Every act of seeing leads to consideration, consideration to reflection, reflection to combination, and thus it may be said that in every attentive look on nature we already theorise. But in order to guard against the possible abuse of this abstract view, in order that the practical deductions we look to should be really useful, we should theorise without forgetting that we are so doing, we should theorise with mental self-possession, and, to use a bold word, with irony. (Goethe, 1967, xl).

In a recent commentary in *Australian Geographical Studies*, Markwell (2000) discusses ‘self-directed’ photo-documentation as an underutilised yet potent methodological tool in exploring the relationship between people and place. In a number of successful studies, Markwell has applied a methodological approach that involves each research participant photographing the particular landscape of concern according to the whim of desire or iconic significance. For Markwell, this photographic process serves as a visual record of how each participant ‘saw’ a particular landscape, capturing mechanically the important, significant and iconic visual features to which each participant was drawn. This visual record is subsequently utilised in an iconographic analysis of tourist (and other) landscapes and as a point of departure in subsequent in-depth interviews, whereby participants are (presumably) involved in a process of speaking about and articulating ‘how they saw’ a particular environment.

By comparison with the other senses, vision has enjoyed exclusive status in the philosophical imagination of Western culture. ‘Long accounted the “noblest” of the senses, sight traditionally enjoyed a privileged role as the most discriminating and trustworthy of sensual mediators between man and the world.’ (Jay, 1986, 176). The eye has been, traditionally, divorced from its position in the human body and positioned above mere experience, with a god-like panoptic ability. Although unconsidered in Markwell’s commentary, his method relies on the fundamental assumption that there is an absolute correspondence between the space of sight and the space of articulation: that it is possible to translate visual experience into text. The epistemological assumptions of his method posit an ‘obviousness’ to sight — that the research participant, and by extension the human subject, ‘simply sees’ and thus ‘knows’ the external world.

It is this obvious notion of sight that has been the subject of extensive critique.
The link between privileging vision and the traditional humanist subject, capable of rational enlightenment, has been opened to widespread attack. The illusions of imaginistic representation and the allegedly disinterested scientific gaze have been subjected to hostile scrutiny. The mystifications of the social imagery and the spectacle of late capitalist culture have been the target of fierce criticism. And the psychological dependence of the ideological ‘I’ on the totalizing gaze of the ‘eye’ has been ruthlessly exposed. (Jay, 1986, 178).

In the context of this critique of vision, Foucault’s notion of, and critique of, ‘the gaze’ is, perhaps, the most famous. Foucault’s radical redefinition of disciplinary power, as a play of the visible against the invisible, irrevocably involves a critique of the naturalistic accounts of vision. Given the currency — or notoriety — of Foucault’s arguments there is little value in simply rehearsing his oppositions to Cartesianism, or explaining his critiques of the gaze (Touey, 1998). However, in re-visiting Foucault’s critique of vision — as a path to responding to Markwell’s epistemology — we shall attempt to contextualise Foucault’s position within that of the current of contemporary anti-ocular French thought. In suggesting the limits of Foucault’s epistemology we shall also seek to explore a vague line of affinity between Foucault and the transcendental universalism of Kant.

The ‘naturalness’ of sight
Although largely bereft of theoretical consideration, Markwell’s method relies on a Cartesian teleology regarding the relationship between the processes of vision and discussion, and therefore between sight and knowledge. If Markwell’s self-directed photo-documentation method may be regarded as a practice of knowledge production — a way in which spatial knowledge is produced, captured and subsequently recorded, appropriated and combined as ‘academic’ or sociological knowledge — then it is governed by the following logical equation:

\[ \text{landscape seen} = \text{landscape photographed} = \text{landscape described} \]

This teleology assumes that the landscape described by each participant corresponds in mimetic exactitude to the landscape experienced visually — that there is a direct correspondence between sight and (spatial) knowledge, between perception and cognition. Vision is thus positioned as providing the raw data, uncorrupted by secondary connotations, upon which the spatial knowledge is formed. The eye and the processes of seeing operate as a transparent medium through which the sensible subject may experience and thus form knowledge. For example:

Self-directed photography was used … because it gave some degree of power back to the subjects in the sense that they could use photography as a means of ‘telling their own stories’ though the photographs they took. (Markwell, 2000, 92).

Or again:

The benefits associated with using self-directed photography … derive from the ‘naturalness’ of the photographic act within a tourism experience. … In other words, tourists are in fact unwittingly collecting valuable data every time they press the shutter button on their camera. (Markwell, 2000, 97, emphasis added).

The teleology of transparency is apparent in that vision (conflated with the mechanical/chemical process of photography) is posited as a ‘natural’ or ‘objective’ view of the world — a transparent lens through which visual information passes. The method assumes that the landscape ‘described’ directly conforms to the landscape ‘seen’. The conflation of seeing and saying, vision and articulation — that the participants could use ‘photography’ (vision) to ‘tell their story’ (articulation) — assumes that visual experience operates only as a conduit, or a
medium, through which spatial knowledge is formed.

**To simply see**
The conflation between the realms of sight and text has enjoyed much currency in Western epistemology. The word ‘idea’ in its modern sense may be traced to the Greek verb ‘to see’ and to the notion of the ‘outward appearance’ (Panofsky, 1991; Evans, 1999). The mental processes of forming ideas, concepts, connections and tangents have enjoyed an extensive visual vocabulary. To see, to perceive, to ‘take it all in’ are, either formally or colloquially, used as metaphors for understanding, cognition and deduction. Epistemologically, knowledge has typically been equated with representations of an external world. Based on the notion of a universal visual experience — that all people ‘see the same world’ and that, therefore, the external, physical world is universal, pre-eminent, and foundational — knowledge is judged according to its degree of exactitude in reflecting this external reality (Panofsky, 1991; Evans, 1999).

Theories of the image, from ancient Greece and the Renaissance, through the period of Romanticism, to modernist painting, have been dominated, almost unchallenged, by the idea of the purely visual ... The presupposition [is] that the visual is a terrain of perception and experience untainted by precepts, concepts and language. (Evans, 1999, 11).

Through the presumed objectivity of sight above the other senses, and its perceived freedom from both the subjective concerns of the corporeal body and the secondary processes of cognition, the human subject is able unobtrusively to perceive the world. It is the ‘bird’s eye view’, the panoptic ability to scope a scene in its totality that is presumed to be at the foundation of knowledge. In a sense, then, the eye is discursively removed from the body (which is unpredictable, earthy and corrupted by subjective desires and intensities) and placed at a height above the external world (Jenks, 1995). The removal of the eye from the body also disables the eye from functioning as a part of the body, as a fleshy, biological unit, as it is regarded as simply a valve, conduit or medium through which cognition is stimulated by perception. In this sense there is a simple ‘obviousness’ to sight — to see is to believe is, thus, to know.

**The visibility of the visible**
As stated above, the notion that the eye and the process of sight provide an uncluttered and objective view of the world has received extensive critical attention. Of particular interest here is a current of this critique that runs through modern French philosophy.

In short, although the reasons are still uncertain, it is legitimate to talk of a discursive or paradigm shift in twentieth-century French thought in which the denigration of vision supplanted its previous celebration. (Jay, 1986, 178).

It is this shift in the way that vision is positioned that forms a critical context for Foucault (Jay, 1986). For Foucault, the interpenetration of images and words, what we see and what we say, is a recurring theme throughout his diverse works. His concern is not only directed toward the physiology of sight, but also more broadly, to how the visible becomes visible, and maintains its visibility. Foucault is concerned about the discursive conditions under which we might say: ‘I say what I see’. The question for Foucault is thus not ‘how does one see?’ or even ‘what does one see?’ but more precisely ‘how is the visible made visible?’ What is seen and what is described is therefore not the same. The relationship between words and images is disjunctive, governed by two basic principals. Firstly, words and images are not of the same order and, secondly, neither words nor images may be reduced to the other (Foucault, 1970). In this sense Foucault holds that words and images cannot be totalised into a system of language, to be read according to a particular code. In

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opposition to the Cartesianism of Markwell, which posits the visual experience as the raw datum of knowledge. Foucault holds that words and images are not complementary and do not form part of the same jigsaw puzzle known collectively as language or communication. Rather words and images are of different orders and it is the disjuncture or the non-relation between them that so interests Foucault (Foucault, 1970; 1983; Deleuze, 1986).

... it is in vain that we say what we see; what we see never resides in what we say. And it is in vain that we attempt to show, by use of images, metaphors or similes, what we are saying; the space where they achieve their splendour is not that deployed by our eyes, but that defined by the sequential elements of syntax. (Foucault, 1970, 9).

Foucault thus redefines the common sense notion of sight and the operations of the eye. Vision is neither the beginning nor foundation of knowledge in that the phenomenological impressions of light upon the retina do not form the reality we describe through knowledge. Rather for Foucault there is nothing ‘before’ or ‘prior’ to knowledge, in as much as there is nothing ‘behind’ knowledge. This marks Foucault’s radical departure from the phenomenological proposition of the pre-discursive or the a priori. Foucault’s infamous rejection of the situationist notion of the ‘society of the spectacle’, by invoking the Platonic distrust of images in favour of an image-less and therefore purely cognitive knowledge, indicates his notion of the contingent nature of vision.

We are much less Greeks than we believe. We are neither in the amphitheatre, nor on the stage, but in the panoptic machine ... (Foucault, 1975, 216).

Whereas Cartesianism invokes a teleology that extends from the essential ‘man’ to the external world, Foucault rejects this essentialism. We are less Greek than we, or perhaps the neo-Marxism of situationism, admit principally because there is no natural state; no ideal, pure paradise behind or before our spectacle or our image world. There is neither a pre-discursive world, nor essential ‘man’ behind the visual world. Rather knowledge is composed of rough, constantly bifurcating combinations of the seeable and the sayable, the visible and the articulatable (Foucault, 1970; 1973; 1983). ‘Knowledge is a practical assemblage, a “mechanism” of statements and visibilities.’ (Deleuze, 1986, 51).

The seeable then, for Foucault, is not simply that which is brought forth to the eye, or which is plainly visible due to the operation of light. His most basic departure from enlightenment Cartesianism is his refusal to posit sight as, simply, a transparent process whereby phenomenological stimuli are formed into knowledge. For Foucault, one does not simply ‘see’, but rather objects and phenomena are ‘seeable’ or ‘visible’ in specific contexts. The seeable is that which is visible when the eye is placed in machinic combination with discourses, knowledges and spaces. We are neither in the ‘amphitheatre nor on the stage’, precisely because we are not simply seeing or being seen. Rather we are implicated in a variety of seeing machines, or technologies, that define what is visible, according to a specified nomenclature. In this way the ‘madman’ is only visible in the asylum. The madman, the prisoner, the patient, the body are not only visible in the common sense of the term but are visibilities, continually made visible in specific contexts and combinations (Foucault, 1973; 1975).

The eye is thus not prior to knowledge, but is combined or (in the Platonic sense) corrupted with knowledges in making things visible. The relation between sight and knowledge, between the visible and the articulatable is a non-relation of indissolubility of the two into each other, defined by disjuncture, uneven combination and interpenetration (Foucault, 1970; 1983). In Deleuzian terms it is a space of constant deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation (Deleuze, 1986; Deleuze and Guattari, 1987). It is this very disjunction between words and images, the space between that which is visible
and that which is articulatable that forms Foucault’s interest in technologies of vision and of speech (Foucault, 1970; 1975; 1983).

Foucault’s notion of the disjunctive relationship between words and images forms a decisive break from the epistemology implied by Markwell’s method. Whereas Markwell’s method implies that there is a common sense relationship between that which is ‘seen’ and that which is ‘said’, that there is a direct correspondence between the seeable and the sayable, Foucault insists that words and images are related only through their very non-relation. This break with the position implied by Markwell also signifies Foucault’s critique of Cartesianism. Markwell’s teleology implies the Cartesian distinction between objects, objective knowledge and the knowing subject. Cartesianism implies that things exist independently or prior to the knowledge that is formed about them by human subjects — that there is a foundational ‘there-ness’ of objects independent of human action. Vision in a Cartesian sense is, thus, the process whereby the knowing subject apprehends the external world. It is both pre-discursive and objective. Foucault radically critiques this foundational notion of Cartesianism, insisting that there is nothing before or prior to knowledge, nothing that is pre-discursive. For Foucault, things do not exist independently from our means to describe them (Foucault, 1970).

A transcendent Foucault?
Foucault’s critique of the Cartesian foundations, upon which Markwell relies, parallels6 Kant’s own break with Descartes (Deleuze, 1986). That which is fundamental in Descartes — space and time — become for Kant determinable elements. Rather than space and time being fundamental elements of the external world, Kant insists that space and time are determined by the actions of the human subject in producing and practicing knowledge. Space and time become for Kant the absolute conditions of all knowledge — that is, they are a priori (Kant, 1934; Deleuze, 1986). Foucault’s epistemology implies that language and vision operate as the absolute a priori conditions of knowledge, in a similar way that Kant posits space and time as the absolute a priori conditions of all knowledge. Whereas for Kant knowledge is formed synthetically under the conditions of absolute space and time, for Foucault knowledge is formed through the ‘synthetic truth of language’, that is, the rough combinations of the seeable and sayable. The dialectic of the seeable and the sayable determine, for Foucault, what is knowable in given situations, institutions and mechanisms (Deleuze, 1986; Mitchell, 1994). What, indeed, is unclear and ambiguous is the extent to which these specific discursive conditions may have universal effect or, in Kantian terms, whether the seeable and the sayable are transcendent categories.

Foucault’s characteristic procedure might be described, then, as his identification of the visual-verbal dialectic as a kind of ‘historical a priori’ which serves, not merely as one of the structures of knowledge and power, but a key to the relation of theory and history. The dialectic of the visible and the sayable is the closest Foucault comes to a set of foundational Kantian categories ... (Mitchell, 1994, 72).

The relationship between Kant and Foucault is ambiguous, at best, and at times simply confusing. Foucault’s consideration of his relationship with Kant and his affinity to Kant’s notion of critical philosophy is contained in a handful of essays, reviews and interviews.7 There is no acknowledgement by Foucault of a debt owed to Kant. However, Foucault’s (1984) essay ‘What is enlightenment?’, which responds to Kant’s (1784) earlier essay ‘An answer to the question: “What is enlightenment?”’ attempts to construct a line of affinity between Kant, Baudelaire and Foucault, identifying a common philosophical thread between enlightenment, modernism and postmodernism (Touréy, 1998). Despite Kant’s overwhelming reliance on an essentialist notion of the transcendent nature

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of the human subject — a notion that Foucault radically rejects — Foucault fails to highlight this divergence (Foucault, 1984; Touey, 1998). It is this ambivalence to the differences between himself and Kant, in favour of positing a line of common pursuit, that points to the lingering influence of Kant on Foucault.

For all his anti-foundationalism, Foucault’s historicism does seem to suggest that the discourse of the seeable and the sayable form the foundation of all knowledge and therefore social power. The genealogical method ambiguously skirts whether the specific combinations of language and vision in particular contexts are applicable on a universal level. Foucault’s method reaches its most fundamentalist and prescriptive only when discussing specific examples. His genealogical method takes on the form of Kant’s critical transcendentalism, except that it is applied to specific contexts (Flynn, 1993; Mitchell, 1994). Foucault retains an indelible connection to Kant’s critical philosophy — the continual problematisation of the work of the philosopher. In his comments on Kant’s (1784) essay, ‘An answer to the question: “What is enlightenment?” Foucault celebrates Kant’s critical position in relation to his own time.

If one cares to think of philosophy as a form of discursive practice with its own history, it seems to me that with this text on Aufklärung [Kant’s essay on enlightenment] one sees philosophy ... problematising its own discursive present-ness: a present-ness which it interrogates as an event, an event whose meaning, value and philosophical singularity it is required to state, and in which it is to elicit at once its own raison d’être and the foundation of what it has to say. (Foucault, 1993, 11, italics in original).

It is crucial to note that Foucault posits as philosophy’s raison d’être — its very justifying principal — the ability to problematise its own present-ness. It is the freedom to be critical, which provides a key to both Kant’s notion of enlightenment and his critical transcendentalism, that defines Foucault’s own genealogy.

The implications of Foucault’s freedom become apparent with his major works on the architectures of incarceration. It becomes clear that ‘Foucault is like Kant in insisting that we can establish a reflective distance from the objects of our analysis.’ (Kemal, 1999, 292). In his critique of modern prisons, hospitals and asylums as machines of light, and of the disciplinary gaze, Foucault remains surprisingly ambivalent about his own vision (Levin, 1997). His historicism utilises vision as a critique of vision, and yet his own visionary tactics remain hidden throughout. It appears that he retains Kant’s transcendent, or free, vision. For example, Foucault’s famous analysis of the panoptic prison machine shows the prison to be a machine of light, whose power is maintained by the play of transparency of opaqueness. The power of the panopticon is to make the inmate visible and legible (that is readable, or knowable) to the eye of the guard, whilst making this knowing practice invisible — the visible yet unverifiable action of discipline (Foucault, 1975). However, Foucault’s own historicist position within this mechanism is left ambiguously invisible. From where (or when) does Foucault ‘see’ the panoptic machine? How does he maintain his own critical vision when, in his own analysis, the power of the panopticon is to make the reverse or reflective look impossible?

The circularity of this critical genealogy, to make visible, to uncover, or to expose that which Foucault has defined as invisible, or unverifiable, obscures the fact that in proposing a critique of vision, as it is encapsulated in the gaze, Foucault constructs his own ‘all-seeing’ gaze. It is only through an all-powerful, ‘god’s eye view’, that Foucault is able to lay bare the operations of light in the panopticon (Jay, 1986; Crary, 1990; Mitchell, 1994). The point, then, of seeking to draw a line of affinity between Kant and Foucault, is to highlight the way in which Foucault retains, in his critique of vision, a conception of the universal, all-seeing critical
eye (Deleuze, 1986). Foucault retains language and vision as the historical a priori of all knowledge, and thus in his critique of pure vision, that vision is indeed corrupted by knowledge and by text in specific combinations, he remains ambivalent towards his own powerful gaze.

**Conclusion**

In drawing together, then, the disparate threads of this critical response to Markwell’s method we are perhaps ready to propose our own tentative critique of pure vision. Markwell’s Cartesianism is constructed around the notion of pure vision — vision that is uncorrupted by secondary connotations of knowledge and cognition. One simply apprehends the extreme totality of the external, natural world, in the god-like capacity of the universal glance. This rests on both a notion of an essentialised human subject, and of a natural, pre-discursive world. Foucault’s critique of pure vision entails a critique of these fundamental assumptions. There is no longer an essential human subject, and even less, one that is constructed as a unitary hierarchy from the mind through to the senses. Similarly there is in no natural state, nor pre-discursive ideal. Rather nothing is before or behind knowledge. To see then is not to apprehend the world, but it is to initiate a knowledge practice, to engage with and negotiate the various discursive conditions whereby the visible becomes visible. However despite the radical divergence between Foucault’s anti-essentialism and Markwell’s Cartesianism, both positions retain one fundamental characteristic: the position of the critic, or academic, within the apparatus of vision. Both entail a critical view of mechanised vision (the prison and the camera) whereby the vision, the critical negotiating tactics of the viewer, remain invisible. Where Foucault lays bare the panoptic architecture, Markwell ignores the fact that he also occupies a position within the complex of vision. Foucault perhaps has much that we might aspire to achieve in a critique of pure vision, but also an ambiguous tendency toward an universalist constructionism that we cannot accept.

How then are we to assess the visual meaning of landscape? Is it possible to provide a theoretical account of the visual world, which avoids the notion of pure, universal vision? We must retain Foucault’s conception of the relation between words and images as being related only though disjuncture, combination and corruption. However, the task is less to generate a theory that explains, or even exposes in specific circumstances, this disjuncture than it is a creative negotiation. Perhaps this approaches Mitchell’s (1994, 6) aim:

> My aim has not been to produce a ‘picture theory’ (much less a theory of pictures), but to picture theory as a practical activity in the formation of representations. I have not wanted to settle the question of what pictures are, how they relate to words, and why the relationship matters. I’ve been more interested in showing how the received answers to these questions work in practice and why settled answers of a systematic kind may be impossible.

Any negotiation of visual experience is thus less about determining the ‘meaning’ of pictures and images and more about examining the various combinations and conditions under which the subject of the picture becomes both visible as a subject and the subject of the picture. Remembering that, in Goethe’s words, ‘in every attentive look on nature we already theorise’ (Goethe, 1967, xi), this negotiating also entails a negotiation of our own visibility and powers of vision.

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**NOTES**

1. The notion of contextualisation, as we use it here, is Foucauldian both in origin and intention. Foucault’s work resists any attempt to be tied down to a particular ‘school’ or line of argument. Also Foucault critiqued the notion of authorship, the assumption that the text is
the product of the mysteriously original genius of the author (Foucault, 1977). For Foucault, texts are always fragments pieced together from disparate sources, and thus the notion of contextualisation roughly corresponds to his own genealogical approach of identifying the discursive conditions or contexts of his arguments (Foucault, 1977; Jay, 1986).

2. Again, this drive to present the limits of a Foucauldian approach to vision stems from Foucault’s own limit-attitude.

This philosophical ethos may be characterized as a limit-attitude. We are not talking about a gesture of rejection. We have to move beyond the outside-inside alternative; we have to be at the frontiers. Criticism indeed consists of analyzing and reflecting upon limits. (Foucault, 1984, 45).

The goal then is not to be for or against Foucault — in as much as our commentary on Markwell’s Cartesianism must not be regarded as a rejection — but rather to explore the limits, frontiers and contradictions of his work.

3. For example, structuralist semiotics has sought to question the relation between visual experience and the ‘meaning’ of pictures. Barthes (1977b, 33) ironically asks ‘How does meaning get into the image? Where does it end? And if it ends, what is there beyond?’ This question seems to strike at the very foundation of the Cartesian epistemological of vision. Barthes seeks to oppose the Platonic ‘reflectionist’ notion of knowledge — that knowledge may be considered an exact, or mirror, reflection of an external world. Rather than being in anyway natural, the meaning of pictures is, for Barthes, arbitrary (Barthes, 1973; 1977a).

Feminist authors have critiqued Cartesian ocularcentrism, focusing on the dichotomy between sight and the remaining four senses. The lionisation of sight from the body and the assumption that sight is panoptically objective compared to the other subjective, embodied senses has faced feminist critique focusing on the implicitly gendered nature of this dichotomy. The divide between mind and body, between autonomy and embodiment is ensconced by gendered notions of autonomous, objective masculinity and fleshy, subjective and hysterical feminism (Grosz, 1994; Longhurst, 1995; 1997).

4. See Debord (1970). Debord’s notion of the society of the spectacle is of a social and political reality that is increasingly mediated by images. ‘The entire life of societies in which modern conditions of production reign announces itself as an immense accumulation of spectacles. Everything that was directly lived has moved away into a representation.’ (Debord, 1970, 2, italics in original). The ‘society of the spectacle’ is a conception of the usage of images to maintain political consent.

5. Foucault rejects the situationist account due to its reliance on the state, or king figure, as the producer, of the society of the spectacle. Foucault refuses to construct a dichotomous relationship between the ‘state’ and ‘the people’ in which images assume the status of ‘false representations’, or in the Marxian sense a ‘false consciousness’. Rather Foucault is interested in the micro-politics of surveillance, how the visible becomes visible.

So, for Foucault, the situationist ‘spectacle’ simply rehearses the still dominant juridical discourse of political theory in which the king and later, for liberal theorists, the state which are individualized, made known in written accounts and visual representations, and thus marked as the height of visibility; whereas the modern period is characterized by the ever-increasing disciplinary attention paid to the particular case, to the observation, comparison and classification of separate individuals, which is, in short, a ‘reversal of the political axis of individualisation’ in which power becomes more anonymous, exercised by ‘surveillance rather than ceremonies’ … (Evans, 1999, 15).

For an in-depth analysis of Foucault’s relationship with the undercurrent of 20th century anti-ocular French thought, including his rejection of the Marxian, situationist position see Jay (1986).

6. By parallel, we intend to highlight the discursive similarities of Foucault’s work to some of the transcendental aspirations of Kant. In this sense our mapping of this parallel is genealogical in direction and purpose. The goal is not to equate Foucault with Kant but to highlight the ambiguousness of Foucault’s discourse to questions of universalism, freedom and enlightenment.

7. See Foucault’s (1984) essay ‘What is enlightenment?’ for his most complete consideration of his relationship to Kant. See also Foucault’s (1986) essay ‘Kant on enlightenment and revolution’. Foucault’s (1991) introduction to Canguilhem’s The Normal and the Pathological, and Raulst’s (1983) interview with Foucault entitled ‘Structuralism and post-structuralism: an interview with Michel Foucault’.

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