The European community that is in the process of being created is still searching for its history. For a few years now, the publishing market, which has been attempting – under the heading of ‘European history’ – to construct a shared past for a present that we now have in common, has been mushrooming. This communal experience is indisputably gaining ground (though more slowly and controversially than some well-known optimists hoped): it is promoted by freedom of movement within the European Union, by the effect of tourism, which some time ago ceased being reserved only for the elite, by the availability everywhere of products that, a few years back, typically represented a certain type of national consumption, and finally by the unifying influence of the media. To the extent that closer relations between the inhabitants of the ‘old world’ run in parallel with the attempt to create institutions to regulate these common goods, and to protect against movements of people from other areas with their own sets of values,1 a combination of powerful ingredients is in place that leads one to anticipate a strengthening of ‘European’ identity.2 It is well known in research into identity that history plays an important part in its construction.3 And indeed historians from European countries have set themselves the task of jointly putting together a school textbook in which presentations that might otherwise focus on national character and be likely to offend neighbours will be harmonized. Others are looking at ways of celebrating memory (places of memory) that are intended to stimulate European rather than national memory. In addition, German and French historians met a while ago, in the little town of Genshagen near Berlin, with the intention of identifying events that would be suitable for European celebrations, in that they would not be connected with events that one of the participants might be ashamed of, or refer directly to a victory of one over another. But to anyone who studies the history of the two neighbours separated only by the Rhine, it quickly becomes clear that there is not a lot of space left in the calendar for activities that would found a common tradition.

The difficulties are obvious, and historians’ efforts to overcome them are still at an embryonic stage.4 And meanwhile books on national history fill the bookshop windows. As a general rule, research is still influenced by close familiarity with the archives of one’s own country, whereas the historical tradition of another country is understood more or less superficially. However, things are starting to change. Student mobility is continually expanding, and the unilateral connection between young people’s careers and their country is fast disappearing. For doctoral students, a knowledge of the relevant languages is also increasing in a way that can only be pleasing. Research grants make it easy to travel to another country to study its history in more detail, just as links between universities are no longer restricted to exchanges of letters or reciprocal visits by high-ranking delegations. More and more, university and non-university institutions make it point of honour
Matthias Middell

to attract foreign scholars and establish bilateral or multilateral research groups. New
types of training for those interested in European history have been initiated, thanks to
funding for European postgraduate schools and shared responsibility for doctoral stu-
dents (such as joint supervision of theses). 5

But all this does not mean that the methodological difficulties inherited from a century
and a half of national practice of historiography will be easy to overcome in order to
write a European history. Longstanding appropriation by state teachers’ interpretations,
especially among historians of the older generation, is declining only slowly, though
nowadays it is no longer the main obstacle. The days have long gone when comparative
studies were suspected of betraying historians’ founding mission to articulate identity.
But comparison is not in any way an innocent route, in methodological terms, towards
the unity greater than national states which will provide the historical framework for the
future. 6 The cultural turning point which had a tremendous effect on the historical sci-
ences in the 1990s flowed from a problematization of comparative studies and a sharper
critique of a concept that had long been dominant and linked comparative studies closely
to the process of identification focused on the nation state. Today the important thing is
first to surmount the considerable barrier which for many years meant that the results of
comparative study were always brought back to an interpretation centred in the end
on the nation. By this we should understand the so-called thesis of the special way
(Sondersweg). In Germany especially this thesis enjoyed great popularity as an explana-
tion of National Socialism and the Holocaust: early in the 1950s it was first put forward
by Georg Lukacs and Alexander Abusch in the East, and in the Federal Republic by an
older interpretive model dating from the period when political history was replaced by
the historical social sciences. 8 To summarize briefly, this thesis starts from the explana-
tion that the catastrophe of 1933 resulted from long-term structural causes to be found in the
political weakness of the liberal bourgeoisie in Germany, and in the lack of a thorough-
going democratization on the road to the nation state. Thus the failure of 1848–1849 more
or less directly brought about the weakness of the Weimar Republic and the handover of
power to the National Socialists. This method of interpretation implied an idealization –
which was very quickly criticized, in particular by American historians – of the situation
in western Europe, especially in Britain and France, which was not examined closely but
simply used as a contrast with an interpretation applied solely to Germany. Since the
‘comparative fever’ broke out, the assumptions of the ‘thesis of the special way’ have
turned out to be less and less tenable. 9 As to whether the French version of this thesis, as
François Furet was defending it a few years back, will meet the same fate (the idea that
since 1793 France lost the thread of democratic co-liberal compromise and did not return
to the Anglo-American ‘normal path’ till the late twentieth century), it is still too soon to
tell: the attraction of such models of argument is connected only indirectly to their plaus-
ibility in expert discourse, which is always specialized, and also at the very least to the
possibility of instrumentalizing them for critical problems of orientation in historical/
social policy (as in the case of the French use of the turning-point of 1989 in its dual
dimension: the end of communism as an important political bloc of states, and the start of
the consciousness of the effects of globalization in a world dominated by the United
States). 10 In any event, the model of ‘normal’ historical development and corresponding
‘deviations’ – which figures in the modernization theory of Rostow and others, and also
in the work of historians whose starting point is Marx’s *Capital* – has proved to be a hindrance to the progress of unbiased comparative practice.

If comparative work in history managed, against all the odds, to make gradual headway from the late 1960s, it was often by reference to a significant lecture given by Marc Bloch at the 1928 international conference of historians, which very much simplified its basic tenets. For comparative studies, as practised by historians, took its guiding concepts rather more from the social sciences, where – in research fields such as ‘nation building’ and work on nationalism – a type of comparison was developing in which theoretical formulation of models was followed by elaboration of criteria, to be subsequently refined for specific cases, of which there might be many or few – almost like filling in boxes in a table. There is no denying that this method threw up a considerable amount of new knowledge. By not starting from available historical sources, but from a theoretical model developed from current processes, the weaknesses of traditional historicism, with its individualizing method, were eliminated, and new material – on the stratification of modern societies, or the shaping of the political environment and systems of representation – was taken into account, material that for historians had hitherto played a minor or nonexistent part. It must be emphasized too that this way of proceeding enjoys such a degree of popularity because it seems relevant to the current manner in which research is organized: at the start of a project the theoretical model is developed, then, with the help of research funding and doctoral posts, a number of collaborators are found to examine huge quantities of material. The expansion of knowledge thus develops as a modification that globally endorses the model of thought springing from Western awareness of modernization and the illustrative effect of European development.

But recently dissatisfaction with this way of tackling problems has been growing. First, developments in Asia, Latin America and Africa, as well as the great laboratory of change in eastern Europe, show that the premises of the theory of modernization in the West are not very helpful when it comes to dealing with the ‘ambivalent effects of Westernization’. They are incapable of either reliably predicting divergences in the processes of change, or of preventing their critical deterioration; but above all they have clearly shown themselves to be utterly inadequate as regards mobilizing to a satisfactory degree local forces for development, whether they be political or social structures or cultural practices.

[In a different but equally radical area, there is the critique of sociological comparison based on these criteria put forward by ‘new historicism’. For this method of comparison not only avoids historicism’s weaknesses, it eliminates its strengths as well.] These strengths were once more placed on the agenda by the ‘linguistic turn’, the opposition raised against an over-confident answer to the ‘objectivity question’, and also by the greater attention paid to historical actors, their motives and models of perception, and it was stressed, very much to the point, that Marc Bloch, in his defence of comparative history seventy years ago, had called for and set out an alliance between the forces of positivism and historicism. A kind of comparison that treats national ‘cases’ using pre-set criteria proves counterproductive in the long term for the purposes of European history, because it erects just those national differences it claims to overcome. At the very least it avoids revealing their emergence, favouring decisions that stress these differences rather than other solutions in alternative situations. Thus this type of comparative approach consolidates
national stereotypes and in some way carries on working, though with different tools, in
the same area as old-style national history, which had always done its utmost to help oust
the ‘other’ in history and had sometimes claimed to be that movement’s standard-bearer.
It is only at first glance that this looks paradoxical, for as soon as the various epistemo-
logical bases are examined, it becomes obvious: the comparative approach of the social
sciences, which has predominated among historians since the 1970s, is still in this guise
incompatible with the new focus on cultural history and so, even though it is expand-
ing numerically, is unsuited to following current trends in historiography that are revis-
ting the questions that had already been exhaustively debated around the turn of the
century.18

Research on cultural transfer, on the other hand, has chosen another strategy. The
French cultural historians and Germanists Michel Espagne and Michael Werner sug-
gested this concept around the mid 1980s in order to give a totally new lease of life to
the traditional history of relationships.19 In doing so they were implicitly, and in part
explicitly, following the direction of previous attempts to find variations on the compara-
tive approach, such as the one found, for example, in the work of the historian of German
culture Karl Lamprecht,20 or else to operationalize the claim to cultural history, such as
one can find in action, for example, in the studies by the historian of East Europe Eduard
Winter.21 The methodological starting point is a truly radical change of perspective: in-
stead of the magical category of influence, here we have an integration of foreign cultural
elements into a culture defined as native. Replacing a perspective that describes exporta-
tion, there is a picture of the motives and circumstances of importation.

From this arise two main orientations directed polemically against widespread prac-
tices and certain theoretical choices in the historical sciences. On the one hand this re-
search is directed against the notion of influence (which is also accompanied in religious
history by the idea, which nowadays seems odd, of a cultural interpenetration between
western, central and eastern Europe, but which emerges as a necessary consequence
of the notion of influence), for: ‘the absorption of foreign cultural elements cannot be
decreed or even achieved by an deliberately expansionist policy adopted by the original
culture’.22

We are not discussing merely the result of historians’ research here. For the whole of
our current experience is teeming with similar appropriations that see foreign material as
in step with the receiving culture, presented then integrated. Basically the motives for this
appropriation are to be put down to the identification of gaps in the receiving culture; this
is where the direction and type of change is decided; but this not only confirms what is
indigenous, it also, at the same time, means the genuine integration of something foreign.
It therefore seems fruitful to pursue these questions in three directions.

First these ideas, cultural models, systems of thought and interpretation, which have
played an important part in these transfer processes, must be examined in more detail.
Secondly, we shall be looking at the people who were the carriers of transfer processes
because of their temporary or longer term immersion in another culture: as translators,
experts in the foreign field (like the language teachers in many European towns, the
Italian or French musicians at eighteenth-century German courts, the professors of philo-
logy in German universities from the nineteenth century,23 voluntary or forced émigrés,
such as the Huguenots in the late seventeenth century who left France for Germany, or
political exiles after 1848 or 1933 in the opposite direction).24
Finally, a third level provides an approach to cultural transfer and lies rather in the field of economic history, goods and technologies, which cross borders and also change their meaning. There is still a very large number of things to do in this area, since it is not very common to see economic history as part of cultural history. So we shall simply refer, as an example, to a field that has already been fairly thoroughly explored, the history of the book, which has been the subject of various studies in recent years on the French-English-German network of innovation in printing techniques in the early nineteenth century, as well as the reorganization of the European book market in the eighteenth century.

It cannot be denied that, at the outset, the concept of cultural transfer was subject to the same weaknesses as socio-historical comparative studies, particularly because in the Franco-German context it was for the most part focused on the national field. But the diversity of national cultures, too, can perfectly well be considered as a construct contributing to the consolidation of identity. However, its creation – and this is the central idea of research on cultural transfer in the strict meaning of the term – occurs as a continuous appropriation of foreign cultural elements that are taken over as part of a complex transformative process of reduction and reinterpretation, and the result allows us to stress the differences. It is easy to see that a perspective in which the notion of culture, understood as a homogeneous entity, is not problematized from the outset matches perfectly the nineteenth-century conception according to which the national culture in western and central Europe so predominated compared with other cultural contexts that it seemed utterly unchallengeable.

But as soon as the age of nationalism – from the second half of the nineteenth century to the middle of the twentieth – is left behind, it is indeed the Franco-German case that shows that the ‘national’ level reveals another more flexible one. In these areas are concentrated many processes of identification that also obey the effects of the processes of cultural transfer described above. However, we know that the regions are very different things in France and in Germany. And the result is disparities in research in cultural history that need to be taken into account. In this context, the example of Anglo-French relations has been a particular object of study in the last few years. It appears that this type of research can completely reverse perspectives accepted hitherto. For a long while, Franco-German relations were seen through the prism of Prussian dominance within the German empire, because this perpetuation of the political, economic and cultural power of the capital of the Kaiser’s empire is what chimes best with French history. But in fact, at the beginning of the modern period, it was Kursachen in particular that maintained special relations with France, since they supported its claim to the Polish crown, its attempts to take over as cultural leader in the kingdom and the mercantile interests of the bourgeoisie. After the Seven Years’ War, when Saxony’s attempt to establish itself as a great European power failed, France took on a new and threefold significance. She continued to contribute to good relations between the centre of the book market and the market of western European fairs that Leipzig, along with Paris and Lyon, had become during the second half of the eighteenth century. In the course of the reconstruction of the country, during the so-called Rétablissement of 1763, French physiocrats’ ideas were taken up, and later the French model was often used in the modernization of Saxony. A third level may be perceived more generally, which continued to play a part subsequently: Saxony played the French card in order to affirm its claim to independent cultural
Matthias Middell

development within the empire. This point can be observed equally as regards nineteenth-century economic development and in relation to the modernization of the University of Leipzig after 1890, or during the renewal of foreign relations in Europe after the First World War. On each occasion it was a case of Saxony, which was desperately poor in resources, mobilizing ‘French’ elements of its cultural memory against the dominance of the Prussian model. But those who are wary of comparisons with the present day – and there is no doubt that historians need to be cautious in this area – will not be surprised after 1989–1990 to find the old affinity: it was France that built the largest French Institute in the new federal Länder, in Leipzig; it was French students who formed the largest group of foreign colleagues at the university in the city of fairs; Saxony is linked with Brittany in a regional partnership . . . and the list could be added to in many other areas.

What I hope to have shown through these examples is the need to supplement classical historical comparative studies, which has long been dominated by paradigms from the social sciences, with research into cultural transfer. It is the price we have to pay if we want to achieve a new quality of European history that would be more than the synthesis of national histories carried out by writers of books.

Matthias Middell
Centre for Advanced Studies, University of Leipzig
(translated from the French by Jean Burrell)

Notes

1. Because of the paradoxical attraction the effects of globalization and the obsession with ‘fortress Europe’ clearly has for the defenders of strategies for demarcating borders.

2. It is impossible to review here all the literature for and against, simply in order to convince a few Eurosceptics. But the very intensity of the debate demonstrates that apathy is not the problem. G.M. Breakwell and E. Lyons (eds., 1996), Changing European Identities: Social psychological analyses of social change (Oxford); M. Martin (ed., 1998), Ethnic and National Consciousness in Europe (Florence).


4. Alongside the series entitled ‘Construire l’Europe’, under the editorial direction of Jacques Le Goff and published in several European countries (the German version is published by C.H. Beck in Munich), an ambitious project for a ‘European history’ published in Frankfurt in paperback by Fischer and edited by Wolfgang Benz is aiming to comprise around a hundred volumes, which is particularly significant in the field of German studies.


6. The simple fact of comparing will no longer do; comparative scholars are trying to transmit the quite natural optimism that stems from comparison and is a result of the power of achievement linking peoples together, in short a claim to a better ‘historiography’ that can be of interest to a qualified minority only: see, among others, H.-G. Haupt and J. Kocka (eds., 1996), Geschichte und Vergleich, Ansätze und Ergebnisse international vergleichender Geschichtsschreibung [‘History and comparison. Methods and results of a comparative international writing of history’] (Frankfurt-am-Main and New York); in a more self-critical vein, T. Welskopf (1995), ‘Stolperstein auf dem onigsweg. Methodenkritische Anmerkungen zum internationalen Vergleich in der Gesellschaftsgeschichte’ [‘Stumbling block on the royal road. Critical remarks on method
in international comparison in social history], in Archiv für Sozialgeschichte 35, pp. 339–367; for a radical
critique of the methodological blind spots of classical comparison resulting from causal sociological expla-
nations, see M. Espagne (1994), ‘Sur les limites du comparatisme en histoire culturelle’ ['On the limits of
the comparative approach in cultural history'], in Genèses. Sciences sociales et Histoire 17, pp. 112–121.

Theory (Princeton); C. Conrad and M. Kessel (eds., 1998), Kultur und Geschichte ['Culture and history'],
Stuttgart; T. Mergel and T. Welskopp (eds., 1997), Geschichte zwischen Kultur und Gesellschaft. Beiträge zur
Theorie debatte ['History between culture and society. Contributions to the theoretical debate'] (Munich).

Kaiserreich und Nationalsozialismus ['The ideology of the German way. German history in historiography
between empire and National Socialism'] (Munich).

9. For an attempt to clarify the structural analogies in the argument between two approaches as different as,
on the one hand, that of West Germany’s social history (Gesellschaftsgeschichte), and East Germany’s com-
parative revolutionary history (Vergleichende Revolutionsgeschichte), see M. Middell (1998), ‘Metaerzählung;
Vergleichende Revolutionsgeschichte und Sondерwegstheese’ ['Metanarrative: Comparative revolutionary
history and the special way thesis'], in Berliner Debatte Initial, 9, no. 5, pp. 59–75.


11. Summary in C. Lorenz (1997), Konstruktion der Vergangenheit. Eine Einführung in die Geschichtstheorie ['Con-
struction of the past. An introduction to historical theory'] (Cologne, Weimar and Vienna), pp. 231–284.

12. The debate in Germany was bogged down for a long time in a stalemate between historicism and social
history, because the conservatism – both methodological and political – of neo-Rankians, roughly from
1885 to 1945–1955, encouraged polarized thinking. It is only in the last ten years that breakthroughs
have painfully been made. So the energy needed to take on board the initiatives of the ‘New Historicism’,
and cultural history more generally, was lacking. Now at last, rediscovering the peace and openness
that has long been the norm elsewhere see: J. Schott (ed., 1997), Historismus am Ende des 20. Jahrhunderts.
Eine internationale Diskussion ['Historicism at the end of the twentieth century. An international debate']
(Berlin).


14. Leipzig University has set up a postgraduate centre on this topic where twenty postgraduates from both
West and East work. By way of a first sample of the outcomes, see Dorothée Müller (ed.), Ambivalenzen der
Okzidentalisierung (Leipzig).

15. P. Novick (1993), That Noble Dream: The ‘objectivity question’ and the American Historical Profession (Cam-
bridge); for France see, G. Noirié (1994), La ‘crise’ de l’histoire ['The “crisis” of history'] (Paris); for Germany
see, C. Conrad and M. Kessel (eds., 1994), Geschichte schreiben in der Postmoderne. Beiträge zur aktuellen
Diskussion ['Writing history in the postmodern age. Contributions to the current debate'] (Stuttgart).

H. Atsma and A. Burguière (Paris).

17. More explicitly on this point, see Michel Espagne (1994), ‘Sur les limites du comparatisme en histoire
culturelle’ ['On the limits of the comparative approach in cultural history'], in Genèse. Sciences sociales et
histoire, no. 17, pp. 112–121.

[‘What is a history of mentalities? Structure and development of a research tradition’], in H. Hahn (ed.),
Kulturunterschiede. Interdisziplinäre Konzepte zu kollektiven Identitäten und Mentalitäten ['Cultural differences.
Interdisciplinary concepts relating to shared identities and mentalities’] (Frankfurt-am-Main), pp. 9–62.

19. See in particular Transferts. Les relations interculturelles dans l’espace franco-allemand (XVIIe–XIXe siècle) ['Trans-
fers. Intercultural relations in the Franco-German area (seventeenth–nineteenth century]']. Texts collected
and presented by M. Espagne and M. Werner (Paris, 1988); on the subsequent development of this research
Frankreich und Deutschland’ ['Research on cultural transfer. France and Germany'], in Grenzgänge, no. 2,
2nd year, pp. 107–122.

20. R. Chickering (1993), Karl Lamprecht, A German Academic Life (1856–1915), (New Jersey); M. Middell (1998),
‘Méthodes de l’historiographie culturelle: Karl Lamprecht’, in Revue Germanique Internationale, 10, pp. 93–
116.
Matthias Middell

32. See the result of the many research proposals on which the author has continued to make progress throughout the last fifteen years: Michel Espagne (1999), *Transferts culturels franco-allemands* [Franco-German cultural transfers] (Paris).