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The Return of the King (1658–1660)

1 The Fall of the Protectorate (September 1658–April 1659)¹

‘All Men wondred to see all so quiet, in so dangerous a time’ wrote the Puritan minister Richard Baxter of the autumn of 1658. The death of Oliver Cromwell on 3 September signalled no discernible quickening of either royalist or republican pulses. There was no sudden or general upsurge of public opinion either against the Protectorate or for a return to monarchy: ‘Contrary to all expectation both at home and abroad, this earthquake was attended with no signal alteration’, recalled Charles II’s Chancellor, Edward Hyde, afterwards Earl of Clarendon.² Nor, though ‘all the commonwealth party’ may have ‘cried out upon [Richard’s] assuming the protectorship, as a high usurpation’, was there any concerted attempt by republicans to undo what they saw as the perversion of the Good Old Cause into the tyranny of rule by a single person: ‘There is not a dogge that waggs his tongue, soe great a calm are wee in’, observed John Thurloe, Oliver’s, and now Richard’s, Secretary of State.³ *The Humble Petition and Advice*, the Protectorate’s constitution since 1657, empowered Cromwell to name his successor, but this was managed ‘so sleightly, as some doubt whether he did it at all’ reported John Barwick, future Dean of St Paul’s, in a letter to Charles II. Nevertheless, despite the want of any formal or written nomination, Richard Cromwell’s succession was generally accepted not only without opposition but with signs of positive relief. The proclamation of his succession was acclaimed in London and provincial cities, and a hundred or more loyal addresses were received in which ‘the Counties, Cities, and Corporations of *England* sen[t] up their Congratulations, to own him as Protector’. National stability and civic welcome marked the inauguration of the second Protectorate.⁴ The experiment of the major-generals had caused resentment, and there was no escaping the ultimate sanction of military power which legitimized Cromwellian rule, but in its later years the increasingly traditional and

conservative manner, court and constitution of the Protectorate had begun to win confidence in what was beginning to appear to be a settled form of government. Many were impressed that Cromwell's foreign policy was more to the credit of a Protestant nation than that of the Stuarts, and many were coming to recognize that in significant respects the experience of Cromwellian rule was more liberal and humane than that of Charles I, particularly in its quite exceptionally generous policy of religious toleration, its allowance of an unusual degree of freedom to the press, and its aspiration to reform the law. All the indications were that the Protectorate would survive.

The welcome in the country at large was not, however, matched in the estate upon which the Protectorate depended, the Army. As Protector, Richard Cromwell was constitutionally its commander-in-chief. It was in this role that his father had been supremely successful, demonstrating superlative qualities as a military leader and forging bonds of loyalty through war. This exceptional achievement only accentuated Richard's complete lack of military experience. His younger brother Henry, or any one of a number of senior officers, were better qualified to exercise high command. The unfavourable comparison with his father and the estimate of his character which became current was succinctly put by the fiercely republican Lucy Hutchinson in her memoir of her regicide husband, Colonel John Hutchinson: Oliver's 'son Richard was a peasant in his nature, yet gentle and virtuous, but became not greatness'; he 'had not a spirit fit to succeed his father, or to manage such a perplexed government'.⁵ Upon Richard Cromwell's succession, Charles Fleetwood, as lieutenant-general of all the army the highest ranking officer, did secure the signatures of the senior officers of the armies of England, Scotland and Wales to a loyal address, presented to Richard two weeks after his father's death, to which he responded with undertakings to promote only 'Men of known Godliness and sober Principles', to maintain 'an equal and just Liberty to all Persons that profess Godliness' and to improve Army pay, as the address desired.⁶ This was reassuring, but the Army wished supreme command to be vested in Fleetwood and, as he himself wrote in October to Henry Cromwell, had 'a great desire, that the good old spirit may still be kept alive'. That spirit, more republican in politics, more enthusiastic in religion and more extreme in temper than Richard Cromwell's, led to confrontations between him and Army officers in October and November, but Richard's appeals for unity and loyalty reassured his critics, at least sufficiently to permit Oliver's state funeral on 23 November to pass without incident and to allow the issuing of writs in December for a new parliament.⁷

Tension between 'Commonwealthsmen', or republicans, who resented rule by a single person, and Cromwellians ('the Court Party' to its opponents), Presbyterians and crypto-royalists sympathetic to such rule, doomed the parliament which met on 27 January 1659. The former shared a deep-rooted suspicion of the constitution of the Protectorate and of Richard as inadequate

defenders of the republican ideal. They feared, wrote one contemporary chronicler, 'that the Protector did intend to cast them out of their Places, and put the Army into the hands of the Nobility and Gentry of the Nation, thereby to bring in the King'. The traditional inclinations of the latter preferred the Protectorate to a Republic and disrelished the Army's role in government. The shape of things to come was intimated by the House's inability to agree to a bill in recognition of Richard's right and title as Lord Protector and Chief Magistrate, and this despite every member having sworn on taking his seat to 'be true and faithful to the Lord Protector of the Commonwealth'.⁸ However, though coherent and committed as a group, republicans had no clear majority in the Commons. While they could delay business and prolong debates, members of a more conservative temper continued to recognize Richard as the chief magistrate and to co-operate with the House of Lords, whose constitutional identity republicans did not accept. The result was stalemate: 'The proceedings at Westminster', wrote Barwick in February to Hyde, 'are so full of distraction, that it is probable they will end in confusion. For the one party thinks the protectorists cannot stand, and the other that the commonwealth cannot rise.'⁹ While the Protectorate's legislative arm was thus being effectively crippled by republican filibustering, the republican campaign was being conducted still more vigorously outside parliament. *The Humble Petition of Many Thousand Citizens to the Parliament*, presented on 15 February, called for the restoration to parliament of supreme authority and a succession of tracts promoted the Good Old Cause by presenting the Protectorate as a threat to Army power, to civil liberty and to religious toleration. Their heady and inflammatory mix of biblical oracles, apocalyptic imagery, millenarian expectancy and Fifth Monarchist fervour incited agitation and civil disobedience.¹⁰

This fervour outside the House served only to stiffen resolve within not to yield to military, republican or enthusiastic demands. Although republican members such as Sir Arthur Haslerig, Sir Henry Vane and Thomas Scot spoke in its favour, the Commons rejected the *Humble Petition*. It appeared increasingly willing to criticize all that had been done by the Rump Parliament, to circumscribe the national church more narrowly, to limit toleration, to favour the peers and, in the case of some members, even to contemplate monarchy. Nor was anything done to meet the Army's pressing pay arrears. Both it and Richard came increasingly to be seen as more sympathetic to moderates and to Presbyterians than to the Army and to religious radicals. Certainly, men like Baxter, politically conservative and deeply opposed to Oliver Cromwell, invested in Richard Cromwell great hopes of religious and political recovery for the nation. What to his Army critics might appear Richard's lamentable want of military experience was to Baxter his strength: since he 'never had any hand in the War', he might 'be used in the healing of the Land':

Many sober Men that called his Father no better than a Trayterous Hypocrite, did begin to think that they *owed him Subjection*. They knew that the King was by Birth their Rightful Sovereign . . . But they were astonished at the marvellous Providences of God, which had been against that Family all along, and they thought that there was no rational probability of his Restoration, having seen so many Armies and Risings and Designs overthrown, which were raised or undertaken for it: They thought that it is not left to our liberty, whether we will have a Government, or not; but that *Government* is of Divine Appointment; and the Family, Person or Species is but of a subservient, less necessary determination: And that if we cannot have him that we would have, it followeth not that we may be without . . .¹¹

As Army grandees and Commonwealthsmen alike found themselves increasingly dissatisfied with the direction Richard and his parliament appeared to be taking, approaches were made in late March by the Wallingford House party (so known from Fleetwood's London residence where the senior officers met) to the republican Edmund Ludlow, and through him to Vane and Haslerig, to attempt to forge a joint policy. This new resolve produced a challenge to the civil authority and to Richard in *The Humble Representation and Petition of the General Council of the Officers of the Armies of England, Scotland and Ireland* of 6 April, which called upon Richard to support and promote the Good Old Cause, to act against royalists now prominent in London, and to meet the Army's arrears of pay. It was an ominous flexing of military muscle. To it Bulstrode Whitelocke, at this time one of the Keepers of the Great Seal, traced 'the beginning of *Richard's* fall . . . set on foot by his relations; [John] *Desborough* who married his Aunt, and *Fleetwood* who married his sister, and others of their party'. Baxter was implacably hostile to the 'Firebrands of the Army', to 'the Sectarian party' and to those he called 'the Vanists', but he understood well enough the power struggle that was taking place:

when they saw that he [Richard] began to favour the sober People of the Land, to honour Parliaments, and to respect the Ministers, whom they called Presbyterians, they presently resolved to make him know his Masters, and that it was *they* and not *he*, that were called by God to be the chief Protectors of the Interest of the Nation'.¹²

The Commons, however, was unresponsive when Richard forwarded this petition to them two days later and the rift with the Army became unbridgeable when, on 18 April, the House resolved that commissioned officers should subscribe an undertaking not to disrupt its proceedings and, by the overwhelming majority of 163 votes to 87, that the General Council of Army Officers should not meet except with the approval of the Protector and both houses of parliament. Even as this motion was before the Commons, Richard attempted to assert his authority by dissolving the General Council and

ordering officers in London back to their regiments. On 21 April the Army in return demanded the dissolution of parliament. In this contest, troop loyalty was to their senior officers rather than to their notional commander-in-chief, Richard. Bereft of military support, Richard had to submit. The compliance of the Commons was secured on 23 April by the simple expedient of locking and guarding the doors to the House.¹³

Following this coup, 'All matters were at a stand', observed Whitelock.¹⁴ This was to be the first of four Army interventions in public affairs within the next year. In each case, again in October, through Lambert, in December, through Fleetwood, and in February 1660, through Monck, the result was constitutional uncertainty and administrative disorder while political thinking strove to catch up with events. On this occasion, in the absence of a parliament, the Council of Officers (a smaller body than the all-inclusive General Council), sitting at Fleetwood's residence, Wallingford House, assumed the constitutional authority to govern. The inclination of these grandees, bound to Oliver and his legacy by personal, familial and professional ties, was to preserve the Protectorate, with or without Richard as its head. However, the body of Army opinion, as expressed by junior officers, was religiously enthusiastic and politically republican and this carried the day. On 6 May the General Council issued a declaration in which, observing that 'the good Spirit, which formerly appeared among us, in the Carrying on of this Great Work, did daily decline, so as the Good Old Cause itself became a Reproach', it invited the return to government of those former 'eminent Assertors' of the Cause who had sat as members of the purged Long Parliament between December 1648 and 20 April 1653. In its reply, the restored Rump readily accepted the Army's contention that there had been a 'special Providence of God' with the members of that assembly and resolved 'not to neglect this opportunity... for the Prosecution of what yet remains of their great Trust'. Prudently, but ominously, neither they nor the Army chose to recall that it was their failure in that trust which had led the Army itself forcibly to turn them out in 1653.¹⁵

2 The Rump Restored (May–September 1659)¹⁶

Some 42 MPs assembled on Saturday 7 May out of what the House itself took to be a total of eligible survivors of the purged Long Parliament of 78.¹⁷ This rump of a rump comprised the core of radical, enthusiastic and republican opinion in England, to its supporters the essence of the revolution; but it had less show of legitimate authority than any regime since the execution of Charles I. Though ultimately dependent upon the military might of Cromwell, Barebone's Parliament and the Protectorate parliaments could lay claim to some constitutional legitimacy. This body sat solely by the authority of the Army, to which it was twice indebted, for its original formation in 1648 and for this

second opportunity to exercise power.¹⁸ Most obviously, its authority was compromised by the ‘secluded’ members surviving from Pride’s Purge, over two hundred of them. The most vociferous of these, the veteran Presbyterian campaigner William Prynne, led a deputation to demand admission to the House at its first sitting. It was turned away by the Army guards. When, two days later, Prynne contrived to enter the chamber only to find himself prevented from returning in the afternoon, he embarked upon a sustained pamphlet campaign for the next six months, denying the legitimacy of the regime and calling for a return of the full Long Parliament.¹⁹ In this, he could appeal to a widespread sentiment. The restored Rump enjoyed far less general support than had its predecessor, the Second Protectorate Parliament; its promoters and apologists were intense and committed, but by the majority of the political nation – Presbyterian, Cromwellian, royalist, episcopalian – they were derided as ‘a mean and schismatical party’, supported by ‘fanatic spirits’.²⁰

While Prynne fulminated, the restored Rump recommended itself to radical opinion as the likeliest authority to realize its aspirations. There was no mistaking the disposition of the 31-member Council of State appointed on 13 May: it included 15 senior Army officers (Lambert, Desborough, Fleetwood and Ludlow among them) and 16 civilians, prominent among whom were Haslerig, Vane, Scot, James Harrington and Henry Neville. The Commons soon found itself the target of papers, petitions and tracts on the three perennially contentious topics of the revolution: legal reform, the abolition of tithes and full religious toleration. National toleration for all save episcopalians and Roman Catholics was an aspiration of the Army’s *Humble Petition and Address of the Officers* presented to the Rump on 13 May 1659, as was a republican constitutional settlement and provision for an elected legislature to succeed the Rump, which should not ‘by their long sitting become burthensome or inconvenient’.²¹ These petitioners were curiously unmindful of the fact that during its previous term the Rump had failed to legislate on these very issues and had disappointed this very constituency. It should, then, have occasioned no surprise that, despite serious-minded endeavour, this Rump no more abolished tithes than had its previous incarnation or its successor, the Barebone’s Parliament; it no more favoured Quakers than had Oliver’s or Richard’s parliaments; it made no headway with legal reform; it could not agree on a form of republican constitution for its successor; and it was no more able to manage its fiscal affairs to allow a reduction in Army arrears than had any Interregnum parliament.

By mid summer, neither the Army nor radical religious opinion any longer had much regard for the restored Rump. The House did not, however, correspondingly rise in the estimate of conservatives. By virtue of its dependence upon the Army it was regarded as complicit in the forcible abolition of the Protectorate. Its resumption of power might so disenchant former Cromwellians that, like the Admiral of the Fleet, Edward Mountague, and the regicide Colonel Richard Ingoldsby, they were in the summer of 1659 prepared to

entertain approaches from Charles II. This disaffection of those whom, with a republican's scorn, Lucy Hutchinson called 'the Protectorean faction', might have been foreseen, but not, perhaps, that dismay at the Army coup and the re-establishment of the Commonwealth shared by Presbyterians, royalists, and uncommitted local leaders of a traditional temper now encouraged them to consider actively working together for a restoration of monarchy as the only way to prevent either military dictatorship or anarchy. Baxter, for example, was approached in the summer of 1659.²² For royalists themselves, the Rump was damned not only as an illegitimate regime but as a government republican in its politics and apparently radical in its religious sympathies. It may not have legislated to satisfy radical demands, but it quite failed to curb, and by this very failure exacerbated, what, with increasing dismay, royalist opinion saw as the anarchic insurgency of enthusiastic religious sects (especially the Quakers). On 1 August a royalist uprising broke out, contrived largely by John Mordaunt, in the spring of 1659 created Viscount for his energetic pursuit of the royalist cause, but known to history as Booth's Uprising after Sir George Booth, its most notable leader. It was a conspicuous failure. The Council of State had gained advance warning of the rebellion and Booth's followers were routed on 19 August by John Lambert at Winnington Bridge and Booth himself was committed to the Tower.²³

This was apparently the final end of royalist hopes. The Republic had shown itself able efficiently and speedily to neutralize and overcome the best the royalists could hope to put in the field against it. Both the old Sealed Knot and the newer royalist confederacy established in 1658 around the figure of Mordaunt were utterly discredited. The Rump was restrained in its reaction, but it pursued royalist fugitives, sequestered some estates and set about purging the commissions of peace.²⁴ The victory of the Republic did tend to strengthen the movement towards an alliance between its conservative opponents, as the only hope of securing its demise. Presbyterians, royalists and even some Independents, began to correspond and to make common cause. Nevertheless, the standing of Charles and his court in Europe was lamentable. He would, it appeared, be a permanent exile, dependent upon the charity of European monarchs while Lambert and the Army enjoyed unchallenged supremacy. With a new confidence the form of a permanent constitution for the commonwealth was debated by religious radicals, Fifth Monarchists and republicans in a fine display of optimistic ingenuity. This was not a development viewed sympathetically by MPs at Westminster, jealous of their recently resumed authority.²⁵

3 Don Juan Lamberto²⁶ (October–December 1659)

Given the Rump's vulnerability to conservative criticism on the one hand and to pressing radical demands on the other, members of the House might have

been expected judiciously to cultivate those to whom they owed their power, the Army and its officers. The Rumpers could sit as the sole legislative authority only as long as the military guard at the door of the House admitted them and denied access to the secluded members, and they knew full well that this Army was as capable of ejecting them as it was of restoring them; it had done both once already. Although, as desired in the 13 May petition, Fleetwood was appointed commander-in-chief, the man of whom they had most cause to be wary was the officer who had presented that petition, John Lambert. Promoted to major-general at the age of only 28, he had had an outstanding military career as a cavalry officer, taking a decisive part in the parliamentary victories in the Second Civil War and in the Scottish campaign. He was Cromwell's closest ally in forging the Protectorate, whose first constitution, the *Instrument of Government*, he drafted in late 1653, and, until he was deprived of his commission when he fell out with Cromwell over the offer of the crown in 1657, his most likely successor. Despite being no regicide, an opponent of the initiatives of the Fifth Monarchist Thomas Harrison and of the Barebone's Parliament, and despite being a gentleman of whom the royalists had some hopes, he enjoyed a unique standing with the ordinary soldiery of the Army and he was the only one of its officers who had had some expectation of holding supreme power. He was thus the most dangerous of the restored Rump's potential enemies. Not surprisingly, republicans held him in even less esteem than Cromwell. Lucy Hutchinson dismissed Winnington Bridge as 'a very cheap victory' and in her opinion 'his ambition . . . had this difference from the Protector's: the one was gallant and great, the other had nothing but an unworthy pride, most insolent in prosperity, and as abject and base in adversity'.²⁷

In September, at Derby, Lambert's victorious officers addressed to parliament *The Humble Petition and Proposals of the Officers under the Command of the . . . Lord Lambert* for effecting the reforms requested in the Army petition of May which, they charged, the Commons had neglected. At the end of that month, Mordaunt opined that 'Lambert is so put to it, by Sir. Ar[thur] H[aslerig] and [Thomas] Scot that he is either lost, or must loose them. And the House will either be dissolved or purged unlesse by a common consent, new writs be issued out.' It was a shrewd forecast. The attempt of the Commons, led by Haslerig, to admonish those responsible for the Army's petition led to an even fiercer *Humble Representation and Petition of the Officers* (5 October), which defended Lambert's soldiers, demanded the censure of MPs who criticized the Army and the payment of arrears, and reiterated the demand for reform to secure civil and religious liberties.²⁸ In response, 'The parliament carried it very high against the Army', revoking the commissions of nine officers who had signed a letter soliciting support for this petition (including Lambert and Desborough), annulling Fleetwood's commission as commander-in-chief and placing the Army under the joint control of Fleetwood, Ludlow, Haslerig

and four other commissioners answerable to parliament. There could be no mistaking the determination of members that the Army should be subordinate to their will. By 8 October the royalist Sir Edward Nicholas could write to Mordaunt that 'All our letters from England this week say the Army and parliament cannot agree long, and its beleev'd that before Christmas the Army will dissolve, or (at least) purge the parliament'. They did not wait till Christmas. 'The string is like to break with skrewing too high', wrote the royalist Barwick, in a letter of 13 October, 'for the Army hereabouts incline to Lambert and his party', and so it proved. That day 'the late principal Officers of the Army whose Commissions were vacated, drew up Forces in and about *Westminster*, obstructed all Passages both by Land and Water, stopped the Speaker in his Way, and placed and continued Guards upon and about the doors of the Parliament-House'. In Whitelocke's account of this incident we catch a glimpse of the courage and authority which so recommended Lambert. Confronting the parliamentary guard, Lambert commanded them to dismount, 'and though *Lambert* were on foot, and none with him, yet *Evelyn* at the head of his Troop, dismounted at his command, and his Troop also obeyed *Lambert*'. The Rump was once more locked out.²⁹

For nearly two weeks there was such a constitutional vacuum as had followed the forcible dissolution of Richard Cromwell's parliament in April: 'now no Government in the Nation, all in confusion; no Magistrate either own'd or pretended, but the souldiers & they not agreed' wrote John Evelyn in his diary under 16 October. 'We are', observed Barwick, 'yet at gaze, what government we shall have.' It was not even clear whether parliament had been dissolved, or merely suspended. There was, though, no doubt who wielded power. Within a few days attendance at meetings of the Council of State had become so thin that there was no alternative to the Army's Council of Officers, acting under Fleetwood, whom it declared to be commander-in-chief. On 26 October the Army's General Council finally replaced the Council of State with a 23-member Committee of Safety. Civilians formed a majority on this committee, but this did not impress those hostile to the Army. In the words of one contemporary royalist chronicler, after 17 years deprived of just government, the nation 'groaned under a fatal *Anarchy*; which to supply, a Tumultuary *Juncto* was set up, called a *Committee of Safety*'. It is true that, despite the apprehension of some that 'the success [of Winnington Bridge] inspired him with the ambition of imitating Cromwell, in dissolving the parliament, and making himself protector', and the judgement of others that, as 'a Person of great Parts and good Courage', he was 'as fit for a *Protectorship* as *Oliver*, and some think fitter', Lambert had not instituted a third protectorate.³⁰ Nevertheless, the country had effectively reverted to a military dictatorship under a ruler seemingly as invincible as Cromwell himself had been.

Lambert's reign was, however, to prove the briefest of the several hegemonies of 1659. Looking back, Lucy Hutchinson blamed Lambert's 'insolent

usurpation' for the final collapse of the Republic, for it 'so turned the hearts of all men, that the whole nation began to set their eyes upon the King beyond the sea, and think a bad settlement under him better than none at all but to be still under the arbitrary power of such proud rebels as Lambert'. From the opposite side of the political divide, Mordaunt, believing in 'the firme resolution of some of the most considerable persons in England... to hazzard all by rising to restore the King', saw in Lambert's ejection of the Rump a royalist opportunity. Royalists such as Sir John Grenville were convinced that 'it is now most apparant to all men living, there can never be any happy setlement without his Majesties establishment'. However, when it came, the challenge to Lambert was issued from quite another, and unforeseen, quarter. It was made by the one force which had hitherto never opposed the Army and the only one, with the power to do so effectively: the Army itself.³¹

The commander responsible had hardly impinged upon the English political consciousness. George Monck had been a professional soldier since 1625 and had fought for many masters, including both Charles I and the Long Parliament. Under Cromwell he had served as general-at-sea (1652–3) and as commander-in-chief in Scotland since 1654. He was apparently of Presbyterian persuasion, but 'He had', wrote Hyde, 'no fumes of religion which turned his head, nor any credit with, or dependence upon, any who were swayed by those trances'. He had played no part in public life, and, resident in Scotland, he was all but unknown to both the government and the public in London. He had sworn allegiance to Richard Cromwell, but since the restoration of the Rump he had conducted himself in public as its loyal servant, taking no part in the Army's increasing criticism of, and opposition to, its proceedings. Like other moderate leaders, he received an approach from Charles II in the summer of 1659, when he was believed to be 'more inclinable to the parliament then the Army but yet more inclinable to a free [parliament], then either'. There were, however, no signs that he was inclined to go beyond this: as Hyde remarked in November 1659, if Monck had 'any designe to serve the King' it was 'very strange' that he did not let the royalists know of it.³² What he did declare was commitment to national stability, to a clear separation of military and civil power, and to the subordination of military authority to civil. That obedience is 'the greatest virtue which is required in a Souldier' had long been one of his maxims. Back in February, when tension was growing between Richard Cromwell's parliament and the Army grandees, he had written to Thurloe from Dalkeith: 'I am sorry some officers of the Army should trouble themselves with thinges they have nothing to do withall; but you need not doubt for the officers here'. In view of these sentiments the Army commanders had cause to be 'in some fear' how Monck would react to their dissolution of Richard Cromwell's parliament, but on 12 May he had written a dutiful letter of acquiescence and

congratulation to Fleetwood and the Council of Officers. However, the letter's desire that 'honourable provision' be made for Richard Cromwell, that no 'particular partie' in religion be preferred, and that 'the freedome and priviledges of [the people's] representatives' be asserted were foreign to the inclinations of Wallingford House. That same moderate disposition appears in a letter Monck wrote to the Speaker in June 1659: 'Obedience is my greate principle and I have alwise, and ever shall, reverence the Parliament's resolutions in civill things as infallible and sacred'.³³ It is consonant with this that in September he ordered his officers not to subscribe the Derby petition when it was circulated in Scotland. Consonant too, that when he heard of Lambert's coup, he wrote from Edinburgh to Fleetwood, to Lambert and to Lenthall on 20 October declaring his opposition to the Army's action and his support for the excluded MPs. His letter was received in London on the 25th; on the 28th the Committee of Safety decided to send Lambert with a force of some 12,000 men against Monck and he left London on 3 November.³⁴

In the event, no military action took place: Lambert's final campaign proved a lamentable anti-climax to his career. With the October coup he had overreached himself; power began ineluctably to slip from him the moment he appeared to have seized it completely. Rather than invade and risk alienating English opinion by an apparently hostile, and certainly burdensome, incursion, Monck had the prudence 'to be on the defensive, so that Lambert must march into Scotland to seeke him and the season being now so severe, t'will incommode his men extreamly; t'will be near a monthes march to the frontiers of Scotland from hence'. While Lambert was gathering his force and making his way to Newcastle, which he reached on 23 November, Monck secured his own Army's loyalty through judicious promotions, transferrals and dismissals and entered into negotiations with the Committee of Safety, thereby minimizing the likelihood of hostilities, even should the opposing armies finally find themselves in the same vicinity. Delay and prevarication were his shrewdest tactics. The Committee of Safety had to govern without any semblance of constitutional legitimacy, under threat of civil war, and in the face of a London populace among whom opinion began to run decisively against the Army. Monck's stand against Lambert received ever increasing support in the capital, where he was in correspondence with the largely sympathetic Common Council of the City. As Baxter put it, 'while *Monk* held them Treating, his Reputation increased, and theirs abated, and their Hearts failed them, and their Soldiers fell off'. Tracts berating the Army for the illegality of its proceedings began to appear, orchestrated by the republicans, who had now regrouped under Haslerig and were agitating for the return of the Rump. Other pamphleteers argued in support of Monck, and for a free parliament. The radical alliance forged during the Civil War and cemented by Pride's Purge was finally cracking: 'The thing most to be wondered at is, that

the Congregationall men are many of them disgusted at the Army' wrote Barwick.³⁵ Increasing unrest on the streets of London boded ill. By late November the law-courts were closed, the judges' commissions having expired, and trade in the city was seriously disrupted. There was friction between civilians and soldiers and the behaviour of the apprentices of the city grew increasingly riotous, especially after their presentation to the City's Common Council on 5 December of a petition calling for a free parliament. 'Many of the apprentices doe boldly say that as their predecessors did help to drive out the father, so they are resolved to bring home the sonne', wrote Nicholas.³⁶ There was evidence, too, of growing opposition to the Army's action in the provinces and throughout the country at large. In Yorkshire, no less a figure than Thomas, Lord Fairfax, declared for Monck and against Lambert. On 13 December the fleet under Vice-Admiral John Lawson, declared for the purged parliament and, on the 16th, sailed to Gravesend and blocked the Thames. In Ireland, whence Ludlow had returned to London on hearing of Lambert's action, the commanders Sir Charles Coote and Sir Hardress Waller declared for the Rump. Meanwhile, Haslerig, Scot, Ashley Cooper and five other members of the superseded Council of State continued to meet in secret, working against the Committee of Safety and the Wallingford House group. They entered into negotiations with Monck, issued pamphlets, and hatched a plot to seize the Tower of London. On 3 December Haslerig established a base at Portsmouth where the military governor, Colonel Nathaniel Whetham, a friend of Ashley Cooper, and his garrison, declared for the Rump and threatened a march on London.³⁷

In this extremity, the inability of the Committee of Safety and the General Council of Officers to agree upon a constitutional settlement was fatal. While they, and their subcommittees, wrangled through November and December over toleration, tithes, qualifications for parliamentary candidature and the franchise, any residual entitlement they may have had to the respect due to governors was frittered away. By December Bulstrode Whitelocke, a member of the Committee of Safety, had become convinced that 'Monk's *design was to bring in the King, and that without terms for the Parliament party*'. He told the despairing Fleetwood that he had only two choices: to declare for a free parliament or to offer his support to Charles II. By Whitelocke's own account, Fleetwood was willing to anticipate Monck and adopt the royalist solution, but he was inhibited by his inability to consult Lambert and overruled by Vane, Desborough and Major-General James Berry. There was a third course, which Whitelocke had not mentioned, and Fleetwood's inaction forced him into it. With the disorder in London approaching uncontrollable proportions, on 24 December he surrendered the keys of the House to the Speaker with the observation 'that the Lord had blasted them and spitt in their faces, and witnessed against their perfidiousnesse'. On 26 December about forty MPs were readmitted to the House.³⁸

All this while, Lambert had been marooned in the north of England, unable to risk leaving the road south open to Monck and unable to influence events in London while his situation grew ever more desperate. Spread thinly throughout Northumberland in search of shelter, afflicted by bitterly cold weather and heavy snow, ill-provisioned and unpaid, morale in his Army steadily declined. Public opinion in the north grew increasingly hostile since his troops were 'forced to take free quarter'. Lambert's forces had not the commitment to tolerate these appalling conditions, and his Army gradually melted away. Monck's Coldstreamers, meanwhile, were benefiting from their general's belief that troop morale, regular supplies and pay were crucially a commander's concern. On 27 December, when the die had been cast, Lambert finally turned south, but, unable to preserve under his command a sufficient force to pose any threat, he was reduced to submitting himself to the clemency of the restored MPs on 4 January, who ordered him 'to one of his dwelling-houses most remote for the City of London, in order to the quiet and peace of this Commonwealth'. 'All things here at present in so great a cloud', wrote Hartgill Baron to Mordaunt on 29 December, 'that the most quick sighted or wisest man living is not able to make a judgement what may be the issue.'³⁹

4 The Long Parliament Restored (January–March 1660)⁴⁰

Since early December the Scottish Army had maintained from Coldstream, on the border, 'that famous Leaguer, where the General encamped and besieged (as it were) *England and Ireland*'. Finally, on 1 January, Monck ordered his infantry to cross the Tweed, and the next day he himself followed with the cavalry. His purpose, however, was very far from clear, for he had already achieved his declared aim: Lambert had submitted and the Rump had been restored. The pretext for an invasion had by now passed. When Monck came 'out of *Scotland* . . . no man knew what he would do, or declare'.⁴¹ There were many possibilities: his plan might be to establish military rule under his own leadership, for, after the flight of Lambert, he was by far the most powerful military figure in Britain; it might be to restore Richard Cromwell and the Protectorate; it might be to shore-up the Rump and republican government; it might be to secure the return of the members of the Commons secluded by Pride's Purge in 1648, and so re-establish a Presbyterian regime; it might be to insist on dissolution and the election of a new and free parliament; and it might be to work for the restoration of the Stuarts. To further confuse prognostication, any one of these ends might prove a means to another. Monck's biographers would claim that it was his 'full and constant purpose to Restore his Majesty' and that he '*did all along with a direct Eye aim at the Kings Restauration*', but, after the event no other version of the (now) Duke of Albemarle's intentions would be tolerable. Whether he saw things so clearly at the time is doubtful.

In himself and his manner, Monck gave nothing away. He was, in the words of Milton's nephew Edward Phillips, 'the most reserved man then living'; he could 'keep his reserves with Men' and 'kept himself in a cloud' agreed John Price, one of his chaplains; another chaplain, Thomas Gumble, described him as 'of a silent reserved nature, one that thought much, but spoke little'.⁴² Because of this 'reservednesse' royalists, who had been making unsuccessful attempts to convey to him Charles's assurances 'of the kindnesse and good opinion wee have ever had of him', could not make out whether he might be for them or not; his actions were a 'mistry'; 'Monck no flesh understands' exclaimed Mordaunt in exasperation in early January; it is 'too difficult to make any warrantable conclusion of Monck's intentions', 'what he really is none knows'. The general did not even impress: 'a dull heavy man' says Pepys, with some disappointment, when he finally saw Monck in London. Pepys's 'lord', Edward Mountagu, formerly a Cromwellian general but in 1661 created Earl of Sandwich for his part in effecting the Restoration, similarly judged Monck 'a thick-skulled fellow'. 'All the world is now at a loss to think what Monke will do' wrote Pepys under 18 January. Two months later, in mid March, even though the dissolution of the Long Parliament was then assured, the London barber Thomas Rugg could write in his journal that Monck had 'not fully declared his minde'.⁴³

As a result, an air both of expectancy and of apprehension marks comments on public affairs during the first three months of 1660. History seemed to have lost its momentum. Far from an inevitable rush towards the restoration of monarchy, public life seemed almost suspended. At the start of the year, a Church of England observer remarked of public affairs that 'Never was more said, and less known'. Three months later, in late April, he was still as bemused: 'It is yet standing water with us, we neither flow nor ebbe; how farr the near approaching Parliament may ether [*sic*] advance or drive us back, I know not'. In January the country was reported to be 'full of confusion', the city of London 'in suspence' awaiting Monck's arrival. As he moved slowly south (he was at York on 11 January), the addresses, petitions and messages of welcome he received did not merely applaud his stand against the Army coup and for the purged parliament; they welcomed his action as preparatory to further constitutional movement. Private and public letters, petitions and declarations, from individuals and from local authorities, circulated in favour both of the secluded members and of a free parliament (that is, elected without restriction of franchise or candidature). To the addressees, Monck's response was studiously non-committal: 'The *Generals* Return consisting in a Nod, a Frown, or the Rubbing of his Fore-head, if the Speech were long'. He issued a statement that the Army would not accept the return of the secluded members, that any attempt to restore them would lead to public disorder, and that, by holding elections to fill its vacancies, the House would anyway become free and representative.⁴⁴ Even so, when he arrived in London on 3

February, 'he had many cry to him for a free parliament', but some days later Pepys was still 'at a great stand to think what will become of things, whether Monke will stand to the Parliament or no'. On 3 March he heard 'from many, that things are in a very doubtful posture', with rumours that Monck himself might assume supreme power, that the parliament might endeavour 'to keep the power in their hands', or that 'my Lord Protector would come in place again'. In one respect, at least, the rumours were not idle. In March the republican Edmund Ludlow was approached with a design 'for the setting up of Richard againe', but he responded with contempt (and good sense) that he would 'durst not adventure to scratch my finger for the promoting thereof, knowing that confusion, and consequently the bringing in of Charles Steward, would be the product of it'.⁴⁵ During March, Monck was feted and dined 'by most of the companyes of London' in order, as the hostile witness of Ludlow has it, 'to ratify and confirme the bargaine they had made with him, and to express their desires of having the King brought in'. He was not far wide of the mark, for Monck was now in touch with Charles through an intermediary and the 'bringing in of Charles Steward' had been actively in hand since January, when Charles had authorized royalist agents to offer pardon to all save regicides and issued instructions how to win soldiers and Londoners to the royalist cause. A glimpse of the kind of activity now being undertaken is afforded by Evelyn's note that in January he spoke to Colonel Herbert Morley, Lieutenant of the Tower, 'concerning delivering it to the King, and the bringing of him in, to the greate hazard of my life'. Nevertheless, when Monck was asked by the republican colonel John Okey for an assurance that he was 'against Charles Steward', Monck 'gave him his hand before all the officers, that he would oppose his comming in to the utmost', and, in April, Monck still 'continued his sollemne protestations that he would be true to the interest of the Commonwealth, against a King and Howse of Lords'. 'Things seem very doubtful what will be the end of all', wrote Pepys on 13 March, remembering the Army's role in recent history, 'for the Parliament seems to be strong for the King, which the soldiers do all talk against'; 'Monck is so dark a man, no perspective can looke through him, and it will be like the last scEAN of some excellent play, which the most judicious cannot positively say how it will end', wrote Mordaunt to Henrietta Maria in late January.⁴⁶

As Monck continued his inexorable march towards London (he left York on 16 January and was in Market Harborough on the 23rd, Northampton on the 25th) the restored Rump, under the leadership of Haslerig, now 'very jocund and high' at having through Lambert's capitulation finally (as it seemed) overcome the Army, applauded and approved all Monck had done and rewarded him with estates and honours. It assured him that parliament would meet all his expenses and pay his soldiers, and desired him 'speedily' to come to London. The Rump also sought to distance itself from the radicalism of the Army and to recommend itself to its new patron by moves

of studied moderation. It set about purging those hostile to its authority and it reinstated men who had opposed the events of 1648–9 and others who had been supporters of the Protectorate. Lambert, Desborough and other officers ‘who had acted against Parliament in the late Interruption’ were placed under house arrest. The Army’s chief champion in the Commons, and the man most identified with religious radicalism, Sir Henry Vane, was expelled and placed under house arrest. In a similar vein, a proposal that members should be required to renounce the house of Stuart was not adopted. The pamphlet literature shows a similar reaction against religious and political extremism, berating the Quakers in particular.⁴⁷ However, though its actions and pronouncements appeared to mark a turning away from its radical heritage, the Rump showed no inclination to yield to the pressure for its dissolution. It did not agree to permit the return of the secluded members, who, never having taken the Engagement to the Commonwealth, could be expected to vote to end the term of the republican Rump; nor did it decide on dissolution in favour of a general election to a new parliament, which might be expected to show a Presbyterian, if not a royalist majority. Instead, it resolved on by-elections to fill its seats, but by-elections hedged with restrictions on candidature and franchise designed to ensure the participation only of the politically sympathetic.⁴⁸

This determination to perpetuate itself was scant recommendation. The Rump’s history was too graphically present to allow many to be persuaded by its new moderate image. ‘The most sober here conclude, without their [the secluded members’] admission or a free parliament, the Rump will not sit long’, wrote the royalist Hartgill Baron from London on 29 December. Four days later, Pepys reports ‘Great talk that many places have declared for a free Parliament; and it is believed that they will be forced to fill up the House with the old members’ excluded since Pride’s Purge of 1648. Rugg similarly records under January that ‘the [Rump] parliament did not please the people in regard they were so few in number, not above 60 or 70, and they were hated the more because they would not permit the secluded members to sit with them. All cries out for a free Parliament.’ When, on 23 January, the Rump endeavoured to secure its authority and future as a republican government by issuing a declaration committing itself to a permanent constitutional settlement, to the impartial administration of justice, to support for the ministry and the universities, and to the maintenance of tithes, ‘I do not find people apt to believe them’ wrote Pepys.⁴⁹ In particular, the City of London was quite unpersuaded by these undertakings. Its Common Council became a centre of opposition to the payment of taxes levied by the Rump and the focus of the movement (both Presbyterian and royalist) for a more representative legislative assembly. Its demand that the secluded members should be readmitted prompted Prynne once more to lead a delegation of them to seek admittance to the House, which, predictably, was turned away by soldiers. In

November Prynne's pamphleteering had earned him a letter of recognition and appreciation from no less a person than Charles himself, and Prynne's reaction to being once more excluded was to renew his literary campaign with his usual indefatigability and ferocity.⁵⁰ It was at this time, in this mood of hostile reaction after its second restoration and in part through Prynne's efforts, that the royalists' sobriquet *Rump* for the purged parliament became general, and that the vilificatory, denigratory and scatological possibilities of the term began to be deployed by controversialists and satirists.⁵¹

By the second week of February this hostility had so provoked the Rump that it turned to its new-found champion to assert its authority. On 28 January Monck was at St Albans; on 3 February, with some 6,000 troops, he had finally reached London, having ensured a peaceful entry and secured his own authority through the Rump's agreement that regiments stationed in London should be dispersed and quartered outside the city. On Monday 6 February Monck attended the House to receive its thanks and had spoken, not entirely to its satisfaction, against extremism, either royalist or radical, and had requested that it proceed to elections to fill its vacancies.⁵² Three days later this alliance between the studiously moderate Monck and the beleaguered Rumpers was put to the test. Over a month before, on 23 December, London's Common Council had resolved to call out six regiments of trained bands, reorganized under officers of a predominantly royalist disposition, and on the 24th it had ordered that chains, gates and other defences be set up to bar access to city streets if need be. Although the Council's declared aim was to counter growing public disorder in the city, these measures were easily construed as provocative and defiant by the Rump. This interpretation was further encouraged when, on 8 February, the Common Council received sympathetically a petition effectively calling upon it not to co-operate with the Rump or to recognize either its tax-raising or legislative authority. If the Rump could not command the loyalty of the capital there were scant hopes for its writ beyond; steps were consequently taken 'for reducing of the City to the Obedience of Parliament'. The Commons readily approved when the Council of State ordered Monck to enter the City to restore public order, to arrest prominent members of the Common Council, to break down the City's defences and to station troops in the city. They also declared null and void the recent elections to the Common Council and resolved on an act to appoint a new Council 'with such Qualifications as the Parliament shall think fit'.⁵³ When, on 9 February, Monck entered the city and, the next day, took down 'all the gates of the City, and portcullises, posts and chaines', his action so disappointed the hopes vested in him that it 'made the poore cittizans look very bigg on him, and for the present, [thinking] that all their expectations in him [were] lost, many did that night curse and sweare att him like divells': 'All the City indeed seem'd as People confounded with wonder and Anxiety'. 'The City look mighty blank and cannot tell what in the world to do', wrote

Pepys.⁵⁴ The next day, however, the decision was finally taken to curb the Rump's overweening exercise of its power. On the morning of the 11th, Monck and 14 of his officers signed and despatched to parliament a letter of protest at its recent order, which, it expostulated, had dismayed the many who clamoured for legal government and a full and free parliament. There was disquiet, too, that parliament had not proceeded decisively against Lambert or Vane, or finalized a constitutional settlement, and that it had received kindly a vehemently anti-royalist petition. The letter required the House to issue writs to fill its vacancies by the following Friday, 17 February, to dissolve by 6 May, and to arrange for the election of a full and free parliament as its successor. This letter was read in the House that same day, 11 February.⁵⁵

The effect of this 'brisk and smart Letter' was instantaneous: hearing 'the news of a letter from Monke, who was now gone into the City again and did resolve to stand for the sudden filling up of the House', Pepys found it 'very strange how the countenance of men in the Hall was all changed with joy in half an hour's time'; when Monck himself appeared in public there was 'such a shout I never heard in all my life, crying out "God bless your Excellence"', while his soldiers were hailed with 'extraordinary good words' by the London citizenry who were so 'open-handed' with them that 'they are most of them drunk all day, and have money given them'. Opposition to the republican regime and jubilant anticipation of its demise now knew no restraint. 'Never was joy so Universall', wrote the royalist pamphleteer Roger L'Estrange, 'wise men grew mad upon't, and mad men sober. The cries, the Bonfires, and the fume of Rosted Rumps, did quite take down the *Legislative Stomack*'. That night,

news rane like wild fier . . . that now his Excellency would put in the sceluded [*sic*] members that Oliver put out because they would not consent to the death of the Kinge, that hee would stand by them, and they should have a free Parliment, made boonefiers very thick in every street and bells ringing in every church and the greatest acclamations of joy that could posially be expresed, and many drunk for joy . . . Also in the suburbs boonefiers, and as they hard the newes quit through England, Scotland and Ireland.

Thomas Rugg's account is corroborated by Pepys, who, late on the evening of 11 February, counted 14 bonfires 'between St Dunstan's and Temple-bar', and 'could at one view tell 31 fires' from the Strand bridge. In King Street there were seven or eight fires, 'and all along burning and roasting and drinking for rumps – there being rumps tied upon sticks and carried up and down. The butchers at the maypole in the Strand rang a peal with their knives when they were going to sacrifice their rump. On Ludgate-hill there was one turning of the spit, that had a rump tied upon it, and another basting of it': 'the common joy that was everywhere to be seen! . . . it was past imagination, both the greatness and the suddenness of it'.⁵⁶

There was 'now a State of War between the *Scottish* [*sic*] *Army*, and the *Parliament*' such as might seem wearisomely familiar to those who had lived through the Commonwealth and Protectorate, but Monck did not attempt any such forcible ejection of MPs as had been effected by Cromwell in 1653 and in 1659 by Fleetwood and by Lambert. Remaining true to his 'principle' he required the legislature to act on its own behalf: members were to 'be their own *Executioners* within their walls of Empire'. Ten days after this 'signal day' Monck suddenly and dramatically impelled parliament further down this road. Despite his declared opposition to the readmission of the secluded members and despite the fact that the House had proceeded, as he wished, with arrangements for elections, he and his officers decided on the readmission of the secluded MPs. On condition that they preserved the Republic, safeguarded the Presbyterian church and permitted toleration of sects, that they raised a tax to meet the Army's arrears, and that they proceeded to a speedy dissolution of the House, issuing writs for a new parliament to meet on 20 April, on 21 February Monck's soldiers permitted them to enter the House, to the astonishment of the sitting MPs. It may be that his discussions and negotiations with all the competing factions had persuaded him that they were irreconcilable; it may be that he was finally persuaded that readmission was the swiftest and simplest way to ensure the final dissolution of the House; perhaps the volubility of the public outcry persuaded him it had to be heeded; and it may be that this had been his intention all along and that the opportunity had finally presented itself.⁵⁷ What further he intended cannot be known. In an address to the now fully restored Long Parliament he still maintained a studiously moderate position, insisting that the national interest 'must lye in a Commonwealth' and that, 'after so long and bloody a War against the King for breaking in upon their Liberties', people would not tolerate the restoration of monarchy. Furthermore, monarchy in the state would mean prelacy in the church, 'which these Nations, I know, cannot bear, and against which they have so solemnly sworn: And indeed moderate, not rigid, Presbyterian Government, with a sufficient Liberty for Consciences truly tender, appears at present to be the most indifferent and acceptable Way to the Church's Settlement'. Perhaps this did represent the limit of Monck's aspirations at this stage, but, whatever his thinking, the history of the purged parliament, created by the Army in 1648, twice restored by it and now three times rejected, was finally brought to a close, and brought to a close amidst general rejoicing. Evelyn, Pepys and Thomas Rugg all report great jubilation when the secluded members were readmitted on 21 February: 'out of the window it was a most pleasant sight to see the City from [one] end to the other with a glory about it, so high was the light of the Bonfires and so thick around the City, and the bells rang everywhere'.⁵⁸

Some 90 secluded members resumed their seats on 21 February. Republican commitment was not obliterated. Rumpers such as Haslerig and Scot

continued to sit, and, though they were now in a minority, it was by no means an insignificant one; average attendance rose from 44 before the return of the secluded members to 111 after.⁵⁹ For Commonwealthmen, for whom the purged parliament had been the glory of the revolution and the true repository of the Good Old Cause which Cromwell had betrayed, parliament was now so far from being restored to a more truly representative body that it was all but defiled by the presence of those they regarded as temporizing Presbyterians, men who had been prepared in 1647–8 to do a deal with Charles I. It was to attempt to placate such republican feeling in the Army that, on that same day, 21 February, *A Letter from General Monck and the Officers Here . . .* was despatched to troops stationed outside London reassuring them that ‘since the Providence of God hath made Us free at the cost of so much Blood’ its signatories would never ‘return to our old Bondage’ or ‘lose so glorious a Cause’ as their liberty, but such protestations carried little weight with men of the stamp of Edmund Ludlow, convinced that the secluded members had been excluded by ‘a lawful authority’ – namely, the vote of ‘a quorum of the House of Commons’ – and that they were now no better than ‘Monck’s journeymen’, brought back by ‘treachery and force’ to overthrow ‘the privilege of parliament’. He refused to sit in the House once they returned and was prepared to engage in a plot to assassinate Monck.⁶⁰

Had he remained, Ludlow would have found its proceedings intolerable for, despite the persistence of republican sentiment, the return of the Presbyterian members decisively changed the temper of the Commons. After all, it had been their royalism in 1648 that had led to their original exclusion. In June 1659 Barwick had written to Hyde that ‘If they can get in all the members that sate in 48, it is thought there will be a great alteration; for then those, that were immediately guilty of the king’s blood, will be much the lesser party’, and this, he added, would ‘most advance his majesty’s interest’. This had now come about. The majority in the fully restored Long Parliament promptly turned on the Rump and all its works. On 21 February, the day of the secluded members’ readmission, they voted to erase from the record all decisions surrounding Pride’s Purge. This was more than a simple act of revenge. The Purge on 6 December 1648 had been precipitated by the Army’s determination to frustrate the Long Parliament’s vote of 5 December to proceed to a settlement with Charles I. On 18 December 1648 the purged parliament agreed that members might register their dissent from that earlier vote for settlement with Charles I. That decision was among those which the restored Long Parliament now erased from the record, but the decision to treat with Charles I still stood. The implication was that this parliament was prepared to treat with Charles II. The restored Long Parliament also set about reversing more recent history. In the next few days it reinstated London’s Common Council; it ordered the City’s gates, posts and chains to be repaired at public cost; it abolished the Army Commission and appointed Monck commander-in-chief; it discharged from

his post as Dean of Christ Church the leading Independent minister John Owen, who had been warmly thanked by the Rump for his sermon at its restoration in May; and it freed from their imprisonments Booth, the leader of the royalist uprising of the previous summer, the Presbyterian Earl of Lauderdale and Bishop Matthew Wren, imprisoned since 1651 and 1641 respectively. Lambert was sent to the Tower and, with the Army's leaders arrested or discredited, 'great care was taken' also to disable the troops by, in Burnet's words, scattering them

in wide quarters, and not to suffer too many of those who were still for the old cause to lie near one another. The well and the ill affected were so mixed, that in case of any insurrection some might be ready at hand to resist them . . . above all they took care to have no more troops than was necessary about the city.⁶¹

The new Council of State was predominantly of a Presbyterian and covertly royalist temper; only 7 of its 31 members were Rumpers. Despite the efforts of the Commonwealthsmen, and some agitation among Army officers, the enlarged House proceeded to enact the Presbyterian and moderate legislation which Monck had required: the Westminster Confession of Faith was agreed to be 'the Publick Confession of Faith of the Church of *England*' and the Solemn League and Covenant was republished and displayed in churches, where it was to be read annually. The Covenant included a promise to defend the King, and, led by Prynne and despite Monck's caution, Presbyterian members began to express pro-monarchical sentiments in the House. Indeed, Presbyterians were now so determined upon a restoration that, Denzil Holles later told Burnet, they 'pressed the royalists to be quiet, and to leave the game in their hands; for their appearing would give jealousy, and hurt that which they meant to promote'. And, finally, the Commons did agree on its own dissolution by 15 March and that a new parliament should meet on 25 April.⁶²

With such tendencies evident in its members, and its term thus set, the restoration of the full Long Parliament was so far from calming the constitutional uncertainty that it only encouraged speculation about what might succeed it. At the beginning of March Pepys found that 'Great is the talk of a single person', though at this stage there were still several candidates: Charles, Monck or even 'Richard [Cromwell] again'. Vilification of the Rump continued unabated, but Milton's *Readie and Easie Way to Establish a Free Commonwealth*, first issued in the last week of February and re-issued in an enlarged second edition in early April, was still arguing the increasingly forlorn republican case, while his friend Marchamont Nedham was discrediting the Stuart cause in *News from Brussels*, which appeared in March. However, the pro-monarchical case was now also being publicly heard. In November 1659 it had been 'capital to speake or write in favour' of Charles Stuart when, in response to the justification of Lambert's coup in *The Armies Plea for their Present*

Practice, Evelyn's anonymous *Apology for the Royal Party* had responded by rehearsing the 'wretched *Interludes, Fancies and Fantasmis*' of government since Charles I's execution to argue that only the restoration of monarchy could secure a stable settlement. There was no such risk when, in late February, Pepys read 'a pamphlet, well-writ and directed to Generall Monke in praise of the form of Monarchy which was settled before the Warrs', and Evelyn, that same month, published a pamphlet in defence of Charles against the attempt of Nedham's 'wicked forged paper' *News from Brussels* 'to render him odious, now when every body were in hopes & expectation of the Gen: & Parliaments recalling him, & stablishing the Government on its antient and right basis'.⁶³ Prynne, moving the bill for dissolution of the Long Parliament, had on 1 March openly stated in the House that the writs for the next parliament should be moved 'In King Charles' name', and a few days later Pepys was hearing talk that 'the King would come in'. It was about this time that Rugg, too, first heard people in London calling for the return of Charles II. By 5 March Pepys could write 'Great hopes of the King's coming again' and on the 6th he noted that 'Everybody now drinks the King's health without fear, whereas before it was very private that a man dare do it'. When, a day late on 16 March, the Long Parliament finally dissolved 'very cheerfully', in Pepys's words, people began 'to talk loud of the King': there was, wrote Rugg, 'heare in London great expectation that the King of England will be brought [in] by the Parliament that is to sit in Aprile next'. By 19 March Pepys could finally write that 'All the discourse nowadays is that the King will come again; and for all I see, it is the wishes of all and all do believe that it will be so'. The movement had become so irresistible that by 4 April Pepys's friend Robert Blackborne, Secretary to the Admiralty under the Commonwealth and Protectorate and a convinced Puritan, was not only persuaded 'that the King must of necessity come' but, to Pepys's surprise, commended Charles 'for a sober man' and professed 'how quiet he would be under his government'. In April Rugg saw pictures of Charles II 'sett up in houses without the least molestation' which formerly 'was almost a hanging matter so to doe'. That same month he saw Thames watermen wearing 'those badges that they wore in the time of Kinge Charles the Firsts dayes'. By the time the Convention met, people, in Pepys's experience, had begun to speak 'very freely' of the King's coming.⁶⁴

5 Monarchy Restored (April–May 1660)⁶⁵

Some spoke too freely. When, on 25 March, Matthew Griffith preached in Mercers' Chapel on his own pointedly extended version of Proverbs 24.21 ('My son, fear God and the King, and meddle not with them that be *seditionous* or desirous of change'), the intemperance and virulence of his support for the

return of Charles II threatened to dismay waverers rather than to win converts to the royalist cause. A few days later the printed sermon appeared with an appended historical survey of the last 20 years which concluded that ‘without the restitution of King CHARLES to his native rights, we can in reason look for no solid settlement of Religion, or Law, Liberty or Property, Peace or Plenty, Honour or Safety’. Its dedication to Monck urged him, now that we are ‘upon the point of recovery’, to continue ‘what you have already so happily begun . . . till you have finish’d this great and good work, and brought it to perfection’. For such enthusiastically public promotion of what was still, technically, treason, Griffith found himself committed to Newgate by the Council of State on 5 April. There was, though, very little likelihood that anything could now stay the monarchist movement, as no less a committed figure than Milton conceded when, in his final defence of the Good Old Cause, his *Brief Notes upon a late Sermon Tilt’d The Fear of God and the King*, he forlornly proposed that, if there must be a monarchy, then let it be elective and let us choose ‘out of our own number one who hath best aided the people, and best merited against tyrannie’, that is (presumably), Monck. Roger L’Estrange’s anonymous reply, *No Blinde Guides*, impatiently dismissed Milton’s claim that, as England is no longer a monarchy, there is no one with an hereditary claim to the title of its king.⁶⁶

At just the time Milton’s tract was published there was more dramatic evidence that the cause was lost. On 10 April, Lambert escaped from the Tower, where he had been confined since 4 March for having refused to leave London. It ‘was supposed he would draw a considerable body of the Army together speedily’ but in the event only a few hundred gathered at the muster arranged, with a nice sense of history, at Edgehill on 22 April. With his customary style, Lambert ‘was mounted on a Barb’ but ‘on ploughed land’ its speed was useless and, when his supporters fled, Lambert had ignominiously to yield to Richard Ingoldsby. That it should have been a regicide who returned him to the Tower was a sign of the times which Ludlow, who had declined to become involved in the attempted uprising, would have understood. Keeping himself out of public view in a house in Somerset in April, he found that the royalist Colonel Robert Phillips had lately visited the same house, equally privately: ‘It was twielight (as we call it) with us both: with me it was as that of the evening, when it darkens by reason of the departure of the sunne, but with him as that of the morning, when it vanisheth by reason of its rising’.⁶⁷

With the close of the Long Parliament’s 20-year term, both its members, even its Speaker William Lenthall, and its military servants, such as Mountague, set about making their individual peace with the Stuarts.⁶⁸ And, at last, royalist perplexity over Monck was resolved. Hitherto he ‘would hold no conference’ with royalists and had not been drawn to do so when, in the summer of 1659, his brother Nicholas, a Presbyterian minister, afterwards Bishop of Hereford, conveyed a letter from Charles brought to England by

Monck's cousin Sir John Grenville, afterwards Earl of Bath. Monck had then refused to accept the letter, but, a day or two after the dissolution of the Long Parliament, he not only received Grenville and accepted the King's letter but professed that the restoration of monarchy had all along been his intent. At a private meeting, arranged by another kinsman, Sir William Morice, afterwards Secretary of State, Monck finally and unequivocally declared that 'As to the Kings Majesty . . . None wish'd him greater felicity than he, nor desired his Restauration with more passion'. He was ready 'not only . . . to obey his [Majesty's] Commands, but to sacrifice my Life and Fortune in his Service'. Perhaps he was not being disingenuous. Certainly, there is no doubt that his profession of loyalty was now in tune with the public mood, leading Hyde to suppose that Monck realized that when the members of the Convention met, 'there would be a warmth amongst them that could not be restrained or controlled, and they might take the business so much into their own hand that they might leave no part to him to merit of the King'. Once declared, however, there was nothing half-hearted about his allegiance. Just as he had done the royalists' work for them by opposing Lambert, and so rendering a foreign invasion unnecessary, so his readiness to promote the restoration was conditional only upon the payment of Army arrears and indemnity; he expressed no opinion about the institution of monarchy or its constitutional role. He did, however, offer advice which, unless the report of it is coloured by subsequent events, earned his dukedom, for upon it the success of the Restoration would depend. Cautious as ever, he refused to reply to Charles in writing lest the letter be intercepted, but he had Grenville commit to memory three pieces of advice. First, to prevent anxiety and fear, the King should declare 'a free and general pardon to all his Subjects, and engage himself to give it under the Great Seal, to all that should submit to his Authority, except such as should be exempted by the *Parliament*'; secondly, that sales of public lands should be confirmed and the soldiers' arrears paid; thirdly, that the king should express his willingness to consent to an act 'for toleration of Liberty of Conscience to all his Subjects'. Monck also recommended that Charles remove from the Roman Catholic Spanish Netherlands to the Protestant United Provinces, a domicile more congenial to Puritan sentiment.⁶⁹

In his unconcern about conditions Monck, despite his Presbyterian background, differed from such Presbyterian lords and MPs as Denzil Holles, one of those whom Charles I had attempted to arrest in 1642, William Pierrepont, son of the 1st Earl of Kingston and a secluded member, and William Russell, 5th Earl (and afterwards 1st Duke) of Bedford. They continued consistently to maintain the Presbyterians' Civil War negotiating position with Charles I, namely, that the Army and Navy should be under parliamentary control, and monarchy and church established on the clearly defined constitutional and Presbyterian principles enunciated by the Long Parliament in the Newcastle

Propositions of 1646 and in the Treaty of Newport put to Charles I in September 1648 when he was a prisoner on the Isle of Wight.⁷⁰ Though very willing to support a restoration, they were accordingly determined that it should depend upon Charles II's acquiescence to such terms: 'there must be strict conditions upon which he must be bound, which it should not be in his power to break', in Hyde's words. Though unwilling, Hyde anticipated such a negotiated settlement with the Presbyterians if ever the restoration became a possibility. More ardent spirits, though they recognized in the Presbyterians 'the chief wheele of this motion' towards restoration, were less ready to pay their price. Writing to Charles in November 1659 of 'a close correspondence between some of the presbyterian lords and Monck', Mordaunt had reported that 'the best wee can hope for . . . will be the articles of the Isle of Wight, and the parliament of 48, and those I doubt not will restore you, but not so restore you, as your faithfull servants desirte. For Sir, tis a great and glorious prince we hope to see you, not what they please to make you'. Although there was now no possibility that Presbyterian demands would founder, as they had in 1648, on Army and Independent disquiet, yet founder they would, this time on opposition from the opposite quarter.⁷¹

That opposition could be foreseen from the elections to the Commons House of the Convention. In the debates in March calling for a new parliament, Prynne's proposal that the writs should be moved in the King's name was defeated and it was agreed they would be issued in the name of the Keepers of the Liberties of England. The decision to forbid Catholics and unrepentant royalists and their sons to stand for election was consonant with this republicanism. However, a different temper declared itself when, on 13 March, the Engagement (or oath of allegiance) to the Commonwealth (that is, to government without a king or House of Lords), hitherto required of new members, was abolished and all orders concerning it were expunged from the Commons' journals. In this mood, the House rejected a proposal to deprive all royalists of the franchise. Since, as Ludlow observed, 'they had given liberty to cavaleers to choose, it was not like that they would choose any of other principles': and the prohibition on royalists standing was consequently 'no more regarded than dead men's Shoes; the Countrey hastening to their Election'. When it met on 25 April, the Convention was dominated by members who were, in Hyde's words, 'of singular affection to the King', with 'very few' members 'who did not heartily abhor the murder of his father and detest the government that succeeded'.⁷² Of the 300 or so members whose family allegiances in the Civil War can be determined, 158 came from royalist families, 150 from parliamentarian, but these 150 were almost all Presbyterian. A total of 108 members had actually been in arms for Charles I. The ranks of Commonwealthsmen, of Army officers and of Independents and Cromwellians, were very thin. Although, as Burnet put it, 'The republicans went about as madmen, to rouse up their party . . . their time was

past. All were either as men amazed or asleep . . . The elections of parliament men run all the other way.' The parliamentary careers of the Army grandees, of Fifth Monarchists such as Thomas Harrison, of Vane, Haslerig and other republicans, of parliamentary lawyers like Oliver St John, and of the Speaker of the Long Parliament, William Lenthall, were over. No member of the Committee of Safety set up after Lambert's coup was elected and only 15 of those who had sat in the restored Rump in 1659 were returned to the new House, of whom one was declared not duly elected and three were expelled.⁷³ The expulsions were of the regicide John Hutchinson, and of Robert Wallop and Francis Lascelles, both nominated as judges of Charles I but neither a signatory of the death warrant (Lascelles, it seems, never sat). Altogether five regicides or judges were returned, but the election of Ludlow was disputed and the House found against him, which, of the five, left only Ingoldsby, whose capture of Lambert had sufficiently redeemed him.⁷⁴ No wonder that for republicans of Ludlow's stamp, for whom, since the Long Parliament was not legally dissolved, the Convention could only ever be 'a nominall Howse of Commons', the elections to the Convention were little more than a royalist subterfuge, conducted under cover of Monck's feigned impartiality.⁷⁵

However, although, in Lucy Hutchinson's scornful phrase, the Presbyterians were now 'the white boys' and there was a large group of over a hundred former members of the Long Parliament, it was outnumbered by members who had never sat before (208 MPs). Furthermore, the Presbyterians lacked coherence and leadership as a group and their parliamentary effectiveness was severely compromised by the virulence with which Prynne pursued former Cromwellians and Independents. His vindictiveness not only played into royalist hands by delaying votes and prolonging debates, it dissipated the force of the Presbyterian position since it dismayed many more moderate Presbyterians. Heneage Finch, afterwards Lord Chancellor and 1st Earl of Nottingham, Edward Turner, afterwards knighted and Speaker of the Cavalier Parliament, Job Charlton, afterwards Justice of the Common Pleas, and Roger Palmer, afterwards Attorney-General, proved far more adept at managing debates in the royalist cause. The Presbyterians did secure the election of a sympathetic Speaker, Harbottle Grimston, but they found themselves unable to command an outright majority in either the Lords or Commons. Furthermore, now that the return of Charles was all but certain, for any Presbyterian member to make a stand for a conditional restoration was to jeopardize his position once the King had been restored.⁷⁶ 'The Cavaliers', as Mountagu reported to Pepys, 'have now the upper hand clear of the Presbyterians.' When (on 8 May) Sir Matthew Hale proposed a subcommittee be constituted to consider which of the clauses of the 1648 Treaty of Newport should be presented to the King, he was opposed by Monck and the motion was withdrawn. The possibility of making terms with Charles, of offering a

conditional restoration, simply never arose. His return was to be, as Andrew Marvell later remarked, neither 'soiled with the blood of Victory, nor lessened by any capitulations of Treaty'.⁷⁷

The one person who might have been expected to support the Presbyterian position studiously declined to do so, even, as in the case of Hale's proposal, opposing it. With his usual taciturnity Monck, in the main, simply 'now sat still'. He made no opening address to the parliament which he had called into being and offered that assembly no advice or guidance. However, and again as usual, he had a hand to play. Following his meeting with Grenville in mid-March he had received from Charles five letters dated from Breda on 4 April to be communicated to the President and Council of State and to Army officers, to the fleet, to the Speakers of the Commons and the Lords, and to the Lord Mayor, Aldermen and Common Council of London; these letters were accompanied by a public *Declaration*. On 1 May, 'Monk's Hood' was finally 'take off': he revealed to the House that Grenville had these letters and *Declaration*, as yet unopened, from Charles, and the House, 'with a general acclamation', called for Grenville and had the documents read; 'And from this time Charles Steward was no more heard of, and so universal a joy was never seen within those walls'. Following motions of thanks and gratitude and resolutions to print the *Declaration* and to send £50,000 to the King, the Commons, on what Pepys called the 'happiest May-day that hath been many a year in England', unanimously approved a motion put by Morice concurring with the Lords that 'according to the antient and fundamental Laws of this Kingdom, the Government is, and ought to be, by King, Lords, and Commons' and that ways should be sought 'to obtain the King's Return to his People'.⁷⁸