South Australia: Caution and Consistency

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During the 1990s public service industrial relations in South Australia have followed the state's long-standing practice of being moderate and careful. From 1993 onwards, processes of corporatisation and privatisation that had commenced under the Bannon Labor government were continued and extended under the new Liberal government, in part as a response to financial pressures arising from the State Bank collapse, and in part as a reflection of the same trends that were widespread elsewhere. Where possible the government avoided direct confrontation with unions. There were various contests where the parties explored options in the changing environment, but the most prominent trend was that government policies of financial restraint and outsourcing tended to reduce most unions' bargaining power. Those policies were initially conjoined with agency-specific enterprise bargaining, but the resulting variations in outcomes finally led to a Wages Parity Agreement to restore consistency.

During the 1990s public service industrial relations in South Australia have followed the state's long-standing practice of being moderate and careful, neither a pacesetter nor a model of fundamental restructuring, but rather reflecting national trends within a local context of bargaining acceptable outcomes. In this decade South Australia has fallen clearly into the collectivist, two-tiered model identified by Thornthwaite and Hollander: 'a two-tier arrangement of awards overlaid by agency agreements, and trade union involvement'.[1] This model can be contrasted with a de-collectivist model which exhibits 'a greater choice of mechanisms, including individual agreements, and an erosion of the representative capacity of trade unions', which those authors see as being followed by Victoria, Western Australia and the Commonwealth.

Industrial Relations and Public Administration

To a significant extent, the South Australian experience reflects the desire of successive state governments to preserve the state's 'good industrial relations record'. During the 1990s state premiers have imitated their predecessors in emphasising that factor, often in attempts to attract investment to the state.[2] To that extent, the period has continued the pluralist approach identified by Wanna in the 1980s.[3] In the 1993 state election campaign, the Opposition Leader, Dean Brown, adopted an approach to industrial relations that was distinctly less radical than those of Liberal counterparts in Victoria and Western Australia, with the comment that 'We have South Australian solutions to South Australian problems'.[4] Undoubtedly, the approach was tempered to some extent by the desire to obtain sufficient electoral support to control the state Upper House (a desire that was not fulfilled). However, the Labor government's electoral problems from the State Bank's non-performing loans gave the Opposition a strong position to move in a more radical direction on industrial relations if it had wished to, and in any case the concern about electoral response to a radical policy only reflects the fact that the state's long-standing pluralist traditions were expected to be well accepted by the electorate.

The result was the Industrial and Employee Relations Act 1994 (SA). While this repealed the Industrial Relations Act 1972 (SA) and was in some respects a 'major revision of the

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system',[5] it did little more than set up a state version of the changed federal arrangements that had been introduced by the Labor government's Industrial Relations Reform Act 1993 (Cwlth). In 1991 the South Australian state tribunal had followed its federal counterpart in introducing principles for enterprise bargaining,[6] and subsequent legislative change only extended the same basic approach. Consistency had always been important in South Australian wage fixing,[7] and to some extent developments have revolved around the extent to which consistency ought to give way to deregulation and decentralisation. But perhaps the respects in which the 1994 Act has most clearly reflected conservative ideological commitments are the provisions broadly associated with 'freedom of association', and efforts to moderate union involvement in bargaining processes. Thus, for example, a union may become party to an agreement applying to a group of employees only if notice has been given to each employee in the group in the form of a written statement advising them of the union's intentions, if the notice advises each employee that the union must be authorised by a majority of the group to act on the group's behalf, and if the union has been authorised in writing by a majority of the employees currently constituting the group to act on their behalf (s.75(2)–(4)). The implication is extra administrative work for unions, but arguably their task in that respect is less onerous for public sector unions than others, since their members are already used to the ways of government bureaucracy.

More recently, in March 1999 the Liberal government introduced the Industrial and Employee Relations (Workplace Relations) Amendment Bill 1999, which proposed substantial amendments to the Industrial and Employee Relations Act 1994. The amendments would effect significantly more radical change than the 1994 Act, but perhaps just for that reason have encountered more opposition than the earlier changes, and after inconclusive debate in parliament it is not clear at the time of writing whether the government will persist in attempting to pass the Bill through the Upper House. Present doubt about the fate of the Bill only seems to reflect the tradition of moderation in the state as far as industrial relations matters go.

Thus, the recent years of Liberal government rule have seen an evolutionary continuation of what was in place at the time of their election, rather than any revolutionary change in industrial relations. As in other parts of Australia, trends in industrial relations have often complemented changes in public administration, but the developments have been affected by the distinctive history and situation of the state. In the early 1990s Radbone was able to write that:

> the dominant theme of developments in the South Australian public sector under Bannon was cut-back management. These cuts were accompanied by the introduction of a managerialist philosophy which stressed the value of adopting private-sector management techniques in the public sector.[8]

This trend was at least partly the result of financial pressures on state government that resulted from a decline in the level of economic activity and cuts in Commonwealth financial assistance.[9] However, the financial pressures were much increased by the need to support the State Bank when it was disclosed in 1991 that the bank had $2.5 billion worth of non-performing loans. In 1993 the Labor government (by then with Lynn Arnold as Premier in succession to John Bannon) initiated a process of public sector reform. To a significant extent, the process merely continued reform processes that had been occurring since the time of the Corbett Report,[10] including changes introduced with the Government Management and Employment Act 1986. The 1993 program built on proposals that had emerged from the Government Agencies Review Group during the early 1990s, but was presented with the theme of a 'responsive' public sector.[11] Inevitably, the program was oriented toward financial restraint. Measures associated with it went on to figure in the dynamics of enterprise bargaining. One which may have been especially significant in subsequent events was an endeavour to further increase the mobility of public sector employees between positions and units.[12] But the themes of responsiveness and financial restraint meant that the Brown Liberal government that was elected in December 1993 was able to continue and extend processes that were already in train.

In addition, despite undertakings given before the election that the Government Management and Employment Act would

remain in place, the new government moved the following year to replace it with a new Public Sector Management Act that would remove legislative requirements for consultation with unions and in other ways increase political control of public administration. As with other proposals, the eventual legislation had to be modified in significant ways before its passage through the Upper House, but the final Act preserved the same basic directions: in particular, increased managerial powers for chief executive officers (CEOs) and the capacity to employ executive staff on contracts. The increased powers that were given to CEOs may in some ways have served to expand the possibilities for enterprise bargaining focused on individual departments, but the government still faced one notable constraint. In its dying days, the preceding Labor government had entered into a 'Framework Agreement' for enterprise bargaining with public sector unions. This had two key elements. One was a commitment to several arrangements that could otherwise have been expected to fall victim to change under the new conservative rule. These arrangements covered maintenance of union payroll deductions, continuation of the prevailing policy of 'no compulsory retrenchments', and broad requirements for consultation with unions. The other key element was to establish arrangements for enterprise-level productivity bargaining. These included provision for each department to establish a 'Single Bargaining Centre' (SBC) with unions and for a 'gainsharing pool' to be set up in each department, to contain cash and non-cash savings identified in the bargaining process. The amount in the gainsharing pool might then be directed to employment in the department, to service enhancement or to improve wages and conditions for employees in the department. While unions condemned the Framework Agreement publicly because it was not tied to a wage increase, it was clear that in the government's political circumstances this agreement was as good as anything they might hope for.

The Enterprise Bargaining Framework Agreement

It might have been expected that the new government would view aspects of this agreement with disfavour, but because it had been registered as an agreement in the Australian Industrial Relations Commission as well as in the state industrial commission, the government could not remove its effect by executive action or even by any legislative fiat it could have contrived.

Initially, the Framework Agreement does indeed seem to have presented itself as a problem for the new government as it sought to contain wage increases. In the Department of Housing and Construction (SACON), unions sought a ruling from the federal Industrial Relations Commission when the department received a direction from government not to negotiate on matters to do with wages or general conditions of service. The commission made an order requiring the government to negotiate in good faith.[13] It may be this case that resulted in subsequent government control being exercised through budget constraints on departments rather than through direct instructions about the bargaining agenda.

Nevertheless, that degree of control proved satisfactory enough for the government's purposes for the Framework Agreement to be substantially renewed by a Memorandum of Understanding between the government and unions in 1996. The government had responded to provision for union payroll deductions by requiring individuals to give an annual renewal of their authority for deductions to continue. It had been able to continue with the previous government's means of reducing payroll numbers through voluntary separation arrangements to an extent that made it willing to maintain the commitment to no retrenchments.

What of the bargaining arrangements that had been put in place by the Framework Agreement? The transitional provisions of the Industrial and Employee Relations Act 1994 (SA) preserved the force and effect of the Framework Agreement. The process that the Framework Agreement established for the negotiation of individual enterprise agreements in separate agencies was generally consistent with the approach taken by the new Act. One arrangement that was promoted at first by the incoming government was for individuals to be involved directly in enterprise bargaining that affected them, rather than through unions. In some cases, the involvement of individuals with

limited experience or idiosyncratic expectations hindered unions, but in Education Department bargaining the Australian Education Union deliberately invited individual members to participate, as a tactical move, and the resulting meetings were unworkable. Perhaps as a result of this, encouragement of direct involvement by individuals in collective bargaining at enterprise level has subsequently given way to a more orthodox division between union negotiation of collective agreements and attempts by management to increase the use of individual contracts. A later attempt by government to seek agreement direct from individual employees for the Wages Parity Agreement (see below) failed decisively, and the matter was resolved through negotiation with the union.

As for the content of the various agreements that emerged, it was inevitable that there would be a substantial amount of pattern bargaining between agencies, and that there would continue to be emphasis on the debt problem that confronted the new government in the aftermath of the State Bank collapse. One of Premier Brown's first initiatives after the 1993 election was to establish a 'Commission of Audit' to assess the state's overall financial position and to recommend strategies for managing the public sector in the light of that assessment. Published in April 1994 under the title Charting the Way Forward: Improving Public Sector Performance, many of the recommended strategies gave scope for bargaining in the ensuing years. They included levels of resourcing for various functions and levels of service provision, matters of flexibility in workforce deployment and others that might generally be referred to as issues about management prerogative. In a number of cases, the report noted with approval what had already been achieved. For example, in its discussion of the Engineering and Water Supply Department (EWS), it noted that:

> Over the last two and a half years, EWS has achieved substantial improvements in labour productivity with staff reductions of over 900 employees (equivalent to a 24 percent reduction). This rationalisation has been achieved concurrently with maintaining or improving service levels.[14]

In this case the major recommendation was to change the ownership framework. The report said:

> The EWS operates as a department of state. This institutional form must change to assist in establishing the appropriate set of incentives for EWS to operate in a more commercial manner, to establish an appropriate balance between government control and managerial flexibility and to provide a catalyst for the change in the culture of the workforce.[15]

To a large extent this example reflected developments across the public sector. Moves for increased efficiency had been the subject of major industrial bargaining since the 1987 Second Tier wage round. 'Privatisation' and milder but related initiatives like 'commercialisation' and 'corporatisation' had been politically sensitive. In 1985, a media campaign conducted by the South Australian Public Service Association against Opposition privatisation policies helped win enough public sympathy to play a major part in the Bannon government retaining office.[16] This may partly have reflected South Australia's long-standing commitment to public sector provision of infrastructure to assist industrial development, a strategy that had been a prominent part of long-time Liberal Premier Tom Playford's period of government from 1938 to 1965.[17] But by the end of the 1980s, the Bannon government had already been taking some steps in the new direction.[18] The Brown government took power without any of the ideological reservations that had held back the Labor government, in a changed climate of opinion from that of 1986, and where other developing initiatives promoted policy change. For example, the 1995 Competition Principles Agreement between the Commonwealth and the states embodied the principle that government business enterprises ought not enjoy any net competitive advantage simply as a result of public sector ownership, while competitive tendering and contracting out services that had hitherto been performed within agencies were further promoted by the 1996 report of a Commonwealth Industry Commission Inquiry.[19] The outsourcing of activities had immediate industrial relations effects. In some cases it meant that the workers performing the activities were no longer governed by the same framework of awards and agreements that applied to the public sector, and it removed the constraints of the Framework Agreement and the 'no

retrenchments' policy that applied to employees within the sector.

In addition to proposals along these lines, the 1994 Commission of Audit also contained an Appendix on 'Restrictive Work Practices' that provided possible bargaining initiatives for government. The restrictive practices listed were identified by agency, so that a different agenda might be expected for each Single Bargaining Centre established in the Framework Agreement, but they tended to focus on conditions that appeared to management to hinder the recruitment, deployment or termination of staff. These might be addressed directly by negotiation over rostering arrangements, shift length limitation and the like, but outsourcing or other devolution of functions could often pre-empt the issue. Reduction in public sector workforce numbers had already been in train under the Labor government, and was made a systematic part of the new government's array of initiatives. The 'no retrenchments' commitment of the Framework Agreement meant that the government needed to effect workforce reduction through continuing the scheme of Targeted Voluntary Separation Packages (TVSPs). Use of these was at a maximum over the two-year period 1993–95, and reduced thereafter.[20] The major change under the new government was that earlier use of the TVSPs had been funded to a significant extent by a Federal government bail out package in the aftermath of the State Bank collapse, but their continued use now had to be funded by savings from within agencies.

The way that such strategies as outsourcing could circumvent the need to bargain over certain issues is an example of the general point that in dealing with public sector unions over recent years the government has generally tried to avoid confrontation on issues where union membership opinion might be aroused and unified. Since the 1994 SACON case, the government has simply set financial parameters that the outcome would have to satisfy within each bargaining unit, rather than setting targets for agreement on particular bargaining issues. Such an approach is straightforward in the general enterprise bargaining environment and within the specific terms of the Framework Agreement.

During 1994–95 the government initially conducted negotiations with public sector unions through the SA United Trades and Labor Council, which might have achieved similar outcomes for enterprise bargaining in different agencies. However, several significant groups — notably teachers, police and nurses — sought better outcomes. Nurses' strategy was determined by a national commitment to achieving professional rates, while police and teachers were motivated at least in part by comparisons with rates paid to interstate counterparts. In response, the government moved to pursue agency-based bargaining.

These developments were affected by a number of different factors. The change emphasised the role of the 'gainsharing pool' that had been established in the Framework Agreement, since a base offer of $35 per week (later increased to $36) could be supplemented from productivity improvements. To the extent that this focused attention on agency-specific initiatives, the change reflected managerialist emphases on devolution, incentives and outcome measurement.[21] But it was also consistent with the increased emphasis on enterprise bargaining in both state and federal industrial relations systems. That emphasis was accepted by both the federal Labor government of the time and by the Australian Council of Trade Unions, but individual unions and membership groups varied in their degree of acceptance of enterprise bargaining, and in their tactics.

In some cases, unions attempted to continue reliance on industrial tribunals. In the Department for Correctional Services, for example, long-running disputation involving prison officer members of the Public Service Association finally came to arbitration in early 1996, when the SA Industrial Commission determined that negotiation and conciliation processes had reached an impasse. After determining some relatively clear matters about interpretation of the Framework Agreement, the commission was faced with a less straightforward issue about quantifying productivity gains. Detailed evidence was heard from employees and managers about changes and initiatives in the department. Both sides called expert witnesses regarding quantification and measurement of gains in productivity and efficiency, but their views about quantification of the gainsharing pool ranged from $4m to $18m.

Taking a 'broad-axe' approach to the exercise, the commission determined the size

of the gainsharing pool to be approximately $13m, and the matter was referred back to the parties to finalise an agreement on that basis.[22] Hearing an appeal from the Public Service Association, the Full Commission commented that many of the relevant issues 'are notoriously difficult to assess in a service industry',[23] and found that the decision 'was within the range of appropriate assessments'. The result was a wage rise broadly similar to that achieved in other departments.

In some cases unions attempted unsuccessfully to distance themselves from the enterprise bargaining process. Thus, for example, the Miscellaneous Workers' Union (FMWU), covering a number of weekly-paid workers in several agencies, withdrew from SBC meetings early in 1995. Subsequent events in the Department for Environment and Natural Resources show their resulting problems. Negotiations continued involving other unions. When terms for agreement were arrived at in those negotiations, FMWU members were confronted with a dilemma. If the agreement was approved, they would be bound by it even though their union would not be a party to it. One possibility was for them to abstain from voting in the ballot that was to be held to seek the majority employee approval that is required under the Industrial and Employee Relations Act. But if the agreement was not approved, they and other employees of the department would forgo the associated pay rise. In the event, 52.7 percent of eligible employees supported the agreement. The enterprise agreement was subsequently approved by the South Australian Industrial Relations Commission, at the request of unions who covered most of the department's employees, in the face of opposition from the FMWU. The FMWU's withdrawal from enterprise bargaining had been associated with applications for increases to relevant awards, but in approving the agreement, the tribunal noted the implication of the Act that enterprise agreements were a preferred alternative to award variations.[24]

Nurses, police and teachers were more successful in attempts to avoid enterprise bargaining on the government's terms. All eventually achieved relatively favourable outcomes. Perhaps the reason was to some extent a degree of public sympathy or support not available to other groups of public servants, but their road was still not straightforward.

For example, in the Education Department, the Australian Education Union was able to play a major role, given the large proportion of employees who were AEU members, even though workers in schools were covered in the same negotiations as public service administrative workers in the department. Traditionally militant and effective, during 1994 and 1995 the AEU refused to accept offers made by the government under the Framework Agreement, and sought an award in the federal commission. The government opposed the award application, arguing that the AEU's participation in the Framework Agreement prohibited it from seeking federal arbitration. Although the argument ultimately failed, it prompted the AEU to withdraw from the Framework Agreement and decline to participate in the Memorandum of Understanding that renewed it in 1996.

Records of industrial action seem to show that bargaining in the education area was particularly acrimonious. Table 1 shows stoppages during the period July 1995 to June 1997, as recorded in annual reports of the Department of Industrial Affairs for 1995–96 and 1996–97.

Eventually, an agreement was reached to operate from December 1996 that afforded Education Department employees a 17 percent wage increase. Although the settlement achieved by the AEU was delayed by a protracted dispute it did not involve the bargaining about productivity, conditions and arrangements in schools that the union wished to avoid. The eventual wage increase exceeded others that were achieved where unions did the best they could after accepting a need to engage in enterprise bargaining, and the salary rates set in the education settlement were later used as the public-sector-wide comparison benchmark underpinning the 1999 Wages Parity Agreement.

There could be a number of explanations for the AEU's decision to pursue a militant bargaining strategy, and for its degree of success. It is quite possible that unity derived from members' similarity of training and function played a significant role, but it is also plausible to suggest that a key factor was the impracticability of outsourcing teaching and teaching-related functions in the state school system, so that the policies of competitive tendering and contracting out that were significant elsewhere played a lesser role there.[25]

Table 1: Industrial Stoppages, 1995-97[26]

Agency	Number of stoppages	Average number of employees involved	Average hours lost (approximately)
Education & Children's Services	9	4,410	21,666
Correctional Services	9	56	61
Health Commission	9	31	101
Other	9	63	1,150

The Wages Parity Agreement

After dispute during 1997 about quantification and distribution of another 'gainsharing pool', this time in the Department for Environment and Natural Resources, unions again sought arbitration of the matter.[27] Their claim was again unsuccessful, and continuing disaffection over the issue contributed to a change of approach during subsequent negotiations. Another contributing factor was the variation in bargaining outcomes in different agencies. The first round of bargaining gave fairly uniform outcomes over a wide range of different agencies, but dates of operation varied, and there were enough variations to give rise to some concern. While bargaining was coordinated through the government's Industrial Claims Coordinating Committee, some agencies proved more effective at it than others. To some extent, this may be explained by the extent to which there were measures available to them which figured in the government's general agenda of outsourcing and asset sales. Departments which had traditionally employed a significant blue-collar workforce were often able to divest the functions that those employees had performed, and it was often those same departments that had assets to sell. Other factors that may have differed between agencies were the skill and experience of their senior managers and the extent to which their recent history had involved their continuing existence as discrete and coherent units. At the same time, from the union point of view there were at least some cases where their relationships within Single Bargaining Units became disorganised and ineffective, as a result of traditional rivalries, professional jealousy.[28]

Variations in outcomes had predictable effects in an environment where developments from the Labor government's 1993 reform agenda onwards had placed some premium on the flexible deployment of labour. Where different pay or arrangements applied to employees in one agency compared to another, there were problems when staff were to be moved from one to the other. Employees were affected by cases of 'unequal pay for equal work'. At the same time, senior managers were concerned at the prospect of losing staff to other agencies who could pay more for the same work. Some of these problems were exacerbated by a major reorganisation of departments and portfolios in late 1997, which resulted in hitherto discrete agencies being grouped together, with the consequent widespread juxtaposition of employees who were subject to different arrangements for pay and conditions, or who had been involved in negotiations that were at different stages of development.

At least partly as a result of those factors, extensive negotiations were conducted between the government and unions around the possibility of putting in place an arrangement that would provide for 'wage parity' across the public service, to equalise and maintain salary levels for the same classification levels in different agencies. By early 1998 government and unions reached an agreement in principle that would not only extend the Memorandum of Understanding that had maintained the Framework Agreement, but would also provide 'wages parity' in mainstream public service portfolios and a number of other areas. Disputation occurred about the quantum of associated wage movements, and the government attempted to win acceptance of its proposals by a direct ballot of employees. However, this failed decisively, and negotiations continued with unions. Despite the difficulties engendered by the requirement that differential increases be applied to different groups in order to achieve parity, an agreement was eventually

arrived at to extend for two years from October 1999. It included extension of the previous Memorandum of Understanding for the term of the agreement, and superseded expiring agency-specific agreements.

The Wages Parity Agreement undoubtedly represented a substantial departure from some earlier policies, and may be interpreted as a realistic assessment of the possibilities for enterprise bargaining in a public sector environment. It should be noted that the agreement did not signal a return to past bargaining agendas. For example, during 1999 government and unions achieved a significant agreement to allow widespread salary packaging. Nevertheless, the agreement did endorse the principle that internal wage consistency is desirable among public sector employees, while still being broadly consistent with federal industrial relations developments.

At the end of the decade South Australian public sector industrial relations continue to take place in an enterprise bargaining framework characteristic of the collectivist two-tiered model. The 'South Australian solutions to South Australian problems' have been the combination of pragmatism and moderation previously characteristic of South Australian industrial relations. The approach seems to have worked effectively in a period of significant privatising, outsourcing and downsizing, not presenting any major obstacles to the managerialist agenda of the South Australian government. The parity agreement seems to indicate a return to centralised wage outcomes for the public service below executive levels and it is a significant lever of government control over wage outcomes for the core public service. The general South Australian industrial legislative context remains uncertain. However, the more radical legislation that would see the state move in a de-collectivist direction and become more congruent with Commonwealth workplace relations legislation remains stalled in the Legislative Council. It is highly likely that the state will maintain an approach of caution in public sector industrial relations and seek to maintain consistency of wage outcomes for the core public service.[29]

Notes

1. Thornthwaite, L & R Hollander 1998 'Two Models of Contemporary Public Service Wage Determination in Australia', AJPA 57:98–106.
2. See The Australian Financial Review 27 March 1990 and 26 March 1991 (Bannon), 18 October 1993 (Arnold), 10 September 1998 (Olsen).
3. Wanna, J 1986 'The State and Industrial Relations in South Australia' in K Sheridan ed The State as Developer: Public Enterprise in South Australia, Royal Institute of Public Administration, Adelaide in association with Wakefield Press.
4. The Australian Financial Review 10 December 1993.
5. Reitano, R 1995 'Legislative Change in 1994', Journal of Industrial Relations 37:84–94.
6. Industrial Commission of South Australia 1991 'State Wage Case — December 1991', Print I.115/1991, 3 December (South Australian Industrial Reports vol. 58).
7. Cf. Provis, C 1986 'Comparative Wage Justice', Journal of Industrial Relations 28:24–39.
8. Radbone, I 1992 'Public-sector Management' in A Parkin & A Patience eds The Bannon Decade, Allen & Unwin, Sydney.
9. See, for example, The Australian Financial Review 24 August 1990.
10. Corbett, DC, DM Martin & RD Bakewell 1975 Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the Public Service of South Australia, SA Government, Adelaide.
11. See, for example, 'A Bias for YES: The Public Sector Response in the Revitalisation of South Australia', Ministerial Paper released 4 May 1993, and accompanying Ministerial Statement.
12. See, for example, Ministerial Statement, p.44.
13. Australian Industrial Relations Commission 1994 's.170QK Application for good faith orders', Print L4602, 3 August.
14. 1994 Charting the Way Forward: Improving Public Sector Performance, South Australian Commission of Audit, Report.
15. 1994 Charting the Way Forward: Improving Public Sector Performance, South Australian Commission of Audit, Report. The recommendation was later implemented through an outsourcing contract with a consortium under the name of United Water to run and maintain the state's water and sewage system.
16. Cf. Jaensch, D 1992 'The Liberal Party' in A Parkin & A Patience eds The Bannon Decade: The Politics of Restraint in South Australia, Allen & Unwin, Sydney.
17. Jaensch, D 1986 'The Playford Era' in D Jaensch ed The Flinders History of South Australia:

Political History, Wakefield Press, Adelaide.

18. For example, in developments associated with the Department of Woods and Forests, such as the SA Timber Corporation and Forwood Products Pty Ltd.
19. Public Sector Research Centre 1996 Contracting Out and Competitive Tendering, Community and Public Sector Union, Melbourne.
20. See Report of the Auditor-General for the year ended 30 June 1997.
21. See, for example, M Keating 1990 'Managing for Results in the Public Interest', AJPA 49:387–98.
22. See Industrial Relations Commission of South Australia 1996 'Public Service Association of South Australia v Department for Correctional Services', Print I.69/1996, 12 April (South Australian Industrial Reports vol. 63).
23. Industrial Relations Commission of South Australia 1996 'Public Service Association of South Australia Inc v The State of South Australia (Department for Correctional Services)', Print I.123/1996, 16 August (South Australian Industrial Reports vol. 63).
24. Industrial Relations Commission of South Australia 1995 'Department for Environment and Natural Resources Tier 1 Enterprise Agreement 1995', Print I.108/1995, 22 June.
25. Although recent government initiatives to devolve increased control of schools to local communities could have some similar industrial relations effects. For background to those initiatives, see Community Partnerships in Education : A Report on Local School Management ('The Cox Report'), Department of Education, Training and Employment, Adelaide, 1998.
26. Source: Department of Industrial Affairs, Adelaide, Annual Reports, 1995–6 and 1996–7.
27. Industrial Relations Commission of South Australia 1998 'Department for Environment and Natural Resources Tier 1 Enterprise Agreement 1995, etc', Print I.89/1998, 3 September 1998.
28. Health-related areas were one notable example.
29. The authors are grateful to a number of industrial relations practitioners who made themselves available to discuss issues raised in this paper and to comment on an earlier draft.