship as a legal and administrative status is insufficient as a foundation for political loyalty or unity, and needs to be supported by programmes that encourage citizenship as a culture and practice. The question remains, however, what kinds of citizenship and democratic culture ought to be encouraged.

As for the problem of disenchantment, projects to revitalize citizenship may have little effect. Valuable as higher voter turnouts may be for enhancing the legitimacy of governments, voting by itself may not be a useful indicator of political participation or apathy. Citizens' interest and participation in politics may simply have shifted to such different sites as social movements or non-governmental organizations in civil society. It is also not clear that reviving national citizenship can have much impact on the processes of globalization. Achieving such an impact would require significant institutional change within the polity as well as reform to transnational institutions. The role of transnational corporations, which follow a political and economic logic of their own, severely limits the scope of government and hence the direct contribution that national citizens can make to economic decisions. Where national control over the economy has been greatly eroded, no amount of civic enhancement on its own will assist in restoring governmental legitimacy.

Two slightly different problems for governments emanate from the growth of the politics of identity.⁹ First, there is the practical problem of how to deal with claims for recognition and rights from different cultural, ethnic and religious groups within liberal democracy. Where immigrants come from countries with little or no democratic culture, the problem arises of how to incorporate them into the society and polity. Second, even where immigration is not a central issue, in multi-ethnic states localist tendencies give priority to the maintenance of communities and ways of life based upon ethnicity, race or religion, and may give rise to conflicts. Here, issues of cultural and political autonomy such as self-government and even secession may become prominent. These claims upon local loyalty and culture can erode commitments to a wider democratic community and notions of a public good. The activism of women, gays, indigenous peoples and the disabled comprises another version of the politics of identity. The protagonists of this type of poli-

tics usually demand greater recognition, representation, more rights to resources, and reformed political procedures to allow them a more effective political voice. In practice, liberal democratic governments have responded by acknowledging a few of such claims and selectively granting various rights, such as women's rights and indigenous land rights.

One of the theoretical responses to such concerns has been to challenge the central normative ideal of a unitary citizen or civic identity that ought to have priority over other identities.¹⁰ For those political theorists inspired by postmodern or post-structuralist ideas, there are few grounds for requiring citizens to have a unified identity with an overriding civic loyalty to the nation-state. It is argued that the differences in identity, culture and economic conditions under which many women, gays, indigenous peoples and disabled people live are so great that no universal normative theory can incorporate fairly their interests. Worse, such universalism is thought to 'suppress various particularistic identities'.¹¹ For some, liberal democracy is a regime that simply overrides difference, and citizenship has only a residual and limited protective value.¹² Nonetheless, deploying the concept of citizenship necessarily entails some conformity to a wider political culture and community. The main issues are where and how a polity sets the limits of conformity, and how it deals with those who do not want to conform.

A few of the writers above have attempted to revise democratic citizenship to take account of difference.¹³ Critics more sympathetic to citizenship point to new assumptions that have to be made, namely, that there are multiple ways of being a citizen and multiple sites for civic action.¹⁴ Although traditionally most emphasis is given to political citizenship, one can now speak of activities such as multicultural citizenship, ecological citizenship and global or cosmopolitan citizenship.¹⁵ Such aspirations link up with an older critical tradition that rejects the governmental project of using citizenship as a means of regulation and assimilation. On this view, citizenship is a vital means for extending citizens' rights, claiming essential services from governments, and for resisting state incursions into citizens' lives. Citizenship practice may also be oriented towards protecting ecological resources and promoting national and global policies on the environment, peace or human rights. Accordingly, citizenship may be expressed in a variety of ways that only marginally touch upon the formal political institutions of liberal democracy. The new practices of citizenship may consciously aim to transform or even subvert these institutions. In liberal and social democracies, the issues of critique and transformation are significant elements of citizenship theory and practice.

These comments suggest a key question: to what extent do democratic theories have the potential to respond to these challenges? In evalu-

ating democratic theories of citizenship, Aristotle offers a way forward. Just as he enquired into the nature of the 'good citizen',¹⁶ so may we ask: what are the main features – capacities, competencies and values – required of the good democratic citizen? The main focus of this chapter will therefore be upon the problem of citizenship as a civic identity. Of particular concern, however, will be the capacity for critique and possible transformation of individual, society and polity. This criterion also prompts us to ask whether any of the democratic theories encourage critical reflection within and about democracy itself.

One of the inherent difficulties in this approach is that there are many ways of categorizing democratic theories. Following the precedents of C. B. Macpherson, David Held and Jürgen Habermas, I have chosen to use the device of a 'model' as a way of ordering the relations between democracy and citizenship.¹⁷ Normative models offer a synthesis of arguments that serve to indicate the ideal relations between different components of a democratic theory. Such models specify the leading values, the ideal characteristics required of citizens, and recommend practical programmes for protecting or implementing values. Such a project necessarily involves historical and conceptual oversimplification and certain features overlap between the models. For example, in practice, liberal democracy may include elements of liberal minimalism, developmentalism and even deliberation. Nonetheless, the device of a model serves to isolate the key characteristics and normative principles of the main types of democratic theory and enables their systematic comparison.

Models of democratic theory vary according to the weight they give to different kinds of value and institution, as well as the nature and extent of citizenship participation. These elements are all reflected in the four models of democracy and citizenship considered below. They are (1) liberal minimalism, (2) civic republicanism, (3) developmental democracy and (4) deliberative democracy. The four models are selected because, arguably, they cover the principal traditions of democratic theory and citizenship, past and present. Although others have noted the main lines of these models, often under slightly different terminology, I have attempted here to draw out more clearly their implications for democratic citizenship.

Liberal Minimalism

Liberal minimalism is the generic term that encompasses protective theories of democracy and their ideas of citizenship. Although liberal minimalist models cover a variety of liberal democratic theories, they

share a number of elements. The main internal aim and justification of theories of protective democracy is to protect individual citizens from arbitrary rule and oppression by government, as well as from infringements upon individual liberty from other citizens.¹⁸ Democracy is an institutional instrument, based upon actual or implied contracts, for protecting the legal and political rights of individuals. In addition, all are united by their understanding of democracy as a procedure for choosing governments, and a preference for a minimal role for citizen participation. Democracy is not the highest value; it is simply a means to other political ends.

The liberal minimalist model of democracy involves establishing a constitutional framework (often involving a clear separation of powers), as well as laws and law enforcement mechanisms for the operation of representative and responsible government. These laws are also intended to provide the political and legal conditions for security and stability, as well as to protect the rights of individuals, such as rights to vote and the freedoms of speech and association. Voting also allows for the legitimation of governments by a form of popular consent. Generally, the theorists advocating protection require a minimal state but one capable of firm intervention where the laws are infringed. Placing limits on government serves to expand the space for personal freedom and especially the operations of markets. John Locke, the original protective theorist, argued for natural rights to 'life, liberty and estate [property]', which it is the purpose of government to secure.¹⁹ Where individuals give 'tacit consent' to government, they are also obligated to obey its laws, but only as long as governments do not violate natural rights or go beyond their legitimate authority. Locke also provided arguments for individuals to claim a right of representation.

In the twentieth century, the liberal minimalist model was refined in slightly different ways by Max Weber and Joseph Schumpeter.²⁰ Both pointed to empirical evidence about the limits and possibilities for democratic politics that pressed democratic theory to become more 'realistic'. Central were the apparent ignorance of voters and their tendency to be swayed by emotional arguments. For both Weber and Schumpeter, elections were important for registering the views of citizens and for changing governments. Accordingly, democracy was best understood and practised as a means for choosing political elites who compete with each other for the people's vote. Similar features are evident in the pluralist theories of democracy developed, for example, in the early writings of Robert Dahl.²¹ The main difference is that the pluralists focus less on individual citizens' relation to the state than on the role of factions, and participation in interest or pressure groups, such as business associations

or trade unions. Pluralism therefore puts more stress on the importance of competitive political struggles between groups.

Liberal minimalist citizenship is founded upon the important normative principle of political equality that requires maintaining equal formal political rights among those considered to be citizens. The principle of each citizen being accorded only one vote in elections derives from the belief that neither wealth, power nor status should count before the law, nor in the ultimate exercise of democratic power, namely, voting. This anti-aristocratic principle of equal legal and political worth is central to the liberal minimalist. Equal citizenship is not an end in itself but an essential instrument for protection against oppression and injustice.

What is the good citizen?

The practice of good liberal democratic citizenship is largely confined to the requirement of voting in elections and possibly serving on juries. The main civic obligation is to obey the law, and sometimes assist in adjudicating it. The citizen's prime formal political task is to elect representatives who will form the government of the day. In this model, most citizens give up their power to govern to representatives and merely give periodic consent to governments formed by their representatives.²² Where, in the early realist model, the good citizen is primarily a voter, in the pluralist version, good citizens are those who also cooperate with like-minded others to pursue their interests. For the twentieth-century realists, any more active forms of citizenship were considered dangerous, in that they were likely to threaten liberal political values or, at a minimum, result in poor policy-making. Because of their education and training, only the elites were sufficiently competent and able to rule, but these too had to be checked.

Citizen engagement in political deliberation before making judgments is important, but secondary as a source of legitimacy. Within liberal minimalist democracy, political decisions tend to be reached after limited debate and through the method of a majority vote. Although liberal minimalists advocate a citizen politics conducted through debate, such a politics tends to be oriented towards the assertion of one's individual political will and the pursuit of preconceived interests. Given the strong liberal distinction between public and private life, this model may also imply that men are more suited for civic participation, thus encouraging women to limit their civic commitments. Nevertheless, it is arguable that even women with heavy domestic responsibilities could meet the minimum requirements of voting once or twice every few years.

The liberal minimalist assumptions about civic capacities and practices are those of a market model in which human beings are understood as competitive individualists. These individuals – oriented largely to calculating and promoting their own self-interest – give priority to the pursuit of freedom and fulfilment in their private lives. Generally, individuals are regulated more by the threat of state sanction and punishment than by any cooperative impulses or social concerns. Nonetheless, in the public sphere the good liberal citizen will be prepared to discuss matters, make judgements and vote, or organize according to his or her perceived interests. Only a minority, however, will be prepared to undertake the task of managing the state. Although good citizens are simultaneously distrustful of the state and alert to its incursions into individual rights, they are generally politically passive. While Locke's theory of universal natural rights and his arguments for rebellion may give later liberal citizens the resources for the critique and transformation of governments, they are only to be activated under extreme circumstances.

The main site for citizen participation is within the nation-state and national government, but it also includes subordinate lower-level constituencies such as regional states within a federation, and local or municipal government. Although the pluralists appreciate the importance of participation in non-state groups in civil society, the main focus is upon their effect on government and state power. Although liberal democratic states may join with other states in international institutions such as the United Nations, the aims are primarily the minimal ones of securing mutual protection and the maintenance of stability within the system of states.

Liberal minimalism and civic deficit

For liberal minimalist theorists, citizen participation is valued instrumentally to the extent that it fosters the interests of stability, security and state administration. This project requires two levels of citizenship. Among the masses, citizenship is a way of maintaining regulation and control, and minimal participation is encouraged. Among political elites, participation and leadership is valued. At both levels, the liberal call for good citizenship is primarily an ethical appeal for individuals to be honest and upright and to refrain from always putting private self-interest above public interest. Yet, such a civic strategy conflicts somewhat with the more dominant liberal stress upon individualism. A similar problem confronts liberal democratic states that have called for an 'active citizenship'²³ to overcome apathy and loss of national integration. The

fostering of 'active citizenship', however, has more in common with republican democracy.

Extending the reach and intensity of liberal minimalist citizenship would be impossible without changing the nature of liberal democracy or, at a minimum, provoking serious fractures within it. Globalization, for example, brings to prominence the conflict between economic liberalism and liberal human rights. Without a thoroughgoing stress on human rights, or extending its deliberative dimension, liberal minimalism is unable either to formulate effective critiques of governments or transform its theory of democracy. Indeed, in his liberal mode, Karl Popper argues that we have been 'unduly sceptical' of liberal democracies and that we ought to resist the tendency to devalue liberal democratic achievements.²⁴ At the heart of liberal minimalism is the contradiction that the more it encourages an active and critical democratic citizenship, the more it shifts the polity away from liberal values towards more democratic ones.

Civic Republicanism

Republicanism has its origins in the Athenian *polis* and in ancient Rome. A republican polity is defined by at least two elements: the importance given to the public interest or the common good (or the commonwealth), and a key role given to citizen participation in making political decisions. Typically, the latter process requires the use of reason and public deliberation. In this tradition, it is political community that makes the highest claims upon citizens and it is their political identity that is pre-eminent. Modern republicans share particular sets of rights and obligations with liberalism.²⁵ Like the liberal minimalists, republican citizens ought to have equal political and legal rights that enable them to pursue their private goals and their public roles. They also have a corresponding set of obligations that include obeying the law, paying taxes, performing jury service and, sometimes, military service.

We may distinguish between two different traditions of republicanism. Whereas civic republicanism grew out of the traditions of direct democracy in ancient Athens, protective republicanism corresponds to those more limited democratic forms of government associated with political traditions emanating from ancient Rome.²⁶ More recent civic republicans include Arendt, Barber and Oldfield, while the protective republicans include Sunstein and Pettit.²⁷ Unlike the civic republicans, the protectivists tend not to give the highest priority to democracy.²⁸ Nonetheless, much of the recent revival of republican thought is oriented

towards overcoming the democratic deficiencies – low participation rates, lack of motivation and elitism – of liberal democracy. Because of its stronger democratic credentials and role for citizens, here we shall focus upon the civic republican tradition. On the Athenian model, for example, priority was given to direct citizen participation at all levels of government and administration in what is called direct democracy.

What is the good citizen?

The ideal republican citizen is one who is imbued with civic virtue, which means giving priority to the public (civic) good over one's private interests. This attitude and habit of civility is possibly the defining quality of the republican citizen. Central is the ability to maintain a critical and reflective distance from one's own interests and desires.²⁹ The good republican citizen is committed to making decisions after due deliberation with others, and tends not to resort to majority votes except as a last resort. In the Athenian version, republican citizenship was a distinctly political status and practice in which political participation was valued for its own sake.³⁰ Civic republicans generally reject the practice whereby citizens leave major political decisions to representative assemblies and envisage the role of a member of parliament to be more like that of a delegate. Citizenship is therefore a vital political activity for forming public opinion, as well as expressing the will of the people and sustaining checks upon it. Although the republican citizen has a range of rights and obligations, the latter are usually given greater prominence.³¹

Despite the original weight given to ownership of property as a qualification for citizenship, modern republicans seek to reduce differences in wealth and urge that all members of society ought to participate in the public sphere. Miller explains that the good republican citizen must be 'willing to take active steps to defend the rights of other members of the political community, and more generally to promote its common interests'.³² In addition, the good republican citizen is obligated to play 'an active role in both the formal and informal arenas of politics'.³³ Yet, the citizen's political participation ought not simply to be oriented towards the liberal objectives of putting limits on governmental excess or corruption, or pursuing sectional interests, but 'as a way of expressing your commitment to the community'.³⁴

For Oldfield, the republican citizen must have the capacities for autonomy, friendship and judgement. Individuals must be able to make 'authentic choices about the ways of life they wish to follow'.³⁵ Autonomous citizenship must also be based upon 'a particular form of

moral bond' between individuals, which may be called friendship. Such bonds give the individuals the motivation to carry out the duties of citizenship. As citizens, however, individuals must also be able to make 'judgements about their identity and about the common purposes they wish to pursue'.³⁶ That is, they require the capacity and motivation to engage in rational deliberation with others. For Oldfield, the motivating force for civic action is 'political sentiment', which may be understood as a kind of 'reflective' patriotism.

Civic republicanism and civic deficit

Civic republicanism gives priority to political community, the use of reason in determining the public good and to the public realm over the private realm of life. Certainly, republicanism involves a strong critique of individualism and consumerism with their focus upon private interests and amusements. Civic republicans largely conceive democracy in non-instrumental terms and encourage participation of its citizens in public life as a way of expressing their commitment to the political community. Most civic republicans would presume that greater participation would increase political interest and knowledge. Thus active and informed citizenship is central to civic republicanism.

Identity politics raises difficulties for republicanism because republican citizenship, as a legal and administrative status, is necessarily exclusive. Oldfield explains: 'it is not a person's humanity that one is responding to, it is the fact that he or she is a fellow citizen, or a stranger.'³⁷ Giving priority to one's political community requires excluding those who are not part of it, for whatever reason. Recurring questions include: who may rightfully constitute the republican community? and what ought to be the criteria for granting citizenship?³⁸ Furthermore, for many civic republicans, an individual may be eligible for citizenship by birth, but will only gain the status of citizen by acting as one.³⁹ There are also problems with internal communities who do not meet either the ethnic or civic criteria for citizenship. Indigenous people in many countries have strong cultural and political commitments that do not fit easily into republican communities.

A key problem remains that of how citizens can decide what is the common good or in the public interest, or even whether this is possible. One widely held view is that most democratic polities now comprise so many different types of group, whose interests are not reconcilable, that determining a common good may be impossible, except perhaps for the most minimal commitment to the democratic process. In this regard, many feminists have criticized republicanism because of the emphasis it

gives to the public sphere and the requirement for strong participation. Anne Phillips, however, is cautiously optimistic in suggesting that republicanism does provide an insecure resolution of ‘that tension between insisting that different groups do have distinct and different interests and nonetheless projecting a vision of politics as something more than looking after yourself’.⁴⁰ The republican objective is to maintain a commitment to community and public good that is above the individual’s private interests, but that does not sacrifice the individual. In the truly democratic republic, the broader democratic political culture must have precedence over local cultures that would threaten to erode it.

Active citizenship is a key element of civic republican democracy and offers the prospect of reducing democratic disenchantment. Yet, identity politics poses a special challenge for republicanism in that, historically, it has tended to restrict those who can become a citizen and participate in the public sphere. Since it is the common good of the republic and its civic identity that must prevail, republicanism has the potential for inflicting serious discrimination. The measures that are intended to bind a political community together, and thereby avoid the dilemmas of liberalism, bring their own difficulties. Nonetheless, under his revised neo-republican theory of citizenship, van Gunsteren argues that ‘this type of citizenship demands no overarching or total claims of allegiance to the republic’, but that where people do have to deal with their differences, they do so as citizens.⁴¹ This republican possibility may only arise once citizens become aware of themselves as members of a ‘community of fate’.

On the surface, republicanism encourages the use of reason and deliberation to make political decisions. These practices can allow for the criticism and transformation of internal political, social and economic arrangements within the republic. The priority given to maintaining the republican community, however, tends to rule out serious consideration of any options that would transform its basic character. Hence, republics can justifiably place strong restrictions on immigration and the award of citizenship. Because republican citizenship is confined within the national polity, republicanism may be hampered in its ability to respond democratically to major global issues that transcend the nation-state.⁴² For these reasons, republican democracy does not fulfil its potential for critique.

Developmental Democracy

Those democratic theories designated as ‘developmental’ generally accept the political principles and institutions of liberal democracy as

necessary, but not sufficient, for democracy to flourish.⁴³ Two other essential requirements are extensive individual participation in politics and the formation of strong communal bonds between individuals. Developmentalists consider political participation and deliberation to be a primary means of personal and intellectual development.⁴⁴ The developmental model of democracy is also more optimistic about the 'improvability' of citizens. Importantly, these writers see individual development occurring in association with others. They also espouse an interventionist conception of the democratic state that enables its members to fulfil themselves and their civic duties.

The developmentalists encompass those known as the 'new liberals' and various reformist socialists, liberal socialists and democratic socialists. The liberal developmentalist tradition begins with J. S. Mill and T. H. Green, and was elaborated in the twentieth century by L. T. Hobhouse, A. D. Lindsay, Ernest Barker, John Dewey and John Rawls.⁴⁵ Twentieth-century democratic socialists include G. D. H. Cole, Harold Laski and T. H. Marshall,⁴⁶ who drew upon similar values but extended the critique of capitalism and property.⁴⁷ There were, however, significant differences between Cole and Marshall. On the one hand, Cole's guild socialism advocated a retreat from using the state for socialist purposes and recommended citizen participation in a host of new functional and self-governing organizations and associations. On the other hand, Marshall envisaged an expansion of state power to fulfil a citizen's social rights to basic education and social welfare services. Certain developmental themes are also evident in the 'Third Way' rhetoric about 'reciprocity, equal opportunity and autonomy' in the British Labour Party.⁴⁸ The following discussion focuses primarily on the social liberals.

Although the state retains the instrumental role of establishing a system of law and enforcing justice, this is for the higher purpose of developing 'the capacities of the human personality in as many persons as possible to the greatest possible extent'.⁴⁹ The aim is not just to protect citizens from government, but to use governmental, or collective, resources to expand a citizen's freedom and enhance the overall condition of society. Concern for the common good lies at the heart of developmental democracy.⁵⁰ As citizens pursue the common good, they also transform themselves and become more autonomous. Democracy was pivotal in this process. J. S. Mill, for example, valued democracy as a means to self-improvement.⁵¹ For others, democracy is an end in itself or way of life,⁵² and not just a means to other ends. The developmentalists, however, did not confine citizenship to the formal political sphere of elections and voting. Few considered the act of voting to be especially educative.⁵³

Later developmentalists came to stress the importance of citizens' rights to social justice as a means for facilitating political participation. In addition to the basic civil and political elements of citizenship, Marshall sees the historical emergence of a social element. By this, he means 'the whole range from the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of civilized being according to the standards prevailing in the society'.⁵⁴ The ideals of social citizenship register the reciprocal relationship between the individual and the democratic state. Marshall indicates the kinds of rights that the citizen ought to be able to claim from the state in order to have a suitable base from which to begin their self-development and become 'active citizens' in a democracy.⁵⁵ Put another way, without the proper resources supplied by education, health and social welfare, the poor are unlikely to be effective citizens in any of its meanings. Although Marshall was not writing in a normative sense, his concept of social citizenship has come to be used as an ideal against which the achievements of governments in meeting their obligations to their citizens can be assessed.⁵⁶

The developmentalists often refer to compulsory membership of the state. In this way they recognize that some members of the state may have full political rights and others not.⁵⁷ Accordingly, two kinds of citizenship status are evident in the writings of many developmentalists. The first is citizenship as a formal or official status allowing one to exercise political rights such as the right to vote in elections. The second type recognizes that citizenship could also be exercised in social or economic or industrial spheres. Whereas in the political sphere governments are required to allocate formal citizens' rights to certain individuals, in social or economic spheres civic status may depend upon being a member of a workplace or organization or voluntary association.⁵⁸

In addition to the usual domains of government and elections, developmental theorists stress the importance of participation in non-government, non-political or voluntary associations in what we now call civil society. Whereas many of these associations can assist in providing an 'education for democracy', they also constitute significant sites of democratic process in their own right.⁵⁹ In this regard, developmentalists have regularly recommended democratizing business corporations.⁶⁰ Overall, developmental citizenship can be exercised not only in elections for government, but also within voluntary associations or within the corporation, or internationally. For these reasons, developmentalism shares a great deal with the later associative democratic theory and the civil society theorists.⁶¹

What is the good citizen?

The good citizen participates in political activity wherever possible, at all levels within a polity.⁶² Citizens will vote in elections, but also participate in the other non-political associations of civil society. While participation may include relatively unreflective political action such as casting an uninformed vote, it also ought to include participating in informed public discussion and debate. Here, the developmentalists favour political deliberation, which is a public activity requiring reflection, discussion and argument over a proposed course of action. Such activity encourages citizens to consider issues beyond those they would normally come across in their daily life. It is assumed that, as citizens become more active in their local communities, workplaces and churches, they will come into touch with wider national issues and so cast a more informed and responsible vote.

In addition to promoting the citizen's intellectual development, such activities encourage a wider consciousness of commonality and community.⁶³ Although citizens can pursue their own interests, one of their duties is to seek out the common good, which may also reach beyond their national community. The developmental citizen is urged to obey the law except in such cases where it may be needed to make the laws of the state accord more with its overall purpose of sustaining rights,⁶⁴ or where the disobedience can be justified with reference to some higher 'obligation' or principle of justice.⁶⁵ At whatever level the citizens participate, they will become more aware of themselves as members of a larger community united by the common good.

A major tendency among the developmental liberals is to conceive of the good citizen as one who exercises perceptive judgement.⁶⁶ A core assumption is that citizens have the capability to refine their judgements 'about what is in their interest'.⁶⁷ In particular, the good citizen in a developmental democracy ought to have the capacity for criticism and self-criticism. Here we find an overlap between the later developmental theorists and deliberative democracy, but the former tend to focus upon formal deliberation at the level of state and government. John Rawls's concept of public reason and his version of deliberative citizenship, for example, requires a certain level of self-reflection and distancing from the citizen's own beliefs and political position.⁶⁸ There are, however, certain limits. The good Rawlsian citizen would not pursue a 'comprehensive doctrine of truth', but is guided by 'an idea of the politically reasonable'.⁶⁹ Such requirements enable citizens to deliberate upon

the common good. For William Galston, the aim is to foster those skills, values and virtues, such as the need to think critically, deemed essential to effective participation in democracy.⁷⁰ From a stronger social liberal/social democratic perspective, however, Gutman and Thompson argue that this kind of deliberative democracy also requires citizens to ‘enjoy basic opportunities that include adequate income and decent jobs’.⁷¹

Developmental democracy and civic deficits

Good developmental citizens are those who participate at all levels of politics and who transform themselves along the way. Providing for new types of social and economic rights also aims to facilitate greater participation. Yet, the recognition of new rights can be extended to other spheres, such as cultural and ecological rights. One problem with developmental democracy, however, is that it may be overly optimistic about how much participation is possible by the great mass of citizens. It is a commonplace that the pressures of life and work in modern societies may not allow sufficient time for the citizens to participate in the range of activities that the developmentalists envisage.

Developmental democratic theory provides a defence of broader schemes of state intervention to defend the larger community. Proposals for worker participation in industry, for example, create the new categories of industrial or economic citizen. Further innovations are possible, such as corporate citizenship, in which corporations would be encouraged to act like good corporate citizens, taking seriously their wider responsibilities to society. Such obligations would reach beyond the usual concerns with corporate ethics or corporate philanthropy, to include internal obligations to treat their workers according to certain standards, as well as external duties to avoid bringing social and ecological harm to communities. Thus the pursuit of profit would be qualified by a commitment to other civic obligations.

Given the developmentalists’ concern to widen the range of sites for political participation, it could conceivably incorporate many of the claims of identity politics. There would appear to be few developmentalist reasons why, in principle, many of those who want recognition of their different identities could not be encouraged to make the most of their various talents. Kymlicka and others, for example, see liberalism as able to justify granting rights to certain kinds of cultural or ethnic group.⁷² Although developmental democracy allows for the recognition of cultural differences, in principle, this is usually within the limits of perceptions of the common good. As with all concepts of the common

good or public interest, however, this constraint is potentially oppressive. Developmentalism allows more extensive rights, but also stresses the importance of obligations to the larger community.

One of the strengths of citizenship in developmental democracy is the encouragement it gives to critique. When citizens engage in the process of reconciling their own private interests with the common good, it is thought that they can become not only reflective, but also critical and self-critical. By participating in democratic politics, and engaging in discussion, citizens can enlarge their horizons, and those of their community.⁷³ At the heart of the normative aspirations of developmental democracy is the idea that individuals and society need not remain as they are, and this would also apply to members of ethnic or religious communities. Nonetheless, there seem to be certain limits to critique. Fostering a civic outlook, in which one is critical of authority, will almost inevitably encourage criticism of the communities, families and cultures in which the critics live, so possibly undermining them.⁷⁴ Although personal transformation is vital for developmentalists, it is not clear that they envisage the possibility of fundamentally altering the liberal democratic polity or its economy.

Developmental theory is based upon an optimistic assessment of human capacities and conceives of citizens as they could become. This allows for criticism of the existing social and political order, and also, within certain limits, its transformation. Many of the claims of identity politics can be accommodated by developmental democracy, if only because it broadens the scope of citizenship status beyond that officially granted by the state. By extending the range of sites for exercising citizenship, developmental democratic theory also sets a broader agenda for democratic politics, both within and outside the nation-state. One weakness, however, is that whereas the developmentalists have a strong theory of participation, their theories of deliberation are somewhat limited. Nor is there any well-formulated notion of the common good or procedures for determining it.

Deliberative Democracy

Political deliberation has long played a role in theories of democratic legitimacy. It is only relatively recently, however, that liberal and critical theorists have attempted to formulate a distinctive theory and practice of deliberative democracy. Deliberative theorists argue that existing liberal democratic arrangements do not address sufficiently the various problems, including those of pluralism, inequality and complexity, that

are a condition of contemporary society.⁷⁵ Such sentiments are implicit or explicit in the works of the critical theorists of deliberative democracy, Habermas and Cohen.⁷⁶

At its most general, deliberative democracy ‘refers to the idea that legitimate law-making issues from the public deliberation of citizens’.⁷⁷ Bohman and Rehg continue: ‘As a normative account of legitimacy, deliberative politics evokes ideals of rational legislation, participatory politics and self-governance. . . . it presents an ideal of political autonomy based on the practical reasoning of citizens.’⁷⁸ The primary goal of deliberative democracy is to expand the use of deliberative reasoning among citizens and their representatives. The quality of this public deliberation is also a criterion for the legitimacy of democracy: the better the deliberation the more it can be said to be based upon the consent of the citizens, and the more legitimate the democracy. For Cohen, the outcomes of democratic deliberation are only legitimate ‘if and only if they could be the object of a free and reasoned agreement among equals’.⁷⁹ In the Habermasian version, legitimacy can be based upon a version of the ‘discourse principle’ which allows for the impartial justification of morality and law: ‘Only those actions are valid to which all affected persons could agree as participants in rational discourses.’⁸⁰ Accordingly, the ideal of deliberative democracy is premised upon a more radical form of political equality than that envisaged by liberal minimalism.

Although deliberative democracy is based upon a strong critique of other theories of democracy, it still draws on the values and institutions of republicanism, populism and liberalism. From republicanism it takes the idea of political participation and its orientation to the common good. In the deliberative version of populism, democracy is a way for citizens to exercise popular rule. It differs from republican theories in its scepticism about whether a single shared vision of the common good could ever be attained or effective in motivating citizens.⁸¹ Nonetheless, deliberative democracy still allows for the formation of provisional notions of the common good by deliberation. From liberalism, deliberative democracy takes the values of individual political equality, autonomy and consent. Most deliberative theorists envisage democracy being conducted within a liberal constitutional framework and under the rule of law in which key rights are protected.⁸²

Habermas is explicit in specifying that all those who have an interest in an issue ought to be allowed to engage in public debate to influence the decision. Here, political equality is given greater force than in liberalism and communitarian theories, and is not just limited to equality of voting. On the more generous view of deliberative citizenship, the citi-

zenry would have to include those who were permanent residents and possibly even those often more marginal and temporary residents such as refugees and asylum seekers. For this reason too, a radical deliberative democracy allows for the concepts and practices of transnational citizenship, such as those embodied in the regional citizenship of the EU, as well as the global citizenship required by emerging institutions of global civil society and global democracy. A citizen of a deliberative democracy would therefore automatically have the status of a citizen of the world where the basic unit of reference is that of a common humanity.

Despite its diverse origins, deliberative democracy accepts that in modern liberal democratic states the people do not rule except indirectly through representatives. Habermas explains: 'Discourse theory has the success of deliberative politics depend not on a collectively acting citizenry but on the institutionalization of the corresponding procedures and conditions of communication.'⁸³ Because of this, it rejects an entirely instrumentalist and strategic approach to political decision-making. Accordingly, deliberative theorists also reject any elitist arguments on participation or arbitrary limitations on citizen engagement in the processes of public deliberation. Although deliberative democracy may be instrumentally effective, in the Habermasian version it is oriented to enhancing the processes of 'communicative action'.

For these reasons, deliberative democracy opposes the usual kinds of liberal politics that are based upon struggles to pursue predetermined interests that are consummated in decisions reached by aggregating votes and using the method of majority voting. Unlike liberal minimalism, deliberative democratic theory 'construes politics as aiming in part at the formation of preferences and convictions, not just at their articulation and aggregation'.⁸⁴ Bohman explains some of the procedural conditions for the implementation of public deliberation: 'The exchange of reasons takes place in a *discourse* in which participants strive to reach agreement solely on the basis of the better argument, free of coercion and open to all competent speakers.'⁸⁵

What is the good citizen?

The ideal citizen in a deliberative democracy is an active one requiring many diverse capacities. Central is the ability to engage in dialogue and communication. Ideally, citizens do not form their preferences solely according to their previously established statuses, roles or identities. Citi-

zens need to be able to exercise self-restraint in avoiding the immediate instrumental pursuit of their own self-interests. This quality would need to be accompanied by the capacity for critique and self-reflection. The good deliberative citizen would need the capability not only to formulate his or her own interests, but also to acquire an understanding of, and contribute to the formulation of the common or public good on a particular issue. As well as the ability to listen carefully to others, and open themselves to revisions of their earlier position and interests, citizens would need to have the moral strength to accept the decisions arrived at. Crucial too is the old liberal requirement that participants in public deliberation must be able to distinguish between arguments and the human beings who express them, and where the rejection of ideas does not entail the rejection of the person.⁸⁶ Bohman writes: ‘Many different “self-governing capacities” are necessary if citizens are to participate effectively in public deliberation and dialogue, including understanding, imagining, valuing, desiring, storytelling, and the use of rhetoric and argumentation.’⁸⁷ All such self-governing characteristics are also those associated with the expression of political autonomy. But they also suggest some of the difficulties of implementing deliberative democracy. For these reasons, deliberative democratic theorists are alert to the material conditions and inequalities that impede proper deliberation and support measures to overcome them.

Deliberative democracy and civic deficit

Deliberative democracy of the radical kind is applicable to all kinds of organization. Cohen, for example, considers the secondary or voluntary associations of civil society as particularly important sites for practising, learning and expressing deliberative ideals.⁸⁸ For Habermas, deliberative citizenship would be applicable at any level of public politics where decisions need to be made, either within the nation-state or outside it. Accordingly, relevant organizations would include parties, parliaments, executives and judiciary within the nation-state, as well as the resolution of international issues between nation-states. Deliberative citizens would also operate through the many non-governmental organizations of global civil society that work to reform the policies of governments and transnational institutions. Since deliberation is not limited to institutions within the nation-state, deliberative reasoning would be required of citizens *and* their international representatives, whether these were governments or non-governmental institutions. Habermas, for example, sees state citizenship and world citizenship as forming a continuum.⁸⁹ Deliberative

democracy may assist in the formation of a new ethical community of global citizens that would provide the overriding civic unity and principles of good citizenship that nation-states seem to have lost.

Habermas addresses a few of the problems raised by identity politics. He argues for a liberal immigration policy in, for example, the EU, partly on the grounds that immigrants will bring fresh and diverse perspectives on shared political constitutions. Habermas also claims that 'the democratic right to self-determination includes the right to preserve one's own *political* culture . . . but it does not include the right to self-assertion of a privileged *cultural* form of life'.⁹⁰ That is, democratic political values and institutions have priority over cultural values and communities, and a democratic civic identity has primacy over non-political cultural identities.⁹¹ For Habermas, whatever the cultural forms of life, every citizen must be 'socialized into a common political culture'.⁹² It also seems that this political culture may no longer have a foundation within the nation-state.

Radical deliberative democratic theory encourages citizenship participation on the widest scale at all levels (national and international), and all spheres (public and private), in democratic polities and beyond them. The normative ideals of deliberative democracy also put a premium on practical citizenship based upon extensive individual self-reflection. Although deliberative democracy begins from an analysis of the practical problems and characteristics of existing liberal democracies, it does not take them as unalterable. As citizens engage in public deliberation, they accept the possibility of change and reform at the level of both the individual and the institutions. Bohman writes: 'Out of this public expression of these problems and needs, some citizens begin to formulate new understandings of themselves and of institutions, all the while seeking to modify the current framework for deliberation.'⁹³ On this interpretation, deliberative democracy encourages citizens to be critical and self-critical, as well as allowing for the transformation of themselves, their institutions and their social contexts.

Numerous criticisms have been directed at deliberative democracy and I shall only raise two here concerning citizenship.⁹⁴ Arguably, the ideal capacities for citizenship vital to deliberative democracy represent a very high order of communicative standards that are often simply not readily available among large numbers of citizens. That is, the criteria for citizen deliberation may be too strong and so exclude large numbers of citizens who do not or cannot meet them, or who may have different cultural standards. Nonetheless, deliberative democrats such as John Dryzek, James Fishkin and John Uhr have devised various practical proposals for enhancing the quality of deliberation by citizens and legislative institu-

tions.⁹⁵ Furthermore, what kinds of political context would be more conducive to deliberative democracy? Even where socio-economic and political conditions are relatively good, there remains the problem of how to encourage the kinds of civic identity best suited for public deliberation. For example, what sorts of civic education would need to be implemented to encourage the moral personality of the deliberative democrat?

Despite these problems, deliberative democracy seems to provide more of the theoretical resources needed to deal with the substantive problems of liberal democracies. Because deliberative democracy requires critique and self-critique it opens up a space for reflection upon entrenched views. Although deliberative values have civic priority, they are primarily procedural in character. As such, they allow for the widest possible participation – active citizenship – over a wide range of issues within and outside the nation-state. The concept of global citizenship alluded to by Habermas both offers a critical perspective on issues that reach beyond the borders of the nation-state and encourages practical political responses to globalization. Deliberative values also appear to provide a regulative ideal for managing many of the conflicts arising from identity politics.

Conclusion

As a valued legal *status*, citizenship may allow entry into a political community, command access to valuable resources and require the performance of certain obligations. Ideally, the granting of citizenship status enables the citizen to participate in determining the affairs and future of a community. Nonetheless, citizenship may be exercised inside and outside democracy, in affirmation or criticism of democracy, in formal political institutions or in civil society, in democratic or even undemocratic ways. *Democratic* citizenship, however, generally operates within the relatively familiar traditions, values and institutions oriented towards accountability, legitimacy and participation. Here, citizenship puts a premium upon the use of argument and discussion rather than physical force or violence, and the practice of criticism and critique is central. In this regard, each of the models offers diverse, though sometimes overlapping, accounts of an ideal civic identity, which rely, to varying degrees, upon criticism and critique. The models differ, however, according to how central the practice of critique is, its preferred scope, and the sites in which it can be exercised.

Under liberal minimalism, criticism and judgement are an essential part of individual political leadership in national politics, but they do not extend to critique and transformation of individuals or the liberal democratic system itself. The capacities of the liberal minimalist civic identity are far too restricted to adapt to the challenges discussed above. For civic republicans, participation, deliberation and criticism are encouraged in the public sphere on issues concerning the political community. With a few exceptions, however, the stress is upon defending the republic, not its criticism or transformation. Civic republicanism itself provides an important critique of liberal minimalism, but it remains primarily a normative aspiration and, unlike protective republicanism, it is only marginally grounded in current political realities. By contrast, developmental democratic theories have provided the rationale for many of the social and economic policies of twentieth-century democracies, especially through the extension of the welfare state. Developmental democratic theory acknowledges the necessary and recursive relationship between individual citizen and political community. The developmental democrats advocate participation and deliberation at all levels of the political community – local, national and international – in ways that are intended to encourage critical self-reflection. Furthermore, personal transformation is envisaged as a likely *outcome* of the process. Apart from a few of the social democrats, however, the possibility of criticism leading to radical transformation of polity, society or economy is limited.

For the radical deliberative democrats, critical self-reflection is essential at all levels of politics where deliberation is needed. This can occur alongside or within liberal democratic institutions. Deliberation itself creates a temporary discursive or dialogical community of citizens seeking to resolve issues that may arise out of more substantive communities and cultures. It would appear, however, that such discursive communities require personal transformation *before* one can participate properly. Another difficulty for deliberative democracy is that the skills required appear to be of a high order and there is little indication of how they may be encouraged. Although deliberative democracy, like civic republicanism, is a normative aspiration based upon theoretical critiques of liberal democracy and republicanism, its critical reach is far greater. Deliberative democracy is applicable in all sorts of political situations and allows for incremental institutional changes as well as more far-reaching ones. For these reasons, deliberative democracy seems to have a greater potential to respond, not only to the issues associated with democratic disenchantment in liberal democracy, but also to the challenges of identity politics and new social

movements. Despite its shortcomings, there are good grounds for proposing that deliberative democratic theory offers the greater promise of renovating both the practice of democratic citizenship and democratic institutions.

NOTES

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- 1 See, e.g., J. Barbalet, *Citizenship* (Milton Keynes, Open University Press, 1988); R. Beiner (ed.), *Theorizing Citizenship* (Albany, SUNY Press, 1995); D. Heater, *Citizenship: The Civic Ideal in World History, Politics and Education* (London, Longman, 1990); W. Kymlicka and W. Norman, 'Return of the citizen: A survey of recent work on citizenship theory', *Ethics* 104 (1994): 352–81; G. Shafir (ed.), *The Citizenship Debates: A Reader* (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1998); B. S. Turner, *Citizenship and Capitalism: The Debate over Reformism* (London, Allen and Unwin, 1986); B. S. Turner (ed.), *Citizenship and Social Theory* (Thousand Oaks, CA, Sage, 1993); B. van Steenberghe (ed.), *The Condition of Citizenship* (Thousand Oaks, CA, Sage, 1994); H. van Gunsteren, *A Theory of Citizenship* (Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1998); U. Vogel and M. Moran (eds), *The Frontiers of Citizenship* (London, Macmillan, 1991); I. M. Young, 'Polity and group difference: A critique of the ideal of universal citizenship', *Ethics* 99 (1989): 250–74.
- 2 This concern is not new, as reading J. Bryce, *Hindrances to Good Citizenship* (New Brunswick, Transaction, 1993 [1909]) demonstrates.
- 3 Kymlicka and Norman suggest, however, that there is a need for an independent theory of citizenship that is not just a theory of democracy or justice. See their 'Return of the citizen', pp. 368 and 381.
- 4 In early republican theory and practice, citizens held a privileged political status based on having certain equal political and civil rights. But given the exclusion of women, the poor and slaves, for example, such citizenship was not exercised within a democracy.
- 5 P. Norris (ed.), *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Government* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999).
- 6 See D. Held, *Democracy and the Global Order* (Cambridge, Polity, 1995), pp. 16–23.
- 7 R. Beiner, 'Why citizenship constitutes a theoretical problem in the last decade of the twentieth century', in R. Beiner (ed.), *Theorizing Citizenship* (Albany, SUNY Press, 1995), p. 1.
- 8 For the UK, see D. Heater, 'Citizenship: A remarkable case of sudden

- interest', *Parliamentary Affairs* 44 (1991): 141–56; D. Oliver and D. Heater, *The Foundations of Citizenship* (London, Harvester/Wheat-sheaf, 1994), pp. 123–6. For Australia, see Civics Expert Group, *Whereas the people . . . Civics and Citizenship Education* (Canberra, Australian Government Publishing Services, 1994), pp. 13–15.
- 9 See G. Stokes, 'An introduction to the politics of identity in Australia', in G. Stokes (ed.), *The Politics of Identity in Australia* (Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 1–20.
 - 10 See, e.g., Young, 'Polity and group difference'; C. Mouffe, 'Radical democracy or liberal democracy?' *Socialist Review* 20, 2 (1990): 57–67, p. 64.
 - 11 Beiner, 'Why citizenship constitutes a theoretical problem', p. 9.
 - 12 See B. Hindess, 'Limits to citizenship', in W. Hudson and J. Kane (eds), *Rethinking Australian Citizenship* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 66–74.
 - 13 E.g. E. Laclau and C. Mouffe, *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics* (London, Verso, 1985); Mouffe, 'Radical democracy or liberal democracy?'; I. M. Young, *Justice and the Politics of Difference* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1990).
 - 14 See W. Hudson, 'Differential citizenship', in Hudson and Kane (eds), *Rethinking Australian Citizenship*, pp. 15–25.
 - 15 W. Kymlicka, *Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1995); B. van Steenberg, 'Towards a global ecological citizen', in van Steenberg (ed.), *The Condition of Citizenship*, pp. 141–52; G. Stokes, 'Global citizenship', in Hudson and Kane (eds), *Rethinking Australian Citizenship*, pp. 231–42.
 - 16 Aristotle, *The Politics*, trans. T. A. Sinclair (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1962), Book 3, p. 107.
 - 17 E.g. C. B. Macpherson, *The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1977); D. Held, *Models of Democracy*, 2nd edn (Cambridge, Polity, 1996); J. Habermas, 'Three normative models of democracy', in S. Benhabib (ed.), *Democracy and Difference: Contesting Boundaries of the Political* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1996), pp. 21–30. See also T. Janoski, *Citizenship and Civil Society* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 17–24 and 226–7, who uses three models similar to those used below.
 - 18 Macpherson, *The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy*, p. 22; Held, *Models of Democracy*, p. 99.
 - 19 J. Locke, *Second Treatise of Government* [1690], in C. Cohen (ed.), *Communism, Fascism and Democracy* (New York, Random House, 1962), p. 441.
 - 20 See M. Weber, 'Politics as vocation', in H. H. Gerth and C. W. Mills (eds), *From Max Weber* (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1948);

- J. A. Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*, 5th edn (London, Unwin, 1952).
- 21 R. Dahl, *A Preface to Democratic Theory* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1956).
- 22 Held, *Models of Democracy*, pp. 83–4.
- 23 D. Oliver, 'Active citizenship in the 1990s', *Parliamentary Affairs* 44 (1991): 157–71; Civics Expert Group, *Whereas the people...*, pp. 6–7.
- 24 K. R. Popper, *Conjectures and Refutations*, 4th edn revised (London, Routledge, 1972), p. 372.
- 25 D. Miller, 'Bounded citizenship', in K. Hutchings and R. Dannreuther (eds), *Cosmopolitan Citizenship* (Houndsmill, Macmillan, 1999), p. 62.
- 26 Held, *Models of Democracy*, pp. 44–5.
- 27 H. Arendt, *The Human Condition* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1958); B. Barber, *Strong Democracy* (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1984); A. Oldfield, *Citizenship and Community: Civic Republicanism and the Modern World* (London, Routledge, 1990); C. R. Sunstein, *The Partial Constitution* (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1993); P. Pettit, *Republicanism: A Theory of Government and Freedom* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1997).
- 28 Pettit's republicanism, for example, does not regard democratic participation as a 'bedrock value'. See Pettit, *Republicanism*, p. 8.
- 29 See S. Burtt, 'The politics of virtue: A critique and a proposal', *American Political Science Review* 87, 2 (1993): pp. 361–2.
- 30 J. G. A. Pocock, 'The ideal of citizenship since classical times', in Shafrir (ed.), *The Citizenship Debates*, pp. 31–41; p. 36.
- 31 See, e.g., M. Canovan, 'Republicanism', in D. Miller (ed.), *The Blackwell Encyclopedia of Political Thought* (Oxford, Blackwell, 1997), p. 434.
- 32 Miller, 'Bounded citizenship', p. 62.
- 33 *Ibid.*, p. 63.
- 34 *Ibid.*
- 35 Oldfield, *Citizenship and Community*, p. 9.
- 36 *Ibid.*, p. 148.
- 37 *Ibid.*, p. 8.
- 38 See the discussion in R. Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany* (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1992).
- 39 Oldfield, *Citizenship and Community*, p. 159.
- 40 See A. Phillips, 'Feminism and republicanism: Is this a plausible alliance?', *Journal of Political Philosophy* 8, 2 (2000): p. 293.
- 41 See van Gunsteren, *A Theory of Citizenship*, pp. 26–7.
- 42 See A. Linklater, 'Cosmopolitan citizenship', in Hutchings and Dannreuther (eds), *Cosmopolitan Citizenship*, pp. 35–59.
- 43 In his article 'Democratic theory and self-transformation', *American*

- Political Science Review* 86, 1 (1992): pp. 8–23, Warren uses the term ‘expansive democracy’ to describe developmental democracy.
- 44 See G. E. Gaus, *The Modern Liberal Theory of Man* (London, Croom Helm, 1983), pp. 205–6.
- 45 On Rawls, see *ibid.*, pp. 1–11.
- 46 While A. H. Halsey (in ‘T. H. Marshall and ethical socialism’, in M. Bulmer and A. M. Rees (eds), *Citizenship Today: The Contemporary Relevance of T. H. Marshall* (London, UCL Press, 1996), pp. 81–100) locates Marshall in the tradition of ethical socialism, M. Bulmer and A. M. Rees (in their ‘Conclusion: Citizenship in the twenty-first century’, in Bulmer and Rees (eds), *Citizenship Today*, p. 278) consider him to be a twentieth-century ‘liberal democrat’.
- 47 The socialists also include R. H. Tawney and Anthony Crosland.
- 48 S. White, ‘Rights and responsibilities: A social democratic perspective’, in A. Gamble and T. Wright (eds), *The New Social Democracy* (Oxford, Blackwell, 1999), pp. 166–7.
- 49 E. Barker, *Principles of Social and Political Theory* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1951), p. 208.
- 50 L. T. Hobhouse, *Liberalism* (London, Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 70.
- 51 J. S. Mill, *Considerations On Representative Government* (Chicago, Henry Regnery, 1962), pp. 32–6.
- 52 J. Dewey, ‘Creative democracy – The task before us’, in D. Morris and I. Shapiro (eds), *John Dewey: The Political Writings* (Indianapolis, Hackett Publishing Company, [1939] 1993), pp. 241–2.
- 53 Gaus, *The Modern Liberal Theory of Man*, p. 209.
- 54 T. H. Marshall, *Citizenship and Social Class and Other Essays* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1950), p. 11.
- 55 Raymond Plant points out that Marshall did not envisage such rights as being claimable by individuals, ‘but that the state had a general duty to provide collective services in the fields of health, education and welfare: he did not envisage that these would yield individual entitlements’. See R. Plant, ‘Social rights and the reconstruction of welfare’, in G. Andrews (ed.), *Citizenship* (London, Lawrence and Wishart, 1991), p. 57.
- 56 There has been much controversy over Marshall’s work, including the claim that he encourages citizens to be passive recipients of welfare, that he focuses largely upon rights and not obligations, and that he does not sufficiently recognize the needs of women. Furthermore, there are other rights, such as ecological and cultural ones, that may, arguably, now be required for democratic citizenship, as well as domains other than the nation-state in which citizenship rights can be claimed.
- 57 T. H. Green, *Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation* (New York, Longmans, 1931), p. 145; H. Laski, *Social Theory*, 2nd edn (London, Methuen, 1921), p. 456, repr. in M. Spahr, *Readings in Recent Political Philosophy* (New York, Macmillan, 1949).

- 58 Within the work of the developmentalists there are allusions to a conception of citizenship that extends beyond national boundaries. See, e.g., Green, *Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation*, p. 145; Hobhouse, *Liberalism*, pp. 121–2; D. Held, *Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance* (Cambridge, Polity, 1995); D. Archibugi and D. Held, *Cosmopolitan Democracy: An Agenda for a New World Order* (Cambridge, Polity, 1995), pp. 12–15.
- 59 See, e.g., A. D. Lindsay, *The Essentials of Democracy*, 2nd edn (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1935), p. 74.
- 60 *Ibid.*, p. 66.
- 61 The associative democratic theorists tend to be more in the democratic socialist tradition of developmentalism. See April Carter's chapter on 'Associative democracy' and Baogang He's chapter on 'Civil society and democracy' in this volume.
- 62 J. Dewey, *The Public and its Problems* (Athens, OH, Swallow Press, 1927), p. 146.
- 63 Gaus, *The Modern Liberal Theory of Man*, pp. 206–9.
- 64 Green, *Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation*, p. 147.
- 65 Barker, *Principles of Social and Political Theory*, pp. 224–5.
- 66 Burt, 'The politics of virtue', p. 362. This writer is pessimistic about the prospects of encouraging American citizens to adopt such virtues.
- 67 D. F. Thompson, *The Democratic Citizen* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1970), p. 15.
- 68 The necessary political virtues of citizens are those of 'political cooperation, such as a sense of fairness and tolerance and a willingness to meet others half-way': J. Rawls, *The Law of Peoples* (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1999), p. 15. On deliberation, see also J. Rawls, *Political Liberalism* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1996), pp. 212–54.
- 69 Rawls, *The Law of Peoples*, p. 132.
- 70 W. Galston, *Liberal Purposes* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 224–7. See also A. Gutman, *Democratic Education* (Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1987); S. Macedo, *Liberal Virtues: Citizenship, Virtue and Community* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1990).
- 71 A. Gutman and D. Thompson, *Democracy and Disagreement* (Cambridge, Belknap Press, 1996), p. 301.
- 72 See Kymlicka, *Multicultural Citizenship*.
- 73 For an astute critique of the transformative potential of democratic participation, see Warren, 'Democratic theory and self-transformation', pp. 13–16.
- 74 Kymlicka and Norman, 'The return of the citizen', p. 367.
- 75 J. Bohman, *Public Deliberation: Pluralism, Complexity and Democracy* (Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 1996), p. 237.

- 76 See Habermas, 'Three normative models of democracy', pp. 21–30; J. Habermas, *Between Facts and Norms*, trans. W. Rehg (Cambridge, Polity, 1996), pp. 287–328; J. Cohen, 'Deliberation and democratic legitimacy', in J. Bohman and W. Rehg (eds), *Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics* (Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 1997), pp. 67–91; J. Cohen, 'Procedure and substance in deliberative democracy', in Benhabib (ed.), *Democracy and Difference*, pp. 95–119.
- 77 J. Bohman and W. Rehg, 'Introduction', in Bohman and Rehg (eds), *Deliberative Democracy*, p. ix.
- 78 Ibid., p. ix.
- 79 Cohen, 'Deliberation and democratic legitimacy', p. 73.
- 80 Habermas, *Between Facts and Norms*, p. 459.
- 81 Bohman, *Public Deliberation*, p. 5.
- 82 Dryzek, however, sees the accommodation with liberalism as blunting the critical edge of deliberative democracy. See his *Deliberative Democracy and Beyond* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000).
- 83 Habermas, 'Three normative models of democracy', p. 27.
- 84 Cohen, 'Deliberation and democratic legitimacy', p. 83.
- 85 Bohman, *Public Deliberation*, p. 7.
- 86 See the discussion in G. Stokes, *Popper* (Cambridge, Polity, 1998), pp. 61–5.
- 87 Bohman, *Public Deliberation*, p. 7.
- 88 Cohen, 'Procedure and substance in deliberative democracy', in Benhabib (ed.), *Democracy and Difference*, pp. 110–13.
- 89 Habermas, *Between Facts and Norms*, p. 515.
- 90 Ibid., p. 514.
- 91 Habermas offers the idea of 'constitutional patriotism' as a way of transcending the narrow 'motivating forces' of national political identities based upon ethnic community and culture. See his 'Citizenship and national identity', in *Between Facts and Norms*, pp. 500 and 514–15.
- 92 Ibid., p. 500.
- 93 Bohman, *Public Deliberation*, p. 198.
- 94 For other criticisms, see essays in Bohman and Rehg (eds), *Deliberative Democracy*; J. Elster (ed.), *Deliberative Democracy* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998); R. E. Goodin, 'Democratic deliberation within', *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 29, 1 (2000): 81–109.
- 95 See also J. S. Dryzek, *Discursive Democracy* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990); J. Fishkin, *Democracy and Deliberation: New Directions for Democratic Reforms* (New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 1991); J. Fishkin, *The Voice of the People: Public Opinion and Democracy* (New Haven CT, Yale University Press, 1995); J. Uhr, *Deliberative Democracy in Australia: The Changing Place of Parliament* (Melbourne, Cambridge University Press, 1998).