

# Overture

## Thinking the Global



# 1

## Tracking Global Flows

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Consider the following five snapshots.<sup>1</sup>

Snapshot One: In Guatemala, several thousand Mayan youth – the majority of whom are young unmarried daughters – work as apparel assemblers at the Sam Lucas *maquila* factory. The factory, built from cement blocks with aluminum roofing, is the size of a football field. Inside, long wooden tables divide the workers into production lines of about 30 people. Each person in a line repeats the assigned task over and over, whether it is to sew labels on pants, fasten sleeves to a shirt or cut threads off the almost finished product. Production goals are established for each line. If the production line reaches its goal, then the workers are promised extra pay; if not, money is deducted from their wages, which on average is about US \$4 per day for 14 to 16 hours of work.

Snapshot Two: In Germany, there is an increasingly vocal concern about the “refusal” of Turkish Muslims to integrate into German society and the emergence of a self-sufficient “parallel society” that has developed in the heart of German cities. Within this parallel society, it is said, honor killings proliferate and traditionally oriented men prevent their wives and daughters from fully participating in German society. For the most vocal activists and experts, the solution is to “save” these women by offering them shelter when they escape from their families so that they can merge into German society and be “free” of the constraints of the parallel society.

Snapshot Three: In Russia, McDonald’s is nowadays a prominent feature in the local landscape. The physical topography of Moscow’s streets and pedestrian walkways, for example, is shaped by large red signs with recognizable golden arches and arrows directing pedestrians and motorists to the nearest restaurants. Furthermore, political demonstrators – anti-American or otherwise – often use McDonald’s restaurants as

landmarks for staging and dispersal areas. And whereas school groups formerly took cultural excursions to sites such as Lenin's tomb, museums and factories, today the same groups take educational tours through McDonald's restaurants and the McComplex production facilities.

Snapshot Four: Meanwhile, in northern Nigeria Indian films have become an integral part of the media scene and form the everyday media environment through which people move. Stickers of Indian stars emblazon trucks, cars, and bikes of the north. Popular stars are given Hausa nicknames, such as *Sarkin Rawa* (King of Dancing) for Govinda, or *Dan daba mai lasin* (licensed hooligan – in the same way that James Bond is licensed to kill). Indian jewelry and clothing have influenced Hausa fashions. Indian film songs and stories have penetrated everyday Hausa popular culture. And Hausa youth draw on the movie world of Indian sexual relations to test the boundaries of their own culture.

Snapshot Five: And in Hong Kong, it is the spring of 1994 and everyone is talking about female inheritance. Women in the New Territories are subject to Chinese customary law and, under British colonialism, still unable to inherit land. A group of rural indigenous women have joined forces with Hong Kong women's groups to demand legal change. In the plaza in front of the Legislative Council building, the indigenous women, dressed in the oversized hats of farm women, sing folk laments with new lyrics about injustice and inequality. Across the plaza, a conservative group representing rural elite interests gathers in large numbers to protest female inheritance on the grounds that it would undermine tradition. One banner carries the plaintive message: "Why are you killing our culture?"

We begin with these snapshots because, at a general level, they illustrate nicely what is now commonly known, not least in anthropological circles, as globalization.<sup>2</sup> This term refers (simply for now) to the intensification of global interconnectedness, suggesting a world full of movement and mixture, contact and linkages, and persistent cultural interaction and exchange. It speaks, in other words, to the complex mobilities and interconnections that characterize the globe today. The general picture these snapshots conjure is thus of an increasingly interconnected world. It is of a world where borders and boundaries have become increasingly porous, allowing more and more peoples and cultures to be cast into intense and immediate contact with each other.

We also commence with these snapshots because, at a more specific level, each highlights a particular mobility or cultural flow – respectively, of capital, people, commodities, images, and ideologies – through which the spaces of the globe are becoming increasingly intertwined.<sup>3</sup> Take, for example, the case of Guatemala. The scene of young women working in an export apparel assembly factory illustrates how, as technologies of communication and transportation have made capital more and more mobile, the search to reduce the costs of production has led corporations farther and farther afield, resulting in a rapid shift of labor-intensive industrial production and service work from the United States, Japan, and western Europe to new and highly dispersed low-wage sites around the globe. Places such as Guatemala

have thus become nodes in the rapidly developing and ever-densening network of capital interconnections that epitomize the modern world.

Or take the case of Germany. The presence of Turkish migrants in the heart of German cities represents the extensive post-World War II movement of populations from the less affluent parts of the globe into the major urban centers of the “developed” and “developing” nations; the result being that peoples and cultures formerly located in different parts of the world now find themselves inhabiting the same physical terrains, and the spaces of the “West” find themselves homes to a host of diverse and sometimes incommensurable cultures.<sup>4</sup> This intensification of global mobility and interconnectedness has turned places such as Germany into spaces of juxtaposition and mixture, spaces where disparate cultures converge, collide, and grapple with each other, often in conditions of radical inequality.

Or the case of Russia. The prevalence of McDonald’s in this country points to how Russians, and indeed people around the world, increasingly have to wrestle with the global standardization of cultural goods, tastes, and practices. From clothes, food, and music to architecture, film, and television, there is no denying that certain western styles and brands – Coca-Cola, Calvin Klein, Microsoft, Levis, Nike, and, of course, McDonald’s – have achieved global prominence, so much prominence, in fact, that they can be found practically anywhere in the world. As this flow of commodities continues apace, as it keeps accelerating across the globe, the cultural lines that connect the world become ever more dense and mass consumption increasingly becomes a primary mediator in the “encounter” between peoples and cultures from around the planet.

Then there is Nigeria. The popularity of Indian film here accentuates the increasing importance of the media in allowing Hausa viewers to partake, as they go about their everyday lives, in the imagined realities of other cultures. More specifically, the snapshot shows the way Indian films participate in the dialogic construction of Hausa popular culture, for they offer Hausa men and women an alternative world, not altogether unlike their own, from which they may envision new forms of fashion, beauty, love, and romance. Indian films thus present Hausa (and other non-western) viewers with a means of creatively engaging with forms of tradition outside their culture but which do not emanate from the West, in effect highlighting how the circulation of media between non-western countries has become an increasingly important aspect of global cultural flows.

And finally Hong Kong. The fear expressed by rural elites that female inheritance would undermine tradition points to how the question of women’s rights excites political and ideological struggles framed in terms of cultural authenticity versus foreign influence. There is thus an important tension in Hong Kong (and elsewhere) about the proper role of women in society. It is a tension between those who seek to place gender equality and human rights at the center of the formation of society and those who would call into question such a project as an alien western imposition. This snapshot can therefore be seen as an instance of the global circulation of western ideologies – most often made up of elements of the Enlightenment worldview such as freedom, welfare, human rights, democracy, and sovereignty – and of the cultural interconnections and tensions that result as these ideologies are localized in various places around the world.

We begin with these pictures, then, because they provide us with a nice panoramic view of the world of globalization. It is a world of motion, of complex interconnections. Here capital traverses frontiers almost effortlessly, drawing more and more places into dense networks of financial interconnections; people readily (although certainly not freely and without difficulty) cut across national boundaries, turning countless territories into spaces where various cultures converge, clash, and struggle with each other; commodities drift briskly from one locality to another, becoming primary mediators in the encounter between culturally distant others; images flicker quickly from screen to screen, providing people with resources with which to fashion new ways of being in the world; and ideologies circulate rapidly through ever-expanding circuits, furnishing fodder for struggles couched in terms of cultural authenticity versus foreign influence. The pictures thus describe a world in which a myriad of processes, operating on a global scale, ceaselessly cut across national boundaries, integrating and connecting cultures and communities in new space-time combinations, and “making the world in reality and in experience more interconnected” (Hall 1996: 619). They speak of an intensely interconnected world – one where the rapid flows of capital, people, goods, images, and ideologies draw more and more of the globe into webs of interconnection, compressing our sense of time and space, and making the world feel smaller and distances shorter. This is the world of globalization.<sup>5</sup>

A few words of caution, however. There is no doubt that the world as a whole is experientially shrinking. Twentieth- and twenty-first-century innovations in technology – particularly in transportation and communication – have made it easier and quicker for people and things to get around. But there are limits to global mobility and connection. It is thus not necessarily the case that the world is shrinking for everyone and in all places (Allen and Hamnett 1995). The experience of globalization is a rather awkward and uneven process. For instance, while some people may possess the political and economic resources to trot across the world, many more have little or no access to transport and means of communication: the price of an airplane ticket or a phone call is just too high for them. And more generally, there are large expanses of the planet only tangentially tied into the webs of interconnection that encompass the globe. According to John Allen and Chris Hamnett, for example, whole areas of Africa “are quite literally off all kinds of maps – maps of telecommunications, maps of world trade and finance, maps of global tourism and the like” (1995: 2).<sup>6</sup> Such places thus have few circuits connecting them to anywhere, only routes of communication and transportation that skip over or bypass them. The point here, then, is that while the world may be full of complex mobilities and interconnections, there are also quite a number of people and places whose experience is marginal to or excluded from these movements and links. Indeed, not everyone and everyplace participates equally in the circuits of interconnection that traverse the globe. For the very processes that produce movement and linkages also promote immobility, exclusion, and disconnection (Coutin et al. 2002; Navaro-Yashin 2003; Ferguson 2006). And this, too, is the world of globalization.

The aim of this reader is to provide an introduction to this world of globalization, to this world of complex mobilities and uneven interconnections. More specifically, it offers an anthropological takes on such a world. The book is an exercise in the

anthropology of globalization.<sup>7</sup> Of course, anthropologists are not the only ones interested in this issue. Since the late 1980s or so, globalization has become one of the most important academic topics. It is thus a central concern of quite a number of disciplines, from sociology and economics to media and literary studies. Anthropology, however, brings a unique perspective to bear on the topic. The tendency of much of the literature on globalization is to focus on the macro scope of the phenomenon, thinking of it principally in terms of very large-scale economic, political, or cultural processes. Anthropology, on the other hand, is most concerned with the articulation of the global and the local, that is, with how globalizing processes exist in the context of, and must come to terms with, the realities of particular societies, with their accumulated – that is to say, historical – cultures and ways of life.<sup>8</sup> The anthropology of globalization, in other words, is concerned with the situated and conjunctural nature of globalization. It is preoccupied not just with mapping the shape taken by the particular flows of capital, people, goods, images, and ideologies that crisscross the globe – that is, with tracking global processes as locatable networks of practices and connections – but also with the experiences of people living in specific localities when more and more of their everyday lives are contingent on globally extensive social processes (Foster 1999). What anthropology offers that is often lacking in other disciplines is a concrete attentiveness to human agency, to the practices of everyday life, in short, to how subjects mediate the processes of globalization (Povinelli and Chauncey 1999). Thus, to provide an anthropological introduction to globalization is to focus at once on the large-scale processes (or flows of subjects and objects) through which the world is becoming increasingly, albeit unevenly, interconnected and on how subjects respond to these processes in culturally specific ways.<sup>9</sup> This is precisely what this book does. The articles offered here are concerned with tracking global flows in a way that highlights human agency and imagination. They are a selection of some of the best recent critical anthropological work on globalization.<sup>10</sup> It is material that highlights the great complexity and ingenuity of the anthropology of globalization.

In the rest of this introductory chapter, we present a more comprehensive view of globalization than offered above. First, we provide a more elaborate definition of globalization. We suggest that the term implies something more radical about the world than the mere fact of increasing global interconnectedness: it points to a basic reorganization of time and space. Second, given this more extensive definition, we then consider the cultural dynamics of globalization. This is the realm of global activity that has attracted the most anthropological attention. Third, we focus on the limits of global mobility and connection. The idea is to move beyond the image of unfettered flows and unbound connectivity to conceptualize the manifold practices that both promote and constrain movement and linkage. In the last section, we provide a brief overview of the reader and point to some of its limitations.

### **The Spaces and Times of Globalization**

Earlier we defined “globalization” rather simply as the intensification of global interconnectedness. To be sure, this is in large part what globalization is all about. The world today is witnessing an intensification of circuits of economic, political,

cultural, and ecological interdependence. This is a world in which the rapid acceleration in the flows of capital, people, goods, images, and ideologies – subjects and objects, in short – across the face of the globe has brought even the most remote parts of the world in contact with metropolitan centers. However, globalization suggests something much more profound about the modern world than the simple fact of growing global interconnectedness. It implies a fundamental reordering of time and space. We would like to offer, then, a more theoretical take on globalization, one that draws from the work of the two authors who have best captured this profound reorganization of time and space: David Harvey and Anthony Giddens.<sup>11</sup>

### *Speeding it up*

David Harvey (1989) conceptualizes globalization principally as a manifestation of the changing experience of time and space. He captures this change in the notion of “time-space compression,” which refers to the manner in which the speeding up of economic and social processes has experientially shrunk the globe, so that distance and time no longer appear to be major constraints on the organization of human activity. In other words, the term points to how the pressures of technological and economic change have continually collapsed time and space: collapsed them in such a way that time has overcome or annihilated the barriers of space. (One brief example of this collapse is the fact that, it is now possible for folks in London to experience the same thing, say, a media event or a business transaction, at the same time as people in Thailand (Waters 1995).) For Harvey, then, globalization involves the “shrinking” of space and the shortening of time. It entails the speeding up of the pace of life, such that the time taken to do things, as well as the experiential distance between different locations in space, becomes progressively shorter. For him, in sum, globalization is intimately linked with the intensification and speeding up of time-space compression in economic and social life.

This process of time-space compression (and hence of globalization), Harvey argues, is not a gradual or continuous occurrence. Rather, it takes place in discrete phases of short and concentrated bursts. The world at any particular moment is not the product of a smooth linear compression of time and space, but the result of a more discontinuous historical unfolding. These eruptions of time-space compression, Harvey notes, can be attributed to the periodic crises of overaccumulation that plague the capitalist system. Today’s world, for instance, is in just such a phase, one that started during the early 1970s (Harvey 1989: 141–72). It began with a crisis of overaccumulation in the Fordist system of mass production of western economies. This system, based on Henry Ford’s model of centralized mass-assembly production of standardized products, had become so successful and efficient that it began to overproduce, resulting in the massive lay-off of workers, and effectively reducing demand for products. Consumer markets thus became completely saturated. And since there were not enough consumers to buy these goods, corporate profits began to decline, which in turn precipitated a fall in government revenues. This meant the onset of fiscal problems for governments, who consequently found it increasingly difficult to sustain their commitment to their welfare programs. They attempted to solve the problem primarily by printing extra money, but this only set in motion a



wave of uncontrollable inflation. This crisis jarred the Fordist system to such a degree that the model of mass production (which entailed rigid arrangements between the state, capitalists, and workers to maintain high levels of employment, investment, and consumption) became unraveled.

In its place, there has emerged a post-Fordist regime of flexible accumulation. This regime, according to Harvey, “rests on flexibility with respect to labor processes, labor markets, products, and patterns of consumption. It is characterized by the emergence of entirely new sectors of production, new ways of providing financial services, new markets, and, above all, greatly intensified rates of commercial, technological, and organizational innovation” (1989: 147). For example, labor markets have become flexible through the introduction of new forms of labor regulation – outsourcing, subcontracting, putting-out and “home work” strategies – and the hiring of large numbers of temporary, part-time, and seasonal workers; production arrangements have become malleable owing to a shift away from rigid centralized firms oriented towards mass production to small, decentralized firms oriented towards niche markets; and capital has become less anchored as a result of the deregulation of the global financial market. This flexibility is aimed at reducing the turnover time of capital: the amount of time necessary for money furnished to fund new production to be recovered with a profit through the sale of services and goods. In other words, the goal is to speed up the process of both production and consumption, for, as the old capitalist adage says, time is money, or rather time costs money. Thus one finds that practices such as subcontracting and outsourcing, as well as other organizational shifts, coupled with new technologies of electronic control, have all decreased turnover times in many domains of production (e.g., clothing, electronics, automobiles, machine tools, and construction). Moreover, improved modes of communication and information, together with rationalizations in methods of distribution (e.g., inventory control, packaging, and market feedback), have made it possible for commodities to move around through the market system at a faster pace; 24-hours-a-day financial services and markets have increased the mobility of capital; and the mobilization of fashion in niche markets has facilitated a speed-up in the pace of consumption in clothing, ornaments, and across a wide range of recreational activities and life-styles (e.g., pop music styles, leisure and sporting habits, and video and children’s games). In this post-Fordist phase of capitalism, the regime of flexible accumulation reigns – whether in the realm of high finance, production systems, consumption, or labor markets – and the pace of economic and social life has generally accelerated.

The main implication of all this is that, for Harvey, we are currently caught in a particularly intense moment of time-space compression. The general speed-up in the turnover time of capital is rapidly shrinking the world. Time is quickly annihilating space. He puts this in the following terms:

The satellite communications systems deployed since the early 1970s have rendered the unit cost and time of communication invariant with respect to distance. It costs the same to communicate over 500 miles as it does over 5,000 via satellite. Air freight rates on commodities have likewise come down dramatically, while containerization has reduced the cost of bulk sea and road transport. It is now possible for a large

multinational corporation like Texas Instruments to operate plants with simultaneous decision-making with respect to financial, market, input costs, quality control, and labor process conditions in more than fifty different locations across the globe. Mass television ownership coupled with satellite communication makes it possible to experience a rush of images from different spaces almost simultaneously, collapsing the world's spaces into a series of images on a television screen. The whole world can watch the Olympic Games, the World Cup, the fall of a dictator, a political summit, a deadly tragedy. . . while mass tourism, films made in spectacular locations, make a wide range of simulated or vicarious experiences of what the world contains available to many people. (Harvey 1989: 293)

The world today, in other words, is subject to the concurrent implosion of space and the speed-up of all facets of economic and social life. Yes, space is shrinking. The pace of life is speeding up. The time taken to do things is becoming progressively shorter. The world, in short, is witnessing the intensification of the compression of time and space. And so, as the world appears to shrink and distances seemingly diminish, as happenings in one place come to impact instantaneously on people and places miles away, "we have to learn how to cope with an overwhelming sense of *compression* of our spatial and temporal worlds" (Harvey 1989: 240).

### *Stretching it out*

Anthony Giddens, like Harvey, considers globalization to involve a profound reorganization of time and space in social and cultural life. However, while Harvey focuses on the general speed-up of economic and social processes, Giddens is more preoccupied with the stretching of social life across time and space. Giddens captures this preoccupation in the notion of "time-space distancing," which refers to "the conditions under which time and space are organized so as to connect presence and absence" (1990: 14). The basic argument is that social life consists of two fundamental kinds of social interaction. The first entails face-to-face contact. Here people engage directly with each other as they go about their everyday lives in what are often closely bounded local spaces. The second form consists of more remote encounters, those made possible by transport and communications systems, those that people engage in across space and time. The first type of interaction tends to predominate in premodern societies. These are societies in which the "spatial dimensions of social life are, for most of the population, and in most respects, dominated by 'presence' – by localized activities" (1990: 18). With the advent of modernity, however, the second sort of social intercourse becomes increasingly important. Modernity tears the spatial orbit of social life away from the confines of locality, "fostering relations between 'absent' others, locationally distant from any given situation of face-to-face interaction" (1990: 18). In other words, it disembeds or lifts out social relations from local contexts of interaction and rearranges them across extensive spans of time-space. One important effect of this disembedding is to make place, "which refers to the physical settings of social activity as situated geographically," increasingly phantasmagoric (1990: 18). This means that, in conditions of modernity, locales are haunted, so to speak, by that which is absent. They

are constituted not just by what is immediately present but also by influences quite removed from them. Modern localities, then, are settings for distanced relations – for relations at a distance, stretched out across time and space.

It is in terms of space-time distancing that Giddens understands the process of globalization. For him, globalization broadens the scope of the disembedding process, so that “larger and larger numbers of people live in circumstances in which disembedded institutions, linking local practices with globalized social relations, organize major aspects of day-to-day life” (1990: 79). Said otherwise, it intensifies the level of time-space distancing and correspondingly stretches out the relations between local and distant social practices and events. Giddens thus defines globalization “as the intensification of worldwide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa” (1990: 64), emphasizing how the emergence of instantaneous global communication and mass transportation, as well as the expansion of complex global systems of production and exchange, reduce the hold of local environments over people’s lives. For example, the jobs of Chinese “Mattel” factory workers may be more dependent on the sale of Barbies in the United States than on the direct actions of local management. This does not mean, however, that place (or locale) has ceased to be significant in the organization of everyday life. It simply means that as social connections extend laterally across time and space, localities around the world become less dependent on circumstances of co-presence (on face-to-face interaction) and more on interactions across distance (on relations with absent others). For Giddens, then, globalization points to the interlocking of the local and the global; that is, it “concerns the intersection of presence and absence, the interlacing of social events and social relations ‘at a distance’ with local contextualities” (1991: 21). In short, globalization expresses basic aspects of space-time distancing. It is fundamentally about the transformation of space and time.

The two perspectives sketched out above undoubtedly contain a number of significant differences.<sup>12</sup> For our purposes, however, we want to take them as complementary viewpoints. Together they highlight the basic, present-day spatial-temporal parameters of globalization. Drawing on the work of David Held et al. (1999: 15), we suggest that globalization consists of the following characteristic elements. First of all, given the development of worldwide modes of transport and communication, globalization implies a speeding up of the flows of capital, people, goods, images, and ideas across the world, thus pointing to a general increase in the pace of global interactions and processes. Second, it suggests an intensification of the links, modes of interaction, and flows that interconnect the world, meaning that ties across borders are not sporadic or haphazard but somewhat regularized. Third, globalization entails a stretching of social, cultural, political, and economic practices across frontiers so as to make possible action at a distance – that is, so that happenings, decisions, and practices in one area of the globe can come to have consequences for communities and cultures in other, often quite distant, locales around the world. And finally, as a result of all this speeding up, intensification, and stretching, globalization also implies a heightened entanglement of the global and local such that, while everyone might continue to live local lives, their phenomenal worlds have to some

extent become global as distant events come to have an impact on local spaces, and local developments come to have global repercussions.<sup>13</sup> All told, globalization can be seen as referring to those spatial-temporal processes, operating on a global scale, that rapidly cut across national boundaries, drawing more and more of the world into webs of interconnection, integrating and stretching cultures and communities across space and time, and compressing our spatial and temporal horizons. It points to a world in motion, to an interconnected world, to a shrinking world.

### The Cultural Dynamics of Globalization

Given this general framework, let us now consider the cultural dynamics of globalization. This is the sphere of global activity that has received the most anthropological attention. This is not to say that anthropologists neglect or fail to consider other aspects of globalization, say, the economic or the political.<sup>14</sup> Indeed, they hardly could. For these are not completely separate realms of activity. What anthropologists tend to do, though, is interpret these other spheres through the prism of the cultural. Indeed, the cultural realm – the realm of meaning, one might say – most often takes conceptual priority. This prioritization is done, however, without necessarily positing the cultural dimension as the master sphere through which everything about globalization must be understood. Anthropologists realize that globalization is a complex, multifaceted process that operates simultaneously in diverse realms – the cultural, the economic, the political, the environmental, and so on – and can thus be embraced from numerous angles (see Nederveen Pieterse 1995). The cultural functions as just one such angle: as one of a number of important ways through which one can grasp the complex creature that is globalization. What does it mean, then, to speak of the cultural dynamics of globalization?

#### *The de/territorialization of culture*

Let us begin with the notion of culture itself. The concept has a long and complicated history. Raymond Williams (1976) describes it as one of the two or three most complex words in the English language. “Culture” can thus be a rather slippery idea. We would like to sidestep the problems of definition, however, and propose what might be considered a standard conceptualization of the term. We understand culture, for the purposes of this volume, “as the order of life in which human beings construct meaning through practices of symbolic representation” (Tomlinson 1999: 18). It is the sphere of existence in which people make their lives, individually and collectively, meaningful; and it encompasses both the practices through which meaning is generated and the material forms – popular culture, film, art, literature, and so forth – in which it is embodied.

In anthropology, the historical tendency has been to connect this realm of meaning construction, this realm of culture, very closely to the particularities of place (Clifford 1997; Malkki 1997). The idea of “a culture,” for instance, which refers to a group of people – whether a nation, ethnicity, tribe, or so forth – who more or less use a system of shared meanings to interpret and make sense of the world, has

traditionally been tied to the idea of a fixed territory. Akhil Gupta and James Ferguson elaborate on this in the following terms:

The distinctiveness of societies, nations, and cultures is predicated on a seemingly unproblematic division of space, on the fact that they occupy “naturally” discontinuous spaces . . . For example, the representation of the world as a collection of “countries,” as on most world maps, sees it as an inherently fragmented space, divided by different colors into diverse national societies, each “rooted” in its proper place . . . It is so taken for granted that each country embodies its own distinctive culture and society that the terms “society” and “culture” are routinely simply appended to the names of nation-states, as when a tourist visits India to understand “Indian culture” and “Indian society” or Thailand to experience “Thai culture” or the United States to get a whiff of “American culture.”

Of course, the geographical territories that cultures and societies are believed to map onto do not have to be nations . . . On a smaller scale perhaps are our disciplinary assumptions about the association of culturally unitary groups (tribes or peoples) with “their” territories: thus “the Nuer” live in “Nuerland” and so forth. The clearest illustration of this kind of thinking are the classic “ethnographic maps” that purported to display the spatial distribution of peoples, tribes, and cultures. (2002: 65–6)

The inclination in anthropology, then, has been to assume an isomorphism between place and culture. Culture has been seen as something rooted in “soil.” It has been thought of as a bounded entity that occupies a specific physical territory. The idea of culture has thus rested on the assumption of rupture, on the assumption of an intrinsic discontinuity between places as the loci of particular formations of meaning. It has traditionally pointed to a world of human differences conceptualized as a mosaic of cultures – with each culture, as a universe of shared meanings, radically set apart from every other. In short, as James Clifford has noted, “the idea of culture” has historically carried with it an “expectation of roots, of a stable, territorialized existence” (1988: 338).

Nowadays, though, it is impossible, or at least rather unreasonable, to think of culture strictly in such localized terms, to view it as the natural property of spatially circumscribed populations.<sup>15</sup> Globalization has radically pulled culture apart from place. It has visibly dislodged it from particular locales. The signs of this disembedding are everywhere. Just think back to the snapshots we discussed at the beginning of the chapter. These are all essentially about the traffic in meaning. They are about the global mobility of cultural forms and products. Consider the scene of Turkish Muslims in Germany, for example. It illustrates how people, or cultural subjects, nowadays readily traverse national boundaries, a process that brings cultures formerly located in different parts of the world into the same physical terrains, thus turning numerous places into spaces of cultural juxtaposition and mixture. Or take the case of McDonald’s in Russia. It shows how cultural objects – clothes, food, music, and so forth – circulate rapidly through ever-expanding networks, networks so extensive that certain styles or brands have achieved an almost ubiquitous presence in the world. Or contemplate the episode of mass media in Nigeria. This, too, is about cultural objects on the move. It highlights how images drift easily across the globe, allowing an increasing number of viewers to participate in the

imagined realities of other cultures. This world of the snapshots is thus no “cultural mosaic, of separate pieces with hard, well-defined edges” (Hannerz 1992: 218). Rather, it is a world of culture in motion. It is a world where cultural subjects and objects – that is, meaningful forms such as capital, people, commodities, images, and ideas – have become unhinged from particular localities. The snapshots, in other words, suggest that culture is highly mobile. They point to how cultural interconnections increasingly stretch across the globe, eroding the “natural” connection or isomorphism between culture and place.

On one level, then, anthropologists have come to conceptualize culture as deterritorialized. The term is used to refer to this general weakening of the ties between culture and place, to the dislodging of cultural subjects and objects from particular or fixed locations in space and time. It points to how cultural processes readily transcend specific territorial boundaries. It designates a world of things fundamentally in motion. This should not be taken to mean, though, that anthropologists now think of culture as free-floating, without anchors. Indeed not. For anthropologists realize that the uprooting of culture is only half of the story of globalization. The other half is that the deterritorialization of culture is invariably the occasion for the reinsertion of culture in new time-space contexts. In other words, for anthropologists, cultural flows do not just float ethereally across the globe but are always reinscribed (however partially or fleetingly) in specific cultural environments. The signs of this reinscription, like the marks of deterritorialization, are everywhere evident. We need only turn, again, to our snapshots. Turkish Muslims *in* Germany, for instance, are not aimless wanderers. McDonald’s restaurants *in* Russia are not meandering endlessly around the globe. And the Indian films *in* northern Nigeria are not flickering endlessly from screen to screen. They are all, instead, localized in very specific time-space contexts: that of Germany, Russia, and Nigeria respectively. These snapshots are thus not simply of cultural subjects and objects in motion but also of their contingent localizations, of their reinsertion in particular cultural milieus. On another level, then, anthropologists have come to conceptualize culture as reterritorialized. The term refers to this process of reinscribing culture in new time-space contexts, of relocalizing it in specific cultural environments. It suggests that while the connection between culture and specific places may be weakening, it does not mean that culture has altogether lost its place. It just signifies that culture has been placed otherwise, such that it no longer necessarily belongs in or to a particular place. In short, it means that culture continues to have a territorialized existence, albeit a rather unstable one.

The point of all this is that, for anthropologists, globalized culture is never simply deterritorialized. It is also always reterritorialized. We are not dealing, in other words, with two separate processes. Rather, they occur simultaneously. It is a double movement, if you will. We would like to capture this double movement with the neologism *de/territorialization*. The term captures at once the lifting of cultural subjects and objects from fixed spatial locations and their relocalization in new cultural settings. It refers to processes that simultaneously transcend territorial boundaries and have territorial significance. The key to the meaning of this term is the slash. It allows us to separate “de” from “territorialization,” thus calling attention to the fact that deterritorialization always contains territorialization within

itself. For us, this means that the root of the word always to some extent undoes the action of the prefix, such that while the “de” may pull culture apart from place, the “territorialization” is always there to pull it back in one way or another. So there is no deterritorialization without some form of reterritorialization. There is no dislodging of everyday meanings from their moorings in particular localities without their simultaneous reinsertion in fresh environments. You can’t have one process without the other. It is a matter of both at once. It is a matter of de/territorialization.

### *Cultural imperialism and the homogenization of the world*

One of the important issues that the de/territorialization of culture raises concerns the organization of the flow of meaning in the world, or what might be called the cultural economy of globalization. It may very well be the case that culture is being dislodged from one locality and placed in another, thus generally weakening the ties of culture to particular sites. But this says nothing about the sort of culture that is being disembedded or about its origins and destinations. Does culture, for example, flow equally from and to all locations? Or does its dissemination involve some form of asymmetry? In other words, is there a power geometry to globalization and what might it be (see Massey 1994)?

A powerful answer to this set of questions comes from the discourse of cultural imperialism, a perspective that offers a highly critical stance towards the globalization of culture.<sup>16</sup> One of the central propositions of this discourse is that the de/territorialization of culture is not a benign matter.<sup>17</sup> For there is indeed a power geometry to the processes of globalization. It is one in which the traffic in culture moves primarily in one direction: sometimes it is seen to move from the First World (or West/center) to the Third World (or rest/periphery), other times more specifically from the United States to the rest of the world. In either case, given the asymmetries that putatively structure the flow of meaning, the discourse of cultural imperialism suggests that the processes of globalization involve the domination of certain cultures over others. In other words, this discourse understands the increased global movement of cultural goods primarily as a process of cultural imposition and dominance – of the imposition and dominance of western (predominantly American) culture over the remainder of the globe. The significance of this pattern of domination, from the point of view of this discourse, is that it is leading to the cultural homogenization of the world. The scenario that is often outlined is one in which, as global cultural influences continuously batter the sensibilities of the people of the periphery, “peripheral culture will step by step assimilate more and more of the imported meanings and forms, becoming gradually indistinguishable from the center” (Hannerz 1991: 122). The de/territorialization of culture is thus conceived as promoting a convergence of cultural styles inasmuch as western culture is being embraced in localities around the globe. It is seen, in other words, as leading to the increasing elimination of cultural difference in the world and hence to the crescent production of a world of sameness. The impact of western culture is perceived as rather overwhelming.

This, then, in general terms, is how the discourse of cultural imperialism regards the globalization of culture. The discourse, however, can be broken down and explored a little further. It actually presents us with at least two specific, albeit interrelated, visions of global cultural uniformity (see Tomlinson 1999).<sup>18</sup> The first vision attributes the increasing synchronization of world culture to the ability of transnational capital, most often seen as American-dominated and mass-mediated, to distribute cultural goods around the globe. A dominant version of this vision runs more or less as follows.<sup>19</sup> Since World War II, the global distribution of power points has shifted massively, such that the United States has become increasingly dominant, while European hegemony has diminished. A new empire, that of America, has thus come to replace the western European colonial system that had ensnared much of the world since the nineteenth century. This new imperial regime owes its ascendance to economic might, which germinates principally from the actions of US-based transnational corporations, and communications know-how, which has permitted American business and military interests to largely monopolize the development of electronically based systems of communication. This monopoly has been so strong that the American broadcasting system, which is essentially a commercial system dependent on advertising revenue, has functioned as an archetype for the formation of broadcasting systems around the globe, particularly in the Third World. One problem with the dissemination and adoption of this commercial system of mass media is that it has opened up Third World countries to the large-scale importation of consumer-oriented foreign programs. The outcome has been an electronic invasion that promises to eradicate local traditions everywhere. Local culture, in other words, is meeting with submersion from the mass-produced emissions of commercial broadcasting. It is in danger of being drowned underneath a deluge of commercialized media products and other consumer goods pouring from America and a few other power points in the West. The Third World's adoption of a commercial system of broadcasting has thus been no innocent proposition. These countries have become strapped and buckled to an American-dominated global system of communication and commodity production that threatens to supplant traditional cultural values with the values of consumerism. The scenario often painted, then, is one in which the spread of American/western cultural goods is leading to the absorption of peripheral cultures into a homogenized global monoculture of consumption. It is a vision of a world culturally synchronized to the rhythms of a mass-mediated global marketplace.

The second vision of global uniformity attributes the synchronization of the world to the spread of western culture more generally.<sup>20</sup> This means that globalization entails more than just the simple spread of American/western cultural goods, more than the development of a global taste for McDonald's, Levis, Coca-Cola, and the like. It actually involves, as John Tomlinson points out, "the installation worldwide of western versions of basic social-cultural reality: the West's epistemological and ontological theories, its values, ethical systems, approaches to rationality, technical-scientific worldview, political culture, and so on" (1997: 144). In other words, globalization entails the dissemination of all facets of the West's way of being: from musical forms, architecture, and modes of dress to eating habits, languages



(specially English), philosophical ideas, and cultural values and dispositions – those concerning, for example, freedom, democracy, gender and sexuality, human rights, religion, science, and technology. And this is not just a post-World War II development either. Globalization is in fact “the continuation of a long historical process of western ‘imperialist’ expansion – embracing the colonial expansions of the sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries – and representing an historical pattern of increasing global cultural hegemony” (Tomlinson 1997: 143–4). This vision of cultural uniformity implies that the world is gradually being made over in the image of the West. It indicates that cultural diversity is disappearing as non-western cultures are progressively incorporated into a western-dominated homogenized culture. The ramification here is that western culture has been globalized to such an extent that the West has lost its “natural” connection to a specific geographical territory. The West is no longer an assemblage of cultural practices linked to a particular territorial foundation. It has been deterritorialized, uprooted from its historical birthplace. As such, the West no longer refers simply to Europe. It names instead a worldwide cultural formation.<sup>21</sup> It designates a machine of sorts, one producing planetary unification, one ushering in the worldwide standardization of life-styles. The West describes, in short, the cultural condition of the world. It is simply everywhere, dooming the world to uniformity.

To sum up, then, the discourse of cultural imperialism, taken as a whole, understands the experience of de/territorialization as the global dissemination of certain cultural practices, goods, styles, institutions, and so forth, the result being the increasing cultural homogenization of the world. It suggests that western culture, whether in the form of consumer goods or otherwise, has been lifted from its territorial grounding only to be replicated across the world, leaving a trail of uniformity behind it. Globalization thus becomes coterminous with Americanization or, more generally, with westernization. There is something to be said for this vision of the world. It presents a not entirely implausible scenario. The signs of global uniformity, at least on some level, are there. There is no denying that western cultural forms can be found everywhere (or almost so). Take clothes or food, for example: there are certain styles and brands – we earlier mentioned Coca-Cola, McDonald’s, and so forth – that have become household names all over the world (even if not everyone can afford to buy them). Or take film and television: CNN, MTV, the Disney Channel are globally recognized icons; American television shows are broadcast around the world, *Law and Order* and *The Simpsons* being two recent examples; and Hollywood films – *Titanic*, *Mission Impossible*, *Pirates of the Caribbean* – and their stars – Leonardo DiCaprio, Tom Cruise, Johnny Depp – have extraordinary worldwide visibility. Or take the realm of ideas: notions of freedom, welfare, rights, democracy, sovereignty seem to be in everyone’s vocabulary, indicating that the Enlightenment worldview has much of the world in its thrall. These examples are only the more obvious signs of cultural uniformity. We could point to many others. But we think the point is sufficiently made: there is an abundance of evidence suggesting that western cultural forms have a ubiquitous presence in the world. It would thus appear that there is no denying that the world is becoming to some extent homogenized, that it is becoming to some degree westernized. It is plain as day. All one has to do is look around.

### *A different picture of the world*

From an anthropological perspective, however, the situation is not plain as day. All one has to do is look around – a little harder though. What one finds is that the picture the discourse of cultural imperialism draws of the world fails to adequately capture its complexities. The world, indeed, is a much more complicated place. In what follows, we will explore just how much more complex the world actually is. The tack we will take is to focus on three fundamental problems with the discourse of cultural imperialism, the main goal being to cast doubt on the vision of the world as a homogenized or westernized entity.

The first problem with the discourse of cultural imperialism concerns the fashion in which alien cultural products are said to act upon their consumers in the Third World. An important assumption of the cultural imperialism discourse is

that TV programs which are made for a commercial television system will unavoidably express consumerist values, both in the programs themselves and in the advertising which constitutes the financial basis of the system; and that these representations will in turn create wants and foster consumerist motivations in their recipients, in such a way that these recipients become harnessed to a western-based system of commodity production and exchange (Thompson 1995: 170–1)

The main problem with this assumption is that it constructs Third World subjects as passive consumers of imported cultural goods. The discourse of cultural imperialism, in other words, relies on what is called the hypodermic model of media effects (Morley and Robins 1995: 126): a model that presupposes that media texts have direct cultural effects on those who view them. This basically means that cultural effects are imputed from an examination of the cultural forms themselves rather than from careful attention to the actual context of viewing. This is too simple a model of cultural reception. The process of reading cultural texts is actually a rather complicated affair, one that entails the active participation of the viewing subject in the construction of meaning (see Morley 1992). Third World consumers faced with an imported text, media or otherwise, will not simply or necessarily absorb its ideologies, values, and life-style positions. Rather, they will bring their own cultural dispositions to bear on such a text, interpreting it according to their own cultural codes (see Ang 1985; Liebes and Katz 1990). What takes place in the viewing encounter is that foreign cultural forms have a tendency to become customized.<sup>22</sup> They are interpreted, translated, and appropriated according to local conditions of reception.<sup>23</sup>

The classic example of this process of customization is Liebes and Katz's (1990) well-known study of the reception of *Dallas* in Israel (focusing on four different ethnic groups: Arabs, Russian Jews, Moroccan Jews, and kibbutz members), the United States, and Japan. The basic finding of the investigation was that viewers from diverse cultural backgrounds attributed very different meanings to the program. The various groups, for example, had different explanations for the motivations of the characters in *Dallas*:

the Americans and the kibbutz members invoke a sort of Freudian theory, perceiving individuals as governed by irrational drives and connecting these with childhood events.

Thus, JR's personality is thought to derive from his having been second to Bobby in his mother's favor. Interpretations of this kind, of course, relieve individuals of much moral responsibility. In contrast, a large proportion of the Russian statements invoke determinism of another form, as if people behaved in a particular way because their roles impelled them to; as if businessmen, for example, or women, were programmed by society. The Moroccans also blame society, but invoke a Hobbesian model in which individuals must fend for themselves in the jungle of the world. Only the Arabs – who focus not on motivation but on family interrelations and moral dilemmas – find the individual free and responsible enough to struggle against temptation and constraint. (Liebes and Katz 1990: 103)

Given the clear and systematic differences in the ways the various groups interpreted *Dallas*, Liebes and Katz conclude that the process of reception is not a straightforward imposition of meaning but a creative encounter between “the symbolic resources of the viewer and the symbolic offerings of the text” (1990: 6). They suggest, in other words, that the reception of media products is an intricate cultural process that entails the active involvement of individuals in making sense of the images they consume.

Eric Michaels (2002) provides another important example of the customization of alien cultural forms (see also Boellstorff, Chapter 13 in this volume). His work focuses, in part, on the reception of Hollywood videotapes among Warlpiri Aborigines in the western Central Desert of Australia. Michaels's most suggestive finding was that the Aboriginal peoples were not familiar with the genres and conventions of western narrative fiction. They were unable to distinguish, for example, romance from documentary, or to judge the truth value of Hollywood cinema. The reason for this is that in traditional Warlpiri culture all stories are true. Fiction simply does not exist as an epistemological form through which to make sense of the world. This situation produces, according to Michaels, quite extraordinary interpretations of Hollywood programs. He elaborates in the following manner:

Comparisons between Warlpiri story form and imported video fictions demonstrated that in many instances, content (what is supplied in the narrative) and context (what must be assumed) are so different from one system to the other that they might be said to be reversed. For example, Warlpiri narrative will provide detailed kinship relationships between all characters as well as establishing a kinship domain for each. When Hollywood videos fail to say where Rocky's grandmother is, or who's taking care of his sister-in-law, Warlpiri viewers discuss the matter and need to fill in what for them is missing content. By contrast, personal motivation is unusual in Aboriginal story; characters do things because the class (kin, animal, plant) of which they are members is known to behave this way. This produces interesting indigenous theories, for example, of national character to explain behavior in *Midnight Express* or *The A-Team*. (2002: 319)

The point here is that for Warlpiri viewers Hollywood videos are not necessarily complete, authoritative texts. They are instead partial stories that require “a good deal of interpretive activity on the part of viewers to supply contents as well as context with which to make these stories meaningful” (2002: 321). Michaels's conclusion, then, is that it is not possible to know in advance what the effects of

particular television programs might be on traditional Aboriginal audiences. It is only in the actual context of viewing that meaning can be determined.

These two examples should not be taken to imply that foreign texts have no cultural influence at all. It is not our intention to romanticize the process of interpretation. It may be that consuming subjects are active makers of sense. But this does not mean they can therefore do whatever they want with the goods they consume. There are limits to how one can interpret a text.<sup>24</sup> All we mean to suggest is this: that the process of interpretation, and hence the influence that foreign programs have on their audiences, are rather more complicated than the discourse of cultural imperialism, with its hypodermic model, permits. Cultural materials just do not transfer in a unilinear manner (see Tomlinson 1999). They always entail interpretation, translation, and customization on the part of the receiving subject. In short, they can only be understood in the context of their complex reception and appropriation.

The implications of this way of conceptualizing the reception of imported products are rather profound. It gives us cause to rethink the idea that the world is being homogenized. The discourse of cultural imperialism argues that the spread of western cultural goods is leading to the incorporation of peripheral cultures into a synchronized global monoculture. The problem here, though, as Tomlinson points out, is that the cultural imperialism argument makes “unwarranted leaps of inference from the simple presence of cultural goods to the attribution of deeper cultural or ideological effects” (1997: 135). In other words, it simply assumes that the sheer presence of western forms has a self-evident cultural effect on Third World subjects. However, if it is the case (as we are arguing) that consumers do not necessarily absorb the ideologies, values, and life-style positions of the texts they consume, if it is true that subjects always bring their own cultural dispositions to bear on such texts, then the case for the homogenization of the world loses much of its force. The only way to really show that the world is being homogenized is to demonstrate not only the ubiquity of western cultural forms but also that the consumption of these goods is profoundly transforming the way people make sense of their lives. Indeed, the homogenization scenario only makes sense if it can be established that the consumers of foreign cultural products are internalizing the values allegedly contained in them, whatever these values might be. The point, then, is that the ubiquity of western cultural forms around the world cannot in and of itself be taken as evidence that the world is being homogenized. Homogenization entails much more than this: it entails the transformation of the way people fashion their phenomenal worlds (see Tomlinson 1999). This not to say that there has been no cultural convergence at all in the world. It is to suggest, though, that as long as the process of customization is hard at work, the specter of homogenization will be kept somewhat at bay and the world will remain full of difference.

The second problem with the discourse of cultural imperialism’s vision of the world has to do with the tendency to analyze globalization simply as a flow from the West to the rest. To be sure, there is substantial asymmetry in the flow of meaning in the world: the center mostly speaks, while the periphery principally listens (Hannerz 1992: 219). But this hardly means that the periphery does not talk back at all. For indeed it does. Culture does move in the opposite direction, that is, from the rest to the West (see, for example, Shannon 2003 and Cook et al. 2004). There is

no denying this. The signs of it are everywhere. Take the case of food, for example: there are certain cuisines – such as Indian, Chinese, Korean, Thai, and Mexican – that have become standard eating fare for many in the West. Or take the realm of religion: it is not just Christianity and Judaism that command the attention of the faithful but increasingly also “non-western” religions such as Islam and Buddhism. Or take music: the listening pleasures of those in the West now include not only rock-and-roll and R&B but also samba, salsa, reggae, *rai*, juju, and so forth. Or take, finally, the case of people, which undoubtedly represents the most visible sign of this reverse traffic in culture: since World War II, largely as the result of poverty, economic underdevelopment, civil war, and political unrest, millions of people from the less affluent parts of the world have been driven to seek a future in the major urban centers of the “developed” and “developing” nations.<sup>25</sup> The result is a monumental presence of Third World peoples in the metropolises of the West. One finds, for example, people from the Caribbean basin (Cubans, Dominicans, Haitians, Puerto Ricans, Jamaicans), Asia (Chinese, Cambodian, Indian, Korean, Pakistani, Japanese), and Latin America (Mexicans, Guatemalans, Colombians) in the US; from Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco in France; from Turkey and North Africa in Germany; from Morocco and the Dominican Republic in Spain; from Indonesia and Suriname in the Netherlands; from Senegal and Albania in Italy; and from the Caribbean, India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh in the United Kingdom (Hall 1996). What has happened, as a result of all this reverse traffic in culture, is that the periphery has set itself up within the very heart of the West. As such, the encounter between the core and the periphery no longer takes place simply “out there.” It now also comes to pass “here.” The core has been peripheralized, as it were (see Sassen-Koob 1982).

A significant effect of this peripheralization of the core has been that the nation-states of the West have been somewhat unsettled. This unsettling – and we will shortly see what is meant by this – has a lot to do with the nature of contemporary population movements. The interesting thing about migrants nowadays is that, in general, when they move across national boundaries, they do not simply leave their “homelands” behind (see Basch et al. 1994).<sup>26</sup> Rather, they are able to forge and maintain distanced social relations – relations at a distance, across time and space – that link together their home and host societies. In other words, migrants today often form what might be called diasporic attachments; this refers to this dual affinity or doubled connection that mobile subjects have to localities, to their involvement in webs of cultural, political, and economic ties that encompass multiple national terrains.<sup>27</sup> These are people who have become practiced exponents of cultural bifocality (Rouse 2002). Or, as Stuart Hall has put it:

They are people who belong to more than one world, speak more than one language (literally and metaphorically), inhabit more than one identity, have more than one home; who have learned to negotiate and translate *between* cultures, and who, because they are irrevocably the product of several interlocking histories and cultures, have learned to live with, and indeed to speak from, *difference*. They speak from the “in-between” of different cultures, always unsettling the assumptions of one culture from the perspective of another, and thus finding ways of being both *the same as* and at the same time *different from* the others amongst whom they live. (1995: 206)

Contemporary migrants (or at least many of them) thus represent different ways of being someone in a shrinking world. They are mobile subjects who draw on diverse assemblages of meanings and locate themselves in different geographies simultaneously.

The classic anthropological example of this diasporic process is Roger Rouse's (1988, 2002) study of the movement of labor migrants from the rural Mexican town of Aguililla, located in the southwest corner of the state of Michoacán, to the North American community of Redwood City, found on the northern edge of California's celebrated Silicon Valley (see also Ong, Chapter 7 in this volume, and Ewing, Chapter 8 in this volume). One of Rouse's basic observations is that the social-spatial image of "community," identified as a "discriminable population with a single, bounded space – a territory or place" (2002: 158), has historically been used to understand the experiences of Mexican migrants to the US as a relatively unproblematic one-way movement from one national space to another, that is, as a movement in which "migrants and their descendants experience a more or less gradual shift from one ordered arrangement to another, either fully converting to the dominant way of life or forging their own form of accommodation in an ordered synthesis of old and new" (2002: 160). Mexican immigrants have thus conventionally been viewed as persons who uproot themselves, leave behind home, country, and community, and endure the painful process of incorporation into a new society and culture. Rouse argues, however, that since World War II the image of the territorially bounded community "has become increasingly unable to contain the postmodern complexities that it confronts" (2002: 160). For Mexican migrants have developed socio-spatial arrangements that question the received ways of viewing migration and that thus call for alternative cartographies of social space. What has happened, to put it simply, is that the Aguilillan "migrants" who have settled in Redwood City have not severed their ties to "home" but have instead maintained connections so intense that Aguililla and Redwood City can no longer be conceived as separate communities:

Through the constant migration back and forth and the growing use of telephones, the residents of Aguililla tend to be reproducing their links with people that are two thousand miles away as actively as they maintain their relations with their immediate neighbors. Still more, and more generally, through the continuous circulation of people, money, commodities, and information, the diverse settlements have intermingled with such force that they are probably better understood as forming only one community dispersed in a variety of places. (Rouse 1988: 1–2; quoted in García Canclini 1995: 231–2)

Put otherwise, Aguilillan migrants have not abandoned one national space for another but have formed – through the continuous circulation of people, capital, goods, images, and ideas – a community that stretches across national boundaries. Rouse refers to this territorially unbound community as a transnational migrant circuit, emphasizing that it is here rather than in any particular locale that the lives of Aguilillans take place. Aguilillan migrants thus occupy no singular national space. They live their lives transnationally. They are cultural bifocals who belong

simultaneously to more than one home and hence to no one home in particular. They are, in short, the fruit of several interlocking nations and cultures.

What all this indicates is that we are witnessing a world in which significant social relations and the parameters of community are no longer, if they ever were, simply confined within the limits of a single territorial national space. We are witnessing a world, in other words, that has become strewn with migrants who inhabit imagined communities of belonging that cut across and encompass multiple national terrains. The implications of this development for western nation-states, to get back to the question of unsettling, are rather profound. The nation-state, according to Arjun Appadurai, has historically functioned “as a compact and isomorphic organization of territory, ethnos [or people], and governmental apparatus” (1996: 42). This basically means that it has traditionally been constructed as a territorially circumscribed and culturally homogeneous political space. The main way the nation-state has achieved this cultural homogeneity is through systematically subjecting the individuals living within its spatial frame to a wide array of nationalizing technologies. These technologies of nationhood include the granting of citizenship rights; the development of rules on nationality; the invention of symbols of nationhood such as flags, ceremonials, the celebration of historical figures, and the observance of national holidays; the provision of social welfare policies, conscription, and public bureaucracies; and the building of roads, schools, hospitals and prisons (Axford 1995: 152–3). The nation-state, then, has historically operated with coercive practices designed to forge its subjects into a single homogeneous national community. And it has by and large been very effective at creating this uniform space of nationness, successfully nationalizing not only those folks born on its soil but also the many migrants who settle within its boundaries.<sup>28</sup> Nowadays, however, western nation-states are no longer able to adequately discipline and nationalize all the subjects under their domain. They cannot fully produce proper national subjects – subjects defined by residence in a common territory, a shared cultural heritage, and an undivided loyalty to a common government. A case in point: the many migrants who live their lives across national boundaries. These are people who, because they are intimately linked to more than one place and to no one place in particular, are able to escape, to some degree, the nationalizing apparatuses of the nation-state. These are people, that is, who cannot be fully subjected to the nationalizing or assimilating imperatives of one nation-state since their experience is not limited to that single space. The basic problem here is that these days the nation-state functions less and less as a self-contained, autonomous entity and more and more as a transit depot through which an ever-increasing number of migrants pass, thus making it almost impossible for the technologies of nationhood to do their job and delimit the contours of a singular national order.

The result of this inability to construct a monolithic national community, of the incapacity to turn migrants into proper national subjects, is that the nation-states of the West have become homes to a host of diverse and sometimes incommensurable cultures. They have been turned into meeting places for a broadening array of peoples and cultures. They have developed into sites of extraordinary cultural heterogeneity.<sup>29</sup> Significantly, what this unfolding means is that the isomorphism of territory, ethnos, and legitimate sovereignty has to some extent been undone.

The ethnos and the territory no longer neatly coincide. The nation-state is no longer the place of the ethnos. It has become instead the place of the ethni. Moreover, this unfolding means that the cultural centeredness of the West has been somewhat called into question. For what can it mean to be English or American or French or, simply, western when these countries have become containers of African, Asian, and Latin American cultures? Contemplate, for instance, the following remarks from Jo-Jo, a young white reggae fan in Birmingham's ethnically diverse Balsall Heath neighborhood:

There's no such thing as "England" any more . . . welcome to India brothers! This is the Caribbean! . . . Nigeria! . . . There is no England, man. This is what is coming. Balsall Heath is the center of the melting pot, 'cos all I ever see when I go out is half-Arab, half-Pakistani, half-Jamaican, half-Scottish, half-Irish. I know 'cos I am [half-Scottish/half-Irish] . . . who am I? . . . Tell me who I belong to? They criticize me, the good old England. Alright, where do I belong? You know I was brought up with blacks, Pakistanis, Africans, Asians, everything, you name it . . . who do I belong to? . . . I'm just a broad person. The earth is mine . . . you know we was not born in Jamaica . . . we was not born in "England." We were born here, man. (Hebdige 1987: 158–9, quoted in Gupta and Ferguson 2002: 69)

Jo-Jo no doubt overstates the case a bit. There are many people who continue to define England as a homogenous national space and wish to keep its culture intact, unified within, and with strongly marked borders dividing it from others (Hall 1995). But certainly the idea of a culturally stable and unitary England no longer has the hold it once had. And the same could be said of France, the US, and most other First World nations, whose spaces have similarly become zones of heterogeneity. In a world of motion, the nation-states of the West have indeed been unsettled as antiquated efforts to map the world as an assemblage of homogeneous culture areas or homelands are "bewildered by a dazzling array of postcolonial simulacra, doublings and redoublings, as India and Pakistan seem to reappear in postcolonial simulation in London, prerevolution Teheran rises from the ashes in Los Angeles, and a thousand similar cultural dramas are played out in urban and rural settings all across the globe" (Gupta and Ferguson 2002: 68). In a world of complex mobilities, in short, the normative character of the western nation-state has been called into question and unsettled.<sup>30</sup>

Three general points spring from this discussion of reverse cultural flows. The first is that the process of globalization is much too complex to be thought of merely as a westernizing affair. For it involves not just the circulation of western subjects and objects but also the dissemination of non-western cultural forms. Globalization, in other words, cannot be conceived solely as a matter of one-way, western imperialism. It must be understood instead as a process of mutual, if uneven, infiltration: with the West permeating the rest and vice versa. The second, and related, point is that the process of globalization cannot be thought of merely as a homogenizing affair. For it is also, on some level, about heterogenization. It is about the differentiation of the world. Or, more precisely, it is about the differentiation of the West. The idea here is simply that a primary effect of the peripheralization of the core, or of the reverse traffic in culture, has been to turn the spaces of the West into dense



sites of cultural heterogeneity. The final point is that as a result of all this back and forth movement, from the West to the rest and vice versa, the familiar lines between “here” and “there,” center and periphery, and West and non-West have to some extent become blurred. That is to say, insofar as the Third World is in the First and the First World is in the Third, it has become difficult to specify with any certitude where one entity begins and the other one ends (see Gupta and Ferguson 2002). Where, for example, does one draw the boundaries of Mexico when so many of “its people” live in the US? Or where does one draw the boundaries of the US when “its capital” has such a strong presence in Mexico? This is not to say that these geopolitical categories have ceased to be useful. Indeed not. But they have become more difficult to map considering that we live in a world of “crisscrossed economies” and “intersecting systems of meaning” (Rouse 2002: 157). In the end, globalization cannot be thought of simply as a westernizing affair, nor can it be viewed solely as a homogenizing one. It must be read instead as a complex process that brings the West to rest and the rest to the West. It must be understood, in short, as a process of mutual imbrication.

The third, and last, problem with the cultural imperialism scenario is that it neglects those circuits of culture that circumvent the West – those which serve primarily to link the countries of the periphery with one another. These circuits can sometimes be more important and influential in shaping local milieus than those that connect the First World to the Third. So it is a major mistake to exclude them from the analysis of globalization. The signs of this peripheral traffic in culture are many. Consider the itineraries of capital: in China, to note just one case, the most important streams of finance come not from the West but from the Chinese communities of Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Southeast Asia (Yang 2002). Or take the flow of commodities: in the northeastern Indian settlement of Rangluwa, for example, the foreign commodities the populace consumes – clothing, cosmetics, and so forth – are more often than not from China rather than from the West (Borooah 2000). Or consider the movement of people: one can find populations from India in South Africa, Fiji, Guyana, and Trinidad and Tobago; from China in Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines, Mexico, and El Salvador; from Afghanistan in the Islamic Republics of Iran and Pakistan; and from Egypt, Pakistan, Eritrea, India, and the Philippines in Saudi Arabia and other Arab Gulf countries (see Margold 1995; Malkki 1997; Willford 2002; Brodwin 2003; Al-Sharmani 2006). This, of course, is only to cite a few examples. Or take, finally, the case of the mass media, undoubtedly one of the most visible signs of the peripheral flow of culture: the India film industry, for example, serves not only the Indian subcontinent but also Indonesia, Malaysia, and areas of Africa; Mexican and Brazilian soap operas are popular not just in Latin America but in Russia as well; and Hong Kong supplies films not simply for mainland China, Taiwan, and the Chinese diaspora but also for other parts of the Third World. Such are the manifestations of the peripheral flow of culture. What they suggest, above all, is that the global cultural encounter takes place not just between the West and the rest but also within the periphery itself. It also takes place between the countries of the Third World.

There are two significant implications of this peripheral flow of culture. The first is that, for some countries of the periphery, the specter of Americanization or

westernization may be less worrisome than, say, the prospects of Indianization, Indonesianization, or Vietnamization (Appadurai, Chapter 2 in this volume). This is the case for Sri Lanka, Irian Jaya, and Cambodia respectively. For some Third World countries, then, the worry is not so much about western domination as it is about the enormous cultural power of other non-western nations. One important analysis of this cultural dynamic is Mayfair Yang's study (2002) of mass media and transnational subjectivity in Shanghai. Yang's central argument is that, for China (or, more specifically, for the Chinese state), the fear of western cultural domination is of minor concern in comparison to the consternation over the subversive influence of overseas Chinese communities. To be sure, she notes, American film and television have made some inroads into China but the far more invasive influence has been Hong Kong and Taiwan popular culture:

One most vivid indication of this cultural invasion can be found in the pop songs that young people listen to and the popularity of karaoke singing. There is something mesmerizing about the repetition of endless stories of love and disappointment. Hong Kong and Taiwan popular culture has gained a firm foothold in the mainland... with visiting singers giving concerts to packed halls filled with adoring fans paying high prices for tickets. Sixteen- and seventeen-year-old girls want to embrace and kneel in the footsteps of such male idols as Tong Ange and Tang Yongling. The longing to be a star oneself can be temporarily satisfied using the imported karaoke audiovisual systems now found in karaoke bars and in many work units, schools, and restaurants. Music stores have sprung up to sell this music on cassettes. Hong Kong songs are sung in Cantonese by young Shanghainese whose point of comparison these days is not Beijing but Hong Kong. (Yang 2002: 335)

The importance of this Hong Kong and Taiwanese cultural invasion, according to Yang, is that it has exposed Shanghainese subjects to overseas Chinese culture and thus made it possible for them to construct new ways of being Chinese – ways not prescribed by the apparatuses of the centralized state. This cultural invasion, in other words, has enabled Chinese national subjects to fashion identity spaces that “spill out over the constrictive molds of a fixed, state-spatialized Chinese identity and homogeneous national culture” (Yang 2002: 341). One can see, then, how the introduction of Hong Kong and Taiwan popular culture into mainland China might give the Chinese state cause to worry. It is a development that has disrupted the ability of the state to form proper national subjects – subjects whose allegiance and orientation are strictly to the state and the nation it embodies. This is not to suggest, though, that the Chinese state has completely lost its subject-making capacity. This is hardly the case. But it is to suggest that the Chinese state is no longer the sole arbiter of the identity of its subjects: it now has to compete for their minds and allegiances with a host of “foreign” entities. The upshot of all this is that for China, as well as for many other countries of the periphery, the West is not the only, or even the major, cultural power they have to contend with. Just as worrisome are the many cultural forces within the Third World itself. Just as distressing are the cultural powers of the periphery.

The second implication is that, in some cases, the peripheral flow of culture is not perceived as a threat but welcomed as a resource that allows people to participate,

on an ongoing basis, in the imagined realities of other cultures. One notable examination of this cultural dynamic is Brian Larkin's study (Chapter 14 in this volume) of Indian films among the Hausa of northern Nigeria. Larkin's basic argument is that Indian films allow Hausa viewers to creatively engage a cultural tradition different from their own and thus to envision new styles of fashion, beauty, love, and romance. The crucial thing about these films, as well as about the styles they inspire, according to Larkin, is that they emanate not from the West but from another Third World country. As such, they are not associated, in the minds of Nigerians, with a cultural imperialist power.<sup>31</sup> This makes their incorporation into Hausa culture much more readily acceptable. Larkin puts this in the following terms:

In northern Nigeria there is a familiar refrain that Indian culture is "just like" Hausa culture. While indeed, there are many similarities between Hausa and "Indian culture" (at least how it is represented in Indian films) there are many differences, most obviously the fact that Indians are predominantly Hindu and Hausa are Muslim. The popularity of Indian films rests, in part, on this dialectic between difference and sameness – that Indian culture is both like and quite unlike Hausa culture. It is the gap between difference and sameness, the ability to move between the two, that allows Indian films to function as a space for imaginative play in Hausa society. The intra-Third World circulation of Indian film offers Hausa viewers a way of imaginatively engaging with forms of tradition different from their own at the same time as conceiving of a modernity that comes without the political and ideological significance of that of the West. Moreover, when Hausa youth rework Indian films within their own culture by adopting Indian fashions, by copying the music styles for religious purposes, or by using the filmic world of Indian sexual relations to probe the limitations within their own cultural world, they can do this without engaging with the heavy ideological load of "becoming Western."

Larkin's basic argument, in other words, is that Indian films provide Hausa viewers with a meaningful cultural alternative to the aesthetic productions of the West, an alternative that allows them to explore modern forms of existence not linked to the history of western cultural imperialism. Indian films furnish them with a way to fashion new selves without having to take on the West and its ideological baggage. What this example highlights is that peripheral flows of culture figure prominently in generating interconnections between different peoples and cultures – interconnections that allow individuals to construct new ways of being in the world. As such, the traffic in culture within the Third World does not necessarily have to be about cultural domination. It can also be just about allowing people to creatively partake in the imagined realities of different cultures.

The basic point that emerges from all this is that the discourse of cultural imperialism's vision of the West overrunning the Third World, once again, cannot capture what is taking place in the world today. The idea here is that while the circuits that connect the West to the Third World are undoubtedly the prime movers of the global traffic in culture, they are by no means the only important forces around. There are also quite a few circuits that circumvent the West altogether, circuits that serve mainly to interconnect the countries of the periphery with each

other. And these can be just as powerful in shaping the local environments of the periphery as any that go through the First World. This means that the West is not necessarily the only or primary foreign influence on many Third World countries. It indicates that the global cultural encounter takes place not just between the core and the periphery but also within the non-western world itself. As such, globalization cannot be thought of simply as a westernizing or homogenizing matter. It must be understood instead as an intricate process that brings not just the West to the rest or the rest to the West but also one part of the periphery to another. It has to be grasped as a much more complex, crisscrossing global affair.<sup>32</sup>

### *A dislocated world*

The argument we have been making is that the discourse of cultural imperialism understands the increased global traffic in culture principally as a process of cultural imposition and dominance: of the imposition and dominance of western culture over the rest of the world. Moreover, we have noted that this pattern of domination is perceived as bringing about the increasing cultural homogenization of the world. The scenario that is often sketched is one in which western cultural practices, institutions, goods, and styles are being lifted from their territorial grounding and replicated across the world; the result being that the cultures of the periphery are being pounded out of existence. The de/territorialization of culture, in other words, is envisioned as leading to the elimination of cultural difference in the world as western culture is increasingly embraced in localities around the globe. It is seen as promoting the production of a world of sameness. We have also suggested, however, that from an anthropological perspective this westernization/homogenization scenario fails to adequately capture what is going on in the world. One basic problem with this take on globalization is that the traffic in culture is conceptualized as simply moving in one direction: from the West to the rest. To be sure, this center to periphery flow is a crucial component of the global cultural economy. But it is not the only thing that globalization is about. Globalization is actually a much more complex process, one that also involves substantial movements of culture from the periphery to the core as well as within the periphery itself. Another basic problem is that western cultural texts are perceived as having a self-evident cultural effect on Third World subjects, the effect being to westernize them. But this is an erroneous perception. The peoples of the periphery do not simply or necessarily absorb the ideologies, values, and life-style positions putatively embedded in the foreign cultural goods they consume. More often than not they actually customize these imported forms, interpreting them according to local conditions of reception. From an anthropological perspective, then, the process of globalization, we have suggested, is much too complex to be thought of merely as a westernizing affair, one that is leading to the obliteration of cultural difference in the world. We have argued that globalization is not in any simple way battering the cultures of the periphery out of existence and bringing forth a world of sameness.

What all of this implies is that the world can no longer be viewed simply as a matter of one-way, western cultural imperialism. It cannot be conceptualized just in terms of core-periphery relations. The world is just too complex a place. What we

need, then, is a more nuanced view of the globe than that provided by the discourse of cultural imperialism. We need a different image of the world than the core-periphery model. The image we would like to put forth is that of dislocation. We propose, in other words, to view the world as a dislocated cultural space. The term “dislocation” is borrowed from Ernesto Laclau (1990), who uses it to refer to structures whose center has been displaced – displaced in such a way as to be supplemented not by another center but by a plurality of them. The main structures Laclau has in mind are modern societies or nation-states. But we think that the world as a whole can be conceptualized in similar terms. For the world, like the nation-state, has no single cultural power center from which everything radiates. The West may have historically played this role. But this is no longer the case. The West has been displaced and now has to compete with a plurality of power centers around the world. This is not to suggest, though, that the West has ceased to be the major player in the global cultural economy. It certainly has not. But it does mean that it no longer occupies an unchallenged position of dominance in the world. The world can thus be said to be dislocated to the extent that there is not just one global cultural power center but a plurality of them, even if the West stands out among these. In other words, the world can be thought of as a dislocated cultural space insofar as global cultural power has ceased to be concentrated in the West and become somewhat diffused. It can be considered dislocated, in short, to the degree that the traffic in culture or the flow of meaning does not just originate in the West but also in places all over the globe. To think in terms of dislocation is to view the world not in terms of a monolithic core-periphery model but as a complexly interconnected cultural space, one full of crisscrossing flows and intersecting systems of meaning. It is, in sum, to view the world (and hence globalization) not as a western project but as a global one.

### **The Limits of Global Mobility and Connection**

The world we have described so far is one that is very much in motion. It is a world full of intricate flows and far-flung interconnections. This should not be taken to suggest, though, that the assorted mobilities which traverse the planet are completely foot-loose nor that the links connecting the various parts of the globe to each other are uniform and limitless. Indeed, we do not live in a world of unfettered flows and boundless connectivity. There are definite limits to global mobility and connection (Trouillot 2001; Coutin et al. 2002; Navaro-Yashin 2003; Cunningham and Heyman 2004; Cooper 2005; Tsing 2005; Ferguson 2006). What we would like to do here is explore these limits. First, we will examine what might be called the materiality of the global. This refers to the material practices – infrastructure, institutions, regulatory mechanisms, governmental strategies, and so forth – that both produce and preclude movement. The objective here is to suggest that global flows are patently structured and regulated, such that while certain objects and subjects are permitted to travel, others are not. Immobility and exclusion are thus as much a part of globalization as movement. Second, we will explore what we are calling, inspired by Anna Tsing (2005), awkward connections. This notion captures

how the interconnections that typify the globe are highly selective and uneven. The idea here is that while the world might be highly interlinked, it is discriminatingly and unequally so. Indeed, there is a certain patchiness to the global map: while some areas of the world are well networked, others are all but skipped over or bypassed. Disconnection and segregation thus characterize globalization as much as linkage. In this section, then, we aim to round out the picture of globalization, attending to the processes that promote and limit movement and connection.

### *The materiality of the global*

Let us start with the materiality of the global. Too often stories of globalization have imagined the circulation of capital, goods, ideas, images, and people as unrestrained. But the reality is that objects do not generally circulate freely. They require some sort of material infrastructure – encompassing anything from juridical frameworks, governmental strategies, and regulatory mechanisms to highways, airplane routes, and communications technologies – in order to move. By the same token, this very infrastructure (or lack thereof) can serve to limit and constrain mobility. Global flows, then, cannot be adequately apprehended without some attention to the sundry mechanisms that enable or hinder them. Indeed, they very much depend on what Tsing (Chapter 3 in this volume) calls a “material and institutional infrastructure of movement.”

A prime example of the how material infrastructures enable movement is Jeffrey Juris’s (Chapter 15 in this volume) study of new digital media flows and global activist networking. This work generally focuses on how anti-corporate globalization activists, inspired in large part by the ground-breaking utilization of the Internet by the Zapatistas, have employed new digital technologies – Web pages, open editing software, e-mail lists, and so forth – to create networks, organize mass actions, engage in media activism, and practice an emerging political ideal of open communication and globally networked democracy. Endeavors these activists have spearheaded include global campaigns against the liberalization of trade, drives to abolish the foreign debt of poorer countries, international forums, cross-border information sharing, and global days of action. Through the use of communication networks that span the globe, then, anti-corporate globalization activists have mobilized millions of people around the world in protest against capitalist-driven globalization, as well as brought extensive visibility to issues involving democracy and global economic justice. Significant here is that digital media technologies are a crucial condition of possibility for anti-corporate globalization activism. Juris articulated this as follows:

By significantly enhancing the speed, flexibility, and global reach of information flows, allowing for communication at a distance in real time, digital networks provide the technological infrastructure for the emergence of contemporary network-based social movement forms... Using the Internet as technological architecture, [anti-corporate globalization] movements operate at local, regional, and global levels, while activists move back and forth between online and offline political activity.

Juris’s argument is thus that new digital media provide the technological infrastructure that enables information to traverse the globe and communities to engage in

exchanges across vast distances. Without this infrastructure, anti-corporate globalization activism could hardly thrive.

Also emblematic of how infrastructure makes mobility possible is Kavita Misra's (Chapter 18 in this volume) study of AIDS service organizations in India and the global circulation of ideas. Misra notes that, as her fieldwork developed, she noticed how the transnational idea and practice of "confidentiality" lay behind many key negotiations related to AIDS work. "The uses of this language by AIDS experts," Misra states, "came to signify all that was deemed culturally absent but desirable and ideal for AIDS prevention and management in the Indian context (indeed, in all non-Euro-American contexts), and all that constituted socio-political impediments to health." The notion of "confidentiality" was thus invoked in discussions of AIDS issues ranging from consent, information, and privacy to discrimination, stigma, and institutional neglect. As such, it constituted a key discursive site reflecting changing and contested definitions of health, configurations of citizenship, and arrangements of governance. Importantly, the movement of "confidentiality" to India could not have been possible without the expert infrastructure set up to deal with AIDS. As Misra put it:

The AIDS crisis in India has . . . produced a community of expertise, a set of transnationally mobile individuals and groups, many of whom are situated in the realm of the non-governmental. This space of expert knowledge acts as a self-critical source of cultural commentary as well as transformative trends. It is a conduit for globally established scientific and ideological material to be delivered to local spaces, and the medium through which such material came to be contested, critiqued and reformulated before finding its way back into global sites.

Put otherwise, "confidentiality," as a transnational concept and practice, is very much indebted for its mobility to the assemblage of scientists, biomedical practitioners, legal experts, policy-makers, and non-governmental organizations that constitute the Indian AIDS service. This assemblage basically acts as a channel for the circulation of global AIDS ideologies.<sup>33</sup>

Material infrastructures do not only promote mobility, of course. They also hinder and block it. Take, for example, the movement of populations. To be sure, the technological capacity to make people highly mobile generally exists. But the mobility of people is actually rather stratified and subject to often strict state monitoring and control (Coutin et al. 2002; Neumayer 2006). Thus while some people might have the necessary wealth or cultural capital to secure the right to travel, many more do not. Indeed, not everyone has the same capacity for mobility. A particularly significant occurrence is that the immigration policies of First World nations have become progressively stricter, making it more and more difficult for refugees and labor migrants from various parts of the world – Latin America, Eastern Europe, Africa, and Asia – to migrate legally. The case of France is instructive here. Over the last few decades, as Didier Fassin (Chapter 9 in this volume) shows, the attitude of French authorities towards refugees has changed from relative tolerance to almost total mistrust. In 1981, for instance, 80 percent of foreigners who sought asylum in France were granted refugee status. Eighteen years later, in 1999, it was the rejection rate that came to 80 percent. Two developments in the late

1980s were significant in this transformation. One was the end the Cold War, which generated sizable migrations from formerly communist countries toward Western Europe; the other the popular rise of the National Front, an extremely xenophobic political party that loudly decried the “invasion” of France by immigrants. Within this political environment, socialist Prime Minister Michel Rocard famously proclaimed: “France cannot welcome all the misery of the world.” What is more, border officials began turning away numerous refugees before they could even apply for asylum and civil servants who assessed claims were instructed to reduce the number of acceptances. Accordingly, the number of foreigners offered political asylum decreased appreciably, gradually settling at approximately 2,000 refugees per year during the 1990s. Today, political asylum has essentially lost much of its legitimacy and asylum seekers are viewed with deep suspicion. As Fassin puts it: “all candidates for refugee status are now considered, until there is evidence to the contrary, to be undocumented immigrants seeking to take advantage of the generosity of the European nations.” In other words, asylum seekers are nowadays generally deemed illegitimate and therefore highly unlikely to gain admittance into France, at least not legally.

Just as material infrastructures hamper the movement of people, they can also obstruct the mobility of commodities. In point of fact, goods generally do not move across the globe without friction. Obstacles to the free circulation of commodities include global and regional trade agreements (e.g. North American Free Trade Agreement and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade), which specify the rules and protocols of multilateral trade, including the formalities of taxation, export, import, and transit (Chalfin 2006); nation-state customs regimes, which monitor and regulate the movement of goods across state boundaries; and the politics of liquidity, that is, the struggles over the conditions or standards that render objects exchangeable or transferable. A good example of the latter obstacle is Andrew Lakoff’s research (Chapter 12 in this volume) on the global trade in DNA. This work tracks the efforts of a French biotechnology company (Genset) to collect and map the DNA of mental patients at a public hospital (Romero) in Argentina, the goal being to uncover the genes or markers associated with susceptibility to bipolar disorder. If found, these genes would be patented and with any luck used to developed new diagnostic and therapeutic tools. The collection of DNA samples turned out to be more difficult than anticipated. It just so happened that bipolar disorder was infrequently diagnosed in Argentina. The Argentine mental health world generally operated according to a psychoanalytic epistemology and not the North American diagnostic system that recognized bipolar disorder. Without appropriate diagnostic standards in place, the mining and exchange of DNA could hardly transpire. Lakoff puts the problem in the following terms:

Genset’s collection process was based on a more general assumption, in cosmopolitan psychiatry, of the existence of an undifferentiated global epidemiological space. The World Health Organization estimated that 2.5% of the world’s population between the ages of 15 and 44 suffered from bipolar disorder. If this was the case, where were the Argentine bipolar patients? Why was it so difficult for Romero’s doctors to come up with 200 samples? Like the WHO, Genset’s research protocol presumed that bipolar disorder was a coherent and stable entity with universal properties. But as a number of analysts of the production of scientific knowledge have argued, the existence of a given



technoscientific object – here, bipolar disorder – is contingent upon its network of production and stabilization. An individual experience of suffering becomes a case of a generalized psychiatric disorder only in an institutional setting in which the disorder can be recognized, through the use of specific concepts and techniques that format the complexities of individual experience into a generalized convention.

In other words, the problem with Genset's gene-hunting effort was that it took for granted the global validity of North American diagnostic standards. Such standards are part of an infrastructure or epistemic niche that allows technoscientific objects such as bipolar disorder to come into being, take root, and thrive. The difficulty of locating bipolar patients in Argentina signified that a North American diagnostic infrastructure had not quite taken hold there. And in the absence of such an infrastructure, it was difficult to render the illness experience of Argentine mental patients liquid or transferable and thus capable of flowing across administrative boundaries. In the end, Genset did find enough mental patients from whom to collect DNA. But the case shows that the extraction, commodification, and global circulation of genetic material are not a straightforward affair.

#### *Awkward connections*

Now let us turn to awkward connections. Not only have stories of globalization tended to imagine global flows as unrestrained; they have also generally envisioned them as ubiquitous, as thoroughly interlinking the globe. The fact is, however, that such flows are not omnipresent and that the world is not uniformly connected. As Frederick Cooper notes: "The world has long been – and still is – a space where economic and political relations are very uneven; it is filled with lumps, places where power coalesces surrounded by those where it does not, places where social relations become dense amid others that are diffuse. Structures and networks penetrate certain places and do certain things with great intensity, but their effects tail off elsewhere" (2005: 91–2). Globalization, then, is at once a matter of selectively dense interconnections and extensive disconnection and abjection (Ferguson 2006).

We can highlight the awkwardness of global connections through examining the circulation of capital. On the issue of dense interconnections, it is clear that most capital movement occurs within or between the poles of what some have called the Triad (Ohmae 1985; Trouillot 2003): an economic zone with major regional centers in North America (the United States and Canada), Western Europe (with Germany at the epicenter), and Asia (with Japan as the focal point). For instance, in the 1980s, the Triad accounted for 88 percent of all capital flows. And of the \$317 billion dollars invested across political borders worldwide in 1995, the lion's share, \$317 billion, stayed in the United States, Canada, and the European Union (Trouillot 2003: 49). To get a sense of how such an uneven spatial distribution of capital occurs, we can look at the practices of Wall Street global investment banks. As Karen Ho shows (Chapter 6 in this volume), one of the main global strategies of such banks is to concentrate their energies on a few key markets, but simultaneously project the image that they are present (or at least can be) in countless other areas of the world. Being global here is thus not about being everywhere at once but about

maintaining lines of access that allows banks to be flexible and move in and out of places as they wish. To achieve this global strategy, Ho observes:

Wall Street investment banks have empty offices in many places throughout the world, and correspondingly, they focus their material infrastructure, people, and energies on even fewer places such as New York, London, and Tokyo. Such an approach allows investment banks to target their resources and be exclusionary in their sites of capital investment while the empty office secures an entry point, a slight foothold, and a particular global image. This flexible arrangement does not incur the cost of maintaining a fully staffed and operationalized infrastructure, especially if the bank does not have an active business in that location. Given the volatility of financial markets and institutions, the empty office is the kind of unfixed presence that facilitates mobility, even as it diverts from view the particularity and exclusivity of investment banking decisions.

So while Wall Street investment banks might have a presence in numerous places around the world, they actually conduct most of their financial transactions in a limited number of them. They tend to focus their resources on those localities most guaranteed to produce capital returns – on places where, as one of Ho’s informants put it, “the markets are big and real, where our clients are big financial institutions, major companies, wealthy individuals.” And these places are generally located in the Triad.

Turning to disconnection and abjection, there is no doubt that certain areas of the world are on the whole “excluded” from the global economy. Indeed, it appears that portions of humankind are extraneous to world economic processes and that the global map is increasingly full of “black holes” (Trouillot 2001: 129). Such disconnection is perhaps most visible in relation to Africa (Ferguson 2002, 2006). One of the general tenets of post-World War II development theory was that the impoverished countries of the globe would as a matter of course attract large amounts of capital and that, consequently, they would eventually achieve economic parity with the wealthy industrial nations. These assumptions turned out to be mistaken. Today, the most impoverished countries, including many in Africa, draw hardly any private capital and there is certainly no tendency toward economic convergence with the richer nations. The work of James Ferguson (2002) on Zambia is instructive here. It explores how this African nation has been redlined in global financial markets, as well as generally deprived of governmental aid flows, turning it into an out-and-out ghetto of global capital, a space of economic abandonment. This is not to suggest that Zambia in any way exists outside the world capitalist system. As Ferguson explains,

“redlined” spaces of decline and disinvestment in the contemporary global economy are as much a part of the geography of capitalism as the booming zones of enterprise and prosperity; they reveal less the outside of the system than its underbelly. Expulsion and abandonment . . . , disconnection and abjection . . . , occur within capitalism, not outside of it. They refer to processes through which global capitalism constitutes its categories of social and geographical membership and privilege by constructing and maintaining a category of absolute non-membership: a holding tank for those turned away at the “development” door; a residuum of the economically discarded, disallowed, and disconnected – to put it plainly, a global “Second Class.” (2002: 142)

Intrinsic to contemporary global economic processes, then, are practices of exclusion and abjection – the creation of “black holes,” of zones of disinvestment and abandonment. Such practices show that capital flows engender not only dense forms of interconnection but forms of disconnection as well. They not only link together the globe but also set it apart. Indeed, connection and disconnection seem go hand in hand.

The perspective sketched out above on the limits of global mobility and connection can undoubtedly be filled out even further. But the fundamental point here is that the various flows which criss-cross the globe are not entirely footloose and the chains linking different parts of the world to each other far from uniform. Thus while capital can certainly traverse frontiers almost effortlessly, there are places where it does not go; while some people may readily cut across national boundaries, many others are stopped at the border’s edge; while commodities might be able drift briskly from one locality to another, they are regulated via international trade agreements; while images no doubt can flicker quickly from screen to screen, they are often constrained by national regulatory regimes; and while ideologies may be able to circulate rapidly, they require some sort of material infrastructure in order to move. Indeed, globalization is not about unrestrained mobility and limitless connectivity. The world is not a seamless whole without boundaries. Rather, it is a space of structured circulations, of mobility and immobility. It is a space of dense interconnections and black holes.

### The Organization of the Reader

Such is the complex world of globalization. The aim of this reader, as noted earlier, is to provide an anthropological introduction to this world. The articles gathered here are a selection of the most sophisticated recent anthropological work on globalization. We have organized this rich material into an introductory section and five thematic parts (each of which carries a short introduction of its own, along with suggestions for further reading). The introductory section, “Thinking the Global,” brings together general theoretical efforts (including this chapter) to map the global condition.<sup>34</sup> The articles suggest that the picture of globalization as a homogenizing, one-way flow of culture from the West to the rest does not adequately capture the complex realities of the contemporary world. Arjun Appadurai’s piece, for instance, suggests that the global cultural economy is a complex, overlapping, and disjunctive order – one best understood in terms of the relationship among five dimensions of global cultural flows: ethnoscaples (the moving landscape of people), mediascaples (the distribution of the electronic capabilities to disseminate information), technoscaples (the global configuration of technology), financescaples (the disposition of global capital), and ideoscaples (a chain of ideas composed of elements of the Enlightenment worldview). And Anna Tsing’s contribution suggests that anthropologists must investigate global processes “without assuming either their universal extension or their fantastic ability to draw all world-making activities into their grasp.” It calls, in other words, for an exploration of the limits of global movement

and connectivity. The rest of the book moves away from this broad mapping of globalization to track the trajectories of specific global cultural flows. Part I, "Itinerant Capital," focuses on the mobility of capital, concentrating on its articulations with local cultural formations. Part II, "Mobile Subjects," is concerned with the movement of people, focusing primarily on the extensive post-World War II migrations from the countries of the periphery to the major urban centers of the "developed" and "developing" world.<sup>35</sup> Part III, "Roving Commodities," tracks the global flow of commodities, concentrating on the way the consumption of goods often mediates the "encounter" between peoples and cultures from around the world. Part IV, "Traveling Media," deals with the meanderings of the mass media, highlighting the increasingly important role they play in the quotidian realities of people from all over the globe. And part V, "Nomadic Ideologies," explores the circulation of western ideologies and discourses, focusing on how these narratives both constrict the lives of and create new subject positions for the peoples of the periphery.

The volume as a whole, then, aims to capture the complexities of the globalization process. It is concerned with tracking the paths taken by the numerous cultural flows – of capital, people, goods, images, and ideologies – that traverse the globe, as well as with exploring the local experiences of people as their everyday lives become increasingly contingent on globally stretched out social relations. The volume, in other words, simultaneously focuses on the macro processes through which the globe is becoming increasingly, albeit unevenly, interconnected and on the way subjects mediate these processes in culturally specific ways. It focuses, in short, on the conjunctural and situated character of globalization.

To conclude, we would like to call attention to some of the realities that have shaped the construction of this book. The anthropology of globalization is an exciting and rapidly growing field. We would have liked to capture all of this excitement and growth. Unfortunately, the limitation on space and the realities of budgets necessarily made such a task impossible. The volume therefore contains a number of important gaps. There is no intellectual justification for these exclusions other than the need to erect artificial limits. Let us point to some of the most obvious of these gaps. First, a number of important global phenomena are absent from the volume. They include tourist flows, global religious communities, transnational violence, global cities, and transnational pollution. Second, while the geographical reach of the book is fairly broad, there are a few areas of the world glaringly missing, including the Middle East, Australasia, and Polynesia. Third, we would have liked to pay more attention to issues of gender, race, and sexuality, but the need to broadly map the processes of globalization made this task unfeasible. Nevertheless, a number of the articles do touch on these issues (see Boellstorff; Ewing; Green; Merry and Stern; and Misra). And fourth, we would have liked to include more work dealing with the effects of globalization on the First World. But since most disciplines that deal with globalization tend to focus on the West, we felt this volume should be localized mainly in the Third World. This way the book serves as a corrective to much of the literature on globalization. Such are the omissions of this book, or at least some of them. No doubt there are others. We hope the reader will forgive us for these exclusions and enjoy the material that is included here.

## NOTES

- 1 These snapshots are modified quotations taken from various articles included in this volume. See, respectively, Chapter 4, Green; Chapter 8, Ewing; Chapter 10, Caldwell; Chapter 14, Larkin; Chapter 16, Merry and Stern. The quotation marks have been intentionally left off.
- 2 See Robertson 1992 and Featherstone 2006 for genealogies of the concept of globalization.
- 3 For a critique of the rhetoric of circulation and flows as the ruling image for global interconnections, see Ferguson 2006 and Tsing Chapter 3 in this volume.
- 4 In this book, we use the term “western” or “the West” principally as a shorthand for the United States and Western Europe, as well as for the cultural products and practices of these countries.
- 5 We should note here that globalization is not a wholly new phenomenon. The world has for many centuries been an interconnected space (Wallerstein 1974; Wolf 1982; Abu-Lughod 1989). Arjun Appadurai (Chapter 2 in this volume), for instance, traces this interconnectedness back to the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, when the West’s encounter with the rest of the world created an overlapping set of ecumenes in which congeries of conquest, money, migration, and commerce began to form durable cross-cultural bonds. However, the problems of distance and the confines of technology have generally restricted the interactions of the past, so that it has been very difficult (that is, only at great cost and with great effort) to sustain dealings between culturally and spatially separate groups. So it is really only over the course of the past century, with the advent of modern technology – particularly with the innovations in transportation and communication, such as the introduction or improvement of airplanes, telephones, computers and video – that we have entered into a more profound condition of neighborliness, one that encompasses, to varying degrees, even those traditionally most remote from one another. Twentieth-century improvements in technology, then, have made possible interactions of a new magnitude and intensity. Developments in rail and air transport, for example, propel more people faster and longer distances than ever before. High-speed trains dash across the landscape at remarkable speeds, while supersonic jets shrink the extensive landmasses and oceans of the world. And if one prefers not to (or for whatever reason cannot) travel to other regions of the world, people and places reach us in the form of food, clothes, music, television images, and the like; and all kinds of technologies, from the telephone to the internet, enable us to be in touch with people half-way across the world, almost “as if they were present” (Allen and Hamnett 1995: 1). We thus find ourselves in a world that has become smaller over time, one in which borders and boundaries have become more porous than ever, allowing more people and cultures to be cast into “intense and immediate contact with each other,” to be brought “closer” together, as it were (Morley and Robins 1995: 115). For the importance of historicizing global connection, see Trouillot 2003 and Cooper 2005.
- 6 James Ferguson (2002, 2006) thus argues that globalization should not be seen simply as a phenomenon of pure connection. It should also be understood in terms of disconnection.
- 7 The book is also to some extent concerned with related concepts such as transnationalism. Michael Kearney articulates the difference between transnationalism and globalization as follows: “Transnationalism overlaps globalization but typically has a more limited purview. Whereas global processes are largely decentered from specific national territories and take place in a global space, transnational processes are anchored in and transcend

one or more nation-states. Thus transnationalism is the term of choice when referring, for example, to the migration of nationals across the borders of one or of more nations” (1995: 548). See Hannerz 1996 and Ong 1999 for other articulations of the difference between globalization and transnationalism.

- 8 To be fair, anthropologists are not the only ones concerned with the articulation of the global and the local. But such discussions in other disciplines tend to stay at a theoretical level. There is hardly ever any concrete engagement with the local. Anthony Giddens, for example, views globalization as concerning “the intersection of presence and absence, the interlacing of social events and social relations ‘at a distance’ with local contextualities” (1991: 21). However, his analysis doesn’t go much beyond this. There is no concrete engagement with these local contextualities.

In reflecting anthropologically on the global/local distinction, we should bear in mind a few things. First of all, the local, as Stacy Leigh Pigg and Vincanne Adams note, “is not a space where indigenous sensibilities reside in any simple sense” (2005: 11). That is to say, the local cannot be seen as a pre-constituted world, a black slate onto which globalizing processes map. Rather, the local is always already the social and historical product of movement, interaction, and exchange. Second, the global, as Pigg and Adams also point out, is not some sort of abstract monolith that hovers “somewhere above localities, imminently transcending the parochial, embodied, particularistic – and by definition limited and small – ‘local’ worlds” (2005: 30). Rather, it is very much as contingent, rooted, and situated as the local. Indeed, global processes are best thought of as locatable networks of practices and connections. And third, the global and the local should not be thought of as separate processes. Rather they occur simultaneously. At any given time the local is nothing other than the contingent grounding of the global and the global the provisional universalization of the local. The idea here is that what is commonly referred to as the global amounts to the successful circulation of specific localisms. And what we call the local is the “constantly refashioned *product* of forces well beyond itself” (Comaroff and Comaroff 2003: 156). In short, the global is shaped locally while the local is fashioned globally. For recent anthropological takes on the global/local distinction see Comaroff and Comaroff 2003, Mazzarella 2004, Pigg and Adams 2005, and Merry 2006.

- 9 We should point out that the general tendency in anthropology has been to treat the global as “a taken-for-granted macro context and as an abstract process too big for ethnographic endeavor” (Ho, Chapter 6 in this volume). In other words, the inclination has been to examine “the global simply from the ‘rearview’ of what it has left in its wake, that is, as a set of received ‘effects’ or in terms of ‘impact’” (Ho, Chapter 6 in this volume). In keeping with such tendency, this volume generally focuses on the local effects of globalization. However, anthropologists have begun to ethnographically engage the global and track it “as cultural action grounded in specific practices and locales that can be thickly described” (Ho, Chapter 6 in this volume; see also Adams and Pigg 2005, Feldman 2005, and Tsing, Chapter 3 in this volume). This means that agency is accorded not just to the local but also to the global. As Gregory Feldman argues, human mediation is not simply at play when “‘local’ people work over ‘global’ processes” but also when “specific people *located* in ‘macrosystems’ . . . mediate those same processes” (2005: 222). The idea, then, is to treat the global as a project that is humanly mediated.
- 10 Unlike the first edition of this book, which brought together a blend of new writing and old, of the latest “cutting-edge” material and the best pioneering work, this new version mainly assembles recent anthropological texts on globalization (the one exception being Chapter 2, Arjun Appadurai’s contribution, which is an indispensable classic). Over the last half decade, work on the anthropology of globalization has expanded phenomenally.

In order to capture this growth, we felt it best to produce a volume that included as much new work as possible. For earlier work on globalization, readers can turn to the first edition – to its articles and suggestions for further reading.

- 11 The work of Waters 1995 and McGrew 1996 has been very helpful in conceptualizing this section.
- 12 One important difference is that while Harvey sees capitalism as the main driving engine of globalization, Giddens views global processes as operating along four dimensions: capitalism; the inter-state system; militarism; and industrialism.
- 13 We should note here, as Anthony McGrew points out, that these time/space changes

are not uniformly experienced across the globe. Some regions of the globe are more deeply implicated in global processes than others, and some are more deeply integrated into the global order than others. Within nation-states, some communities (e.g. financial ones) are tightly enmeshed in global networks, while others (e.g. the urban homeless) are totally excluded (although not entirely unaffected) by them. And, even within the same street, some households are more deeply embedded in global processes than others. (1996: 479–80)

We will deal more with the awkwardness and unevenness of global connections later.

- 14 Globalization as a whole must be understood in terms of simultaneous, complexly related processes in the realms of economy, politics, culture, technology, and so forth. See Held et al. 1999 for one attempt to provide an overall take.
- 15 To be sure, culture has always been more mobile and less fixed than the classical anthropological approach implies (see Gupta and Ferguson 2002). National, regional, and village boundaries have never enclosed culture in the manner that classical anthropological depictions have often indicated. What the intensification of global interconnectedness means, then, is just that the fiction that such boundaries contain cultures and thoroughly regulate cultural exchange can no longer be maintained.
- 16 The discourse of cultural imperialism is not as popular in academic circles as it was during the 1970s and 1980s (Tomlinson 1999). Nevertheless, it remains an important critical position for understanding the process of globalization. We find this discourse a useful starting point for discussing the cultural dynamics of globalization because it highlights the global asymmetries in the flow of meaning. Such asymmetries continue to be an important part of the world of globalization.
- 17 The discourse of cultural imperialism is actually a heterogeneous ensemble of complicated, ambiguous, and contradictory ideas. Here, however, our main concern is to identify some of the central tenets that run through the discourse. We thus necessarily gloss over its tensions and contradictions. See Tomlinson 1991 for a more nuanced view of this discourse.
- 18 The work of John Tomlinson (1997, 1999) significantly influenced the following discussion of the two visions of global uniformity that follows.
- 19 This scenario is drawn from one of the most important exponents of this view: the American media critic Herbert Schiller. He articulates this view most powerfully in his 1969 classic *Mass Communications and American Empire*.
- 20 This second vision of global cultural uniformity is drawn more or less from Latouche 1996.
- 21 This doesn't mean that the West as a geographical entity has ceased to exist. What has happened, to be more precise, is that "the West" as a cultural formation has been pulled apart from "the West" as a geographic entity. The West, in other words, has been de/territorialized.

- 22 Other names for this process of interpreting foreign cultural forms according to local conditions of reception are creolization (Hannerz 1992), transculturation (Lull 2000), vernacularization (Merry 2006), and indigenization (Appadurai, Chapter 2 in this volume). We prefer the term “customization” because it is less ideologically loaded than terms such as indigenization, which carry connotations of being rooted in the soil. See Malkki 1997 for a discussion of the problems with metaphors of rootedness.
- 23 The discussion of customization that follows focuses on the reception of film and television texts. However, this notion is also useful for talking about how people consume commodities (see Caldwell, Chapter 10 in this volume) and for how they interpret foreign ideologies (see Merry and Stern, Chapter 16 in this volume).
- 24 Morley and Robins, for example, point out that television “programs are usually made in such a way as to ‘prefer’ one reading over another and to invite the viewer to ‘take’ the message in some particular way, even if such a ‘reading’ can never be guaranteed” (1995: 127).
- 25 It is important to point out that this movement of peoples to the First World has been accompanied by mass-media and commodity flows that cater principally to immigrant populations (see Naficy 1993; Mankekar 2002).
- 26 The classic literature on immigration has constructed a picture of migrants as beings who leave behind home and country to endure the painful process of incorporation into a new society and culture. Recent scholarship suggests, however, that this picture is not quite accurate, for immigrants have always, to varying degrees and in different ways, maintained networks of interconnection (Glick Schiller et al. 1995). This is not to say that there are no differences between migrants today and those of the past. One main difference is that, given the introduction of modern technologies of transport and communication (telephone, television, airplanes, fax machines, and so forth), it is now a lot easier for immigrants to maintain networks of interconnection. Today’s interconnections are thus more dense and intense.
- 27 The term “diaspora” has a long and complicated history. Unfortunately, we do not have the space to deal with this history here. Suffice it to say that the term has traditionally been used to refer to the Jewish experience of forced exile from Palestine. And nowadays it is commonly employed to designate the experience of forced dispersal more generally (as in the case of Africans) and to speak of those migrant populations that maintain ties with their countries of origin. See Safran 1991 for a discussion of diasporas in modern society.
- 28 We say “by and large” because nation-states vary (and have historically varied) in their ability to penetrate the nooks and crannies of the everyday lives of the people under their domain. In other words, they are not always (and have not always been) successful in defining and containing the lives of their citizens.
- 29 This heterogenization of the spaces of the West has not come without its problems, however. There has actually been great resistance in both Europe and the US to this heterogenization. Verena Stolcke (1995), for example, argues that over the past decade or so Europe has witnessed the rise of a political rhetoric of exclusion in which Third World immigrants and their descendants have been constructed as posing a threat to the nation because they are culturally different. Numerous strategies have thus been developed to nationalize, repatriate, and marginalize these populations. See also Ewing Chapter 8 in this volume.
- 30 This is not to imply that the nation-state has become obsolete. Indeed not. The nation-state continues to operate today with great effectiveness. Aihwa Ong, for example, suggests that “the nation-state – along with its juridical-legislative systems, bureaucratic apparatuses, economic entities, modes of governmentality, and war-making



- capacities – continues to define, discipline, control, and regulate all kinds of populations, whether in movement or in residence” (1999: 15). All we mean to suggest, then, is that while the nation-state might continue to exist, its normative character is not going unchallenged.
- 31 This is not to say that other countries do not view India as a cultural imperialist power. But this is not the case, for the most part, in Nigeria.
- 32 If we had the space, we would complicate this picture even further by taking into account the numerous flows of culture that take place within the West itself. See Morley and Robins 1995 for a discussion of mass-media flows and Klimt 2000 and Koven 2004 for a discussion of population movements.
- 33 See Rudnyckij 2004 for an exploration of the techniques and networks that make possible the movement of migrant laborers, particularly domestics, from Indonesia to wealthy countries in the Pacific and Indian Ocean regions.
- 34 For other general anthropological takes on globalization see Escobar 2001, Trouillot 2001, Coutin et al. 2002, Moore 2004, Glick Schiller 2005, and Gupta and Sharma 2006.
- 35 The movement of people is, of course, more complex than this. It involves more than just the flow of populations from the Third World to the First. There are also substantial movements of people from the First World to the Third, most notably tourists (see Ebron 1999), and within both the Third and First Worlds (see Margold 1995; Malkki 1997; Klimt 2000; Willford 2002; Brodwin 2003; Koven 2004; Al-Sharmani 2006). Unfortunately, we do not have room in the reader to cover this complexity.

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