

Moral Education and Development

Marianna Raulo

Introduction: All Education is Moral Education

In this article I shall discuss the role of moral education in development. The concept of development is here understood as it is defined in the UN Declaration on the Right to Development. In this definition the goal of development policies is the constant improvement of well-being of the entire population. The right of every person and people to participate in, contribute to, and enjoy economic, social, cultural, and political development so that all human rights and fundamental freedoms can be fully realized is the means by which to achieve this goal.

The right to education is specifically mentioned among the rights. This is not surprising, since education is perhaps the most influential means to development. But usually this has been understood to mean learning the basic skills, like reading and writing, and professional education. According to R. S. Peters, education implies that something worthwhile is being intentionally transmitted in a morally acceptable manner.¹ In this context we must therefore ask what values are worthwhile to transmit in view of development. I want to argue that despite the diversity of values and the culturally dependent interpretation of well-being, some values are conducive to and deducible from the aforementioned definition of development. These values should be present in all educational practices, not just in moral, value, character, civic, or religious education. I agree with John Dewey in his belief that all education is, and should be, moral education. Restricting it to moral lessons about what different people in different times and places have said about how to conduct ourselves toward others and ourselves and what virtues we should possess has very little or no effect.² But Dewey also believed that such moral lessons can be detrimental: "The habit of identifying moral characteristics with external conformity to authoritative prescriptions may lead us to ignore the ethical value of these intellectual attitudes, but the same habit tends to reduce morals to a dead and machinelike routine. Consequently while such an attitude has moral results, the results are morally undesirable—above all in a democratic society where so much depends upon personal disposition."³

Equality in Education

Equality is a good example of this. If teachers in mathematics, science, and so on do not treat students in an equal manner, how are students to internalize the meaning and significance of equality? One important aspect

of equality is that everyone should have a real opportunity to attend school in spite of economic or other difficulties they happen to have, like being needed at home, which in developing countries affects especially the education of girls. The proportion of girls in schools in developing countries is lower than their proportion in the school-aged group, and this phenomenon is even more pronounced in higher education. The reasons for this are either financial or cultural. In the first case, girls are used as earners for the family; in the second, their education is seen as less valuable because their role is seen as future housewives, and therefore helping at home is more useful to them and their family. This attitude to education reflects the wrong idea that education is necessary and valuable only for learning an occupation or fulfilling one's predetermined role in society. It ignores the fact that education is necessary for all, because everyone has a right to become a citizen who can actively contribute to his or her own fate and development and that of his or her country.

There are various interpretations of what equality means and where it is needed. For instance, the minimum requirement of equality before the law is necessary but not sufficient and not without complications. In addition to what is written on paper, citizens need the means to use their rights: they need sufficient knowledge, economic resources, and freedom from social pressure as well as judges who take equality seriously. This already suggests that equality is not attainable without positive action and rights.

The often-mentioned conflict between freedom and equality is clearly seen as an inappropriate way to discuss these values in the context of developing countries. For libertarians equality means equality of freedom, and they believe that people have a right not to be interfered with in respect to their freedom. But clearly this promise of mere noninterference can lead to something we find unjust.

For Amartya Sen freedom means real opportunity to accomplish what one values. So equal freedom is real equal opportunity and, according to Sen, this is not simply a question of equal resources but rather a question of capabilities, since there can be significant variations in the conversion of resources and primary goods into freedoms. The complicating factors can be poor metabolic state due to malnutrition, climatic environment, exposure to parasitic diseases, complex social issues that can lead to apathy and feelings of surrender, gender, and so on.⁴

When we discuss equality and want to act equally in schools, the above-mentioned factors must be taken into consideration. There is, however, a hint of paternalism in Sen's thinking. He points out that people should be made to want what they have real reason to want even if they do not express unhappiness. I do not mean that people should be left alone if they seem content to be undernourished, insufficiently clothed and sheltered, and so on, but we must respect people's choices as far as possible.

Equality of Groups

Equality among groups is another important point, since group identity seems to have greater value for people in developing countries than it has in

Western societies. Discrimination based on inequality among groups may therefore be especially detrimental to one's personal development. Arbitrarily drawn national boundaries have, especially in Africa, led to states inhabited by traditionally inimical tribes with strong group identities. The new developing states have understandably a great need for national unity and have therefore tried to suppress or ignore these identities. But this is only leading to frustration, unrest, and wars.

One important aspect of group identity is the language. It has both its symbolic and practical side. Language is not just a neutral instrument of communication. It functions as one of the primary means for creating personal and group identity. It is also the means of creating power relationships.⁵ If one does not get education in one's own language, it means that one's group is not respected as much as the dominant group. If education is given in, for example, French or English, it means no single language of one's state is fit for today's world and that both are seen as inferior. It is understandable that it is not possible to satisfy the needs of the members of every linguistic group, but with regional arrangements it is perhaps possible to reach a solution acceptable to all.

The practical point of linguistic inequality is that if one cannot use one's own language in trials, government services, and so on, there is a danger of misunderstanding. The bilingualism this induces can also lead to one's having no proper language at all and subsequently no real identity.⁶

Equality is the cornerstone of democracy, and if a country is going to develop politically, its young citizens should learn what it means to be treated and to treat others equally. The schooling of professionals, doctors, lawyers, and teachers is important, but if they have not assumed the fundamental value of equality, the fruits of development do lead, instead of to the well-being of all, to corruption and unjustifiably unequal distribution of material and nonmaterial goods.

History and Literature as Part of Moral Education

The value of history and literature in giving children a view of their own culture and the world in general is considerable. Both supply excellent material for moral discussion in all its complexity. William Galston and Robert K. Fullinwider, however, disagree with this view. For Galston the purpose of civic education, which includes teaching of history, "is not the pursuit and acquisition of truth but, the formation of individuals who can effectively conduct their lives within, and support, their political community."⁷ Galston acknowledges that this is hardly consistent with truth-seeking activities but does not see it in any way morally damaging. In his view "only few individuals will come to embrace the core commitments of liberal society through process of rational inquiry. If children are to be brought to accept these commitments as valid and binding, the method must be a pedagogy that is far more rhetorical than rational."⁸

In the same vein Galston proposes that the teaching of American history needs "a pantheon of heroes" to legitimize central institutions and that "revisionist" accounts of history are not to be recommended.⁹ Fullinwider,

too, defends teaching of “patriotic history” by claiming that students need a “usable past,” a past that “encourages the development of desirable civic attitudes and commitments,” “a past in which they can find values and projects to take as their own legacies.”¹⁰

Of these two Galston offers a view of education that is clearly the more indoctrinative. He has respect neither for the rationality of children nor its desirability in them. How on earth can such children become citizens who actively contribute to the development of their country if they are not encouraged to think for themselves?

Another problem with Galston’s view concerns the equality of groups. If history is presented as a noble picture of the past without any awkward facts, it means, in addition, that loyalty is based on false premises because the sufferings and contributions of those whose history is not told are annihilated. This may damage their self-identity in a serious way.

Fullinwider, contrary to Galston, sees these moral dangers looming somewhere. But according to him, historians have different roles, and the historian-teacher, unlike the historian-scholar, has an end and cannot be disinterested in teaching history. That means that he can hold something back and present topics like the Holocaust or Hiroshima to students in a way that “fortifies their resolve and encourages their industry—not sickens and unnerves them.”¹¹ I acknowledge that the history teacher has an interest, but among other more immediate interests, it is to support the moral development of the students by increasing their ability to think rationally and to feel sympathy and care toward others. This presupposes history that includes histories of all groups. And some sickening feelings might be in order to remind us of the horrible accomplishments of man.

Fullinwider rightly says that giving full equality in practice is not possible nor to be hoped for,¹² but I am convinced that there are events in the history of every country—including my own—that could be useful for students to know and reflect on but that are simply forgotten or their interpretation is heavily biased. The history of developing countries is crucial for the formation of personal identity among residents of those countries. Therefore history should include the history of all.

Literature and other cultural studies are also valuable in moral education. On one hand the selection of works for educational purposes and on the other hand the way they are discussed and used are crucial. This means that esthetic value cannot be the sole criterion for selection of works to be taught and that the presentation of works of members of different ethnic and religious groups is commendable. In addition to the equality principle for groups, this admits various viewpoints to the discussion of the works and is also in that sense useful for the discussion of moral or for that matter other points of the works.

The Value of Human Life and the Inviolability of Persons

The value of human life and the inviolability of personal integrity are also vital. Here we often hear that Western people do not understand the traditions of other cultures, and there is a cry for cultural rights and cultural

interpretation of existing rights. Female circumcision, wife beating, child prostitution, and corporal punishment are often discussed. Nevertheless, none of these can be tolerated on the basis of nonviolability of the person and the value of human dignity, and they cannot belong to the sphere of cultural or human rights. Consent is not the answer here, because children cannot give their consent to something they cannot understand, and women's attitudes, unless they are masochists, may be based on false beliefs and fear of social sanctions. Moral education should seek to eradicate the sources of these misunderstandings for both boys and girls.

The Role of Critical Thinking, Rationality, and Knowledge

Critical thinking, rationality, and knowledge are also vital for development. A person who does not know the values of his own society has no material for rational deliberation. But it is not enough to socialize young people, because development usually means that some of the inherited values and ways of thinking might not be worth valuing. If development is the aim, one cannot do without critical thinking. Teaching critical thinking is the opposite of what Paolo Freire called "banking education," by which he meant that something the teacher deposits in the student comes out exactly the same and no development has taken place. For him the principles of banking education, for example, that "teachers are subjects of the learning process, while students are mere objects," reflect the larger oppressive society. Students of such education are prevented from creating the world. They are being manipulated.¹³ Freire's thoughts are based on experience in Latin America, but his warning is also relevant in other developing countries where there is a danger that the elite uses education for its own purposes and not for the empowerment of all citizens. But even if this were not the case, indoctrination shouldn't be the aim of education. Moral situations are so multifold that students have to learn to think for themselves.

Value rationality means that one has reasons for valuing something. The fact that something has always been so is not a good enough reason for it to continue to be so: for example, hard child labor or the killing of baby girls. Tradition is valuable only insofar as it produces well-being for all its followers. Cultures do change, and the change must be assessed by all. Children must learn moral reasoning not only because they need to reach moral conclusions but also because then they learn to defend and justify their views to others so that all the participants can learn from the dialogue.

To become members of a working society who can meaningfully contribute to its development, children need knowledge. They need to learn about the fundamental freedoms and human rights that their country should guarantee them, and they should learn to recognize their own duties. Knowledge about the environment, other ways of thinking, and causal relationships in the world is also part of moral education because it helps students to evaluate the consequences of their actions.

Tolerance and Moral Courage

To pursue development and the values conducing to it can demand moral courage. It is not an easy virtue to acquire, but schools should encourage students to speak their minds even on difficult and controversial questions. This demands openness to differing opinions and tolerance, which is another disputed liberal virtue. It has its roots in John Locke's demand for religious toleration. The dispute between different conceptions of toleration centers on the interpretations of Rawls's political liberalism and Millian liberalism. The key point has been the value of autonomy and individualism. In Rawls's view liberalism, understood as a comprehensive doctrine that values individualism and autonomy both in public and in private spheres, becomes "but another sectarian doctrine."¹⁴ In his political liberalism autonomy is valued only in the public sphere. On the other hand Mill's liberalism is based on an ideal of rational reflection that applies to human action in general, not just in the public sphere.

The impossibility of political liberalism is, however, evident, because those who reject autonomy in their private lives, such as fundamentalists, are not likely accept it in public life either. They are likely to view the civil liberties of the members of their group as harmful, as apostasy or proselytization, but in practice they have no way of arguing their position in public, because religion belongs to the private sphere.¹⁵

As I understand toleration, it does not merely mean noninterference with conduct I disapprove of. By itself, this could lead to moral indifference. Everything should not be tolerated. There is no reason to believe that all values, traditions, and so on are ethically equally justifiable. If this is so, we must know when to tolerate and when not. One way of defining learning to be tolerant is to say that it is learning to disapprove of fewer things. This learning implies that we have to widen our knowledge of other people and the basis of their views. In conflict situations, in determining whether to tolerate something or not, we have to recognize that values may have a ranking order and that on the basis of that ranking, we are to try to maximize moral good and minimize moral evil.¹⁶ Tolerance so defined is not indifference.

Autonomy: The Disputed Value

Freedom and autonomy have been much discussed in connection with the belief that the citizens of non-Western countries do not value individual autonomy, since the good of the group and its importance to one's self-identity are seen as vital. I am not one to deny this empirical fact, but the other side of the coin is that many members of these cultures do not really know what they are rejecting when they reject autonomy.

According to Joel Feinberg one way of defining autonomy is to see it as a capacity to govern oneself, which, as he rightly says, is a matter of degree and is determined by the ability to make rational choices.¹⁷ In moral education we seek to develop these capacities. Without autonomy we cannot take full responsibility for our actions because we are not actually governed by

ourselves. From the point of view of development it is necessary that children have at least the opportunity to learn to make choices for themselves. This does not mean that they must reject the religion and customs of their parents. It may even strengthen their allegiance to these values when they raise their level of self-esteem, responsibility, and sense of personal dignity. The social dimension of person means also for us Westerners that we are never wholly autonomous in the sense that we make our choices without concern for our membership in a community. But if there is to be, for example, any political development, we need citizens who have at least some degree of personal autonomy. Democracy based on nonautonomous citizenship is not real democracy and cannot fulfill the expectations connected with it.

Friendship is Valuable, but . . .

The worth of friendship and personal relationships should be taken into account when talking about values. Already Aristotle realized this and included friendship among the necessities of a good life.¹⁸ I believe that this has been better recognized in developing countries than in the individualistic Western societies. But therein also lies a moral danger of false loyalty. Friendship, kinship, and group loyalty should not lead to favoritism and corruption. Equal concern for everyone's vital interests should come first.

Honesty

Honesty and truthfulness are also values that are not dependent on cultural differences. The life of every society would be chaos if people lied and forfeited their promises at will, because there could be neither trust nor friendship. Even corruption, which in itself is a condemnable practice, presupposes honesty in a sense.

Kant thought that the foundation and very essence of forming a child's character is truthfulness.¹⁹ Although Kant's famous example of the liar shows that honesty and truthfulness are not overriding values, they are still high in the hierarchy. I believe that at the heart of honesty is the respect for other persons and on the other hand the fact that we are, as MacIntyre says, dependent on them.²⁰

Environmental Values: A Dilemma for Developing Countries

The last value I want to stress here is the value of environment. It poses a difficult dilemma for development because the short- and long-term effects of environmental solutions are often in conflict. We have to recognize our duties to the future generations even though they cannot be individuated or counted. (Many of those contemporary individuals to whom we have duties are not individuated either.)²¹ We have every reason to believe that they are going to need clean air and water, land for cultivation, and so on; they might even enjoy wilderness. It is often argued that it is hypocritical for Westerners to warn the developing countries about pollution as Western countries

themselves encourage a lifestyle that promotes it. I cannot but agree that the least the Western countries can do is not to dump their polluting products and techniques in developing countries. On the other hand they should not underestimate the ways indigenous peoples have of cultivating the land, and so on, as these peoples have learned to earn their living by respecting nature. In moral education it is therefore important to stress the need for information and rational dialogue in these matters in view of the vital interests of current generations and those of the future ones.

The Eternal Question: Reason or Emotion?

In moral theories and subsequently in discussions about moral education there has been a lot of dispute about the role of reason and emotion in morality. Sympathy and care on one hand and reason and justice on the other have been seen as opposites, the most obvious examples being Kant and Hume. According to Kant, human beings become legislators of their own laws through the exercise of reason alone. It is the task of moral education to ensure "that the child should accustom himself to act in accordance with 'maxims' and not from certain ever-changing springs of action,"²² where the ever-changing springs of action are the volatile emotions of man. Hume, on the contrary, was of the opinion that "reason alone can never be a motive to any action of the will, and secondly, that it can never oppose passion in the direction of the will."²³ Hume, however, qualified his statement by saying that reason is able to oppose passion by forming a calm, general view that corrects the instant feelings of passion because of the relation of the person in question to us.²⁴

The discussion around Lawrence Kohlberg's cognitive developmental theory and its adaptation to moral education is a further implication of this eternal question. Kohlberg is Kantian and accordingly emphasizes moral reasoning. He claims that the moral development of man has six consecutive and invariant stages. His statement that the average male reaches stage 4 and the average female only stage 3 met with furious opposition, first from Carol Gilligan and later from many others. Because Kohlberg's initial empirical work was based on male respondents, Gilligan claimed that his results were biased, and that results based on her own studies on women's response to questions concerning abortion yielded a completely different way of seeing moral development and morals, namely, as a question of feelings and the quality of life instead of as a question of justice.²⁵

This debate raises many questions. To begin with, Kohlberg's results are based on hypothetical moral dilemmas presented in a laboratory or classroom, Gilligan's on a very personal question in a pressing situation, which means that they are not comparable. Another problem is: Why should Kantianism be the ultimate aim of moral learning? Why not utilitarianism or virtue ethics? Is it, on the whole, desirable that children learn only one way to think about morals?

Also Kohlberg's invariant stages have been refuted, along with the whole idea that morality is developmental.²⁶ What I doubt especially is making cognitive development the sole yardstick of morality. I find it very

hard to believe that “right” answers to hypothetical questions alone can be a reliable test for someone’s acting morally in a real situation. Some amount of Humean sympathy is usually needed, and sympathy, as Hume himself maintains, is not an essentially feminine feeling but universal. Already very young children, regardless of their gender, have sympathetic feelings toward others and show this in their behavior.²⁷ These feelings should be encouraged together with teaching moral reasoning.

Many think, as I do, that reason and emotions are intertwined. Virtue theorists have realized that basic ethical characteristics are not purely cognitive powers.²⁸ Alasdair MacIntyre has introduced a virtue called “just generosity” that includes justice along with generosity and beneficence.²⁹ Also, Israel Scheffler and R. S. Peters as philosophers of education have explored the interrelationship of emotion and rationality in morality. According to Peters, if ability to reason is to be effectively exercised, it must be supported by what he calls rational passions.³⁰ Morality will be protected if certain “underlying principles like benevolence, respect for persons and the sense of justice become operative,” and this for Peters represents the intersection of reason and feeling.³¹ Scheffler has made a more detailed account of emotions in the service of reason. In my opinion his “perceptive feelings,” which are emotional filters through which we view the world, interpret objects in the world, and evaluate their critical features,³² are those to be cultivated in moral education. My question is: Why do we try to reach justice if we have no sympathy for others, and how do we treat others with care if we do not know what is meant by justice? So in moral education both justice and sympathy should be developed. Moral solutions and action are not guaranteed by logical formulas, rigid rules, and principles dictated by reason alone, but without them, chaos and undoubtedly injustice will reign. The role of emotions and imagination is to motivate us and make us see the richness of the context in which we evaluate and act. Moral sensitivity embodies both reason and feeling. In a changing world with new innovations and new ways of life it is perhaps the most important capacity to be developed. The finding of morally relevant features in life is important for development. The issues do not appear with a label saying “This is a moral question.” The capacity to recognize questions of justice, equality, care, and the like and to separate them from mere questions of taste, which have no serious moral importance, makes us capable of concentrating on the right issues. (Maybe this is what Scheffler aimed at with his filters?) This capacity is only acquired by discussion and practice.

The ability to do the right thing also requires moral imagination, which means evaluating the different possibilities from the perspective of a good life.³³ It may be impossible to understand fully what it means to be in another person’s shoes, but at least it is worth trying if we wish to develop a more just society for all. Moral imagination helps us to understand the complexity of moral life and to see others, strange as they may seem, as “fellow sufferers,” as Richard Rorty put it.

The Importance of Giving Reasons

The definition of education demands that it be conducted in a morally acceptable manner. This qualification is meant to exclude the indoctrination of children. In practice indoctrination means that the teacher or the parent presents no alternatives but his own and expects the child to treat it as the only truth. The child is to think as I or we without questioning. This leads to the closing of the child's mind and does not respect his or her rationality. It also violates Kant's principle of treating every individual never merely as means but always at the same time as an end.³⁴ Indoctrinators treat their audiences as means.

With small children it is often necessary simply to give basic moral rules, but this must be seen as a temporary solution, and as soon as possible reasons should be given. Otherwise children will have no way of deciding and reflecting on how to evaluate new situations and how to take into consideration all morally relevant factors.

The Three Parties: Child, Parents, State

But who should decide what the content and method of education is and whose interests it should serve? There are three parties involved: the child, the family or other caretaker, and the state. The parents have an interest in transmitting their values to their offspring, because they believe their values are the best, and therefore are in the best interest of the child, too. It is true that children need a starting point from which to form their moral outlook, and the home is the natural place for it. But if moral education is seen solely as a responsibility of the parents, there is no guarantee that the children will not be indoctrinated, and the result will be an intolerant view of other viewpoints and an unreflective view of their own. This will further neither democracy nor other development.

Article 26 in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights gives parents a prior right to choose the kind of education that shall be given to their children. I suggest that this right is to be interpreted indirectly, that is, its purpose is to protect the interest of the child, not the interest of the parents. Otherwise it would mean that the parents own their children and can do with them almost whatever they want in this respect. This is the libertarian view.³⁵ In developing countries the care and love provided for children is often more largely dispersed in a network of kin, but the crucial question remains the same. The child's need to grow into a person who is at least to some degree autonomous, with the ability to contribute to his or her own fate and that of his or her country, is the primary interest to be protected.

If, on the other hand, moral education is based on the interest of the state, as Plato thought, there are other dangers. The state could base its education on perpetuating its own system without thinking of the children's rationality and autonomy. Blind obedience to existing institutions could be the only target. This kind of reasoning was earlier seen as William Galston's idea of moral education.

Because both ways of thinking prevent children from having what Joel Feinberg defined “an open future,”³⁶ we have to find a compromise, and I believe it is to be found in common moral education in schools, based on the values discussed above. I am not saying that moral education in schools is going to change the world, but it is certainly part of the effort to improve the well-being of entire populations, also in developing countries. Education and family life are not the only sources for a moral outlook. Media, peer groups, politicians, and their activities as well as experiences in life are important, too. In this sense we all are moral educators.

Notes

- ¹ R. S. Peters, *Ethics and Education* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1966), p. 25.
- ² John Dewey, “Education and Morals,” in William Frankena (ed.), *Philosophy of Education* (New York: McMillan, 1965), p. 71.
- ³ *Ibid.*, p. 73.
- ⁴ Amartya Sen, *Inequality Reexamined* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992), pp. 31, 33.
- ⁵ David F. Marshall and Roseann D. Gonzalez, “Why We Should Be Concerned about Language Rights: Language Rights as Human Rights from an Ecological Perspective,” in *Language and the State: The Law and Politics of Identity* (Québec: Éditions Yvon Blais, 1991), p. 290.
- ⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 291.
- ⁷ William Galston, *Liberal Purposes: Goods, Virtues, and Diversity in the Liberal State* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 242–3.
- ⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 243–4.
- ⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 244.
- ¹⁰ Robert K. Fullinwider, “Patriotic History,” in Robert K. Fullinwider (ed.), *Public Education in a Multicultural Society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 205–6, 222.
- ¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 209.
- ¹² *Ibid.*, p. 219.
- ¹³ Paolo Freire, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, trans. Myra Bergman Ramos (New York: Continuum, 1970, 1993), pp. 52, 54.
- ¹⁴ John Rawls, “Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical,” *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 14 (1985), pp. 245–6.
- ¹⁵ Will Kymlicka, “Two Models of Pluralism and Tolerance,” *Analyse & Kritik* 13 (1992), p. 45.
- ¹⁶ George David Miller and Conrad P. Pritscher, *On Education and Values* (Amsterdam and Atlanta: Rodopi, 1995), p. 83.
- ¹⁷ Joel Feinberg, *Harm to Self* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 28.
- ¹⁸ Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, bk. VIII.
- ¹⁹ Immanuel Kant, *Kant on Education*, trans. Annette Churton (Bristol, England: Thoemmes Press, 1992), p. 90.
- ²⁰ Alasdair MacIntyre, *Dependent Rational Animals* (London: Duckworth, 1999), p. 151.
- ²¹ Onora O’Neill, *Towards Justice and Virtue* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 115.
- ²² Kant, *Kant on Education*, p. 83.
- ²³ David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, ed. Ernest C. Mossner (London: Penguin Books, 1985; 1739 and 1740), pp. 460–1.
- ²⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 631–4.
- ²⁵ Carol Gilligan, *In a Different Voice* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982).
- ²⁶ Nel Noddings, *Philosophy of Education* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1998), p. 154.

- ²⁷ M. L. Hoffman, "Moral Development," in P. A. Mussen (ed.), *Carmichael's Manual of Child Psychology*, vol. 2 (New York: Wiley, 1970); William Damon, *The Moral Child* (New York: Free Press, 1988), chap. 2.
- ²⁸ Bernard Williams, "The Primacy of Dispositions," in G. Haydon (ed.), *Education and Values: The Richard Peters Lectures* (London: University of London Institute of Education, 1987), p. 65.
- ²⁹ MacIntyre, *Dependent Rational Animals*, p. 121.
- ³⁰ R. S. Peters, *Moral Development and Moral Education* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1981), p. 143.
- ³¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 68–82.
- ³² Israel Scheffler, *In Praise of the Cognitive Emotions and Other Essays in the Philosophy of Education* (New York: Routledge, 1991), p. 6.
- ³³ John Kekes, *Moral Wisdom and Good Lives* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1995), p. 101.
- ³⁴ Immanuel Kant, *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* (London: Hutchinson, 1949), p. 95.
- ³⁵ L. Lomasky, *Persons, Rights, and the Moral Community* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), pp. 165–87.
- ³⁶ J. Feinberg, "The Child's Right to an Open Future," in J. Feinberg, *Freedom and Fulfillment: Philosophical Essays* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992).