

## Race, Social Welfare, and the Decline of Postwar Liberalism: A New or Old Key?

*Fifty-one years ago, when liberalism and social welfare democracy were expanding in all advanced industrialized nations, V.O. Key, Jr., forecast the decline of postwar liberalism in the United States. Current discussion of the decline of liberalism has ignored Key or, when evidence is lacking, has incorrectly cited him. In contrast to Key's relatively direct, simple, and heavily documented reasoning, current explanations are multifactorial, complex, less well documented, and often ideologically loaded. Some explanations for the "postwar" decline identify causal factors more than six years after the war, yet they ignore events in 1945–47. At the fifty-first anniversary of V.O. Key's Southern Politics in State and Nation, attention to Key's forecast and Occam's razor is called for. Key argued that racism in the South, exerted through congressional committees, would lead to a decline of liberalism in the nation. Using "legislative histories," this article compares Key's single-factor "racial" explanation with a two-factor explanation—and by implication with multifactor ones—and finds Key's more compelling and parsimonious. Archival sources indicate that more than two years before the 1948 Democratic Convention, Charlie Ross, Truman's closest advisor, and Truman himself encouraged Key to assess the emerging postwar politics of the South. As Key anticipated, institutionalized racism sunk the Fair Deal and postwar social democracy, despite Truman's efforts. The effects of racism on postwar and current politics and public administration should be reexamined as a key to understanding American distinctiveness or exceptionalism.*

In recent years, scholars and practitioners have offered an increasing number of explanations for the decline of liberalism in the United States after World War II. Whether "race" has been a determining factor in this decline is currently of much interest. As V.O. Key, Jr. (1949) suggested 51 years ago, the decline of liberalism and government activism could well be a result of racial heterogeneity in the United States and failures to reach racial accommodation through institutionalized processes (Key 1984, 1949; Williamson 1984). The only other industrialized country to decrease government social democratic programs following the Second World War is South Africa. Substantial evidence has been presented recently in the scholarly literature that race has shaped postwar public policy greatly out of proportion to many other influences, and it continues to do so.

One of the better-known examples of this literature is Quadagno (1994), who argues that welfare has had and continues to have a "color" about it. Likewise, Carnoy

(1994) argues that race has had a strong, dominant, and continuing influence on economic policy, and, more recently, Jones (1998) has used extensive historical research to describe how race has persistently influenced access to jobs and employment opportunities. Recent studies sup-

---

**Arthur R. Williams** is a professor of public administration and director of Health Services Administration, L. P. Cookingham Institute of Public Affairs, University of Missouri–Kansas City. His Ph.D. is in government from Cornell University, and he holds an M.P.A. from GSPIA, University of Pittsburgh, and an M.A. from the School of Economics, University of the Philippines. He has done postdoctoral work in epidemiology and biostatistics at Johns Hopkins University and the New England Epidemiology Institute. He has published in the areas of health outcomes, public policy, public finance, local-level development in the U.S. and abroad, and colonial policy in Southeast Asia. He holds a Fulbright Research Scholar award in the Philippines for 2000–2001. Email: williamsar@umkc.edu

**Karl F. Johnson** is a professor of public administration and director of the L. P. Cookingham Institute of Public Affairs at the University of Missouri–Kansas City. His Ph.D. is in political science from the University of Oregon. He is co-author of the Politics of Education in the States and co-author of chapters and articles in urban public administration, public works, and citizen participation. Current work includes studies of the history of public policy, budgeting, and local government auditing. Email: johnsonk@umkc.edu

ported by the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation demonstrate that the U.S. health care system exhibits “health care divided” by racial lines consistently drawn by public policies (Smith 1999). In these books alone, race is seen to decisively affect a broad array of public policies from the end of World War II to the present, including welfare, fiscal, employment, and health care.

Most of this literature, only a minuscule portion of which is cited above, does not assert that race is the only factor influencing public policy, but argues that race often plays a dominant role. What this means specifically can be difficult to grasp in practical terms. Does race have a beta weight three or four times the value of other variables in a regression equation? Does race dominate solutions to a zero-sum game? Or what? And, is the influence of race on American policies broad, as the corpus of this literature and Key (1949) suggest, or is the racial factor more important in specific policy arenas? Such literature has been often dismissed quietly as “radical,” “ideological,” or labeled with a scarlet “L.” At the other extreme, much of the mainstream literature in political science and public policy has relegated race to footnotes or a few sentences within several hundred pages of text. Typical of this literature is an increasingly arcane attempt to show how numerous, complex, diverse, and “exceptional” influences have shaped American public policy. Apart from dulling Occam’s razor, such attempts have an air of medieval scholasticism about them. If a phenomenon were not adequately explained by observation, scholastics would simply increase the number of variables or concoct more abstract ones (Kuhn 1970).

Shipler (1997) may be correct. Americans appear uncomfortable with and reluctant to discuss race as an issue, and this may include and be reflected in the mainstream literature (or paradigm) in public policy and administration. Nevertheless, ignoring race or relegating it to simply one of many variables explaining limited government activism in the United States is increasingly difficult. Too much solid contrary evidence is accumulating.

The study described here began as an attempt to use the resources of the Harry S. Truman Library in Independence, Missouri, to examine possible explanations for the decline of liberalism immediately following the Second World War. There is considerable agreement that the period of 1946–52 was crucial in determining subsequent patterns of government activism (or liberalism), yet great disagreement concerning evidence and its meaning (Brinkley 1995, 1998; Hamby 1973; Skocpol 1995; Lieberman 1998; Mettler 1998).

The authors decided to focus their efforts on the war years 1940–45 and 1946–48. Public opinion polls at that time indicated broad, though mixed, public support for a wide array of liberal or social democratic programs, including subsidized housing and education, guaranteed

employment, national health insurance, and maternal child welfare (Polenberg 1972; Vatter 1985; Gallup 1972). Little doubt exists that during these years, substantial public support could be found for such programs and a window of opportunity for their future development was open. Such programs would have been similar to social democratic programs then being designed and implemented in all other advanced industrialized countries. The failure to establish similar programs in the United States, the authors believe, was likely to illuminate underlying American policy and administrative constraints.

The original paradigm guiding this effort was one not unlike that in the mainstream literature criticized above. Race was initially considered one of many explanatory factors of interest, including labor unions, corporate organization and public relations, cleavages within the New Deal coalition, the emerging “Red Scare,” desire for a return to normalcy, veteran’s politics, gender dominance, and a growing consumption orientation in the economy and society. Investigation of primary and secondary sources indicated that all the above could be of interest in explaining or describing the decline of postwar liberalism; however, for the period 1940–52, all paled beside the issue of color.

Race appeared to be a hurdle over which legislation had to leap before other factors became important. To put it another way, policies and programs had to pass a racial screen, benchmark, or litmus test in Congress before other factors came into play. Such an observation is entirely consistent with correlational evidence that race and a number of other variables affected the passage of legislation. A relationship of precedence, or lexicographic ordering, such as that just hypothesized is unlikely to be uncovered using static associational measures, such as those embedded in roll call analyses or Pearson’s correlation coefficients. The methods finally chosen to investigate the racial connections to the postwar decline of liberalism are discussed below.

The primary focus of this article is this postwar decline. Whether race continues to be an important factor in public policy cannot be addressed adequately in a brief article; however, some concluding observations are offered.

## Study Methods

The plausibility of a single factor (race) versus multi-factor explanations (two or more) for the decline of postwar liberalism is assessed in this study by constructing legislative histories of three roll-call votes and a vote on a presidential nomination. Primary materials were consulted extensively, though not all these materials can be cited here. When secondary sources are referenced, materials were checked against relevant primary sources such

as congressional hearings and testimony printed by the Government Printing Office and materials at the Truman Library. Abbreviated versions of these legislative histories are reported below.

The authors selected bills from the appendix of Katznelson et al. (1993, 303–6), which lists 150 roll-call votes between 1933–50 in the House and Senate. No similar list of presidential nominations was found. This study is notable for its application of roll-call analysis and its finding that coalition voting in Congress emerged on only two categories of issues during the 17-year period examined: race and labor. The authors attribute the decline of postwar liberalism to bloc votes (“the Southern veto”) and actions taken on these two categories of issues. Other categories examined but found not to be influenced by bloc voting were social welfare, planning, fiscal, and regulation.

The authors of the present article selected bills for examination and constructed legislative histories as follows: bills could not fall in the explicit race or civil rights category as defined in the Katznelson et al. appendix. The bills examined were initiated during the war (1940–46). Further, the three bills selected were from distinct, different legislative categories, as defined by Katznelson et al. Additionally, the bills were not directly referenced as racially affected legislation in V.O. Key, Jr., *Southern Politics in State and Nation* (1949, 1984). Finally, enough primary and secondary material had to be available to construct legislative histories from the bill’s inception to its passage or rejection on the floor.

One of the bills selected for examination was the Employment Act of 1946. Previous writing on this bill (Bailey 1950; Stein 1990, 1994) and the Katznelson et al. appendix consider it fiscal legislation. The two other pieces of legislation selected were categorized as social welfare and labor. A fourth legislative history was selected to include a presidential nomination (Salmond 1983). Only the presidential nomination was considered to possess overt racial overtones, and, as shown below, these emerged only in the course of congressional hearings.

The four legislative histories presented here are 1) continued Civilian Conservation Corps appropriations in 1942, categorized by Katznelson et al. as social welfare; 2) the return of the United States Employment Services to the states in 1945, categorized as labor; 3) the Employment Act of 1946, categorized as fiscal; and 4) the nomination of Aubrey Williams to the Rural Electrification Administration in 1945, which, according to the Katznelson et al. categories, might be considered planning (defined in Katznelson et al., fn 14).

The selection of cases or legislative histories for examination in this article serves as a kind of test of multifactor explanations for the decline of liberalism as compared to the single factor of race. The Katznelson et al.

explanation is the most limited of plausible multifactorial explanations—two, race and labor. Presumably, if this explanation does not fit their data well, other multifactor ones are unlikely to do better. Should issues other than race have a critical effect on the legislation selected for examination, the role of racial factors in the legislative histories should appear minimal, if at all. The cases herein, of course, were selected intentionally to exclude race as a primary consideration. This test, if it can be called such, is configurative, or one of plausibility. Yet it is a strong one, although proof lies in the presentation of the cases and is not primarily statistical.

Nevertheless, using a binomial distribution, one might argue that the likelihood of finding four previously classified non-civil-rights bills with obvious racial complexions is, at best, only six in a hundred. “At best” is used since this calculation assumes that it is equally likely that a piece of legislation may or may not be tied to race, that is,  $p = .50$ . The chance of finding three such pieces of legislation is  $p = .125$ , and four such,  $p = .0625$ . Because Katznelson et al. have previously ruled out such likelihood, one might argue, from a Bayesian perspective, that the probability should be something less than that of a coin toss. If the probability were slightly less than .50 per occurrence (actually  $p = .473$ ), then the likelihood of obtaining four pieces of racially loaded legislation by chance would be about five in 100, or  $p = .05$ . Suppose one wishes to argue that it is unfair to include a presidential appointment vote; these were not even mentioned by either Katznelson et al. or by V.O. Key. A similar Bayesian argument for three such identifications, excluding the appointment, means that a probability of  $p = .3685$  per occurrence (a little more than a one in three chance) would produce a standard  $p = .05$ .

This analysis is presented for the mathematically inclined, though its relevance might be challenged. While the four pieces of legislation could be statistically independent, it is implicit in our argument and what we know about voting behavior (logrolling, ideological preferences, etc.) that independence is implausible in the entire universe or population. Indeed, what is the entire population in such an instance?

## Four Legislative Histories

### The Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) and H.R. 7181

With its emphasis on youth employment and conservation, the CCC was one of the more popular New Deal programs (Biles 1994; Salmond 1967). Its director, Robert Fechner, was a Southerner and a labor organizer who had cultivated many friendships in Congress. FDR’s attempt to reduce the number of camps and enrollments in 1938 to balance the budget was met by active resistance from “Cot-

ton Ed” Smith (D-SC) and other Dixie delegates (Salmond 1967, 191). A rigid segregation was maintained within CCC camps in the South. At the time of the termination of the Corps in July 1942, more than 2.5 million unemployed youth had entered and exited its camps. Even though more than 10 percent of the U.S. population was black and black males were a disproportionate percentage of the unemployed, fewer than 200,000 of CCC enrollees (7 percent–8 percent) were non-Caucasian. In few Southern states were more than token numbers of blacks selected, suggesting that during the nine-year life of the Corps, non-Caucasian enrollees came predominately from the Northeast and Midwest (Salmond 1967, 88–91).

The techniques used to discriminate against black applicants have been well documented (Biles 1978, 112–33; Salmond 1967, 94–6; Sitkoff 1978, 61ff.). Exclusionary techniques included moral or other kinds of suasion and the open use of white citizen councils. Most effective, though, were executive orders, regulations, and administrative decisions assuring the assignment of blacks to segregated camps. Because local communities were given a veto over the placement of camps and many would not accept Negro camps, few openings were available to blacks. Negro applicants were logged onto interminable waiting lists. Segregation by camp and use of waiting lists were approved by FDR in July or August 1935 (Salmond 1967, 98–9).

The Katznelson et al. appendix categorizes two pieces of CCC legislation as social-welfare: H.R. 6551 (1937), which dealt with the expansion of CCC eligibility requirements, and H.R. 7181 (1942), which dealt with continuing appropriations. The following legislative history will focus on the 1942 bill.

A strong case for CCC bills through 1939 as social-welfare legislation can be made. This legislation was designed to cope with unemployment by placing youth on conservation projects. However, between 1933 and 1939, the CCC turned toward education and job training as its mission. Splits developed within its bureaucracy and among outside supporters over the emphasis that should be placed on the original emergency-employment and discipline-building aspects of the Corps relative to education, job training, and democracy development. By late 1939 or early 1940, democracy development had been strongly endorsed by both FDR and Eleanor Roosevelt.

As the United States became the “arsenal of Democracy,” not only did shortages of skilled labor arise in defense industries, but also large numbers of youth were found to be physically or mentally unfit during the nation’s first peacetime draft. During the year preceding the bombing of Pearl Harbor, FDR vigorously advocated an enhanced education and job-training mission for the CCC. The active involvement of the First Lady brought a more leftist

and racially integrationist tone to the CCC than had been articulated by Fechner, who died on New Year’s Eve 1939.

The White House encouraged better coordination of the CCC and the more liberal National Youth Administration. In its report, the American Youth Commission strongly advocated an increased job-training mission for all youth agencies including the CCC (Lorwin 1941, 12–15, 47–8), and the Democratic Party platform of 1940 called for a strengthened and enlarged CCC. The master plan of new CCC Director James McEntee called for training more than 300,000 enrollees for defense-industry placement. The job-training, education, and defense components of the Corps were promoted, not its social welfare aspects.

Congressional hearings and bills leading up to and including H.R. 7181 were all couched in job-training language. In late 1941, Director McEntee himself testified before Congress that “from a relief standpoint,” there is not “a scintilla of reason for carrying on this Corps” (U.S. Congress 1942, 266). He emphasized the importance of the CCC job-training and education mission throughout his testimony, including the danger to which the country was exposed due to scarcities of mechanics, machinists, and other skilled labor.

As a result of the improving economy and conscription, CCC enrollments fell from 300,000 to 160,000 from January through November 1941, with departures from camps taking place at a rate exceeding 6,000 monthly (Salmond 1967, 210). This enrollment decline may partially explain the September 1941 Director’s authorization for increased “Negro selection,” and a de-emphasis on segregation, including newly opened discussion of placing Negro camps on military bases, thereby avoiding local vetoes. Also, the NAACP and other advocacy groups were exerting mounting political pressure for racial integration (Lacy 1976, 202).

The CCC had maintained solid, though not unanimous, support from Southerners as long as it was white and subject to local control. The potential racial consequences of administration actions and proposed activities explain the harsh treatment accorded Director McEntee by Southerners at congressional hearings. Testimony at hearings and votes on proposed CCC legislation between November 1941 and June 30, 1942 (the final vote on H.R. 7181) show a sharp change in attitude, particularly among Southern legislators.

By 1940, the changing complexion—literally and figuratively—of social welfare programs, including the CCC, was apparent. Fewer whites qualified, and continuation of programs at established levels would have led to increasing “blackness.” The NAACP and other advocacy groups called for increased Negro CCC selection at then-existing levels of enrollment due to high levels of black unemployment, which did not fall from Depression levels until after

December 7, 1941 (Jaynes 1990, 10–11). Meanwhile, a concerted congressional attack was launched on all welfare or relief programs through a provision in the Revenue Act of 1941 that authorized a Joint Committee on the Reduction of Nonessential Federal Expenditures.

The committee chairman was Sen. Harry F. Byrd (D-VA), a vocal opponent of the New Deal and a proponent of segregation. The joint committee's 11 members included five Southerners and one border state representative. The Republican delegation contained two intransigent opponents of FDR: Taber (R-NY) and Nye (R-ND). Every Southern delegate on the committee was not only a strong proponent of segregation, but several had played key roles in adopting segregation legislation and constitutional provisions in their states. This committee selected the CCC as its first target. Hearings were held November 28–December 4, 1941.

Testimony and inquiries at these hearings, like those on other legislation mentioned in this article, were heavily loaded with code words in lieu of direct racial epithets. Sen. Kenneth McKellar (D-TN) attacked Director McEntee for not giving “a tinker’s hurrah” for any legislator (Salmond 1967, 211). McEntee was identified as one of the “new boys” in the administration (although he had been with the CCC since its inception), was a personal friend of former Director Fechner, and was known by Southerners to be a political conservative. Not surprisingly, the majority report of the committee recommended abolition of the CCC not later than July 1, 1942.

In his budget message of January 7, 1942, FDR fought back, defending the CCC job-training and education mission and arguing that the need for skilled labor was even more urgent after Pearl Harbor than before—a position consistent with the earlier minority report of the joint committee. FDR launched a strong defense of the CCC, including letters to members of Congress, press conferences, and requests to have legislation ending the Corps withdrawn. The administration was successful in having legislation referred to a liberal authorization committee, the Senate Education and Labor Committee (March 23–April 17, 1942). Impressive testimony in favor of the CCC education mission was marshaled. A termination bill introduced by Sen. McKellar died in committee.

On June 3, 1942, however, the House Appropriations Committee, dominated by Southerners, voted 15–12 not to comply with the president’s \$49 million funding request. Since no funding was appropriated, the CCC would cease to exist as of July 1, 1942. On June 5, an attempt to revive CCC appropriations led to a House vote of 158–151 not to appropriate funds except for liquidation.

A Senate debate on the House action on June 26 produced a vote of 32–32. A second vote failed to break the tie, and Vice President Wallace cast his vote to uphold the

agency. Conference committee meetings, however, led to no compromise on Senate and House funding. On June 30, the Senate accepted a conference committee report that produced \$8 million for the liquidation of the CCC. This second vote on H.R. 7181 led to termination.

By June 26 and June 30, votes on H.R. 7181 clearly had lost the social welfare connotations earlier associated with the CCC. The Katznelson et al. social welfare categorization is difficult to accept without demur, either a “no” or a “yes, but...” At the time of these votes, H.R. 7181 was a job-training and education bill colored by the changed racial complexion of likely applicants and beneficiaries.

### **United States Employment Service (USES), Unemployment Insurance (UI), and S. 1274**

The roll-call vote on S. 1274 occurred in the Senate on September 19, 1945. As a result, not only were local USES offices returned to state control, all funding for the service was to be provided with federal dollars under state supervision. Prior to the war, employment offices were funded by state-federal cost sharing under loose but formal federal supervision. In early 1942, these offices were federalized under the Federal Security Administration with FDR promising their return to the states after the war.

S. 1274 and parallel legislation in the House (H.R. 3736), not listed in the Katznelson et al. appendix, can be viewed as labor legislation in fulfillment of FDR’s promise. However, hearings in both houses and the management of subsequent legislation suggest that race was an important, if hidden, agenda. Hearings on both pieces of legislation were held August 29–September 7, 1945. Testimony in the two houses often was taken from the same persons, and both sets of hearings were consulted for the legislative history below (U.S. Senate 1945; U.S. House 1945). Superficially, the hearings are a classic contest between proponents and opponents of “states rights.” Clear differences in emphasis, however, exist between decentralized state capacity advanced by Republicans and sovereignty assertions of Southern Democrats. These differences cannot be explored in this article, but citations below suggest their tenor and intent.

Although Katznelson et al. categorize it as labor, S. 1274 dealt with both the management of USES (labor) and the funding of unemployment compensation (fiscal), specifically the duration of unemployment benefits, their level, and federal supplemental support. Senate and House bills were referred to revenue committees: the Committee on Finance in the Senate and the Committee on Ways and Means in the House, both of which were Southern dominated. The former committee was chaired by Sen. Walter George (D-GA), an active New Deal opponent and a segregationist; other members from the Old South were Sen. Harry Byrd (D-VA), Sen. Josiah Bailey (D-NC), and Sen.

Tom Connally (D-TX). The House committee was chaired by Rep. Robert L. Doughton (D-NC), with eight of its 14 Democrats from the South.

The administrative history of USES is exceedingly complex, and critical historical material is scarce (Adams 1969; Clague and Kramer 1976; Haber and Kruger 1964; Ruttenberg and Gutches 1970). The literature consistently fails to discuss racial discrimination, even though discrimination by Southern employment agencies has been documented in studies of race relations throughout the New Deal (Biles 1994; Corson 1943; Sitkoff 1978).

The modern structure of USES was established as a federal-state partnership under the Wagner-Peyser Act of 1933 and the Social Security Act of 1935. Employment services through USES were to be funded by the states and the national government equally, while unemployment insurance (UI) was to be provided by taxing employer payrolls in each state. Employer contributions were deposited in trust funds established in each state for the income support of unemployed workers on terms determined by the state legislatures. As late as May 1945, only 30 million of 43 million nonagricultural workers were covered by UI; domestic and agricultural workers were excluded from the system (U.S. Senate 1945, 5–6).

The Wagner-Peyser and Social Security acts separated USES job-placement services from UI. Nevertheless, when unemployment claims began to be paid by all states (1939), USES and UI became linked. Most states used USES personnel and offices to investigate and certify UI claims, thereby severely lessening the capacity of employment agencies to place workers or assist applicants with job searches. Some states used refusal to accept an employment referral as a test for denial of UI payments.

A 1940 study of USES found employment services to be highly decentralized in tiny local offices. Of the 359 offices examined, 264 had fewer than 10 employees. Only three of the eight states in the study, none of the Southern ones, had “well rounded and stabilized programs for the training of employees.” Few staff members possessed “proper knowledge about job requirements and job conditions.” USES placement activities did not reach one-third of applicants, and both placement and job training were subordinated to the investigation of UI claims. Referrals for employment were rarely made outside local areas or across state boundaries, even when labor markets were multistate. While the study did not recommend centralizing employment services, USES was compared unfavorably with more centralized labor exchanges in Britain (1909) and Germany (1922). Despite cautious wording, the study suggested that offices were often subordinated to local political interests (Weigert 1940, 27–30).

After federalization under the FSA and War Manpower Commission, USES’ success in job placement may have

increased, and transfers to critical industries in other states and across jurisdictional boundaries may have become more common (Adams 1969, 30–1; Haber and Kruger 1970, 31–3). Even under the FSA, however, substantial control over USES remained with the states (Ruttenberg and Gutches 1970).

In response to concerns about anticipated increases in unemployment at the conclusion of the war, President Truman’s message to Congress on May 28, 1945, called for corrections of “defects” in “existing State laws.” First, UI coverage would be expanded to 13 million nonagricultural workers then uncovered. Second, increases in the average state weekly UI benefit from \$15–\$18 to \$25 were recommended. Third, extensions of the average duration of UI benefits from 16 to 26 weeks were urged. Supplemental payments were to be provided through the federal government to states to assure uniform benefits to the temporarily unemployed. Truman’s message did not advocate increased federalization; however, it did call for UI and USES to be “appropriately administered” under “minimum federal standards” (U.S. Senate 1945, 5–6).

At the time of hearings, an unemployment crisis was anticipated. Initial unemployment claims had risen to 596,458, an 11-fold increase in filings from the week prior to V-J Day. Unemployment was expected to exceed more than 8 million, or about one-seventh of the labor force (U.S. Senate 1945, 176). Yet, Congressional testimony by a member of the Texas Unemployment Compensation Board typified that of Southerners before committees: “I think it is high time for the Congress to decide one thing, and it is fundamental; that is, whether you are going to leave the States alone and let them continue with the efficient system they have developed, or whether you are going to take it over” (U.S. House 1945, 395).

In written testimony, Governor Robert Cherry of North Carolina asserted that “for myself and my state, I would prefer that our citizens suffer the hardship of displacement and unemployment rather than have them shoved about the country where work is said to be available. North Carolina has a sizable capital investment in its workers and does not want to lose any of them.” Sen. Byrd and Sen. George noted that travel support for displaced persons could “expect” to be limited only to workers seeking employment in states of origin. Marion Williamson, director of the Georgia Employment Security Agency, suggested that the provision of travel assistance to agricultural labor was a “nigger in the wood pile” which would exacerbate labor shortages on farms. He argued that stronger linkages between state employment services and UI were needed to assure that existing employment opportunities, including those on farms, were accepted. W.O. Hoke, commissioner of the Tennessee Department of Employment Security, and Claude A. Williams of the Texas Unemployment Compen-

sation Board, presented similar arguments (U.S. Senate 1945, 503, 191ff, 426, 369–83; U.S. House 1945, 395).

Race issues and segregation rarely surfaced explicitly during the hearings; however, some exchanges are revealing. A.L. Fletcher, chair of the North Carolina Unemployment Compensation Board, provided testimony “in full accord” with Governor Cherry. Noting in passing that the exclusion of domestics and agricultural workers from the Social Security Act of 1935 was wise, he responded to the following inquiry from Chairman George.

**Chair.** Suppose people have left North Carolina and gone to Baltimore or Detroit or some other industrial center where they have had employment in war work or work similar to that, and there is congestion there. If they draw unemployment compensation there where they are not needed, will not that militate against their returning to North Carolina where they are needed?

**Mr. Fletcher.** Yes, sir; it may do it to some extent. It probably will. We have 267,000 North Carolinians who have social-security numbers and are on record in our office who have gone to other States to work in war plants.

After further questioning, Fletcher indicated there were plenty of jobs in North Carolina, although “maybe they are not the kind of jobs that suit them.” Fletcher was asked by the chair to define “suitable wage”:

**Mr. Fletcher.** The wage paid in that group for the same class of work, paid by other people. It is the established rate of pay in a community. I would like to give you just a little example to show you how our commission in particular dealt with one case; and it is typical of a great many cases.

Down at Wilmington there was a colored fellow who had been in the employ of a Wilmington contractor for ten years. That Wilmington contractor paid him 50 cents an hour for an 8-hour day. He received \$4 a day. When he went to work for the shipyard, when they opened up down there, his pay with overtime [number of additional hours not noted] ran to \$7.80 a day. The shipyard closed up part of its business and laid this man off, and he went back to his former employer and his employer offered him exactly the same job at 50 cents an hour [1939–45 the cost of living index increased more than 30 percent], pushing the same wheelbarrow, and he refused to accept it on the ground that it was not what he had been earning and he filed a claim for benefits.

We denied the claim on the ground that he had been offered suitable work and that was the rate of pay for everybody in Wilmington working on the same sort of job, who were lucky enough to be hired by the shipyard.

Clearly, this “colored fellow” and other “typical” cases were being told by officials of the state to accept a substantial cut in real wages. The only justification offered was a community norm based on group or classes, not the cost of living or other economic considerations. Mr. Fletcher was subjected to severe questioning by Rep. Kean (R-NJ); however, Kean was interrupted by the chair to introduce written testimony, letters from Governor Cherry (U.S. Senate 1945, 426, 427–9).

Earlier in the House hearings, questions had arisen about the definition of “suitable work,” since refusals to accept such work were being used to deny UI claims. A member of the Texas Unemployment Compensation Board cited the Texas Unemployment Act:

In determining whether or not any work is suitable for an individual, the commission shall consider the degree of risk involved to himself, his safety, and morals, his physical fitness and prior training, and his experience and prior earnings, the length of employment and prospects for securing local work in his *customary occupation*, and the distance of available work from his residence. [Italics added.]

He also asserted that “the same provision is in all State laws,” and, while persons should not be compelled to relinquish a “God-given right” to refuse a job, states had no obligation to assist them in finding employment that did not meet the above requirements. In the context of legal and customary segregation, the requirements are clear: A refusal to accept employment such as that offered by Mr. Fletcher clearly was considered as contravening morals, physical attributes, training, and custom.

Throughout testimony in both the Senate and House, Southern officials frequently appeared to ignore the Depression, World War II (even the Civil War), and the transformation of the American economy. Testimony in favor of more centralized administration of USES and UI was provided by a number of persons. These included members of the Truman administration, organized labor, state employment-service directors (including that of Kentucky), and experts who criticized the existing system for not encouraging labor mobility, career guidance, and support for job training. As a measure of states’ lack of concern and capacity, William Green, president of the American Federation of Labor, noted that not a single state had paid unemployment compensation prior to the Social Security Act of 1935. He and others testified that state laws and administration were not only inadequate to support the numbers needing jobs during postwar reconversion, but state control had generated interjurisdictional conflicts impeding job placement (U.S. Senate 1945, 394, 398ff, 521ff).

Congress, nevertheless, produced legislation returning USES to state control with 100 percent federal funding and

provisions for state determination of UI standards and enforcement. Postwar studies of USES, not surprisingly, have found that only a few states were distributing or keeping labor market data; research functions in Washington were denuded of staff; and the “heart and core” of USES—job placement—was a failure. Regulations and legislation forbade USES “records and issuance of reports on what is done for people in special categories,” such as race. USES “is regarded by the poor and disadvantaged as the least likely source of meaningful help, if not as the enemy, to be avoided at all costs” (Haber and Kruger 1970, 50, 84–95, 75; Adams 1969, 37ff, 86; Ruttenberg and Gutches 1970, 3).

### **S. 380 and the Employment Act of 1946**

Two votes on S. 380 (the Full Employment Bill) in the Katznelson et al. appendix are categorized as fiscal. The outcome of these votes was the Employment Act of 1946, which established the Council of Economic Advisors to the President. According to Richard Neustadt (1960, 19), this bill bound “personal responsibility for gauging and for guiding the American economy in the Presidency.” Herbert Stein and others, who frequently cite him, have popularized the notion that the act was a result of new ways of thinking about fiscal policy, specifically Keynesianism (Flash 1965; Stein 1990, 1994; Brinkley 1995).

Such assertions are not supported in the thousand pages of testimony from hearings on the bill in July–September 1945. Only the testimony of Paul Hoffman, then the boss of Herbert Stein at the Committee for Economic Development, and, perhaps, otherwise vague comments by Harold D. Smith, director of the Bureau of the Budget, can be interpreted as Keynesian. Testimony on the bill typically dealt with closing the budget deficit, types and rates of taxes to be used, the need to revitalize public works, and, most importantly, direct job creation. Both supporters (Fiorello La Guardia, mayor of New York) and critics (Ira Mosher, National Association of Manufacturers) agreed that the bill as written guaranteed employment for all able bodied citizens after the war. As the testimony indicates, proposed employment creation policies were part of the New Deal. The anticipated war on unemployment was to be fought at the Maginot Line of public works and government job creation should the private sector falter in creating adequate jobs (U.S. Senate 1945b, 468ff, 571–4, 638ff).

A classic case study of the Employment Act, S. 380, and related legislation is that of Stephen K. Bailey; an updated review and legislative history is in press (Bailey 1950; Williams et al. 2000). Both works show the second vote on S. 380 was essentially a vote on a conference committee report favoring House legislation (H.R. 2202) which had eliminated the guaranteed job creation provisions in the Senate bill. Bailey attributes the excision of employ-

ment provisions to a 1940s version of gridlock, the “complex” and “cumbersome” legislative process. Williams et al. argue that the legislative process was used to systematically eliminate any possibility of federal intervention in segregated employment through fair employment practices and federal standards.

The first vote on S. 380 in the Katznelson et al. appendix was a bill declaring a policy of guaranteed employment and providing for implementation through a “national production and employment budget” to be prepared by the president and reviewed by a Joint Committee of Congress. While Section 3 of this bill can be broadly construed as fiscal, the hearings on the bill prior to this first vote, as noted above, focused on job creation. Should this vote be categorized as fiscal, planning, or labor? The legislative history is reviewed below.

Intensive promotion of a guaranteed employment policy dates from a National Resource Planning Board report of March 10, 1943, which called for planned economic management and federal job creation during postwar reconversion (Millet 1947, 18–36). Such planning and job creation were widely supported by the public in Gallup polls in 1944 and early 1945 and by most professional economists, who believed that massive unemployment would result otherwise (Bailey 1950, 9ff).

As early as November 1943, Sen. Harley Kilgore (D-WV) began work on an omnibus reconversion bill with guaranteed employment provisions. On March 29, 1944, the Kilgore bill (S. 1823) was introduced in the Senate. It provided for both postwar economic planning and work relief to be funded and administered by the federal government with fair-employment provisions. Sen. Harry S. Truman (D-MO) was a strong supporter and a cosponsor of this bill.

Public sentiment in favor of the Kilgore bill and extensive cosponsorship seemed to assure the passage of a federal employment program with fair-employment provisions. However, Sen. George (D-GA), chair of both the Senate Finance Committee and the Postwar Economic Policy and Planning Committee, was successful in placing a bill of his ahead of Kilgore’s on the calendar. These maneuvers guaranteed that the Kilgore bill would not receive hearings or a vote during that Senate session. The George bill was passed and signed by FDR in October 1944, the best of a bad lot. This bill not only eliminated the employment and planning provisions of S. 1823, but also authorized only limited unemployment compensation payments through the states.

On January 22, 1945, the original supporters of the Kilgore bill and additional sponsors introduced S. 380 (the Full Employment Act). This bill emphasized full employment through federal job creation and government planning during postwar reconversion, and again it was assumed

that fair-employment practices would accompany employment using federal funds. Supporters of S. 380 paid special attention to moving the legislation forward in the Senate and to avoiding the legislative maneuvering that had killed the earlier Kilgore bill. However, plentiful opportunities for obstruction were available to opponents in the other House.

When Rep. Wright Patman (D-TX) introduced parallel legislation (H.R. 2202) on February 15, 1945, to the surprise of many, it was referred to the Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Department, one of the more conservative and racist in Congress, rather than to the liberal banking or labor committees. Senior Democratic members of the Committee on Expenditures came from rural Southern districts. Chairman Carter Manasco (D-AL) represented one of the poorest districts in the country, but “his voting record was almost consistently conservative on domestic issues” (Bailey 1950, 153).

Of the three Democrats on the drafting subcommittee, Rep. Manasco and Rep. Will Whittington (D-MS) were on record as opposed to federally guaranteed full employment, both were associates of Sen. George, and both were from “black belt” districts. V.O. Key singled out these districts as especially segregationist due to white fear of mobilized black populations (Key 1984, 5–6). Of the two Republicans on the subcommittee, Rep. George Bender (R-OH) had a liberal record, but Rep. Clare Hoffman (R-MI) had one of the most reactionary in the House. Hoffman was “anti-union, anti-liberal, and xenophobic [sic]” (Bailey 1950, 198). Hoffman’s closest friend in the House was Rep. John Rankin (D-MS), the leading racial demagogue on the other side of the aisle, and Hoffman himself was especially renowned for use of racial epithets and abusive anti-labor practices against minority employees on his fruit farms in Michigan.

In the drafting of H.R. 2202, Manasco and associates deleted guaranteed-employment provisions. The bowdlerized bill, called the Employment and Production Act, “rejected the fundamental principles of the Senate bill” (Bailey 1950, 166–7). The Southern-dominated House Rules Committee, at Manasco’s request, submitted the bill under rulings that limited votes to passage or recommittal. The December vote on the Manasco bill was 255 to 126 in its favor.

A letter from President Truman to Manasco stated that the House vote reflected the belief that full-employment provisions would be restored in conference committee. Manasco and other conferees were urged “to support the essential characteristics of the Full Employment Bill” (Harry S. Truman Library, Papers of Samuel Rosenman, letter of December 20, 1945, rough draft attached to final version; and Harvey 1989). The president cited his September 6 speech to Congress that included a reference to the bill as a “national reassertion of the right to work for

every American citizen.”

While H.R. 2202 is not listed in the Katznelson et al. appendix, its influence on the final vote on S. 380, the conference committee report, was decisive. No compromise could be reached in conference; the report accepted House provisions rather than no bill at all.

Assertions that votes on S. 380 were primarily fiscal are misleading. The president, most experts testifying pro and con, and a majority of Congress viewed the legislation as a federal guarantee of employment. True, the final Employment Act of 1946 may have been only a statement of good intentions for full employment in a law that could be categorized broadly as fiscal, but this result was a consequence of legislative hijacking, hidden agendas, and race. It was not the intent of original sponsors of the bill.

The first vote cited in the Katznelson et al. appendix was clearly on employment creation or social welfare legislation. The second vote might be categorized as fiscal, if viewed as a vote on a bill denuded of all guaranteed-employment provisions, or as a vote on the hope that the weakened legislation might be later redrawn to meet original employment objectives. The Employment Act and what happened to it was an essential part of Truman’s education on the implications and consequences of Southern obstruction. What is not often mentioned is that the employment and planning provisions of the Employment Act went down to defeat at virtually the same time as Truman’s fair-employment practices legislation was killed in another committee. Bailey does not mention the other legislation in his discussion of the act. Yet, the two were linked in Truman’s mind (Truman 1956, 180).

### **Nomination of Aubrey Williams to the Rural Electrification Administration (REA)**

Despite strong opposition by conservative Sen. McKellar (D-TN), FDR submitted the nomination of Aubrey Williams as director of the Rural Electrification Administration (REA) to the Senate on January 23, 1945 (Salmond 1983, 179–97). Williams, a prominent Southern New Dealer, was strongly supported by liberal Southerners and Senators William Fulbright (D-AR), Richard Russell (D-GA), and John Bankhead (D-AL). The latter was from Williams’s home state. Even though conservative Republicans opposed the appointment and Williams had a well-known liberal record, the *St. Louis Post Dispatch* predicted confirmation on February 8.

At confirmation hearings, however, Sen. Theodore Bilbo (D-MS) confronted Williams on the issue of race. Bilbo accused Williams, when director of the National Youth Administration, of favoring situations in which “whites are forced to use toilets with the blacks.” Williams asserted that if one consequence of equal employment is toilet sharing, so be it.

Then, so to speak, a South wind blew foul. Numerous scurrilous letters were sent to Williams. Sen. Bankhead withdrew his support: "This is too much. . . . I did not know all this at the time I made you the promise." Sen. Russell said that his promise was withdrawn "with deep regret," and hoped that "you will understand my position." Considerable pressure was placed on Sen. Fulbright to vote against the Williams's nomination, and he did. In the end, 19 Democrats voted against the nomination, only two from outside the South. Salmond cites a number of sources in addition to letters that indicate the nomination died on the race question. Using the Katznelson et al. categories, this appointment might have been classified as social welfare or planning since it dealt with the Rural Electrification Administration.

## Conclusion and Discussion

The four pieces of legislation examined in this article represent about 2.6 percent of the 150 bills in the Katznelson et al. roll-call analysis, about 5.8 percent of the 68 bills listed during the war years (1940–46). A small sample, yet the legislative histories of these bills are depressingly consistent, despite the method used to select legislation for review, which explicitly excluded bills with obvious racial content. As the analysis in "Study Methods" indicates, this result is unlikely to have occurred by chance.

Legislation was shaped to make certain that blacks and whites would not be treated equally and the potential for federal intervention on the race question would be avoided. Race was a hurdle that each piece of legislation had to clear. The legislative histories are consistent with Key's findings published 51 years ago. Key (1949) had argued that fear of mandated equality with blacks through federal intervention would lead Southerners, even the more liberal, to coalesce around the "one and only one real basis for Southern unity; the Negro," thereby stunting liberalism in both state and nation (Key 1984, 315).

Key appears to have correctly forecast the decline of postwar liberalism, for the correct reason. Perhaps the strongest single piece of evidence supporting Key in this article is the Williams's nomination—one he never used. Williams was not only a well-known liberal, he also had strong connections with more radical New Dealers such as Eleanor Roosevelt. Nevertheless, all believed that Senate approval of his nomination was inevitable until the race issue was raised. Reporters of the *St. Louis Post Dispatch*, who had easy access to Southern legislators and staff, believed his nomination was strongly supported within these delegations. After the racial card was played, Williams was quickly abandoned by Southern moderates and liberals, as Key would predict.

All the legislative histories presented above are consistent with Key's analysis that race would shape virtually all important legislation during this period. The legislative histories also suggest that the content of bills could be effectively determined or reshaped prior to roll-call votes. Additionally, the histories, particularly those of CCC funding and UI and USES, illustrate the importance of program administration and outcomes in shaping legislation over time.

The findings in this article raise concerns about whether roll-call analysis of distinct votes can capture dynamic changes as legislation moves from bill to law. The racial agenda buried in the legislation examined in this study is largely hidden, yet it is embedded within all policy arenas. Whether the dynamics of the legislative process can be captured statistically should be of concern. The combined use of qualitative information, such as legislative histories, with quantitative data may be more revealing than straightforward statistical analysis.

By late 1945, President Truman had become greatly concerned about the postwar fate of a liberal Democratic legislative agenda. While Truman's stature continues to grow, much of this recognition rests upon his achievements in foreign policy (Borden 1971, 1961). [Borden's latter edition was expanded to 11 "Great Presidents" to include an essay on Truman.] The apparent failure of Fair Deal domestic legislation in Congress has contributed to Truman's recognition as a less-than-great or a "near-great" President, even by some admirers (Kirkendall 1971). Often cited are blunders on domestic legislation by inept aides and Truman himself. The failure of the Full Employment Bill of 1945 is often used as a case in point. Neither the study by Bailey (1950) nor the one by Williams, Johnson, and Barrett (2000) places blame for the bill's failure on Truman. Nevertheless, this article would be incomplete without addressing the possibility of presidential ineptness in managing legislation.

Truman's aides at times have abetted allegations of fumbling on domestic policy. For example, Clark Clifford (1992, 207) asserts that "we badly underestimated the reaction of the South to the civil rights message, and it almost cost President Truman the 1948 election. The message produced an immediate explosion of anger in the South, and set into motion the Dixiecrat revolt. Had we foreseen the Southern counterattack, the President might have adjusted his timing and tactics, but he still would have pursued his basic objectives."

No evidence for such "underestimation" exists in Truman's memoirs, his statements after leaving the presidency, or in unpublished correspondence that the authors of this article have seen (Truman 1956, 178–84; 1953). Truman consistently maintained that a Southern counterattack against him began shortly after he assumed the presi-

gency and was based on opposition to his stand on fair-employment practices specifically and his open support for civil rights more generally, including the first speech by a president to the NAACP.

Evidence from 1946–47 suggests that President Truman and his friends conducted an intense search for information and allies in the South. Efforts were made to obtain intelligence on what would now be called “white backlash.” Alexander Heard, who was a research assistant to Key, states that research on *Southern Politics in State and Nation* was encouraged by Truman through contacts with Roscoe Martin, who was then at the University of Alabama. According to Heard, Truman wrote Key through Martin that he could do a great service by studying politics in the South. Other contacts were made with Harold B. Smith, director of the Bureau of the Budget (Heard 1984, xxi–xxv). No evidence of the correspondence has been found at the Truman Library; however, other correspondence exists, and it appears that these contacts were more direct than Heard has suggested.

Letters of May 25, 1946, transmitted between Ellis Arnall, the former liberal governor of Georgia, and Charlie Ross, Truman’s press secretary and closest friend in the administration, includes a copy of a letter sent to Key by the President:

May 25, 1946

Dear Professor Key:

Governor Arnall has told me of the proposed study of the electoral process in the South. He has also said that you are peculiarly equipped to direct the research on this project. I would like to voice my opinion that the project is an important one, and my hope that you will find it possible to undertake this assignment.

Very sincerely,

cc: Governor Arnall

May 27, 1946

Dear Governor Arnall:

Enclosed is a copy of the letter, which the President has sent to Professor Key. It was a pleasure to see you here the other day.

Very sincerely yours,

Charles G. Ross

Key corresponded with Ross in September, October, December, January, February, and April; however, the documentary record is incomplete, and one cannot tell what information may have been exchanged. The evidence, nevertheless, shows great interest in an “academic” study that would deal with race and politics in the South.

Truman, himself a former Senator with close ties to the Bourbon belt, knew that liberal domestic policies could be held hostage by Southern congressmen. Not necessarily because all were illiberal or anti-New Deal, but because legislation on social and economic issues in an industrial society could not fail to touch the irritant of race. At the end of the war, obvious tension existed between the requisites of a newly industrialized economy and the capacity of political institutions to meet altered demands in a racially mixed, urban, modernizing society (Polenberg 1972; Vatter 1985; Goodwin 1994; Sugrue 1995). Without capitulating on “race,” Truman’s legislative agenda was gridlocked.

V.O. Key, Jr., often has been cited erroneously in support of observations diametrically opposed to his. In an essay with much otherwise fine discussion of the New Deal and Southern politics, Brinkley (1998, 64) argues that “neither the Depression nor the New Deal appeared to have wrought any significant changes in the region’s [South’s] internal political organization or in the nature of its political leadership.” He cites Key (1949, 645) as noting that “only weak forays against the established order” had been made, which Brinkley then observes were “generally countered with ease.” The citation of Key is taken out of context from his chapter titled “Crisis Over the Suffrage: Ferment and Fears.” Key’s point is that the New Deal did stimulate important changes in the South, and these social and economic changes promoted a climate of crisis and fear. Indeed, this climate is a crucial element in Key’s forecast of the decline of postwar liberalism (Odum 1943; Goodwin 1994).

Unlike his predecessor, Truman viewed overt racial discrimination as inconsistent with and antagonistic to liberalism and improvements in the quality of life of all Americans, and he let people know it (Ferrell 1994; McCullough 1992; Hamby 1995). If one is ever to understand the decline of postwar liberalism, more study is required of dislocations wrought by the Depression, changes created by engagement in total war, and the consequent climate of fear or apprehension often associated with race generated in all parts of the country but particularly in the South. [See Sugrue (1995) on emergent racism and antiliberalism in the North.]

The suggestions made in this article may help move the discussion of the decline of postwar liberalism back toward V.O. Key’s analysis and directly into the arena of race relations. Key’s book is continually incorrectly cited as “Southern Politics” while his essential point that the politics of race affect both state and nation is de-emphasized or ignored. With rare exceptions, such as the paper by Katznelson et al. (1993), references to Key generally focus only on his description of politics within one or a group of Southern states and not within Congress or the nation.

After 51 years, someone may have the time and energy to update and expand upon Key's work. This work is unique in its attention to Congress (including its use of roll-call votes) and local constituencies. Following up this work would require a tremendous effort, but could be helpful. Americans face formidable obstacles in promulgating and implementing policies for a just, humane, and racially complex society (Gilens 1996, 593–604; Sears and Jessor 1996, 751–9; Tuch and Hughes 1996, 723–45; Carnoy 1994, 237–42). While the focus of this article is on the immediate postwar years, one must be concerned about the apparent persistence of the race factor, whether transformed or not, in social and economic policy (Virtanen and Huddy 1998). A particularly depressing example of racial prejudice is the 26 percent of respondents to the 1987 General Social Survey who indicated that states should pass laws barring interracial marriages (Kaufman 1996, 92). This, unfortunately, may be the tip of an iceberg.

Shipler (1997, 564–5) argues that Americans live in a country of strangers where race is being confronted on public policy, institutional, and individual levels through a

“curious coexistence of intensive effort and cold neglect.” This phenomenon also may be reflected in scholarship. Continuing efforts to advance more complex explanations for the decline of liberalism are not mere “nuanced views” of its decline (Lieberman 1998, 28 fn.15). Increasingly complex explanations encourage a view that race is not a distinctive contributor to stunted social policy but only one of many such contributors and, perhaps, not even a proximate one (Jones 1998; Quadagno 1994; Carnoy 1994). An explanation lost in a haystack can create invisible men and women. Commenting on the history of social welfare programs from 1933–50 and of African Americans, John Kenneth Galbraith (1981, 42) recalls that other New Dealers and he “remembered the forgotten man but not the truly forgotten. Looking back, I am astonished at how little we were concerned.” A refocusing of research on institutional processes in Congress and between congressmen and their constituencies is likely to provide more insight into the decline of liberalism and hidden racial agenda than further study of roll-call votes or social correlates.

---

## Acknowledgments

---

Diane Daus Williams, Kansas State University, and Stan Viebrock and Suzi Lockett, University of Missouri–Kansas City, rendered valuable research assistance. The authors appreciate assistance given by the staff of the Harry S. Truman Library,

Independence, Missouri, on this project and others. An earlier version of this article was presented at the annual meeting of the Southwest Political Science Association and Southwest Social Science Association, New Orleans, LA, March 26–29, 1997.

---

## References

---

- Adams, Leonard P. 1969. *The Employment Service in Transition, 1933–1968: The Evolution of a Placement Service into a Manpower Agency*. Ithaca, NY: New York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell University.
- Bailey, Stephen K. 1950. *Congress Makes a Law*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Biles, Roger. 1994. *The South and the New Deal*. Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky.
- Borden, Morton, ed. 1961. *America's Ten Greatest Presidents*. Chicago: Rand McNally.
- . 1971. *America's Eleven Greatest Presidents*. Chicago: Rand McNally.
- Brinkley, Alan. 1995. *The End of Reform*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
- . 1998. *Liberalism and Its Discontents*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Carnoy, Martin. 1994. *Faded Dreams: The Politics and Economics of Race in America*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University.
- Clague, Ewan, and Leo Kramer. 1976. *Manpower Policies and Programs: A Review, 1935–75*. Kalamazoo, MI: W.E. Upjohn Institute.
- Clifford, Clark. 1992. *Counsel to the President: A Memoir*. New York: Anchor.
- Corson, John J. 1943. *Manpower for Victory*. New York: Farrar and Rinehart.
- Ferrell, Robert H. 1992. *Harry S. Truman: A Life*. Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press.
- Flash, Edward S., Jr. 1965. *Economic Advice and Presidential Leadership: The Council of Economic Advisors*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Galbraith, John Kenneth. 1981. *A Life In Our Times*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
- Gallup, George H. 1972. *The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1935–1971*. New York: Random House.
- Gilens, Martin. 1996. “Race Coding” and White Opposition to Welfare. *American Political Science Review* 90(3): 593–604.
- Goodwin, Doris Kearns. 1994. *No Ordinary Time: Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt, The Home Front in World War II*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- Haber, William, and Daniel H. Kruger. 1964. *The Role of the United States Employment Service in a Changing Economy*. Kalamazoo, MI: W.E. Upjohn Institute.
- Hamby, Alonzo L. 1995. *Man of the People: A Life of Harry S.*

- Truman. New York: Oxford University Press.
- . 1973. *Beyond the New Deal: Harry S. Truman and American Liberalism*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Harvey, Philip. 1989. *Securing the Right to Employment*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Heard, Alexander. 1984. Introduction to the New Edition. In *Southern Politics in State and Nation*, by V.O. Key, Jr., xxi–xxv. Knoxville, TN: University of Tennessee Press.
- Jaynes, Gerald D. 1990. The Labor Market Status of Black Americans: 1939–1985. *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 4(4): 9–24.
- Jones, Jacqueline. 1998. *American Work: Four Centuries of Black and White Labor*. New York: W.W. Norton.
- Katznelson, Ira, Kim Geiger, and Daniel Kryder. 1993. Limiting Liberalism: The Southern Veto in Congress, 1933–1950. *Political Science Quarterly* 108(2): 283–306.
- Kaufman, Robert L. 1996. Comparing Effects in Dichotomous Logistic Regression. *Social Science Quarterly* 77(1): 90–109.
- Key, V.O., Jr. 1949. *Southern Politics in State and Nation*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
- . 1984. *Southern Politics in State and Nation*. New ed. Knoxville, TN: University of Tennessee Press.
- Kirkendall, Richard S. 1971. Harry Truman. In *America's Eleven Greatest Presidents*, edited by Morton Borden, 255–88. Chicago: Rand-McNally.
- Kuhn, Thomas S. 1970. *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*. 2nd ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Lacy, Leslie A. 1976. *The Soil Soldiers: The Civilian Conservation Corps in the Great Depression*. Radnor, PA: Chilton.
- Lieberman, Robert C. 1998. *Shifting the Color Line: Race and the American Welfare State*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Lorwin, Lewis. 1941. *Youth Work Programs: Problems and Policies*. Washington, DC: American Council on Education and American Youth Commission.
- Mettler, Suzanne. 1998. *Dividing Citizens: Gender and Federalism in New Deal Public Policy*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- McCullough, David M. 1992. *Truman*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- Millett, John D. 1947. *The Process and Organization of Government Planning*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Neustadt, Richard. 1960. *Presidential Power*. New York: Wiley.
- Odum, Harold W. 1943. *Race and Rumors of Race*. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press.
- Polenberg, Richard. 1972. *War and Society: The United States 1941–1945*. Philadelphia, PA: Lippincott.
- Quadagno, Jill. 1994. *The Color of Welfare: How Racism Undermined the War on Poverty*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Ruttenberg, Stanley J., and Jocelyn Gutches. 1970. *The Federal-State Employment Service: A Critique*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Salmond, John A. 1967. *The Civilian Conservation Corps, 1933–1942: A New Deal Case Study*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- . 1983. *A Southern Rebel: the Life and Times of Aubrey Williams, 1890–1965*. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press.
- Sears, David O., and Tom Jessor. 1996. Whites' Racial Policy Attitudes: The Role of White Racism. *Social Science Quarterly* 77(4): 751–9.
- Shipler, David K. 1997. *A Country of Strangers: Blacks and Whites in America*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
- Sitkoff, Harvard. 1978. *A New Deal for Blacks: The Emergence of Civil Rights as a National Issue, the Depression Decade*. New York: Oxford.
- Skocpol, Theda. 1995. *Social Policy in the United States*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Smith, David B. 1999. *Health Care Divided: Race and Healing a Nation*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
- Stein, Herbert. 1990. *The Fiscal Revolution in America*. Washington, DC: AEI Press.
- . 1994. *Presidential Economics*. Washington, DC: AEI Press.
- Sugrue, Thomas J. 1995. Crabgrass-Roots Politics: Race, Rights, and the Reaction against Liberalism in the Urban North, 1940–1964. *Journal of American History* 82(2): 551–78.
- Truman, Harry S. [1956] 1995. *Years of Trial and Hope*. Norwalk, CT: Easton Press.
- . [1953] 1995. *Mr. Citizen*. Norwalk, CT: Easton Press.
- Tuch, Stephen A., and Michael Hughes. 1996. Whites' Racial Policy Attitudes. *Social Science Quarterly* 77(4): 723–45.
- U.S. Congress. 1942. *Reduction of Nonessential Federal Expenditures: Hearings Before the Joint Committee on the Reduction of Nonessential Federal Expenditures, Congress of the United States*. 77th Congress, 1st session.
- U.S. House of Representatives. 1945. *Unemployment Compensation Act of 1945, Hearings Before the Committee on Ways and Means*. 79th Congress, 1st session.
- . 1946. *United States Employment Service, Hearings Before the Committee on Labor*. 79th Congress, 2nd session.
- U.S. Senate. 1945. *Emergency Unemployment Compensation, Hearings Before the Committee on Finance*. 79th Congress, 1st session.
- . 1945. *Full Employment Act of 1945: Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee of Banking and Currency*. 79th Congress, 1st Session.
- Vatter, Harold G. 1985. *The U.S. Economy in World War II*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Virtanen, Simo, and Leonie Huddy. 1998. Old Fashion Racism and New Forms of Racial Prejudice. *Journal of Politics* 60(2): 311–32.
- Weigert, Oscar. 1940. *Administrative Problems of Employment Services in Eight States*. Chicago: Public Administration Service.
- Williams, Arthur R., Karl F. Johnson, and Michael Barrett. 2000. Cutting the Deck: New Deal, Fair Deal, and the Employment Act of 1946. In *Franklin D. Roosevelt and Congress: The New Deal and Its Aftermath*, edited by Thomas P. Wolf, William D. Pederson, and Byron W. Daynes, 100–22. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharp.
- Wolf, Thomas P., William D. Pederson, and Byron W. Daynes, eds. 2000. *Franklin D. Roosevelt and Congress: The New Deal and Its Aftermath*. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharp.