Chapter 1

The First Decades: From Liberal Humanism to Formalism

At the end of the nineteenth century, criticism in Europe and America had been predominantly biographical, historical, psychological, impressionistic, and empirical. With the establishment of English as a separate discipline in England, many influential critics, such as George Saintsbury, A. C. Bradley, and Arthur Quiller-Couch, assumed academic posts. By far the most influential of this early generation of academic critics was A. C. Bradley. In *Shakespearean Tragedy* (1904), Bradley’s central thesis, influenced by Hegel and the Hegelians T. H. Greene and F. H. Bradley (his brother), saw Shakespearean tragedy as a dialectic whereby the moral order and harmony of the world were threatened (by the tragic hero) and then re-established.

In America, influential theories of realism and naturalism had been propounded by William Dean Howells, Hamlin Garland, and Frank Norris. An important concern of American critics such as John Macy, Randolph Bourne, and Van Wyck Brooks was to establish a sense of national identity through tracing a specifically American literary tradition. In France, the most pervasive critical mode was the *explication de texte*, based on close readings which drew upon biographical sources and historical context. In the humanist tradition of Matthew Arnold, much of this *fin-de-siècle* criticism saw in literature a refuge from, or remedy for, the ills of modern civilization. In both America and Europe, the defenders and proponents of literature sought to preserve the humanities in the educational curriculum against the onslaughts of reformists such as Harvard University President Charles Eliot and John Dewey, who urged that the College education system be brought into line with prevailing bourgeois scientific and economic interests.
The New Humanists, Neo-Romantics, and Precursors of Formalism

The humanist tradition of the late nineteenth century, as expressed by figures such as Matthew Arnold, vociferously reacted against the commercialism and philistinism of bourgeois society. This tradition was continued and intensified in the polemic of the “New Humanists,” as well as by certain neo-Romantic and formalistic critics. Led by Harvard professor Irving Babbitt and including figures such as Paul Elmer More, Norman Foerster, and Stuart Sherman, the New Humanists were conservative in their cultural and political outlook, reacting against what they saw as a relativistic disorder of styles and approaches characterizing early twentieth-century America. They rejected the predominant tendencies stemming from the liberal-bourgeois tradition: a narrow focus on the present at the expense of the past and of tradition; unrestrained freedom in political, moral, and aesthetic domains; a riot of pluralism, a mechanical exaltation of facts and an uninformed worship of science.

Irving Babbitt’s humanism posits a unity which might contextualize historically the reductive multiplicity and isolated present of the bourgeois world. Babbitt described the dilemma of relating the One and the Many, of perceiving unity in the diversity of our experience, as “the ultimate problem of thought.” Babbitt sees the Protestant Reformation and the French Revolution as the crucial historical impulses toward modernity. At the heart of these eras of expansive individualism he locates Bacon and Rousseau who respectively embody “scientific” and “sentimental” naturalism, which attempt to explain man’s nature and the world on “natural” rather than transcendent foundations. As a result of this misguided veneration of the sciences, affirms Babbitt, “Man has gained immensely in his grasp on facts, but . . . has become so immersed in their multiplicity as to lose that vision of the One by which his lower self was once overawed and restrained.”

In Rousseau and Romanticism (1919) and Democracy and Leadership (1924), Babbitt sees Rousseau as both the father of “radical democracy” and the fullest representative of Romanticism (RR, ix, 379). Babbitt here articulates the opposition between classicism and Romanticism. Classicism expresses what is “normal” and “central” in human experience; it is not local and national but universal and “human”; it thus offers a model of representative human nature (RR, xxii, 14–17). Hence it seeks a “true centre,” an abiding permanent human element through change. Classicism employs an “ethical” imagination which insists on restraint and proportion. In contrast, Romanticism’s pursuit of the strange, extreme, and unique is premised on a conception of imagination, derived from Kant and Schiller, which is utterly free from all constraint. Babbitt’s main objection to Romanticism is its fostering of “anarchic individualism” and evasion of
moral responsibility. In avoiding a center of human experience, it con-
demns itself to both intellectual and moral relativism, a blind immersion
in the “Many” with no recourse to the stabilizing authority of the “One”
(RR, 391). Babbitt’s humanism, concerned with perfecting the individual,
urges a return to the Renaissance ideal of the “complete” man who achieves
a Socratic harmony between thought and feeling (LAC, 75, 80, 82, 166).
Babbitt insists that both life and man constitute a oneness that is always
changing, and that experience contains both unity and multiplicity (RR, xi).
At the foundation of Babbitt’s humanism, then, is a view of human
nature as essentially fixed through all its surface changes and a view of
reality as ultimately a unity.

Literary criticism, according to Babbitt, is infected with the pervasive
disease of impressionism. To reaffirm the role of “objective” judgment
Babbitt calls for comparative and historical methods which treat the clas-
cics “as links in that unbroken chain of literary and intellectual tradition
which extends from the ancient to the modern world” (LAC, 159–160).
The modern obsession with originality, says Babbitt, betrays “the profound
doctrine of Aristotle that the final test of art is not its originality, but its
truth to the universal . . . Now . . . there is a riot of so-called originality”
(LAC, 186, 188). These statements will be echoed almost verbatim by
writers such as T. S. Eliot and Ezra Pound. Genuine originality, Babbitt
suggests, “imposes the task of achieving work that is of general human
truth and at the same time intensely individual” (LAC, 194–195). What is
needed, says Babbitt, is a critic who will use the “historical method” while
guarding against its dangers of relativism by seeing “an element in man
that is set above the local and the relative . . . in Platonic language, he will
perceive the One in the Many” (RR, xii). This was a call to which Eliot,
Pound, and others enthusiastically responded.

Also reacting against the industrialism and rationalism of the bourgeois
world were the neo-Romantic critics in England, including D. H.
Lawrence, G. Wilson Knight, John Middleton Murry, Herbert Read, and
C. S. Lewis. Lawrence (1885–1930) was an avowed irrationalist, who saw
the modern industrial world as sexually repressive and as having stunted
human potential. His literary criticism was expressed in several reviews and
in his Studies in Classic American Literature (1923), as well as in essays on
sexuality and the unconscious. In both these works and his fiction, Law-
rence advocated a vitalism and individualism which often had parallels in
the views of Nietzsche and Freud. He attempted to reevaluate various writers
in the light of his libidinal and primitivist ideology, urging that their art
achieved something contrary to their conscious and morally repressive
intentions. His disposition is anti-democratic and even fascistic, reacting,
like Nietzsche, against mass mediocrity and moral conventionalism, and
urging hope for a new man. In his own highly idiosyncratic way, Lawrence
anticipates the stress on the unconscious, the body, and irrational motives
in various areas of contemporary criticism.
Of the other neo-Romantic critics mentioned above, Middleton Murry (1889–1957) attempted to reinstate a Romantic belief in pantheism and the organic unity of the world. He saw a central criterion of genuine poetry that it was not amenable to paraphrase and that it expressed truths inaccessible to reason or concepts. Herbert Read (1893–1968) began as an advocate of imagism and classicism and eventually expressed an allegiance to Romanticism and articulating an organicist aesthetic, viewing poetry as transcending reason. G. Wilson Knight (1897–1985), a Shakespeare scholar, is best known for his *The Wheel of Fire* (1930). Drawing on the findings of anthropologists such as Sir James Frazer concerning myths, rituals, and symbols, Wilson Knight interprets Shakespeare’s plays in terms of certain recurring symbols and motifs. As a critic, he distinguished interpretation, which aims empathetically to reconstruct an author’s vision, from criticism, which he sees as evaluative. Somewhat like the New Critics, Wilson Knight wished to subordinate considerations drawn from intention or biography or morality to artistic concerns. Another significant critic in this broad Romantic-religious tradition was C. S. Lewis (1898–1963), whose major critical work was *The Allegory of Love* (1936), which, along with his other works, contributed to his mission of promoting understanding of the formality and didacticism of the literature of the Middle Ages and the Renaissance. Finally, mention should be made of the scholar of Milton and Shakespeare, E. M. Tillyard (1889–1962), who engaged in a debate with C. S. Lewis in *The Personal Heresy* (1939) and whose most influential work was *The Elizabethan World Picture* (1943). New Critical trends were also anticipated in America where W. C. Brownell attempted to establish literary criticism as a serious and independent activity, and where James Gibbons Huneker and H. L. Mencken insisted on addressing the aesthetic elements in art as divorced from moral considerations.

Hence, the critical movements of the early twentieth century were already moving in certain directions: the isolation of the aesthetic from moral, religious concerns, and indeed an exaltation of the aesthetic (as transcending reason and the paradigms of bourgeois thought such as utility and pragmatic value) as a last line of defense against a commercialized and dehumanizing world; and a correlative attempt to establish criticism as a serious and “scientific” activity. This broadly humanist trend is far from dead; it has not only persisted through figures such as F. R. Leavis but has also often structured the very forms of critical endeavors which reject it.

The Background of Modernism

Modernism comprised a broad series of movements in Europe and America that came to fruition roughly between 1910 and 1930. Its major exponents and practitioners included Marcel Proust, James Joyce, Ezra Pound, T. S.
Eliot, William Faulkner, Virginia Woolf, Luigi Pirandello, and Franz Kafka. These various modernisms were the results of many complex economic, political, scientific, and religious developments over the nineteenth century, which culminated in the First World War (1914–1918). The vast devastation, psychological demoralization, and economic depression left by the war intensified the already existing reactions against bourgeois modes of thought and economic practice. Rationalism underwent renewed assaults from many directions: from philosophers such as Bergson, from the sphere of psychoanalysis, from neoclassicists such as T. E. Hulme, the New Humanists in America, and neo-Thomists such as Jacques Maritain. These reactions were often underlain by a new understanding of language, as a conventional and historical construct. The modernist writer occupied a world that was often perceived as fragmented, where the old bourgeois ideologies of rationality, science, progress, civilization, and imperialism had been somewhat discredited; where the artist was alienated from the social and political world, and where art and literature were marginalized; where populations had been subjected to processes of mass standardization; where philosophy could no longer offer visions of unity, and where language itself was perceived to be an inadequate instrument for expression and understanding.

A distinct group of artist-critics associated with modernism was the highly iconoclastic Bloomsbury Group. This circle included Virginia Woolf and her sister Vanessa, daughters of the critic and agnostic philosopher Leslie Stephen, the art critics Roger Fry and Clive Bell, the economist John Maynard Keynes, the biographer Lytton Strachey, and the novelist E. M. Forster. Most members of the group fell under the influence of the Cambridge philosopher G. E. Moore’s *Principia Ethica*. They saw this text as affirming an “aesthetic” approach to life inasmuch as it stressed the value of allegedly timeless states of consciousness which facilitated the enjoyment of beauty. The Group inevitably fell under many of the influences that had shaped modernism, such as the notion of time advanced in the philosophy of Bergson. It was during this period also that the foundations of the New Criticism were laid by figures such as William Empson and I. A. Richards; the latter’s *Principles of Literary Criticism* (1924) and *Practical Criticism* (1929) were widely and enduringly influential. Here, too, the literary artefact was treated as an autonomous and self-contained verbal structure, insulated from the world of prose, as in Richards’ distinction between emotive and referential language. In France also, the somewhat positivistic earlier mode of criticism, the *explication de texte*, was opposed by influential figures such as Bergson, whose novel conceptions of time and memory, and whose view of art as uniquely transcending the mechanistic concepts of bourgeois society, profoundly influenced Proust and other modernists. Paul Valéry (1871–1945) formulated a criticism drawing on the earlier French symbolists, one which prioritized the aesthetic verbal structure over historical and contextual elements.
The Poetics of Modernism: W. B. Yeats, Ezra Pound, T. S. Eliot

Over the last fifty years or so, we have come to appreciate more fully the complexity and heterogeneity of literary modernism, in its nature and genesis. It is no longer regarded as simply a symbolist and imagistic reaction against nineteenth-century realism or naturalism or later versions of Romanticism. It is not so much that modernism, notwithstanding the political conservatisms of many of its practitioners, turns away from the project of depicting reality; what more profoundly underlies modernistic literary forms is an awareness that the definitions of reality become increasingly complex and problematic. Modernists came to this common awareness by different paths: Yeats drew on the occult, on Irish myth and legend, as well as the Romantics and French symbolists. Proust drew on the insights of Bergson; Virginia Woolf, on Bergson, G. E. Moore, and others; Pound drew on various non-European literatures as well as French writers; T. S. Eliot, whose poetic vision was profoundly eclectic, drew on Dante, the Metaphysical poets, Laforgue, Baudelaire, and a number of philosophers.

In general, literary modernism was marked by a number of features: (1) the affirmation of a continuity, rather than a separation, between the worlds of subject and object, the self and the world. The human self is not viewed as a stable entity which simply engages with an already present external world of objects and other selves; (2) a perception of the complex roles of time, memory, and history in the mutual construction of self and world. Time is not conceived in a static model which separates past, present, and future as discrete elements in linear relation; rather, it is viewed as dynamic, with these elements influencing and changing one another. Human history is thus not already written; even the past can be altered in accordance with present human interests, motives, and viewpoints; (3) a breakdown of any linear narrative structure following the conventional Aristotelian model which prescribes beginning, middle, and end. Modernist poetry tends to be fragmented, creating its own internal ‘logic’ of emotion, image, sound, symbol, and mood; (4) an acknowledgment of the complexity of experience: any given experience is vastly more complex than can be rendered in literal language. For example, the experience of ‘love’ could be quite different from one person to another, yet language coercively subsumes these differing experiences under the same word and concept. Modernist poetry tends to veer away from any purported literal use of language which might presume a one-to-one correspondence between words and things; it relies far more on suggestion and allusion rather than overt statement; (5) a self-consciousness regarding the process of literary composition. This embraces both an awareness of how one’s own work relates to the literary tradition as a whole, and an ironic stance
toward the content of one’s own work; (6) finally, and most importantly, an awareness of the problematic nature of language. This indeed underlies the other elements cited above. If there is no simple correspondence between language and reality, and if these realms are mutually constituted through patterns of coherence, then a large part of the poet’s task lies in a more precise use of language which offers alternative definitions of reality. Eliot once said that the poet must “distort” language in order to create his meaning.

Twentieth-century modernism, as manifested in the work of the Irish poet and critic W. B. Yeats (1865–1939), the American poet Ezra Pound, and the Anglo-American poet and critic T. S. Eliot, was deeply influenced by symbolism, whether that of the English Romantics such as Blake, Coleridge, Wordsworth, and Shelley, or French symbolism as developed in the work of Baudelaire, Mallarmé, Verlaine, and Rimbaud. French symbolism was introduced to English and American audiences largely through Arthur Symons’ book *The Symbolist Movement in Literature* (1899). In this book, Symons explained the history and rationale of French symbolism, which he saw as a reaction against nineteenth-century scientism and materialism. French symbolism saw literature as affirming the reality of a higher, spiritual realm which could be divined not by rational thought but only in glimpses through a pure poetic language divested of any representational pretension. Symbolism is an attempt to reinvest both the world and language – stripped by much bourgeois thought and science to a utilitarian literalness – with metaphor, ambivalence, and mystery. In symbolist poetry, concrete images are used to evoke emotions, moods, and atmospheres otherwise ineffable.

Yeats’ own theory and practice of symbolism drew from William Blake, Shelley, Irish mythology, and magic. Yeats affirmed that external objects and scenes could express the profoundest internal states, and that the poet’s task is to imbue such scenes and images with a symbolic significance transcending the time and place of their immediate origin. Symbols, for Yeats, evoke what he calls the “Great Mind” and “Great Memory.” Yeats’ own poetry uses numerous symbols with both private and public associations, such as the rose, the cross, the stairway, and the tower. Yeats worked out his own highly intricate cosmological symbolism in *A Vision* (1925–1937). His assessments of most poets were motivated by a search for symbolic predecessors and an attempt to explain their techniques.

The other major critic of the early twentieth century influenced by French symbolism was the modernist poet T. S. Eliot (1888–1965). Some of the assumptions underlying his renowned critical notions, such as “tradition” (expressed in his seminal essay of 1919, “Tradition and the Individual Talent”), “dissociation of sensibility,” and “objective correlative,” were derived in part from French writers. Eliot’s concept of “dissociation of sensibility,” for example, according to which a dissociation of thought from feeling had arisen subsequent to the Metaphysical poets, was informed
by his perception of some of the nineteenth-century French poets as "Meta-
physical" in their attempt to harmonize these polarized faculties. Both
Eliot’s “dissociation of sensibility” and “objective correlative” may have
had roots in the thought of French symbolists and especially Remy de
Gourmont. Other major influences on Eliot’s criticism were Ezra Pound’s
imagism and T. E. Hulme’s classicism. Eliot’s main critical contributions
were (1) to combat provincialism by broadening the notion of “tradition”
to include Europe; (2) to advocate, as against the prevailing critical impres-
sionism, a closely analytical and even objective criticism which situated
literary works alongside one another in the larger context of tradition. In
this, he contributed to the development of notions of artistic autonomy
which were taken up by some of the New Critics; and (3) to foster, by his
own revaluation of the literary tradition (reacting against the Romantics,
for example, and highlighting the virtues of the Metaphysical poets), a
dynamic notion of tradition as always in the process of change. Eliot
also brought to literary criticism a sophistication drawn from his
philosophical studies, which helped to display the intricate connections
between literary study and other fields such as religion, philosophy, and
psychology. Eliot’s criticism, as he acknowledged, was motivated by a desire
to explain and propagate the kind of poetry he was writing, as well as
to draw attention to the various elements of literary tradition which
had proved serviceable to his verse. Hence, his criticism was in part a
manifesto of literary modernism, characteristically infused with political
conservatism.

Eliot’s aesthetics and his notion of tradition were also indebted to Ezra
Pound (1885–1972) and the imagist movement. Pound assumed a broad
range of critical roles: as poet-critic, he promoted his own work and the
works of figures such as Frost, Joyce, and Eliot; he translated numerous
texts from Anglo-Saxon, Latin, Greek, and Chinese; and, associating
with various schools such as imagism and vorticism, he advocated a
poetry which was concise, concrete, precise in expression of emotion,
and appropriately informed by a sense of tradition. As a result of his
suggestions, Eliot’s major poem The Waste Land was radically condensed
and transformed. The ideas of Pound and Eliot have had a lasting influence
but their most forceful impact occurred between the 1920s and the
1940s.

Formalism

The various modernistic groups tended to be formalistic in tendency,
focusing considerable detail on the formal structure of a work of art.
Indeed, literary critics and thinkers of various historical periods have placed
emphasis on the formal aspects of art and literature. Aristotle, ancient and
medieval rhetoricians, Kant, many of the Romantics, and writers in the
nineteenth-century movements of symbolism and aestheticism all placed a high priority on literary form. This emphasis reached a new intensity and self-consciousness in the literatures and critical theories of the early twentieth century, beginning with the Formalist movement in Russia and with European modernism, extending subsequently to the New Criticism in England and America and later schools such as the neo-Aristotelians. In general, an emphasis on form parenthesizes concern for the representational, imitative, and cognitive aspects of literature. Literature is no longer viewed as aiming to represent reality or character or to impart moral or intellectual lessons, but is considered to be an object in its own right, autonomous (possessing its own laws) and autotelic (having its aims internal to itself). Moreover, in this formalist view, literature does not convey any clear or paraphrasable message; rather, it communicates what is otherwise ineffable. Literature is regarded as a unique mode of expression, not an extension of rhetoric or philosophy or history or social or psychological documentary. Critics have variously theorized that preoccupation with form betokens social alienation, a withdrawal from the world, an acknowledgment of political helplessness, and a retreat into the aesthetic as a refuge of sensibility and humanistic values. Such an insular disposition also betokens a retreat from history and biography, effectively isolating the literary artefact from both broad social forces and the more localized and personal circumstances of its author.

In both academia and popular culture, we are still today very familiar with terms such as “art for art’s sake” and we still hear poetry or music or art spoken of as “ends in themselves,” to be enjoyed for their own sake. Most thinkers from Plato to the eighteenth century would not have understood this idea or indeed the desire to read literature as literature: while they might admit that one function of literature is to “delight” us via its formal qualities, they would insist that literature has an important moral, religious, or social dimension.

Strange as it may seem, the idea of literature as autonomous, as having no purpose beyond itself, received its first articulate expression not by a poet or a literary critic but by a philosopher: Immanuel Kant. It was Kant’s *Critique of Judgment*, first published in 1790, which synthesized previous haphazard attempts toward expressing literary autonomy. This book proved to have a vast influence on subsequent aesthetics and poetry, an influence still alive today in our own reverence for the literary artefact as something which stands above and beyond the demands of morality, education, and politics. Throughout the nineteenth and into the twenty-first centuries, the notion of literary autonomy – an index of a broader mutual separation and specialization of disciplines in bourgeois society – was developed by many literary figures and movements, ranging from the Romantics, Poe, and the French symbolists through the aestheticism of Pater and Wilde into modernism and current reactions against what are seen as ideological or political readings of literature.
Russian Formalism

Along with movements in futurism and symbolism, the Russian Formalists were a group of writers who flourished during the period of the Russian Revolution of 1917. The Formalists and the futurists were active in the fierce debates of this era concerning art and its connections with ideology. The Formalists and futurists found a common platform in the journal *LEF* (Left Front of Art). The Formalists, focusing on artistic forms and techniques on the basis of linguistic studies, had arisen in pre-revolutionary Russia but now saw their opposition to traditional art as a political gesture, allyng them somewhat with the revolution. However, all of these groups were attacked by the most prominent Soviet theoreticians, such as Trotsky, Nikolai Bukharin (1888–1937), Anatoly Lunacharsky (1875–1933), and Voronsky, who decried the attempt to break completely with the past and what they saw as a reductive denial of the social and cognitive aspects of art. V. N. Volosinov and Bakhtin later attempted to harmonize the two sides of the debate, viz., formal linguistic analysis and sociological emphasis by treating language itself as the supreme ideological phenomenon, as the very site of ideological struggle. Other groups, called "Bakhtin Circles," formed around this enterprise.

There were two schools of Russian Formalism. The Moscow Linguistic Circle, led by Roman Jakobson, was formed in 1915; this group also included Osip Brik and Boris Tomashewsky. The second group, the Society for the Study of Poetic Language (*Opoyaz*), was founded in 1916, and its leading figures included Victor Shklovsky, Boris Eichenbaum, and Yuri Tynyanov. Other important critics associated with these movements included Leo Jakubinsky and the folklorist Vladimir Propp.

It should be said that the Russian Formalists’ emphasis on form and technique was different in nature from that of the later New Critics. The Formalists’ analyses were far more theoretical, seeking to understand the general nature of literature and literary devices, as well as the historical evolution of literary techniques; the New Critics were more concerned with the practice (rather than the theory) of close reading of individual texts. Though Russian Formalism as a school was eclipsed with the rise of Stalin and the official Soviet aesthetic of Socialist Realism, its influence was transmitted through the structuralist analyses of figures such as Jakobson and Tzvetan Todorov to writers such as Roland Barthes and Gerard Genette. Even reception theorists such as Hans Robert Jauss have drawn upon Victor Shklovsky’s notion of defamiliarization.

Victor Shklovsky (1893–1984) became a founding member of one of the two schools of Russian Formalism, the Society for the Study of Poetic Language, formed in 1916. His essay “Art as Technique” (1917) was one of the central statements of formalist theory. It is in this paper that Shklovsky introduces defamiliarization, one of the central concepts of Russian
Formalism: as our normal perceptions become habitual, they become automatic and unconscious: in everyday speech, for example, we leave phrases unfinished and words half-expressed. Shklovsky sees this as symptomatic of a process of “algebraization” which infects our ordinary perceptions: “things are replaced by symbols”; we fail to apprehend the object, which “fades and does not leave even a first impression; ultimately even the essence of what it was is forgotten” (AT, 11).

Shklovsky quotes Tolstoy as saying that “the whole complex of lives of many people go on unconsciously . . . such lives are as if they had never been.” Hence habituation can devour work, clothes, furniture, one’s wife, and the fear of war. It is against this background of ordinary perception in general that art assumes its significance: “art exists that one may recover the sensation of life; it exists to make one feel things, to make the stone stony . . . The technique of art is to make objects ‘unfamiliar,’ to make forms difficult, to increase the difficulty and length of perception because the process of perception is an aesthetic end in itself and must be prolonged. Art is a way of experiencing the artfulness of an object; the object is not important” (AT, 12).

Boris Eichenbaum (1886–1959)

Like Shklovsky, Eichenbaum was one of the leaders of the Russian Formalist group known as the Society for the Study of Poetic Language, founded in 1916. Like others of his school, Eichenbaum was denounced by Trotsky. He wrote an important essay, “The Theory of the ‘Formal Method’” (1926, 1927), expounding the evolution of the central principles of the formalist method. Eichenbaum begins by stating that formalism is “characterized only by the attempt to create an independent science of literature which studies specifically literary material.”

According to Eichenbaum, the Formalists were aware that “history demanded . . . a really revolutionary attitude . . . Hence our Formalist movement was characterized by a new passion for scientific positivism – a rejection of philosophical assumptions, of psychological and aesthetic interpretations . . . Art . . . dictated its own position on things. We had to turn to facts and, abandoning general systems and problems, to begin ‘in the middle,’ with the facts which art forced upon us” (TFM, 106). It is clear from these lines that the ideology behind Formalism was positivism, an attempt to emulate the models and methods of what is perceived as “science,” an attempt to focus on immediately given empirical data rather than on general schemes or theories for uniting and understanding such isolated information. It is hardly surprising that the spokesmen of the official Russian aesthetic saw such a posture as reductive, tearing art from its historical and political contexts, denying its ideological function, and attempting to view it as an independent, autonomous domain. In the context of early twentieth-century Russia, Eichenbaum evidently sees this
strategy as revolutionary, as attempting to free art from serving ideological and political ends.

Eichenbaum also argued that poetry uses words differently from their function in ordinary speech, disrupting “ordinary verbal associations” (TFM, 129). The suggestion here is that poetry, or more specifically poetic form, comprises a kind of speech of its own, which is cumulatively developed by a tradition of poets. Rhythms are developed that are peculiar to poetry, and so are shades of meaning and syntactical structures. In this view of poetic form, the notion of content or material, as explained in Yuri Tynyanov’s *The Problem of Poetic Language* (1924), does not lie opposed to or outside of or beyond form; rather, content is itself a formal element (TFM, 130). Also, the Formalists adopted a new understanding of literary history which rejected the idea of some linear, unified tradition. Rather, literary tradition involved struggle, a destruction of old values, competition between various schools in a given epoch, and persistence of vanquished movements alongside the newly dominant groups (TFM, 134–135). The Formalists insisted that literary evolution had a distinctive character and that it “stood alone, quite independent of other aspects of culture.” Clearly, such a model of literary history anticipates later theories such as those of Pound and T. S. Eliot; the latter saw works of literature as forming an “ideal order” among themselves. For the Formalists, moreover, this evolution was independent of biography and psychology: “For us, the central problem of the history of literature is the problem of evolution without personality – the study of literature as a *self-formed social phenomenon*” (TFM, 136). Such methods clearly anticipate certain tenets of structuralism, such as the location of an author’s subjectivity within linguistic and social structures.

Mikhail M. Bakhtin (1895–1975)

Bakhtin is perhaps best known for his radical philosophy of language, as well as his theory of the novel, underpinned by concepts such as “dialogism,” “polyphony,” and “carnival,” themselves resting on the more fundamental concept of “heteroglossia.” Bakhtin’s writings were produced at a time of momentous upheavals in Russia: the Revolution of 1917 was followed by a civil war (1918–1921), famine, and the dark years of repressive dictatorship under Joseph Stalin. While Bakhtin himself was not a member of the Communist Party, his work has been regarded by some as Marxist in orientation, seeking to provide a corrective to the abstractness of extreme formalism. Despite his critique of formalism, he has also been claimed as a member of the Jakobsonian formalist school, as a poststructuralist, and even as a religious thinker.

Bakhtin’s major works as translated into English include *Art and Answerability: Early Philosophical Essays* (1990), *Rabelais and his World* (1965; trans. 1968), *Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics* (1929; trans. 1973), *The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays* (1930s; trans. 1981), and *Speech Genres and
Other Late Essays (1986). His important early essay “Towards a Philosophy of the Act” (1919) was not published until 1986. Bakhtin’s interest in the nature of language was formed in part by members of the various “circles” that formed around him during his career. The authorship of some further publications, such as Marxism and the Philosophy of Language (1929, 1930), which was published under the name of V. N. Volosinov, is still in dispute.6

Bakhtin’s major achievements include the formulation of an innovative and radical philosophy of language as well as a comprehensive “theory” of the novel. His essay “Discourse in the Novel,” furnishes an integrated statement of both endeavors. Indeed, what purports to be a theory of the novel entails not only a radical account of the nature of language but also a radical critique of the history of philosophy and an innovative explanation of the nature of subjectivity, objectivity, and the very process of understanding. In this essay, Bakhtin defines the novel as a “diversity of social speech types (sometimes even diversity of languages) and a diversity of individual voices, artistically organized” (DI, 262). It quickly becomes apparent that Bakhtin’s view of the novel is dependent upon his broader view of the nature of language as “dialogic” and as comprised of “heteroglossia.” In order to explain the concept of dialogism, we first need to understand the latter term: “heteroglossia” refers to the circumstance that what we usually think of as a single, unitary language is actually comprised of a multiplicity of languages interacting with, and often ideologically competing with, one another. In Bakhtin’s terms, any given “language” is actually stratified into several “other languages” (“heteroglossia” might be translated as “other-languageness”). For example, we can break down “any single national language into social dialects, characteristic group behavior, professional jargons, generic languages, languages of generations and age groups, . . . languages of the authorities, of various circles and of passing fashions . . . each day has its own slogan, its own vocabulary, its own emphases.” It is this heteroglossia, says Bakhtin, which is “the indispensable prerequisite for the novel as a genre” (DI, 263).

“Dialogism” is a little more difficult to explain. On the most basic level, it refers to the fact that the various languages that stratify any “single” language are in dialogue with one another; Bakhtin calls this “the primordial dialogism of discourse,” whereby all discourse has a dialogic orientation (DI, 275). We might illustrate this using the following example: the language of religious discourse does not exist in a state of ideological and linguistic “neutrality.” On the contrary, such discourse might act as a “rejoinder” or “reply” to elements of political discourse. The political discourse might encourage loyalty to the state and adherence to material ambitions, whereas the religious discourse might attempt to displace those loyalties with the pursuit of spiritual goals. Even a work of art does not come, Minerva-like, fully formed from the brain of its author, speaking a single monologic language: it is a response, a rejoinder, to other works, to
certain traditions, and it situates itself within a current of intersecting dialogues (DI, 274). Its relation to other works of art and to other languages (literary and non-literary) is dialogic.

Bakhtin has a further, profounder, explanation of the concept of dialogism. He explains that there is no direct, unmediated relation between a word and its object: “no living word relates to its object in a singular way.” In its path toward the object, the word encounters “the fundamental and richly varied opposition of . . . other, alien words about the same object.” Any concrete discourse, says Bakhtin, “finds the object at which it was directed already as it were overlain with qualifications, open to dispute, charged with value, already enveloped in an obscuring mist – or, on the contrary, by the ‘light’ of alien words that have already been spoken about it. It is entangled, shot through with shared thoughts, points of view, alien value judgments and accents. The word, directed toward its object, enters a dialogically agitated and tension-filled environment” (DI, 276–277). The underlying premise here is that language is not somehow a neutral medium, transparently related to the world of objects. Any utterance, whereby we assign a given meaning to a word, or use a word in a given way, is composed not in a vacuum in which the word as we initially encounter it is empty of significance. Rather, even before we utter the word in our own manner and with our own signification, it is already invested with many layers of meaning, and our use of the word must accommodate those other meanings and in some cases compete with them. Our utterance will in its very nature be dialogic: it is born as one voice in a dialogue that is already constituted; it cannot speak monologically, as the only voice, in some register isolated from all social, historical, and ideological contexts. We might illustrate this notion of dialogism with an example taken from the stage of modern international politics. Those of us living in Europe or America tend to think of the word (and concept of) “democracy” as invested with a broad range of positive associations: we might relate it generally with the idea of political progress, with a history of emancipation from feudal economic and political constraints, with what we think of as “civilization,” with a secular and scientific world view, and perhaps above all with the notion of individual freedom. But when we attempt to export this word, this concept, to another culture such as that of Iraq, we find that our use of this word encounters a great deal of resistance in the linguistic and ideological registers of that nation. For one thing, the word “democracy” may be overlain in that culture with associations of a foreign power, and with some of the ills attendant upon democracy (as noted by thinkers from Plato to Alexis de Tocqueville): high crime rates, unrestrained individualism, the breakdown of family structure, a lack of reverence for the past, a disrespect for authority and a threat to religious doctrine and values. What occurs here, then, is precisely what Bakhtin speaks of: an ideological battle within the word itself, a battle for meaning, for the signification of the word, an endeavor to make one’s own use of the word predominate.
Similar struggles occur over words such as “terrorism,” welded by the Western media to a certain image of Islam, and qualified in the Arab media with prefixes such as “state-sponsored.” In such struggles, the word itself becomes the site of intense ideological conflict. Hence, language is not somehow neutral and transparent: it is the very medium and locus of conflict.

In formulating this radical notion of language, Bakhtin is also effecting a profound critique not only of linguistics and conventional stylistics but also of the history of philosophy. He sees traditional stylistics as inadequate for analyzing the novel precisely because it bypasses the heteroglossia that enables the style of the novel. Stylistics views the source of style as “the individuality of the speaking subject” (DI, 263–264). Stylistics, linguistics, and the philosophy of language all postulate a unitary language and a unitary relation of the speaker to language, a speaker who engages in a “monologic utterance.” All these disciplines enlist the Saussurean model of language, based on the polarity of general (language system) and particular (individualized utterance) (DI, 269). In this respect, the historical project of literary stylistics, philosophy, and linguistics has been one. Bakhtin sees this project as deeply ideological and political: it was a project that entailed exalting certain languages over others, incorporating “barbarians and lower social strata into a unitary language of culture,” canonizing ideological systems and directing attention away “from language plurality to a single proto-language.” Nonetheless, insists Bakhtin, these centripetal forces are obliged to “operate in the midst of heteroglossia” (DI, 271). Even as various attempts are being made to undertake the project of centralization and unification, the processes of decentralization and disunification continue (DI, 272). This dialectic between the centripetal forces of unity and the centrifugal forces of dispersion is, for Bakhtin, a constituting characteristic of language.

What Bakhtin, like Bergson, is doing is not merely reconceiving the nature of language but the act of understanding itself: this, too, is a dialogic process. Every concrete act of understanding, says Bakhtin, is active; it is “indissolubly merged with the response, with a motivated agreement or disagreement . . . Understanding comes to fruition only in the response” (DI, 282). Moreover, it is not merely that language is always socially and ideologically charged and is the locus of constant tension and struggle between groups and perspectives: in its role of providing this locus, it also furnishes the very medium for the interaction of human subjects, an interaction that creates the very ground of human subjectivity. For the individual consciousness, says Bakhtin, language “lies on the borderline between oneself and the other” (DI, 293).

Even literary language, as Bakhtin points out, is stratified in its own ways, according to genre and profession (DI, 288–289). The various dialects and perspectives entering literature form “a dialogue of languages” (DI, 294). It is precisely this fact which, for Bakhtin, marks the
characteristic difference between poetry and the novel. According to Bakhtin, most poetry is premised on the idea of a single unitary language; poetry effectively destroys heteroglossia; it strips the word of the intentions of others (*DI*, 297–298). In the novel, on the contrary, this dialogization of language “penetrates from within the very way in which the word conceives its object” (*DI*, 284). Bakhtin sees the genres of poetry and the novel as emblematic of two broad ideological tendencies, the one centralizing and conservative, the other dispersive and radical. It may even be that “poetry” and “novel” are used by Bakhtin as metaphors for these respective tendencies. The “novel” embodies certain metaphysical, ideological, and aesthetic attitudes: it rejects, intrinsically, any concept of a unified self or a unified world; it acknowledges that “the” world is actually formed as a conversation, an endless dialogue, through a series of competing and co-existing languages; it even proposes that “truth” is dialogic. Hence, truth is redefined not merely as a consensus (which by now is common in cultural theory) but as the product of verbal-ideological struggles, struggles which mark the very nature of language itself (*DI*, 300).

Roman Jakobson (1896–1982)

The work of Roman Jakobson occupies a central and seminal place in the development of formalism and structuralism. Essentially a linguist, Jakobson was born in Moscow, where he co-founded the Moscow Linguistic Circle in 1915, which also included Osip Brik and Boris Tomashevsky. Along with Victor Shklovsky and Boris Eichenbaum, he was also involved in a second Russian Formalist group, the Society for the Study of Poetic Language, formed in 1916. The Formalists were in some ways precursors of structuralism: in 1926 Jakobson founded the Prague Linguistic Circle which engaged critically with the work of Saussure. And, fleeing from Nazi occupation, he moved to America in 1941 where he became acquainted with Claude Lévi-Strauss; in 1943 he co-founded the Linguistic Circle of New York. His ideas proved to be of greatest impact first in France and then in America.

In his paper “Linguistics and Poetics” (1958) Jakobson argues that poetics is an integral part of linguistics. He insists that “literary studies” must engage in “objective scholarly analysis of verbal art” (*LL*, 64). Whereas most language is concerned with the transmission of ideas, the poetic function of language focuses on the “message” for its own sake (*LL*, 69). Jakobson’s essay “Two Aspects of Language and Two Types of Aphasic Disturbances” (1956) suggests that language has a bipolar structure, oscillating between the poles of metaphor and metonymy. This dichotomy, he urges, “appears to be of primal significance and consequence for all verbal behavior and for human behavior in general” (*LL*, 112). The development of any discourse takes place along two different semantic lines: one is metaphoric, where one topic leads to another through similarity or
substitution. The other is metonymic, where one topic suggests another via contiguity (closeness in space, time, or psychological association). In normal behavior, says Jakobson, both processes operate, but one is usually preferred, according to cultural and personal conditions (LL, 110–111). In verbal art, also, while the two processes richly interact, one is often given predominance. Jakobson notes that the primacy of metaphor in literary Romanticism and symbolism has been widely acknowledged. What has been neglected, he thinks, is the predominance of metonymy in realism: the realist author often “metonymically digresses from the plot to the atmosphere and from the characters to the setting in space and time” (LL, 111). Jakobson notes that a competition between metaphoric and metonymic devices occurs in any symbolic process. In analyzing the structure of dreams, for example, the decisive question, he says, is “whether the symbols and the temporal sequences are based on contiguity (Freud’s metonymic ‘displacement’ and synecdochic ‘condensation’) or on similarity (Freud’s ‘identification and symbolism’)” (LL, 113). Here Jakobson anticipates Lacan’s analysis of Freud’s contrast between condensation and displacement in terms of metaphor and metonymy.

The New Criticism

In the Anglo-American world, formalistic tendencies were most clearly enshrined in the New Criticism. Some of the important features of this critical outlook originated in England during the 1920s in the work of T. S. Eliot and Ezra Pound, as well as in a further generation of professional critics who helped to rejuvenate the study of English literature. The most prominent of these, associated with the new English curriculum at Cambridge University, were I. A. Richards and his student William Empson. In his Principles of Literary Criticism (1924) and his Science and Poetry (1926), Richards attempted to establish a systematic basis for the study of literature. His Principles of Literary Criticism advanced literary critical notions such as irony, tension, and balance, as well as distinguishing between poetic and other uses of language. In 1929 Richards published a book, Practical Criticism, whose profound and pervasive influence still endures. Using samples of students’ often erratic attempts to analyze poetry, he emphasized the importance of “objective” and balanced close reading which was sensitive to the figurative language of literature. The practice of close reading as established by Richards, at both Cambridge and Harvard (to which he later transferred), later had a profound impact on the New Critics who facilitated its academic institutionalization. While William Empson himself was not a New Critic, he produced a book, Seven Types of Ambiguity (1930), which had an impact on the New Criticism in virtue of the close attention it paid to literary texts and its stress on ambiguity as an essential characteristic of poetry.
Across the Atlantic, New Critical practices were also being pioneered by American critics, known as the Fugitives and the Southern Agrarians, who promoted the values of the Old South in reaction against the alleged dehumanization of science and technology in the industrial North. Notable among these pioneers were John Crowe Ransom and Allen Tate who developed some of the ideas of Eliot and Richards. Ransom edited the poetry magazine *The Fugitive* from 1922 to 1925 with a group of writers including Tate, Robert Penn Warren, and Donald Davidson. Other journals associated with the New Criticism included the *Southern Review*, edited by Penn Warren and Cleanth Brooks (1935–1942), the *Kenyon Review*, run by Ransom (1938–1959), and the still extant *Sewanee Review*, edited by Tate and others. During the 1940s, the New Criticism became institutionalized as the mainstream approach in academia and its influence, while pervasively undermined since the 1950s, still persists. Some of the central documents of New Criticism were written by relatively late adherents: W. K. Wimsatt and Monroe Beardsley’s essays “The Intentional Fallacy” (1946) and “The Affective Fallacy” (1949) (it is worth noting, in this context, the enormous influence of E. D. Hirsch’s book *Validity in Interpretation*, published in 1967, which equated a text’s meaning with its author’s intention); Austin Warren’s *The Theory of Literature* (1949); W. K. Wimsatt’s *The Verbal Icon* (1954); and Murray Krieger’s *The New Apologists for Poetry* (1956).

John Crowe Ransom (1888–1974)

The seminal manifestoes of the New Criticism, however, had been proclaimed earlier by Ransom, who published a series of essays entitled *The New Criticism* (1941) and an influential essay, “Criticism, Inc.,” published in *The World’s Body* (1938). This essay succinctly expresses a core of New Critical principles underlying the practice of most “New Critics,” whose views often differed in other respects. As Ransom acknowledges, his essay is motivated by the desire to make literary criticism “more scientific, or precise and systematic”; it must become a “serious business.” He urges that the emphasis of criticism must move from historical scholarship to aesthetic appreciation and understanding. Ransom characterizes both the conservative New Humanism and left-wing criticism as focusing on morality rather than aesthetics. While he accepts the value of historical and biographical information, Ransom insists that these are not ends in themselves but instrumental to the real aim of criticism, which is “to define and enjoy the aesthetic or characteristic values of literature.”

In short, Ransom’s position is that the critic must study literature, not *about* literature. Hence criticism should exclude: (1) personal impressions, because the critical activity should “cite the nature of the object rather than its effects upon the subject” (*WB*, 342); (2) synopsis and paraphrase, since the plot or story is an abstraction from the real content of the text; (3)
historical studies, which might include literary backgrounds, biography, literary sources, and analogues; (4) linguistic studies, which include identifying allusions and meanings of words; (5) moral content, since this is not the whole content of the text; and (6) “Any other special studies which deal with some abstract or prose content taken out of the work” (WB, 343–345). Ransom demands that criticism, whose proper province includes technical studies of poetry, metrics, tropes, and fictiveness, should “receive its own charter of rights and function independently” (WB, 346). Finally, in this essay and other works, Ransom insists on the ontological uniqueness of poetry, as distinct from prose and other uses of language, as in prose. “The critic should,” he urges, “regard the poem as nothing short of a desperate ontological or metaphysical manœuvre,” which cannot be reduced to prose (WB, 347–349). All in all, he argues that literature and literary criticism should enjoy autonomy both ontologically and institutionally. His arguments have often been abbreviated into a characterization of New Criticism as focusing on “the text itself” or “the words on the page.”

William K. Wimsatt, Jr. (1907–1975) and Monroe C. Beardsley (1915–1985)

In addition to their other works, the critic Wimsatt and the philosopher Beardsley produced two influential and controversial papers that pronounced central positions of New Criticism, “The Intentional Fallacy” (1946) and “The Affective Fallacy” (1949). In the first of these, they lay down certain propositions that they take to be axiomatic: while acknowledging that the cause of a poem is a “designing intellect,” they refuse to accept the notion of design or intention as a standard of literary critical interpretation. In stating their second “axiom,” they raise the question of how a critic might find out what a poet’s intention was and state what is effectively their central claim: “If the poet succeeded in doing it, then the poem itself shows what he was trying to do. And if the poet did not succeed, then the poem is not adequate evidence, and the critic must go outside the poem – for evidence of an intention that did not become effective in the poem.” The third axiom is the American poet Archibald MacLeish’s statement that a “poem should not mean but be.” Wimsatt and Beardsley explain this statement as follows: “A poem can be only through its meaning – since its medium is words – yet it is, simply is, in the sense that we have no excuse for inquiring what part is intended or meant . . . In this respect poetry differs from practical messages, which are successful if and only if we correctly infer the intention” (VI, 4–5). This is an effective statement of the New Critical position that the poem is an autonomous verbal structure which has its end in itself, which has no purpose beyond its own existence as an aesthetic object. It is not answerable to criteria of truth, accuracy of representation or imitation, or morality. Finally, Wimsatt and Beardsley insist that the thoughts and attitudes of a poem can be imputed
only to the dramatic speaker or persona of the poem, not directly to the author (VI, 5).

What Wimsatt and Beardsley are opposing is what they take to be a Romantic intentional fallacy: the Romantic idea, expressed in ancient times by Longinus and more recently by figures such as the great German writer Goethe and the Italian philosopher Benedetto Croce, that a poem echoes the soul of its author, that it embodies his intentions or psychological circumstances (VI, 6). The most influential recent statement of intentionalism, according to the authors of this essay, is I. A. Richards’ fourfold characterization of meaning as “sense,” “feeling,” “tone,” and “intention.” The passwords of the intentional school are Romantic words such as “spontaneity,” “sincerity,” “authenticity,” and “originality.” These need to be replaced, say the authors, with terms of analysis such as “integrity,” “relevance,” “unity,” and “function,” terms which they claim to be more precise (VI, 9).

Wimsatt and Beardsley’s later essay “The Affective Fallacy” (1949) is motivated by the same presupposition, namely that literature or poetry is an autonomous object, independent not only of author psychology, biography, and history but also of the reader or audience that consumes it. The word “affection” is used by philosophers to refer to emotion, mental state, or disposition. Hence, the “affective fallacy” occurs, according to Wimsatt and Beardsley, when we attempt to explicate or interpret a poem through recourse to the emotions or mental state produced in the reader or hearer. As these authors put it, just as the intentional fallacy “is a confusion between the poem and its origins,” so the affective fallacy “is a confusion between the poem and its results (what it is and what it does).”10 “The outcome of either Fallacy, the Intentional or the Affective, is that the poem itself, as an object of specifically critical judgment, tends to disappear” (VI, 21).

There are many possible objections to the arguments of both essays. To begin with, they presuppose that we can treat a poem as an isolated artefact, torn from all of its contexts, including the circumstances of its reading or reception. Clearly, the distinction between what Wimsatt and Beardsley see as “internal” and “external” evidence cannot be absolute and will vary according to the reader’s knowledge and literary education. Moreover, many interpretative disputes arise not from questions of content but rather from questions of form and tone: we may agree on the most basic meaning of a poem but disagree on the significance we attach to this meaning. For example, Horace’s famous “Ode to Pyrrha” could be translated in a tone of polite urbanity or one of crude sarcasm. Broad considerations of the intention behind the poem may legitimately help us clarify such issues. Many poems, such as satires or mock-heroic poems, presuppose a reader’s prior acquaintance with certain literary traditions and conventions: it is important to acknowledge, for example, that Pope’s The Rape of the Lock is intended to employ epic conventions for the purpose of satire. Recourse
to intention can yield necessary insight into the relations between form and content, as well as relations between an artist and his audience. Moreover, given that the same statement made by different speakers in differing contexts could have vastly divergent meanings, it seems implausible to attribute autonomy to any statement or group of words, whether embodied in poetic language or not. As Frank Cioffi has remarked, to refute the intentionalist, Wimsatt and Beardsley should have shown that our response to a poem is not altered by reference to intentional information; but all they have shown is that this does not always or need not happen. Perhaps the most fundamental objection is the impossibility and artificiality of somehow treating literature as a self-contained object, an object which is not somehow realized in its performance, in interaction with readers who legitimately bring to the texts their own cultural backgrounds, interests, and assumptions.

Notes