Patriotism, Nationalism, and Internationalism Among Japanese Citizens: An Etic-Emic Approach

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The present study examined national attitudes among Japanese citizens. A National Identity Scale was developed and administered to a non-student sample (n = 385) and an undergraduate sample (n = 586) in a metropolitan area of Japan. The results revealed aspects that are common (i.e., etic) to different nationalities and those that are indigenous (i.e., emic) to Japanese people. Factor analyses identified etic factors of patriotism (i.e., love of the homeland), nationalism (belief in superiority over other nations), and internationalism (preference for international cooperation and unity). Attachment to the ingroup and ethnocentrism were thus shown to be separate dimensions. Distinct from these factors, commitment to national heritage emerged as an emic component of Japanese national identity. The discriminant validity of these factors was demonstrated in differential relationships with other variables, such as ideological beliefs and amount of knowledge. Commitment to national heritage was associated with conservatism, whereas internationalism was related to liberal ideology, a high level of media exposure, and knowledge of international affairs. Implications for the study of intergroup and international relations are discussed.

KEY WORDS: patriotism, cultural nationalism, internationalism, etic-emic

On a morning in February 1999, the principal of a high school in Hiroshima, Japan, was found to have committed suicide at home. The reason was obvious to people around him. The Japanese government had announced that every public school should have their students sing Kimigayo, the national anthem, toward Hinomaru, the national flag, at their graduation ceremonies. Despite the conventional use in many occasions, Hinomaru (or “Rising Sun”) and Kimigayo (literally translated as “Your Highness Era”) had not been granted legal status. Indeed, strong oppositions arose against the government’s attempt, particularly among teachers unions. They claimed that these national symbols were associated with the wartime image of the Japanese Empire. It is reported that the Ministry of Education was
pressuring schools in Hiroshima into strict enforcement, and that the principal who eventually killed himself had been agonized by the fierce tension between the two camps. The tragedy of the suicide ignited a nationwide controversy, and finally a law was passed to give these national symbols a legal acknowledgment for the first time since the end of the Second World War. According to polls, the majority of Japanese agreed with this legalization, but a substantial minority disagreed, suggesting that people still held mixed feelings toward these symbols (Asahi Shinbun, 1999; Nihon Keizai Shinbun, 1999).

The purpose of the present study was to examine the structure of national attitudes, including patriotism, nationalism, and internationalism, among Japanese citizens. As the above incident exemplifies, sentiment involving group identity has an extraordinarily powerful and even lethal influence on its members. Indeed, patriotism and nationalism seem to play a central role in tensions and conflicts between groups currently taking place all over the world. Understanding potential outcomes and correlates of these national attitudes should provide important clues for remedies of these problems at the global level. Furthermore, the manifestation of national attitudes often takes highly complex forms. For instance, burning the flag of one’s own country is normally regarded as an unpatriotic deed, but this can actually be a sign of dissatisfaction with the current situation based on an idealistic, or even constructive, love of the country (Schatz, Staub, & Lavine, 1999). Also, there is empirical evidence that members of a higher status group do not always show self-pride but at times find themselves guilty of exploiting lower status groups (e.g., Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, & Manstead, 1998). Exploring the potentially complex structure of national attitudes should help us understand how people view today’s world and respond to political events in domestic and international contexts.

In an attempt to examine Japanese national attitudes, the present study modeled the so-called “etic-emic” approach, which is prevalent in cross-cultural studies (Berry, 1969, 1989). From an etic viewpoint, the study aimed to identify components of national attitudes that are common to Japanese and other nationalities. On the other hand, from an emic perspective, aspects that are distinct in Japanese national identity were also sought. A factor analysis was conducted to examine whether there were any attitude components indigenous to the Japanese sample in addition to the etic components. Furthermore, each of these components was analyzed with regard to its relationship to other political and ideological attitudes.

1 Scholars, even in the same discipline, often disagree over the definition of the term “nationalism” (e.g., Motyl, 1992). In the present manuscript, “nationalism” refers to an ideological belief that one’s own nation should be superior to other nations (Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989). “Ethnocentrism” is not limited to an international context and indicates the general tendency to favor one’s own ingroup over outgroups in perceptions, evaluations, and behaviors (Brewer & Brown, 1998; Sumner, 1906). A broader class of attitudes, including nationalism and other related components such as patriotism, will be termed “national attitudes.”
These structural analyses were designed as a test for the discriminant validity of the factor-analytic results.

In addition, investigating Japanese national attitudes was expected to provide insights regarding domains of nationalism. Most empirical studies in the past examined nationalism in relation to political dominance and warfare. However, modern forms of nationalism, particularly in the post–Cold War era, are not limited to a political or militaristic nature. For instance, nations and states often attempt to protect their own domestic markets from international competition (i.e., “economic nationalism”; e.g., Burnell, 1986; Johnson, 1967). Consumers likewise tend to prefer domestic products over foreign goods (“consumer nationalism”; Baughn & Yaprak, 1993, 1996; Bilkey & Nes, 1982; Sharma, Shimp, & Shin, 1995). At other times, citizens take pride in the cultural and/or historic heritage of their community (“cultural nationalism”; Yoshino, 1992). Because the Japanese Constitution renounces war, we may expect that the national attitudes among the citizens pertain to domains other than militarism. Indeed, Japan has typically been seen as an economic rather than political threat to Westerners after the Second World War. By exploring in what domains the citizens find their national pride, the present study attempted to establish a case for nationalism and patriotism of a less political nature.

*Ethics of National Attitudes*

Social psychologists have traditionally approached the study of national attitudes from a universalist perspective. They tend to regard nationalism as one subclass of a broader phenomenon of “ingroup favoritism” (Doob, 1964; Rosenblatt, 1964; Silverstein, 1989), which is widely observed in various kinds of social groups (Brewer & Brown, 1998). According to this characterization, ethnocentrism is likely governed by psychological principles common to intergroup relations in general, such as competition between groups over limited resources (Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood, & Sherif, 1961), the desire to achieve distinctive and positive ingroup identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1986), and stereotypes based on cognitive biases (Hamilton & Trolier, 1986).

One important finding from the etic approach, particularly the one based on social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986), is that attachment to the ingroup and positive evaluations of the group are not necessarily accompanied by antipathy toward the outgroup. A number of studies have shown that this is often true for artificial groups created in laboratories as well as for more naturalistic groups (Brewer, 1999; Heaven, Rajab, & Ray, 1984). Extending this argument to the international context, some researchers have proposed that nationalism can be distinguished from patriotism both theoretically and empirically (Dekker & Malova, 1995; Doob, 1964; Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989; Sidanius, Feshbach, Levin, & Pratto, 1997; see also Hurwitz & Peffley, 1999; Mummendey, Klink, & Brown, 2001). Citizens may feel a strong affection toward their home country (i.e.,
patriotism) without holding a belief that the country should exceed other nations (i.e., nationalism).

A study by Kosterman and Feshbach (1989) has provided empirical support for the above contention. These researchers developed a scale to assess Americans’ attitudes toward the United States and administered this scale to a sample consisting mainly of college students. A factor analysis identified several important subcomponents of national attitudes, including patriotism (i.e., simple love of the country) and nationalism (the belief that the United States should be the number one in the world, and the commitment to national heritage), along with internationalism (cosmopolitan beliefs and willingness to cooperate with other nations), as distinct factors. Furthermore, the interfactor correlation between the first two was relatively low \( r = .28 \). This finding has been replicated mainly in Western nations (e.g., Dekker & Malova, 1995; Sidanius et al., 1997), but a few attempts have also been made to extend the investigation to Asian samples. For instance, Sakano (1992; see also Feshbach & Sakano, 1997) developed a scale in Japanese, which was essentially a direct translation of the Kosterman-Feshbach scale. The data from his Japanese undergraduate samples mostly replicated the factor structure originally reported by Kosterman and Feshbach (1989): Nationalism, internationalism, and patriotism emerged as distinct factors with eigenvalues descending in this order. Hence, the patriotism-nationalism distinction has been established as an etic aspect of national attitudes among certain nations.

**Emics of Japanese National Attitudes**

Although the common aspects of the factor structures of national attitudes have been demonstrated between Japan and the United States, it is premature to expect that they are entirely identical. Emic aspects should be considered as well in order to understand the full picture of national identity. In such an attempt, the present study argues that the Kosterman-Feshbach scale primarily pertained to political domains. A typical example can be seen in their nationalism subscale, which was mainly concerned with America’s political superiority over other nations. By contrast, in a country like Japan, which has not been a real political superpower in its history, nationalistic attitudes may be based on other domains. One candidate for such a comparative dimension is cultural and/or historical heritage. Some Japanese people boastfully compare their “thousands of years” of history to, say, the 200-year history of the United States. For these people, a simple length of time is something they can take pride in about their homeland. Indeed, they may regard anything that appears unique to their culture—such as the diligent work ethic, the natural beauty and tranquility of the islands, and even the relative homogeneity of the population—as a basis for national pride (see Yoshino, 1992). This can be seen as an example of what Tajfel and Turner (1986) called “social creativity”—that is, the general tendency among group members to seek comparative dimensions along which they can achieve the distinctiveness of the ingroup.
Another emic issue in Japanese national attitudes pertains to national symbols. In most countries, national flags and anthems attract citizens’ positive and patriotic feelings, while not necessarily embodying nationalism (but see Billig, 1995, for a different view). Empirical evidence certainly shows that feelings toward those national symbols are often associated more with patriotism than with nationalism (Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989), and more with “constructive” than with “blind” nationalism (Schatz et al., 1999). In sharp contrast, a number of Japanese people appear to hold mixed feelings toward the national symbols, as discussed earlier. An empirically intriguing question is whether attitudes involving these symbols are associated with Japanese patriotism or with nationalism. Or are they entirely independent of either component?

In an attempt to answer these questions, the present study examined the structure of Japanese national attitudes through the factor-analytic approach. A new scale to assess national attitudes was constructed, and both etic and emic aspects discussed thus far were extensively investigated.

*Correlates of National Attitudes*

In addition to the examination of the structure of Japanese national attitudes, this study aimed to identify correlates of national attitudes. Such analyses were also expected to demonstrate the predictive and discriminant validity of the revealed factor structure. First, respondents’ political ideology along the liberal-conservative dimension was examined. On the basis of past findings that conservatism and closed-mindedness are correlated with ethnocentrism and political intolerance (e.g., Baughn & Yaprak, 1996; Sharma et al., 1995; Sullivan, Piereson, & Marcus, 1982), an association between nationalism and conservatism was anticipated. In contrast, internationalism would involve liberal ideology. If patriotism turns out to be distinct from nationalism, it might not necessarily relate to these ideological distinctions. As a measure of the liberal-conservative dimension, the present study assessed respondents’ intent to vote for various political parties. Furthermore, opinions were assessed regarding those issues that have traditionally been associated with particular ideological positions, such as pro versus con positions concerning the reformation of the Constitution and rearmament.

Second, national attitudes should be related to images of foreign countries. Ethnocentric attitudes like nationalism are expected to be negatively correlated with evaluations of outgroups. On the other hand, positive evaluations of or attachment to the ingroup, such as patriotism, are not necessarily accompanied by antipathy toward the outgroup. Examining ratings of foreign countries was expected to reveal differentiation among the components of national attitudes in terms of their respective correlations with ingroup versus outgroup ratings.

Third, ethnocentric attitudes may be related to knowledge and information-seeking behavior concerning the ingroup and outgroup. Evidence shows that the level of education tends to be negatively correlated with nationalist attitudes
A low level of education also appears to determine the relationship among factors such as political ideology, ethnocentrism, and political intolerance (Bobo & Licari, 1989; Schuman, Bobo, & Krysan, 1992). Presumably, a low educational level and closed-mindedness are related to the lack of familiarity with outgroups (and their members), and in turn result in unjustified negative attitudes toward those groups (see the “contact hypothesis”; Amir, 1969). Because nationalists are expected to be relatively closed-minded toward foreign countries, they may possess less knowledge regarding international affairs than do non-nationalists. Patriotism, however, can be independent of such knowledge.

Finally, the relationship between national attitudes and demographic variables was examined in an exploratory manner. In particular, age and gender have been acknowledged as potential correlates of various domains of political attitudes (e.g., Conover, 1988a, 1988b; Golebiowska, 1999; Jennings & Markus, 1984; Shapiro & Mahajan, 1986; Vollebergh, Iedema, & Meeus, 1999; see also Hurwitz & Peffley, 1999), but few studies have attempted to compare national attitudes with regard to these variables.

Method

The present data were collected from two different samples. Sample 1 was drawn from non-college populations with diverse demographic backgrounds in order to extend findings from previous studies (e.g., Feshbach & Sakano, 1997; Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989). Sample 2 was collected from student populations. Administering the questionnaire in a classroom setting enabled the investigator to assess the respondents’ knowledge in a quiz format.

Sample 1

Participants. The first sample was collected through two different sources. The first group consisted of participants in the Open Lecture Series (an adult education program) at a large university in Aichi prefecture in central Japan. A total of 382 questionnaires were distributed during a lecture so that the respondents could complete the form at home. Of these, 284 completed forms were returned in the following week (74.3% response rate). Data from the second group were obtained through undergraduate students enrolled in a psychology class at the same university. These students were asked to administer the questionnaire to their parents and acquaintances. Of 210 forms distributed, 101 were returned (48.1% response rate). This resulted in a total of 385 respondents including 171 males (age range 19 to 81 years, median = 54.5), 209 females (19 to 74 years, median = 46.8), and 5 who did not indicate their gender. The breakdown of their age and gender is shown in Table 1.

Questionnaire. The questionnaire began with the National Identity Scale, which was developed for the present study. Among the total of 33 scale items, 18
were replication items drawn from the studies by Kosterman and Feshbach (1989) and Sakano (1992). Respondents were asked to indicate the extent to which they agreed with each of the given statements (1 = “strongly disagree,” 5 = “strongly agree”). An additional 15 items were generated for the present study. These were mainly incorporated from previous surveys conducted by various institutions, including NHK (a semi-public broadcasting station) and governmental offices such as the Department of Internal Affairs. The majority of the items pertained to aspects that were not addressed in the preceding studies, such as reactions to national symbols (i.e., Hinomaru and Kimigayo), cultural and historical heritage (DeLamater, Katz, & Kelman, 1969), safety, and the high cost of living.

Respondents next answered a set of questions to assess their attitudes in other political domains. These mainly pertained to their ideological stance. First, opinions regarding five issues that have historically been associated with ideological positions in Japan were rated. This included questions regarding the constitutional renouncement of militaristic activities (which nationalists have long opposed) and questions regarding protectionism in trade.

Next, the intent to vote for different political parties associated with various ideological positions was examined. The respondents were given a list of major political parties and were asked to indicate the extent to which they were willing to vote for each “if there was a general election tomorrow.” Finally, as directly relevant correlates of national and international attitudes, images of home country and foreign countries were measured. Respondents were asked to indicate their images of the United States, Russia, and Japan with regard to the following trait dimensions: trustworthy–untrustworthy, strong–weak, rich–poor, peaceful–warlike, and likable–dislikable. All ratings above were made on a 5-point scale.

Data collection. The data were collected in the summer of 1993. For the Open Lecture Series sample, the questionnaire was distributed in class and was collected the following week. For the second group, the questionnaires were distributed during an upper-division undergraduate psychology class. The students were asked to pass on these questionnaires to potential respondents who were not college

| Table 1. Age and Gender Distribution of the Respondents: Sample 1 |
|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|
| Gender | <30 | 30–39 | 40–49 | 50–59 | 60–69 | ≥70 | Total |
| Male | 9 | 11 | 37 | 42 | 53 | 19 | 171 |
| Female | 14 | 21 | 97 | 50 | 23 | 4 | 209 |
| Total | 23 | 32 | 134 | 92 | 76 | 23 | 380 |

Note. aColumn percentages are given in parentheses. bFive respondents failed to indicate their gender. cThe discrepancy is due to rounding errors.
students. Only three respondents (0.8%) identified themselves as “students” in the entire body of Sample 1.

Sample 2

Participants. In contrast to Sample 1, Sample 2 was specifically targeted on student populations. A total of 586 (177 male and 409 female) students attending four different schools in Aichi prefecture, Japan, participated in the study. There were 271 students from a large private university, 43 from a national university, 148 from a women’s junior college, and 124 from a vocational school of business. Students responded to a questionnaire on a voluntary basis in their classrooms. The data were collected in the fall of 1993.

Questionnaire. A short form of the questionnaire was distributed to Sample 2. The National Identity Scale was reduced to 27 items. On the basis of the factor analysis on Sample 1 (reported below), 26 items that well represented the four main factors were selected. One additional item was drawn from the Kosterman-Feshbach scale because the extraction of one of the factors was relatively equivocal in Sample 1.

Next, respondents indicated the extent to which they were exposed to information regarding domestic and foreign affairs. Respondents were asked to indicate how many times a week they read each of the following sections in newspapers: (1) politics and international affairs, (2) business and economics, (3) domestic affairs, and (4) family and education. The scale consisted of four categories: “0–1,” “2–3,” “4–5 times,” and “almost every day.”

The questionnaire also included a measure to assess the level of respondents’ knowledge. A series of quizzes were given concerning domestic and international affairs. Some questions pertained to national pride (e.g., “Name three Japanese Nobel Prize winners”) and Japanese culture (e.g., “Name the founders of four major Buddhist denominations”). Other questions were related to nationalist issues, such as listing the names of the four islands in the Northern Territory (which have been occupied by Russia and often appear in right-wing agitations). Questions regarding international affairs were concerned with such things as the names of political leaders (e.g., the prime minister) and capitals of foreign countries, and the current yen-dollar exchange rate.

Results

Factor Analyses

Factor analyses were separately conducted for Samples 1 and 2 with regard to the ratings on the National Identity Scale. The principal factor method was used for initial factor extraction. Highly similar factor patterns were observed across the two samples, with four clearly interpretable factors emerging in each analysis (for
Sample 1, eigenvalues = 8.83, 2.04, 1.21, and 0.87 in order, with proportion of variance accounted for by each factor of 26.77%, 6.19%, 3.68%, and 2.63% of the total variance; for Sample 2, eigenvalues = 5.02, 1.87, 1.46, and 0.99, accounting for 11.30%, 8.57%, 7.99%, and 6.72% of total variance). Although the fourth factor in each case failed to reach the conventional standard of an eigenvalue (i.e., 1.0), this factor was interpretable because of its consistency with the findings by Kosterman and Feshbach (1989) and Sakano (1992).

The adoption of the four-factor model was justified by additional reasons. First, the four-factor solution was compared to a three-factor as well as a two-factor solution. According to the results of varimax rotations for both samples, the last factor (i.e., Factor 3 in the three-factor model and Factor 2 in the two-factor model) was consistently identical to Factor 4 in the four-factor model. Thus, the key question for the four-factor model was concerned not with whether Factor 4 should be considered but with whether the first three factors should be combined or be treated as distinct factors. Second, tests of model fitting were conducted based on the maximum likelihood method. The $\chi^2$ statistic reached significance in both samples (for Sample 1, $\chi^2 = 775.26$, df = 402, $p < .001$; for Sample 2, $\chi^2 = 709.74$, df = 249, $p < .001$). However, this is typical for such large degrees of freedom. The Tucker-Lewis reliability coefficients, on the other hand, were acceptably high (i.e., .868 for Sample 1 and .834 for Sample 2). Moreover, the four-factor models in both samples significantly improved the fit relative to the three-factor models (for Sample 1, change in $\chi^2 = 136.22$, df = 30, $p < .001$; for Sample 2, change in $\chi^2 = 334.96$, df = 24, $p < .001$) and relative to the two-factor models (for Sample 1, change in $\chi^2 = 425.39$, df = 61, $p < .001$; for Sample 2, change in $\chi^2 = 847.37$, df = 49, $p < .001$). Hence, the four-factor model was retained for both samples. The factor loadings after a varimax rotation and the mean ratings are shown in Table 2.

It is notable that items associated with the national symbols of Hinomaru and Kimigayo were all clustered on Factor 1 (whether they were translated from the Kosterman-Feshbach scale or newly developed for the present study), along with items referring to historical and traditional aspects of Japanese culture. This factor was denoted commitment to national heritage (COM). It seems simplistic to regard COM as exclusively representing mere patriotism or nationalism among Japanese. Rather, parts of both attitude dimensions were blended into this factor. Among the items with high loadings on COM, several had been identified by the previous studies (Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989; Sakano, 1992) as either “patriotism” items (e.g., items 7 and 10) or “nationalism” items (items 1 and 18). Other replication items pertained to national symbols and cultural heritage (items 21 and 24). Overall, COM was interpreted to represent a considerably distinct component of Japanese national identity.

The interpretation of Factor 2 was more straightforward. This factor pertained to a simple love of the home country and was highly similar to the patriotism (PAT) subscale in the Kosterman-Feshbach study. It should be noted, however, that a few items revealed unique aspects of Japanese patriotism both in positive and negative
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commitment to National Heritage (COM)</th>
<th>Sample 1</th>
<th>Sample 2</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Factor</strong></td>
<td>Mean (SD)</td>
<td>Mean (SD)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Mean</strong></td>
<td><strong>Mean</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Commitment to National Heritage (COM)</td>
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<tr>
<td>22. Every time I hear Kimigayo, I feel strongly moved. [*]</td>
<td>3.36 (1.07)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>10. When I see Hinomaru waving in the streets on national holidays, I feel great. [K-P, S-P]</td>
<td>3.20 (1.01)</td>
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<tr>
<td>18. Hinomaru is the best among the world’s national flags. [S-N]</td>
<td>3.44 (1.15)</td>
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<tr>
<td>(24). It bothers me to see children made to stand up to Hinomaru or to sing Kimigayo. [K-P, S-O]</td>
<td>2.51 (1.19)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>32. It is a desirable attitude for a Japanese citizen to worship at shrines and temples. [*]</td>
<td>3.78 (1.04)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>14. Affection toward the nation is the most important emotion as a citizen. [*]</td>
<td>3.88 (1.08)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>21. Every young Japanese should pay respect to their national history and heritage. [K-N, S-P]</td>
<td>3.97 (0.96)</td>
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<tr>
<td>33. I feel a great affection to old Japanese temples and buildings. [*]</td>
<td>4.27 (0.79)</td>
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<tr>
<td>12. To be a good Japanese citizen, no one should criticize the nation. [K-O*, S-O]</td>
<td>3.31 (1.29)</td>
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<tr>
<td>(7). It is not that important for a citizen to develop a patriotic attitude. [K-P, S-O]</td>
<td>2.16 (1.21)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1. It is important that Japan win in international sporting competition like the Olympics. [K-N, S-N]</td>
<td>3.73 (0.85)</td>
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<tr>
<td>8. The unique Japanese culture is something we can take pride in. [*]</td>
<td>4.50 (0.83)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Patriotism (PAT)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>26. Living in foreign countries may cost less, but I would prefer living in Japan paying more. [*]</td>
<td>4.07 (0.94)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>9. I don’t want to live in foreign countries because there are more crimes. [*]</td>
<td>4.16 (1.07)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>30. If I were born again, I would like to be Japanese again. [*]</td>
<td>4.15 (1.00)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>15. I love this country of Japan. [K-P, S-P]</td>
<td>4.56 (0.70)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25. I am proud to be Japanese [K-P, S-P]</td>
<td>4.33 (0.85)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Japan is the best country in the world. [S-N]</td>
<td>3.87 (1.02)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(23). I don’t feel much attachment to Japan. [*]</td>
<td>1.74 (0.97)</td>
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### Nationalism (NAT)

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Sample 1 Factor</th>
<th>Sample 2 Factor</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mean (SD) 1 2 3 4</td>
<td>Mean (SD) 1 2 3 4</td>
</tr>
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27. In view of Japanese economic superiority, it is only right that we should have a bigger say in the United Nations and other international organizations. [K-N, S-N]

11. I would not be willing to decrease our living standard to increase that of people in poorer countries in the world. [K-L, S-I]

29. The Japanese people are among the finest in the world. [S-N]

1. I would not be willing to decrease our living standard to increase that of people in poorer countries in the world. [K-N, S-N]

28. The alleviation of poverty in other countries is their problem, not ours. [K-I, S-I]

5. Japan should open its doors to more foreigners in many areas. [*]

17. Japan should be more willing to share its wealth with other suffering nations, even if it does not necessarily coincide with our political interests. [K-I, S-I]

19. Japan should exclude those foreign athletes who dominate our sport scenes. [*]

20. Automobiles and appliances cannot be reliable unless they are made in Japan. [*]

16. It helps Japan that we try to learn from foreign cultures. [*]

15. Japan shouldn’t offer foreign aids if they cost our national interest. [K-N*]

Note: *Item numbers indicate the order in the questionnaire for Sample 1. A number in parentheses indicates that the item was negatively worded. Items are listed in the order of factor loadings obtained from Sample 1. The final, unnumbered item is the one added for Sample 2 that had not appeared in the Sample 1 questionnaire; see the text.

bK = Items used in Kosterman and Feshbach (1989). S = Items used in Sakano (1992). * = Items that were newly generated or modified for use in this study. N, P, I, and O indicate the factor (Nationalism, Patriotism, Internationalism, and other) with which each item was associated in the previous studies.

c1 = “strongly disagree,” 5 = “strongly agree.”

dRows void of factor loadings indicate items that were not included in the questionnaire for the given sample.
terms. That is, items referring to public safety (item 9) and the high cost of living (item 26) were acknowledged as distinct characteristics of Japanese society.

Factor 3 was heavily loaded by items related to the need for protecting Japanese national interests as well as items referring to the superiority of Japan and the Japanese ethnicity. This was essentially a duplicate of the nationalism (NAT) factor in the Kosterman-Feshbach scale.

Finally, Factor 4 was positively correlated with belief in the necessity of opening Japanese society to the international community and was inversely related to the desire to exclude foreign people and products. This was clearly interpretable as the internationalism (INT) component of national attitudes, which was consistently reported by the preceding investigations.

Table 3 illustrates interfactor correlations among the four components. The results were again highly consistent across the two samples. The correlation between PAT and NAT was considerable and similar to the findings from previous studies (Baughn & Yaprak, 1996; Sakano, 1992). Yet these subscales showed differentiation regarding relations to INT. That is, NAT had a negative correlation with INT for Sample 1, whereas the correlations between PAT and INT were near zero in both samples. As discussed above, nationalism by definition involves a comparison with other nations and thus can be negatively correlated with attitudes toward the outgroup, whereas patriotism can be independent of outgroup evaluations. The differentiation between PAT and NAT will become clearer below. It should also be noted that COM showed equally high correlations with PAT and NAT. Again, COM seemed to bear both patriotic and nationalistic implications.

Demographic Variables

Analyses of Sample 1 revealed that there was generally a very minor gender difference for each factor. This was consistent with the finding by Kosterman and Feshbach (1989). A series of one-way analyses of variance on mean factor scores revealed that the main effect for gender approached significance in terms of COM only \( F(1, 331) = 3.42, p < .07 \), with males \( M = .081 \) scoring slightly higher than females \( M = -.100 \). There was no gender difference in PAT, NAT, or INT \( F_s < 1 \)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3. Interfactor Correlations on the Basis of Oblique Rotation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sample 1</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 (COM)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 (PAT)</td>
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<tr>
<td>3 (NAT)</td>
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<tr>
<td>4 (INT)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

COM = Commitment to National Heritage, PAT = Patriotism, NAT = Nationalism, INT = Internationalism.
for PAT and NAT, and $F(1, 331) = 2.17$, n.s., for INT]. In contrast, age showed significant and positive correlations with COM, PAT, and NAT ($r_s = .31, .20, \text{ and } .34$, respectively, all $p_s < .001$), but not with INT ($r = -.02$, n.s.).

Support for Political Parties

The questionnaire administered to Sample 1 included questions to assess various political orientations as potential correlates of national attitudes. First of these was the respondents’ intent to vote for different political parties. Because of the drastic change in the alignment of parties that was taking place at the time of data collection, it was necessary to determine the definition of each party along interpretable dimensions. Scores for respondents’ willingness to vote for each party were factor-analyzed. A factor analysis using the principal factor method was first conducted, but the resultant factor structure was extremely difficult to interpret. As an alternative, a principal components (PC) analysis was performed, and three interpretable PCs were identified with eigenvalues of 2.06, 1.41, and 1.15. As Table 4 shows, the first PC represented the ideological dimension in place during the Cold War era, with the pro-Soviet Communist and Socialist parties on one end and the pro-America Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) on the other. This factor was named Classic Ideology, with higher scores representing support for Communists/Social-

Table 4. Coefficients From a Principal Components Analysis on Party Identification: Sample 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intentions to vote for:</th>
<th>PC 1</th>
<th>PC 2</th>
<th>PC 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Democratic Party</td>
<td>−.42&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>.68</td>
<td>−.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese Socialist Party&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>.69</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Komei Party</td>
<td>.44</td>
<td>.63</td>
<td>.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese Communist Party</td>
<td>.74</td>
<td>−.10</td>
<td>−.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progressive Democratic Federation</td>
<td>.38</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reformationist parties&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>−.19</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.85</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup>Loadings after a varimax rotation are indicated. Items with high loadings are in boldface.

<sup>b</sup>A literal translation of the Japanese name. Their official English name was the Japanese Democratic Socialist Party.

<sup>c</sup>This category included reformationist parties defecting the LDP, such as the Japan New Party and the New Frontier Party.

2 Sample 1 appeared to be more informative than Sample 2 for the analysis of demographic variables because of the diversity of the respondents’ backgrounds. The disproportionate male-female ratio in Sample 2 was also a concern. With these cautions in mind, it still seems worth noting that significant but somehow inconsistent gender differences were observed in the student sample. Factor scores from the female respondents were significantly higher than scores from males in COM ($M = .075$ vs. −.175, $p < .01$), PAT ($M = .047$ vs. −.106, $p < .05$), and INT ($M = .045$ vs. −.105, $p < .05$), but lower in NAT ($M = −.045$ vs. .102, $p = .05$).
ists as opposed to the LDP. The second PC represented support for conservative parties and was therefore denoted Neo-Conservatism. The third PC was named Neo-Liberalism because it was associated with support for new parties that advocated political reforms and relatively liberal platforms.\(^3\)

Factor scores from each PC were computed as an index of voting intent, and the influence of COM, PAT, NAT, and INT (represented by factor scores as well) on the behavioral intentions was examined. In order to test the model of causal paths, a structural equations modeling analysis using AMOS was conducted. Paths from each component of national attitudes to the three PCs of party support were examined. Age was also included in the model as a potential factor because of its correlations with national attitudes.\(^4\)

The model fitted the data \(\chi^2 = 11.12, \text{df} = 11, \text{n.s.}; \text{goodness-of-fit index (GFI) = .990, comparative fit index (CFI) = .999}\), and the paths with significant coefficients are shown in Figure 1. The results revealed that the four subcomponents of national attitudes exerted influence on voting intent in highly differentiated manners. The COM factor had significant influence on anti-communist (pro-LDP) tendencies and on Neo-Conservatism, but not on support for liberal parties. Also, PAT showed an influence on the anti-communist stance. In a sharp contrast with these factors, INT revealed its liberal tendency, showing a negative path on Neo-Conservatism and a positive path on Neo-Liberalism. Finally, NAT showed no significant influence on voting inclinations. Although NAT constituted an ethnocentric attitude, it appeared to differ from a stereotypic image of right-wing nationalists holding conservative ideology.

### Ideological Beliefs

The relationship between national attitudes and other ideological domains was further pursued. First, opinions representing the “right- vs. left-wing” or “hawkish vs. dovish” dimension were examined. The right-wing or hawkish position in Japan has traditionally been associated with calls for a reformation of the Constitution (particularly a call for an amendment of Article 9, which renounces war) and protectionist views in international trade policies. The left-wing or dovish stance,

\(^3\) The second and third PCs identified by the present analysis were in many ways predictive of political developments in later years. For instance, the two parties that loaded heavily on the Neo-Conservatism factor—the Komei Party and the LDP—formed a conservative coalition in the late 1990s. The Democratic Socialist Party, which later dissolved, included a faction whose members had been known to be even more conservative than the LDP. New small parties advocating political reformations such as the Progressive Democratic Federation and the Japan New Party yielded high loadings on the Neo-Liberalism factor, and these parties later joined the Democratic Party, which was founded in 1996 as a major opposition party against the LDP.

\(^4\) A covariation between errors for NAT and INT was suggested by a Lagrange multiplier test in a preliminary analysis and was included in the model. Also, one may argue that a reversed causality between national attitudes and party support should be considered. An alternative model with paths drawn from each category of voting intent to each component of national attitudes was tested. The alternative model failed to fit the data \(\chi^2 = 60.20, \text{df} = 14, p < .001, \text{GFI} = .947, \text{CFI} = .654; \text{change in } \chi^2 = 40.08, \text{df} = 3, p < .001\). Thus, the original model was retained.
on the contrary, has been associated with the preservation of the current Constitution and with mixed positions regarding trade issues.

The results summarized in Table 5 demonstrate that COM, PAT, and NAT showed distinct correlational patterns. The COM factor was associated with the conventional Japanese right-wing position. It was negatively correlated with the preservation of the war-renouncing Constitution and the current restriction of international aid to non-military activities, but was positively correlated with support for dispatching a peace-keeping operation in Cambodia. The PAT, NAT, and INT factors showed completely different patterns. Contradicting an intuitive prediction, NAT did not resemble traditional right-wing attitudes. Rather, it was positively correlated with a pro-Constitution position, opening the domestic market, and restricting foreign aid. The PAT factor showed a pattern similar to NAT only in this domain. Finally, INT was consistently correlated with open market opinions.

Table 5 also illustrates correlations with images of different countries. Ratings of each country were combined because of high reliability coefficients (Cronbach’s $\alpha = .76, .69$, and $.75$ for ratings of the United States, Russia, and Japan, respec-
Russia has been criticized by nationalists and right-wing groups as a symbolic enemy mainly because of its occupation of northern territories. As for the United States, mixed feelings have often been observed among Japanese. In the context of Cold War ideology, conservatives were supposed to be pro-America vis-à-vis the communist countries. It has also been true, however, that nationalists frequently express antipathy toward “American imperialism.” The results were fairly consistent with these views. The image of Russia was negatively correlated with COM and NAT. On the other hand, the evaluation of the United States showed a positive correlation with COM, but not with NAT. In contrast, INT was positively correlated with the pro-U.S. image. The only significant correlation involving PAT was observed concerning the home country, which was clearly consistent with its definition.

In sum, COM was relatively associated with conservative attitudes and behavior, whereas INT was related more with liberal ideology. The PAT factor showed relatively weak relations with ideological variables. Surprisingly, NAT was not strongly related to conservatism.

**Knowledge and Media Exposure**

A structural equations modeling analysis was conducted for Sample 2 to examine the influence of knowledge and media exposure on national attitudes. Because the reading frequencies of the four categories of newspaper sections were highly correlated with one another (average \( r = .57 \), all \( ps < .001 \)), they were combined as a single predictor. The two domains of knowledge, domestic and international, were treated as separate predictors because the difference between...
these two was of exploratory interest. The model fitted the data ($\chi^2 = 12.33$, df = 6, n.s.; GFI = .994, CFI = .988). As Figure 2 illustrates, the frequency of newspaper reading showed a positive path to INT, but no significant path to COM, PAT, or NAT. On the other hand, knowledge in the international domain showed negative influence on COM and NAT along with positive influence on INT. Knowledge in domestic affairs showed no significant paths. Although domestic knowledge was significantly correlated with international knowledge and produced a similar pattern of correlations with national attitudes at the bivariate level ($r = -.13$, -.17, and .11 with COM, NAT, and INT, respectively, all $p < .01$), it showed no unique contribution to any of the national attitude components when statistically controlling for all other variables.

**Discussion**

The present study revealed a common factor structure across two different samples, one collected from the general population (Sample 1) and the other from an undergraduate population (Sample 2). The factor-analytic approach uncovered etic as well as emic aspects of Japanese national attitudes. On the etic side, the three dimensions of PAT, NAT, and INT all emerged as distinct factors. The results

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Figure 2. Results from a structural equations modeling analysis regarding news exposure, knowledge, and national attitudes: Sample 2. Only significant paths with estimations of standardized coefficients are shown. ***$p < .001$, **$p < .01$, *$p < .05$.

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5 When the two domains of knowledge were combined, the effects were essentially identical to those of knowledge in the *international* domain alone.
concerning these factors replicated the findings by Kosterman and Feshbach (1989; see also Baughn & Yaprak, 1996; Feshbach & Sakano, 1997). Of particular importance was the result that PAT and NAT constituted different aspects of national attitudes. Admittedly, the interfactor correlation was high in the present data. However, the discriminant validity of these subscales was well demonstrated by distinct causal and correlational patterns with other domains of political attitudes, images of other countries, and knowledge.

The existing evidence concerning differentiation among patriotism, nationalism, and internationalism mainly comes from studies conducted in Western nations (e.g., Dekker & Malova, 1995; Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989; Mummendey et al., 2001; Schatz et al., 1999; Sidanius et al., 1997), and investigation has been extremely sparse in regions like East Asia (Feshbach & Sakano, 1997). Also, previous studies have almost exclusively relied on student samples. Considering these limitations in the preceding research, the present study has provided greater external validity for the subscales of national attitudes by extending the evidence to Japanese samples including both student and non-student subsets.

The instruments that potentially tap common aspects of PAT and NAT across Japanese and American citizens also revealed unique aspects of Japanese patriotism and nationalism. For instance, the Japanese version of the PAT subscale did not include items referring to the national flag and anthem, which are typical for American patriotism. In addition, NAT betrayed our stereotypical conception of right-wing nationalism. The NAT factor showed no association with support for conservative political parties and presented relatively “dovish” attitudinal positions (see Table 5). It is also notable that the scale item “It helps Japan that we try to learn from foreign cultures” produced a fairly high loading on NAT in both samples. This factor was hence not necessarily associated with the exclusion of foreign cultures. The belief in learning from other countries for the sake of national interests may indicate that the mentality of “catching up with the West” still continues to underlie the national ethos.

The most distinct and emic aspects of Japanese national attitudes emerged as the COM factor. The scale items with high loadings on this factor mainly pertained to respect for cultural and historical heritage along with national symbols. Symbols such as the national flag and anthem were dissociated from the PAT and NAT factors, suggesting that they may represent cultural rather than political or militaristic significance for Japanese citizens, just as shrines and temples do.

Along with these peculiarities with respect to its content, COM appeared to embrace right-wing conservatism in its relation to other variables. For instance, COM was associated with political conservatism and so-called “hawkish” opinions, such as support for sending troops overseas and a revisionist position against the Constitution, which renounces armament. The COM factor also presented a conservative stance on an ideological dimension from the Cold War era in that ratings of nations and voting intent both indicated pro-America and anti-Russia tendencies. Furthermore, COM was associated with a low level of knowledge in
international affairs among the student sample, which is consistent with the concept of “blind patriotism” proposed by Schatz et al. (1999). The factor that showed the greatest contrast with COM was INT, and this factor was generally associated with support for parties with liberal platforms, favorable attitudes toward open market policies, and a high level of knowledge in international affairs.

The results involving knowledge and news exposure revealed that attitudes toward the home country were not necessarily formed on the basis of factual information. Specifically, knowledge in domestic affairs showed no unique contribution to COM, NAT, or even PAT when the other variables were all statistically controlled for, even though the questions pertained to national pride and cultural heritage. The level of exposure to news produced the same results. On the other hand, knowledge in the international domain showed negative paths to COM and NAT. By definition, these two factors involve beliefs in unique aspects of the home country and its superiority over other nations. Ironically, however, these beliefs were inversely related to knowledge about other countries. One may point out that the validity of the sample and the measure of knowledge still need to be tested. Further examinations of underlying processes with elaborated instruments and extended samples should produce highly meaningful results.

An attempt to achieve a comprehensive understanding of national attitudes necessitates an overarching theoretical framework. The present results seem to have significant implications for such theorizing. In their social identity theory, Tajfel and Turner (1986) emphasized that ingroup identification combined with emotional significance attached to it (i.e., social identity) can be an important source of ingroup-favoring tendencies. According to this perspective, antagonism toward the outgroup may be an important correlate of ingroup favoritism but is not a necessary antecedent (Brewer, 1999). Numerous studies have provided empirical evidence for this contention (e.g., Brewer, 1979; Heaven et al., 1984; Mummendey et al., 2001). Results from the present factor analyses have added another piece of evidence that attachment to the homeland (i.e., PAT) can be maintained without recourse to a belief in its superiority (i.e., NAT, and possibly COM). It should also be noted that PAT was not correlated with the rating of a negative outgroup (i.e., Russia).

Also orthogonal to belief in ingroup supremacy was pride in its distinctiveness (i.e., COM). Note again that COM accounted for a greater proportion of Japanese national identity than did NAT. These results nicely illustrate another major thrust of social identity theory. Emphasizing cultural and historical distinctiveness of the ingroup may serve the goal of establishing positive social identity, particularly when the group is not the most powerful.

Nations and states embrace both positive and negative characteristics in their history to varying degrees. In Japan’s case, expelling the wartime image of an imperialist state and achieving a new form of national identity has been among its top-priority goals. The present finding that national attitudes were more deeply rooted in cultural than in political or military domains seems mainly attributable
to the peculiar characteristics of Japanese history. On the other hand, other nations—particularly those in Asia that had direct experience with Imperial Japan—seem alert to nationalistic movements in present-day Japan. Understanding the true nature of Japanese national identity is expected to provide a basis for guiding Japan and other countries toward the correct course in today’s volatile international situation. Respect for the national pride and identity of different countries is essential for fostering mutual understanding among those nations. This should be one lesson that the high school principal left us with.

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