# 1

# The Third Wave of Democracy

## 1.1 Introduction

Until recently there were very few democratically elected governments in Latin America, Asia or Africa. Instead, political terrains were filled with various kinds of unelected regimes, including military, one-party or no-party systems and personalist dictatorships. The 'third wave of democracy' is said to have started in Southern Europe in the mid-1970s, before spreading to Latin America, Eastern Europe, Asia and Africa (Huntington 1991). Eventually the result was that, whereas in the early 1970s only a quarter of countries had democratically elected governments, two decades later more than 50 per cent had them. By the end of the 1990s, about 75 per cent of governments around the world had come to power via the ballot box. Such was the shift to elected governments during this time that a new area of concern in political science was born: 'transitology', that is, the study of *democratization*, 'the process of becoming democratic' (Bealey 1999: 100). As time went on, studies of democratic transition were augmented by investigations of the difficulties of *consolidating democracy*, known as 'consolidology'.

By the 1990s, all 23 Latin American countries, with the exception of Cuba, had elected governments, as did several formerly authoritarian countries in Asia – including Bangladesh, Nepal, the Philippines, Taiwan, South Korea and Mongolia. Africa showed a similar picture, with over 20 democratically elected governments. The only region that seemed apart from the democratic trend was the Middle East. With the exception of Turkey and the partial exceptions of

Jordan, Morocco, and Kuwait, *authoritarian* – that is, democratically unaccountable – regimes remained the norm.

By 1999, as table 1.1 indicates, there were 48 new democracies in Latin America, Asia (counting in Turkey) and Africa: 16 in Latin America, 10 in Asia and 22 in Africa. Of the 10 in Asia, 4 (40 per cent) – Mongolia, South Korea, Taiwan and the Philippines –

**Table 1.1**  New democracies in Latin America, Africa and Asia, 1999: ratings by Freedom House

| | *Political rights* | *Civil liberties* | *Freedom rating* |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Latin America** (16 countries) | | | |
| Uruguay | 1 | 2 | Free |
| Bolivia | 1 | 3 | Free |
| Chile | 3 | 2 | Free |
| Ecuador | 2 | 3 | Free |
| Panama | 2 | 3 | Free |
| Honduras | 2 | 3 | Free |
| Argentina | 3 | 3 | Partly free |
| Dominican Rep | 3 | 3 | Partly free |
| El Salvador | 3 | 3 | Partly free |
| Nicaragua | 3 | 3 | Partly free |
| Brazil | 3 | 4 | Partly free |
| Colombia | 3 | 4 | Partly free |
| Paraguay | 4 | 3 | Partly free |
| Guatemala | 3 | 4 | Partly free |
| Peru | 5 | 4 | Partly free |
| Haiti | 5 | 5 | Partly free |
| **Africa** (22 countries) | | | |
| Cape Verde | 1 | 2 | Free |
| Sao Tomé e Principe | 1 | 2 | Free |
| South Africa | 1 | 2 | Free |
| Benin | 2 | 2 | Free |
| Namibia | 2 | 3 | Free |
| Malawi | 2 | 3 | Free |
| Mali | 3 | 3 | Partly free |
| Madagascar | 2 | 4 | Partly free |
| Seychelles | 3 | 3 | Partly free |

**Table 1.1**  *continued*

|  | Political rights | Civil liberties | Freedom rating |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ghana | 3 | 3 | Partly free |
| Mozambique | 3 | 4 | Partly free |
| Central African Rep. | 3 | 4 | Partly free |
| Guinea-Bissau | 3 | 5 | Partly free |
| Lesotho | 4 | 4 | Partly free |
| Uganda | 4 | 4 | Partly free |
| Ethiopia | 4 | 4 | Partly free |
| Burkina Faso | 5 | 4 | Partly free |
| Comoros | 5 | 4 | Partly free |
| Gabon | 5 | 4 | Partly free |
| Zambia | 5 | 4 | Partly free |
| Tanzania | 5 | 4 | Partly free |
| Zimbabwe | 5 | 5 | Partly free |
| **South East/East Asia** (4 countries) | | | |
| South Korea | 2 | 2 | Free |
| Taiwan | 2 | 2 | Free |
| Philippines | 2 | 3 | Free |
| Thailand | 3 | 3 | Partly free |
| **South Asia** (3 countries) | | | |
| Bangladesh | 2 | 4 | Partly free |
| Nepal | 3 | 4 | Partly free |
| Pakistan | 4 | 5 | Partly free |
| **Central Asia** (2 countries) | | | |
| Mongolia | 2 | 3 | Free |
| Kyrgyzstan | 5 | 5 | Partly free |
| **West Asia** [Middle East] (1 country) | | | |
| Turkey | 4 | 5 | Partly free |

The Freedom House scale runs from 1 = most free, to 7 = least free; see the appendix to this book for Freedom House criteria and methodology. All data from 'Annual survey of Freedom country scores, 1972–3 to 1998–9', http://www.freedomhouse.org/survey99/method/

were classified as 'free' by Freedom House (see below); the other 6 (60 per cent) – Bangladesh, Kyrgyzstan, Nepal, Pakistan, Thailand and Turkey – were judged 'partly free'. Of the 16 in Latin America, Freedom House perceived 6 (37.5 per cent) as 'free', while the remaining 10 (62.5 per cent) were 'partly free'. Africa had 6 (27.3 per cent) new democracies rated 'free' and 16 (72.7 per cent) 'partly free'.

As table 1.2 shows, there was relatively little difference in the percentages of 'free' states – that is, where democracy might be said to be consolidated – among the new democracies in the three regions. In other words, democracy appeared to be consolidated, with democratic institutions developed to a considerable degree, in about one-third of the new democracies. Why was the average consolidation rate as it was? Was it simply that insufficient time had elapsed since the initial democratic transitions? A comparison can be made with three Southern European third wave democracies: Greece, Portugal and Spain. All are said to have completed democratic transitions – and to have been well on the way to democratic consolidation – within a decade following the collapse of authoritarian governments in the mid-1970s. But such a fast rate of democratic progress is historically most unusual. Even under broadly favourable conditions, it normally takes much time and effort to develop democracy and democratic institutions to the point of consolidation. For example, democratic consolidation in Britain and the United States gradually evolved over a long period of time – decades or longer. Consequently, judged in such a historical context, 'only' limited signs of democratic consolidation a few years after authoritarian rule ends do not necessarily signify that democratic progress is not being made. On the other hand, while democratic consolidation may well be a lengthy process, it is possible to identify whether it is happening by various indicators, including the amount of political rights and civil liberties judged to be present in a country. This is the method chosen by the American organization, Freedom House, which publishes an annual survey of democratic progress covering all countries (see p. 11 and the appendix below for the Freedom House criteria and methodology).

Whereas there was much euphoria in the late 1980s and early 1990s that the world was witnessing an epochal shift to democracy, captured in the term 'new world order', by the end of the latter decade many observers were much less certain. After a decade of swift democratization, commentators' opinions varied about the chances of widespread democratic consolidation. A few saw evidence of continuing democratic progress around the world, believing that, while

**Table 1.2**  'Free' and 'partly free' new democracies, 1999

|  | 'Free' | | 'Partly free' | | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | *No.* | *%* | *No.* | *%* | *Total no.* |
| Asia (incl. Turkey) | 4 | 40 | 6 | 60 | 10 |
| Latin America | 6 | 37.5 | 10 | 62.5 | 16 |
| Africa | 6 | 27.3 | 16 | 72.7 | 22 |
|  | 16 | 33.3 | 32 | 66.7 | 48 |

*Source*: Freedom House.

consolidating democracy would be a long, arduous and highly prob-
lematic task, there was clear evidence of gradual democratic consoli-
dation in many new democracies (Karatnycky 1999). Others saw
something different: a widespread 'hollowing out', that is a dimin-
ishing, of democracy in many countries that had recently undergone
democratic transitions. While multiparty competition was common,
with, in some cases, a large degree of uncertainty over electoral out-
comes, few new democracies showed much evidence of democracy
becoming entrenched and embedded in ways commensurate with
democratic consolidation. In fact, Diamond (1999) asserted, there
was strong empirical evidence, not just of a failure of democracy to
progress, but of something more serious: a 'reverse wave' away from
democracy and back to authoritarianism.

## 1.2   The third wave of democracy and
## its ramifications

Contrasting assessments of widespread democratic consolidation are
the starting point for this book. It is not principally about democra-
tization and democratic transitions, although, because the nature of
a transition is often thought to influence the chances of democratic
consolidation, we focus on the issue in chapter 2. However, the main
concern of the book is democratic consolidation – its problems and
processes – in the new democracies of Latin America, Asia, Africa
and the Middle East, an issue we turn to in chapter 3. It is worth
noting in this context that the concept of 'third wave of democracy',
originally coined by Samuel Huntington (1991), is actually rather
meaningless. This is because it is used to group together *all* recog-

nizably democratic systems outside Western Europe and the United States. The problem is that there are very few common features between the political systems of countries as politically, socially and economically different as those of Latin America, Asia and Africa. In addition, some third wave democracies, such as Chile, have a long history of democracy and recent, relatively short, periods of authoritarian rule; others, such as Jordan or South Korea, have no tradition of democracy. This is not irrelevant because a tradition of democracy is thought likely to make a significant difference to attempts to consolidate democracy, for example by affecting the level of party institutionalization, seen as an important contributory factor in democratic consolidation. The point is that some countries will build and consolidate democracy relatively easily, and others will not; and that countries that manage to consolidate democracy tend to have certain identifiable characteristics and features.

Chapter 3 is devoted to an examination of the theory and practice of democratic consolidation, and addresses the following issues:

1   What is democratic consolidation?
2   Why does it occur in some countries and not others?

My main hypothesis is that democratic consolidation is linked to:

1   the nature of the *structural conditions* that democratically elected regimes inherit;
2   *agent-led innovations* that can encourage or discourage democratic progress.

The interaction of these two sets of concerns is known as *structured contingency.*

The literature on democratization and democratic consolidation is clear about when to expect structural continuities or agent-led innovations. Many analysts favour *contingent explanations for democratic transitions*, that is, political outcomes seem primarily to be the result of the interplay and interactions between leading political actors. On the other hand, when attention turns to seeking to explain *democratic consolidation*, structural explanations are usually deemed of greater relevance to outcomes. This is because a contingent approach – one that focuses on what political actors *do* – cannot tell the whole story. To augment its insights, it is also necessary to be concerned with *patterns of institutional regularity* which significantly inform progress towards democratic consolidation. However, there is a complicating factor: while the insight that both structure and

agency are of importance to democratic consolidation may be analytically useful, we cannot know at the outset how much weight to attach to each. Under what conditions will structure shape action? Under what conditions will the opposite be true? It seems likely that the relative importance of structure and contingency will differ from country to country and reflect the importance of various factors, both domestic and, given the importance attached to globalization, external. It may well be that some circumstances lead to political continuity, while others favour significant political innovations.

Using the explanatory insights offered by a structured contingency approach, in chapters 4–8 I focus on democracy and democratic consolidation – or their lack – in Latin America, East and South East Asia, South Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. Each chapter contains two case studies. The main criteria for selection are that countries should have interesting political histories, that they have made recent attempts to consolidate democracy, and that they illustrate the role of structured contingency in democratic outcomes.

Inevitably I will be making comparisons – and generalizations – between a number of diverse countries in different parts of the world. An obvious problem with this approach is that because these regions and countries vary – for example, they have different historical experiences, cultures and social, political and economic structures – then, it might be argued, comparisons between them would offer little in the way of general analytical guidance. To complicate matters further, there were 'unexpected' democratic outcomes *within* regions, for example the sudden emergence of democracy in the 1990s in economically impoverished, multiethnic African countries, such as Benin, Malawi and Mali. Consequently, attempting a comparative examination of democratization and democratic consolidation could throw up at least as many questions as answers. However, there is a growing body of literature on democratic consolidation, and this will help in attempting to pull things together when seeking to identify and account for both universal and particularistic factors of regions' and countries' democratic experiences. In sum, aware of the potential pitfalls of overgeneralization, I am nevertheless convinced that it is possible to arrive at a reasonably well-informed judgement regarding what factors are most important in explaining why democratic consolidation has occurred in some countries and not in others.

Before discussing the issue fully in chapter 2, it will be useful to note here what are said to be the main signs to explain democratic consolidation or its lack. The literature on democratic consolidation highlights how important it is that certain conditions and factors are present, including 'broadly consensual, political attitudes, social

structures and political institutions' (Pinkney 1993: 159). Other important factors are said to include a certain, relatively high, level of national prosperity; a robust, relatively unfragmented civil society; and an institutionalized, relatively unfragmented party system. International encouragement can only help, although it is rarely, if ever, pivotal for democratic consolidation. Certain factors, the converse of the above, are said to make democratic consolidation most unlikely: enduring economic crisis; lack of societal tolera-tion among ethnically and/or religiously divided groups; a weak civil society; a highly fragmented party system; no or unsustained external encouragement.

## 1.3   Forms of authoritarian rule

While it is important to identify what democracy is, defining it is a very tricky task. Consequently, I shall start by discussing what it is *not*. I will do this by identifying four generic types of authoritarian regimes found either historically or currently in the regions examined in this book. Although by 2000 around 75 per cent of governments were elected, this obviously implies that around a quarter – about 50 regimes – were not. Four generic kinds of authoritarian regimes can be identified:

1   communist governments;
2   non-communist single-party regimes;
3   'personalist' governments, including autocratic monarchies;
4   military administrations.

### Communist governments

After the demise of socialist regimes in Eastern Europe a decade ago, five communist governments remained worldwide, those of China, Cuba, Laos, North Korea and Vietnam, collectively home to nearly 1.5 billion people. The theoretical justification for communist single-party rule was that only the party had the capacity to organize the defence of the revolution against counterrevolutionary forces, plan and oversee expansion of the forces of production, and supervise the reconstruction of society. Consequently, the party, via the state, was to be the vehicle for building the framework for communism. Fol-

lowing the collapse of Eastern Europe's communist regimes, the remaining communist governments, to some degree affected by the global pro-democracy *Zeitgeist*, felt obliged to change tactics and, in some cases, alter national goals. For example, the communist government of China allowed capitalism to grow to previously unexpected heights, to the extent that it is difficult to believe now that it still envisages the development of a classless society. The governments of Vietnam and Cuba also allowed more capitalism than before, while both Laos and North Korea urgently sought increased international aid to shore up their crumbling economies. In sum, affected by the global trend towards free markets and, to a lesser degree, democracy, after the fall of the Soviet bloc the remaining communist regimes attempted to reform economically but without necessarily allowing more democracy than before.

## Non-communist single-party regimes

While communist governments achieved power as a result of revolutionary change, non-communist single-party regimes typically came to power either by the ballot box or via a military coup d'état. Following decolonization in Africa and Asia in the 1950s and 1960s it was confidently expected that political parties would increasingly come to resemble those of the West. With the same forms and functions, they would be integral parts of multiparty systems offering an increasingly educated and discerning public organized electoral choice and channels of accountability. What actually happened, however, was in many cases somewhat different: after independence, multiparty systems soon gave way to single-party systems, especially in Africa. Between 1958 and 1973 multiparty governments in 12 African countries abandoned multipartyism, mostly for single-party rule (Doig 1999: 23). Some observers saw this as a broadly progressive development, as single-party governments were often judged to be the only 'modern' organizations, crucially important 'agents of national integration in states whose new and often arbitrarily imposed boundaries commanded less loyalty than "primordial" ties of language, religion or locality' (Randall 1988: 2).

But single-party regimes were not democratic in the sense of allowing citizens the periodic chance to elect their government. Their legitimacy was often rooted in the claimed ability to oversee economic development and national integrity, that is, to weld together often disparate peoples into a nation-state. While, initially, both tasks

seemed within the grasp of many single-party regimes, over time their abilities in these regards were increasingly questioned. Popular demands for democracy in the 1980s and 1990s, especially in Africa, were often the result of the failures of single-party regimes to preside over acceptable levels of economic development or to engineer national integrity.

## Personalist regimes and autocratic monarchies

In personalist regimes, a dominant figure wields a great deal of personal power. It is absolutist rule with virtually no limitations. The main justification for such rule is that it ensures political stability and enhances chances of economic development. Under such regimes, the 'luxury' of political parties or free and fair elections cannot be allowed because, it is argued, the resources and energy used to contest elections and fight political battles between parties detract from the development effort. In sum, under such regimes, most – if not all – democratic freedoms are denied, including freedom of expression, assembly and organization.

## Military regimes

Military government is rule by the armed forces, commonly achieved by coup d'état. Until the recent shift to democracy, they were the most common form of non-democratic regime in Latin America, Asia and Africa, with about half the countries in these regions ruled by the military (Hadjor 1993: 196). Military regimes come in varying forms. Some of them are dominated by a charismatic senior officer and described as 'military dictatorships'. Others are governed by groups of military personnel in juntas. While military regimes can vary considerably, what they all have in common is a dislike of democracy and a suppression of civic freedoms. While military personnel nearly always claim to be only temporarily in power to deal with civilian corruption and the task of putting 'the ship of state back on an even keel', in fact, once there they tend to stay put, often for years. And while the number of overtly military regimes has declined in recent years, this does not mean that the political power of the military has necessarily fallen away. In fact, in many countries it remains great, to the extent that military support is often seen as fundamental to a regime's survival.

*Summary of characteristics of authoritarian regimes*

While the various kinds of authoritarian regimes differ, all have the following characteristics:

- A voice in politics is denied to the mass of ordinary people.
- Power is in the hands of a numerically small elite group.
- Regime legitimacy is measured in terms of economic success rather than accountability or representativeness.

## 1.4  Forms of democracy

It is widely agreed that democracy has two fundamental aspects: *democratic institutions*, including popularly elected legislatures; and *democratic principles*, including popular control of the government and political equality among citizens (Beetham 1999). Beyond that, while consensus is elusive, Robert Dahl's concept of 'polyarchy' is often cited as denoting a form of democratic system. 'Polyarchy' has seven main features:

1  free and fair elections;
2  elected officials;
3  inclusive suffrage;
4  the right to run for office;
5  freedom of expression;
6  alternative sources of information to those disseminated by the state;
7  associational autonomy. (Dahl 1989: 221)

I shall work from the premise that when these seven features are in existence in a polity then democracy is consolidated.

The American organization Freedom House, broadly making use of a Dahlian concept of democracy, compiles annual statistics pertaining to the degree of democracy in all countries. Freedom House ratings of a country's democratic position are judged in terms of 'political rights' (PR) and 'civil liberties' (CL). In both categories the highest level of freedom is rated '1', while the lowest is rated '7'. Thus the best score that a country can achieve under the Freedom House system is a '1' for PR and a '1' for CL. (See the appendix for more on Freedom House and its criteria in awarding its ratings.) Diamond

(1996) suggests that the Freedom House rating of 'free' is a 'rough' indicator of democratic consolidation in a country. Zakaria (1997) proposes a combined PR + CL total of between 2 and 4 to denote democratic consolidation, while Diamond suggests a range of between 2 and 5. Both Diamond and Zakaria suggest that PR + CL scores of between 5 and 10 amount to a 'partly free' state, that is, one where some aspects of democracy are present but not others, that is, a 'limited' democracy. For both authors, as well as for Freedom House, a combined PR + CL total of between 11 and 14 signifies a state which is 'not free', that is, there are very few, if any, indicators that a democratic regime exists.

I use Freedom House indicators in this book to judge whether democracy appears to be consolidated, that is, when a polity is described by Freedom House as a 'free' state. A second category, 'partly free', denotes in my terminology a 'limited' democracy – that is, it is a polity with a recognizably democratic system but with flaws. Third, 'not free' refers to a country with very few – if any – democratic characteristics.

## 1.5   Types of democratic regime

I refer to three kinds of democratic system in the chapters of this book:

1   'facade' democracy;
2   'limited' democracy;
3   'full' democracy.

They principally differ from each other in varying degrees of political and civil freedoms, although the dividing lines between the categories are rarely clear. 'Facade' democracies have few democratic characteristics, although periodic elections will be allowed. Examples are found in contemporary Africa and the Middle East. 'Full' democracy is at the other end of the democratic spectrum, but does not actually exist anywhere in the world at the current time. Consequently, it is an aspirational category. 'Limited' democracies fill the middle of the spectrum and are the most common form of post-transition regime in Latin America, Asia and Africa. They are hybrid regimes with a mix of democratic and non-democratic characteristics.

## 'Facade' democracy

Facade democracies exist when rulers have few real pretensions to democracy, yet allow regular, albeit controlled, elections and a very limited range of civil liberties. Historically, such regimes were common in some Latin American countries and are currently found in certain Middle Eastern and African countries. In Latin America they were the result of elections held primarily to impress external observers: that is, 'for the English to look at' (or, in the original Portuguese, 'para os ingleses ver') (Whitehead 1993: 316). In contemporary Africa, 'figleaf' elections in various countries, such as Togo, Burkina Faso and Cameroon, fulfil a similar role (Bayart 1993: xii–xiii).

The contemporary Middle East offers the most egregious examples of facade democracies. Leaders such as Saddam Hussein (Iraq), the late Hafiz al-Assad (Syria) and Hosni Mubarak (Egypt) have regularly won presidential elections with unfeasibly large majorities – often more than 90 per cent of the popular vote. Moammar Gadaffi (Libya) takes things one step further: he does not bother to put himself before the electorate, despite the fact that he grabbed power in 1969 and has *never* asked Libyans formally to endorse his rule. His justification is that he is merely the conduit for popular decisions taken at lower levels via elections; a claim, many observers judge, that does not stand up to serious scrutiny (Bill and Springborg 1994).

During the Cold War (*c*.1948–89), facade democracies were often encouraged by Western governments anxious to thwart the perceived desire of the Soviet Union to expand its global influence. Friendly regimes lacking most democratic attributes were supported if they appeared to be important bulwarks against the spread of communism, not least because they denied left-wing forces any chance of coming to power. Under conditions of political repression, reformist movements often had great difficulty in making headway, being routinely labelled communists. This repression was rarely a bar to friendly regimes receiving aid, developing trade links and instituting military pacts (Gills et al. 1993). While the end of the Cold War opened up the possibility of transitions to more authentically democratic regimes, democratic progress often proved elusive, a consequence of the historic entrenchment of unrepresentative, undemocratic political systems under the domination of unrepresentative, often tiny, elites.

### Summary of 'facade' democracy

- Common historically in Latin America, this form is currently found in Africa and the Middle East.
- Rulers have few real pretensions to democracy, yet allow regular, controlled elections.
- Facade democracies were often encouraged during the Cold War by Western governments anxious to combat the global influence of the Soviet Union.
- Leaders of facade democracies manage to retain power when there is insufficient pressure to compel them to change.

### 'Limited' democracy

Limited democracies are hybrid regimes, political systems with a mix of democratic and non-democratic characteristics. They differ from facade democracies in satisfying certain formal procedural criteria of democracy, especially periodic, relatively free and fair elections – that is, with meaningful rules and regulations to determine their conduct and content – and a range of political and civic freedoms. However, limited democracies lack a full array of liberal freedoms. They have a relatively narrow range of civil liberties, often limited concern with the processes of law and, other than at election times, low levels of political participation in politics.

Limited democracies typically have their roots in political competition or collaboration among numerically small elite groups, sometimes exclusive oligarchies dominated by 'informal, permanent, and pervasive particularism (or clientelism, broadly defined)' (O'Donnell 1996: 120). Under such regimes, elections are not necessarily designed to produce the conditions where a change of government is plausible, but rather to 'change *the form* in which political actors pursue control of the state apparatus and its resources *but not the logic of their behaviour*' (Bratton and van de Walle 1997: 235–6, emphasis added).

Limited democracy, Zakaria suggests, is 'a growth industry. Seven years ago [that is, 1990] only 22 per cent of democratizing countries could have been so categorized; five years ago that figure had risen to 35 per cent.' The point is not that limited democracies are a point on a forward trajectory to consolidated democracy; few have reached that stage. As Zakaria observes,

far from being a temporary or transitional stage, it appears that many countries are settling into a form of government that mixes a substantial degree of democracy with a substantial degree of illiberalism. Just as nations across the world have become comfortable with many variations of capitalism, they could well adopt and sustain varied forms of democracy. Western liberal democracy might prove to be not the final destination on the democratic road, but just one of many possible exits. (1997: 24)

Political stability in a limited democracy is often based less on respect for democratic values than on the personal power of the state's leader, his or her immediate circle of confidants and the security services. There will typically be only limited institutional constraints on executive power, with power effectively personalized, constrained only by the 'hard facts of existing power relations and by constitutionally limited terms of office' (Zakaria 1997: 22).

Finally, unequivocal civilian control over the military is likely to be absent. This is either because the military is institutionally too strong to be controlled by an elected civilian regime, or that the latter recognizes the crucial importance of having a supportive military. In both scenarios, elected leaders forge alliances with senior military personnel. Military leaders publicly profess support for elected governments while resisting civilian efforts to control the armed forces' internal affairs, to dictate security policy and to make officers subject to the judgement of civil courts.

### Summary of 'limited' democracy

- Limited democracies have certain formal procedural criteria of democracy.
- There is a lack of *liberal* freedoms, a relatively narrow range of civil liberties and, except at election times, low levels of popular involvement in politics.
- Political control is often in the hands of small elite groups and military support is cultivated.

### 'Full' democracy

Full democracy is an ideal: it does not exist anywhere in the world. It is, however, useful to discuss it briefly as it represents an important aspirational goal towards which, no doubt, many ordinary

voters would like to see progress. The concept of full democracy extends the democratic ideal beyond the formal mechanisms of limited democracy to a point where there is widespread, continuous citizen participation in politics, and government rules with much transparency and accountability. A full democracy would have a real and sustained, as opposed to rhetorical and intermittent, stress on individual freedoms and the representation of citizens' interests, a consistently high degree of equity and justice for all, and a full array of civil liberties and human rights. All citizens, regardless of social or class position, would have easy, regular access to governmental processes and, as a result, a real say in collective decision-making. This would be accomplished, not only via elected representatives in national and subnational legislatures, but also via other methods of group participation and public forums. The armed forces would be consistently and unequivocally subservient to civilian rule. Those traditionally lacking power – such as the poor, minority ethnic and religious groups, women, young people – would have a real say in political outcomes.

### Summary of 'full' democracy

- The concept of full democracy extends the democratic ideal beyond the formal mechanisms of electoral democracy to include continuous citizen participation in politics.
- Government rules with much transparency and accountability.
- The military is unequivocally under civilian control.
- Those formerly lacking political power would enjoy some.

## 1.6   Overall conclusions

Democratically elected governments have appeared in large numbers of previously undemocratic countries in recent years. Initially, scholarly attention was devoted to democratic transition, assumed to lead typically to democratically elected governments. It was widely expected that democratic consolidation would follow, but optimism was dashed when limited democracies developed in many countries. Consequently, there was a shift in scholarly interest towards the problems of the survival and stability of new democratic regimes, or, in the terminology adopted in this book, problems of democratic consolidation.

Most transitions led to limited democracies, where basic democratic institutions and practices coexisted with weakness of political accountability and often fragility of civil and political rights. The large number of enduring limited democracies made it clear that democratic consolidation could not be understood simply as regime durability. Rather, it was a question of the democratic content of regimes: measuring the degree to which basic rights were respected and comparing countries' democratic performances. It became clear that accounting for democratic outcomes depended on structural and agency factors, and these differed from country to country, a reflection of individual political histories and characteristics.