BOOK REVIEWS

Ann O’M. Bowman, Editor


In *The Rise and Decline of Nations* (1982), Mancur Olson describes an idealized society that could decide to “repeal all special-interest legislation or regulation and at the same time apply rigorous anti-trust laws to every type of cartel or collusion that used its power to obtain wages or prices above competitive levels. A society could in this way keep distributional coalitions from doing any substantial damage” (236).

As Kenneth Thomas’s well-researched and insightful analysis demonstrates, this has happened to a considerable degree in the European Union, at least in one respect. It is official EU policy, backed up by a Committee on Competition with enforcement powers and European Court of Justice rulings, that member states cannot use selective incentives and try to outbid each other to attract mobile capital and footloose firms. Thomas’s task is to explain why a union of sovereign states has been able to accomplish this, despite powerful pressures from declining industries and impoverished regions to subsidize business. He also explains why the nonsovereign American states and (to a somewhat lesser degree) the Canadian provinces remain vulnerable to demands by business for increasingly costly location incentives that deplete revenues and provide no net economic benefit to the country as a whole.

Why is the European Union so much more successful, despite the increasing mobility of capital in this global era? As far back as the founding of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951, member states recognized that protectionist policies and economic nationalism would exacerbate conflicts within Europe, retard economic growth, and permit the United States to widen its already huge economic lead. The lowering of trade and customs barriers could have given businesses even greater bargaining power over national governments. Thus the Treaty of Paris not only prohibited any subsidies or grants by states, but provided that the High Authority of the community could impose...
fines on firms that received such state aid. However, control of state aid was initially a very low priority, in part because of the absence of the appropriate institutions for monitoring and enforcement.

In 1957, however, the Treaty of Rome established a Commission on Competition to implement Articles 92 through 94, which addressed the issue of state aid. A small bureaucracy in Brussels, headed by a Commissioner for Competition, was set up to monitor the extensive reporting requirements, investigate violations, approve subsidies that did meet broader objectives (such as assistance to the poorest or least densely populated regions or to East Germany after reunification), and demand repayment if any state subsidy was found to be in violation of Community principles. At first, progress was slow: member states had to provide extensive documentation of any and all categories of assistance. Industries facing bankruptcy, labor unions, and poorer countries or regions (e.g., Ireland, the Mezzogiorno) pressed hard to retain or increase subsidies even if the objective conditions (high unemployment, slow growth) no longer justified them.

But the Commission steadily increased its supply of enforcement tools. Key elements were several pivotal rulings by the European Court of Justice that upheld findings of violations and the Commission’s authority. Also, other EU members and nonsubsidized industries began to protest state aid efforts, which they regarded as unfair competition. Transparency requirements and the development of a solid database also provided the Commission with solid evidence to use to challenge state aid efforts. As Thomas shows (Table 4.2), both the number of cases heard by the Commission and the number of “aid recovery” orders have increased dramatically since 1980.

Some types of business incentives or state aid are permitted. The criterion is whether the EU as a whole will benefit, not the political clout of a particular industry, region, or country. The Commission has also developed a rationale for channeling state assistance to lagging regions in an effort to bring employment and GDP closer to EU norms. This contrasts sharply with North America, where (as Timothy Bartik as shown) the people or areas most in need of jobs and new business investment are often the least able to compete for it. In the EU, bailouts of failing industries are not allowed (although exceptions do occur, especially for state-owned firms), but assistance to help industries restructure or improve their use of technology or expand exports do receive support.

In Thomas’s terms, the development of viable enforcement and monitoring mechanisms is essential to overcoming the repeated-game prisoners’ dilemma problem. And it is the lack of enforcement that has bedeviled efforts in the U.S. and Canada to get out of the ever-increasing escalation of demands by businesses for incentives to locate or expand in a particular jurisdiction. Canada does prohibit local governments from offering incentives, but in the U.S. “voluntary” efforts by the National Governors’ Association and regional governors to curb such use of incentives have floundered. Thomas does credit initiatives by NGOs (labor, community activists, environmentalists, and even some con-
servatives opposed to activist government) to challenge incentive packages, enforce clawbacks, or require a focus on jobs with good wages, but only a few of these local efforts have succeeded. The states of Maine and Minnesota have adopted laws to set strict criteria for the granting of subsidies and to consider their impacts on labor markets, but the inexorable logic of the prisoners’ dilemma is that a few states acting on their own will be unable to change the dynamics of subsidies.

Thomas does note that EU efforts have not all been successful. First of all, agricultural subsidies, as important politically as they are in the U.S., are not even under the purview of the Commission on Competition. Individual countries do not always provide the required data and frequently try to reclassify illegal subsidies into forms that are permitted (such as those for research and development). Regions or industries resist being “decertified” as eligible for assistance. The expansion of the EU into Eastern Europe will pose serious additional challenges because these poorer countries will have a far greater claim on EU assistance than less developed regions within the current EU.

However, this book does demonstrate that solutions to troubling collective-choice problems are feasible. Thomas provides a clear explanation of the theoretical rationale for efforts to limit subsidies and good reasons why no individual country (or state or province) can do so on its own. He carefully documents the evolution over time of successful enforcement mechanisms in the EU, despite strong opposition at every stage from countries, industries, or regions seeking some protection from the hazards of capital mobility. And he suggests that international organizations like the WTO and OECD have much to learn from the EU experience.

Does the EU success to date offer any lessons for North America? Thomas is cautiously optimistic about Canada, which has already taken what he terms “baby steps” by increased monitoring and by forbidding provinces from using subsidies to lure business away from other provinces. But the U.S. faces considerable obstacles: governors unwilling to yield any powers to the federal government, powerful business lobbies, even the growing industry that tracks state/local incentives and thereby pressures “lagging” jurisdictions to become more competitive in bidding for business. It is by no means evident that even the Enron scandal will change the current appetite for deregulation in Congress. Thomas may be too optimistic, however, about possible action by the U.S. Supreme Court. He cites evidence from the 1950s (sending federal troops to enforce school integration) to show the power the U.S. federal government has over the states, but does not consider recent Court decisions (Bush v. Gore, of course, excepted) that have given much more legal and administrative authority to state governments. Given the critical role of the European Court of Justice in upholding rulings by the Commission on Competition, the lack of Supreme Court enforcement is a major problem for the U.S.

Professor Thomas is to be commended for his strong theoretical focus and for a comparative approach that includes the European Union as well as Can-

Considering the frequency with which new political parties emerge in established democracies, the dearth of truly comparative work on this topic is surprising. *Altering Party Systems* represents an ambitious attempt to fill this gap. Combining formal methods with quantitative analysis, this work aims to identify an underlying logic common to the formation of such parties.

After a brief introductory chapter outlining some of the shortcomings of the existing literature, chapter two provides an account of the rise of the Green Party in the Netherlands, the National Socialist Party in Germany, and the Social Democratic Party in Britain. These accounts serve to demonstrate that the underlying process of party formation is similar across countries, institutions, and time. The choice of cases is not intended to be comprehensive. Nonetheless, the selection of the German NSDAP as one of the three cases is puzzling. The theory outlined in the subsequent chapters concerns itself only with the emergence of new parties in stable democracies, hardly an accurate characterization of Weimar Germany in 1924.

The third chapter, which lays out the theoretical framework, is the real strength and contribution of this work. Using game theoretic analysis, the author models the strategic interaction between potential new parties and existing parties to derive five testable implications. The probability that a new party will emerge depends on the interaction of three key elements: the beliefs of existing parties about the strength of the potential new party, the credibility of weak new parties, and the likelihood that an existing party will reject a high demand from a potential new party. The main implications derived from the interaction of these elements suggest that new parties will be more likely to arise when new issues play an important role in a country’s politics and where the costs of formation are low.

Perhaps the most serious criticism that can be leveled at this book is that in its ambition to create a general theory of party emergence, it makes the assumption that all new parties have “a new demand or a neglected issue that [they] would like to have addressed by the polity” (40). There is no attempt to capture in either the formal or quantitative analysis the impact of intraparty tensions on the emergences of new parties. The major implication of this assumption is that party fissions and genuinely new parties are treated as equal. However, fissions

Ada, the American states, and international organizations. Such studies are unfortunately all too rare in political science. His book is recommended for social scientists in any subfield who are interested in the problems posed by cooperation under conditions of anarchy.

Susan B. Hansen, *University of Pittsburgh*
need not be in response to any new issue emerging in the polity but rather a reaction to intraparty tensions over the division of party offices or the personal ambition of party members. The rise of such parties as the Progressive Democrats in Ireland is largely rooted in intraparty tensions over the leadership of an established party. The assumption underlying the game theoretic model that the benefits from having a demand accepted for a strong potential party is greater than the benefit from forming a party is only really valid if we model potential new parties as issue seekers.

The remainder of the book focuses on testing the theoretical model. Chapter four concentrates on the research design and the problems of testing the model in considerable depth. Nonetheless, the empirical evidence offered in chapter five is not always convincing, and the results are sometimes counterintuitive. For example, there is no real explanation for such odd findings as the higher the threshold of exclusion, the more likely are new parties to form. In addition, the operationalization of some of the key independent variables is problematic. For instance, new issues are measured in terms of the homogeneity and economic well-being of a country. Finding good proxies that are not case specific is admittedly difficult; nonetheless, it is not surprising that the effects of religious homogeneity and ethnic linguistic homogeneity on new party formation are in the wrong direction. Finally, the theoretical model in chapter three does not address the success of new political parties. In fact, Hug argues that the success of new political parties can be divorced from the question of their formation. Nevertheless, in chapter six Hug attempts to test some rather vague theories of party success. This chapter is not theoretically well-defined and the book would not have suffered had it been omitted.

Altering Party Systems will undoubtedly provoke considerable debate among party theorists. The author has successfully laid out his argument in such a way as to make the book accessible to readers with little or no training in game theory. Despite some criticisms of the model as laid out in chapter three, this book has a great deal to recommend it and deserves to have a wide readership. In particular, the research design, which combines qualitative, quantitative, and formal modeling, merits wider application in comparative politics.

Gail McElroy, Trinity College, Dublin


Why and how do long entrenched economic policies and institutions get changed? Shaun Goldfinch tries to answer this question by examining the dramatic policy reversals that occurred in New Zealand and Australia starting in the mid-1980s. He argues—as his subtitle suggests—that ideas, institutions,
and policy communities all shape not just the onset of policy change but the specific direction it takes. Both countries examined here encountered substantial economic difficulties in the late 1970s. But ideas mattered: actors did not have an automatic understanding of the nature, extent, and causes of this crisis and thus did not have an automatic sense of the appropriate solutions to the problem(s). Instead, a variety of social and bureaucratic actors tried to influence political actors’ understanding of what went wrong and what changes had to be effected.

While ideas were important, institutions did not permit actors to automatically translate ideas into policy. New Zealand had a highly centralized and unitary state that permitted a small number of actors in and around the Cabinet to “crash through” with their preferred policies. The relevant policy community was much smaller than in Australia. In contrast, Australia’s more complicated federal institutional structure and greater dispersion of power meant that actors had to bargain for change and that more actors were involved in bargaining. Critically, labor unions had a greater voice in Australian policy making, even though Labor parties initiated change in both societies. Different institutional structures thus determined the differences in outcomes in these two cases, and these differences mattered. Australian economic performance has been substantially better than New Zealand’s over the past 15 years. However, it is not clear whether this institutional effect is a purely institutional effect (which would have required an analysis of policy making in Australia’s states) or an effect of scale. Australia after all has a larger and more complex economy than New Zealand, with a greater variety of organized actors and a greater variety of better organized interests.

The book’s great strength is its use of 180 participant interviews to tease out the precise lines of influence on 14 important policy decisions. In these interviews Goldfinch asked his interviewees to pinpoint the most influential actors and ideas around each decision. This soft version of the Delphi technique involves two risks. First, it may simply confirm retrospective conventional wisdom about what happened. Second, it is not clear whether the interviewees were assessing people’s overt or covert influence, and, as we know, much of political life occurs outside formal meetings. Nonetheless, Goldfinch uses these interviews to sketch a map of the social forces impinging on many of the most important discrete policy decisions in these two countries.

The interviews also bolster the book’s second great strength, which is to correct, encompass, and flesh out many other accounts. There are no other book-length treatments of the role of ideas in these policy reversals and few comparative book-length studies. Goldfinch shows clearly that Michael Pusey’s survey research-based analysis of bureaucrats’ role in the Australian policy reversal (Economic Rationalism in Canberra: A Nation-Building State Changes Its Mind, Cambridge University Press, 1991) misses the mark in assigning great weight both to training in neoclassical economics and the influence of the bureaucracy. Goldfinch also summarizes other ideational accounts of the policy
reversals, although he necessarily loses some of the nuances in these finer grained studies of particular policy lines or think tanks.

That said, Goldfinch’s book suffers from two important and related flaws. First, there is no coherent explanation of how ideas, institutions, and policy communities come together to influence policy. The closest Goldfinch comes to elaborating a sustained general argument about this occurs in Chapter two, which merely presents a laundry list of plausible ways in which ideas might influence policy and, in particular, the kinds of ideas that influenced policy in his cases. In this sense the book’s ambit is substantially smaller than that in, for example, Christopher Hood’s *Explaining Economic Policy Reversals* (Open University Press, 1994), which remains the preeminent example of this larger enterprise and is not cited in Goldfinch’s bibliography.

Second, neither ideas nor politicians float freely. Ideas are carried into the policy arena by actors with interests at stake and executed by politicians seeking reelection. Goldfinch has neither a discussion of how actors whose experience of their changing positions in markets for goods and votes deployed ideas instrumentally to affect the direction of policy change. Instead he generally appears to take at face value the power of ideas and his interviewees’ declarations about the power of ideas. His maps of the lines of influence on policy could have been powerful tools in a more general analysis for explaining why social actors sought to change policy and the role that ideas played in those changes. In this sense he regrettably ignores his own opening analysis of the social construction of policy alternatives in favor of an unstructured series of studies of discrete policy decisions. These decisions did matter, and they were influenced by people’s ideas about proper economic and proper social policy. But Goldfinch is satisfied simply to point out that the institutional landscape ensured a more immediate translation of ideas into policy in New Zealand than in Australia, without asking whether Australian actors might deliberately have pursued the bargained outcome he observes.

Herman M. Schwartz, *University of Virginia*

*Alfarabi and the Foundation of Islamic Political Philosophy*.

By Muhsin S. Mahdi.


Abu Nasr Muhammad al-Farabi (c. 870–950 c.e.) is considered by many to be the foremost Muslim philosopher of the medieval period. His deep understanding of Plato and Aristotle served not only as a foundation for Islamic political thought, but also in the development of European philosophy. As Alfarabi’s premier interpreter in the United States, Muhsin S. Mahdi, Arabic professor emeritus at Harvard University, demonstrates the depth of his scholarship in his critical editions of several of Alfarabi’s works as well as other classical texts.
In the aftermath of September 11, many commentators noticed the dearth of academically trained experts in Islamic culture and law. Mahdi’s work is thus both timely and useful. Divided into three parts, the first two are perhaps most interesting to political scientists: “Philosophy, Jurisprudence, and Theology” and “The Virtuous City.” Part III is “On the Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle,” and the work concludes with “Religion and the Cyclical Nature of History,” with some remarks on Machiavelli and Nietzsche.

The book is disappointing in some respects. At first reading, it seems dated in both style and substance. In style, the author’s use of noninclusive language is jarring in a work published in 2001. In substance, each of the eleven chapters has appeared in earlier incarnations, dating from 1963 to 1999, as is readily acknowledged by the author (pp. 247–48). More troubling is the complete absence of any references to scholarship since 1975. Butterworth’s foreword gives an explanation—or perhaps an apologia—for this lacuna: “Consequently, with one exception, Mahdi says nothing about scholarship on Alfarabi since Leo Strauss’s article on Alfarabi published in 1945 . . . Mahdi’s silence is understandable, for in those intervening years nothing of significance with respect to Alfarabi’s political philosophy appeared” (pp. xii–xiii). The book might have been more illuminating if the insignificance of the “nothings” had been clearly demonstrated. Even the work of Mahdi’s own students is ignored. While Butterworth sees this as “commendable” (p. xiii) reticence, the reader might well argue for some engagement with the views of others in the field.

Despite these limitations, Mahdi’s work is valuable for readers interested in grounding themselves in medieval Islamic thought or in seeking to understand the origins of the most burning issues in Islamic political thought today. Mahdi’s explanation of the relationship between law and philosophy is both eloquent and illuminating. Unlike Christianity, the primary interpreters of Islam have not been theologians or philosophers, but jurists. Because the law is both revealed and perfect, discussion of its origins is unnecessary. Therefore, only legal interpretation—which is the realm of the jurists—matters in the development of Islamic political philosophy. And yet:

If there is a single attitude that has characterized the entire Muslim community throughout the centuries, it is gratitude for revelation and the divine law; commitment to the exemplary deeds and sayings of the Prophet, the vehicle of that revelation; adherence to the way of life of the Prophet and his companions as the correct way, which the community must preserve and imitate and to which it must return; and the conviction that deviation from the way of these pious ancestors is wrong and constitutes a rebellion that leads to strange byways, to forsaking God’s command, to estrangement, and to exile to a world of infidelity, from which the Muslim community must return and again find its home. No amount of interpretation, legal devices, reliance on the consensus of the community and its common interest, or justification based on necessity and the change of times can undermine the fundamental belief that genuine progress requires a return. There is no rainbow on the horizon, no golden age at the end of man’s time whether resulting from the perfection of human sciences and arts or from man’s controlling or conquering nature. Progress consists in resisting estrangement and false paths and in returning to one’s origins (17).
This insight alone shows the vast philosophical gulf between medieval Christian and Islamic political ideas of which we are the heirs. As a primer in Islamic political thought, however, this work is not for the faint of heart. That purpose is better served by Anthony Black’s *History of Islamic Political Thought* (Routledge, 2001). Mahdi’s work is ideally suited, however, for those with a deep knowledge of Aristotle who would like to explore Alfarabi’s understanding of Aristotle under the guidance of the foremost scholar in the field.

Kate Langdon Forhan, *Siena College*


Robert Putnam’s recent designation of Tocqueville as “patron saint of American communitarians” is one indication among many that the current renaissance in Tocqueville studies is likely to continue well into the new millennium. Sheldon Wolin thinks contemporary theorists are right to turn to Tocqueville, but generally do so in a way that fails to come to terms with the genuine article. Wolin’s masterful new book depicts a struggling and sometimes hesitant politician-theorist caught between a fading old world and a newly emerging one. Notwithstanding his limitations, Wolin discovers in Tocqueville a depth, creativity, and complexity as yet largely untapped, someone who furnishes an important vantage point from which to survey the transformation of liberal society into its current postmodern form.

For Wolin, Tocqueville’s genius arises from the confluence of personal, political and theoretical crises. He weaves together Tocqueville’s political and theoretical careers, imbedding often profound readings of Tocqueville’s books in contemporaneous reflections drawn from his personal correspondence and public speeches. Wolin is at his best situating Tocqueville within the larger tradition of political philosophy, putting him into dialogue with the leading architects of modern French culture, but eventually the entire tradition—from its Greek and Biblical origins to its most recent postmodern articulations. The result is an evocation of what might be called Tocqueville’s public persona as it emerges from the encounter between his practice of both politics and political theory; an encounter that reveals a lifelong struggle to revive the political (la chose publique) in the face of an increasingly anonymous and depoliticized modernity.

Tocqueville’s travels in the new world of America were, for Wolin, also a journey in self-discovery. What began as a strategy to enter politics ended by establishing his enduring reputation as a theorist. Tocqueville’s most famous book marks “the moment when democracy first came into focus as the central subject of a political theory” (8). Wolin explains that Tocqueville’s greatest discovery in America—the positive value of associations—was made possible by his “feudal” sensibilities. Cutting against the grain of modern social contract theory and Madison’s valorization of interest-group politics, Tocqueville’s “archaic”
sensitivity (the result of both biological inheritance and the influence of Montesquieu's corporatism) enabled him to recognize in the American proclivity to form associations an important antidote to the politically debilitating effects of individualism. The second volume of *Democracy in America*, written in the aftermath of a disillusioning experience of politics and electoral failure, centered on the broader theoretical task of conceptualizing democracy as a cultural force; America was its reference point, but Tocqueville's real interest lay with the emerging dynamic of modernity itself. In Wolin's terms, the second installment of *Democracy* offered a mythic presentation of civil society in which individual actors were dwarfed or submerged by the collective and depoliticizing force of *le pouvoir social* (311, 369–70). If the first volume had celebrated the discovery of political or communal liberty in America, the great theoretical achievement of volume two is found in Tocqueville's intimation of an utterly novel form of despotism, one that was as yet non-existent (339–41).

Wolin's study culminates with a fascinating reflection on Tocqueville's final, unfinished book. Although well-regarded by historians, Wolin maintains that *The Old Regime and the Revolution* is best understood as a new form of theory—political education in the guise of historical narrative. Likening it to Thucydides' *Histories*, Wolin portrays this masterpiece as a combination of history and myth governed by political thought. Although the old regime had been irretrievably lost, its re-creation as myth sought to convey an experience of tragic loss as something integral to the present (512, 514). Tocqueville attempted to both demythologize the alleged achievement of the French revolution—its boast to have brought into being an entirely new world—while at the same time remythologizing the heroism of the revolutionaries themselves, something that he wished to preserve as a lesson for unheroic times (523–525).

Unlike *Democracy in America*, the *Old Regime* is retrospective rather than prospective, although Wolin observes that the distinction is rendered enticingly problematic by Tocqueville's startling comparison of himself to a doctor performing an autopsy who will "attempt to surprise the laws of life" by showing not merely why the old man (supply old regime) died, but "how he might have avoided death" (527). Tocqueville resuscitates an ancient ethos against which he is able to tell the story of the antipolitical consequences of modernization (552). He is even more forthcoming about the enduring need for aristocracy or its functional equivalent, lest uneducated democratic participation turn into mass support for despotism, as it did in France through the plebiscitary practices of Louis Napoleon. Tocqueville's overarching strategy is to unsettle the present, compelling it to be more self-questioning and thereby slowing the modern urge to totalize, by confronting it with his own still-living archaic sensibility. In so doing, he casts critical new light on modern democracy's central innovation: free private individuals—the envied achievement of modern liberal societies—conceal from themselves the conditions of their own enslavement under a new kind of despotism, one fully compatible with the outward forms of freedom and the dazzling spectacle of unprecedented economic prosperity.
Paradoxically, Wolin embraces Tocqueville’s theoretical strategy while rejecting his deepest insights into the salutary character of revealed religion (for Wolin, merely a “method of social control”) or Tocqueville’s critical accounts of the dangers of utopian socialism (downgraded by Wolin to “aristocratic resentment in the language of explanation”). Wolin suggests that we, like Tocqueville, stand between two worlds inasmuch as “democracy is poised to become for our times what aristocracy was for Tocqueville’s, the archaic remains of a superseded past” (567). His Tocquevillean strategy seeks to awaken in readers an unsettling experience of loss as the necessary prelude to democratic revival (if there is to be one). On the other hand and to his credit, the seriousness of Wolin’s concern to convey at depth the complexity of Tocqueville’s thought far outweighs the ideological constraints imposed by his own more partisan commitments. The result is an important and provocative masterwork, one that deserves to achieve enduring status in the years ahead.

Aristide Tessitore, Furman University


In Conscience and Community, Andrew Murphy seeks to provide an important historical and analytical contribution to contemporary debates about what he calls “identity politics.” In attempting to challenge comparisons between the claims of modern scholars (like John Rawls and David A. Richards) and early modern religious tolerationists (such as Roger Williams and William Penn), Murphy appears to offer a fresh avenue of approach for those interested in debates about race, gender, ethnicity, sexuality, and culture. Murphy’s conclusion is that the demands of Rawls and Richards, when compared with the centuries-long struggle for religious toleration, fail at many important points. First, contemporary scholars misappropriate the historical struggle for religious toleration and draw inappropriate parallels to their own arguments. Second, this misapplication of historical struggles to “identity politics” has resulted in an overly ambitious program discarding the traditional call for modus vivendi and potentially threatening important liberties. Murphy sees little comparison between demands for a negative religious freedom from political persecution and calls for attitudinal acceptance and adherence to “public reason.” Third, misuse of conscience properly (and historically) understood keeps contemporary scholars from developing a more applicable paradigm of egalitarianism as an alternative to “conscience.”

Murphy’s build-up to this critique is long on historical presentation but disappointingly short on analysis. His larger points in the historical narrative are straightforward: 1. Early modern calls for religious toleration came from deeply religious persons. 2. Calls for toleration were not calls for religious plural-
ism. 3. Antitolerationists were driven primarily by a desire for civil peace. 4. Debates took place in important political contexts. 5. Toleration advocates are not clearly understood when seen through the lens of contemporary liberalism or “whig history.” 6. Locke is overemphasized in histories of religious liberty.

The first six chapters promise to explore the “recurring tension between conscience and community” and to show both the true nature of the early modern debates and their political context. Murphy makes much of the distinction between religious uniformity and political unity, and he seeks to carry this through to his contemporary analysis in the final two chapters of the book. His historical narrative travels familiar ground, and early modern English and American events are well chronicled. Bibliographical work, evidenced particularly by the use of primary sources and in footnote commentary, is impressive.

Regrettably, it is easy to get bogged down in the fine historical narrative and to lose sight of the original thesis. Despite the admirable detail and balance of the historical narrative, it is not always clear what it all has to do with the overall critique of identity politics. The result is a fine historical presentation that sometimes seems misplaced and a contemporary analysis that reads as disappointingly incomplete.

Unless Murphy’s point is to defend the substance of the toleration debates against misuse by contemporary liberalism, he needs to devote more of the text to showing why these debates are any more important than similar debates on the question of conscience and community. (Does it really matter who the true heirs of the Anglo-American toleration debates are?) It’s not always clear if Murphy’s criticism of Rawls is that his design for comprehensive doctrines misappropriates the toleration advocates or that Rawls misses important and timeless lessons from their political theories. (Would Murphy have applied the debates to Rawls or Richards if they had never sought to appropriate them for their identity politics?) If the goal of the text is to argue that a more prudential creation of protected spaces is preferable to necessarily encompassing acceptance of various identities, then more should be said about what the original toleration debates have to say to identity politics today.

In the end, Murphy seems to be arguing that Rawls and Richards need to understand the incremental nature of toleration and learn from the history of the struggles for toleration. This is surely a better argument than simply asserting that contemporary liberals are neither good liberals nor good tolerationists. But even if Rawls and Richards would now agree that they have misapplied the original arguments for religious toleration, would it change their program? Perhaps Murphy’s text provides the background for a provocative argument, based on the case of antitolerationists, that identity politics are a threat to a truly liberal order and thus to civil peace. Such an argument would require a historical narrative at least as good as Murphy’s. But it would need much more theoretical presentation.

Glenn A. Moots, Northwood University
Political Nature: Environmentalism and the Interpretation of Western Thought.

It occurred to me on reading this book that green political thought has not only established itself as an area of study within political science, but has really been instrumental in transforming political theory itself from a historically oriented interpretation of past theorists to, again, the actual development of political theory. John Meyer is helping to move that effort forward, as are many others over the past decade or more—many of whom Meyer assesses within this volume. He also reconsiders two classical theorists, Aristotle and Hobbes, and applies his insights to the contemporary concerns of the environmental movement and environmental public policy. He sees through the entire task with considerable intelligence and grace.

Meyer’s central focus is on the nature-politics relationship. He rejects both a dualist account wherein Western political thought is seen to be essentially divorced from nature and a derivative interpretation that sees it “as replete with theories derived from conceptions of nature” (2). Many inclined to either view assert that only an ecological view of nature can lead us to appropriate governance practices, thus transforming ‘nature’ into “a source of authority that can transform human affairs” (6). For Meyer, dualism leads too easily to a view that environmental problems cannot be addressed within a framework of Western thinking and governance. A purely derivative view is too prone to ignoring the many ways that humans, through politics, understand nature and to an ecological politics perhaps too prone to place insufficient emphasis on human well-being.

Meyer argues “neither a derivation of politics from nature nor a dualism that separates the two works even in theory” (13) and through his examination of Aristotle and Hobbes seeks to show that a derivative view “cannot be maintained in even some of the most renowned theoretical efforts that seem to many to do so,” and thus “there is good reason to conclude that such a relationship also cannot exist in practice” (13). For Meyer, humans are inescapably natural beings, and much of our politics (more than that which is ordinarily seen as environmental politics) relates to our relationship with the natural world; but the contemporary practice of environmental politics within Western governance suggests that dualism is not the all-powerful force many green theorists take it to be. Human embeddedness within the natural world is an essential part of our condition, but this should not be seen in and of itself as producing a political worldview. Politics has a life independent of any single understanding of nature and our relationship to it.

Many contemporary environmentalist thinkers, in Meyer’s view, “seriously overestimate the importance of transforming our worldview—a transformation that appears dependent upon the adoption of a new conception of nature” (34). There is no escaping politics just as there is no escaping nature. In the end, overcoming dualism will not in and of itself assure the realization of environ-
mentalist goals. The relationship between humans and nature is “central to what politics is” (125), but while “political decisions affect and shape the natural world in the most profound and consequential ways” (125), knowing this may not produce outcomes desirable to environmentalists.

Meyer concludes with an examination of contemporary environmental politics and notes that significant elements within the environmental movement, including environmental justice, are wary of appeals to nature that are distinct from the protection of human health and safety. Returns to nature, postmaterialism, and even the preservation of nature “for its own sake” have limited appeal within third-world ecological resistance movements. He might also have considered indigenous groups that have achieved land claims settlements but have opted to participate in or even to help to accelerate extractions from nature. Dualism can be rejected or nondetermining, but political outcomes regarding nature nonetheless may remain uncertain.

A great strength of Meyer’s book is that it provides an integrated treatment of classic political theory, contemporary green political thought, and some aspects of contemporary environmental politics. He helps us to better understand how our interpretations of nature influence political life both throughout history and especially now. Human political and social life operates within nature itself and within our understanding of nature and our sense (or lack thereof) of its importance. An understanding of nature, scientific or otherwise, does not lead at all straightforwardly or necessarily to environmental protection outcomes. The quest for the latter has, however, led to a considerable renewal of political theory.

Robert Paehlke, Trent University


One of the most important aspects of this volume is its illumination of the “normality” of black political behavior in the sense that it proceeds, like that of other groups, from ideology to identity formation, to opinion formation and often to action. This idea supports the existence of a location for the authoritative expression of ideas and actions based on a “mainstream” that is often different from that of the majority, but that constitutes its own universe of concerns. Professor Michael Dawson is quite right that Americans—and whites who control the public discourse in particular—have often dismissed the presence of ideology as the basis of their political decision making, and even though it is manifested empirically through studies of public opinion there still has been difficulty seeing it as the self-evident motivating force (61). This gives to Amer-
ican politics a naive quality that only accords the presence of ideology to the context of social movements, rather than to systematic political outcomes that are also driven daily by a purposeful worldview.

This tendency, as Dawson suggests, has also led many researchers and public officials to devalue the importance of mass ideology, in particular, among blacks as a motivating force for political action, favoring instead explanations based on the control exercised over the black community by black leaders. Dawson finds that in general, the nature of black ideology is thematically oppositional to mainstream ideologies as indicated by the persistent rejection of “moderate” politics and public policies, or what blacks would consider to be conservative elements. In this sense, what he does not say is that the oppositional quality of black mainstream ideology and the public opinion that substantiates it have functioned as a predicate for the further subordination and exclusion of blacks from the public discourse and debate over critical national issues.

In this work, Dawson has given us a useful term in defining the mainstream black ideology as “radical equalitarianism,” which he suggests changes because the adherents to it and to other ideologies occasionally change. Nevertheless, I would suggest that the volume might have contained a more robust discussion utilizing a set of examples—whether historical or not—that seeks to analyze the weight that determines why black adherents shift from one to another worldview. Although Dawson posits that radical equalitarianism is generally the most supported concept and that black nationalism is the ideology that has the strongest impact upon black public opinion because of its association with black social networks, we are left to ponder the deeper implications of these conclusions on two levels.

The first level is a deepening of the discussion of the way in which culture informs ideology. In one section (124–132), Dawson discusses the cultural determinants responsible for or reflective of a growing alienation that has resulted in the ideological shift to black nationalism. They include the very useful concept of “community nationalism” as the context for assessing the dynamics of social structure, rap music, black separatism, and black public opinion. Although this is a useful set of variables, it is somewhat surprising that the roots of alienation were not better argued with respect to the downward spiral of the economic fortunes of the black community in the 1980s, the violently antagonistic and often deadly relationship between the police and the black community that evolved during the so-called drug war, and the like. Then, even with respect to social structural variables, traditional measures of organizational membership and leader/follower distance are not utilized in determining the internal adherence to various black ideologies.

In any case, one can agree with Dawson that the dynamic characteristics that comprise the ideologies are constructed from the internal tensions within the black community. This is what he means when he says that “the racial order structures perceptions of racial interests, which in turn structure public opinion on racial policy” (318).
However, they also vary as a result of the interaction between black survival and white oppression. Filling out this causative discussion would provide a contextual dimension that is important for understanding the “ties” among black ideologies that Dawson discusses in Chapter 7. The relationships illustrated in Figure 7.1 explicate the ties among ideologies that are all part of the internal black experience. However, the political context of white conservatism, Dawson suggests at one point, has affected liberalism, producing a disillusionment that has resulted in the intensification of black nationalism. Thus, the ideological features of the periodic swings in the national political environment within which the black community is set strongly affect the adjustments toward a given internal ideology that, in turn, expresses itself in shifts of identity, public opinion, and action. In this sense, then, black ideology becomes an instrumental resource that is mobilized to address whatever dynamic the larger political system uses to engage the black community at any given era of history.

Another matter is whether the ideologies addressed in this work are all of the same class of autonomous concepts which, although they have overlapping relationships to one another, still constitute specific and unique ways of thinking about the world without the supportive contribution of other ideologies. Put another way, the issue here is whether there is a functional relationship among these ideologies to the extent that, if Malcolm X, for example, was right, the strong pursuit of black nationalism was ultimately supportive of radical egalitarianism in helping to motivate white decision makers to choose the most preferred method of nonviolence in achieving the black agenda over violence.

Professor Dawson might also have carried forth an insight in Chapter 5 about the extent to which black nationalists and black Marxists have been the strongest critics of both major political parties. To go further, these two ideologies have also expressed the most radical tendencies toward black mobilization against racism as supportive tissue or rooted in the vividness with which they posed alternatives, in the 1920s, 1940s, and during the 1960s’ Black Panther Party and Pan-African movements, some of which he analyzes.

The tension among these ideologies arises, in part, from their “valence,” which determines their ultimate strategies. Marxism, radical egalitarianism, and social democracy are all devoted to measures of class concerns and racial integration and regard black nationalism as chauvinistic, while black nationalism and black feminism parse core issues internal to the black community as their major preoccupation. Even this dichotomy is not absolute, as Dawson’s well argued chapter on black feminism illustrates. The strains of that ideology are more liberal than black nationalism, finding that black women differ on issues of immigration, coalitions, and the nationalist characterization of the black community as a “nation within a nation.”

More attention to the integration of external contextual dynamics might have also provided an answer to Dawson’s correct observation that the force of all black ideologies subsided in the 1990s. He proposes three “daunting problems”—changes in political economy, a rightward shift in the political environment,
and dissatisfaction with the racial and economic status quo—all of which have
a bearing on the future of black ideologies, but we are left to guess at the
empirical dimension to these issues as systematic factors that might help to
shape black ideology in any age.

A major omission from this work, which Dawson pointedly acknowledges at
the outset, is the failure to address the ideology of Pan Africanism. My own
work on this topic (Pan Africanism in the African Diaspora: Wayne State Uni-
versity Press, 1993) has convinced me that a comparativist treatment of this
subject commits researchers to seriously consider the domestic politics of each
state in the comparative frame of reference, not only in the theoretical space
between them. Thus, I believe that insofar as the Pan African ideology has
often been a motivating force for domestic black politics and has constituted a
subordinate theme and set of activities to black nationalism, it should have
been included. Moreover, the enhanced immigration of Africans to the United
States and their social location, most often as members of the black commu-
nity, may raise complex issues internal to all of the ideologies addressed.

If the book has a major structural flaw, it is the curious inclusion of a dis-
cussion of black conservatism within a chapter on the ideology of black liber-
alism. Although black conservatism may be posed as a polar opposite, in view
of its ascendancy as an ideology that exists as an appendage to the major ideo-
logical trend within the white community, it deserves major treatment in such a
work as this on its own merits.

In any case, while most other works of black political theory have addressed
one or another of the variety of such ideologies, this work is a major contribu-
tion to the field of black politics in its comprehensive, rigorous and high-level
discursive analytical treatment of the subject.

Ronald Walters, University of Maryland

The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. By Stephen Kalberg. (Los
Angeles: Roxbury Publishing, 2002. Pp. 266. $55.00 cloth, $15.95 paper.)

The complicated volume under review contains the first new English trans-
lation of Max Weber’s striking work in some seventy years, following upon the
“standard” version produced by the noted sociologist Talcott Parsons in 1930, a
decade after Weber’s death. Stephen Kalberg, a sociologist at Boston Univer-
sity, is well-qualified by training, knowledge of German, and previous writing
on Weber and other leading figures of nineteenth- and twentieth-century Cen-
tral Europe to undertake the task. As is customary in his work, Kalberg’s ap-
proach is thorough and detailed, perhaps in some respects too detailed. The
book is one to be retained and regularly referenced for information and in-
sights, not one for light perusal. Considering Max Weber’s fame, even in his
lifetime (1864–1920), such care is warranted.
The words of philosopher Karl Jaspers summarized Weber after his relatively early death without even mentioning sociology, much less political science: “a searcher for truth, as a philosopher a politician, as a philosopher a researcher: This was a Man!” (quoted in Winkelmann, 1962, ix). And a stern critic of Weber’s “fact-value” distinction, Leo Strauss, termed him in Natural Right and History (1953, 36) probably not without a certain irony, “the greatest social scientist of our century.”

Kalberg has chosen one of Weber’s most famous works for his examination. The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism first appeared in two installments in 1904–05; typically for Weber, it was later re-worked, shortly before his death in 1920. It soon had a host of admirers as well as critics. R. H. Tawney’s Religion and the Rise of Capitalism is probably the best-known adaptation and partial revision of Weber’s topic in the English-speaking world. Talcott Parsons’s translation tended to “integrate” Weber’s book into the Parsonian scheme of sociology. It is this volume that Kalberg successfully seeks to transcend by returning to the German original, providing substantial clarifications of Weber’s argument and showing the intellectual setting for the work in the first two decades of the twentieth century.

On the very first page of his “Introduction” to the new volume, Kalberg seeks to restate Weber’s aim in The Protestant Ethic. It was actually “far more modest” than to provide “an explanation of the rise of modern capitalism,” or even “the origin of our secular, urban, and industrial world today” (xi). Rather, “Weber wished to demonstrate that one important source of the modern work ethic and orientation to material success, which he calls the ‘spirit of capitalism,’ is located outside the realm of ‘this-worldly’ utilitarian concerns and business astuteness” (xi). In other words, Kalberg elucidates and stresses the central religious source for Weber’s thesis—the notion of a religious “calling” rooted in Calvinism in particular. According to Weber, this sense (spirit) of a “calling” is more central to the Calvinist-Puritan (and, later, related “sects”) than “predestination” ideas, and still “today” (in Weber’s own time) stalks “like a ghost” through Western culture.

There is more. Weber saw the emphasis upon work, diligence, and routine arising from the sense of a “calling” more and more being displaced from its religious roots in modern society, thus becoming a mode of life, and fitting into or even engendering the increasing bureaucratization and routinization of modern Western life. This thread of Max Weber’s Protestant Ethic idea, then, testified to what may be called the “re-linking” of his interpretation of ideas and values to social reality. Calvinistic ideas engendered a diligent and domineering work ethic, which in turn molded a new society of unremitting work and organization for work. This condition could then be a subject for sociological analysis, and it also spawned Weber’s increasing pessimism about the “iron cage” of compulsions upon industrial humanity created by human development itself. Such apprehensions were especially exhibited in Weber’s lectures “Science as a Vocation” and “Politics as a Vocation” toward the end of his life.
Thereby he added a Nietzschean element to what undoubtedly had been at least one of the stimuli to Weber’s development of The Protestant Ethic thesis—Marxism, with its disparagement of “values” and “ideas” as causes of historical events. So much here is merely a hint of why Max Weber’s work, with its many linkages to intellectual history and to issues of the origins of social theories, continues to fascinate. His non-Marxist interpretation of the social roots of economic behavior in religious impulses provided an avenue for many versions of “sociological” research.

At the same time, this avenue has been, and remains, controversial, not only to those such as Leo Strauss who see Weber as fastening upon late developments in the Calvinist tradition as moving forces in Western thought instead of, more properly, the emergence of modern political thought through a divorce from the classical tradition—initiated by figures such as Machiavelli and Hobbes.

In a sense, the whole status of “sociology” as a discipline is at stake in discussions of Weber’s work: how persuasive are the methodology and the results of this late-blossoming field, even measured against the standards of its perhaps most famous representative?

Such questions, while not explicitly raised by Kalberg, are implicitly at the ground of the impressive effort this translator and author has made with this volume. The wealth of detail in this book illuminate Weber’s intentions, the intellectual horizons of his time, and his interest. The translations of The Protestant Ethic and the associated Weber “‘Prefatory Remarks’ to Collected Essays in the Sociology of Religion,” along with the previously published Hans H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills translation of Weber’s “The Protestant Sects and the Spirit of Capitalism (Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, 1946) are very valuable contributions to an understanding of Weber on his own terms, rather than filtered through later interpreters. This is without even stressing the 92 pages of newly translated and annotated “Notes” Kalberg has provided for the Weberian texts. Many of these are mini-essays in themselves that yield insights into the intellectual horizons at the time Weber wrote, as well as explications of oft-invoked but equally misunderstood Weberian categorizations.

For example, a leitmotif of Kalberg’s work in this book is the difficulty many commentators have today in comprehending “Weber’s fine-grained causal lines of argument,” (v), alone because of the intervening years of more simplified education or because notions of the importance of religion in society are diminished today, thereby reducing the comprehensibility of Weber’s topics. Another aspect of Kalberg’s editorial approach is found in his comments (123–24, 245–46) on the alleged “iron cage” (a Parsonian translation) in modern society. Kalberg objects to the phrase because he thinks it not a literal rendering of the German “stahlhartes Gehäuse” [steel-hard casing]. Yet behind this objection are substantive issues for the editor: that the “iron cage” language transforms Weber from a “rigorous comparative-historical sociologist into a social philosopher of modernity” (246) and that it connotes great inflexibility, rather than a “casing” that might sometime be “peeled off.” Inflexibility would mean perma-
nence of “the massively impersonal, coldly formal, harsh and machine-like character of public sphere relationships whenever they remain uninfluenced by either traditions or values” (245).

With this—for Kalberg, unusually assertive—contention about the status of sociology in Weber’s study, the editor seems to echo the very end of The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. For Weber there paints the possibility of a gloomy “ossification in long civilizational development,” rather than continual change (124). Weber retreats hastily from such a conclusion, however, warning of the danger of “falling into the realm of value-judgments, and judgments rooted in faith” (124). Thereby, of course, he alludes to his conception of the need to separate “factual” from “value” judgments. Kalberg does not enter this terrain, which is not obviously a part of The Protestant Ethic landscape and would have required much further examination. Thus, while one finds it meritorious that the author-editor raises the point about accurate translation, one is not convinced that Max Weber was entirely clear about how he could reconcile his “facts-values” distinction with his fears of future human decline.

George K. Romoser, University of New Hampshire


Our sense of obligation to our fellow humans is so impoverished that we must resort to pleas based on our own self-interest to stir us to care for one another. The metaphor of the miner’s canary, Lani Guinier and Gerald Torres illustrate, helps us see our common fate. In the coal mines, if the canary in the cage gets sick, the miners know to get out of the mine and insist that the conditions of the mine be cleaned up before they reenter. The miners realize the dangers to themselves if they resort to blaming canaries for their illnesses. It is the conditions of the mines, which affect both the miners and the canaries alike (although the canaries succumb first), that are the problem. Guinier and Torres use the analogy of the miner’s canary to argue that the plight of the least of our brothers and sisters (the canaries) is a warning to the rest of us that the mine shaft environment is toxic and eventually will kill us, too, if we do not ultimately fix the underlying problems.

Drawing on their concept of “political race,” Guinier and Torres demonstrate instances where people come together into diverse coalitions to question the conditions of the mines rather than settle for explanations that the canaries themselves are at fault. Focusing on the environmental factors that sicken the canaries expands citizens’ visions to the larger community and to social programs that clean up the toxicity in the climate. Then the canaries and everyone else remain healthy and safe.
To illustrate their points and display the viability of political race politics to empower people, the authors present several case studies of diverse local coalitions. These cases examine social issues from a community point of view. The response of the citizens of Texas to the *Hopwood v. Texas* (78 F.3d 932 [5th Cir. 1996]) decision is a compelling example of the authors’ points. The issue was the use of race within affirmative action programs for admission to prestigious Texas public universities. The discussion of what to do after the *Hopwood* decision could have bogged down in sniping about the problems with canaries and how and why some groups of people were not gaining entrance to these universities. All too often this level of discourse divides people along race lines, creates hostilities between groups, and does little if anything to help the situation. In Texas, a remarkable coalition of legislators, educators, parents, and policy makers in the field of education used race politically but in a positive and constructive way. Recognizing that race-neutral policies would end in race-specific results (mostly white children admitted to the universities), the citizens discussed the criteria for admission to these universities in total. They didn’t focus on standardized test scores alone. They didn’t discuss race alone. They didn’t allow the reification of standardized test scores to shape and limit the discussion of the problem and therefore the possible solution. Instead, they noted that many Texas high school graduates who were otherwise qualified did not get admitted to these universities. Instead, it was the urban and upper- to middle-class high schools that sent a disproportionate number of students to these select universities. In many rural Texas high schools, data displayed that no graduates were admitted to these universities. Race, therefore, is not ignored in this discussion. Central to the framing of the dispute, however, is the fact that social class also is not ignored but included in the analysis. Instead of dividing rural and working-class whites from people of color, then, their commonalities were highlighted and included. The creative policy reform in Texas is to admit a certain percentage of the top graduates of every Texas high school into these universities (called “The Texas 10 Percent Plan”). Therefore, the suburban white schools are placed on the same playing field as the rural and poorer schools. The results have been positive for the students so admitted. The dreaded increase in student failure rates has not materialized (after all, some of them did not have the highest standardized test scores). The universities have admitted Texas students in a fair manner, without violating the rulings of *Hopwood* but without ignoring race, class, or region of the state. The citizens tried to alter the condition of the mines instead of just burying the dead canaries and going back to work. The result has been universities that are a little more representative of the children of Texas.

Guinier and Torres teach us a lot about the positive potentials of political race. One strong theme throughout the book is our need to increase the real representation of citizens throughout public institutions. Winner-take-all elections fail to represent many voters’ true choices. Given the controversy over the
2000 presidential election, Guinier and Torres’s theories about and suggestions for how to incorporate true citizen preferences are even more timely and important. 

The Miner’s Canary is an important book that can help us expand our visions of what is possible politically. The instances described within the study in which citizens behaved well toward each other and labored to solve social problems to the benefit of everyone in the community are inspiring. Our political cynicism is often based on our experiences of how our votes and voices did not seem to make any difference. Reforms that represent all citizens more within the polity can be based on the insights in this wise book. Democratic theorists as well as scholars of representation, public policy, interest groups, and social movements will find Guinier and Torres’s insights and evidence aimed at future positive progressive political reforms indispensable.

Laura R. Woliver, University of South Carolina


Jane Bennett neither praises nor rues modernity in this earnest and appealing book. Rather, she suggests that at least one of its purported features—the process of disenchantment—has never really taken place. This, she suggests, is cause for hope.

Bennett’s line of thought is as follows. Enchantment attaches us to the world and thus provides the affective motive for ethical engagement. Enchantment energizes and enlivens us by presenting us with a world that is “vibrant, quirky, and overflowing” (162), with an abundance of energy from which we may draw. She writes, “It seems to me that presumptive generosity, as well as the will to social justice, are sustained by periodic bouts of being enamored with existence” (12). However, the process of rationalization in modernity—or more precisely the “disenchantment tales,” such as those told by Max Weber, Hans Blumenberg, or Simon Critchley, that attribute the effect of disenchantment to this process—threatens our attachment to the world. A disenchanted world is a “flat,” “dull,” “dreary,” “unenticing,” “lifeless,” and “existentially unsatisfying place.” Without some affective relationship—without “active affirmation” and “love” for the world—the modern demons of skepticism, atheism, and nihilism and their accompanying feelings of purposelessness and meaninglessness threaten to render every ethical project powerless and vain. Luckily, the disenchantment tales of modernity can be counteracted with alter-tales, of which this is one, that show the persistence of sources of enchantment in modern life. On Bennett’s telling, enchantment is a feeling both pleasurable and uncanny. It is “a mood of fullness, plentitude, or liveliness” (5) and “that energizing and unsettling sense of the great and incredible fact of existence” (159).
account to resonate with others, so that one ought be reminded of one’s favorite, whether it be the upsurge of the Dionysian in Nietzsche, the moment of standing-beside-oneself in Thoreau or Heidegger, or Emerson’s description of “The Method of Nature:” “that redundancy or excess of life which in conscious beings we call ecstasy” (Essays and Lectures, 1995, 121). The experience of enchantment is an aesthetic experience, requiring the cultivation of a taste for the strange, the unexpected, and the wonderful. She draws on Kant, Schiller, Foucault, and Richard Flathman to develop the ethical importance of this “aesthetic disposition” (131).

One of Bennett’s tactics is to engage the reader in a kind of therapy to awaken a desire for enchantment, so that one becomes receptive to the unexpected in ordinary experience. This tactic becomes overt, and enjoyable when she offers a magazine-style quiz intended to diagnose a longing for enchantment. (“Do you long to be released from ‘cold skeletal hands of rational order, just as completely as from the banality of everyday routine’?” (56) Give yourself one point for a “yes.”)

Her main tactic, however, is to revive vitalism, which she calls the “liveliness of matter” (118) or “enchanted materialism.” She begins by focusing on interspecies crossings, between humans and animals and between the organic and the mechanical, as exemplified by Donna Haraway’s cyborg and Deleuze’s “body without organs.” She enriches this vision by offering several enchanted conceptions of nature. There is Paracelsus the Renaissance physician, whose nature is infused with divinity, and Kant, whose nature inevitably appears as teleologically ordered. Then there is the nature of Thoreau, interspersed with artifacts, and the natural world of Ilya Prigogine (the founder of chaos theory) and Issabelle Stengers (a philosopher of science), which is indeterminate and full of “communication” and “choosing.” Most importantly and most beautifully, there is Lucretius, whose nature is comprised solely of atoms falling forever through the void, but that exhibit a “primordial declension” or “swerve” that results in “unlikely combinations and novel alliances—out of which is born something new under the sun” (100). In fact, many of the valuable elements of this book tie back into Bennett’s sustained reflection on the ethical project of Lucretius and the Epicureans. Her reworking of this project shows it to be a noble and generous vision of the good life for those particular motile material things that find such tales so necessary and so heartening.

Like the Romantics, Bennett seeks the point of confluence between ethics, aesthetics, and politics in the experience of the sublime in the ordinary or the transcendent in the commonplace. Unlike the typical Romantic, however, she is willing to search in the realms of science and technology, commercialism, and even bureaucracy for enchantment. The book works its own charm best in its demonstrations of how enchantment can be found in what seem to be the most unenchancing places. For example, the stories of Kafka awaken an inexplicable attraction to the “obscurity of power” and “the ambiguous charm of institutional complexity” (106). Likewise, the evident commodity fetishism of a Gap
advertisement for khaki pants becomes “commodity enchantment” when viewed with an eye for aesthetic elements such as playfulness, surprise, and vitality.

But the incongruity of some of the elements she insists are intimately related—for example the enjoyment of TV commercials and the fundamental motive for ethical action—raises a question about her account of the latter. Attachment to the world (and other people, I would add, although she doesn’t use this language) may be necessary for ethical engagement. The route to attachment she has charted is steep, however. One wonders how much enchantment is necessary. How long will a single dose remain effective? Must we eschew the ordinary and the quotidian—when they are unenchanting—for the sake of these exemplary moments of consciousness? What of the days when enchantment doesn’t come? Are there other routes to attachment? How can we pursue an ethical life in our mundane or profane moods? What attaches us in the ordinary qua ordinary? Finally, one wonders if Bennett doesn’t unwittingly give hostages to the forces of disenchantment that she cannot redeem. If ethical life can only be saved by something as powerful as enchantment, it must face a grave threat indeed.

Hans von Rautenfeld, University of South Carolina


To the frustration of its critics, rational choice theory over the years has presented a moving target. Among many self-induced changes, it substituted subjective for objective probabilities in the definition of rationality, introduced time discounting, and via game theory, incorporated a host of refinements to accommodate the existence of multiple rational decision makers. In this fascinating book, Alexander Schuessler adds a new twist by allowing rationality to incorporate individuals’ concern with the way their actions both create and affirm their identities. In the world of ordinary products, for example, some people buy an American car not only because they find the combination of features and price attractive, but to affirm that they are Americans who “buy American.” Likewise, argues Schuessler, individuals may decide to support a particular political party not only for instrumental reasons such as the expected impact of the party’s economic policies on their income, but as a statement of who they are, say Democrat or Republican. Adding this new dimension to rational decision theory, according to Schuessler, solves the persistent problem of explaining turnout in mass elections from rational voters and provides a unifying explanation for broader patterns of political behavior, some of which might otherwise have gone unnoticed. While many pundits have complained about the marketing of candidates, Schuessler exploits the parallel in a systematic, empirically informed, and ingenious way.
A natural interpretation of Schuessler’s approach to turnout is to assume he is merely complicating a much older analysis by William Riker and Peter Ordeshook (1968) in which a civic duty or other private benefit component is added to the instrumental calculation associated with ordinary decision making. Schuessler protests that his approach treats the instrumental and expressive as equal parts of a coherent whole and that expressive behavior, like instrumental calculation, has its own logic. In particular, in his formulation the expressive component is still additive, mathematically speaking, but is conceived as a concave function of the number or percentage of supporters for a candidate (in the case of voting). With similar expressive utility for the alternative candidate representing an opportunity cost, Schuessler develops the idea of an expressive equilibrium, which in turn can be subjected to stability analysis. Depending on the relation between the two curves, voters in this analysis may, for example, exhibit bandwagon behavior in which a candidate gains momentum or engage in mass desertion.

This behavior is not entirely spontaneous. In light of the logic of expressive voting, Schuessler examines various election strategies such as negative campaigning, ambiguity, and claims of strong support for the candidate. This last strategy presumably would not appeal to instrumental voters who want their votes to be decisive. In short, political campaigns, like marketing campaigns, are analyzed as producers of expressive meaning. The book provides numerous illustrations from actual campaigns and comparisons with findings from the empirical literature on primaries and general elections.

Although Schuessler questions the purely instrumental calculus usually attributed to rational actors, in one important respect he is faithful to rational choice theory’s behavioral approach to psychology. For while he makes much of the behavioral consequences of expressive meaning, he does not engage in very much systematic interpretation or analysis of meaning. This is all to the good as I see it, but in not doing so, perhaps he implicitly concedes the weak foundations and nebulous methods burdening the interpretive approach. These burdens emerge in some of the specific interpretations he does pursue.

For instance, he recognizes the instrumental character of the typical voter’s own explanation for voting and therefore is forced to distinguish the instrumental “idiom” of the voter’s response and the true expressive meaning of his or her actions (26). Voters, the reader is told, vote to express who they are, but apparently are reluctant to say so when questioned by survey researchers. One possible explanation is that these publicly expressed motivations are hidden from the respondents themselves. Welcome to the world of interpretation. Similarly, when analyzing his introductory jukebox example, Schuessler puts the following words in the participant’s mouth: “I can, at the mere cost of participation, purchase for myself the status of outcome-producer” (5, emphasis deleted; see also 18). Again, to fit this motivational statement into his non-instrumental analysis, Schuessler must distinguish idiom and actual psychological mechanism (16); but it is worth noting that he finds it useful to abuse the
distinction when quoting his own hypothetical participant. The same interpretative freedom occurs in the explanation of restaurant booths as a useful source of anonymity among diners (21). One trusts there is also an explanation for what in my experience is often the close proximity of tables in both low- and high-end establishments. Finally, there is the real case of Mr. Bonaccorso, who refused a key reserved seat at a popular concert for which otherwise he had to wait in line for a week. Schuessler explains that the lower price would have diminished the meaning of what he was paying for (136). Yet, in the mathematical formulation described above, the contribution of expressive meaning to utility is a separable and additive function of the number of participants, which is not clearly related to how Bonaccorso got his particular seat. Granted, the meaning to Bonaccorso in some sense did change, but it is an interpretive stretch to map that change into the formal apparatus Schuessler provides.

Despite these qualms, or perhaps partly because of them, I heartily recommend this book to rational choice theorists wanting to consider further imperialistic extensions of the theory, to proponents of traditional interpretation interested in operationalizing their insights, and to non-allied students of campaigns and mass elections desiring a theoretical framework or simply a source for numerous testable hypotheses.

Robert Grafstein, University of Georgia


Solving the collective action problem among the states was crucial to success in the Revolutionary War. Insufficient solutions to this problem left the Americans under the Articles of Confederation unable to achieve many of their main goals. In this book, Dougherty seeks to explain both successes and failures, why some states contributed little while others actually paid large portions of their requisitions to the federal government despite the public goods nature of the services provided. His argument is that states responded when it was in their best interest to do so, when their local interests were served by particularistic federal government actions.

The book explores the nature of the collective action problems faced by the states from the Revolutionary War years through the Articles of Confederation. Dougherty examines three theories of state contributions and brings to bear both qualitative and quantitative evidence in support of his hypotheses. He makes good use of the historical record, focusing on both words and actions used in attempts to secure collective action. He concentrates mainly on responses to requisitions of soldiers during the war, to regular requisitions of money under the Articles, and to special requisitions, such as in response to Shays’ Rebellion.

To understand state actions, Dougherty presents three alternative hypotheses. The “abilities hypothesis” was advanced initially by the anti-Federalists and
supported by current historians over the past two decades, suggesting that compliance was limited mainly by each state’s ability to raise soldiers and revenues. The “public goods hypothesis” notes a free-rider problem, suggesting that this problem leads either to no contributions to the common good or to contributions from only a single high-demanding state. The third theory, espoused by Dougherty throughout, argues that contributions to the confederation were actually joint products, providing both a public and a private benefit. This joint products hypothesis predicts greater contributions from states with the most to gain from collective action, such as those requiring immediate defense against the British.

To examine these hypotheses, Dougherty explores two relationships in the data he uncovers regarding state responses to requisitions: one between supply of soldiers and army location and another between payment of requisition money and locally held public debt. If the joint products hypothesis holds, more troops would be given if the Continental Army (and thus the threat from the British) were closer to the state; and more money would be given if it were to be used to pay local creditors. Both are found to be significant relationships.

The work, however, is not fully persuasive along these lines. In terms of the theoretical advancement, the competitors to the joint products hypothesis are presented in straw-man versions, without being taken as seriously as they merit. Despite evidence from previous historians (which is never tackled head-on), the abilities hypothesis is discounted, although not dismissed, throughout the book. The pure public goods hypothesis is given a more serious analysis, but mainly through an overly stylized formal model. The finding that one state (at most) will contribute to public goods provision is based on assumptions such as states facing no budget constraints, differentiable benefits from public good provision, complete information, and no repeated interaction. Many theoretical treatments loosening these restrictions have yielded predictions of positive contributions to the provision of public goods. One could imagine a simple example in which each state gave all (or even a set portion) of what it could raise, with the sum barely sufficient to defeat the British. This would be in equilibrium as no state would want to give less and suffer defeat. Such an alternative takes seriously both public goods provision and limited abilities, and it is consistent with the evidence presented.

Regarding the empirical evidence, the correlations found in the data analysis may have arisen due to ability to pay rather than due to joint products provision. Certainly states were better able to supply soldiers when the army was nearby; and surely wealthier states were both better able to pay requisitions and more likely to contain individuals who held large portions of the public debt. Thus, the correlations advanced do not lend substantial support for the joint products hypothesis over the abilities hypothesis. Indeed, there are no variables accounting for ability to pay included in the data analysis as controls. It should be noted, however, that perhaps few further data are available from this time period that could be used to distinguish among the competing hypotheses.
These shortcomings aside, the book has a number of strengths. Evidence for the joint products hypothesis extends beyond the data analysis, leaving it as a plausible complement to the abilities hypothesis. Additionally, there are many small gems scattered throughout the book. For example, Dougherty nicely analyzes why the Articles of Confederation were adopted, despite their flaws, and how the collective action problems realized under the Articles increased support for the new Constitution. He details how multiple institutional proposals to overcome the collective action failings under the Articles all failed to receive the required unanimous support needed to alter the Articles. Dougherty interestingly posits that this unanimity requirement juxtaposed against the less restrictive supermajority required for reconstitution helped determine the course of events leading to “a more perfect Union.”

Dougherty argues that the private goods aspects of joint products may allow confederations to raise sufficient resources to function through initial crises, but are likely to be insufficient in the long run. Early Americans had to learn this fact first-hand before risking a government with strong national powers. The point is a good one, and it extends to collective action problems in confederate governments well beyond what is studied here. Dougherty concludes the book with a brief discussion of how a joint products approach may explain the (at least partial) success of modern confederations and international organizations. This book could perhaps best serve as an invitation to examine similar governance structures using the approach it advances.

Craig Volden, University of Michigan


In Corporate Power and the Environment, George Gonzalez challenges what he purports to be the conventional wisdom regarding environmental policy: that it is an area in which the political power of business is weak, an “oasis of democracy” in which corporate power is reined in by public opinion, bureaucratic professionalism, and scientific expertise. On the contrary, Gonzalez asserts, the formation of environmental policy is dominated by a corporate elite, which molds policy in ways that further its own economic interests.

In the book’s first chapter, Gonzalez outlines the central contentions of the theoretical perspective he adopts, which he terms economic elite theory. He contends that “corporate decision makers, along with other individuals of wealth, develop and impose broadly construed policies on the state” (13). His notion of the economic elite is thus largely akin to the Marxist notion of a capitalist class. He contrasts this theoretical perspective against alternative models of policy formulation, which allow for greater policy-making roles for interest
groups, the public, and the state itself. He classifies these alternatives as pluralism, plural elite, and state autonomy/issue networks. While these other theoretical perspectives are often invoked in scholarly examinations of environmental policy making, Gonzalez contends that it is the economic elite perspective that comports most closely with observed environmental policy processes and outcomes.

To demonstrate this, Gonzalez provides case study evidence from four environmental and natural resource policy areas: management of the national forests (chap. 2), management of the national parks (chap. 3), federal wilderness preservation policies (chaps. 4 and 5), and federal clean air policies (chap. 6). He asserts that these constitute “hard cases” for his argument because they are implemented by relatively well-financed and bureaucratically developed institutions, which should give them a greater capacity to act independently of economic elites. Buttressing this view are several studies in which other scholars have found actors other than economic elites to play a significant role in policy formation in these areas. Thus, “on the face of it, these cases seem unlikely to confirm the claim that economic elites are the most powerful influence in determining state behavior” (x).

In each policy area, Gonzalez is careful to document the role played by economic elites in policy formation. Forest and wilderness preservation policies have been heavily influenced by the timber and other extraction industries, national park development by railroads and the recreation industry, and clean air policy by a variety of polluting industries. In many cases a few wealthy individuals have also played a major policy-making role. Moreover, he finds this role determinative in most cases: rarely does policy deviate from what economic elites want. National forests and wilderness areas are largely confined to areas that have no commercial value for timber, grazing, or mining. Clean air regulations that on the surface appear to adversely affect polluting industries actually benefit them by removing the problems caused by disparate state regulations. National parks have been converted to a “profit generating system of tourist centers” (45).

What about cases in which the economic interests of elites conflict? Gonzalez asserts that elites often have institutional mechanisms in place to manage these potential conflicts. Through “policy planning networks,” economic elites seek to develop and promote a consensus industry position. Elements of these networks include think tanks, foundations, university research institutes and, most important, policy discussion groups, which provide the forum by which a coordinated industry position is developed. Examples of the latter include the Clean Air Working Group and the American Forestry Association.

These networks are central to the book’s theoretical argument. In order to argue persuasively that economic elites as a class dominate the process of environmental policy formulation, rather than competing among themselves (and with other interests) for individual gain, it is important to document the ef-
fectiveness of policy-planning networks in both coordinating a unified policy stance internally and pursuing this unified agenda in the public sphere.

Unfortunately the evidence presented here is underdeveloped in both respects. First, the author makes no attempt to offer a theoretical mechanism for how these networks may overcome the collective action dilemmas that inhere in situations like these: that is, what induces some actors to forgo their individual interests in order to promote elite interests more broadly? Second, the author’s case studies, while replete with instances of individual action by elites, provide relatively little evidence of coordinated elite activity. Moreover, the case studies ignore instances in which industry is not unified in its stance on particular legislation. With respect to the Clean Air Act of 1990, for instance, significant cleavages occurred between the auto and oil industries on the issue of who should absorb the costs for more efficient service station pumping of gasoline.

Case selection is also an issue here. In particular, the author is limited in the conclusions he can draw regarding the effectiveness of environmental interest groups. Although he purports to show that these groups are ineffective in the face of corporate power, a large portion of his case material precedes the inception of the mass environmental movement.

Finally, there appears to be no clear standard for what constitutes business “dominance” in any policy sphere: the geographic area included in Redwoods National Park, for instance, was a compromise between timber interests and environmentalists. This is presented as an example of business dominance. Might not other observers construe it as an example of pluralism? More broadly, it would appear hard to argue that the net effect of clean air legislation has been beneficial to business as a class. If elites are as dominant as the author claims, why did we get this legislation at all? Questions such as these remain unaddressed. For each of these reasons, the book fails to make a convincing case for the elite theory of environmental policy making.

Notwithstanding these shortcomings, this study does succeed in several important respects. Its presentation of both theoretical and historical material is clear, making the book suitable for use as a companion text in undergraduate public policy or environmental policy classes. It offers a wealth of information about the formation of policy regimes in a variety of environmental and natural resource policy arenas, which, taken together, mount a persuasive case that environmental policy is no “oasis of democracy,” free from corporate influence. Of particular importance is its discussion of the effect of policy-planning networks on environmental policy formation. This is a subject that has received scant attention in previous literature and is justly emphasized here. Greater attention to the workings and effect of these networks would have made the study even stronger, and future research clarifying these relationships would be a valuable contribution to the literature on environmental policy making.

Neal Woods, University of South Carolina
Perhaps no issue has demanded as much attention in government over the past decade as health policy. Increasing devolution and the 1993 Clinton debacle pushed health policy increasingly upon the backs of the states. Robert Hackey and David Rochefort attempt to capture the complexity of health policy among the states over the last decade. This is an awesome task given the multiplicity of programs and the variation among states along a number of important factors. Nonetheless, the contributors paint a picture of health policy in the states that relies heavily upon governance, citizen involvement, ingenuity, and intergovernmental relations.

The introduction by James Morone provides an excellent framework for the study of health policy. He asserts that health policy invariably involves a moral dimension, thus placing “politics” at center stage. In the end he contends, “our public policies are only as good as the governments that design them” (7). What emerges from the compilation of essays is a mural supportive of this assessment. Notably, many contributors suggest that adaptation to the changing health policy environment is contingent on a number of contextual factors. While this is a strength of the book, it is also a weakness. Beyond the understanding that health policy is dependent upon building political coalitions, savvy policy entrepreneurs, and political culture, there are many questions left unanswered. An attempt to engage in real “theory building” would be a welcome addition. The commentary provided here reflects events occurring during the 1990s—a time when state coffers were bubbling over. However, no real attempt was made to analyze long-term solutions. Perhaps this goes with the territory. The concluding chapter by Thomas Oliver suggests that states too often choose short-term solutions, not allowing sufficient time for policies to take root. Consequently, the citizenry is left wondering, “What next?”

Sandwiched between these chapters are case study analyses of health policies swirling around the United States during the 1990s. These studies provide great understanding in regard to the difficulties faced in the health care policy making arena. Robert Hackey notes that while health care reform is a dominant issue at the state level, many other important policies (e.g., education) vie for precious resources. Frank Thompson contributes thoughtful analysis regarding the current obsession with devolution. He notes that state budgets have increased, state legislatures have become increasingly professionalized, and a general mood swing has created a situation in which states are now required to confront health policy. However, states quickly realized the massive problems associated with health policy implementation. Even with flush coffers, the money needed to effectively ensure greater “accessibility” and “efficiency” is far greater than many imagined. Of particular import is his warning that states must confront the “challenge of rising expectations” (48). This may be particularly de-
bilitating for states as surpluses tighten and tough budgetary decisions must be made in a torpid economy.

The need for strong political coalitions is recognized throughout. Jonathan Oberlander, Lawrence Jacobs, and Theodore Marmor’s analysis of Oregon’s move toward technocracy illustrates the need for political will in the development of health care policy at the state level. Through the stewardship of political and policy entrepreneurs major change can occur in health policy. Similarly, former Massachusetts Governor Michael Dukakis’s examination of the roles governors play in the formation and implementation of health policy reveals the central role political elites have in the success (or failure) of health policy. The insider look that Dukakis provides is a nice peek into the “real world” of public policy making. Despite rhetoric calling for greater accessibility, lower costs, and better care, political savvy and context may be most telling when assessing policy shifts in health care.

Other examinations seek to better understand the changing political climate of health policy. For instance, Suzann Thomas-Buckle and Leonard Buckle examine recent developments surrounding litigation against tobacco companies. They note that while intricate new legal strategies have enabled states to collect vast sums of money from these settlements, little money is being directed back into the health care systems. Instead of focusing on disease prevention (especially regarding tobacco use), states have redirected money in other distributive policies such as dikes and juvenile prisons (247). And when settlement money has been used for health care, the elderly and children have been the most common beneficiaries—not efforts to curb the use of tobacco. Once again, long-term solutions are abandoned for short-term fixes.

Another current running throughout the book is that greater effort should be made to connect the citizenry to health policy making in state governments. Hackey notes the increased dissemination of information distributed to citizens regarding physicians and health plans. The rationale supporting such activity rests upon greater accountability of health care professionals and more market awareness for patients. David Rochefort’s examination of the backlash against managed care serves us well in this respect. He chronicles how public opinion, the mass media and even our popular culture have ridiculed managed care. Hence, it is imperative government take a more active role in transmitting information about health policy to the citizenry. This effort to connect citizens to government was a welcome call.

As many of the contributors note, the lack of aggregate-level data makes the generation of grand theories about health care policy difficult to create. A wonderful opportunity to analyze the experiences of the last decade from a comparative perspective was not seized. Instead, generalizations are offered without sufficient comparative analysis. So while we learn much about the diverse policy-making universe regarding health care, we are left searching for more.

Nevertheless, this book provides a strong foundation for those interested in either policy making at the state level, or those studying the vicissitudes of
health care in the United States over the past decade. The depth of the case studies provides rich color to the goings-on in state policymaking. The mix of academic analyses and “insider” perspectives provides a nice backdrop for something so intricate as health policy.

The complex chain of events and political ballyhoo emanating from the “crisis in health care” extolled by the Clinton administration has found its way to the states. The contributors here do a splendid job of analyzing unfolding events. Many suggest the successful future of health policy relies upon stronger relationships between the public and private sector and, most important, between governmental entities. While several scholars note the appropriateness of the marble cake analogy (Grodzins 1966) for health policy, William Waters suggests a more precise division of responsibility between levels of government may promote more efficient outcomes for the citizenry. Too often, turf battles and defensiveness rule the day, when entities should be focused on adequate, accessible, and preventive health care. A more informed and “connected” citizenry is expected to produce better results.

Robert M. Alexander, Ohio Northern University


In 1990, John Chubb and Terry Moe dragged political scientists back into the education policy arena with the publication of their influential Politics, Markets, and America’s Schools. The authors accomplished two discussion-altering tasks: framing the debate with a model of political and bureaucratic behavior that made a theoretical case for school vouchers and then using student outcome data to empirically test their model.

This analysis paved the way for political scientists to use educational outcome data (primarily student test scores) to assess a hypothesis that could claim firm roots in disciplinary theory. Consequently, in the ensuing years, political scientists have evinced a growing interest in the issue of school choice.

This later work has rarely addressed the larger, more conventionally “political,” aspects of the debate, especially the classic disciplinary question of who gets what. Nor have scholars sought to develop the analysis of bureaucratic behavior that undergirded the Chubb-Moe analysis. Rather, scholars have focused more narrowly on evaluating policy effects in increasingly sophisticated ways. While this has provided a signal service, it has meant that many questions regarding the politics of education and market-based reform received relatively little attention.
Recent books by John Witte and Michael Mintrom are major contributions that help to address this gap. Witte’s thoughtful volume, *The Market Approach to Education*, emerged from his pioneering research on the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program (MPCP). That work attracted national notice in the early 1990s when Witte and his critics debated how to measure and interpret the voucher program’s performance. This book, however, devotes limited attention to the effect of voucher program participation on student performance, while assessing more broadly the politics and political context of school vouchers. Similarly, Mintrom’s *Policy Entrepreneurs and School Choice* makes no effort to evaluate charter schooling, instead using the issue as an opportunity to explore questions regarding the political role of “policy entrepreneurs.”

*The Market Approach to Education* considers both the politics and the evidence on the impact of the Milwaukee voucher program. The program, launched in 1990, has been at the center of the voucher debate ever since. Witte served as the official program evaluator from 1990 until 1994 and produced an annual report each year during the period 1991–1994. The reports would prompt significant methodological debate regarding the manner in which Witte and his team assessed the relative performance of voucher students.

In this volume, Witte devotes just one chapter to discussing how MPCP affected student achievement and another to the question of who chooses to participate in choice programs. The rest of the volume focuses on the political and legal dimensions of choice and the world of public and private education in Milwaukee.

This is a wise choice, as Witte acknowledges that the early MPCP data were fragile and limited by the program’s small, regulated, and tenuous nature. In truth, much better data have since emerged from the privately funded, random assignment voucher experiments launched in the late 1990s. These quasi-experiments have permitted researchers to overcome many of the difficulties that plagued efforts to analyze MPCP outcomes. Meanwhile, rapid expansion of choice options has made available a wealth of new data on who chooses schools and why.

Nonetheless, readers familiar with this debate will be curious to hear what Witte concludes regarding who participated in the MPCP and how the program’s students fared.

By statute, MPCP was limited to low-income families, and Witte found that participants came from poor, mostly single-parent households in which parents were particularly dissatisfied with the public schools. Witte also reports that parents of MPCP students were more educated, had higher educational expectations, and were more likely to participate in schooling than the typical Milwaukee Public Schools (MPS) parent (72–73). When choosing schools, parents reported that their most important criteria were educational quality and teaching approach and style (62). Given the constraints in place, however, Witte cautions voucher proponents and critics to use care in drawing strong conclusions from these findings.
After reanalyzing math and reading performance for MPCP students during the period 1991–94 in a variety of ways, Witte concludes, “There is no consistent and reliable evidence that the Choice students differed in achievement from randomly selected MPS students or Reject applicants” (143). However, Witte raises important cautions about the small sample sizes, selection problems, non-random attrition, and generalizability concerns that plague the Milwaukee data he presents.

In the end, this volume’s signal contribution is Witte’s measured efforts to reintegrate the evidentiary debate into larger questions of politics and urban renewal. Where Chubb and Moe considered vouchers in light of scholarship on the nature of public bureaucracies, however, Witte examines them by exploring what they mean in terms of resource allocation, political empowerment, and urban politics.

Witte argues that the politics of vouchers in Milwaukee were characterized by a shift in which a “substantive program” of educational reform evolved into a “distributive program” (192). This shift reflected a larger conflict over the importance of freedom and equality of opportunity—a clash that Witte sees as central to the school choice debate. Witte sees these two forces as conflictual (though it is relevant to note that some voucher proponents see them as enhancing both freedom and equality). Witte argues that ultimately the debate over school vouchers will not and should not turn on specific programmatic effects, but on values—making it a political question in the most fundamental sense.

In Policy Entrepreneurs and School Choice, Michael Mintrom breaks new ground by asking what larger political lessons may be learned from studying the efforts and impact of those advocates who promoted charter school legislation in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Mintrom uses the issue of charter schooling as an opportunity to systematically explore the role that policy entrepreneurs play in the diffusion and adoption of public policy. In doing so, he provides new insight into policy entrepreneurship and the reasons for the rapid expansion of charter schooling across the nation in the 1990s.

Mintrom highlights six particular social skills he deems crucial to policy entrepreneurship: creativity and insight, social perspectives, social and political dexterity, persuasiveness, strategic sense, and leadership qualities. He emphasizes how entrepreneurs use networks of contacts to gather and disseminate information, how they seek to define problems and frame policy debates, and the manner in which they initiate and publicize demonstration projects.

After sketching these broad analyses, Mintrom explores them through systematic analyses that examine whether and how entrepreneurial activity affected state consideration or enactment of policy. Mintrom collected data on the timing, extent, and nature of entrepreneurial activity through surveys returned by 117 informants throughout the lower 48 states. The author used these data, with appropriate controls, to examine how entrepreneurial activity during the 1987–1992 period impacted state policy.
Mintrom finds that charter activity was indeed more likely in those states where entrepreneurs were more active during the 1987–1992 period. However, as the author notes (174–79), there is a possible problem with endogeneity, given that observers may have been more likely to report entrepreneurial activity in states where legislation was debated or enacted (since debate or enactment may enhance the visibility of activists). Consequently, it would have been useful to see how reported entrepreneurial activity affected subsequent state action. Nonetheless, Mintrom’s is an innovative, thoughtful, and rigorous consideration of a topic about which we have little knowledge.

Of particular interest are Mintrom’s occasional profiles of various elected officials and advocates who have played an entrepreneurial role in the charter school debate.

In these volumes, Mintrom and Witte have produced works of real merit, expanding our understanding of the politics of school choice and what this issue can teach about American politics. Let us hope that their example encourages more such efforts.

Frederick M. Hess, University of Virginia


“Rethinking” democratic accountability starts with old thinking: there are trade-offs among accountability for finances, fairness, and performance. “Finances” refer to what balance sheets and accountants’ audits reveal. “Fairness” has no fixed definition. Robert Behn treats it as procedural regularity and due process in the treatment of individuals. He does not include the larger political concerns of access and participation in administrative policy making, transparency, distributive equality, or the protection of valued interests (e.g., small businesses, rural America). “Performance” is the accomplishment of public purposes. In Behn’s view, Americans’ emphasis on finances and fairness makes for such poor administrative performance that it potentially threatens governmental legitimacy.

His solution is to replace punitive accountability with shared responsibility, ideally through the creation of “a compact of mutual, collective responsibility” (125). The “responsibility compact” is an understanding in which every member makes a mutually supportive commitment to every other member and to their common purpose. It is a compact under which every member personally assumes some specific obligations to the group as a whole and to each of the other individuals in the compact” (126). The compact “imposes obligations not only on the agency, its managers, and its employees. It also imposes obligations on all of the other individuals and organizations in the accountability environment—upon legislators, stakeholders, journalists, and citizens” (126).
Behn considers such compacts a possibly unachievable ideal. He advocates charter agencies as their most practical instantiation: “A charter agency would accept some additional accountability for performance; in trade, it would be required to comply with fewer of the accountability constraints for finances and fairness” (176). Unlike performance-based organizations, charter agencies would not be established by government. They would develop or evolve out of mutual interests and responsibility. Feedback on their performance would come through nonadversarial “360 degree accountability” (chap. 11). Behn does not elaborate on which types of administrative functions are most suitable for charter agencies. Presumably their best fit is with clear, bottom-line implementation. There is no particular reason why a variable like accountability for accomplishment should be equally pertinent to all administrative functions, regardless of whether they are executive, legislative, or adjudicatory, overhead or line.

Behn’s ideas are innovative, complex, engaging, and important. One needs substantial intellectual baggage to appreciate them and understand their referents, which are often strategically presented in shorthand form. For instance, the main text largely reduces traditional administrations’ concept of accountability to a few ideas advanced by Woodrow Wilson, Frederick Taylor, and Max Weber. (Qualifications, elaborations, and nuances are often consigned to the 90 pages of endnotes.) Beginners may come away asking the wrong questions. However, those who know their public administration will be very well served by Behn’s thoughtful and energetic prod “to rethink what we mean by democratic accountability” (217).

David H. Rosenbloom, American University


Michael A. Maggiotto and Gary D. Wekkin are concerned with the degree to which the two major American political parties serve as representatives of their respective constituencies in the contemporary American South. Their work is placed within the larger theoretical context of the role of parties in democratic theory, but the authors are not simply using the South as their unit of analysis. Rather, they are interested in the South for its uniqueness, particularly with regard to political parties. They perform an admirable job of surveying literature from the areas of democratic theory, political parties, and southern politics to frame their study.

The book is largely an empirical study of the 11 former Confederate states circa 1992. The methodology of the study is the measurement, through various means, of the proximity of the relationship between elite and mass public opinion from the two parties in the 11 states. To that end, the authors use a 1991
survey of county party chairs, county party committee members, and national party convention delegates from the states to measure elite public opinion. Mass public opinion is drawn from a Bowling Green State University survey from the 11 states taken in late 1992 and early 1993. The bulk of the book consists of a description of these data and analyses of the correlations between the opinions of the elites and the opinions of the general public in these states.

The book is short and narrowly tailored to the authors’ design. The introduction, which may be optional reading in many books, is required reading for this one as it, along with the concluding chapter, contain much of the rich theoretical overview of the work. Chapters 1 and 2 serve as the descriptive chapters. One of the highlights of the early chapters is the multiple definitions of mass partisans created by respondents’ answers regarding which party they generally identify with in national and state elections, which party they believe generally offers the best presidential and gubernatorial candidates, and for whom they voted in the 1992 presidential election. The authors quickly discover there are significant differences in the responses of mass partisans to issue questions, indicating that there is enough difference in attitudes among the rank-and-file to allow party elites to represent distinct constituencies. The authors also find that both parties’ elites tend to be more ideologically extreme in their self-placement than the rank-and-file partisans and that Democratic and Republican national convention delegates, unsurprisingly, are more ideologically extreme than county-level party leaders.

Chapters 3–5 provide more thorough analyses of the relationship between elite and mass issue positions. The authors introduce a number of state-level institutional, political, cultural, and demographic variables into the mix via multiple analysis of variance (MANOVA) in Chapter 4. In this chapter, the results are presented such that party cohesion is measured on each issue question after controlling for the state-level variables. In Chapter 5, the authors report MANOVA results “before and after controlling for the effects of a covariate [state-level variable] and its interaction with the several elite-mass factors” (103). The authors, therefore, in Chapter 5 are focusing “more . . . on the importance of which contexts influence intraparty issue cohesion rather than on the importance of the issue cohesion itself” (103).

Maggiotto and Wekkin find that although Republican elites and grassroots partisans are more closely related in their ideological self-placement, Democratic elites and nonelites hold more similar opinions on a broad range of issues. The authors report that Democratic elites and individual partisans are still more closely aligned on issues than are Republicans when control variables are introduced, but the introduction of the state-level variables does tend to strengthen the issue position ties for Republican elites and the Republican base. For both parties, demographic variables representing state development (percent college graduates, percent urban, and per capita income) have a positive effect on increasing intraparty cohesion, and the strength of state party organization has a weaker but generally significant effect on Democratic issue cohesion.
In the concluding chapter, Maggiotto and Wekkin state their belief that parties still play a useful role even in this era of candidate-centered campaigning and that parties are especially important vehicles of representation in a federal system. Even southern parties, which historically have been organizationally weak, presently do a reasonably good job of representing their constituents. Perhaps most interesting is their observation that in the early 1990s, party issue cohesion seems to have been a result of state-level development, which produced a diverse population with a multiplicity of interests—as occurred earlier in the rest of the nation. The latter findings and the lack of findings regarding the importance of state African-American population and religious fundamentalist population challenge the notion that the racial politics of an earlier era or the suspected culture wars of recent years are shaping southern parties and their abilities to represent their constituents.

There is much to like about this book. Maggiotto and Wekkin have utilized good sources of data, have presented a theoretically strong study, have used appropriate methodology and data operationalization, and have presented a plethora of results in a fairly organized manner. There are a few things about which one could quibble, such as in regard to the percent fundamentalist variable definition. It is not clear whether Southern Baptists are included or excluded in the authors’ measure of fundamentalist population. The definition of the fundamentalist variable is important because of the size of the Southern Baptist population in the South. The definition is also important because the authors’ finding that the variable is not significant in explaining intraparty cohesion is not intuitive, and it flies in the face of other research about the importance of the Religious Right in contemporary southern politics.

The authors might have spent a bit more time and effort attempting to link opinion with behavior. This is especially true given the results of the 1994 elections, but it is true even in light of the postredistricting gains by congressional Republicans in 1992. One wonders how Republicans could capture most congressional and Senate seats and gubernatorial offices in the South if Republican elites more poorly represented their constituents than Democratic elites represented their own grassroots partisans. Still, in all fairness, Maggiotto and Wekkin do discuss what strategies of the respective parties are likely to be successful in future elections. Furthermore, their work is clearly focused on representation as measured by how well the party’s organizational elites reflect the issue positions of their grassroots comrades; attempts to focus on other aspects of representation by the parties would entail another study altogether.

I would recommend this book as one text in a graduate pro-seminar in American politics because the book offers useful information from the public opinion, political parties, and state politics subfields; the work could also serve as a supplemental text in any graduate course in one of those subfields. At the undergraduate level, the book could probably best serve as a supplemental text in a political parties course or in a course on southern politics, but I fear that
some undergraduates, even political science majors, might find the methodology and the sheer volume of tables somewhat daunting.

Kenneth A. Wink, University of Texas at Tyler


In the fall of 1994, United States Senator David Boren (D-Oklahoma) announced his resignation from the Senate to assume the presidency of the University of Oklahoma. A moderate Democrat, Boren had built his Senate career as one of a group of Republican and Democratic moderates who often worked across party lines. By the early 1990s, the number of centrist senators had diminished and their influence in the Senate had waned. Increasingly, Boren found himself caught in the crossfire between liberal Democrats and conservative Republicans, with no room in the center of the battlefield to maneuver. “There are better things to do in life,” he thought, and he found one.

Boren’s dilemma and choice could serve as an epigraph to this volume, which derives from a conference denoted by the book’s subtitle. During the last third of the twentieth century, the Senate evolved from being a club to becoming a battlefield. The institution that Donald Matthews described in the 1950s bore little resemblance to that observed in the 1990s. Norms such as comity, reciprocity, bipartisanship, deference, and even collegiality itself atrophied. Yet these very norms had been regarded as part and parcel of the Senate’s reputation as “the world’s greatest deliberative body.” Now, the Senate sometimes seems more like “the greatest show on earth!”

This book seeks to trace the impact of this transformation on the Senate’s deliberative character. Sections of the book deal with civility (chapters on the constitutional context by Ross Baker and by Eric Uslaner comparing the Senate and the House), the institutional foundations of deliberation (chapters by Barbara Sinclair on member dynamics, by Lawrence Evans and Walter Oleszek on procedure, and by Gerald Gamm and Steve Smith on the role of the presiding officer), the political context shaping deliberation (chapters by Bruce Oppenheimer on constituency effect, by Timothy Cook on the media, and by Roger Davidson and Colton Campbell on Senate-executive relations), and the political and policy impact on the transformed Senate (chapters by Norman Ornstein on impeachment and by James Thurber on the budget process).

A short review of an edited book cannot do justice to each of its chapters. Taken together they offer a useful review of current Senate practices and procedures. Findings in several chapters reflect the increasing partisanship that has come to characterize the Senate in recent decades. Struggles over unanimous consent agreements, judicial nominations, and budget resolutions have become more frequent and more substantial, for example. Senators know each
other less well than in the past, and interpersonal relationships are less likely to mitigate partisan conflict. Senators from large states are differently situated than senators from small states, leading the former toward public posturing while allowing the latter to develop more personalized legislative styles. Across the board, individualism and partisanship have often supplanted cooperation and comity.

All is not lost, however. Even as these chapters describe and document the more atomized and partisan Senate environment, they affirm the Senate’s deliberative capacity. The impeachment votes in 1998 broke out largely along party lines, but the senators affirmed their commitment to comity and collegiality in the process. Senators who are highly partisan can remain close personal friends, as attests the example of Senators Orrin Hatch (R-Utah) and Ted Kennedy (D-Mass.). The very pressures that make the Senate more difficult to govern provide incentives for accommodation in shaping unanimous consent agreements. While large state senators pose, small state senators make the institution run. As a result, the Senate continues to make and shape policy just as it has in the past. The policy outcomes might be determined by hard bargaining across a wide political and ideological divide, rather than being shaped by a group of bipartisan centrists as Senator Boren would have preferred. But policy it is.

Thus, this book’s tone is neither cynical nor exasperated. Instead, it offers a realistic approach to understanding an institution, the United States Senate, that is shaped more by its constitutional foundations than by the culture of contemporary politics.

Ronald M. Peters, Jr., University of Oklahoma


In The American Statehouse: Interpreting Democracy’s Temples, Charles Goodsell, building on earlier work, argues that the architecture of American statehouses is “deeply vested with cultural meaning” (4) in that they embody political ideals, values, and social meanings, and affect the political behavior of citizens and public officials. Specifically, this research, conducted through extensive personal observation, analysis of the historical background of statehouses, and interviews with over 300 individuals, examines “the way in which statehouses reflect and affect aspects of authority, influence, hierarchy, and culture as they relate to public governing” (7).

To excavate the political meanings of statehouses, Goodsell begins with the concept of an ideal building type (15–34) that enables him to identify common features of statehouses that are the basis of comparative analysis. His interpretation is then conducted through three lenses. The expressive lens focuses on “the ideals and values embedded in features and designs” of statehouses (9).
The behavioral lens focuses on how the architecture could affect political behavior. The societal lens examines the symbolic impact and meanings. In successive chapters, Goodsell brings these three perspectives to bear on the origins and creation of statehouses, the politics of their construction, the objects with which they are adorned and decorated, the organization of physical space, the design of the interiors, and the ways in which the “physical structure and its surroundings act to condition and frame human conduct” (160). For example, in Chapter 6, The Organization of Statehouse Space, Goodsell examines how the organization of space expresses, among other things, the way the separation of powers is embedded in the vertical and horizontal placement of each branch in relation to the others (113–31). Goodsell visited 49 of the 50 statehouses, and all but one of the many photographs are his own. His book is a systematic, comprehensive, and original account of the interplay and connections between architecture and politics, between public physical space and political ideals, meanings and practice. Goodsell’s conclusion is best reflected in his (somewhat exuberant) concluding remark that “the American statehouse is not just a temple—of the state—but a temple of democracy—of the people” (187).

Despite obvious insight and imagination, Goodsell’s work is not without its problems. Leaving aside the question of whether deliberative forms of democracy can afford temples or any other kind of sacred public space (as opposed to hallowed ground), there are two shortcomings on which I will focus. First, although Goodsell draws on the literature of architecture to inform his interpretations, there is no theoretical grounding drawn from those approaches to social and political life or to the humanities that have focused on interpretative modes of explanation. Charles Taylor’s expressivist interpretation, Gadamer’s hermeneutics of tradition and art, Foucauldian genealogical interpretation (including that of public space), Clifford Geertz’s account of thick description, and Habermas’s interpretation of the public sphere, to name some of the more prominent, all seem to be possibilities for providing a theoretical grounding from which to launch Goodsell’s project. Though some of these thinkers are mentioned in passing, none is enlisted in support of Goodsell’s effort. This is particularly important insofar as each articulates a mode of critical interpretation that speaks to one or more and sometimes all three of the lenses through which Goodsell analyzes the social-political meaning of statehouses.

A second shortcoming can be found in Goodsell’s own analyses of the meaning of various statehouses. Goodsell points out that it is not uncommon to find competing values embedded in the very same public space. For example, he identifies a number of features commonly found in statehouses that are the embodiment of democratic values and meanings. The legislative branch of government “was from the very beginning, given the most honored architectural treatment in the statehouse” (184). At the same time, the physical space of the statehouse as a whole reflects the idea that the legislature alone is not the sole embodiment of governance and wisdom: “the most fundamental lesson taught by statehouse spatial organization” is that “state government in the United States
is not a single centralized system, but a pluralistic collection of separated powers” (131). On the other hand, there are also features of statehouses that seem to undercut or domesticate democratic expression. Two more obvious features are the grandeur of the buildings and the extent to which the symbols of (coercive) authority are embedded in them. The grandeur is reflected in such things as the presence of high culture, often in the form of Old World art. Goodsell suggests of such displays that “perhaps citizens are made to feel, without realizing it, inconsequential and alienated from an officialdom whose grand world is so different from their own” (111). Similarly, statehouses are often imposing buildings that seem designed to install a sense of insignificance in citizens. In addition, the statehouse is the site where authority symbols and artifacts of the coercive power of the state are displayed (86–88). Though these are in many respects the object of patriotism and pride, they also serve as reminders of the kind of force that backs up the more gentle exercise of power. Goodsell clearly does not ignore these ambiguities and tensions. But his treatment of them is overly cautious and in some cases disappointing brief, as in when he says that the displays of authority “may have a more compelling, hidden impact” or that some less imposing symbols “may be the most effective socialization instrument of all” (111).

These shortcomings do not, however, take away from the originality, the attention to detail, and the insight that Goodsell provides. Moreover, the importance of his work goes beyond itself for it helps to open up the study of public physical space and its relationship to politics and democracy in other areas as well. For this, we can even forgive his concluding exuberance.

Michael T. Gibbons, University of South Florida


Too often research on the politics of minority communities either considers the behavior of one community, compares the behavior of one minority group with that of the majority white population, or assumes that the factors that influence the political behavior of one minority have bearings on others. Unfortunately, those approaches to the study of minority politics do not allow for theory building on the comparative dynamics of minority politics in the United States. This is especially problematic when considering the political participation and mobilization of minorities where explanatory factors, such as the distribution of resources within groups, social context, and the strategies of political elites, may vary across groups. This book is an important step toward unraveling how participation and mobilization differ among African-Americans, Latinos, and Anglos.
To sort out variations among racial/ethnic groups, Leighley considers a set of theoretical constructs and an array of data sources. Motivated by rational choice models of voter turnout and collective action, she assesses how contextual factors such as elite mobilization, relational goods (defined as a set of social incentives enjoyed by members of a group), and the racial/ethnic makeup of an individual's social context influence participation and mobilization. These factors are considered to be mechanisms that subsidize information to group members and thus reduce their cost of participation. She provides three models of how context influences Anglo, Black, and Latino participation, each distinguished by “whether the racial context influences elite mobilization and relational goods, and whether racial context directly influences participation” (8).

The effects of contextual factors are estimated primarily with data from three surveys: the American National Election Study, the Citizen Participation Study, and the 1996 Texas County Party Chair Post-Election Survey, which was designed for the study. The combination of individual-level data on participation and mobilization and the county-level reports on the targeting of racial/ethnic groups by the Republican and Democratic party chairs provided a rare opportunity for the author to simultaneously compare and contrast the political participation and mobilization of Anglos, Blacks, and Latinos. It also allowed Leighley to simultaneously assess individual-level variables that affect participation and the contextual factors that influence mobilization.

While socioeconomic status and ideological orientations are widely viewed as factors that party elites use to target voters, Leighley finds instead that targeting is strongly associated with the relative size of a racial/ethnic group’s population. That is, the greater the population of the group, the more likely that parties will target the group. However, when estimating the effects of group size on minority political participation, size matters for Latinos in all types of political activities but matters considerably less for African-Americans. Voting in local elections is the only political act affected by the size of the black population. Another important finding is that political empowerment, measured by whether one’s racial/ethnic group holds the office of mayor, increases the probability that blacks will be mobilized, but has no effect on Latino participation. Being mobilized by others, which is operationalized as an indicator of relational goods, positively predicts the political participation of all three groups, while other measures of relational goods, such as personal experience with racial discrimination or being mobilized by someone of the same race, only occasionally affect black participation but not the participation of Latinos. Leighley considers a different theoretical framework when considering the political participation of Anglos. Testing whether Anglo participation is influenced by whether Anglos are responding to threats by other groups—a framework described as group-conflict theory—the author finds limited evidence of the reverse: diversity actually depresses rather than stimulates the participation of Anglos. And when it comes specifically to voting, diversity undermines the participation of
Anglos, Blacks, and Latinos. As she states, “individuals residing in areas that are ‘more like them’ are simply more likely to vote” than individuals who live in more racially diverse areas (164).

While this book clarifies some of the conflicting theories on minority political participation and mobilization, this study raises even more questions about differences in the participation and mobilization of minorities. While Leighley is right to stress that the behavior of all minority groups is not the same, this can be said for Latinos, given the heterogeneity of that population. Had she analyzed variations among Latinos, their heterogeneity would also likely manifest variations in participation and mobilization. For instance, given the more diverse residential patterns of the Latino population in the Northeast, similarities in the voting preferences of Blacks and Puerto Ricans/Dominicans in that region, and that questions regarding citizenship do not come into play among Puerto Ricans, how might contextual factors on the participation and mobilization of these Latinos differ when compared to her analysis of mostly Mexican-Americans in Texas? Despite this limitation, Strength in Numbers is an informative analysis that will influence future comparative work on the political participation of minority and ethnic groups in the United States. I highly recommend it for courses on political participation, minority politics, and specialized courses on African-American and Latino politics.

Frederick C. Harris, *University of Rochester*


Professor Bruce D. Haynes’s book examines “the politics of race and space” in a suburb of Yonkers, New York. Red Lines, Black Spaces analyzes the effect of residential segregation on the common political and other interests of African Americans in Nepperhan-Runyon Heights, New York, which has had a sizable black middle-class population for nearly a century. It is a relevant study with three major strengths.

First, Red Lines, Black Spaces shows the value of case study research. Haynes examines racial, class, and political relationships in a community that has not been studied previously by academic scholars. Because case studies focus on one community, they provide a more in-depth examination of the historical and political relationships of an area than other kinds of studies. The readers of this text will learn about the historical background of Runyon Heights, including its demographic changes, its history of racial polarization, the impact of residential and occupational segregation, and class conflicts among African Americans. In addition, the reader can compare the experience of
these residents to those of African-Americans in other cities of similar size and demographic makeup.

Second, Red Lines, Black Spaces is a significant interdisciplinary study that combines historical, political, and sociological research. The book is very well-written, interesting, and informative. Unlike many other academic texts, it is not overburdened with a lot of jargon, but is easy to read and understand. The theoretical framework employed in the study applies the theories developed in the sociological literature on the black middle class, such as E. Franklin Frazier's Black Bourgeoisie and William Julius Wilson's The Declining Significance of Race, to analyze the black middle class of Runyon Heights. The author also applies the “linked fate” theory utilized by Michael C. Dawson in his award-winning book Behind the Mule: Race and Class in African-American Politics. Haynes's research confirms Dawson's finding that “group interests in African American communities are shaped by pressures from the local community” (xxvii).

Haynes outlines the history of racial solidarity and political interests in the area while pointing out that class divisions have always been prevalent among the African-American residents of this community. For example, Haynes finds that black middle class homeowners maintained “physical and social distance from the black masses” (xix). In other words, the black middle-class residents of Runyon Heights had similar political interests with low-income blacks, but had little desire to live in neighborhoods with the residents of the “ghetto” or desire to socialize with them. This is a relevant finding because Haynes is showing that African Americans are not a monolithic group. Although they have a “linked fate” because of their experiences with racism, many class divisions also exist within their communities.

In addition, the text shows the value of qualitative rather than quantitative research. Professor Haynes relies on both interviews with residents and archival research to study the solidarities, differences, and political interests of Runyon Heights residents over an extended period of time. The research methodology employed is very good; however, the author should have expanded the theoretical framework in the introductory chapter. In Chapter 4, the author should have elaborated on the political mobilization efforts after the influx of new residents into the area during the postwar years. For example, on page 128, Haynes writes, “The political, economic, and social subordination of racial communities encourages political mobilization among racial lines. This is what occurred among residents of Runyon Heights.” As a political scientist, I would have liked to have seen more of a discussion of this. Nevertheless, this is a book with few errors and shortcomings. It is a fine addition to the historical, political, and sociological literature that examines class relationships within African American communities, racial relationships among blacks and whites, and the articulation of African American group interests in America.

Sharon D. Wright, University of Florida


Both of these books illustrate the important policy-making role that state supreme court justices play in state politics. In Courts as Catalysts: State Supreme Courts and School Finance Equity, Matthew Bosworth examines the impact of major state supreme court decisions in the area of school finance equity in three states—Texas, Kentucky, and North Dakota. He analyzes the effects that these rulings had in putting the school-funding equity issue on the respective state lawmakers’ policy agendas and in setting constitutional guidelines for new education financing statutes. In Judicial Review in State Supreme Courts: A Comparative Study, Laura Langer looks at the role state supreme courts from all 50 states played in shaping policy in the areas of campaign and election law, workers’ compensation law, unemployment compensation law, and welfare benefit law. She examines the number and types of these laws that are challenged in state supreme courts. But Langer primarily focuses on the factors that affect whether judicial review cases involving these issues are docketed by state supreme courts and on the factors that influence state high court justices’ decisions on the merits of docketed cases. Not only do these authors emphasize different aspects of state supreme court policy making, but they differ in the theoretical perspectives that inform their analysis and in the methods they use to try to answer the research questions they put forth.

Matthew Bosworth employs the comparative case study method to examine the extent to which state supreme court decisions prompted passage of new school financing legislation in Texas, Kentucky, and North Dakota. He constructs his case studies by employing over 90 interviews with key participants including legislators, staffers, supreme court justices, executive branch officials (including governors where possible), lawyers, journalists, and executive branch officials. For triangulation, he supplements the interviews with examination of newspaper articles, documents, and previous academic work. The case studies are useful in describing and explaining the process of education financing policy change in these three states. The roles of state supreme courts are assessed, as are those of legislators, executive branch officials, public opinion, and interest groups.

According to Bosworth, major policy changes were the result of a series of decisions of rulings by the Texas Supreme Court and a single comprehensive decision by the Kentucky Supreme Court. More modest changes were due to the “threat” of overturning the state’s school funding system by the North Dakota Supreme Court. While legislators were important in all three states, and interest groups were in both Texas and Kentucky, most of the interviewees in-
dicated that policy change came about primarily because of the courts’ decisions. It appears unlikely that any action would have been taken, and certainly not the sweeping reforms in Texas and Kentucky, had the courts not intervened in the policy process and spurred legislators into action.

Bosworth’s study builds on works such as Stuart Scheingold’s *The Politics of Rights: Lawyers, Public Policy and Political Change* (1974) and Michael McCann’s *Rights at Work: Pay Equity Reform and the Politics of Legal Mobilization* (1994). It also serves as a critique of works such as Gerald Rosenberg’s *The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring about Social Change?* (1991) that question whether courts can have a meaningful effect on social policy. *Courts as Catalysts* demonstrates clearly that the courts in these states did just that.

In *Judicial Review in State Supreme Courts*, Laura Langer focuses on explaining the decisions of state supreme court justices in judicial review cases. She tests hypotheses based on the strategic approach. She builds on her own collaborative work with Melinda Gann Hall and Paul Brace, as well as a large body of work on the U.S. Supreme Court. She finds that state supreme court justices are most strategic (i.e., most responsive to state government ideology) in campaign and election law cases. In the other types of cases, the justices’ sincere preferences, strategic calculations, and legal factors all influence their decisions.

A contribution of this study is an additional focus on the factors that lead courts to add judicial review cases to their dockets. As Langer notes, this phase of state supreme court decision making has been overlooked by most previous research. In an examination that uses the court as the unit of analysis, some of the same factors that explain decisions on the merits also are associated with docketing of judicial review cases.

The strengths and weaknesses of these two books present mirror images of each other. The comparative case study approach that Bosworth employs provides a comprehensive description of the crafting of school finance policy in these three states. At the same time, however, it is disappointing that no really firm conclusions can be drawn beyond the fact that the courts were important catalysts in stirring policy change and that such change would not have occurred in the absence of court action. These conclusions are not very surprising; given the design of the study, it would have been surprising if the results were otherwise. In addition, while some discussion is included, there is little systematic attempt to explain why the justices decided as they did in the cases being studied.

The strength of Langer’s book is that it builds on what I take to be the cutting edge of judicial politics research today. That is, it employs a sophisticated theoretical model based on the strategic approach and uses high-level quantitative analysis to test hypotheses derived from the model. I do have some qualms regarding the model for explaining the docketing of cases. Most state supreme courts do not have complete discretion over their dockets as the U.S. Supreme Court does, and data are not available to examine the votes of individual state
supreme court justices on whether to accept a case for review. In addition, the results for cases on the merits are similar in my judgment, whether or not the selection factor is controlled. But this is a relatively minor point. In explaining decisions on the merits, and overall, she is quite successful in developing specific hypotheses, testing them using appropriate methodology, and generally finding support for them.

As Bosworth points out, however, national overviews of court decisions in a given policy area (such as Langer's) fail to provide a richly detailed narrative of the policy process. Descriptions of case issues and the finer points of state supreme court opinions are neglected. It may also be, in my view, that in the quest to be more and more scientific in our approach, we run the risk of becoming overly abstract and of losing sight of the basic and concrete nature of the processes we are studying.

Even though the authors are dealing with similar research questions, only a handful of the same citations appeared in both books. It appears to me that these books are representative of two different "camps" of judicial politics scholarship. In each camp, research questions are framed differently, different methods are used, and different kinds of conclusions are reached. Having said this, both these books represent solid scholarship. Both tell us something about state supreme court policy making that we did not know before. Judicial politics scholars will find much to like about both of these books.

Craig F. Emmert, Texas Tech University