

## **From plan to network: Urban elites and the post-communist organisational state in Russia**

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**Abstract.** This article uses the results from formal network analysis to test hypotheses about the character of Russia's post-communist transition, taking decision-making elites at the sub-national level as the unit of analysis. From the transition literature, the hypothesis generated is that city politics retains elements of its pre-democratic structure; from the urban regime theory, the hypothesis generated is that the elites' structure will show elements of convergence to a Western type, with the prominence of actors from the private sector. The data is drawn from a survey of elites in one city, Novosibirsk, undertaken in 1997. The results show that the membership and structure of the network has some similar characteristics to a Western city. Rather than being purely dominated by bureaucratic elites, the private sector plays a role. The private sector actors are grouped with the public sector actors, though they are not, however, equal partners to the networks as its members do not appear among the most networked in the city. We conclude that the legacy of the past may not be as much a constraint as the transition literature supposes.

Are post-communist ruling elites homogenous or fragmented into competing groups? Do post-communist states exhibit specific patterns of elite behaviour? To provide answers to these questions our study concentrates on the configuration of local elite networks and how they operate in Russia. There are two main reasons why Russia is one of the most important cases for the study of the post-communist state. First, it was the organisational foundation for the twentieth-century communist regime type and, second, this regime type had its longest duration in Russia (1917–1991). If post-communist transition in Russia generated a mixed and divided elite, this would be a significant indication that the country was progressing in its transition and evolving the governance typical of Western cities at the end of the twentieth century given the base line of the elite structure of the old system. Does the evidence from Russia indicate that its urban elites are converging to Western trends or are they still markedly different? Such questions are important for both understanding the politics of transition, which concentrates on the uniqueness of the democratisation experience, and for research into the political organisation of urban politics, which examines comparable elite responses to economic competition. To investigate these questions and to adjudicate between the particu-

larist and convergence arguments, we examined the internal structure of the elite network in Novosibirsk, one of Russia's most important regional cities.

We believe that a local case study reveals important features about the nature of transition that have been hidden by national studies. This is because the dominant perspective for understanding the post-communist state is derived from comparative studies of democratic transition that focus on the nation-state level and emphasises how national actors, national elite pacts, national economic prosperity and the role of state-level institutional engineering sustain democratisation (Lipset 1960; Rustow 1970; O'Donnell et al. 1986; Higley & Burton 1989; Di Palma 1990; Przeworski 1992). Such understandings of transition are based on two fundamentally anachronistic assumptions. First, they assume an end goal of a pluralist democracy whilst setting quasi-monist preconditions of elite 'ideocratic unity' or societal 'national unity' for its realisation. Second, they assume that transitions are exclusively 'state'- or 'national'-level processes.

The state-centred approach is a one-dimensional unit of analysis for understanding the process of transition since it overlooks how democratisation and the market economy are embedded at the local level. As a general principle, it is more plausible to assume that it is by the localisation of transition that democratising regime change is made sustainable. Consequently, our analysis focuses on the *locale* in transition and how elite networks of decision making are affected by and shape processes of change. Before we discuss our results we examine the importance of networks in the study of urban politics, the contribution of sociometric analysis to the study of networks and the weak state of research on the study of urban networks in post-communist transition states.

## Networks in political science

While researchers study economic forces and institutions to explain how cities are governed, they cannot ignore the influential corpus of individuals – the ruling elite – that have extensive control over the urban space. This elite is composed of people who have key positions in powerful organisations, such as private firms, business associations, local/regional governments and administrations and central/state government agencies. Even though the elite often can be fragmented and divided, it usually acts as a single organism, sharing values and framing public policies. Many of the most important works on urban elites and networks have been case studies of cities in the USA. With the exception of a brief flowering of a pluralist school in the 1960s influenced by Dahl's case study of *Who Governs?* in New Haven (Dahl 1961), studies of urban elites have been characterised by much continuity of thinking in the

image and ascription of power to networks of urban elites. Since Hunter's city case studies of the early 1950s the idea that urban settings are governed by concentrated elites has been widely accepted (Hunter 1953). Hunter's approach was developed further by the regime and growth machine case studies of the 1980s and 1990s (Stone 1989). Although scholars contest the extent to which urban elites are concentrated or fragmented and have interests and autonomy, they agree that they are central to governance and policy making in the city.

For political scientists the most generally accepted definition of the elite is of a group of individuals exercising power derived from the resources and legitimacy of the organisations they command. Studies generally focus on the membership of the elite by examining its recruitment and origins, paying particular attention to education, kinship and socioeconomic factors. This approach reflects a traditional Weberian account of political behaviour, which assumes that wealth and social status automatically transmit into political power. What is often neglected from Weber's *Politik als Beruf* (c.1935), however, is his recognition that in practice the ideal that ruling elites should 'live exclusively for politics but not by politics' becomes distorted by their pursuit of private interests. Consequently, the complex relations or networks between elite members, and the extreme difficulty of separating the public and private spheres, taint the Weberian ideal of a politically ethical elite. Personal and organisational networks are the key mechanisms by which political power is routinely channelled, though the resources, leadership skills and other attributes of elite members may also generate political outcomes.

These patterns of relationships partly reflect the resources of the members of the network, but the structure and values of the network often also affect how power is exercised. Moreover, studies have demonstrated that elite members generally provide a functional effectiveness in governing or 'civic capacity' where they form relationships of power, trust and friendship with each other (Putnam 1993). The ties and bonds – the elite networks – facilitate collective action for the elite and their constituencies, whether they are businesses, employees, party machines and even the citizens themselves. This conclusion is at odds with the standard elitist assumption that personal networks cement the power of the elite, facilitate the exchange of often illegitimate public resources and exclude the less powerful. While political leaders can govern alone or in party hierarchies, more usually the elite members, drawn from their different organisations, cooperate over the governance of their city. They seek to routinise exchanges with each other to permit an orderly transaction of their business broadly defined. Time and experience builds trust within networks. Networks are thus an essential building block to the practice of governance, and are a form of social capital at the decision-making level.

Narrowly political-institutional descriptions and socioeconomic accounts of transition and the role of elites, while they summarise important facets of power relations, overlook the complex networks of the relations involved, especially at the local level.

### **Urban elites in post-communist transition**

The starting point for this study is whether there is continuity between Soviet and post-Soviet elites post 1989 and, if so, what is its nature. We do not assume that the baseline for change is a completely unified Soviet era elite. The theoretical and empirical elite studies of Soviet politics were strongly influenced by the power elite approach. Saliency was given to the bureaucratic institutional setting, characterised by the saturation of power positions in society by the Communist Party hierarchy: the *nomenklatura* elite. Conflicts within the elite, sociological determinants of membership (age, qualifications, gender, ethnicity), elite circulation, recruitment, mobility and stratification were all examined from within the *nomenklatura* paradigm. This approach was expressed in its most monochromatic doctrinaire form by the totalitarian school, which took the overt ideological conformity of the Soviet elite and its self-recruitment as axiomatic, and suggested that the *nomenklatura* was an omnipotent unitary elite organised around positional power and patronage within a monolithic bureaucratic structure (Djilas 1957). Later studies attempted to disentangle this monolithic structure by focusing on its composite layers of interlocking, informal patron-client networks and cohorts (Lane 1988; Willerton 1992). The examination of structural interests and idiosyncratic factors in personal followings also underpinned the new school of thought of the 1970s that applied pluralist analysis to the Soviet context. It was suggested that interest groups and modes of 'institutional pluralism' or 'bureaucratic pluralism' operated (Skilling & Griffiths 1971; Hough 1976). Pluralist theory also underpinned case studies of the recruitment and operation of elites in some of the USSR's Union Republics (Hodnett 1978; Urban 1989), as well as of regional and local elites more generally (Moses 1974; Hill 1977; Miller 1983; Bunce 1984; Bahry 1987). Consequently, while Soviet elites operated within the overall integrated structure of the monopoly of power of the Communist Party, there is strong evidence of bureaucratic competition and elite rivalries, both vertically and horizontally, within this system.

The literature on post-communist transition in Russia focuses, both critically and otherwise, on the persistence of the Soviet *apparatchik* that suggests the current form of governance draws as much on the old system as it has been shaped by Western capitalism. There are three vigorously argued views on the

post-communist elite in Russia, the first two of which are based on research that is focused on national elites and their sociobiographical data. First, an *adaptation* thesis holds that the elite is bifurcated into pre- and post-communist elements and either rigidly segmented into political, economic and security elites (Khrystanovskaya & White 1996) or 'interlocked' (Hughes 1997). Second, a *competition* thesis argues that the post-communist national elite in Russia is highly fragmented in conditions where there has been only a minimum of re-circulation of the communist era elite into the new elite (Lane & Ross 1999). Third, a *generational turnover* thesis argues that generational cohort rather than the pre-/post-communist elite cleavage may best explain elite conflicts in post-communist Russia (Hughes & John 2001). If post-communist local elites are divided in the ways indicated we would expect conflicts between the new and old members of the elite over the retention of pre-communist values at the top echelons of power and that these conflicts would be compounded by age differences.

The question of how the elite functions and interacts is crucial in the transition from communism. At both the national and the sub-national levels, there is much evidence to suggest that a significant element of the communist era governing elite in Russia has survived the change of regime. More of a remnant than a residue, this old elite has adapted to the transition and has been transformed in its role and function, in particular by its response to the breakdown of the Soviet system, the problems of dealing with foreign direct investment and the chaotic transfer of ownership of state enterprises and other assets to the members of elite itself. Lane and Ross call this group the 'acquisition class'. It is widely recognised that personal, so-called '*blatnoi*', networks inherited from the communist era, that exist within and span institutions, have been essential to decision making during the Russian transition (Ledeneva 1998). Whether this has contributed to or has been a result of the endemic weakness of formal political institutional structures – most importantly political parties – is an interesting question, but it is outside the remit of the present study.

The continuity or change of the membership of the elite does not say very much about how both groups of new and old actors operate and interact. Do they act as coherent blocks or is there a fragmentation of relationships across and between these groups? Are relationships among the whole elite diverse or are certain members of the elite clustered? At the more individual actor level, who are the people at the centre of networks? Who mediates between the groups? The answer to these questions lies in understanding the role of elite networks. Are they integrated between new and old elites, and between the public and private sectors, or does the bureaucratic echelon govern alone with minimal contact with new actors? By probing these dynamic relationships we can test the extent to which the old elite is embedded in contemporary

post-communist governance and map out the type of governing system that is emerging. Our research investigates post-communist elite networks much more rigorously than previous studies by employing the techniques of formal network analysis.

### **Network analysis**

Network analysis is primarily the purview of sociologists, mathematicians and anthropologists (Scott 1991; Wasserman & Galaskiewicz 1994; Wasserman & Faust 1994; Degenne & Forsé 1999). The mapping of the structure of the relationships is both a subject of its own and it has helped social scientists test hypotheses. Recently, sociologists and political scientists have applied formal analysis to the study of policy networks (Laumann & Knoke 1987; Heinz et al. 1990; Knoke et al. 1996; König 1998). Network analysis provides a rigorous method to map the networks of relationships that commonly appear in policy sectors in a manner that complements and extends case study and qualitative work. More generally, sociologists, who have most commonly applied network analysis, share with political scientists an interest in power, elites and the exchange of resources (Cook & Emerson 1978; Cook et al. 1983).

The central insight of this growing area of research is that the research methods and theoretical insights of network analysis can illuminate some of the central problems of political science even though there are differences between the contexts faced by sociologists and political scientists. In particular, sociometric analysis can map the structure of a governing elite, find out which groups and individuals occupy prominent positions and locate the main patterns of exchange of information and resources. Although the quantification of networks loses some of the rich contextual details about networking and trust, the precision of the technique facilitates the comparison of networks and allows the researcher to ponder why networks take a particular shape at a certain place and point in time. While network analysis does not come with a theory attached, it allows researchers to test their own (Scott 1999). Political scientists can use the many social network tools to indicate political relationships – such as the use of cliques – to look at sub-groups of relationships. This article concentrates on two main measures to appraise relationships among governing elites in one major Russian city: Novosibirsk.

#### *Network centrality*

We examine centrality as a way of describing some of the relationships within the network. Centrality measures the extent to which an actor is placed at an

important point within a network, such as at the centre of the ‘star’ in a simple sociogram. A star exists where the central actor has contacts from other members of the network. Centrality is interesting for political relationships because one can plausibly deduce what kind of policy network it is by the extent to which bureaucratic, political, private sector and other actors occupy the central points. The assumption of the theory is that those persons with high centrality scores in networks play important mediating roles. They are the gatekeepers through whom ideas and decisions to act collectively must pass, particularly when the individuals are in different organisations. Because of these structural properties, actors who are at high central points have certain advantages, such as access to more information and higher status that is translated into more power.

There are many measures of network centrality (Freeman 1979). This article examines two. The first – Freeman’s degree centrality – is a score derived from counting the number of adjacent links between one actor and others. The measure has limitations because it does not capture the system properties of a network. The researcher only knows about the direct connections to and from each actor rather than how an actor relates to the rest of the network. Nevertheless, the score is a useful starting point. It is also essential for valued data that we use to measure the networks in Russia, whereas other centrality measures such as ‘closeness’ and ‘betweenness’ only use dichotomised data. To ensure there is comparability of scores between the networks in Table 1 below we employ normalised degree centrality, which is the degree centrality divided by the maximum possible score expressed as a percentage. The second centrality score is the Bonacich measure of centrality (Bonacich 1987). This is the actor’s summed dichotomous connections to others in the network weighted by the centrality of the others. This measure captures the idea that it is not just centrality on its own that is important but also the relationships between central points, a global or network-wide concept. It is based upon the idea that the power of an actor is reflected by the number of connections they have to others who are not central for, as Bonacich observed: ‘it is advantageous to be connected to those who have few options’ (Bonacich 1987: 1171).

### *Structural equivalence*

We explore the network further by examining measures of structural equivalence. Structural equivalence identifies common social positions among actors based on their linkages. It is a mathematical property of the subsets of actors in a network. Actors are structurally equivalent if they have identical ties to and from the other actors in the network. The analysis picks out groups of

Table 1. Top ten individuals in the Novosibirsk network by centrality score

Name	Post	Degree	Bonacich
Gorodetsky	1st Deputy Mayor	77.59	83
Tolokonsky	Mayor	74.14	85
Nesterov	Deputy Governor	44.83	50
Kiselev	Deputy Governor	43.97	48
Alaferovskiy	Deputy Governor	43.97	48
Zhivotrev	Deputy Mayor	40.52	47
Nikonov	Deputy Governor	39.66	46
Luzhenkov	Head <i>Raion</i> Administrator ( <i>Tsentral'nyi Raion</i> )	37.07	43
Generalov	Head <i>Raion</i> Administrator ( <i>Sovetsky Raion</i> )	32.76	38
Sychev	Chair Regional Assembly	31.03	36

actors who have similar relationships to other actors through clustering procedures, and draws maps of the distances using multidimensional scaling techniques. The maps reveal the structure of the network and facilitate comparison. There are several methods of calculating structural equivalence. Some analysts follow Burt's (1976) use of Euclidean distance to measure structural equivalence. The other method of calculation is to compute correlation coefficients (Pearson's  $r$ ): a method used by Knoke et al. (1996: 87–100) and other researchers. There are some small differences in the scores that these techniques produce and no substantive reason for choosing one particular measure rather than another. But if the task is to compare the results from networks using different studies, it is important to use the same method as that being compared.

### Networks in post-communist Russia

Understanding the operation of networks has become important in the study of post-communist systems. A recurrent theme is the way regional power is exercised by an 'interlocking directorate' of the administrative and business elites, described by one commentator as 'both the politicisation of industrialists, and of the "industrialisation" of politicians' (Kliamkin 1993). During the transition, post-Soviet political and economic elites have become interlocked as the pre-existing social networks of local power adapted by a process of 'colonisation' of the new democratic institutions (Hughes 1997). The

network metaphor appears in studies of the post-Soviet Russian elite in dichotomous form, which emphasises the distinction between 'old' political-administrative elites and 'new' economic ones (Khrystanovskaya & White 1996; Slider 1994; Hughes 1997; Kirkow et al. 1998). There is thus a division in the literature that suggests that elites are either segmented or clustered, or operate in a closed form of decision making reminiscent of the classic elite literature on Western cities. The more complex elite structure in Russia is an effect of the organic nature of Russia's transition whereby former communist elites recirculated into positions of power in the new regime and engaged with new elites. Nevertheless, there is no extant formal network analysis of post-Soviet elites.

Given the lack of comparable data across the former Soviet Union (either before or after 1991), and even from different parts of the Russian Federation, the method of inference used in this study was based on the differences between the structure of the network in Novosibirsk with those in more developed societies which have been studied using the formal approach. While we make some of the inferences about the structure of the network by drawing on theories of transition, elite studies and qualitative insights, one of our important sources of insight is the study of elites in Western systems.

### **Sociometric studies of policy networks**

The sociometric literature in the West has been dominated by the debates about elite power. In particular, Hunter's (1953) study of Atlanta used sociograms or maps of links between the key actors to demonstrate the existence of the ruling elite. While Hunter's approach was highly criticised in the heyday of pluralism, the notion that sociometric analysis could reveal the concentration of power continued in the extensive literature on private company interlocks (Levine 1972; Mizruchi 1982; Beardon & Mintz 1987; Scott 1991). The notion of interlocking networks of actors almost presupposes elite circles of power. Mariolis (1983), for example, used the Bonicich measure of centrality to find out the extent to which companies are interlocked.

Network studies of elites in communities have further developed the elitist tradition in studies of urban politics (Laumann & Pappi 1973; Laumann & Pappi 1976; Laumann et al. 1977; Marsden & Laumann 1977; Galaskiewicz 1979a, 1979b). Laumann and Pappi found reputed power to be concentrated in a small elite, an inner circle in the networks of business-professional relations, social relations and community affairs. The powerful elite was integrated in the sense that 'every leading influential can reach and be reached in each of the three networks by every other influential in the community', though

with different relationships and personnel depending on the network, and lines of fracture in each one (Laumann & Pappi 1973: 219).

The notion of the 'inner circle' or 'central circle' also appears in the work of the 'Columbia school' of elite researchers. The notion was first elaborated by Kadushin (1968), and appears in studies by Moore (1979) and the qualitative work of Useem (1984). In the context of Western democracies Higley et al. (1991) used centrality (reachability) scores to analyse the composition of the core of three national elite networks in the USA, Australia and Germany. They confirmed the hypothesis of Higley and Burton (1989) that a 'consensually unified elite' is a prerequisite for democratic transition and the aversion of breakdown, and concluded that a tightly integrated structure of the elite, though partially fractured as in the pluralist model, is a necessary condition for stable democracy.

Issue-based studies of policy networks similarly show a concentration or a core of elite organisations in a policy sector like health and energy (Laumann & Knoke 1987). This structure relates to a particular pattern of governing in advanced democracies termed by Knoke et al. (1996) 'the organisational state', where the public and private spheres shade into each other and policy networks are the essence of decision making. Typically, the network has a core dominated by governmental actors with wide-reaching mandates, which blends into peripheries of actors with more specific interests, such as pressure groups and professionals. This idea is confirmed by the process of privatisation in Russia which was distorted by 'rent-seeking' bureaucratic insiders to transfer assets to old elites, thus blurring the distinction between the public and private sectors (for the most recent account, see Gustafson 1999).

The consensus over the structure of networks in advanced democracies was broken by Heinz et al.'s research into the Washington policy-making elites in the spheres of agriculture, energy, health and labour (Heinz et al. 1990, 1993). By multidimensional scaling of the Euclidean distances they found a lack of a centre to the relationships, which they termed the 'hollow core'. Their conclusion was that actors connect to those who have similar interests, but not to adversaries or central positions. The implication was that all plural democracies should replicate this pattern. However, this result may have been driven by the research method employed in the study, for the researchers interviewed the representatives of interest groups and lawyers, but did not include bureaucrats and policy makers who were likely to form the core of the network from which lobbyists were the 'spokes'. In this instance, it is less a case of the missing core so much as a missed core. Moreover, Knoke et al.'s (1996) study of labour policy making in the US, Germany and Japan, which includes all the policy-making organisations, finds no evidence for the hollow core. Thus research on post-communist systems should not expect to find a hollow core if the

hypothesis is that their policy networks are the same as those in developed democracies. However, we expect some divergence from the pattern of the organisational state because of the history of communist systems and the implantation of market economies upon them.

### **Researching Russian elites**

To observe and analyse elite patterns of recruitment, structure and networks we selected one of Russia's most important regional cities, Novosibirsk. This city is the capital of Novosibirsk Region, and is by status Russia's third city after Moscow and St Petersburg, and the fourth largest by size of population (1.3 million). Novosibirsk is the administrative, industrial, financial and cultural capital of Siberia, and has a key regional elite. The city is typical in terms of its administrative structure as it has an elected regional governor and an elected mayor for the city. The city is also typical in having a structural legacy from Soviet central planning of a highly specialised economy dominated in this instance by once prestigious but now bankrupt and severely downsized military-industrial industries. The city is also Russia's major communications hub linking the European and Pacific parts of the country. Novosibirsk, consequently, suffered the economic depression typical of most Russian regional cities.

Novosibirsk is untypical, however, in possessing a major skills asset in Akademgorodok, one of the largest and most important concentrations of academic institutes outside of Moscow and St Petersburg. Like many Russian cities, it is now Westernising and becoming more cosmopolitan – a process facilitated in this case by the presence of its large conglomeration of academic and scientific institutes. While ethnicity is not a significant factor in politics in Novosibirsk, there are strong regionalist undercurrents (Hughes 1994). These typical and non-typical characteristics made a detailed profile of the influential elites that govern Novosibirsk a useful means of examining the trends in elites at the sub-state level during Russia's post-communist transition. At the same time, we recognise that every city is bound to have some characteristics that are particularistic.

The key regional leader for most of the transition period from the late 1980s to early 2000 was Vitaly Mukha, who was the regional party secretary to 1991 and then governor (with the exception of a two-year interlude in 1993–1995). Sixty-five year old Mukha, who had strong pro-communist sympathies and a pro-active regionalist orientation, was defeated in the January 2000 gubernatorial elections by the younger, forty-eight year old, pro-reform Mayor of Novosibirsk Viktor Tolokonsky, which is a result that graphically

illustrates both the wider process of generational turnover among elites in the city, and the close interaction of urban and regional politics in Novosibirsk.

We defined the elite as those persons exercising power and influence as a result of their functional or occupational status at the top of a range of socially significant hierarchies. By employing positional analysis we drew up a list of core members of the elite from the following four key sectors:

1. senior administrative officials (governor and deputy governors, mayor and deputy mayors, *raion* administration heads, senior federal officials);
2. elected politicians and heads of political organisations;
3. economic managers (directors of state and privatised enterprises, important entrepreneurs, directors of banks and financial institutions); and
4. cultural-professional intelligentsia.

The selection was then consolidated by a reputational analysis performed with the assistance of local experts (academics and journalists) to a group of 100 elite members. Once the core members were selected, others were identified and added to the list by the 'snowball' method (i.e., by ascertaining from the core members who else is important), a method which is common in network research (Higley et al. 1991; Kadushin 1995). The self-identification of the elite was then verified by a continual triangulation of responses. The cut-off point for the sample was decided on the basis of the diminishing importance of elite members. This method helped to reveal some key elite members who were important outside the formal structures. It was not, however, possible to identify all the informal networks, such as those connected to organized crime, so we investigated the network which members of the elite were content publicly to admit to. The research is based on 97 interviews in Novosibirsk (53 were completed by British researchers and 44 by local journalists acting as paid assistants) using a standard questionnaire and conducted over two periods of time: April and August-September 1997.<sup>1</sup>

### **Russian elites and the organisational state**

Studies of networks in Western democracies that employ centrality, structural equivalence and other measures uncover their intricate architecture. The networks usually have a central core to reflect the need for key individuals to interact, in particular bureaucrats and politicians, though with partial fractures and the incorporation of the rest of the elite. Laumann and Knoke regard this as typical of the 'organisational state', a form of governance that has evolved in response to the complexity of advanced Western political systems. In the light of this empirical regularity across developed democracies, the

key question we investigate here is whether elite networks in a Russian city, with a history of governance by a closed party elite, has developed the structure of governance that would be typical of a Western city or whether the network is unique to post-communist states. For this we examine the maps of actors using the structural equivalence measures and then we examine the centrality scores focusing on the type of elite. We are particularly interested in whether the networks of those members of the elite who were in the elite before 1991 are different from those who joined it afterwards. A major difference would indicate that old patterns of governance had persisted into the post-communist era.

A further dimension is the importance of the private sector in policy making. It is here that the urban focus of our studies is important as private sector involvement in policy making is often essential for the long-term health of cities. In US cities, the private sector is often a key partner in political decision making, what writers, such as Stone and Elkin, call 'urban regimes' (Stone 1989; Elkin 1987). With some modification many observers believe that a regime form of politics has emerged in major European cities, with the private sector becoming the key partner in large projects and involved with the governance of the city (Harding 1994; Stoker & Mossberger 1994; John & Cole 1998). The implication is that under the same forces of globalisation and rapid privatisation, similar patterns of public-private linkage would emerge in central and eastern Europe as those that exist in the West, with the private sector becoming part of the organisational state, though perhaps not as important a player as it is in the cities of the United States. Naturally the privatisation of assets means that the private sector has been created out of the old elite, but this elite has asserted its freedom and also new private elites have emerged. What is interesting to test is whether these private-sector members are part of the organisational state, if not its core, as has been found in Western urban studies and sociometric analysis. So far no study of urban regimes exists in the literature on post-communism, though the word 'regime' is loosely employed by some analysts as an ascriptive term for patterns of regional politics in Russia.

## **Data analysis**

### *Centrality*

As a first cut into the data, we present the individuals who have the top ten centrality scores (see Table 1). These results do not provide a great deal of information about the network structure, but they do identify the people with

whom most other members of the network are most in contact, and can be an indication of who has power or influence over decision making in the city.

Table 1 shows that there can be no doubt about the character of the network. The list of the most central actors shows them to be the conventional political and administrative figures of governor, deputy governor, mayor, deputy mayors and heads of districts. In terms of relationships in the network it is the elected political elite actors, the city mayor and regional governor, who predominate with less of a role for appointed bureaucrats, the private sector and the professional and cultural elite. By a long way, the mayor and governor are the most networked people, followed by lower level bureaucrats and politicians who have much lower scores. It seems that everyone in the network needs to access the mayor and the governor, and then, as demonstrated by their lower scores, the main politicians and bureaucrats. In this respect, such findings are not incompatible with the patterns found in Western cities, especially northern European ones, for it is the people who occupy the formal roles of political and bureaucratic leadership that are at the centre of networks (John 1998). This finding is consistent with the organisational state perspective.

On the other hand, new actors from the business sector do not have a prominent role in the Novosibirsk network, which is a contrast to the United States and some of the larger Northern European cities. The continuing power of political-administrative leaders over economic elites at the local level of Russia's transition suggests a lack of deep-rooted change in power structures. There is no difference between examining Bonacich power and normalised degree centrality – both are correlated with a coefficient near 1.0. The centrality scores, however, only give us a flavour of the relationships in the network. To understand how the network functions (e.g., the proximity of business actors to the political and administrative ones) we need to examine the whole pattern of relationships.

### *Structural equivalence*

There are a variety of methods of calculating structural equivalence matrices, and several ways of scaling them (Wasserman & Faust 1994: 366–88). We remain agnostic about the appropriate method as different routines give quite different results. For the sake of comparing our results with Knoke et al. (1996), we did not seek to normalise the data, but computed correlation coefficients for every pair of profiles using UCINET IV (Borgatti et al. 1992).<sup>2</sup> The results in Figure 1 report a stress of 0.378, indicating that there is a reasonably good fit of the data.




Figure 1. Spatial distribution of the community power network in Novosibirsk (stress = 0.378)

- Select Key:
- 2 = Tolokonsky (Mayor)
  - 5 = Matveev (Deputy Governor)
  - 8 = Gorodetsky (First Deputy Mayor)
  - 9 = Alaferovsky (Deputy Governor)
  - 12 = Luzhenkov (head Tsentral'nyi district)
  - 18 = Vasil'ev (head Pervomaisky district)
  - 19 = Anisimov (head Leninsky district)
  - 20 = Nesterov (Deputy Governor)
  - 22 = Kiselev (First Deputy Governor)
  - 23 = Nikonov (Deputy Governor)
  - 27 = Sychev (Chair Regional Assembly)
  - 45 = Bernadsky (Executive Director MARP)
  - 58 = Zhivotrev (Deputy Mayor)
  - 83 = Ragulin (director shipping company)
  - 84 = Sharoglazova (Deputy Governor)
  - 85 = Babakov (head regional trades unions)
  - 96 = Molchanova (Mayor's office)

Since the names of the cases are sometimes not visible in the scatterplot we also report the values in Appendix A, which can be found at the end of this article. The results reveal that there are five clusters of actors, and three of these are very small, with two or three actors each. One of these clusters (Cluster one) is composed of the mayor as the key person, which suggests that he has a very different structural equivalence to other actors. We believe that this reflects his mediating role through connections to most other actors. By contrast, the other two small clusters (Clusters four and five) include actors that do not have a large number of connections to the core networks, and reflects the existence in any governing network of a few actors who are not greatly connected to others but who resemble each other. The two main networks are Clusters two and three, and they comprise most of the 117 actors we identified.

There are also some special features peculiar to the two large networks that reflect the process of democratisation. The first unites all the heads of district administrations and governor Mukha, and a few company directors. The metro, a heavily subsidised state-socialist residue, falls within this network. The second network is dominated by company and bank directors, and aside from mostly businessmen, it includes administrative elites who specialise in finance matters, such as the three deputy mayors responsible for financial operations, as well as the head of the local branch of the Central Bank. It also includes all the MVD (Interior Ministry) and FSB (Intelligence Service) elite members. This appears to confirm the alliance of law enforcers with financiers and key entrepreneurs at the local level, which is a characteristic of the Yeltsin-era deal (Volkov 2000). It may also be interpreted as a Putin support base in the making. Thus there is an old elite network linked by promotion within the second echelon of officials based at the very weak city-district administration level, connected to the governor, who has strong roots in the old system, and to inefficient industries and public goods providers. A new network is just starting to form tied by new financial flows and the need to regulate or 'police' them.

In spite of these particularities, the composition of the two networks suggests that they take a similar form in the post-communist context as they do in Western national and sub-national policy communities. There are well-defined clusters of activities that in part reflect the prominence of top politicians and bureaucrats in Cluster two (a finding that is consistent with the organisational state hypothesis) and a cluster of more private sectors and less important actors in Cluster three, which is consistent with the urban regime hypothesis. This contrasts with the hollow core thesis or the power elite model where there are two groups of actors, a cluster of the power elite and the other less important actors (John & Cole 1998).

Overall, our findings confirm that the model of the organisational state as the largest cluster is dominated by the bureaucratic and political elites. In fact, our map looks rather similar to those presented in *Comparing Policy Networks* (Knoke et al. 1996: 97–9) with concentrations of types of organisations in a series of clusters. There are rather more in the United States, Japan and Germany, with clusters of labour unions, business associations, interest groups, professional societies and federal agencies, though this may be due to the different policy domains included in these analyses. In market societies there are two main sets of actors – political and business. The similarity means that we can conclude that the same political processes must be at work as we used a very similar methodology to collect the data. The main difference is that Knoke et al. (1996) collect data on organisations rather than individuals as we did, though this difference is not too serious as many of our actors represent organisations and are the leading persons from them, such as the directors of private companies. Our information on individuals may have led to more cross-cluster memberships as we find some private sector individuals in Cluster two and some politicians and bureaucrats in Cluster three. In fact, we would argue that the data on individuals allows us to comprehend the complexity of the networks and the members of the different clusters of actors rather better than the organisational measures do.

## Conclusions

Our study reveals how elites in Russia have moved from a monist planned regime to a more networked system of governance. One of the effects of the breakdown of communist monism and the disintegration of what Kornai (1992) termed the ‘foundation blocks’ of the communist system of power – Block 1 (Marxist-Leninist ideology) and Block 2 (the dominant position of state ownership) – is that informal networks of public and private elites now predominate and they are coordinated by an elected political-administrative hegemony as is the trend in Northern European cities. The conclusion of Higley et al. (1991: 35) was that ‘an informal interaction structure’ binds elites to democratic decision making. These structures are, they argue, ‘the mechanisms which govern the governors but which . . . allow the governors considerable latitude of action’.

What we show in our study is a similar pattern of elite relationships in the post-communist organisational state in Russia, though we interpret this structure to be the mechanisms by which governors actually govern. Our results show that networks in Novosibirsk have a structure predicted by theorists of the organisational state for advanced Western democracies. The members of

the elite with the highest central scores show a network whose most important actors are the bureaucratic and political actors; yet they are not exclusive to the network, with many other actors (e.g., those from the private sector) being involved in it.

Even though there is some skewing in the membership of the main clusters in the network, in that one network does not have that many private sector actors in it, we do not find strong evidence that the elite is bifurcated into two exclusive groups. The clusters of actors are composed of all the main groups confirming the 'interlocked' ruling elite thesis for post-Soviet Russia (Hughes 1997). The division appears to be based on the level of involvement in the network, with one group of actors linked together in a dense network, and with the other network less involved. As with the attitudinal data (Hughes & John 2000), we show that the distinction between new and old elites is too crude a basis for understanding elite relationships as clusters in the network are shaped by more subtle sets of relationships, such as common institutional location and plausibly shared institutional interests.

In terms of the urban dimension to decision making, we find that the membership and structure of the network has some similar characteristics to a Western city. Rather than the city being purely dominated by bureaucratic elites, the private sector plays a role. The private sector actors are grouped with the public sector actors, making the clusters of the network diverse in membership, suggesting close relationships between the different types of actors. The private sector is not, however, an equal partner to the networks as its members do not appear among the most networked in Novosibirsk.

What are the implications of this kind of urban network for Russia's transition? We make two main inferences from this research. First, it would be erroneous to believe that a similarity in the pattern of network relationships between a Russian city and a typical Western city reflects a similarity in the development and institutionalisation of democracy. Structure is not the same thing as behaviour, though the two may well be mutually interdependent, particularly over time. Russian elites are in a transitional phase. They operate in a near vacuum, both institutionally and procedurally, and they have few, if any, of the legal and normative constraints that define the behaviour of their Western counterparts. Our study is consistent with the thesis that Russia is characterised by departicised governance, a factor widely recognised as a major obstacle to democratic consolidation. The network structure of Russian urban elites, however, is the 'right' one in the sense that it mirrors that of a Western city and this is an important building block for the further development of a liberal capitalist polity – even if the democratic linkages are weak. Second, the involvement of private sector actors is a major change from the communist past. The statist economic managers – the 'red directors' – who

were for decades a core segment of the governing elite at all levels in the Soviet Union are being displaced functionally and generationally by the new private sector elites. Indeed, it is this group that, given its centrality to networks, over time will provide the strongest impetus for a deepening of transition in post-communist Russia.

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## Appendix A: Gower's Metric Scaling similarities: List of four clusters of actors (scores)

Actor label	Dimension 1	Dimension 2	Name and position
<i>Cluster one</i>			
1	0.24	-0.48	Ivankov – head Siberian Agreement
2	-0.05	0.31	Tolokonsky – Mayor
91	0.15	-0.00	Mityaev – UZHKKh
<i>Cluster two</i>			
3	-0.83	-0.74	Ivashchenko
4	-0.45	0.13	Mukha – Governor
5	-0.69	0.42	Matveev – Deputy Governor
6	-0.34	-0.22	Kail – Deputy Governor
8	-0.31	0.05	Gorodetsky – 1st Deputy Mayor
9	-0.71	0.26	Alaferovsky – Deputy Governor
10	-0.82	0.00	Parfenov – head Zael'tsovsky district
11	-0.93	-0.01	Generalov – head Sovetsky district
12	-0.78	0.10	Luzhenkov – head Tsentral'nyi district
13	-0.89	0.01	Shaposhnikov – head Oktyabr district
14	-0.89	0.00	Afnas'ev – head Kirovsky district
15	-0.88	0.03	Krivushin – head Dzerzhinsky district
16	-0.80	0.02	Barabanshchikov – head Kalinin district
17	-0.88	-0.06	Grigor'ev – head Zheleznodorozhnyi district
18	-0.83	-0.09	Vasil'ev – head Pervomaisky district
19	-0.92	-0.10	Anisimov – head Leninsky district

Actor label	Dimension 1	Dimension 2	Name and position
21	-0.46	0.01	Tomilov – head energy company
22	-0.32	0.16	Kiselev – 1st Deputy Governor
23	-0.64	0.25	Nikonov – Deputy Governor
24	-0.73	0.57	Azarova – Deputy Governor
25	-0.57	0.47	Nekhoroshov – Deputy Governor
26	-0.60	0.52	Leonov – Deputy Governor
27	-0.67	0.05	Sychev – Chair Regional Assembly
28	-0.92	0.61	Dubrovin – bank director
29	-0.72	-0.60	Kozachok – bank director
31	-0.47	-0.39	Schmidt – president's representative
32	-0.66	-0.87	Yankovsky – <i>Duma</i> deputy
39	-0.72	-0.49	Kisel'nikov – regional deputy
42	-0.62	-0.89	Miller – head Rotary Club
44	-0.48	-0.13	Bets – director manufacturing firm
45	-0.50	0.62	Bernadsky – Executive Director MARP
50	-0.63	-0.22	Chikunov – director investment firm
52	-0.07	1.55	Bespalikov – Deputy Mayor
53	-0.80	-0.48	Sandakov – city administration
8	-0.65	-0.15	Zhivotrev – Deputy Mayor
59	-0.88	-0.44	Pasman – Deputy Mayor
60	-0.29	-0.61	Pasman – owner art gallery
62	-1.07	0.37	Indinok – politician/banker
63	-0.99	-0.45	Karpov – Deputy Chair Regional Assembly
64	-0.38	-0.55	Kuznetsov – Regional Assembly Deputy
67	-0.96	0.23	Shumny – academician
68	-0.69	-0.61	Dugel'nyi – director manufacturing firm
69	-0.81	0.21	Baranovskaya – bank director
71	-0.85	0.52	Boiko – Director Civil Service Academy
72	-0.03	-1.09	Semchenko – unknown
74	-0.71	-0.33	Rychkov – director manufacturing firm
75	-0.71	-0.67	Frantsev – director construction company
76	-0.80	-0.52	Tolokonskaya – Mayor's wife/hospital head
77	-0.31	-0.98	Sakharova – leading doctor
78	-0.20	-0.75	Ruzaev – head metro construction
80	-0.30	-0.56	Demin – head metro company
82	-0.45	0.31	Basalaev – director oil company

Actor label	Dimension 1	Dimension 2	Name and position
83	-0.86	0.53	Ragulin – director shipping company
84	-0.86	-0.31	Sharoglazova – Deputy Governor
85	-0.44	-0.86	Babakov – head regional trades unions
86	-0.17	-1.22	Kurtsevich – director property company
92	-0.34	-0.96	Anokhin – director stock exchange
93	-0.36	-0.74	Zhenov – bank director
97	-0.80	-0.25	Kibirev – company director
98	-0.50	-0.47	Filichev – company director
101	-0.52	-0.73	Afanas'ev – company director
105	-0.04	-0.74	Skosyrsky – Mayor's office
106	-0.71	-0.87	London contact
108	-0.13	-1.07	Stepanov – company director
113	-0.31	-1.10	Labetsky – Regional Assembly Deputy
117	-0.53	-0.91	Zaikov – newspaper deputy editor
<i>Cluster three</i>			
7	1.06	0.31	Moroz – unknown
30	0.33	0.48	Krapivtsev – director travel firm
34	1.10	-0.26	Marzhalov – unknown
35	1.20	0.49	head Evrasia Bank
36	1.20	0.49	Melamedov – company director
37	1.20	0.49	Sakharov – Moscow stock exchange
38	1.20	0.49	Radchenko – bank deputy director
41	0.32	0.74	Zhabotinskaya – branch director TsBR
43	1.23	0.07	head Vinap (distillers)
46	0.72	0.69	Starostenko – director state railway
47	0.22	1.31	Kupeshov – director Sibsels'mash firm
48	0.44	1.19	director Elsib firm
49	0.72	0.69	Gromov – director Instrumental'ny firm
51	0.64	0.82	Anokhin – director stock exchange
54	0.63	0.96	Civil Service Academy
55	0.82	0.89	director airport
56	0.55	0.71	Strel'tsova – bank director
61	1.23	-0.15	Brodsky – Deputy Mayor
65	0.06	1.13	Siberian Academy of Sciences (SORAN)
66	0.60	0.47	Churupaev – finance director SORAN
73	1.11	-0.20	Konovalev – Regional Assembly Deputy
79	1.26	0.25	Nabevich – Deputy Mayor
81	1.28	-0.31	Mozheikin – Deputy Mayor

Actor label	Dimension 1	Dimension 2	Name and position
87	0.70	0.35	Pushkin – deputy head city council
88	1.31	-0.03	Loginov – city council deputy
89	1.31	-0.03	Dorovsky – deputy head regional LDPR
90	1.31	-0.03	Glyazochev – city council deputy
94	1.09	-0.44	Volkov – head regional FKTSB
95	1.11	-0.74	Makhan'kov – regional finance office
96	1.13	-0.38	Molchanova – Mayor's office
99	0.92	0.75	Alekseev – city council deputy
100	0.92	0.75	Medvedko – head regional <i>Yabloko</i>
102	0.98	-0.01	Shleev – Mayor's office
103	0.98	-0.01	Novak – MVD
104	0.98	-0.01	Mironov – FSB
107	1.12	-0.38	Davydov – director aluminium company
109	0.91	0.48	Abrarov – Mayor's office
110	1.03	0.56	Mabivich – Mayor's office
111	1.03	0.56	Zubova – bank director
112	1.03	0.56	Shelepko – company director
114	1.15	0.18	Terekhov – deputy head state property committee
115	1.15	0.18	Afonin – deputy head city property committee
116	1.15	0.18	Bichev – Mayor's office
<i>Cluster four</i>			
40	0.57	-1.15	Elesev – president MARP
70	0.48	-1.24	Gonzharov – <i>Duma</i> deputy
<i>Cluster five</i>			
57	-0.45	1.21	Yevisikov – Siberian Fair Company
33	-0.64	1.24	Novikov – director stock exchange
20	-0.53	1.05	Nesterov – Deputy Governor

## Notes

1. The questionnaire was designed in consultation with local researchers. It was filled in by the interviewer during the interview and extracted key information necessary for the sociological and attitudinal profile of the elite: current status and responsibilities of respondents, career background, personal data, personal identification of their networks. For the network question, we asked interviewees, 'Since January 1997, who are the people you

- have been in most frequent contact with?’ and recorded who these people were and noted the frequency of contacts as either ‘daily’, ‘weekly’ or ‘monthly’/‘more than monthly’. For Novosibirsk we coded these as an actor by actor matrix of relationships. If the scores were inconsistent between actors we either averaged them or used qualitative insights to infer which one was right. In many cases we found that individuals were reluctant to nominate individuals but specified the organisation they belonged to. In these circumstances we either inferred who the people were by taking a list of the people who others cited as important people in the running of the city or we used our insights from the qualitative research to infer who they meant. We entered the matrix into a DOS text editor and then into the software programme UCINET IV (Borgatti et al. 1992) and performed network analysis routines, concentrating on centrality scores.
2. Once we created the similarity matrix, we scaled it non-metrically ignoring the diagonals as missing values. The UCINET scaling programme creates two values and then plots them. The routine, when given a matrix of proximities, finds a set of points in k-dimensional space such that the Euclidean distances among these points corresponds as closely as possible to the input proximities, which is similar to SPSS’s ALSCAL programme. ALSCAL cannot handle more than 100 cases and for this reason we used UCINET. In general, the less the distance between the actors the more they are structurally equivalent. Each routine creates a stress value, which summarises the amount of error between the observed distance matrix and the distance matrix calculated from the k-dimensional solution. This lies between 1 and 0. The closer it is to zero the better the fit of the spatial plot to the data.

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