GLOBALISATION AND RESISTANCE IN POST-MAO CHINA: THE CASE OF FOREIGN CONSUMER PRODUCTS

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The purveyors of nearly all the world’s big consumer brands are battling for at least a foothold in the Chinese market.

(Economist 3 December 1994)

I’d rather die of thirst than drink Coca-Cola
I’d rather starve to death than eat McDonald’s.

Protester’s placard at Guangzhou demonstration against the American bombing of Belgrade, May 1999

While “globalisation” has many facets—even within the cultural arena—consumer products and services have come to be seen as one of its major manifestations. As Russell Belk, a leading scholar of inter-cultural consumer behaviour, expressed it in 1996: “[T]here is now a new member in this cast who is perhaps the most important cultural ambassador of all: the multinational consumer goods and services corporation and its minion—Ronald McDonald, Mickey Mouse, Colonel Sanders, Big Bird, the Michelin Man, and a host of others” (Belk 1996, 25).

Despite the international pervasiveness of multinational consumer goods, few writers now argue that globalisation involves the “triumph of cultural homogenization forces over all others” (Robertson 1995, 25). Heterogenisation, glocalisation, hybridisation and indigenisation have all become part of the wide-ranging cultural studies discourse and debate about the diversity of local interactions with global capitalism (see, for example, Featherstone 1990; King 1991; Featherstone, Lash and Robertson 1995). While much of the focus has been on the interplay between the global and the local, the notion of local resistance against the global has been emphasised by some theorists, including Wallerstein (1991) and Barber.
(1992 and 1996). As Robertson states, while actually taking these two writers to task: “In numerous contemporary accounts … globalizing trends are regarded as in tension with ‘local’ assertions of identity and culture” (Robertson 1995, 33).³

This theme has been taken up by some analysts of inter-cultural consumer behaviour. In an article establishing a paradigm for ethno-consumerism, for example, Venkatesh argues that we need to understand “the local resistances and the adaptive strategies to external influences” when studying consumerism as a global cultural phenomenon (Venkatesh 1995, 31; also Costa and Bamossy 1995; Belk 1996). And at the practical level, writer/journalist Pico Iyer’s travels through some ten Asian countries in the mid-1980s were aimed at discovering “what resistance had been put up against the Coca-Colonizing forces and what kind of counter-strategies were planned” (Iyer 1988, 4; see also London 1996). In his much-quoted article ‘Disjuncture and difference in the global cultural economy’, Appadurai states that Iyer’s “own impressions are testimony to the fact that, if ‘a’ global cultural system is emerging, it is filled with ironies and resistances …” (Appadurai 1990, 3).

The concept of “resistance”, as used in this article, is thus distinguished from hybridisation and indigenisation which, emphasising the interplay between global and local, involve some form of transformation of quality and meaning within new cultural contexts. Rowe and Schelling (1991, 231), for example, define hybridisation as “the ways in which forms become separated from existing practices and recombine with new forms in new practices”. (This is not to say that such interplay and transformations have not occurred in post-Mao China, but they are beyond the scope of the present article.)

A comparative newcomer to the worlds of consumerism and globalisation (at least in the second half of the twentieth century), China’s march towards a consumer society over the past two decades has prompted the label “consumer revolution” (Wu 1998; Li Conghua 1998; Chao and Myers 1998; Davis 2000). Academic analyses to date, covering a range of disciplines, have included the economic dimensions of consumption (for example, Chai 1992; Wu 1998), its sociological dimensions (Sklair 1994; Li Conghua 1998; Chao and Myers 1998), Chinese consumer behaviour (Tse, Belk and Zhou 1989; Etteson and Wagner 1991; Chan and Lin 1992), gender dimensions (Hooper 1998; Evans 2000), ethnographic studies (Davis 2000) and broader cultural analyses of the commodification of everyday life (Dutton 1998; Barmé 1999).⁴ While these accounts include some references to the influx of Western/global products,⁵ the discussion of this issue has been dominated by Western journalists fascinated with each new sign of China’s “globalisation” or “Westernisation”, by business and marketing journals following the twists and turns of the much-vaunted “China market”, and by writers discussing the mixed experiences of Western companies in China (for example, Stross 1993; Mann 1997; FitzGerald 1997; Strange 1997).⁶
The broader issue of globalisation and its cultural implications for China has been taken up in greatest detail by Dirlik (1994; 1996; 1997).

This article explores the theme of globalisation and resistance in post-Mao China, with particular reference to consumer products. (Western popular culture—from Madonna to *The Titanic*—has provoked a parallel discourse which is not covered in the discussion.) Using the framework of resistance and counter-strategies, I argue that, particularly since the early to mid-1990s, the influx of global products has encountered resistance at two major though interacting levels. The first has been a discourse of resistance, within the broader context of mounting cultural nationalism, which has had strong resonance with China’s century-long historical experience at the hands of Western and Japanese imperialism and has sometimes utilised Western theorisations of cultural imperialism. The second has been practical resistance in the form of strategies, adopted by an alliance of Chinese commercial interests, the government and the media, to compete with foreign consumer products by appropriating and commodifying both nationalism and culture. First, they have played the “nationalism card”, using a discourse of consumer nationalism and more broadly economic nationalism. Secondly, they have played the “culture card”, alleging the greater “suitability” of their products for Chinese consumers, only to be confronted with the “glocalisation” of foreign products which “has involved and increasingly involves the creation and the incorporation of locality” as a strategy for seeking global markets (Robertson 1995, 40).

**GLOBAL PRODUCTS IN “REOPENED” CHINA**

In February 1951, a Chinese official was sentenced to five years’ imprisonment for alleged imperialist attitudes which included “having a fondness for Coca-Cola” (NCNA Peking 2 February 1951). By the mid-1990s, more than eight billion bottles and cans of Coke were being sold annually in China and the once despised American symbol was recognised by 98.4 per cent of people surveyed in Beijing (*Shenzhou Xueren* 23 June 1994). Two Procter & Gamble brands (Rejoice and Head & Shoulders) were the top-selling hair products in China (Sinofile Cosmetics Briefing 1–31 July 1998). Tide detergent, Colgate toothpaste, and Safeguard and Lux soaps headed their respective categories, and Fuji, Kodak and Agfa controlled over 75 per cent of the Chinese camera film market (*South China Morning Post* 20 November 1997). These statistics were just a few examples of China’s growing integration into the world of global consumerism: from the early enthusiasm for Gucci sunglasses (usually fake) and Canon cameras to the pervasive McDonald’s and KFC outlets, Mickey Mouse symbols and Toyota advertisements at the end of the 1990s. To all appearances, China seemed to be
sharing what Appadurai called the “bottomless appetite in the Asian world for things Western” (Appadurai 1990, 3). (One would also have to include Japanese products which have been similarly pervasive in Asia.)

The fascination of Western journalists with each new phase of China’s apparent Westernisation or globalisation (which they tended to use interchangeably) was largely attributable to the historical and ideological context within which the developments were occurring. A combination of assertive nationalism and socialist ideology had led to the eradication of the Western presence, including Western culture and products, soon after the Communist victory, while the ending of the Sino-Soviet alliance brought further isolation (Hooper 1986). The denunciation of anything Western as “capitalist”, “bourgeois” and representative of the “imperialist world” reached a peak during the ideological extremism of the Korean War (1950–53) when the final vestiges of the Western economic and cultural presence were eradicated (Hooper 1986) and again at the height of the Cultural Revolution in 1966–67, but it was still pervasive when I was studying in China in 1975–76 (Hooper 1979). Probably the closest recent equivalent to the closed society of Mao’s China has been North Korea, described by Iyer in language once commonly used for the PRC: “It’s as if it’s another planet and either it doesn’t know or it doesn’t care how the rest of the world works . . . The whole country is absolutely hermetically sealed” (London 1996).

With the inauguration of the “open door” policy in 1978–79, prompted by economic reforms and the need for foreign capital and expertise, China was once again hailed as the great marketing opportunity, reviving the hopes of the late nineteenth century when companies like Shell and British-American Tobacco saw China’s 600 million people as potential customers for their products. A century later, a vision of China’s would-be consumers (now doubled in number) has attracted multinationals and small companies alike. As the Economist expressed it in 1994:

The purveyors of nearly all the world’s big consumer brands are battling for at least a foothold in the Chinese market. Pizza Hut, Kentucky Fried Chicken and McDonald’s serve up fast-food . . . Smokers are tempted by advertisements for Marlboro, Salem and Lucky Strike cigarettes. Drinkers are invited to open a can of beer from Australia’s Fosters, Denmark’s Carlsberg or the Philippines’ San Miguel. Department stores offer Estée Lauder cosmetics, shoes from London’s Gieves & Hawkes and Louis Vuitton handbags. Can this be China? (Economist 3 December 1994).

The reality, of course, is that despite China’s rising incomes and consumption levels (Chai 1992; Li Conghua 1998; Wu 1998), the potential market for foreign consumer goods has continued to be limited. “If any FMCG (fast-moving

consumer goods) companies ever thought that Western brands would sweep all before them, they have abandoned that illusion”, the *Economist* wrote in the same 1994 report. “Instead they are adapting to the reality of a segmented market” (*Economist* 3 December 1994). By the mid-1990s China’s consumer market was seen by foreign companies as totalling up to 90 million, the number of people in the so-called “economically active” category with an annual income of over $US1,000. This could be broken into three segments: around 5 million for imported luxury goods including high price spirits, designer watches and cosmetics, some 20 million for imported “middle-class” products including electrical appliances, and up to 65 million for some joint-venture as well as domestic products (*Economist* 3 December 1994; Wu 1998). Reflecting differential urban-rural and regional incomes, the efforts and activities of foreign companies focused mainly on the sites of “advanced” consumption, particularly the more affluent cities, including the southeast coastal region, and increasingly during the 1990s some provincial centres. However, with some 80 per cent of the population having access to television, awareness of China’s new world of consumerism has become widespread, creating new aspirations and consumer desires (Chao and Myers 1998; Hooper 1998).

While the growing pervasiveness of foreign products has been readily apparent to anyone walking along a major city street, wandering through a department store or watching television advertisements, the awareness and purchase of these products has been quantified in some surveys of consumer behaviour in China. Where people’s repertoire of brand names was once limited to a few Chinese products such as Flying Pigeon bicycles, Butterfly sewing machines and White Cat detergent, a 1994 survey conducted by the Beijing Market Research Consultancy revealed that ten foreign brands—headed by Coca-Cola—were recognised by over 90 per cent of people surveyed in the capital, as indicated in Table 1.

Other brands with high levels of recognition included Puma (89 per cent), Pierre Cardin (79.6 per cent) and Rolex (76.4 per cent) (*Shenzhou Xueren* 23 June 1994, 14).

National figures have predictably been rather lower, as demonstrated by Gallup surveys covering both urban and rural areas. For example, a 1997 survey revealed that five foreign brands were recognised by at least two-thirds of the population nation-wide: Coca-Cola by 81 per cent, Beijing Jeep (Chrysler) by 77 per cent, Santana (produced by Volkswagen) by 76 per cent, Head & Shoulders by 72 per cent, and Panasonic by 70 per cent (Gallup 1997).

The Lingdian Market Research Company, China’s leading independent social research organisation, conducted a wide-ranging consumer behaviour survey in 1997 which, inter alia, analysed the penetration of foreign products into people’s purchasing activities, at least in more affluent urban areas. The survey covered...
ten major Chinese cities (Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Nanning, Chengdu, Wuhan, Xian, Jinan, Shenyang, Xiamen), all except Xiamen categorised as provincial level units or provincial capitals.

Although the categories in Table 2 are somewhat vague, with no definition of what constitutes “frequent”, “sometimes” and “seldom”—it would be fairly difficult for individual consumers to quantify these even if they were asked to—the results do indicate both the integration of foreign products into purchasing behaviour and an awareness of whether purchases are “foreign” [yanghuo] or Chinese [guohuo]. Given the definitional problem, probably the most useful statistic is that only 21.2 per cent of respondents stated that they never purchased foreign goods. A striking finding was that only 1.4 per cent of respondents stated that they had not paid attention to whether or not they had purchased foreign products, reflecting the strong consciousness of “foreign” versus “Chinese”

Table 1: Recognition of Foreign Products

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Brand</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Percentage recognition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coca-Cola</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>98.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kang Shifu (noodles)</td>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>96.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hitachi</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>95.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mercedes</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>93.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuji</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>93.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sharp</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>93.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goldlion (clothing)</td>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>92.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toyota</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>92.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McDonald’s</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>92.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lux</td>
<td>The Netherlands</td>
<td>91.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kodak</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>90.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 2: Frequency of Purchase of Foreign Products

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Frequently purchase</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sometimes purchase</td>
<td>33.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seldom purchase</td>
<td>36.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never purchase</td>
<td>21.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haven’t paid attention</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Lingdian Diaocha Gongsi 1998b.
products that was already part of everyday media discourse, as discussed later in this article.

In reality, the identification of a product as “foreign” or “Chinese” could be somewhat illusory, given the complexity of what constituted “foreign”: not just imported goods but also the foreign brands of joint ventures in China which themselves sometimes produced “Chinese” as well as “foreign” products. (For example, Procter & Gamble manufacture Tianqi hair products, as well as Rejoice and Head & Shoulders, and Panda and Gaofuli laundry products as well as Tide.) As Lingdian Market Research expressed it: “A Chinese person may not realise that he/she has unconsciously become a consumer of P & G shampoo or Johnson & Johnson pharmaceuticals” (Lingdian Diaocha Gongsi 1998c, 91). For the purpose of the present discussion, however, the issue is one of perception and attitude, rather than the actual situation.

As indicated in Table 3, by far the greatest proportion of foreign products purchased by respondents (79.8 per cent) were Japanese or American, with Japanese products constituting more than double the proportion of American ones. Korean products (at 6.9 per cent) were the next largest single-country contribution, while the products of six European countries totalled some 10.6 per cent.

The survey examined a number of variables, including location, age and gender. As indicated in Table 4, marked differences were found among the cities surveyed, a product of a number of interacting factors according to the analysts: incomes, geography (including transport facilities) and policies towards “openness” (Lingdian Diaocha Gongsi 1998b). The highest proportion of people

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Product</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td>54.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American</td>
<td>25.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korean</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutch</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italian</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singaporean</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Lingdian Diaocha Gongsi 1998b.

Globalisation and Resistance in Post-Mao China

purchasing foreign goods—and by far the lowest proportion of people who never purchased foreign goods—occurred in the coastal cities of Guangzhou and Xiamen, not just because of their relative prosperity or even their cities’ “openness” (which would also apply to Shanghai), but because of frequent contacts with relatives and others from outside China. At the opposite extreme, the highest proportion of people who never bought foreign products was in three non-coastal provincial cities: Chengdu, Jinan and Shenyang. Beijing and Shanghai, where the bulk of foreign companies and their representatives are headquartered, had the highest and third highest (behind Xiamen) proportion of “frequent purchasers” of foreign products.

The survey also bore out impressionistic evidence, apparent even from the early 1980s, that younger people were “strongly influenced by Western style” and more likely to buy foreign products than the older generation. (Miao and Li 1995; also Hooper 1985, 133–57). In the 18–34 age group, a greater number “sometimes” bought foreign products than “hardly ever” bought them, while the situation was reversed for the 34–54 age group. The largest proportion of people who claimed “never” to have bought foreign products was in the 55+ age group. Gender, however, was not found to be a significant variable.

The appeal of foreign products can be attributed to three major factors—quality, status and marketing—which frequently influence, or interact with, one another. Quality was a particularly important factor in the early years of the post-Mao era, when there was little competition from Chinese products, but it has continued to be significant. As the former Minister for Culture, Wang Meng, expressed it: “When people see that the quality of some foreign goods, including

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location of Respondents</th>
<th>Frequently purchase %</th>
<th>Sometimes purchase %</th>
<th>Seldom purchase %</th>
<th>Never purchase %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Beijing</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>32.3</td>
<td>34.7</td>
<td>20.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shanghai</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>29.7</td>
<td>41.4</td>
<td>19.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guangzhou</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>36.1</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chengdu</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>34.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nanning</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>36.6</td>
<td>37.6</td>
<td>21.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wuhan</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>30.2</td>
<td>39.4</td>
<td>27.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xi’an</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>28.1</td>
<td>42.6</td>
<td>24.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jinan</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>40.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shenyang</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>30.9</td>
<td>34.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xiamen</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>46.3</td>
<td>34.2</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Lingdian Diaocha Gongsì 1998b.
quality of service, is indeed quite good, it is hardly avoidable that such things will excite admiration or even blind worship” (Wang 1995). The quality comparison applied particularly to the basic electrical appliances (refrigerators, washing machines and television sets) that dominated consumer desires for much of the eighties. During that period—and well into the nineties—there were continuing complaints about shoddy and faulty locally-made electrical appliances, together with poor after-sales service, common features of the early production stage in developing countries (Thorelli 1988; Mayer 1989). These were a major feature of complaints to the Chinese Consumers’ Association (CCA), established in 1984 to protect consumer rights (Zhongguo Xiaofeizhe Xiehui 1994; Hooper 2000). Even in 1997, when the quality of some foreign products was coming under criticism, a majority of respondents in the Lingdian survey claimed that “good quality” was their major reason for buying foreign over local products (Lingdian Diaocha Gongsi 1998b).

Secondly, the status and image of global products, often attributed to their association with the world of modernity, has been an important factor in China as in other developing countries. According to Salinas and Paldan, the ownership of global products enables the more affluent members of developing societies to share “patterns of consumption and thereby life-styles and cultural affinities similar to those sustained by the dominant sectors of developed economies” (Salinas and Paldan 1979, 90–91). Belk, who has done research on consumer behaviour in a number of post-communist and developing countries, concludes: “In Romania, Bangladesh, and elsewhere, to use the products from the consumer dreamlands of the more developed world is highly alluring (Belk 1996, 26; also Belk 1988; Ger, Belk and Lascu 1993). Within the changing dynamics of post-Mao Chinese society, global products have become important “positional goods” with their associated status image and symbolic value, and have been integral to the identity creation of China’s burgeoning middle class, including the new breed of yapishi (the term coined for “yuppie”). In the words of one Chinese writer: “People feel superior with foreign products … They are more expensive than local products and represent a certain social standard” (Zhao 1994, 45). Products of the United States and Japan have had a particularly high level of symbolic value, equated with the modernity and sophistication of the two countries which, according to a national survey, are perceived in China as the world’s most prosperous (Lingdian Diaocha Gongs 1997b, 35).

At the peak of the status/symbolic hierarchy, attainable only by the seriously rich but recognised as the ultimate acquisitions for Veblen-style conspicuous consumption, are international status symbols like Mercedes and Rolex (already recognised as brand names by 93.4 per cent and 76.4 per cent respectively in the 1994 Beijing survey discussed above), Gucci and Cartier. As Michael Pinches states in his analysis of the cultural construction of the “new rich” across Asia:
“Despite the complexity and fluidity of the global commodity market, prestigious consumer goods and images identified with the West generally remain the yardstick of luxury” (Pinches 1999, 28). These are the products that feature in advertisements in upmarket magazines like *Xiandai Huabao [Modern Pictorial]*¹⁴ and, for women in particular, in the Chinese versions of *Cosmopolitan* and *Elle* magazines.¹⁵ Unlike advertisements for more widely-owned foreign products, the luxury product advertisements are often identical (with the exception of some Chinese text) to those in Western magazines, featuring “international” supermodels like Cindy Crawford (for Omega) and Elizabeth Hurley (for Estée Lauder) who are themselves becoming well known in China.

Thirdly, superior marketing (including packaging and advertising) has been partially, in some cases substantially, responsible for both the quality reputation and the status of Western and Japanese products. Characteristic of global advertising in developing countries (Anderson 1984; Frith 1996), global brands—backed by international advertising agencies like Ogilvie & Mather and Dentsu—have had a decisive marketing edge over their Chinese counterparts. In China, even more than in many other Asian countries, commercial advertising was a very new concept, banished along with other vestiges of the private economy after the communist revolution and gradually revived only from the end of the 1970s (Stross 1990). The resulting contrast between foreign and Chinese products has been particularly noticeable in the area of toiletries and cosmetics, whose image is heavily dependent on packaging and advertising. It was the “beautiful packaging”, according to one magazine, that made foreign cosmetics “so attractive to Chinese customers” (*China Market* April 1992, 13) and the persuasive TV ads that added glamour and allure. Well-advertised sales promotions, for example by KFC and McDonald’s, gave their products an edge from their early days in China. On one occasion the deputy manager of Ronghua Chicken, which had issued a challenge to KFC, complained that it was very difficult for Chinese fast food restaurants to compete in sales promotions because the foreign-funded outlets were “all backed by major fast food conglomerates” with their wealth of experience and financial backing (*Beijing Review* 15–21 March 1993, 15).

**THE FORCES OF RESISTANCE**

A 1994 book entitled *Chinese products, foreign products: Which do you love?* denounced what it described as China’s “foreign products syndrome”, declaring: “Some of our own products are outstanding and are able to compete with others” (Zhao 1994, 85). In early 1997, a department store in Hainan’s capital, Haikou, removed all Sony products from its shelves when the nearest Sony branch refused to replace a burnt-out TV tube within the officially prescribed
three-year warranty period. Referring to the case, a national industry and commerce newspaper declared that China was “now entirely different from when foreign companies first entered the country with products that consumers were desperate to buy” (Zhonghua Gongshang Shibao 1 April 1997). These statements and actions were part of a pattern of resistance to foreign consumer products that accelerated during the mid-1990s in an environment of mounting cultural nationalism, partially linked to China’s accelerated commercialism and ever-widening “open door” which followed Deng Xiaoping’s 1992 launch of a second wave of economic reform.

While much of the discourse about global consumer culture has been concerned with the interplay between the global and the local, as discussed in the introduction, local resistance against the global has also been an important feature of the interaction. In considering the local as a “site of resistance” to global capitalism in general, Dirlik points to the “proliferation of local movements of resistance in recent years in which women’s and ecological movements are particularly prominent” (Dirlik 1997, 97). Writing specifically of global consumerism, Belk has highlighted a range of local resistances, including the assertion of nationalism and of ethnic identities (Belk 1996, 27–29). While local movements of the type Dirlik describes are relatively undeveloped in China, resistance to global products (and more broadly to global culture) on nationalistic and ethnic/cultural grounds has been a basic feature of the Chinese response to global consumerism. This section examines first the “discourse of resistance” and then the adoption of practical strategies, which have involved the commodification of both nationalism and culture, to compete with global products.

**History revisited: The discourse of resistance**

Perry has suggested, although with particular reference to recent Western political science research on China, that scholars “may be too drawn to European exemplars” and asks “might it not be better to pay greater attention to China’s own past?” (Perry 1994, 708–09). Attempting to break with systemic perspectives on post-revolutionary China, some major historians have also argued that historical forces continue to be influential and that these need to be taken into account in analysing recent developments (see, for example, Cohen 1988; Lieberthal et al. 1991). Few would disagree that the humiliating experience of nineteenth and early twentieth-century Western and Japanese imperialism left an indelible heritage, embodied in the discourse of modern Chinese nationalism. China, of course, is not the only country with such a legacy. As Robertson states, the practice of modern nations of promoting “discourses concerning their own
unique difference ... [was] much encouraged in and by the great globalizing thrusts of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries" (Robertson 1995, 41). For China, however, the confrontation was a particularly traumatic one, built on what Appadurai describes as “active resistance to interactions with the Other” for much of China’s earlier history (Appadurai 1990, 1).

This section suggests that China’s historical legacy, sometimes in association with remnants of the Maoist ideological legacy and admittedly utilised and manipulated by particular interest groups, provides the contextual framework for expressions of resistance to the revived foreign presence. Attempting to explain the rising tide of assertive nationalism in the mid-1990s—and to assuage the fears of foreign investors and their products who were amongst the targets—the historically-aware President of the US-China Chamber of Commerce urged business people to recognise that it all formed “one dimension of a Chinese domestic dialogue that began in the 1850s and will continue long into the future” (China Business Review November-December 1996, 6).16 That dialogue had included not just nationalistic discourse but demonstrations, strikes and boycotts against foreign goods, including anti-Japanese boycotts in 1908 and 1915, more wide-ranging boycotts around the May 4th period of 1919, and anti-British boycotts during the May 30th movement in 1925 (Cochran 1980). The success of the communist revolution had been followed by the complete eradication of all Western products and culture, with frequent assertions that the Chinese people were finally “the masters of China” (Hooper 1986).

Although foreign products re-entered China from the late 1970s in a very different political and economic climate from the pre-revolutionary situation, there was an undercurrent of continuing opposition, fuelled by elements critical of China’s reopening and periodically flaring up in official rhetoric. In June 1982, for example, China’s major newspaper claimed that the “blind worship of everything foreign”, so harshly criticised during earlier periods, was “again rearing its head”.

Some people ... worship foreign goods, pride themselves on possessing foreign goods, and to get hold of foreign goods would sacrifice national and personal dignity ... For Chinese to despise Chinese goods is to destroy our own morale and boost other people’s arrogance. It pollutes and poisons the Chinese national spirit (Renmin Ribao 5 June 1982, 5).

Subsequent campaigns against “spiritual pollution” (1983) and “bourgeois liberalisation” (1986) used similar language about foreign products as part of their broader attacks on Western culture and its alleged negative influences.

In the mid-1990s, such periodic outbursts were absorbed into a more wide-ranging movement and debate about “cultural colonialism”, part of a rising tide
of cultural nationalism which once again attempted to define Chinese identity or “Chineseness”, and denounced the West (and particularly the United States) for allegedly attempting to undermine that identity. Nationalist sentiment had been utilised by the government during the 1980s to maintain its legitimacy but during the 1990s it increasingly became, in Barme’s words, “the basis for a consensus beyond the bounds of official culture” and included avant-garde nationalists who were “resentful of the real and imagined slights that they and their nation have suffered in the past” (Barme 1999, 256, 277).

While some of the rhetoric was directed more broadly against Western cultural influences (which were blamed for everything from hedonism to rising crime and the growing divorce rate), the influx of foreign investment and consumer products was linked with the possibility of renewed economic domination by the West and Japan. The discourse was a striking example of Tomlinson’s suggestion that much of the language of modern-day cultural imperialism “draws its imagery from the age of high imperialism and colonialism [and] invokes an idea of cultural imposition by coercion” (Tomlinson 1991, 173). The terminology of “invasion”, harking back to China’s earlier experiences, was widely used with such statements as: “Multinational troops have once again invaded China. This time they’ve come not with guns and cannon but with cosmetics, cars, cigarettes and Western cuisine” (Zhao 1994, 41). At stake was not just China’s economic integrity but her national identity, suggested an article in Democracy and Legality entitled ‘Foreign winds invade China’. According to the author, a range of foreign food and drink—including McDonald’s and KFC, and Martell and Remy Martin cognac—had “made away not only with the Chinese people’s money but also with the patriotism of a good number of people . . . If such ‘Westernization’ continues, will China still possess her own characteristics?” (Bai 1996, 58).

The issue of whether McDonald’s and KFC were, in fact, symbols of cultural colonialism proved a controversial one, linked to the broader question of whether the renewed Western and Japanese presence could be labelled in this manner. To substantiate their arguments, some of the protagonists, writing in “leftist” publications like Zhongliu Yuekan [Midstream Monthly], drew on Western writings on globalisation as cultural imperialism, citing for example Paul Harrison’s chapter ‘The Westernization of the whole world’ in his book The Third World—Tribulations, Twists and Turns, and Hopes (‘Commentator’ 1996, 24). The opposing view, enunciated in more “liberal” journals like Dushu [Reading], was that the basic issue was one of China’s sovereignty. Unlike the earlier colonial era, when the West and Japan forced themselves on China, the nation’s “opening up is an active assimilation of foreign things on the premise that sovereign power rests in our own hands,” claimed one author (Sima 1995). If China retained its sovereignty, “how could such ‘colonial culture’ run rampant in today’s China?”

(Sima 1995). Since 1978 this had, in fact, been the official line on justifying the reopening of China to foreign investment and products.

When the issue flared again in May 1999 following the NATO bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, it assumed a more populist and specifically anti-American nature. American consumer products, the everyday face of the United States in China, became the targets of demonstrators. “We should boycott American products. We should buy Chinese products,” proclaimed one demonstrator at a televised rally in Beijing, reminiscent of many a demonstration against foreign goods in the early twentieth century. McDonald’s and Coca-Cola, generally regarded internationally as the two most dominant symbols of American economic and cultural imperialism (as well as of desired American culture),19 were singled out as particular targets. In Nanjing students shouted “dadao Maidanglao”[“down with McDonald’s”] as they marched past the Golden Arches and shamed customers into leaving the restaurant.20 In Guangzhou a protestor held up a placard:

I’d rather die of thirst than drink Coca-Cola.
I’d rather starve to death than eat McDonald’s.21

The behaviour of some of the student demonstrators revealed the inherent contradiction in attitudes towards foreign and especially American products. The short-lived nature of the protests was rumoured to be due to students’ looming TOEFL exams, to gain entrance to American and other Western universities. It was the same dichotomy—enthusiasm for, and resistance to, the West—that had existed for most of the century, interrupted only by the “closed door” of the Mao era.

**Playing the nationalism card: The battle of the big brands**

Practical resistance to foreign consumer products, complementing and sometimes utilising the discourse of resistance discussed above, has involved the implementation of strategies by an alliance of Chinese commercial interests, the government and the media to compete directly with foreign consumer products. In appealing to Chinese consumers, these have played the “nationalism card”, using a discourse of consumer nationalism and more broadly economic nationalism, as well as the “culture card” which is discussed in the next section.

The appeal to economic nationalism—as part of national identity, power and prestige—has been a basic feature of political and commercial discourse in both developing and developed countries, exacerbated by the increasing presence of global brands.22 In China, “the ideology of progress, national wealth, and power
“which] continued to inform public opinion” (Barme 1999, 279) has provided a fertile environment for officials and manufacturers alike to promote Chinese products in the name of “consumer nationalism” [xiaofei minzuzhuyi]. Once again, there are historical precedents. In 1915, for example, a national goods movement [guohuo yundong] had accompanied the boycotts protesting about Japan’s Twenty-One Demands. Chinese manufacturers took advantage of (as well as participating in) this and subsequent boycotts against foreign products by urging potential customers to “buy Chinese”. A notable example was the Nanyang Brothers Tobacco Company, enmeshed in rivalry with BAT (The British-American Tobacco Company) and continually attempting to undermine BAT’s reputation as an international brand name (Cochran 1980, 68–77).

Official and media statements in the 1990s had strong resonance with the earlier period, with the declared need for—and promotion of—high quality Chinese-produced goods and particularly brand-name products. According to one official:

Big brands not only symbolise high quality; they also reflect the economic power of our country and the overall quality of our nation. It is not only economically meaningful to create big brands, but also of political significance to do so (Xinwen Zhanxian April 1998).

Citing Deng Xiaoping, he added: “We must have our own competitive products and create our own famous Chinese brands. Otherwise we shall be bullied” (Xinwen Zhanxian April 1998), a statement harking back, once again, to China’s earlier humbling encounter with the West and Japan. “Past generations left us a beautiful country,” stated another author. “What will we pass on to future generations? Chinese electrical appliances or Nescafe?” (Zhao 1994, 139).

Electrical appliances have, indeed, been a major vehicle for the assertion of consumer nationalism since the early 1990s. From the early post-Mao years, these had dominated the list of consumer desires, replacing the watch, transistor radio and bicycle of the mid-1970s. First came washing machines, refrigerators and television sets, the customary indicators of rising living standards in developing countries (Robison and Goodman 1996; Hooper 1998a), with the upper end of the market dominated by Japanese manufacturers including Hitachi, Sharp, Toshiba, Sanyo and Sony. As ownership of these products became fairly general from the late 1980s, at least in urban areas, China’s expanding middle class provided a market for a widening range of Japanese and Western products: stereos, VCRs, air conditioners, video cameras, and the full range of domestic appliances—from microwaves to food processors (Hooper 1998a; Wu 1998, 82). By the mid-1990s, the products of the information age were a growing market: computer hardware and software, pagers and mobile phones. Rural China, up to
fifteen years behind urban areas in terms of consumer purchases, was becoming a growing market for more basic electrical appliances (Wu 1998, 82).

Central to the assertion of consumer nationalism has been the growth of China’s own conglomerates, modelled to a substantial extent on the Korean *chaebol* and enjoying strong government backing. Although the objective of getting into the world’s “top 500” companies has not yet been achieved, the flagship enterprises Changhong and Haier (China’s second and third ranked companies) have increasingly dominated sectors of the Chinese electrical appliances market, as well as becoming “globalised” in their manufacturing and sales.24 By 1998, the Sichuan-based Changhong Company, which had already produced China’s top-selling domestic colour television brand for eight years, accounted for 35 per cent of the total colour TV market (www.changhong.com). Haier, based in the Shandong city of Qingdao (formerly best-known for Tsingtao beer), had become China’s largest electrical appliances manufacturer, with the greatest market share (averaging 40 per cent)25 of refrigerators, air conditioners, freezers and washing machines (*Qingdao Ribao* 1 January 1999). Haier exported its products to almost ninety countries, and had forty-nine overseas sales headquarters and more than 30,000 sales outlets, as well as joint venture factories in Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia and Yugoslavia (*Qingdao Ribao* 1 January 1999; Xinhua Beijing 20 July 1999).26 It was well on the way to becoming a global company, it asserted. “One third of our products are sold in China, one-third are sold overseas, and one-third are produced overseas” (Zhang 1998).

Changhong and Haier were just two of the Chinese electrical appliance brand names with which the population was becoming increasingly familiar and which were also seeking global markets. Others included Konka (best known for its colour TV sets), Xinfei (refrigerators), Meidi (air conditioners) and Little Swan (washing machines), all of which made the list of China’s top twenty companies in 1997 (Li Shuang 1998, 230). The growth and rising reputation of Chinese brands, aided by improved quality controls and a price-cutting “war” in 1996, gave Chinese appliances an expanding share of the once Japanese-dominated market. By 1997, they reportedly accounted for over 93 per cent of the refrigerator market, 83 per cent of washing machines and 65 per cent of colour television sets, as well as 58 per cent of burgeoning air conditioner sales (Xinhua Beijing 2 April 1997).

Individual companies have readily “played the nationalism card” [*da minzu pai*] as part of their promotional strategy, linking their own activities to China’s economic and political power vis-a-vis other countries. As Haier expressed it: “Our ideal must be to assiduously build up our own national brands. A country without famous brands will forever manufacture for others and be subject to conditions imposed by others” (Zhang 1998). The blatant commodification of nationalism has, however, engendered a degree of scepticism amongst both

commentators and the public. “Why do we play the nationalism card?” asked a correspondent for China’s major youth newspaper:

It is true that customers are Chinese who love their country, having been through more than a hundred years of humiliating history ... But should we love whatever is made in China regardless? The protection of national industry should be carried out in accordance with government policy, not because industries play the “nationalism card” to win consumers (Zhongguo Qingnian Bao 26 May 1999).

In the brand-conscious environment of the mid-1990s, foreign companies came under assault for allegedly undermining Chinese brand names to benefit their own. “We can’t let all Chinese brands be eaten up by foreign companies”, the editor of the magazine China’s Top Brands, Chu Wei, told American Business Week reporter Dexter Roberts (Business Week 19 December 1997). The accusation was that, following the establishment of joint ventures, which provided much-needed foreign capital and technology, well-known Chinese brands—like Snow refrigerators, Peacock television sets and White Cat washing powder—were “killed by their foreign partner” in favour of foreign brand names (Zhongguo Zhiliang Wanlixing April 1998). According to one report, the top eight soft-drink producing factories in China had not only been bought up by Coca-Cola or Pepsi-Cola between 1992 and 1997, but had had their brand names “extinguished”. The only remaining Chinese soft drink that could be classed as a “national” product was Jianlibao, long promoted as a health drink and endorsed in advertisements by some of China’s top athletes (Dagongbao 15 June 1998). Chinese brand names, some commentators argued, were akin to intellectual property rights (which the United States had been so voluble about in its dealings with China) and should be protected (Beijing Qingnian Bao 23 May 1996).

A modern version of the pre-revolutionary “national goods” movement, entitled “The 1998–1999 ‘national brands in my heart’ campaign”, was implemented in Beijing in mid-1998. In this case, the commercial interests that instigated the campaign (the Beijing Dayu Advertising Company, television stations and a number of newspapers and consumer-oriented publications) appropriated not just nationalism but the discourse and methods long associated with the political “campaign” [yundong], a basic feature of the communist regime’s mobilisation strategy. Using familiar terminology, the media stated that the campaign’s objectives were to “promote, advocate and guide consumers to protect national brands”, with activities including press articles, display posters, interviews with relevant personnel and the “development of tactics” to counteract foreign goods (Shenghuo Shibao 21 July 1998).
Playing the culture card: Consumerism with Chinese/Oriental characteristics?

The manipulation, revival and even invention of “culture” and “tradition” for commercial purposes—including food, music and heritage tourism—have been widely discussed in academic discourse (for example, Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983; Robertson 1992; Firat 1995; Kong 1999). As Jory comments in relation to Thai advertising, for example: “It is striking . . . that some of the most successful and remembered ads, both on TV and in the print media, base themselves on Thai cultural themes” (Jory 1999, 468). At the same time, global products are themselves adapted to local situations through “glocalisation”, a business buzz-word (subsequently adopted by cultural theorists) from the 1980s for micro-marketing and signifying “the tailoring and advertising of goods and services on a global or near-global basis to increasingly differentiated local and particular markets” (Robertson 1995, 28).

The cultural distinctiveness/glocalisation dichotomy has been played out in China since the early years of the “open door”. This section examines two markets—fast food and beauty products—in which Chinese companies have played the “culture card” in their efforts to compete with global products, alleging that their products are “more suitable” for Chinese and, in some cases, for “Oriental” or “Asian” consumers, because of greater cultural knowledge and affinity. Unlike electrical appliances, these markets had strong Chinese cultural traditions: a long history of culinary culture and of beauty ideals (Chang 1977; Johansson 1998–99). The “greater suitability” argument potentially seemed to have some appeal. In the 1997 Lingdian survey, for example, “unsuitability for the Chinese” was the most important factor (cited by 16.2 per cent of respondents) for not buying foreign products after price considerations (Lingdian Diaoacha Gongsi 1998b).

Two of the most potent symbols of global consumerism—KFC and McDonald’s—have been amongst the most visible faces of China’s open door policy; the latter has already been discussed as an alleged symbol of cultural colonialism. (In mid-2000, KFC was the best-known foreign brand in China, and McDonald’s the fifth best known.) KFC’s first appearance in 1987, on a major intersection in Beijing’s busy Qianmen shopping district, had been followed five years later by the opening of McDonald’s in an even more strategic location—on the corner of Wangfujing and Changanjie, the city’s major east-west artery running past Tiananmen. “In the heart of what remains of the communist world, Marx and Mao are about to be muscled a bit further off stage by the big M of the capitalist world,” wrote the Far Eastern Economic Review (30 January 1992, 43). By the end of 1999, there were over fifty McDonald’s outlets in Beijing and a total of 235 in China, still lagging somewhat behind KFC’s 311. The sight of a Chinese
three-year-old biting into his or her first Big Mac, or a wary grandmother sampling her first Coke or french fries, presented a striking image of globalisation in action. During the 1990s, a host of other foreign food chains, including Pizza Hut, Dunkin’ Donuts, Japan’s Mos Burger and France’s Vie de France, also became part of the urban Chinese scene.

Fried chicken, in particular, became a site of global/local contention, with KFC provoking a challenge from local companies. Imitating the food of their Western counterpart, a host of Chinese versions of KFC (including Lingzhi Roast Chicken, Garden Chicken, Huaxiang Chicken and Xianfei Chicken) appeared on the scene from 1989, prompting what the media described as a “fried chicken war” (Beijing Qingnian Bao 2 April 1991). The most direct challenge was mounted by the Shanghai-based Ronghua Fried Chicken Company, founded in 1989. When Ronghua opened its first restaurant in Beijing in 1992, it was located directly opposite KFC’s popular Dongsi restaurant. At the opening ceremony the head of Ronghua reportedly stated: “Wherever Kentucky Fried Chicken opens a branch there will be a Ronghua restaurant” (Beijing Review 15–22 March 1993, 14). The local fried chicken brands explicitly presented themselves as Chinese versions of their American counterpart, asserting that their chicken was “more suitable” for local tastes. Thus Ronghua claimed it was selling “American style fried chicken with Chinese characteristics”, in this case a marinade of twenty-one traditional Chinese herbs of medicinal value. Others claimed that their “special ingredients” restored one’s yinyang balance or even cured various ailments.

In turn, KFC and other foreign food chains partially glocalised their products, making sustained efforts to present themselves as “Chinese” and downplaying their foreign/global connections. “Our principle is to regard ourselves as Chinese since we are in China,” KFC declared (Beijing Review 15–21 March 1993, 15), pointing out that their employees, their local managers and at least some of their ingredients were indeed Chinese, and holding special sales promotions during traditional Chinese festivals. In the intensely nationalistic environment of the late 1990s, KFC consciously attempted to tone down its all-American image and even to become visibly Chinese. When its flagship Beijing restaurant in Qianmen (still the largest KFC branch in China) reopened after extensive renovations in June 1999, the New China News Agency commented specifically on the “Chinese architectural style” of the new interior: “The layout imitates a typical northern China courtyard residence. The restaurant is also decorated with traditional Chinese handicraft works such as kites and paper-cuts” (Xinhua Beijing 24 June 1999). Both KFC and McDonald’s also followed the customary pattern of partially localising their menus to make them more acceptable to local tastes. As McDonald’s states on its website: “If meeting the demands of local culture means adding to our regular menus, we’ll do it” (www.mcdonalds.com/surfttheworld/asia/).
KFC and McDonald’s were able to maintain their position, not so much because of their food but because of a combination of cultural symbolism and practical appeal. Yan’s ethnographic research on McDonald’s in Beijing has illustrated that in China, as elsewhere in the world, ‘Americana’ also means ‘modern’, and thus to eat at McDonald’s is to experience modernity” (Yan 2000, 212). This was combined with an “exotic, cheerful, and comfortable physical environment” which included brightly lit and spotless open spaces, climate control, light furniture and neat smiling employees (Yan 2000, 213–18). The contrast with many local restaurants was highlighted in a 1996 Chinese article, published in the “internal” publication Gaige Neican and entitled ‘Foreign fast foods gobble up Chinese-style fast foods’. Chinese fast-food restaurants were continuing to lose out to foreign ones, claimed the author, “because of poor sanitary conditions and poor service ... [and] because of the absence of ‘ambience’ that exists in foreign fast-food restaurants ...” (Er 1996, 81).

Beauty products and toiletries, one of post-Mao China’s fastest growing markets, became a second site of contestation over “suitability” for consumers. Reflecting both rising incomes and the lifting of the harsh restrictions of the Cultural Revolution (and to some extent the whole of the Mao era), China’s cosmetics market skyrocketed from just over 200 million yuan in 1982 to 2.5 billion yuan in 1990 and 120 billion yuan in 1998 (China Market April 1992, 13; www.cosmetics.china.com/brand; Wei 1998). “Everyday” global brands, mostly produced as joint ventures with Chinese companies, played a major role in the expanding market. By 1998, two Procter & Gamble products (Rejoice and Head & Shoulders) had a 36.4 per cent share of China’s entire shampoo and hair conditioning market and were the top-selling hair products in China. Ponds and Oil of Olay were the top-selling skin-care products and between them accounted for 21.2 per cent of total sales for the sector (Sinofile Cosmetics Briefing 1–31 July 1998). At the upper end of the market, major international brands including Lancôme, Revlon, Estée Lauder and Shiseido dominated the showy cosmetics counters in up-market department stores and shopping malls, as well as advertisements in glossy magazines like the Chinese version of Elle (co-published in Shanghai and Paris).

According to Dirlik, “[S]ocialist China worked over by global capitalism ... has become a major promoter of Orientalist images of China, which have now been appropriated as the characteristics of Chinese society, often in the very language of Orientalism (including the term ‘Oriental’ itself)” (Dirlik 1996, 200). While Dirlik is discussing the complexities of Chinese culture in general, his words are highly relevant to the promotion of the Chinese beauty industry. With the major rivals being Western, rather than Japanese as in the case of electrical appliances, Chinese advertising discourse has combined assertions of Chinese and more broadly “Oriental” (and sometimes “Asian”) versus Western distinctiveness.

Chinese hair and beauty products are alleged to be “more suitable” for Chinese consumers because of the manufacturers’ greater knowledge of hair and skin types. The claimed distinctiveness of “Oriental woman” [dongfang nüxing] or “Asian woman” [Yazhou nüxing], including skin and hair characteristics but extending to “traditional” features including gentleness, elegance and dignity (Johannson 1999; Hooper 1998b, 186–87), has been promoted particularly by Chinese manufacturers extending their market not just to the Chinese diaspora but more generally within East and Southeast Asia.

The most striking example has been Yue-sai, extolled in the media as the leading Chinese cosmetics brand and designated one of the country’s potential “global players”, along with Changhong and Haier (Beijing this Month March 1999). (A complication, which does not seem to worry the media, is that Yue-sai Kan, the company’s founder, is actually a Hong Kong Chinese who, while having close links with Chinese officialdom and being well-known in China as a television presenter, has lived for many years in the United States.) The Yue-sai brand shares prize up-market department store space with Lancôme, Revlon, Christian Dior et al., its striking red, black and white advertisement (featuring its founder’s face) proclaiming that Yue-sai products are “specially designed for Asian women”. The advertisement usually also features an improvisation on this statement in English: “The best the world has to offer for Asian women”. Yue-sai Kan, who media reports claim has created “the first cosmetic colour system for Asians”, has written a book entitled Asian Beauty which extols the allegedly “traditional” features of Asian “elegance and beauty” (Beijing this Month March 1999).

The “Oriental” or “Asian” categorisation has also been seized on by Japanese companies in their competition with up-market Western brands. The giant cosmetics manufacturer Shiseido, for example, pursues an “Oriental” image in advertising both its named Shiseido products and those of its joint ventures like Huazi shampoo and conditioner: “Please choose Huazi, the mild Oriental type”. With its prestigious “Beautiful White Series”, Shiseido had a head start over Western brands in the booming market for skin-whitening products which it had already produced for the Japanese market and which have appealed to a similar Chinese/Oriental beauty discourse of the desirability of “fair skin” (Johannson 1998–99).

Although (white) Western beauty has conventionally been portrayed in international advertising and the media as a standardised beauty ideal (Chapkis 1988, 37) and white women represent what Schein describes as a “catalogue of consumption style” in China (Schein 1994, 147), the competition from Chinese (and to some extent Japanese) companies has prompted Western companies to play down their identification with Western beauty and to glocalise their products, at least according to their advertising. For example, when Procter &
Gamble introduced its premium hair-care brand Vidal Sassoon to China in 1998, embarking on one of its largest promotional initiatives in the country, the products were marketed as being “specially designed for Asian women” (Jingji Ribao 17 July 1998).

Advertising by the French company, L’Oréal, exemplifies the way in which marketing strategies have shifted as a response to competitive claims for the allegiance of Chinese consumers. An early foreign entrant to China, L’Oréal had from the early 1980s featured fair-haired Western models (as symbols of beauty and modernity) on its advertising billboards and in magazine advertisements (see, for example, Shizhuang March 1982). In 1997, however, it recruited Chinese film star and celebrity Gong Li as the “face of L’Oréal” in China. Advertisements and web sites described Gong Li as “the very embodiment of Chinese elegance and beauty”. In early 1998, the company claimed to have erected China’s largest billboard, located in Shanghai and featuring Gong Li’s face and the simple inscription “L’Oréal Paris” (www.loreal.com/us/group/world/loreal-chine.asp). The advertisement linked L’Oréal with two persuasive status images: China’s best-known female celebrity and the city recognised in China, ahead of Tokyo and New York, as the most stylish and fashionable in the “foreign world” (Lingdian Diaocha Gongsi 1997b, 44). At the same time, the promotion of Gong Li’s “Chinese characteristics” was somewhat at odds with popular perceptions of the celebrity as being more “Western” (or at least “Westernised”) than “Chinese” or “Oriental”, with little more relevance to Chinese women’s lives than Cindy Crawford or Elizabeth Hurley.

CONCLUSION

A 1997 Gallup Survey finding that 73 per cent of people preferred Chinese to foreign products (Gallup 1997) provoked concern from foreign companies active in the China market. However, the statistic that provoked greatest alarm was that even 63 per cent of Chinese classified as “wealthy” (with an annual household income of more than 30,000 yuan), who were expected to provide an ever-increasing market for global products, claimed that they preferred to “buy Chinese” (Business Week 29 December 1997). While these statistics must be treated with some caution, given the general atmosphere of assertive nationalism and admonitions to buy Chinese products, they reinforced other indications that the infatuation with foreign products was declining (Business Week 29 December 1997).

The claimed preference for Chinese goods was at least partly attributable to their improved quality, backed by more sophisticated advertising techniques, both of which are characteristic of countries as they reach a more advanced stage
of development (Thorelli 1998). As Haier expanded, for example, its quality reputation and after-sales service—as well as its much-vaunted globalising strategy—made it highly competitive with global brands. In 1997, the Chinese media claimed that “confidence in Chinese produced goods has increased among Chinese consumers as they’ve come to realize that a group of their own name brands are of the same quality as foreign products” (Xinhua Beijing 15 July 1997).

The growing reputation of Chinese brands was aided by a corresponding decline in the reputation of foreign brands (predictably well-publicised in the Chinese media). Both Western and Japanese products came under criticism for the same problems that had earlier beset Chinese goods, including shoddy workmanship and poor after-sales service. In September 1994, the China Consumers’ Association’s major publication, China Consumer News, claimed that foreign manufacturers had “exploited customers’ naïveté about foreign products” and pointed to a range of cases, including faulty household appliances, unreliable trucks and cars, and cosmetics containing lead or an excessive amount of methyl alcohol (Zhongguo Xiaofeizhe Bao 21 September 1994). The publicised complaints reinforced mounting perceptions that second-rate foreign products were being dumped on the Chinese market, a widespread view during the mid-1990s according to Lingdian’s Managing Director, Dr Yuan Yue (Interview 8 September 1998). The American Multinational Business Review admitted that many foreign manufacturers had, indeed, exploited the perceived superiority of foreign consumer goods by “shipping seconds and factory rejects to China … Chinese consumers quickly noticed the deterioration of quality” (Multinational Business Review Fall 1997, 28–40).

Although surveys indicated that quality and price considerations were uppermost in Chinese purchasing minds, they also suggested that appeals to cultural and economic nationalism may not have fallen on deaf ears. According to a March 1997 survey undertaken in the capital by the Beijing Yunhai Market Research Company, only 10 per cent of respondents claimed that they would buy foreign products if the price and quality were the same. (Almost 74 per cent indicated a preference for Chinese products and 16 per cent said they did not care.) Quizzed specifically on their attitudes towards consumer nationalism, almost 96 per cent of respondents considered that China “should have some internationally famous brands to reflect China’s national power”, close to 93 per cent stated that they hoped that Chinese products would succeed against foreign goods in the market, and 77 per cent thought it would be a “bad thing” if more people bought foreign products (www.315china.com, 6 June 1998). In interpreting these statistics, one again has to take account of the constraints likely to be operating on people’s responses in the heady nationalistic atmosphere of the late 1990s. And for all the statistics, international status symbols have continued to head the list of consumer desires for China’s “new rich”. Mercedes and BMW,
for example, were named as the “most-loved car brands” in a survey undertaken at the Beijing International Auto Show in June 2000 (Zhongguo Baoxian Bao 22 June 2000).

This article has argued that the influx into China of global products, regarded by many people as symbols of quality and status, has also provoked resistance and the adoption of counter-strategies. This pattern conforms to the concept of globalising trends as being “in tension with ‘local’ assertions of identity and culture” (Robertson 1995, 33), expressed by theorists including Wallerstein and Barber, as well as by some researchers on inter-cultural consumer behaviour, as discussed in the introduction. While resistance to foreign products has only been one aspect of post-Mao China’s encounter with the world of global consumerism (there have undoubtedly also been forces of hybridisation and indigenisation at work), it has been an important feature of that encounter. Resistance to foreign products has been particularly apparent since the mid-1990s, within a general environment of assertive cultural nationalism that has itself been partially linked to China’s growing commercialism and widening of the “open door”. Accusations of cultural colonialism which have targeted, inter alia, the growing pervasiveness of foreign products, have been combined with practical strategies—expounded by government, the media and commercial interests—that have appropriated Chinese nationalism and Chinese/Oriental culture to compete with foreign products, only to be faced with the glocalisation strategies of multinational companies.

Although China’s recent interaction with global consumerism is part of an international pattern, the contestation has been—and will undoubtedly continue to be—particularly intense, given the perceived huge potential of the reopened “China market” (which will increase when the country is admitted to the World Trade Organisation) set against China’s historical legacy, as well as its emergence as a powerful force on the international economic and political scene. As China increasingly becomes a global player, the dynamics may well change. Contributing to one of the recent “classic” texts on globalisation, Pieterse expresses unease with the general discourse of globalisation as a “technological, commercial and cultural synchronization emanating from the West” and invokes the idea of a “global mélange” which takes account of, inter alia, “the impact non-Western cultures have been making on the West” (Pieterse 1995, 53). Expressing a similar idea, though focusing on China, a contributor to the cultural colonialism debate wrote somewhat satirically of “bidirectional cultural colonialization”.

The important thing is that we ourselves should send out things we take pride in and “colonize” them in Uncle Sam’s backyard . . . Neither side should have any reason to be displeased if the activities of colonialization are bi-directional (Li Daqiang 1996).
NOTES

1 The research for this article was carried out with funding from the Australian Research Council. It draws on a range of Chinese and Western sources, including sociological and market research surveys, the burgeoning Chinese media as well as Internet sites, and discussions and participant observation in China during regular research visits in the 1980s and 1990s. I would like to thank Sharon Lim and Chen Chuqing for their research assistance and two anonymous readers for their incisive and useful comments.

2 For a discussion of these themes in relation to Asia, see Pinches 1999, especially pp. 27–31, and individual chapters in the book.

3 Robertson himself challenges such views (Robertson 1995, 33).

4 This is but no means a definitive list, but rather indicates the range of research that has been undertaken.

5 The most notable example is Yunxiang Yan’s ethnographic research on McDonald’s in Beijing which is discussed later in this article (Yan 1998, 2000).

6 On the entry of some of the TNCs (Trans-National Corporations) into China, see Sklair 1994.

7 This perception was based on a widely-cited report by the Hong Kong company DRI/McGraw Hill (Economist 3 December 1994).

8 Households with an annual per capita income of over 50,000 yuan (US$6,450), of which one million had an annual per capita income of over one million yuan (US$120,000) (Wu 1998, 9).

9 Illustrating the substantial urban-rural differential, the relative proportions involved were: first segment 1% urban, 0.2% rural; second segment 2.5% urban, 1% rural; third segment 10% urban, 4% rural (Economist 3 December 1994; also Zhongguo Tongji Nianjian 1995).

10 However, pre-revolutionary China had a tradition of brand names, going back to imperial times (Hamilton and Lai 1989).

11 The Lingdian Market Research Company (which also goes under the English name Horizon Research) is headquartered in Beijing with offices in Shanghai and Guangzhou. Founded in 1992, it does research for both Chinese and foreign companies, as well as its own social surveys which are published both in detailed academic form (for example, Lingdian Diaocha Gongsi et al. 1997a) and in summary form for general sale (for example Lingdian Diaocha Gongsi 1998a) or internet access (www.chinavista.com/business/market/lingdian/).

12 The concept of “positional goods” was developed by writers including Hirsch (1975) and Douglas and Isherwood (1980).

13 The characteristics and aspirations of China’s yapishi are discussed in Miao and Li 1995.

14 The English titles which often appear on the cover of popular magazines tend to be rather “free” translations.

15 On the gendered aspects of global status symbols in China, see Hooper 1998b, 185–88.

16 The article cited historian Michael H. Hunt’s book The Genesis of Chinese Communist Foreign Policy and his statement that the fundamental questions “about China’s heritage and its future . . . and its relationship to the outside world” were questions “that were to echo in Chinese politics long after the empire had been reconstituted . . .” (China Business Review November–December 1996, 7).

17 A number of media articles about “cultural colonialism” are translated in Chinese Sociology and Anthropology 31, no. 4, 1999. The cultural colonialism debate is discussed in Béja 1995 and 1996. For an assessment of the Chinese debate surrounding cultural nationalism, including its anti-Western aspects, see Barmé 1999, 255–81.
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