

REVIEW

Michael P. Levine (editor), *The Analytic Freud: Philosophy and Psychoanalysis* (Routledge 2000), 320 pp., £16.99.

The editor intends his contributors to draw out 'the philosophical implications' of psychoanalysis, taken philosophically as a legitimate extension of ordinary psychology. The result is a collection of fifteen papers, reminiscent of a conference proceedings in being for the most part interesting and provocative, but disparate in content and approach and hence something of a challenge to the reviewer. The papers fall (for reviewing purposes) into two groups: six papers under 'Philosophy of Mind' and the rest grouped as three papers each under the separate headings of 'Ethics', 'Sexuality', and 'Civilisation'. The philosophy of mind papers, while varying in philosophical approach, deal mainly with questions about the conceptualisation of the psychoanalytic unconscious and with the problems it poses for the explanation of action.

Paul Redding reads Freud as having a theory of consciousness which anticipates elements both of the access-phenomenal consciousness distinction and of current 'higher-order thought' (HOT) theory. Hughlings Jackson's hierarchical model of central nervous system organisation allowed Freud to 'neurologise' two Kantian ideas about higher order thought as the condition for cognition. First, for thought about the world to take place as the reality principle required, there must be unity of judgements and memory, a requirement reminiscent of the transcendental unity of apperception. Second, what made thoughts apt, as judgements, for any such rational processing – which Redding equates with their access consciousness – was their linguistic or propositional presentation, acquired at the highest level of function. Loss of propositionality meant loss of access consciousness of mental contents, but with retention of phenomenal consciousness which, Redding suggests, provides a key to understanding Freud's conception of the unconscious. Redding does not consider whether pure phenomenal consciousness is sufficiently developed a concept to do this, however, nor does he justify his departure from the usual link between HOT and access consciousness.

The 'psychoanalytic unconscious' has always been problematic for analytic philosophy, whose insistence on the propositional nature of thought conflicts with the Kleinian notion of unconscious phantasy as imagistic pre-linguistic mental representation. David Snelling wishes to show that Kleinian theory, together with Freud's ideas about a 'bodily ego', can give a coherent account of pre-linguistic content. He suggests that there is a 'primordial' concept, the sense of the self, which comes about when the mind *in statu nascendi* receives the 'projection' of the sensory surface of the body. The body image thus created is at the same time a representation of the self. There is however an unresolved ambiguity here in the notion of projection (the anatomical notion that Freud very likely had in mind is a compound of the geometrical notion that Snelling identifies, and the idea, noted by Redding, that high level neuronal grouping was organised around function.) Snelling also ventures on treacherous ground in taking the theory of internal objects, a particularly vexatious piece of Kleinian theory, as a theory of primitive intentionality. Overall his argument is too compressed and employs too much psychoanalytic terminology to be perspicuous. More analysis of the philosophical sort would improve accessibility, as would discussion of the Kantian elements in all this – in particular whether the bodily ego is Freud's re-working of the transcendental unity of apperception, or his version of the empirical self. This would have provided a point of contact to the papers by Marshall (see below) and Redding and would also have offered a better framework for what it looks as though Snelling wants to achieve, a statement of the conditions of possibility of a primary concept of the self.

Jim Hopkins calls on a theory of conceptual metaphor to show how symbolic transformation of unconscious wishes into desires preserves connections of content in the explanation of symptomatic and irrational actions. If metaphorical thinking is theorised as a cognitive ability to map representations systematically between target and source domains, then psychoanalytic symbolic explanation picks out the exercise of this ability to connect symptomatic behaviour with unconscious motivating states such as phantasy and wish. Further, Hopkins suggests that the capacity for symbolic thinking, in particular as it involves bodily metaphor, is explicable teleologically as advantageous. Accordingly, Freudian symbolism and its near relation, Kleinian phantasy about the body, as they are discerned by psychoanalytic exploration, have functional explanations. A great deal of theoretical ground is

covered in this paper and the arguments are inevitably schematic: Freudian symbolism and conceptual metaphor, Kleinians on containment and Wittgenstein on the metaphorical origins of the Cartesian picture of mind, a physiological target domain for physicalistic metaphors of emotion, and a teleological explanation for the ensemble!

Tamas Pataki argues that much more ordinary and symptomatic wish-fulfilment can be explained by reference to both beliefs and desires, than 'sub-intentional' psychoanalytic theorists, including Hopkins, allow. His contention is that most wish-fulfilment is fully intentional, because pursuant on an overall strategy of self-directed solicitude. Accordingly, wish-fulfilling behaviour is explained by a desire to placate, console or pacify the self jointly with instrumental beliefs about the efficacy of the imagination. That such instrumental beliefs are held is evidenced by the capacity to engage in evidently gratificatory daydreaming and masturbation fantasy. Pataki gives no explanation as to why the instrumentality of imagining should be thought to generalise to self-consolation; a brief allusion at the end to psychoanalytic object relations theory on the internalisation of maternal care does not elucidate the question. Pataki's position contrasts with Richard Wollheim's in which imagination in wish-fulfilment, even when begun strategically, is ultimately in the service of reducing psychic anxiety. Here, the operative belief in the power of the imagination is a belief in the omnipotence of thought. Pataki dismisses as unsatisfactory Wollheim's account of how we come to hold the omnipotence belief, but offers no convincing account of why an instrumental belief should come to have the scope claimed for it. This paper does contain careful analytic work, useful both for its critique of the 'sub-intentional' theories it opposes and for an analysis of the structure of wish fulfilment. However, much of this, as the references indicate, has appeared in print *verbatim* elsewhere and the space would have been better devoted to clarifying how self-solicitude derives from maternal care and is believed to be served by the imagination.

Focusing more narrowly on the problem of action explanation, Graeme Marshall suggests that unconscious motivation does not involve intention but is nevertheless voluntary. Just as for Wittgenstein perception is active, so Kant's 'spontaneity of cognition' makes activity integral to all thought. Synthesis of the sensory manifold involves recognition of the fit between intuitions and concepts, and recognition, as Marshall tells us, is active in requir-

ing the voluntary directing of attention. So both mental activity, and physical activity since it springs from perception, are at bottom voluntary. The account has the neat result that psychic defences come out as mental activities, but this, and other parts of Marshall's compressed account require more clarification. Decompression might also remove the circularity apparent in the claim that on the one hand recognition is fundamental to spontaneity of cognition while on the other, recognition as a mental activity is explained by spontaneity.

The authors' brief was 'critically and speculatively' to explore the philosophical contributions of psychoanalysis to analytic philosophy. It must be said that overall the philosophy of mind papers are short on critique of self or other and long on speculation, apart from Pataki's paper which is just long. The format is perhaps against the contributors here; to provide enough psychoanalytic theory with enough critical exegesis to bring out the potential interest for philosophy, to develop their own ideas and to be properly self-critical, all in what looks like a 10–15 thousand word-limit, is not easy. On the other hand, the longer papers are not more developed than the shorter, just more crammed.

The rationale for grouping the remaining papers into three separate sections is not evident. Since Freud's psychology of civilisation and culture proceeds from a basis of methodological individualism, it is natural to expand the largely conceptual concerns of the philosophy of mind section, with a wider exploration of his moral and affective psychology as a whole. All of these papers deal with some aspect of moral psychology, affect and emotion; the ones under the rubric of Civilisation include discussion of sublimation and erotic love (LaCaze), of the role of desire and guilt in the rule of law (Brunner) and, among other things, of the intersection of affect and concept in our understanding of humour (Wright).

In 'Ethics' Michael Stocker argues that, in the paradigm case of *akrasia*, where desire for bodily pleasures prevails over rational choice, Aristotle is concerned with a loss of mastery of principles. This can be seen as a loss of the achievements of maturity, and be understood in developmental terms as an instance of the (wider) psychoanalytic concept of regression. Stocker is concerned with conceptual parallels between Aristotle and Freud, and with their common focus on man's psychological and moral nature; the paper provides a nice example of how to display Freud's thought by discussing the work of a philosopher.

Housed under 'Sexuality' Amelie Rorty's paper, published in an earlier version under a pseudonym, mysteriously, discusses in some detail Freud's rejection of unconscious emotion. Rorty concludes that emotions as types cannot be unconscious because their functional role requires that they have to be felt, in keeping with Freud's explanation of affect as discharged tension or energy. Redding's suggestion that the affective component of emotion is phenomenally- but not access-conscious, could allow Rorty's account to dispense with this dubious piece of metapsychology. States that Rorty thinks can be unconscious are those individuated by content and affect together. While the suggestion recalls Gardner's analysis of those primitive object-bound emotions such as the Ratman's hatred of his father (referred to by Sherman), the two analyses are theoretically widely separated. Gardner's conception of the unconscious is the Kleinian one, while Rorty takes unconsciousness to be self-deception. Further, from the 'naturalistic story' Rorty gives of childhood memories of seduction, she shares Marcia Cavell's deflationary views about the unconscious (just touched on in Cavell's paper here) to which Nancy Sherman (in her paper on 'Emotional Agents') also appears sympathetic, as the repository of early, pre-linguistic childhood memories and records of experience, in some way sequestered psychologically so as to be unavailable for adult reflection.

Such theoretical sympathies and differences denote a special problem for cross-disciplinary work between philosophy and psychoanalysis, in the fact that psychoanalytic theory is not unitary. In particular, a multi-authored compilation such as this one will contain differences in theoretical orientation, with consequent philosophical tensions and incompatibilities. Appreciated, such theoretical differences can be matter for philosophical exploration, as Snelling's introductory remarks indicate.

Equally, as is the case with several papers here, philosophical discussion of psychoanalysis can proceed quite well within a particular theory. However, when such differences fail to register with philosophers, and especially when the work of the historical Freud is taken to be co-extensive with 'psychoanalysis', philosophy can find itself beside the point. Jennifer Radden on *Mourning and Melancholia* is in the first category, Grant Gillett on moral authenticity in the second. Additionally, theoretical divergences are not only geographical but are, significantly, institutionally linked: clinical training in the US is oriented to classical theory

and ego-psychology, but more towards Klein and object-relations theories in the UK. There can be strong institutional pressures within psychoanalysis for adhering to locally accepted theories. This can give an underlying polemic or political nuance to philosophical debate: for instance, Nancy Sherman's argument is intended to justify the analyst's openness to change in the 'psychoanalytic alliance', a thesis that stands in more need of defence in the US than in the UK.

Although the collection is not intended as a book, the review process does prompt one to consider whether, with enough editorial linkage done by the reader, it can be read in a unitary way. Given attentive reading it is thought provoking and rewarding to figure out the thematic connections between the contributions – in particular to note the Kantian elements, and degree of consensus about the psychoanalytic theory of emotion. Taking the papers collectively does give impetus to the question of how best to display psychoanalysis' philosophical antecedents and structuring assumptions. However, more editorial structuring and synopsis would be needed for this collection firmly to establish its interest for analytic philosophy.

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