Discourse and Racism

RUTH WODAK AND MARTIN REISIGL

0 Introduction

“Racism” is a stigmatizing headword and political “fighting word” that seems to be on almost everyone’s lips today. Perhaps this is because the meaning of “racism” has become extraordinarily expanded and evasive. There is talk of a “genetic,” “biological,” “cultural,” “ethnopluralist,” “institutional,” and “everyday racism,” of a “racism at the top,” of an “elite racism,” of a “racism in the midst,” of an “old” and a “new” or “neo-racism,” of a “positive racism,” and of an “inegalitarian” and a “differentialist racism.” (For an explanation of most of the terms just mentioned see Reisigl and Wodak 2001: ch. 1, section 1.2.)

The starting point of a discourse analytical approach to the complex phenomenon of racism is to realize that racism, as both social practice and ideology, manifests itself discursively. On the one hand, racist opinions and beliefs are produced and reproduced by means of discourse; discriminatory exclusionary practices are prepared, promulgated, and legitimated through discourse. On the other hand, discourse serves to criticize, delegitimate, and argue against racist opinions and practices, that is, to pursue antiracist strategies. Because we are bound by constraints of space, we have to do without detailed and extensive analyses of concrete discursive examples that help to show and reconstruct the discursive production and reproduction of racism and the accompanying discursive counteractions. However, after briefly reviewing concepts of “race” (section 1) and explanations of racism (section 2), we present five discourse analytic approaches to racism (section 3), including an illustration of how our own discourse-historical approach works through an analysis of a short excerpt from an interview with an Austrian politician. Our conclusion poses several questions that are still unanswered (section 4).
1 The Concept of “Race”: A Historical-political Etymological Overview

It is currently an undeniable fact for geneticists and biologists that the concept of “race,” in reference to human beings, has nothing to do with biological reality (e.g., Jacquard 1996: 20). From a social functional point of view, “race” is a social construction. On the one hand, it has been used as a legitimating ideological tool to oppress and exploit specific social groups and to deny them access to material, cultural, and political resources, to work, welfare services, housing, and political rights. On the other hand, these affected groups have adopted the idea of “race.” They have turned the concept around and used it to construct an alternative, positive self-identity; they have also used it as a basis for political resistance (see Miles 1993: 28) and to fight for more political autonomy, independence, and participation.

From a linguistic point of view, the term “race” has a relatively recent, although not precisely clear, etymological history. The Italian “razza,” the Spanish “raza,” the Portuguese “raça,” and the French “race” had been documented rarely from the thirteenth century onwards and with more frequent occurrences beginning in the sixteenth century, when the term also appeared in English. It has, at different times, entered different semantic fields, for example (1) the field of ordinal and classificational notions that include such words as “genus,” “species,” and “varietas”; (2) the field that includes social and political group denominations such as “nation” and “Volk” (in German), and, more rarely, “dynasty,” “ruling house,” “generation,” “class,” and “family”; and (3) the field that includes notions referring to language groups and language families1 such as “Germanen” (Teutons) and “Slavs” (see Conze and Sommer 1984: 135). The prescientific (up to the eighteenth century) meaning of “race” in regard to human beings2 was mainly associated with aristocratic descent and membership, to a specific dynasty or ruling house. The term primarily denoted “nobility” and “quality,” and had no reference to somatic criteria yet. However, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries pseudobiological and anthropological systematizations soon conformed its meaning to overgeneralized, phenotypic features designated to categorize people from all continents and countries. The idea of “race” became closely incorporated into political-historical literature and was conceptually transferred to the terminology of human history. In the second half of the nineteenth century, the concept, now with historical and national attributes, was linked to social Darwinism – which can be traced to Darwin’s theory of evolution only in part – and became an “in-word” outside the natural sciences. “Race theorists” interpreted history as a “racial struggle” within which only the fittest “races” would have the right to survive. They employed the political catchword with its vague semantic contours almost synonymously with the words “nation” and “Volk” for the purposes of their biopolitical programs of “racial cleansing,” eugenics, and birth control.

The extremely radicalized “race” theory of the German antisemites and National Socialists in the tradition of Arthur de Gobineau, Houston Stewart Chamberlain, and Georg Ritter von Schönerer tied together syncretistically religious, nationalist, economist, culturalist, and biologicist antisemitism,3 which then served as the ideology to legitimize systematic, industrialized genocide. It was this use of “race theory” “that stimulated a more thorough critical appraisal of the idea of ‘race’ in Europe and
North America and the creation of the concept of racism in the 1930s” (Miles 1993: 29). Since 1945, use of the term “race” in the German-language countries of Germany and Austria has been strictly tabooed for politicians, for academicians, and even for the people in general. In France, the expression “relations de race” would also be regarded as racist (Wieviorka 1994: 173). On the other hand, the term “race relations” is still commonly used in the United Kingdom and in the United States. Research about racism must take into account these differences in language use. Misinterpretations can lead to difficulties in translation and even to mistakes in shaping different analytical categories used when dealing with the issue of racism (see Wieviorka 1994: 173).

2 How to Explain “Racism”

Many approaches from different disciplines reflect on the material, economical, social, political, social psychological, cognitive, and other causes and motives for racism. The explanations offered by each have an important impact on the choice of specific antiracist strategies. Let us mention some of the most prominent approaches (for an overview of theoretical accounts see, for example, Poliakov et al. 1992: 145–96 and Zerger 1997: 99–164; for a more detailed overview see also Reisigl and Wodak 2001: ch. 1, section 2).

Social cognitive accounts focus on social categorization and stereotyping, relying on the cognitive concepts of “prototypes,” “schemas,” “stereotypes,” and “object classification.” Some social cognition researchers, for example Hamilton and Trolier (1986), “argue that the way our minds work, the way we process information, may in itself be sufficient to generate a negative image of a group. They point to several strands of evidence but most notably to the illusory correlation studies” (Wetherell and Potter 1992: 38). Their concepts of society and social environment are quite static, and they assume that prejudicial apperceptions and categorizations (inherent in all persons) are inevitable and cognitively “useful.” In presuming this, they risk playing down and even – at least implicitly – justifying racism as a “survival strategy.” In addition, they cannot explain why some people are more susceptible to racist ideology than others.

Social identity theory (e.g. Hogg and Abrahams 1988; Tajfel 1981; Tajfel and Turn 1985; Turner 1981, 1985; Turner and Giles 1981; Turner et al. 1987) places the concept of social identity in the center of its social psychological theory of intergroup relations. In contrast to the above-mentioned approach, it recognizes the importance of socialization and group experiences in the development and acquisition of social categories. From the perspective of social identity theory, the social structures individual perception, identity, and action. Categorizations are assumed to be necessary for reducing the complexity of the social world. Individual perception is formed by patterns aligned with group memberships and nonmemberships. These learned patterns of perception tend to favor the in-group and to derogate the out-groups. The image of the in-group is more differentiated than the images of the out-groups, which, all in all, are much more characterized by “internal attributions” than the in-group. Racism and ethnocentrism are, in large part, seen as the interpersonal result of
group membership and as the psychological effects of identifying with a specific group in economic and social competition with other groups. Some of the causal assumptions of this theory are rather too simple and reductionist. Apart from the simplistic frustration-aggression hypothesis, and the hasty analogical generalization of the results of small-group experiments, the relationship between experiences, thinking, and practices is simply assumed without any closer differentiation. Like the social cognition approach, social identity theory suffers from “a tendency to universalize the conditions for racism and a lingering perceptualism” (Wetherell and Potter 1992: 47). The implications for antiracism are therefore very pessimistic ones.

Several nativist psychoanalytical theories (for psychoanalytical accounts, see also Poliakov et al. 1992: 175–82 and Ottomeyer 1997, 111–31; for psychological accounts, see Mecheril and Thomas 1997) hold this universalistic viewpoint in common with the two approaches already noted above. Allport (1993: 10) is right to criticize psychoanalytical theories for tending to ascribe to all persons the same dependency on unconscious aggressions and fixations which undoubtedly characterize the inner life of neurotic and psychotic persons. In positing the “thanatos,” that is to say, innate death instincts, many varieties of psychoanalysis naturalize aggressions against “the other” as an anthropological invariant and thus relinquish their political potential to be critical of society (see Masson 1984 and especially Jacoby 1983 for his critique of the politically self-disarming and self-immunizing medicalization and professionalization of conformist psychoanalysis).

In contrast to these approaches, which are inclined to legitimate the social status quo, critical theory (e.g. Adorno 1973, 1993; Adorno et al. 1950; Fromm 1988; Horkheimer 1992; Horkheimer and Flowerman 1949f; Horkheimer et al. 1987; Fenichel 1993; Simmel 1993; Reich 1986; and more recently Outlaw 1990), combine neo-Marxism, politically committed psychoanalysis, and sociopsychology. In this way, they connect economic, political and cultural structures, as well as social dynamics, with the character structure of a person that has been fundamentally formed through childhood socialization. Thus, critical theory does not merely describe racist, and especially antisemitic, prejudice, but primarily tries to explain it in order to illuminate the conditions for the emergence and social maintenance of Nazi fascism and antisemitism and in order to help to eradicate authoritarianism and racist prejudice. Adorno (1973: 8) regards insight into the character structure as the best protection from the tendency to ascribe constant traits to individuals as “innate” or “racially determined.” As a specific character structure – the authoritarian personality – makes an individual susceptible to antidemocratic propaganda, the social and economic conditions under which the potential turns into active manifestation have to be uncovered.

Outlaw (1990: 72ff) develops early critical theory to propagate a critical theory of “race” which challenges the commonsense assumption that “race” is a self-evident, organizing, explanatory concept. Stressing the sociohistorical constructivist dimensions of “race,” Outlaw points to the danger, particularly widespread in the United States, of taking an essentializing and objectivizing concept of “race” as the focal point of contention, thereby supplying a shorthand explanation for the source of contentious differences. Outlaw pleads for emancipatory projects informed by traditions of critical thought which might help to move beyond racism, without reductionism, to pluralistic socialist democracy.
The colonial paradigm or race relations approach (Cox 1970; Szymanski 1985; Wallerstein 1979; Fox-Genovese 1992; Genovese 1995) – the notion was coined by Miles – views racism within the classical Marxist tradition as the consequence of colonialism and imperialism in the context of capitalism. It analyzes racism in the light of the development of a capitalist world economic system. One of the first to analyze “race relations” within this framework is Cox (1970) (see Miles 1993: 30ff). Cox characterizes “race relations” as “behavior which develops among people who are aware of each other’s actual or imputed physical differences” (1970: 320). Although Cox claims that “races” are social constructions, he reifies them as distinctive, permanent, immutable collectivities distinguished by skin color. As Miles (1991, 1994) criticizes, the “colonial paradigm,” assuming that racism was created to legitimate colonial exploitation, externalizes the problem of racism one-sidedly, one consequence being its inability to explain antisemitism and the negative racialization of other “interior” minorities (e.g. “gypsies”) in Europe before and after the Second World War.

The political economy of migration paradigm (Castles and Kosack 1972, 1973; Nikolinakos 1975; Lawrence 1982; Sivanandan 1982, 1990; Miles 1993) analyzes the processes of “racialization” in the capitalist centers in connection with migration, capital accumulation, and class formation. Rejecting the sociological paradigm of “race relations,” Castles and Kosack (1972, 1973) focus on worldwide migration after 1945 as a consequence of uneven capitalist development on a world scale. They identify immigrant workers “as having a specific socio-economic function found in all capitalist societies, namely to fill undesirable jobs vacated by the indigenous working class in the course of the periodic reorganization of production. This stratum of immigration workers thereby came to constitute a ‘lower stratum’ of the working class which was thereby fragmented” (Miles 1993: 36). In common with the proponents of the “race relations approach” Castles and Kosack do not reject the idea of “race” as an analytical concept. “Rather, they subordinate it to a political economy of labor migration and class relations: that is, they retained the category of ‘race’ in order to deny its explanatory significance” (Miles 1993: 36). The analyses by Sivanandan (1982, 1990) suffer from the absence of any critical evaluation of “race” and “race relations” as analytical concepts as well. They suggest at least indirectly that the human population is composed of a number of biological “races.” Beyond that, they ascribe to “race” more or less the same status of reality as to “social class” and reduce racism primarily to economical factors.

The postmodern approaches and the cultural studies perspective – which except for its neo-Marxist orientation partly relies on postmodernism – (CCCS/Center for Contemporary Cultural Studies 1982; Hall 1978, 1980, 1989, 1994; Gilroy 1987; Rattansi and Westwood 1994; Rattansi 1994; Westwood 1994; Bhabha 1990; Said 1978, 1993; Fanon 1986; Bauman 1989, 1991) primarily try to analyze the cultural, ideological, and political construction of racism. They emphasize “that ethnicities, nationalisms, racism and other forms of collective identities” are products of a process to be conceptualized as a cultural politics of representation, one in which narratives, images, musical forms and popular culture more generally have a significant role” (Rattansi 1994: 74). Rejecting Western “metanarratives” constructed around particular “collective subjects” like “nations,” “races,” “ethnic groups,” and “classes,” Rattansi and Westwood (1994: 2) point out that the conceptual vocabulary of “nationalism,” “racism,” “ethnicism,” and “class struggle” can no longer provide the basis for a viable taxonomy of violent
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social antagonisms and clashes.7 In their view, these concepts no longer enable the creation of convincing, all-encompassing explanatory frameworks, since subjectivities and identifications are multiple and shifting under the “postmodern condition” (Lyotard 1984) of chronic disembedding, decentering, de-essentialization, and reinvention of traditions and “collective” identities.

Cultural studies and postmodern approaches regard the western genocide of aboriginal people, slavery, imperialist and colonial domination and exploitation, and the Holocaust, in all of which western doctrines of “racial” and cultural superiority have played a constitutive role, as the other side of western modernity.8 Relying on poststructuralist psychoanalysis (Lacan, Kristeva), they link racism to sexuality, considering racism to be one response of the generically fragile, split, fragmented ego (see Frosh 1987, 1989, 1991) and of the repressed homosexual desire leading into ambivalence and projection of unwanted feelings about the body toward others, whether Jews, “black” people, or Asians (Fanon 1986: 163–78).

Miles proposes the racism after race relations paradigm (see Miles and Phizacklea 1979; Guillaumin 1991, 1992; Goldberg 1993; Taguieff 1987) as an alternative neo-Marxist theorization of racism. It is not his intention to revive the classical argumentation that racism is “only” a utilitarian invention of the bourgeoisie to divide the working class and to legitimate colonialism (Miles 1994: 204). Rather, he locates the explanation for racism in the “disorganization of capitalism,” strictly speaking in a field of several contradictions “between, on the one hand, universalism and humanism, and, on the other, the reproduction of social inequality and exploitation” (Miles 1994: 207). Miles sees the first contradiction in the conflict between the universalizing and equalizing tendencies embodied in the “commodification of everything” (Wallerstein 1988) and the capitalist necessity to reproduce social inequality. Here, racism mediates ideologically by attributing specified essential, naturalizing traits to social collectivities, thereby justifying social inequality and uneven development. The second contradiction Miles (1994: 205) identifies is that “between the capitalist universalizing tendencies and the reality of extensive cultural diversity rooted in the disaggregation of social formations, within which material reproduction was socially organized prior to the development of the capitalist mode of production, and which have been reproduced parallel with that development while those social formations have not been fully incorporated into the capitalist world economy.” Here, racism makes it possible to racialize social groups resisting capitalist “progress” as primitive and inferior. The third contradiction Miles makes out is that between the economic globalization tendencies and the nationalization of social formations, that is to say, the partial confinement of capitalist relations of production within the political form of nation-states wherein political subjects are nationalized and racialized.

Like Miles (1994: 207), we recognize the multiple determination of racism and do not seek to propose a holistic explanation for the expression of contemporary racism in Europe. We believe that no monocausal and monodimensional approach is adequate to grasp the complexity of racism. Racialization is criss-crossed by ethnic, national, gender, class, and other social constructions and divisions, thus rendering a separating view on “race” or “racialization” as an isolated determinant of social relations short-sighted. Multidimensional analysis is required in order to obtain adequate historical reconstructions, actual diagnoses, and anticipatory prognoses, all of which are necessary to develop promising antiracist strategies. Among many other
things, a multidimensional analysis of racism requires taking into account adjacent and overlapping phenomena like antisemitism, nationalism, ethnicism, and sexism.

3 Five Discourse Analytical Approaches to Racism

Now that we have reviewed the meanings of the word “race” and a variety of explanations for racism, it is time to turn to the approaches through which the discursive manifestations of racism have been analyzed.

3.1 Prejudices and stereotypes

One of the first discourse analysts to attempt to study and categorize prejudiced discourse was Uta Quasthoff (1973, 1978, 1980, 1987, 1989, 1998). Quasthoff distinguishes between “attitudes,” “convictions,” and “prejudices.” She defines attitudes as the affective position taken towards a person one relates to and to whom one can express dislike or sympathy. Convictions ascribe qualities to others and often provide rationalizations for negative attitudes (e.g. that “blacks smell bad”). Prejudices are mental states defined (normally) as negative attitudes (the affective element) toward social groups with matching stereotypic convictions or beliefs.

For the purposes of linguistic access, Quasthoff defines the term stereotype as the verbal expression of a certain conviction or belief directed toward a social group or an individual as a member of that social group. The stereotype is typically an element of common knowledge, shared to a high degree in a particular culture (see Quasthoff 1987: 786, 1978). It takes the logical form of a judgment that attributes or denies, in an oversimplified and generalizing manner and with an emotionally slanted tendency, particular qualities or behavioral patterns to a certain class of persons (Quasthoff 1973: 28).

Quasthoff’s investigations cover all kinds of social prejudices and stereotypes, not only racist and nationalist ones. According to Quasthoff (1973), sentences are the linguistic unit most amenable to her type of analysis. However, Quasthoff (1987: 786; 1989: 183) herself points out that “the definitional quality that the grammatical unit of the linguistic description of stereotypes is the sentence does not mean that stereotypes empirically have to appear in the form of complete sentences. It solely implies that the semantic unit of a stereotype is a proposition, i.e. reference and predication, as opposed to a certain form of reference as such.”

Since 1973, Quasthoff herself has done considerable analysis of stereotypes on the empirical basis of their use in very different kinds of discourse; among others, in everyday argumentation (Quasthoff 1978, 1998) and narratives (Quasthoff 1980), thus broadening her linguistic horizons to social prejudice and transcending the single-sentence perspective. When, for example, she applied Toulmin’s schematism (1969) to the microstructural level of argumentation, Quasthoff came to the conclusion that stereotypes do not exclusively, or even primarily, appear as warrants. If they are used to support a claim, they appear usually as a backing (Quasthoff 1978: 27). Moreover, stereotypes can themselves be either data or claims, supported, in their turn, by other kinds of propositions.
3.2 *The sociocognitive approach*

The model of prejudice use by Teun van Dijk is partially based on sociopsychological considerations similar to those of Quasthoff. According to van Dijk, prejudice:

is not merely a characteristic of individual beliefs or emotions about social groups, but a shared form of social representation in group members, acquired during processes of socialization and transformed and enacted in social communication and interaction. Such ethnic attitudes have social functions, e.g. to protect the interests of the ingroup. Their cognitive structures and the strategies of their use reflect these social functions. (van Dijk 1984: 13)

While Quasthoff most generally stresses the marking of distance toward out-groups and the establishment of in-group solidarity (and phatic communion) as social functions of prejudice, van Dijk focuses on the “rationalization and justification of discriminatory acts against minority groups” in more detail (van Dijk 1984: 13). He designates the categories used to rationalize prejudice against minority groups as “the 7 Ds of Discrimination”. They are dominance, differentiation, distance, diffusion, diversion, depersonalization or destruction, and daily discrimination. These strategies serve in various ways to legitimize and enact the distinction of “the other”; for example, by dominating the minority groups, by excluding them from social activities, and even by destroying and murdering them (see van Dijk 1984: 40).

For the elaboration of a discourse analytical theory about racist discourse, one of the most valuable contributions of van Dijk’s model is the heuristic assistance it provides in linking the generation of prejudice to discursive units larger than the sentence. Van Dijk’s initial assumption is that those parts of long-term memory directly relevant to the production and retention of ethnic prejudices (recognition, categorization, and storage of experience) can be divided into three memory structures: semantic memory, episodic memory, and control system.

According to van Dijk, semantic memory is social memory: it is here that the collectively shared beliefs of a society are stored. These beliefs are organized as attitudes, which are of a generalized and abstract nature and are determined by their organization in socially relevant categories of the group that is being evaluated (e.g. national origin and/or appearance, socioeconomic status, and sociocultural norms and values, including religion and language). Episodic memory retains personal or narrated experiences and events as well as patterns abstracted from these experiences. The listener constructs a textual representation of a story in episodic memory. General situational models are the link between narrated events or personally retained experiences and the structures of the semantic memory.

In his new context model (van Dijk 1998a), van Dijk distinguishes between specific event models and context models. He views both types of models as being personal and not shared by a group. Accordingly, van Dijk conceptualizes the third structure of long-term memory, the control system, as a personal model of the social situation. The control system’s task is to link communicative aims and interests (e.g. persuasion) with the situational and individual social conditions (e.g. level of education, gender, and relationship to the person one is addressing). Van Dijk calls the processes involved in the perception, interpretation, storage, use, or retrieval of ethnic information
about minority groups and their actions “strategies.” The control system coordinates these various strategies and at the same time monitors the flow of information from long-term memory to short-term memory, as well as the storage or activation of situation models in episodic memory.

One of the main strategies of the control system is to link a positive self-presentation – i.e. one acceptable to society and signaling tolerance – with an existing negative attitude to foreigners. Positive self-presentations are expressed in phrases such as “Personally, I have nothing against Jews, but the neighbors say . . .” The interaction of these three memory systems thus both directly and indirectly influences the decoding and encoding – which take place in the short-term memory – of the received and/or self-produced remarks about minorities. Van Dijk’s model can thus explain the cognitive processes of the text recipients: isolated experiences, statements, and symbols are assigned to general schemas and confirm existing prejudices.

More recently, van Dijk (1991, 1993, 1998a, 1998b) has turned to the analysis of “elite racism” and to the integration of the concept of “ideology” into his sociocognitive model. He mainly focuses on the investigation of newspaper editorials, school books, academic discourse, interviews with managers, political speeches, and parliamentary debates, with the basic assumption that “the elite” produces and reproduces the racism that is then implemented and enacted in other social fields. We certainly believe that “the elite” plays a significant role in the production and reproduction of racism, but we prefer to assume a more reciprocal and less monocausal and unidirectional top-down relationship of influence between “the elite” and other social groups and strata within a specific society.

### 3.3 Discourse strands and collective symbols

Siegfried Jäger and the Duisburg group are probably the most prominent researchers in Germany dealing with issues of racism and discourse (see S. Jäger 1992, 1993; M. Jäger 1996a; S. Jäger and Jäger 1992; S. Jäger and Januschek 1992; S. Jäger and Link 1993; Kalpaka and Räthzel 1986; Link 1990, 1992). The research was triggered largely by the violent racism that started shortly after 1992, when new and stricter immigration laws were implemented in Germany. Simultaneously, the unification of West Germany and the former communist East Germany erupted in racist violence against many foreigners, who were physically attacked and whose asylum homes were set afire. Among others, this violence was and continues to be connected to the fact that the unification poses tremendous cultural and economic problems for the Germans and that foreigners provide a comfortable scapegoat for these problems (e.g. that millions of people lost their jobs postunification). The Duisburg group has been very active not only in its research and documentation of racism, but also in proposing strategies against it (e.g. see M. Jäger et al. 1998: 167–236).

In several respects, the Duisburg group follows and extends the research of van Dijk. Among others, they interview different groups of people to elicit their attitudes toward foreigners and Jews. In contrast to standard methods for conducting interviews, their method leads people to tell their personal stories in depth. Besides studying everyday racism, the Duisburg group also does media analysis, in particular of the German tabloid Bildzeitung, which launches large campaigns against foreigners,
but also of the conservative quality daily Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, the regional daily newspapers Frankfurter Rundschau, Westdeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, and Rheinische Post, and the social liberal weekly Der Spiegel. A primary interest in the analysis of all these newspapers is the press coverage about criminal acts. A recent analysis (see M. Jäger et al. 1998) shows that most of the papers tend toward singularization and individualization of (alleged) German perpetrators and toward collectivization of “foreigners” who have (allegedly) committed a criminal offence. Moreover, “foreign perpetrators” are marked by reference to their national or ethnic origin in half of the press articles of all newspapers except Der Spiegel.

The main focus in many of the Duisburg studies is discourse semantics, and especially the uncovering of “collective symbols” that are tied together in “discourse strands,” best explained as thematically interrelated sequences of homogeneous “discourse segments” (S. Jäger 1993: 181), which appear on different “discourse levels” (i.e. science, politics, media, education, everyday life, business life, and administration). “Collective symbols” are designated as “cultural stereotypes” in the form of metaphorical and synecdochic symbols that are immediately understood by the members of the same speech community (see Link 1982, 1988, 1990, 1992). “Water,” natural disasters like “avalanches” and “flood disasters,” military activities like “invasions,” all persuasively representing “immigration” or “migrants” as something that has to be “dammed,” are examples of collective symbols, just as are the “ship” metaphor, symbolizing the effects of immigration as on an “overcrowded boat,” and the “house” and “door” metaphor that metaphorizes the in-groups’ (e.g. “national”) territory as “house” or “building” and the stopping of immigration as “bolting the door” (see also Jung et al. 1997). The Duisburg group also analyzes the construction of “the Other” with a focus on the pronominal system, on the connotations of specific nouns, verbs, and adjectives, on stylistic features, on tense, mood, and modality, on specific syntactic means and structures, and on argumentation strategies, which are all employed in self-presentation and other-presentation through discourse (S. Jäger 1993).

3.4 The Loughborough group

The sociopsychologists Margaret Wetherell and Jonathan Potter (1992) criticize the approaches of Robert Miles and of critical theory (see above) for Marxist “determinism” (Wetherell and Potter 1992: 18ff) and for a traditional Marxist concept that refers to “ideology” as “false consciousness” (Wetherell and Potter 1992). They also oppose sociocognitive approaches that give absolute priority to the cognitive dimension in the analysis of racism and tend to universalize the conditions for racism (see also Potter and Wetherell 1987) and reject the concept of an immutable identity (see also Wodak et al. 1998 for a dynamic conceptualization of “identity”), as well as social identity theory and the social cognition approach (see above) for their “lingering perceptualism” (Wetherell and Potter 1992: 69) – a critique that, in our view, is at best partly valid.

Wetherell and Potter (1992: 70) argue, instead, that attitudes and stereotypes are not simply mediated via cognition, but discourse is actively constitutive of both social and psychological processes, and thus also of racist prejudices. In the manner of Billig (1978, 1985, 1988) and Billig et al. (1988), Wetherell and Potter (1992: 59) posit that
racism must be viewed as a series of ideological effects with flexible, fluid, and varying contents. Racist discourses should therefore be viewed not as static and homogeneous, but as dynamic and contradictory. Even the same person can voice contradictory opinions and ideological fragments in the same discursive event.

Wetherell and Potter (1992: 70) also sympathize with, and adopt, the concepts of the “politics of representation” and the “definitional slipperiness” of postmodern theoreticians (see e.g. Hall 1989, 1994). In part, they have been influenced theoretically by some of Foucault’s theses and remarks on discourse, power, and truth, as well as by the neo-Marxist theoreticians.

Finally, like the Duisburg group and in our own discourse-historical theorization (section 3.5), the Loughborough group stresses the context dependence of racist discourse. They define their task as “mapping the language of racism” in New Zealand, and draw up a “racist topography” by charting themes and ideologies through exploration of the heterogeneous and layered texture of racist practices and representations that make up a part of the hegemonic taken-for-granted in this particular society. They bring out the ideological dilemmas and the manifest and latent argumentation patterns (Wetherell and Potter 1992: 178ff, 208ff).

Similarities between the Loughborough and Duisburg approaches go beyond emphasis on context dependence and poststructuralist alignment. Somewhat similar to the Duisburg concept of “interdiscourse” (in which the shared culture and traditions of a society at a certain time are sedimented and conceptualized as systems of collective symbols) is the Loughborough concept of “interpretative repertoire”:

broadly discernible clusters of terms, descriptions and figures of speech often assembled around metaphors or vivid images . . . systems of signification and . . . the building blocks used for manufacturing versions of actions, self and social structures in talk . . . some of the resources for making evaluations, constructing factual versions and performing particular actions. (Wetherell and Potter 1992: 90)

However, in its concrete analyses, the Loughborough group mainly focuses on narratives and argumentation and does not pay as much attention to metaphors or symbols as do Jürgen Link, Siegfried Jäger, and their associates.

3.5 The discourse-historical approach

The four discourse analytical approaches presented thus far have all influenced – either through more or less favorable reception or critical discussion – the theoretical and methodological approach we introduce in this section. We agree with many of Quasthoff’s general sociopsychological assumptions of the social function of prejudices as a sociocohesive means for obtaining in-group solidarity and “phatic communion,” but transcend the single-sentence perspective prevailing in her early work and also try to take into consideration the more latent and allusive meanings of discourses. We adopt several of van Dijk’s concepts and categories (e.g. the notions of “positive self-presentation” and “negative other-presentation”), but put no stress on his sociocognitivism, the latter being incompatible with the hermeneutic basis of our model. Moreover, we do not want to overemphasize a top-down causality of opinion
making and manipulation (i.e. a manipulative impact from the allegedly homogeneous “elite” on the allegedly homogeneous masses of ordinary people). We share the Duisburg group’s transtextual, interdiscursive, sociopolitical, and historical perspective as well as their interest in the analysis of collective symbols and metaphors, but we do not align ourselves with their affiliation with Foucaultian and postmodernist theories of discourse and power, which reify or personify language and discourse as autonomous, collusive actors. We partially share the constructivist approach of Wetherell and Potter as well as their critique of universalizing the conditions for racist discrimination, though without adopting their rather relativist (postmodernist) viewpoint.

One of the most salient distinguishing features of the discourse-historical approach in comparison to the four approaches already mentioned is its endeavor to work interdisciplinarily, multimethodologically, and on the basis of a variety of different empirical data as well as background information. Depending on the object of investigation, it attempts to transcend the pure linguistic dimension and to include more or less systematically the historical, political, sociological, and/or psychological dimension in the analysis and interpretation of a specific discursive occasion (see, for example, Wodak 1986, 1991a, 1991b; Wodak et al. 1990, 1994, 1998, 1999; Mitten and Wodak 1993; Matouschek et al. 1995; Reisigl and Wodak 2001).

In accordance with other approaches devoted to critical discourse analysis (see van Dijk, this volume), the discourse-historical approach perceives both written and spoken language as a form of social practice (Fairclough 1992; 1995; Fairclough and Wodak 1997; Wodak 1996). We assume a dialectical relationship between particular discursive practices and the specific fields of action (including situations, institutional frames, and social structures) in which they are embedded: we consider discourses to be linguistic social practices that constitute nondiscursive and discursive social practices and, at the same time, are being constituted by them.

“Discourse” can be understood as a complex bundle of simultaneous and sequential interrelated linguistic acts which manifest themselves within and across the social fields of action as thematically interrelated semiotic (oral or written) tokens that belong to specific semiotic types (genres). “Fields of action” (Girnth 1996) may be understood as segments of the respective societal “reality” which contribute to constituting and shaping the “frame” of discourse. The spatiometaphorical distinction among different fields of action can be understood as a distinction among different functions or socially institutionalized aims of discursive practices. Thus in the area of political action we distinguish among the functions of legislation, self-presentation, manufacturing of public opinion, developing party-internal consent, advertising and vote-getting, governing as well as executing, and controlling as well as expressing (oppositional) dissent (see figure 19.1). A “discourse” about a specific topic can find its starting point within one field of action and proceed through another one. Discourses and discourse topics “spread” to different fields and discourses. They cross between fields, overlap, refer to each other, or are in some other way sociofunctionally linked with each other (some of these relationships are often described under such labels as “textual chains,” “intertextuality,” “interdiscursivity,” “orders of discourse,” and “hybridity”; see Fairclough 1992: 101–36; Fairclough 1995: 133). We can illustrate the connection between fields of action, genres, and discourse topics with the example of the area of political action in figure 19.1.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Field of action:</th>
<th>Genres:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>lawmaking procedure</td>
<td>laws, bills, amendments, speeches and contributions of MPs, regulations, recommendations, prescriptions, guidelines, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>formation of public opinion and self-presentation</td>
<td>press releases, press conferences, interviews (press, TV), talk shows, &quot;round tables,&quot; lectures/contributions to conferences, articles/books, commemorative speeches, inaugural speeches, speeches of MPs, speeches of the head, speeches of ministers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>party-internal development of an informed opinion</td>
<td>party programs, declarations/statements/speeches of principle, speeches on party conventions, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>political advertising/propaganda</td>
<td>election programs, slogans, speeches in election campaigns, election announcements, posters, election brochures, direct mail advertising, fliers, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>executive/administration</td>
<td>decisions (approval/rejection: asylum, stay, work) inaugural speeches, coalition papers, speeches of ministers/heads, governmental answers to parliamentary questions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>political control</td>
<td>declarations of opposition parties, parliamentary questions, speeches of MPs, petitions for a referendum, press releases of opposition parties, etc.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 19.1
Discursive practices are socially constitutive in a number of ways: first, they play a decisive role in the genesis and production of certain social conditions. This means that discourses may serve to construct collective subjects like “races,” nations, ethnicities, etc. Second, they might perpetuate, reproduce, or justify a certain social status quo (and “racialized,” “nationalized,” and “ethnicized” identities related to it). Third, they are instrumental in transforming the status quo (and “racializing concepts,” nationalities, ethnicities related to it). Fourth, discursive practices may have an effect on the dismantling or even destruction of the status quo (and of racist, nationalist, ethnicist concepts related to it). According to these general aims one can distinguish between constructive, perpetuating, transformational, and destructive social macrofunctions of discourses.

Our triangulatory approach is based on a concept of “context” which takes into account (1) the immediate, language, or text-internal cotext, i.e. the “synsemantic environment” (see Bühler 1934) of a single utterance (lexical solidarities, collocational particularities and connotations, implications, and presuppositions as well as thematic and syntactic coherence) and the local interactive processes of negotiation and conflict management (including turn-taking, the exchange of speech acts or speech functions, mitigation, hesitation, perspectivation, etc.); (2) the intertextual and inter-discursive relationship between utterances, texts, genres, and discourses (discourse representation, allusions/evocations, etc.); (3) the language-external social/sociological variables and institutional frames of a specific “context of situation” (the formality of situation, the place, the time, the occasion of the communicative event, the group/s of recipients, the interactive/political roles of the participants, their political and ideological orientation, their sex, age, profession, and level of education as well as their ethnic, regional, national, and religious affiliation or membership, etc.); and (4) the broader sociopolitical and historical context that the discursive practices are embedded in and related to, that is to say, the fields of action and the history of the discursive event as well as the history to which the discursive topics are related.

The specific discourse analytical approach applied in the different studies carried out in Vienna during the last two decades (for the history of the discourse-historical approach see Reisigl and Wodak 2000: ch. 2, section 1.2) was three-dimensional: after (1) having found out the specific contents or topics of a specific discourse with racist, antisemitic, nationalistic, or ethnicist ingredients, (2) the discursive strategies (including argumentation strategies) were investigated. Then (3), the linguistic means (as types) and the specific, context-dependent linguistic realizations (as tokens) of the discriminatory stereotypes were investigated.

There are several discursive elements and strategies which, in our discourse analytical view, deserve to get special attention. Picking five out of the many different linguistic or rhetorical means by which people are discriminated in ethnicist and racist terms, we orient ourselves to five simple, but not at all randomly selected, questions: (1) How are persons named and referred to linguistically? (2) Which traits, characteristics, qualities, and features are attributed to them? (3) By means of what arguments and argumentation schemes do specific persons or social groups try to justify and legitimate the exclusion, discrimination, suppression, and exploitation of others? (4) From which perspective or point of view are these nominations, attributions, and arguments expressed? (5) Are the respective discriminating utterances articulated overtly, are they even intensified, or are they mitigated?
According to these questions, we are especially interested in five types of discursive strategies which are all involved in the positive self- and negative other-presentation. By “strategy” we generally mean a more or less accurate and more or less intentional plan of practices (including discursive practices) adopted to achieve a certain social, political, psychological, or linguistic aim. As far as the discursive strategies are concerned, that is to say, systematic ways of using language, we locate them at different levels of linguistic organization and complexity.

First, there are referential strategies or nomination strategies by which one constructs and represents social actors; for example, in-groups and out-groups. Among others, this is done via membership categorization devices, including reference by tropes like biological, naturalizing, and depersonalizing metaphors and metonymies as well as by synecdoches (see Zimmerman 1990).

Second, once constructed or identified, the social actors as individuals, group members, or groups are linguistically provided with predications. Predicational strategies may, for example, be realized as stereotypical, evaluative attributions of negative and positive traits in the linguistic form of implicit or explicit predicates. These strategies aim at labeling social actors either positively or negatively, deprecatorily or appreciatively. Some of the referential strategies can be considered to be specific forms of predicational strategies, because the pure referential identification very often already involves a denotatively or connotatively depreciatory or appreciative labeling of the social actors.

Third, there are argumentation strategies and funds of topoi, through which positive and negative attributions are justified, through which, for example, the social and political inclusion or exclusion, and the discrimination or preferential treatment, of the respective persons or groups of persons are suggested to be warranted.

Fourth, discourse analysts may focus on the perspectivation, framing, or discourse representation by which speakers express their involvement in discourse and position their point of view in the report, description, narration, or quotation of discriminatory events.

Fifth, there are intensifying strategies on the one hand, and mitigation strategies on the other. Both of them help to qualify and modify the epistemic status of a proposition by intensifying or mitigating the illocutionary force of racist, antisemitic, nationalist, or ethnicist utterances. These strategies can be an important aspect of the presentation, inasmuch as they operate upon it by sharpening it or toning it down.

We now briefly illustrate the discourse-historical approach with an example of political discourse, taken from an interview with Jörg Haider, the leader of the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ). The interview was printed in the Austrian weekly profil on February 24, 1997, on page 19. The topic was a directive (Weisung) issued on November 26, 1996, by the FPÖ politician Karl-Heinz Grasser, at that time deputy head of the government of the province of Carinthia in Austria and also the highest official (Landesrat) in the building and tourist industries in Carinthia. In his directive, Grasser instructed his consultant (Referenten) for roadwork to include a regulation in the tender invitations for public building projects that such projects were exclusively to be carried out by indigenous (heimisch) workers or by workers from states of the European Union. As a consequence, an intense public discussion arose, and there was strong protest against Grasser’s proposal to institutionalize such an exclusionary practice. Finally, Grasser revoked the directive. During the discussion, Jörg Haider was
interviewed about the “Grasser affair.” The journalist from profil, Klaus Dutzler, asked Haider what he, as leader of the FPÖ, was going to recommend to Grasser, his fellow party member and protégé at that time:

profil: You will not recommend Karl-Heinz Grasser to give in?
Haider: We never thought differently and will continue to do so. The indignation, of course, only comes from the side of those like the Carinthian guild master for construction, a socialist, who makes money out of cheap labor from Slovenia and Croatia. And if, today, one goes by one of Hans Peter Haselsteiner’s “Illbau” building sites, and there, the foreigners, up to black Africans, cut and carry bricks, then the Austrian construction worker really thinks something. Then one must understand, if there are emotions. 13

Haider’s answer is remarkable with respect to the employed referential strategies, the negative other-presentation by the attributions and predications directed against the different groups of “them,” and the enthymemic argumentation serving the justification of “emotions” against “the foreigners up to black Africans.”

The social actors mentioned by the journalist are “Jörg Haider,” social-deictically addressed as “Sie” (the German formal term of address), and “Karl-Heinz Grasser.” The social actors mentioned by Haider are – in chronological order of their sequential appearance – “we,” “the socialist Carinthian guild master for construction,” “the cheap labor from Slovenia and Croatia,” “the building contractor (and politician of the Austrian party Liberales Forum) Hans Peter Haselsteiner,” “the foreigners,” “black Africans,” and “the Austrian construction worker.”

There are at least three strategic moves in this short transcript from the interview. The first is the political self-presentation of the FPÖ as a party with firm positions that acts publicly in unison. Thus, Haider woos the voters’ favor. According to the question asked by the journalist, one would expect an answer with a transitivity structure in which Haider (as a sayer) would recommend (a verbal or/and mental process in Halliday’s 1994 terms) to Grasser (the receiver or target) that he do something (a proposal). Haider does not meet this expectation. He refuses to show himself explicitly as a leader advising his fellow party member in public (and thereby threatening Grasser’s and the party’s reputation) and instead finds refuge in a referentially ambiguous “we” (rather than using the expected “I”), which helps to evade the exclusive referential focus both on Grasser and on himself. The ambivalent “we” allows for different, although not mutually exclusive, interpretations. On the one hand, it can be understood as a “party-we” which is designated to demonstrate a closed, unanimous, fixed position of the whole party on the issue in question. The temporal deixis by past and future tense backs this conjecture. If one knows the history of the FPÖ and the fact that Haider has been an authoritarian party leader since he came into power in 1986, on the other hand, one is led to interpret the “we” as a sort of plurals maiestatis that is employed to reguatively prescribe how the party members of the FPÖ are required to think at that moment and in future.

However, after having introduced this ambiguous “we,” which, in addition to having the two functions just mentioned, invites the potential voters of the FPÖ to acclaim or join Haider’s position, Haider then sets out to present the critics of the directive negatively. This is the second strategic move. Haider deliberately chooses
two prominent critics (who are also political adversaries) as partes pro toto in the groups of critics. He debases the socialist Carinthian guild master (whom he does not identify by proper name) by depicting him as an unsocial, capitalist socialist who exploits “the cheap labor (Arbeitskräfte) from Slovenia and Croatia” (here, one may take note of Haider’s impersonal and abstract reference to human beings as a cheap labor force). This image of the unsocial capitalist who egoistically wants to profit from wage dumping is also inferentially passed on to the second political opponent mentioned by Haider. (We can assume that the reader knows from the Austrian political context that the building contractor, Hans Peter Haselsteiner, is a politician.) Viewed from an argumentation analytical perspective, Haider argues here at one and the same time secundum quid, i.e. taking a part (as = two critics) for the whole (as = for all critics of Grasser’s directive), and ad hominem, i.e. he employs a fallacy of relevance (see Lanham 1991: 779), and he disparages the character of the critics in order to call into question the credibility of all critics – instead of attacking their arguments.

The third strategic move by Haider is partly embedded in the negative presentation of Hans Peter Haselsteiner. It is realized as an imaginary scenario (with the character of an argumentative exemplum) and aims to justify the “emotions” of hostility toward foreigners. This move relies on a shift of responsibility, in rhetorical terms, on a trajectio in alium that places the blames on Haselsteiner and the socialist Carinthian guild master, instead of on those who have racist “emotions” and instead of on Haider himself (for instigating populism).

Haider’s third move contains a blatant racist utterance. Here, the party leader discursively constructs a discriminatory hierarchy of “foreigners” around the phenotypic feature of skin color – strictly speaking, around the visible “deviation” (the color black) of a specific group of “foreigners” (i.e. black Africans) from the “average white Austrian.” Most probably it is no accident that Haider refers to “black Africans,” that is to say, that he explicitly uses the word “black.” In the context given, the attribute “black” has an intensifying function. It helps Haider (who, though he explicitly denies it later on in the interview, wants to emotionalize) to carry his black-and-white portrayal to extremes in a literal sense as well. Haider seems to intend to construct the greatest possible visual difference between Austrians and “foreigners.” His utterance can thus be seen as an example of “differentialist racism” in its literal sense. The out-groups of “the foreigners, up to black Africans” (the definite article is characteristic for stereotypical discourse) employed as construction workers are opposed to the in-group of construction workers. Haider apostrophizes the latter synecdochically as “the Austrian construction worker”. As their self-appointed spokesman, he asks for understanding for the Austrian workers’ “emotions” in the face of the “foreigners, up to black Africans.”

At this point, Haider does not argue why “one” should understand the “emotions.” He simply relies on the discriminatory prejudice (functioning as an inferable “warrant” in this enthymemic argumentation) that “foreigners” take away working places from “in-group members.” Furthermore, he relies on the unspoken postulate that “Austrians,” in comparison with “foreigners,” should be privileged with respect to employment.

However, it is not just Haider’s argumentation that is shortened, incomplete, and vague. In particular, the naming of the prejudicial (mental, attitudinal), verbal, and actional hostilities to “foreigners” is extremely evasive and euphemistic in Haider’s
utterance. In this regard, Haider exclusively identifies and names mental and emotional processes: with respect to “foreigners” (including black Africans), “the Austrian construction worker” is clearly thinking of something (the German particle schon (“really”) serves here as an inference-triggering device that suggests comprehensibility). And in his last sentence, Haider deposits a very euphemistic concluding overall claim with an instigatory potential: “one” is obligated (“must”) to be understanding if there are emotions. In other words, the “emotions,” and whatever the reader of Haider’s interview connects with this nonspecific cover-term that opens the way to a vast variety of associations, are totally justifiable.

4 Conclusion

In this chapter, we have provided an overview of definitions of “race” and explanations of “racism,” as well as a synopsis of five discourse analytical approaches to the problem of racism, and an illustration of the discourse-historical approach. Our discussion has shown that racism remains a multifaceted and theoretically complex issue that leaves us without comprehensive answers to many questions: what exactly are we supposed to take “racist” and “racism” to mean? Which specific forms of “genetic,” “culturalist,” and “institutional racism” do we nowadays face and what causes them? How do these different forms of racism manifest themselves in discourse? Is it possible to delimit racism from adjacent or possibly overlapping discriminatory phenomena like antisemitism, nationalism, ethnicism, and sexism? Which analytical – including discourse analytical – criteria, if any, can be used to set at least somewhat clear boundaries between these different “-isms”? Despite the vast amount of specialist literature in the areas of social science, history, philosophy, and even discourse analysis, these are only a small number of the many questions that still await satisfactory answers. We hope to have suggested some of the paths that can be taken toward such answers.

NOTES

1 The contribution of philology and linguistics to the construction and taxonomization of “races” and to the legitimation of racism was an extraordinarily inglorious one. Apart from the synecdochical usurpation and generalization and the mythicization of the “Aryan” (see Poliakov 1993; Römer 1985; Conze and Sommer 1984: 159), philology and linguistics are responsible for at least three serious faults, viz. (1) for the confusion of language relationship and speaker relationship, (2) for the discriminatory hierarchy of languages and language types, and (3) for the metaphorical, naturalizing description of languages as organisms which provided the basis for the connection and approximation of race and language classifications (see Römer 1985).

2 We omit discussion of language-specific usage of the term “race” in
reference to animals, plants, and even extrabiological groupings of things, such as “type” or “sort” (see Il Nuovo Dizionario di Garzanti 1984: 725; Duden 1989: 1214f).

3 The terms “antisemitism” and “antisemitic”, which post festum cover the whole range of religious, economist, nationalist, socialist, Marxist, culturalist, and racist prejudicial aversion and aggression against Jews, were most probably coined in 1879 in the agitational, antisemitic circle of the German writer Wilhelm Marr (see Nipperdey and Rüup 1972). At that time the word “antisemitic” was employed as a self-descriptive, political “fighting word.” In 1935, the National Socialist ministry of propaganda (“Reichspropagandaministerium”) issued a language regulation in which it prescribed that the term should be avoided in the press and replaced with the term “anti-Jewish” (“antijüdisch”), “for the German policy only aims at the Jews, not at the Semites as a whole” (quoted from Nipperdey and Rüup 1972: 151). Undoubtedly, the term “antisemitic” has been used in postwar Germany and in postwar Austria more often than during the National Socialist reign of terror. This is because the term has become a politically “stigmatic word” for describing others and its meaning has been expanded in the analysis of anti-Jewish aggression throughout history.

4 The term “racism,” with its suffix “-ism,” which denotes a theory, doctrine, or school of thought as well as the related behavior (Fleischer/Barz 1992: 190), was probably first used in a title for an unpublished German book by Magnus Hirschfeld in 1933/4. In this book, which was translated and published in English in 1938, Hirschfeld argued against the pseudoscientifically backed contention that there exists a hierarchy of biologically distinct “races” (see Miles 1993: 29). The actual linguistic “career” of the term started in the postwar period (Sondermann 1995: 47).

5 For a similar critique see Claussen (1994: 2), who complains that in the public world (“Weltöffentlichkeit”) almost all violent social tension in the United States, for example the street fights in Los Angeles in 1992, are reported as “race riots” – “a headword that seems to make superfluous every analysis.”

6 For a critique of the notion of “collective identity” see Berger and Luckman (1980: 185) and Wodak et al. (1998: 58); for a critique of the terminological confusion see below.

7 Postmodernists are not completely consistent in their refusal of “metanarratives” and large-sized “collective subjects.” Rattansi (1994), for example, makes use of the abstract notion of “Western identities” as completely unquestioned reified entities.

8 Wieviorka (1991, 1994) relates racism to modernity as well. He holds the view that the current spread of racism has to do with the actual destructuration of industrial societies, with increasing difficulties of state and public institutions, and with the ongoing transformations of national identities (for a critique of Wieviorka’s postindustrial framework see Miles 1994).

9 For the concepts of “social” and “linguistic prejudice” see also Heinemann (1998).

10 Van Dijk does not neatly distinguish between ethnicism, racism and adjacent forms of discrimination (for a recent discussion of these concepts see also van Dijk et al. 1997), as he believes that they are fuzzy and overlapping concepts.
Margret Jäger adopts the same theoretical framework as Siegfried Jäger. One of her main interests is the relationship between gender and racism. In her analysis of interviews, she proves that sexism and racism are interconnected in multiple ways, especially in discourse about Turkish men and women (see M. Jäger 1996). We are limited by considerations of space and so omit discussion of this issue to concentrate on the theoretical and methodical innovations proposed by the Duisburg group.

A “discourse fragment” is a text or a part of a text that deals with a specific topic; for example, with the topic of “foreigners” and “foreigner issues” (in the widest sense) (S. Jäger 1993: 181).

The excerpt in the original German is as follows:

**profil:** Sie werden Karl-Heinz Grasser nicht empfehlen nachzugeben?


The racist intensification “up to black Africans” implies that in Austria, black African workers, because of their most visible “otherness,” are “an even worse evil” than other “foreigners,” and therefore functions as argumentative backing.

**REFERENCES**


Discourse and Racism


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