Part 1

Concepts and Issues

1

Peacekeeping in Global Politics

This chapter investigates the changing nature of global politics and the role that peacekeeping plays within it. Processes of globalization are changing global politics from a Westphalian order, with states and the relations between them at its heart, to a post-Westphalian order. A post-Westphalian order is characterized by transnational activity, potentially global communications and a variety of politically significant actors. Within this changing global context, peacekeeping has evolved in an ad hoc manner. From the outset, the theory and practice of peacekeeping displayed a commitment to ideas about liberal peace. These ideas can be divided into Westphalian and post-Westphalian conceptions. In its West-phalian form, liberal peace attempts to create institutions and spaces for the peaceful resolution of disputes between states. This approach to peacekeeping is most closely associated with 'traditional peacekeeping' (see chapter 5). On the other hand, post-Westphalian conceptions of liberal peace insist that democratic states do not fight wars with one another. Consequently, one role of peacekeepers should be to spread liberal democracy, thus reducing the likelihood of war between (and within) states.

There is considerable disagreement in international society about which of these two very different roles peacekeepers should fulfil. Indeed, in several contemporary operations it is possible to see both conceptions at work. This ongoing struggle produces a gap between the theory and practice of peacekeeping because the theory is heavily influenced by the Westphalian conception. The picture is further confused when one bears in mind that processes of globalization have significantly increased the number and variety of actors with whom peacekeepers are forced to engage.

1.1   Questioning contemporary peacekeeping

Given the size of the literature on peacekeeping, there have been surprisingly few attempts to think conceptually about its changing roles in global politics. One of the most consistent thinkers in this regard was Indar Jit Rikhye. Writing during the Cold War, Rikhye identified three principal roles for peacekeepers. First, peacekeeping provided a mechanism for resolving conflict without the direct intervention of the Cold War superpowers, thereby reducing the risk of cataclysmic escalation (Rikhye 1984: 221). Second, peacekeeping operations mobilized international society to make a commitment to the maintenance of peace (Rikhye 1984: 245). Finally, he conceived peacekeeping as 'a diplomatic key opening the way to further negotiations for a peaceful resolution of conflicts' (Rikhye 1984: 234, cf. Rikhye et al. 1974: 8–18). Rikhye thus provides an essentially Westphalian conception of peacekeeping as being about creating spaces for negotiation between states. However, this conception only tells part of the story about the role of peacekeeping during the Cold War because only a minority of the UN's early operations were of this classic traditional type (James 1994a: 4).

In contemporary debates there are three main approaches to thinking conceptually about peacekeeping. The first is to assume that because peacekeeping is an ad hoc technique that has developed in response to specific problems it can only be studied on a case-by-case basis. Although few analysts espouse this idea explicitly, the proliferation of edited works containing different case studies with little or no overlap suggests that this view is widely accepted (e.g. Gordon and Toase 2001; Weiss 1995; Damrosch 1993; Durch 1994a, 1997). It emphasizes important differences between operations and acts as a useful guard against the tendency to assume that all peacekeeping during the Cold War was of the Westphalian variety and all peacekeeping afterwards was influenced by post-Westphalian concerns. However, this approach tells us very little about the role of peacekeeping in global politics beyond specific cases.

The most popular way of thinking conceptually about contemporary peacekeeping is to identify its characteristics, functions and types. Boutros Boutros-Ghali's *An Agenda for Peace* (1992a) sparked a widespread debate by referring to the interrelated concepts of peacekeeping, peacebuilding, peacemaking and peace enforcement. He defined peacekeeping as 'the deployment of a UN presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all parties concerned' (Boutros-Ghali 1992a: 5). While his use of the word 'hitherto' proved controversial, there is widespread agreement that peacekeeping is about the deployment of UN personnel with the consent of the parties concerned (e.g. Boyd 1971; Goulding 1993; White 1997). There is also evidence of scepticism towards attempts to expand this definition (Allan 1996). The problem with this approach is that, unfortunately, peacekeeping is uncertain, unregulated and unpredictable (Diehl 1994: 1).

What, for instance, are we to make of operations that carry the label of 'peacekeeping' but do not enjoy the consistent consent of all the parties or do not exclusively employ UN personnel?

One way around this problem is to define peacekeeping according to broad characteristics (James 1990: 1–8). William Durch (1997: 8), for instance, identified four types of 'peace operation' based on such characteristics: traditional peacekeeping, multidimensional peace operations, peace enforcement and humanitarian intervention. Others offer more specific taxonomies. Diehl, Druckman and Wall (1998: 38–40), for example, put forward twelve different types of peacekeeping operation, ranging from 'traditional peacekeeping' to 'sanctions enforcement', while Demurenko and Nikitin (1997) identify seven types of peacekeeping operations. An alternative approach is to categorize peacekeeping chronologically (Segal 1995). Marrack Goulding (1993; see also Richmond 2001), for instance, suggested that there were 'three generations' of peacekeeping, while others have argued that there were only two, the traditional peacekeeping of the Cold War and the 'new' peacekeeping of the post-Cold War world (Ratner 1996; Mackinlay and Chopra 1992).

By identifying the characteristics and functions of different types of peacekeeping mission these approaches provide important insights. However, three main problems arise. First, while there are indeed different types of peacekeeping operation it is misleading to organize them chronologically into 'generations'. Doing so produces a number of anomalies. Just as the shift from a Westphalian to a post-Westphalian international society is protracted, uneven and inconsistent, so is the development of the role of peacekeeping within it. Second, the various taxonomies tend to be self-referential. Although they shed light on how missions are put together, they tell us little about the changing role of peacekeeping in global politics or about the underlying rationale of the activities themselves. Finally, they tend to be inflexible. In putting together their own classification, Paul Diehl and his collaborators argue that other typologies forget that operations may perform multiple tasks simultaneously or may move between different types (Diehl et al. 1998: 38).

The third way of thinking conceptually about peacekeeping is to view it as a form of third-party mediation (Featherston 1994, 1995, 2000; Woodhouse 2000). Featherston argues that the practice of peacekeeping should be based on a theoretical framework that takes both means and ends into consideration. She then goes on to outline such a framework, and insists that there is a gap between what peacekeepers should be doing (mediating, facilitating, etc.) and the military training they are given. Featherston concludes that peacekeepers could be better trained to carry out this third-party role by using her conceptual framework. Similarly, Tom Woodhouse argues that the point of peacekeeping operations is not to encourage victory by one side (2000: 14). However, in some missions (e.g. ONUC in Congo, UNITAF and UNOSOM II in Somalia,

INTERFET in East Timor and UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone) certain sides were encouraged and/or given physical assistance by the peacekeepers. Developing Featherston's perspective, Stephen Ryan (2000) makes use of the different stages of conflict (as identified in the conflict research literature) to propose the best time for peacekeepers to intervene. What Featherston, Woodhouse and Ryan all overlook, however, is the inherently political (and hence inconsistent) nature of peacekeeping operations.

There are therefore several ways of thinking about the role of peacekeeping in global politics currently on offer. All, however, suffer from two principal problems. First, they take peacekeeping practices as a self-evident starting point for analysis, rather than trying to understand what roles peacekeeping plays in the wider processes and structures of global politics. Second, a preoccupation with classifying peacekeeping operations has played down their inherently ad hoc, political nature and concealed disagreements about their ultimate purposes. The rest of this chapter attempts to overcome these problems by exploring the extent of contemporary globalization, Westphalian and post-Westphalian conceptions of peacekeeping, and the different ideas about the roles that peacekeeping ought to play in global politics.

1.2   Contemporary globalization

This section addresses two questions: what is globalization and to what extent does it herald an empirical transformation in the political environment within which peacekeepers operate? And what implications does globalization have for the theory and practice of peacekeeping?

David Held et al. (1999: 1–2) have identified four key questions that lie at the root of the many controversies and debates about globalization:

- What is globalization and how should it be conceptualized?
- Does contemporary globalization represent a novel condition?
- Is globalization associated with the demise, the resurgence or the transformation of state power?
- And does contemporary globalization impose new limits to politics? If so, how can globalization be 'civilized' and democratized?

These questions have, in turn, stimulated five main sources of contention in the globalization debate. These concern matters of conceptualization, causation, periodization, and the trajectories and political impacts of globalization (Held et al. 1999: 10–14; see also Clark 1999: ch.2). Each account of globalization must take a stance on these issues.

Globalization can be understood as an uneven set of processes that affects all areas of human activity, not just the economy. Debates about what factors drive these processes have thrown up both monocausal and multicausal accounts. Chief among the list of potential motors driving

globalization are technological development, the expansionary logic of capitalism, and the historical expansion of Western power and influence. Today, most analysts accept that globalization has come about through the complex interrelationships between many factors that embrace technological, economic, cultural and political change.

Much of the literature on globalization assumes that as it accelerates and intensifies, so the 'limits to national politics' are increasingly exposed (Held et al. 1999: 1). Consequently, state power is often depicted as retreating in the face of globalization and the concomitant revival of non-state sources of power and authority (see Guéhenno 1995; Ohmae 1995; Strange 1996). In practice, however, instead of becoming politically redundant, states have existed (and continue to exist) in a mutually constitutive relationship with the processes of globalization (Clark 1997, 1999). States are thus both a principal site of globalization and are simultaneously transformed by it. This is not surprising if we take seriously insights from historical sociology that states and transnational forces (such as capitalism, religion and civilizations) have developed in an often mutually supportive relationship (Mann 1986, 1993; Tilly 1992). However, globalization has not affected all states evenly. Whereas the policies of the most powerful states – especially the US and the G-7 – have actively facilitated the processes of contemporary globalization, weaker states have generally been forced to react to processes and developments initiated elsewhere. Not surprisingly, therefore, the precise ways in which individual states have adapted to the challenges and opportunities of globalization differ from region to region (Hay 2000).

Although some analysts argue that globalization is a recent phenomenon (e.g. Cox 1996; Scholte 1997) this is not a view we share. Instead, we understand globalization as being a set of processes with a long history, some of which pre-date modernity. It is for this reason that several analysts have attempted to periodize the development of globalization into historical phases in order to gain a more sophisticated idea of the novel features of globalization in the contemporary era (Held et al. 1999). The social and political impacts of globalization, although considerable, are not inevitable but depend on such factors as the strength of domestic institutional structures, the strategies adopted by different states and regional/multilateral associations, and a state's 'location in the global pecking order' (Held et al. 1999: 13).

The final main source of contention concerns the future political direction of globalization. Depending upon one's view of historical change, globalization is seen variously as: exhibiting few qualitatively new characteristics compared to the supposedly 'golden age' of global interdependence (the late nineteenth century) (Hirst and Thompson 1996); the relatively smooth march of human progress (usually by those who emphasize globalization's economic dimension); or a process that is contradictory and historically contingent. In this latter sense, globalization engenders conflict as well as cooperation, fragmentation as well as

integration, and sees universalizing tendencies met with affirmations of local difference (Clark 1997; Rosenau 1997). Thus, globalization should not be understood as the precursor to a single world community; nor should it be seen as following an irreversible logic. Instead, we understand globalization as a fundamentally open-ended set of processes that present actors with both challenges and opportunities, the political outcome of which is not predetermined.

Bearing these points in mind, we follow David Held et al.'s (1999: 27–8) analysis that suggests in a general sense:

1   Globalization can best be understood as a process or set of processes rather than a singular condition.
2   The spatial reach and density of global and transnational interconnectedness have created complex webs and networks of relations between communities, states, international institutions, non-governmental organizations and transnational corporations which make up the global order.
3   Few areas of social life escape the reach of globalization.
4   By cutting across political frontiers globalization is associated with both the de-territorialization and re-territorialization of socio-economic and political space.
5   Power relations are deeply inscribed in the very processes of globalization. In particular, globalization concerns the expanding scale of the networks through which power is organized and exercised.

According to Held et al. (1999), globalization since 1945 constitutes a distinctive historical form rather than a return to late nineteenth-century patterns of interdependence. It represents a unique set of relationships in the fields of politics, law, governance, military affairs, cultural linkages, human migration, in all dimensions of economic activity and in shared environmental problems. The consequences of the Second World War were particularly influential in shaping the contours of contemporary globalization, especially the defeat of the Axis powers, the weakening of the European imperial powers, and the onset of the Cold War system (see Clark 1997; Ikenberry 2001: ch. 6). At the same time, new structures of international governance were established with the birth of the UN and its related institutions and agencies (see chapter 2).

In the economic realm, the institutions that made up the Bretton Woods system initially shaped contemporary globalization until the system collapsed in the early 1970s (Helleiner 1994; Cox 1987). The Bretton Woods system embodied a compromise between those free-marketeers who preferred open international markets, and those social democrats who saw national prosperity and full employment as being of paramount concern. This compromise has been described as 'embedded liberalism' (Ruggie 1982). Its collapse did not herald an era of economic autarky. Instead, Bretton Woods' primary institutions underwent reform and today con-

tinue to play a major role in regulating the global economy, especially through the GATT (now the WTO). In global terms, the predominant economic stratification of the contemporary era has been between those states within the OECD and those left outside it. Within the OECD, its largest economies – the G-7 states – continue to exercise hegemony. At the same time, a new geography of rich and poor has developed which transcends political borders, whereby large-scale poverty exists in rich states and oases of extreme affluence can be found within the world's poorest countries (Thomas 1999). For our purposes, it is noteworthy that the majority of peacekeeping operations have taken place outside of the OECD states and that the policies of the IFIs are increasingly being implicated in the breakdown of international peace and security in certain parts of the world (see chapter 10).

In the military sphere, the contemporary era has been heavily influenced by the alliance systems that emerged during the Cold War. That is, relationships between each bloc's core allies and client states, and the Non-Aligned Movement. Since the Cold War, the global military hierarchy revolves around the North American-Western European security community and its core allies (Shaw 2000). Three developments stand out as being relevant for the theory and practice of peacekeeping. First, after the Cold War, especially within most advanced capitalist states, issues of military security have been shifted from the centre of the political agenda in favour of issues relating to the environment, health, citizenship, education and welfare. The legitimacy accorded to the broadening of the security agenda has had a significant impact on how many states understand and define international peace and security. Second, the last two decades have witnessed significant changes in the nature, scope and organization of the global arms trade. In particular, there has been an increasing transnationalization of the defence industrial base most evident within Europe and North America. This development is linked to the fact that technologies crucial for defence are increasingly being produced within the civil industrial sector. Third, although issues of 'national security' have never been a purely domestic affair, since the Cold War there has been an increase in regional cooperation on matters related to security and defence policy (Adler and Barnett 1998). In addition, patterns of contemporary globalization have encouraged the emergence of a distinctive brand of 'new wars' (discussed on page 20).

Migration flows across the globe have also shifted in the contemporary era. After the Second World War, migrations tended to be from the peripheries of Europe and its ex-colonies to the states of Northern and Western Europe, reflecting the need for cheap labour in these economies. Such migration continues (although at a slower rate) but it has been joined by an explosion of refugee movements, especially Latin American and Asian migration to North America, and labourers from the Middle East and South Asia moving to the newly enriched Gulf states (Held et al. 1999: 426). Indeed, dealing with the repercussions of refugees and

internally displaced peoples has occupied an increasing part of peace-keepers' agenda (see Helton 2002). Potentially tectonic transformations are also under way in the global commons (in the climatic system, the atmosphere, the oceans and the polar regions) and pollutants (such as acid rain and toxic and nuclear wastes) show scant regard for political boundaries. Environmental problems continue to be unevenly spread across the planet, but in the contemporary era they have been given an unprecedented place on the international political agenda.

Contemporary developments in information and communications technology (including radio, television, telephones, international film and publishing businesses, satellites, fibre-optic cables, and digital transmissions) also cross political borders with relative impunity. These developing networks have dramatically altered the velocity and geographic reach of all kinds of human interaction. Importantly, in the contemporary era these networks display at least three novel characteristics (Held et al. 1999: 428). First, they have become increasingly dominated by the English language, which acts as a lingua franca. Second, private corporations have assumed the primary role in the production, regulation and transmission of culture at the expense of religious institutions and states. And, third, the information transmitted through these networks is available not just to elites but also to a significant proportion of mass publics throughout the world.

In these different ways, contemporary globalization challenges state-centric structures of governance and is encouraging the potential emergence of a post-Westphalian world order. This ongoing process is aptly summarized by Held et al. in the following manner:

> In sum, traditional conceptions of state sovereignty and autonomy are being renegotiated and rearticulated within the changing processes and structures of regional and global order. States, moreover, are locked into diverse, complex overlapping political domains . . . Thus national sovereignty and national autonomy have to be thought of as embedded within broader frameworks of governance in which they have become one set of principles, among others, underlying the exercise of political authority. The Westphalian regime of state sovereignty and autonomy is undergoing a significant alteration as it becomes qualified in fundamental ways. However, it by no means follows from this that the nature of this alteration is either straightforward or permanent. (1999: 443–4)

How have these changes impacted on peacekeeping (see Jakobsen 2002)?

First, contemporary globalization forces peacekeepers to pay greater attention to an increasingly diverse array of actors in global politics, many of whom play important roles in either maintaining or disrupting international peace and security (see box 1.1). These actors include regional associations and alliances, the IFIs, TNCs, and NGOs. While many TNCs and NGOs are engaged in legitimate or primarily humanitarian pursuits, transnational associations also have their 'dark side'. The proliferation of transactions across borders makes their regulation

> **Box 1.1 The actors in global politics**
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> - 60,000 major TNCs such as Shell, Barclays Bank, Coca Cola, Ford or Microsoft, with these parent companies having more than 500,000 foreign affiliates.
> - 10,000 single-state NGOs, such as Freedom House (USA), Médecins sans Frontières (France), who have significant international activities.
> - 250 intergovernmental organizations, such as the UN, NATO, the European Union or the International Coffee Association.
> - 5,800 international NGOs, such as Amnesty International, the Baptist World Alliance or the International Red Cross, plus a similar number of less well-established international caucuses and networks of NGOs.
>
> *Source*: adapted from Willetts 2001: 357

extremely difficult and provides spaces for organized criminals and terrorists to operate on a potentially global stage (see Williams 1994). The increased opportunities that contemporary globalization makes available to these different actors suggest that peacekeepers will have to operate in an environment where an increasing number of sources of power and authority exist outside their direct influence.

The hegemonic position of the US is the second feature of contemporary globalization that has important repercussions for peacekeeping. As the most powerful single actor in world politics, it is necessary to understand the primary objectives of the US government and how peacekeeping fits in with them (see Cox 2001, 2002; MacKinnon 2000; Wohlforth 1999). Since the early 1980s, even when US and UN interests coincided, the US has denied the UN the necessary means (financial resources and military capabilities) to give it a reasonable chance of successfully meeting its objectives (Bennis 2000; Falk 1999: 111–24). Both during and after the Cold War, the primary objective of the US government was to maintain a liberal world economy and ensure that it remained the dominant player within it (Cox 1995). For this reason, the US is also a key advocate of the liberal peace (see Cox et al. 2000; and section 1.4). However, US hegemony is not the same as US dominance. Hegemonic relationships – at least in Antonio Gramsci's formulation (1971) – comprise a mixture of coercion and consent, and presuppose opposition as well as mechanisms for constructing alliances and incorporating subordinate groups. In this sense, it is not only the US but also its core allies in the G-7 and elsewhere who are striving to construct a liberal world economy in which they continue to exercise a substantial degree of regulative power. Consequently, the G-7 states also have a crucial role to play in shaping the future of peacekeeping, not least because, by almost every conceivable measure, these states are far more powerful than their antecedents (Mann 1997). Particularly after September 11, the increasingly unilateral and militaristic

character of US foreign policy may significantly eclipse the importance of the other G-7 states. However, the novel impact of these developments for peacekeeping should not be overstated. After all, the US has shown little inclination to engage its own troops in peacekeeping operations after events in Somalia in 1993 and has consistently sought to reduce its financial commitment to peacekeeping over the same period.

Finally, as noted above, contemporary globalization has also given rise to a distinctive form of violent conflict, commonly known as 'new wars' (Kaldor and Vashee 1997; Kaldor 1999). According to Kaldor (1999), in 'new wars' the traditional distinctions between war (violence between states or organized political groups for political motives), organized crime (violence by private associations, usually for financial gain), and large-scale violations of human rights (violence by states or private groups against individuals, mainly civilians) become increasingly blurred. They are characterized primarily by distinct goals, methods and systems of finance that reflect the ongoing erosion of the state's monopoly of legitimate organized violence. The goals of combatants can be understood in the context of a struggle between cosmopolitan and exclusivist identities, the latter seeking to control a given population by ethnically cleansing all those of a different identity or who espouse a cosmopolitan political opinion. The 'new wars' are fought through a novel 'mode of warfare' that draws on both guerrilla techniques and counter-insurgency. Yet this mode of warfare is distinctive inasmuch as decisive confrontations are avoided and territory is controlled through political manipulation of a population by sowing 'fear and hatred' rather than winning 'hearts and minds'. Finally, 'new wars' are financed through a globalized war economy that is decentralized and increasingly transnational, in which the fighting units are often self-funding through plunder, the black-market or external assistance (see also Duffield 2001: ch. 6). Crucially, Kaldor suggests that their resolution lies with the reconstruction of legitimate political communities that instil trust in public authorities, restore their control of organized violence and re-establish the rule of law. 'In this context,' Kaldor (1999: 10–11) argues, 'peacekeeping could be reconceptualized as cosmopolitan law-enforcement. Since the new wars are, in a sense, a mixture of war, crime and human rights violations, so the agents of cosmopolitan law-enforcement have to be a mixture of soldiers and policemen.' As we shall see, this approach was endorsed in important ways by the UN's Brahimi Report (2000), not least in its recommendation that impartiality should be defined in terms of judging parties according to how closely they adhere to the principles of the UN Charter. On the other hand, critics have argued that such a policy would be 'disastrous' since it is little more than 'a left-wing version of the Good Guys vs Bad Guys political thinking that led to disaster in Somalia' (Hirst 2001: 86; see also Kalyvas 2001).

Globalization is thus the umbrella term for the set of processes through which the Westphalian society of states is being transformed into a post-

Westphalian world order. This raises a series of debates about the relationship between sovereignty and human rights, and peace and order, that are fundamental to the way that peacekeeping is conceived.

1.3   A Westphalian society of states

Processes of globalization have prompted debate within international relations theory about the merits of, and challenges to, the Westphalian international order (see Linklater 1996; Dunne 1998). Its most prominent voices are those who claim that the fundamental achievement of the Westphalian order – the establishment of the principle of non-intervention in international society – remains the best route to achieve human development on a global scale, and those who contend that the Westphalian order's commitment to the principle of non-intervention restricts the potential for promoting human rights across the globe. Two distinct but related debates can be identified. On the one hand, there is a largely empirical and ontological debate about what the world is like. In this debate, the protagonists argue about the extent to which world politics in the twenty-first century still conforms to the principles and structures symbolized in the Westphalian settlements of 1648. The key features of this debate have been discussed above with reference to the concept of globalization. There is also a normative debate about the ethical value of the Westphalian principles of sovereignty and non-intervention. This debate is concerned with the extent to which Westphalian structures and principles represent the most appropriate means (system of governance) for promoting human well-being in a world where there is at best only an emerging consensus, and, at worst, radically competing conceptions of what exactly social justice entails.

Contemporary debates about the role of peacekeeping mirror these underlying themes of the international society tradition in international relations theory: how do peacekeepers understand the political environment in which they operate, and what do they see as the most appropriate means of maintaining peace and security both between and within states? At present, it is impossible to discern definitive answers to these important questions in either academic or diplomatic circles. The dominant position, however, clearly favours the idea that the principle of non-intervention offers the best route to peace and security (see Roberts 2002; Chesterman 2001). But this is being increasingly challenged by a growing body of international opinion which suggests that only certain types of states will be able to fulfil the twin goals of human development and peaceful relations (see Deng et al. 1995; Thomas 2000). As a result, there is an increasing preference within both academia and the diplomatic profession to encourage the spread of liberal democratic states across the globe.

The Westphalian settlements were concluded after the Thirty Years' War (1618–48) that took place in Europe between the 'Union' of

Protestant German princes and free cities, and the 'League' of their Catholic counterparts (Jackson 2000: 162–7). The conflict started in the Holy Roman Empire but soon spread to threaten the balance of power in Europe, which was already divided between Protestant and Catholic states and statelets. In late 1648 dual peace treaties were concluded which, according to Robert Jackson, had both a political and religious dimension united within the framework of the state. Politically, the treaties recognized the territorial sovereignty of the approximately 300 states and statelets within Europe. The treaties also confirmed the Peace of Augsburg (1555) at which the principle of *cujus regio ejus religio* was formulated, whereby each ruler declared which brand of Christianity (Protestantism or Catholicism) would hold exclusive rights within their territories (Jackson 2000:163). In short, the Westphalian settlements symbolized the political 'reconstitution of European politics from that of a *universitas*, based on the solidarist norms of Latin Christendom, to that of a *societas*, based on the pluralist norms of state sovereignty, on political independence' (Jackson 2000: 165).

The Westphalian settlements also symbolized two fundamental changes in European politics. First, sovereign states came of age as the dominant form of political organization. Second, their leaders and representatives set about codifying a series of norms to limit disorder between states. The rise of the state was made possible because of several long-term historical developments. According to Charles Tilly (1992), the sovereign state's ability to prevail over its main competitors (city states and imperial structures) as the dominant form of political organization in Europe was largely due to its ability to develop an effective balance between accumulating the instruments of coercive power and allowing its populace to develop along capitalist lines. Also crucial to this enterprise was the success of European states in acquiring five monopolies (Linklater 1998: 28): 1) the right to monopolize control of the instruments of violence; 2) the sole right to tax citizens; 3) the prerogative of ordering the political allegiances of citizens and of enlisting their support in war; 4) the sovereign right to adjudicate in disputes between citizens; and 5) the exclusive right of representation in international society, which has been linked with the authority to bind the whole community in international law. These monopoly powers have been the defining characteristics of states during the Westphalian era inasmuch as transnational authorities and loyalties were shifted from the centre of the political agenda. In some parts of the world, however, and especially those parts where peacekeeping operations have taken place, these monopoly powers have eroded, sometimes to quite startling degrees, or never fully existed in the first place.

The state's success in Europe brought with it the development of three fundamental norms (Jackson 2000: 166–7). The first norm held that the king was emperor in his own realm. Thus, sovereign states are not subject to any higher political authority. The second norm was that outsiders have no right to intervene in a foreign jurisdiction on the grounds of

religion. The third norm affirmed the European balance of power as a means of preventing one state from making a successful bid for hegemony that would, in effect, re-establish an empire over the continent. These three norms provide the political environment in which, according to Jackson, different cultures and political communities can recognize and respect each other as human beings 'without assimilating each other's values and becoming all alike' (2000: 182).

The historical development of these three norms was incremental and required the active use of at least two important instruments at the disposal of state-leaders and their governments: diplomacy and international law. It should be noted that these tools were not available to inhabitants of dominions or colonies, who were often denied the right of direct representation in the diplomatic profession and under international law. Initially, diplomacy as a European profession was styled largely on French diplomatic etiquette, documented in Latin, upheld Christian values, accepted the principles of royal legitimacy and dynastic succession, and was used as a tool to maintain orderly relations between states through organized and multilateral systems of communication (Stern 1999: 65–9). Similarly, international law was not imposed from above but developed by sovereigns for their mutual benefit. The defining characteristics of this Westphalian body of rules are set out in box 1.2.

By the latter half of the twentieth century, the Westphalian *societàs* covered virtually the entire globe. Its expansion can be summarized as taking place in three phases (Jackson 2001: 45–6; see also Bull and Watson 1984). The initial catalyst was the desire of the major European powers to

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Box 1.2   The Westphalian conception of international law

1   The world consists of, and is divided into, sovereign territorial states which recognise no superior authority.
2   The processes of law-making, the settlement of disputes and law enforcement are largely in the hands of individual states.
3   International law is oriented to the establishment of minimal rules of coexistence; the creation of enduring relationships among states and people is an aim, but only to the extent that it allows state objectives to be met.
4   Responsibility for cross-border wrongful acts is a 'private matter' concerning only those affected.
5   All states are regarded as equal before the law: legal rules do not take account of asymmetries of power.
6   Differences among states are often settled by force; the principle of effective power holds sway. Virtually no legal fetters exist to curb the resort to force; international legal standards afford minimal protection.
7   The minimization of impediments to state freedom is the 'collective priority'.

Source: Held et al. 1999: 37–8

penetrate and control areas of the globe that they deemed economically and strategically useful. In this sense, the expansion of international society went hand-in-hand with the expansion of the capitalist market economy. By the nineteenth century, even relatively inaccessible areas like the African interior had fallen under the political control of Western empires. Crucially, even those political entities that successfully resisted Western control, such as the Ottoman Empire, China and Japan, eventually acceded to Westphalian norms and the instruments of diplomacy and international law.

The second phase of expansion followed the wave of nationalism and anti-colonial sentiments that emerged shortly after the Second World War. In this period of decolonization, local political leaders across South and Southeast Asia, most of the Middle East, and almost the whole of Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific, agitated for independence based on European and American ideas of self-determination. In what Hedley Bull described as the 'revolt against the West' the newly independent states gained membership of the Westphalian *societàs*. Consequently, between 1947 and 1967 the society of states expanded from about 50 states to over 160 (Jackson 2001: 46).

The Westphalian order completed its process of expansion with a final phase of European decolonization following the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Russian imperial frontiers were transformed into borders between newly independent sovereign states. Combined with the break-up of other states such as Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia and Yugoslavia, membership of international society expanded to over 180 states. Hence, as Jackson noted:

> Today, for the first time in world history, there is one continuous international society of global extent – without any intervening gaps of isolated aboriginal government or imposed colonial jurisdiction and also without any external hegemons – based on local territorial sovereignty and a common set of rules the most important of which are embodied by the United Nations Charter. (2001: 46)

Even before Westphalia's geographical expansion had come to an end, debates were raging over the extent to which global politics had entered a post-Westphalian era. However, it does not necessarily follow that just because post-Westphalian systems of governance were emerging, actors would behave according to a post-Westphalian code of ethics.

Defenders of the Westphalian *societàs*, such as Jackson, argue that the international norms it embodies 'compose a workable ethics of international relations' that are the best currently available to 'come to grips with the unavoidable realities of human diversity and human imperfection' (2000: 400; see also Bull 1977). In short, the Westphalian *societàs* performs the valuable task of ensuring that the

> standards of [international] conduct are not set any higher than what the statespeople involved could reasonably be expected to acknowledge or

abide by... Notwithstanding its very real limitations and imperfections, to date the *societás* of sovereign states has proved to be the only generally acceptable and practical normative basis of world politics. (2000: 406, 425)

In order to move beyond the normative international order symbolized by Westphalia, the onus has fallen upon its critics to show how alternative structures and norms of governance could promote a greater degree of human flourishing across the planet. Box 1.3 summarizes some of the major criticisms of the Westphalian order. What these critics share is a profound sense of scepticism that adherence to Westphalian principles will provide a sound basis for ensuring international peace and security in the future.

In some ways, these disputes mirror debates about how best to manage and resolve violent conflict that have exercised UN officials throughout the organization's history. This is borne out by recent UN documents on peacekeeping. Both *An Agenda for Peace* (Boutros-Ghali 1992a, 1995a) and the Brahimi Report (2000) demonstrate that many senior UN

Box 1.3   Criticisms of the Westphalian society of states

[The Westphalian] system is failing Nature – the planet Earth – which is being increasingly pillaged, perverted and polluted by economic enterprises which the state-system is unable to control or restrain. It is failing Capitalism in that the national and international institutions that are supposed to manage financial markets are progressively unable – as recent developments in east Asia demonstrate – to keep up with the accelerating pace of technological change in the private sectors, with potentially dire consequences for the whole world market economy. And it is failing world society by allowing a dangerously wide gap to develop between the rich and powerful and the weak and powerless. (Strange 1999: 346)

The 'society of states' run by Western governments and a variety of local strongmen... bears an uncomfortable resemblance to a global protection racket. There is a sense of society among the countries of the liberal-democratic world, but precious little in their relations with those beyond. (Booth 1994: 57)

The states-system, edified into the notion of a society of states, legitimises all manner of quasi-states and tyrants... There is a society of *states*, and within this governments turn a blind eye to the aggression of their friends, regardless of the consequences for 'other' people... In terms of spreading the good life, Westphalia is another of the West's failures. (Booth 1995: 122–3)

What has declined in recent years is the level of consensus about the adequacy of sovereign states and the principles of international relations which have prevailed during the Westphalian era... it is no longer utopian... to imagine new forms of political community and new conceptions of citizenship which bind sub-state, state and transnational authorities and loyalties together in a post-Westphalian international society. (Linklater 1998: 8)

officials and diplomats share a growing unease about the potential of the norms of sovereignty and non-intervention to maintain peace and security either between or within states. Section 1.4 argues that while peacekeeping has demonstrated a commitment to maintaining liberal peace there is no agreement about the best way to proceed. Some states (most notably China, Russia and India) usually advocate the Westphalian conception, insisting that the role of peacekeeping is to create spaces and institutions for sovereigns to resolve their disputes peacefully. From this perspective, the UN should only act when those sovereigns give their consent and even then should not interfere with matters that are deemed to be essentially domestic. Other states, predominantly in the West, often argue that the UN has to be in the business of building liberal democratic societies in war-torn places. This implies placing significant limits on sovereignty and establishing a post-Westphalian world order in both an empirical and normative sense.

1.4   Building liberal peace

In its attempt to construct zones of 'stable peace' (Boulding 1978), the theory and practice of peacekeeping is informed by a commitment to the liberal peace. Democratic peace theory is based on the observation that democratic states do not wage war on each other (Doyle 1983; Levy 1988). That is not to say that democracies do not wage wars at all or that they are less warlike in their relations with non-democracies, only that democracies tend not to fight each other (Elam 1999; Russett 1993). Exponents of this theory generally present two reasons to explain why this might be. These are structural or institutional accounts and normative accounts (Owen 1994). Structural or institutional accounts explain the democratic peace by pointing to the institutional constraints placed on decision-makers in democracies. Legislatures, rule of law and electorates mitigate against rash decisions to go to war (Owen 1994: 90). We can add to this the plethora of international institutions that tie liberal states into international society and give political leaders international as well as domestic responsibilities (Keohane and Nye 1977). Normative explanations focus on the ideas and norms underpinning liberal democracy. Democracies practise compromise in their internal politics, believe that it is imprudent to fight each other and confer legitimacy upon other states believed to be democratic, making it unjust to wage war upon those states (Owen 1994: 90). A further explanation is that states who trade with each other tend not to fight because war is costly and irrational (Hegre 2000). In arguing that peacekeeping is informed by a commitment to the liberal peace we mean that the theory and practice of peacekeeping tries to maintain stable peace across the globe by promoting and defending liberal political and economic practices. It is not difficult to understand why those concerned with maintaining peace and security are committed to the theory of liberal peace. After

all, if accurate, it means that the more democracy and liberalism spreads around the globe the less likely war becomes.

Mirroring the conceptions of global politics discussed on pages 1–3, 11, we can discern two competing images of liberal peace that underpin peacekeeping. In its Westphalian guise, the commitment to liberalism and democracy is tempered by a predominant concern with maintaining order between states. At the end of the First World War, the American President Woodrow Wilson called for an international order that prioritized self-determination and democracy. The birth of the League of Nations seemed to herald the emergence of such an order, but the new organization's Covenant resolved that the sovereign rights of states should take precedence over concerns about a state's internal political organization (Claude 1963; Walters 1952; Zimmern 1945). Wilson's liberalism was thus manifested in a vision of a particular way of conducting *international* politics (see chapter 3). If a world full of liberal democratic states was unrealistic, then at least international diplomacy should be conducted in a liberal fashion. The instrument of war should be renounced, there should be open diplomacy, an end to secret alliances, a space for rational discussion and a forum for independent arbitration, should potential belligerents desire it. If, as many suspected, states became less liberal and democratic as they prepared for war (Mousseau and Yuhang 1999), providing institutions and spaces for inter-state conflict to be resolved without violence would both reduce the number of wars in the short term and, by providing conditions for the creation of more liberal-democratic states in the long term, encourage stable peace to develop. This Westphalian conception of liberal peace was reconstructed after the Second World War in the form of 'traditional peacekeeping' (see chapter 5).

Post-Westphalian conceptions of liberal-democratic peace turn this logic on its head and correspond more closely to the rationale envisaged by democratic peace theorists. Figure 1.1 illustrates how post-Westphalian conceptions insist that liberal practices of international relations can only be conducted by liberal-democratic states. Mutually trusting relations, free trade, cooperation for mutual gain and relationships between societies within different states are the international ingredients for stable peace, according to this conception. Although liberal-democratic peace theory tells us very little about why non-democracies wage war more often than democracies, it follows that if these characteristics of liberal society are absent war between and within states will be more prevalent. The principal aim is no longer to provide institutions and spaces for states to resolve their differences. After all, the theory tells us that without widespread liberal democracy there will always be a tendency for non-democratic states to wage war. That is why the League of Nations became an international sideshow in the late 1930s and why the UN's first fully fledged traditional peacekeeping mission, UNEF I in the Middle East, failed to ameliorate the conflict there (see chapter 5). The primary aim of the post-Westphalian conception is to protect and spread

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┌─────────────────┐              ┌─────────────────┐
│   Westphalian   │              │ Post-Westphalian│
└─────────────────┘              └─────────────────┘
         │                                │
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┌─────────────────┐              ┌─────────────────────┐
│ Inter-state peace│             │Liberal-democratic states│
└─────────────────┘              └─────────────────────┘
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┌──────────────────────┐         ┌──────────────────────────┐
│Free trade and cooperation│      │Liberal international relations│
└──────────────────────┘         └──────────────────────────┘
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┌──────────────────────┐         ┌─────────────────┐
│Democracy and liberalism│        │ Inter-state peace│
└──────────────────────┘         └─────────────────┘
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┌──────────────────────┐         ┌─────────────────┐
│ Global stable peace  │         │Global stable peace│
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Figure 1.1   The routes to stable peace
Source: compiled by authors

liberal-democratic governance. It is post-Westphalian because the in-
ternal nature of a state's organization is no longer always treated as less
important than its sovereignty by other states, international organiza-
tions, TNCs and NGOs.

Box 1.4 shows how the post-Westphalian conception of liberal peace has
been supported by policy-makers within Western states and the UN Secre-
tariat. The shift from the predominance of the Westphalian conception
evident in traditional peacekeeping was largely facilitated by the UN's
growing involvement with *internal* rather than *international* conflict. How-
ever, because not all the members of the UN Security Council, let alone the
rest of the world's states, are liberal democracies the urge to spread the
liberal-democratic peace has been limited to three types of situation.

First, there are occasions where the belligerents to a conflict invite the
UN to help install liberal-democratic forms of governance, as in the cases
of Cambodia, El Salvador and Namibia (see chapter 6). Second, the UN
Security Council has defended democratically elected governments
ousted by coup d'états, though it has not been consistent in doing so
(e.g. Pakistan and Congo-Brazzaville). In the case of Haiti, for example,
the Security Council resolved that the illegal removal of a democratically
elected government constituted a threat to regional peace and security
(Byers and Chesterman 2000: 287). In 1997, the Council likewise found
that the overthrow of the elected government of Sierra Leone was a
threat to peace, demanded that it be restored and welcomed an ECOWAS
intervention that contributed to its reinstallation (Roth 1999: 405–6).
Finally, the UN and regional organizations have attempted to install

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Box 1.4   Voices for the liberal-democratic peace

Democratic institutions and processes within States may likewise be condu-cive to peace among States. The accountability and transparency of demo-cratic Governments to their own citizens, who understandably may be highly cautious about war, as it is they who will have to bear its risks and burdens, may help to restrain recourse to military conflict with other States. The legitimacy conferred upon democratically elected Governments commands the respect of peoples of other democratic States and fosters expectations of negotiation, compromise and the rule of law. (UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali to the UN General Assembly 1996: UN Doc. A/51/761, 20 December 1996)

Democracies don't attack each other…ultimately the best strategy to insure our security and to build a durable peace is to support the advance of democracy elsewhere. (US President Bill Clinton in the 'State of the Union Address': *New York Times*, 26 January 1994)

There is an obvious connection between democratic practices – such as the rule of law and transparency in decision-making – and the achievement of true peace and security in any new and stable political order. These elem-ents of good governance need to be promoted at all levels of international and national political communities. (UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali: 1992a: para. 59)

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liberal democracy in places where the state has failed to exert effective authority, such as in Bosnia after 1995, and Kosovo and East Timor after 1999 (see chapter 12).

There is therefore an ongoing debate about which conception of the liberal peace should inform peacekeeping. China and many states in the developing world insist that the Westphalian conception should continue to predominate (Morphet 2000b). They argue that stable peace can only be built on the maintenance of peace between states (Owen 2000: 382–3) and that this requires respect for the sanctity of sovereignty. Many Western leaders disagree. They insist that inter-national peace is produced by an international society made up of liberal democracies. British Prime Minister Tony Blair (1999), for example, argued that sovereignty should no longer provide rogue states with the ability to conceal large-scale and systematic human rights abuses from international scrutiny. According to this view, wherever possible the UN and regional organizations should support the creation of liberal democ-racies as the best route to stable peace. This debate between Westphalian and post-Westphalian conceptions of the role of peacekeeping in world politics manifested itself in the development of peacekeeping (see Part 2), the different types of peacekeeping that have been practised and concep-tualized (see Part 3), and contemporary debates about its future direction (see Part 4).

Nevertheless, the liberal peace is not without its problems and critics. These issues become evident in the debate about what the primary role of peacekeeping should be. At least six problems can be identified with the liberal peace:

- The liberal peace does not exist. Many critics doubt the empirical evidence for the claim that liberal democracies tend not to fight each other. Some argue that the evidence is so sparse that peace could be attributed to chance (Mearsheimer 1994; Spiro 1994; Cohen 1995). Others point out that definitions of 'democracy' and 'war' are so vague that they can be manipulated to provide favourable evidence for the thesis (Russett 1993: 16). A third group of critics point out that there are plenty of cases where democracies have fought each other (Layne 1994). The most commonly cited example of this is the Spanish–American war in 1898.
- Democracy alone does not account for peace. Neo-realists argue that the domestic nature of a state does not determine whether or not it goes to war. That is determined by the logic of international anarchy and the clash of sovereign entities pursuing their own interests (Layne 1994; Cohen 1994). If this is the case, peace cannot be achieved solely through the spread of liberal democracy.
- The liberal peace is based on a statist conception of global politics. Both Westphalian and post-Westphalian conceptions are primarily concerned with states and this is inappropriate in an era of globalization (Barkawi and Laffey 1999). This has led to an exaggeration of the so-called 'pacific union' of liberal democracies, and of the warlike nature of relations between these states and those that are not liberal democracies (MacMillan 1996: 293).
- It is part of a Western imperial project. It is impossible to understand the development of democracy without recognizing that it was intimately linked with colonization (Barkawi and Laffey 1999: 411). Not only were liberal-democratic ideas imposed on the rest of the world by Western imperial states, but many one-party systems evolved from the demands of fighting anti-colonial wars (e.g. Ho Chi Minh in Vietnam and Fidel Castro in Cuba). War between liberal democracies is unlikely because they are embedded in a web of political, social and, most crucially, economic relations that support capitalist power (Barkawi and Laffey 1999: 419). The aim of the liberal peace is thus to expand and strengthen the structures of international capitalism.
- Imposed democracy does not take root. One of the fathers of classic liberalism, John Stuart Mill, argued that democracy not won by the people would be malleable. This freedom would be self-contradictory because it is won by 'foreign' agents and therefore represents the replacing of one form of foreign rule with another (Mill 1874: 238–63).
- In some parts of the world, most notably sub-Saharan Africa, the promotion of liberal democracy (which privileges demands for polit-

ical and civil rights at the expense of those for socio-economic and cultural rights) can actually encourage instability and violence rather than peaceful development, both within and between states, by dissolving the patrimonial glue that previously bound many African states together (Abrahamsen 2000, 2001). Liberal-democracy promotion has sometimes resulted in the production of 'exclusionary democracies' that legitimize the continued suffering of the impoverished majority.

Some of these arguments can and have been refuted. For example, the rebuilding of Germany and Japan after 1945 provides a good example of imposed liberal democracy taking root. Nevertheless, the criticisms highlight some of the central dilemmas confronting peacekeeping today, particularly as the post-Westphalian conception of liberal-democratic peace assumes greater prominence.

There are therefore significant disagreements about the role of peacekeeping in global politics. These are especially evident in international disquiet about some of the more ambitious UN operations, such as those in Bosnia, Kosovo and East Timor, that are actively trying to construct liberal-democratic societies, polities and economies (see chapters 9 and 12). Amongst other things, this requires: a functioning civil society, the rule of law, effective and accountable police forces, civilian control of the armed forces and an independent media. Critics argue that such operations actually create a democratic deficit in these countries by denying them the right of self-determination (Chandler 2000b; Chopra 2000). It is argued that this expansive understanding of what peacekeeping is for is ethnocentric and contributes to a new kind of imperialism that is unlikely to produce stable peace across the planet.

Not only is the environment in which peacekeepers operate changing, there are also two different conceptions of its role in global politics. Although they both display a commitment to liberal peace and both focus on the state, they suggest two very different approaches to the theory and practice of peacekeeping. The Westphalian conception suggests that peacekeeping should create institutions and spaces that allow states to resolve their differences. The post-Westphalian conception insists that peacekeepers should be in the business of creating and defending liberal democratic regimes.

1.5   Summary

It is important to understand the role that peacekeeping plays in global politics. Without this understanding, other approaches tend to overlook the inherently political nature of peacekeeping. Consequently, most discussions about definitions of peacekeeping, peacebuilding, peacemaking and peace enforcement, although often insightful, ignore three key

points: 1) public political discourse uses 'peacekeeping' to refer to a wide variety of operations and tasks; 2) historically, missions have taken on many functions simultaneously, so drawing rigid boundaries between different tasks can be unhelpful; and 3) peacekeeping operations change over time. The crucial point is that decisions about when to intervene, how to intervene and what resources to employ in that intervention are unavoidably political, complex, multidimensional and contested.

The decision *when* to intervene is usually taken by the Security Council, a body whose Permanent Members have very different ideas about the best way to maintain international peace and security (see chapter 2). Although analysts might be able to identify the optimum stage in a conflict for a peacekeeping force to be deployed, in practice that decision will always be a political one and often a compromise between competing Westphalian and post-Westphalian visions. This question is further complicated by the fact that in the past peacekeeping missions have been authorized by both the General Assembly and regional organizations. Similarly, questions concerning *how* to intervene and what *resources* to commit are also political and context-dependent. For instance, the US decision not to intervene in Rwanda during the 1994 genocide was in large part due to its previous experiences in Somalia and its concurrent military preparations for intervention in Haiti. Similarly, the Netherlands was the only state in the world that offered to send its peacekeepers to protect the perilous 'safe area' of Srebrenica. We are not arguing that peacekeeping can only be studied on a case-by-case basis, but that the starting point should be an appreciation of its essentially contested nature and its underlying purposes rather than abstract ideas drawn from conflict research or complex taxonomies derived from what peacekeepers do in the field.

Today's world is shaped by contemporary globalization. This raises important challenges for the Westphalian order on a number of different levels. Events that happen in one part of the world invariably impact on another, be that through flows of refugees and migrants, trade (both legal and illicit) or communications. Opinions about what roles peacekeeping should play in this changing world can be divided into Westphalian and post-Westphalian ideas. Many states and other actors continue to argue that the principles of Westphalian international society should be maintained and should temper peacekeeping's commitment to liberal peace. Stable peace, they argue, can only be achieved by creating spaces and institutions for states to resolve their differences on the basis of consent. What goes on within states should not concern peacekeepers unless their hosts invite them. Only by producing a degree of inter-state order can human development flourish.

In contrast, a second body of opinion has emerged over the last few decades. According to this post-Westphalian view, not only will democratic states not fight each other but they will also reduce the likelihood of conflict within their own borders. Consequently, the more democratic

states there are, the more stable peace there will be. Many people therefore argue that peacekeepers should be in the business of rebuilding war-torn societies along liberal-democratic lines. Only in this way can stable peace be secured because the Westphalian conception leaves the seeds of war (including injustice, human rights abuse and poverty) in place. The inability of international society to resolve this debate means that peacekeeping remains contested, inconsistent, unpredictable and uncertain.

There are therefore three important issues raised by this chapter that are fundamental to the rest of our study:

- A gap between the theory and practice of peacekeeping.
- An ongoing debate between Westphalian and post-Westphalian conceptions of what roles peacekeeping should play in global politics.
- The effects of contemporary globalization on the peacekeeping environment, particularly the exponential growth of the number and variety of (transnational) actors that show little respect for political boundaries, the emergence of 'new wars' and US hegemony.

Having looked broadly at the changing international society and the different conceptions about what roles peacekeeping should play within it, chapter 2 asks who the peacekeepers are and what institutions and ideas guide what they do.