22 Prestige, Cultural Models, and Other Ways of Talking About Underlying Norms and Gender

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1   Introduction

In this chapter I will focus on how speaker norms have been conceived in language and gender studies, and attempt to arrive at a synthesis which suggests how a speaker's knowledge about language and social context contributes to the patterning of language by gender. I will focus both on what we can "objectively" describe about a society, as well as how speakers "subjectively" conceive of society, and then how these conceptions might have consequences for behavior (language use in particular). In addition, I want to explore the connection between what gender meanings arise in a particular interaction and wider societal meanings.

2   What Are Norms?

2.1   Norms and sociolinguistic meaning

The first important distinction that needs to be made is between norms about the social identity of a speaker (*social group norms*) and norms about the social meaning of a linguistic item (*social action norms*). These two have often been conflated in correlational studies of variationist sociolinguistics, such that a given variant will be claimed to "mean" membership in the group that uses it the most. While this is sometimes the case, the picture is usually more complex. For example, we might propose that a low-pitched voice is indicative of (i.e. means) masculinity. But we can show that the same kind of voice has connotations of authority, even for women. We are thus more accurate in

describing the relationship between masculinity and voice pitch by saying there is an (arbitrary) linguistic norm that connects authority and pitch, and a further social norm that connects masculinity and authority (see Connell 1995; Kiesling 2001a). (Whether or not the meaning of low pitch came from its association with men is not important here, just that there is a linguistic feature connecting a social group norm with a linguistic norm.) The connection between authority and masculinity is a social group norm, while the connection between low pitch and authority is a social action norm.

Ochs (1992) has characterized the connection between linguistic forms and social identity as *indirect indexicality*, because there are one or more social actions (a stance, speech act, or speech activity) that come between a linguistic feature and the group that uses it the most, rather than a *direct indexicality* between the group and the linguistic feature. The distinction I am making names the two parts of indirect indexicality, which include both social action norms and social group norms. Social action norms are those norms that describe the indexing of stances, acts, and activities by linguistic forms, while social group norms are those that describe the connection between stances, acts, and activities and the social identities of speakers. This distinction is similar to, but slightly different from, that between *social significance* and *social meaning*, originally made by Lavendera (1982) and discussed by Milroy (1992) and Holmes (1996). Social significance is meaning that comes from the statistical connection between a group and a linguistic feature, so it is a *direct index*. But social meaning is meaning that derives, at least in part, from the function of the linguistic feature. If I claim that low pitch directly indexes "male," then that is social significance. If I claim that tag questions index tentativeness, then that is social meaning. The difference between these terms and what I am suggesting is that I want to say that all variables have social meaning but not necessarily social significance. The social meaning of a linguistic item is ontologically primary, while its social significance derives ultimately as a kind of short circuit between social meaning and social action.

We thus have three interrelated norms: social group norms, social action norms, and social significance norms. While I believe social action norms are ontologically primary, the connection between each type of norm is functionally bidirectional, and in fact a linguistic form can be used to indirectly index a stance by first indexing a social group. For example, a White American speaker might use a feature of African American English to index a stance stereotypically associated with African Americans (as shown in Kiesling 2001a). This bidirectional, web-like view of these norms is illustrated more fully below.

In interactional discourse gender studies, such as summarized in Tannen (1990), the distinction between social group norms and social action norms has in fact been the point: that different linguistic features carry different social meanings for men and women (and other groups). Thus, Maltz and Borker (1982) suggest that questions play different roles in conversations for men and

women. Further, if groups share social action norms, they still may value norms differently. Goodwin (1980), for instance, shows how boys and girls use different forms of directives to accomplish their goals and organize their groups. Of course, the distinction between social group and social action norms (as we will see with all types of norms) is not necessarily kept separate by speakers, but interact and influence one another. I will explore these interactions below.

Another more common way of describing norms is as *descriptive* or *prescriptive*. Descriptive norms are those that simply describe a group, usually through some statistic like the average, such as "the average height of men." Prescriptive norms are those values that people are expected to adhere to (or at least strive for), such as "Men should be tall." Both kinds of norms have played a part in language and gender research; often, they are difficult to tease apart, as prescriptive norms often affect descriptive norms. Moreover, both social group norms and indexical norms each have a prescriptive and a descriptive flavor. In general, studies try to find out what the descriptive norm is (see especially Romaine, this volume), and then use prescriptive norms to help explain those norms, although in practice the two often get confused. Indeed, prescriptive norms, such as "Women should be more polite" (see Lakoff 1975), often turn out to be descriptively accurate: "Women are more (positively) polite" (see Holmes 1995). The interaction between the two, however, can be quite complex, with each kind of norm influencing the other. For example, men are, on average, taller than women in most societies, but this has led to a complete gender dichotomy whereby all men are expected to be taller than women. This prescriptive norm makes life difficult for short men and tall women, and one rarely sees couples in the USA and perhaps throughout Western society in which the man is shorter than the woman. Below I will revisit this notion when I discuss the connection between social power and masculinity.

The height example shows how prescriptive norms affect descriptive norms: a descriptively average difference has been turned into a prescriptively categorical difference, such that men and women are prescriptively completely separate categories and differ categorically on many traits. "Men should not be like women and women should not be like men." In turn, we find a much more categorical pattern in couple's relative heights than would appear by chance.

I want to make a further distinction among norms that characterize a society, norms that characterize institutions, and norms that characterize speech events. As I see it, we need to distinguish among at least these three interacting levels when thinking about language and gender: (1) the wider society, consisting of large census group categories; (2) institutions such as corporations, clubs, families, universities, etc.; and (3) specific speech events with their individual speakers. At each level there are norms of each type, and they interact. On the societal level we have patterns such as those described by Romaine (this volume) on variation and Talbot (this volume) on stereotypes. At the institutional level, we have patterns described in Part V of this volume,

and by McConnell-Ginet (this volume) on community of practice. Finally, each speech event will develop both types of norm as the event unfolds, and as a type of speech event recurs, prescriptive norms for those events will develop, as seen in Bucholtz (this volume, on discourse analysis). Speakers have knowledge of all these levels of norms, and of course each individual has a way of approaching these norms (among these approaches are resistance, compliance, and active promotion).

How might this knowledge be characterized, and how do different "levels" of norms interact? In order to explore this question further, I want to rely on an extended example, based on my own research with fraternity men. I will briefly look at how norms have been used in language and gender through this example, and then explore how they might be combined to arrive at an understanding of the relationships among the various underlying norms that speakers use when making choices about how to say something, and making meaning out of the choices of other speakers.

2.2   *The fraternity study: Background and data*

I spent a little more than a year in 1993–4 with a fraternity at a university in Northern Virginia, in the suburbs of Washington, DC. A fraternity of this kind is an all-male social group. It is essentially an institutionalized friendship network which also does volunteer work to help the university and the surrounding community. I chose this site because there had been very little work until then specifically focusing on men's gender identity; most work had focused on explaining why women did not act the way men were assumed to behave. Also, there was increasing evidence that we could learn much about language and gender by focusing on the differences within genders as well as among or between them (see Eckert 1989).

I investigated both variation and discourse strategies in the fraternity, and possible connections between these kinds of linguistic features. I specifically looked at style shifting by individual men: how did they speak differently in varying situations? For variation (see Kiesling 1998), I focused on how they used the (ing) variable when socializing, in interviews with me, and in fraternity meetings. I found that, while most men used a high percentage of the alveolar N variant in socializing situations, in the meeting and interview situations there were some men who continued to use the high N, while most of the men used a lower N (see figure 22.1). In discourse (see Kiesling 1997, 2001a), I explored what discourse features and strategies men used to create authority (power and hierarchy), and, most importantly, what *kind* of power and authority the men construct based on their position in the fraternity and the speech event. In all of these investigations, I have explained the patterns I find based on a number of underlying norms the men have about gender and society, usually as described in their own words. Below I will introduce some of these terms in the context of the fraternity research.

Figure 22.1 Cross-tabulation of speaker and activity type for progressive verb forms only (from Kiesling 1998: 84)

2.3   Prestige

What explanatory norms have been proposed for patterns of variation in census categories? The first kind of norm, proposed by Labov (1966), is in terms of prestige. Prestige in variation studies has always been assumed to be some shared value (norm) of a single speech community, but in fact it is something that has at its root the identification of certain linguistic forms with upper-class speakers. The assumption has been (and this has often been corroborated in experiments) that the speech of such speakers is the more desirable kind of speech for everyone in a speech community.

   In the fraternity example, G is what is usually called the prestigious variant, and men use it less than women, following a recurrent pattern in variation studies for stable variables of this kind (see Romaine, this volume). So why do men use more N, if there is more prestige in G (especially if one assumes they would want to display greater societal power)? Labov left the door open to other kinds of prestige as well. Trudgill (1972) pursued this notion and found that in fact men in Norwich, England, valued the vernacular variant, even though they didn't come right out and say it. Following Labov, he called this "covert prestige." So one type of underlying evaluative norm that has been used is the notion of prestige, and the corresponding notion of covert prestige.

2.4   *Power, solidarity, and politeness*

Now let's have a look at the most important norms that have been used in interactional sociolinguistics: power, solidarity, and the related notion of politeness. These kinds of norms, while cultural, describe norms for different speech activities and speech acts. In this view, speakers orient themselves (because of their culture, gender, and so on, and the specific nature of the speech activity or act) more toward relationships of power (hierarchy or rank) or relationships of solidarity (social distance). Power and solidarity have been investigated most closely on the discourse level, but the claim is that cultures and subcultures have different orientations to these values. In language and gender, for example, it has been claimed that men concern themselves more with relationships of power, while women are more concerned with relationships of solidarity. A good example of this is Goodwin's (1980) study, in which she found that the boys tended to use directives that emphasized and created hierarchy, while the girls used directives which emphasized solidarity and inclusiveness.

Brown and Levinson's (1987) politeness theory is related: they make a distinction between negative politeness (minimizing interference with an addressee's freedom of action) and positive politeness (focusing on the similarity between speakers' wants). However, their theory is more focused on individual speech acts and speakers, and less on conversational goals and cultural expectation. But it is close enough to include it in this set of norms, and it has been used profitably to explain gender differences in language use, most notably by Holmes (1995). However, positive and negative politeness strategies are often tied to meanings of solidarity and power, such that positive politeness is tied to solidarity (because of its focus on connections) and negative politeness to power (because of its focus on freedom and independence, which a powerful person has more of than a non-powerful person). These connections are essentially a conflation of distance with inequality and closeness with equality. But Brown and Levinson clearly intend these three concepts (power, positive politeness, and negative politeness) to be kept separate. As Tannen (1993b) points out, hierarchy and distance are separable, and are often bound together differently depending on the culture. This view suggests that another type of norm for describing gender differences is how hierarchy relationships are bound with distance relationships.

These norms could help us explain the differences in the men's use of (ing) in the fraternity, but only in the most general terms. Moreover, the pattern in the fraternity raises problems for the generalization that men focus on power. We could say that the men are more focused on solidarity in the socializing situation, and more on power in the interview and meeting situations. We could extend this generalization to suggest that the men who use more N in the interview and meeting situations are focusing more on solidarity than the others. But this explanation cannot be more specific while relying only on

general notions of power and solidarity. In addition, since these are all men, why aren't they all more focused on power all the time, even in the socializing situation? I will return to these questions below.

2.5   *Immediate speech event norms*

Before I move to a synthesis, I want to briefly touch on what we might call the local effects of norms. We can exemplify this if we consider one of the principles of accommodation theory, which holds that under situations of positive affect, speakers try to adjust their speech so it more closely matches the patterns of their interlocutor(s). Speech accommodation theorists have identified a number of motivations for accommodating behavior, as summarized in Weatherall and Gallois (this volume) and Giles, Coupland, and Coupland (1991). It is these *motivations*, rather than the accommodating behavior, that I would classify as true norms, and hence accommodation can be said to be a local norm *effect*.

A related notion used to explain the patterning of linguistic variation is network analysis, as pioneered by Milroy (1980) and used recently by Eckert (2000). As with accommodation, social networks work in concert with specific norms to produce linguistic patterns. Denser and more multiplex networks tend to amplify the importance of norms with more immediate and local meaning for speakers in those networks, while less dense and multiplex networks tend to allow for a wider range of norms to influence speech behavior. However, the network analysis points to the need for a subtle understanding of and differentiation among the different kinds and levels of norms that may impact the speech of a given person in a given speech event.

3   Norms and Identity: Toward a Synthesis

Accommodation patterns highlight a very important aspect of sociolinguistic research: that all patterns arise from decisions people make in interaction, when they are talking to someone and thinking about "who they are" with respect to that person or people. So in explaining these patterns, we must ask what kinds of (sub)conscious knowledge speakers draw on to achieve these stances. Most of the above norms have been claimed at one time or another to be The Primary Motivation for sociolinguistic patterns, including and especially those about language and gender. But in fact people can multi-task, and even apprehend multiple levels of meaning, as indirect speech acts show us (see also Silverstein 1976). Here I want to propose a way of characterizing the knowledge people rely on during the process outlined above.

Following Ochs (1992), I propose that people's primary way of organizing interaction (including language) is through stances. This focus does not mean

that knowledge relating to larger "census" categories does not come into play, just that this knowledge is invoked in the service of creating stances and performing certain acts situated in particular activities. With respect to the fraternity data above, then, I claim that the men who use a high level of N in the meeting do so because they want to construct a certain kind of stance in that meeting, specifically one of practicality and hard work. However, N does not directly index this stance, but relies on a web of indexicality associated with the wider linguistic style that N is a part of. Another way of thinking about stance is in terms of personal style (Eckert 2000), where a single linguistic feature is part of a wider personal style of a speaker, or even category of speakers. In this view, a linguistic feature does not, in speaker's real-time processing, do the work of creating an identity. Rather, the correlations that linguists find between gender and a particular linguistic feature are simply a heuristic indication of similar personal styles. As the California Style Collective (1993) explains, each style is unique, made up of a bricolage of linguistic (and other) behaviors that index various sociological and cultural meanings. Stances are local instantiations of a personal style, performed in a particular speech event. It is the nature of these various sociological and cultural meanings to which I now turn.

3.1   (Ing) and the web of norms in the fraternity

In order to make this discussion more concrete, let us return to the fraternity. Given the explanation above, N should indicate (but not necessarily fully index) a certain general personal style, which can be discerned through an examination of the specific personal styles of those who use it. We should be able to show that it helps create specific stances in interaction. In this regard, the three men who use high amounts of N in the meeting are worth focusing on, because they provide a contrastive category with the other, "control" category. We should thus be able to analyze the stances and styles of these three men and identify how they are specifically different in this regard. This analysis will yield a better understanding of the kinds of specific indexicality being used when these men use N and the others use G (the velar variant).

I will focus on the following speech, given by Brian Waterson, a first-year member of the fraternity. In this speech he is running for the office of vice-president. It is unusual for someone in his position in the fraternity (new) to run for such an office (and even more unusual to succeed, which he does not). In fact, this is the only time in my corpus when he speaks in a meeting, and this passage is thus responsible for Waterson's categorical (4/4) use of N in the meetings.

Waterson's Speech
  1 Hotdog: Could we have Brian Waterson
  2 (7.3)   ((*Waterson walks in, goes to the front of the room*))

3	Waterson:	Um (1.1) I'm not gonna f:- um put a load of shit in you guys whatever.
4		Um (0.7) You guys know I'm a **fuckin'** hard worker.
5		I work my ass off for everything.
6		I don't miss anything
7		I'm always I'm always there,
8		I'll do anything for you guy:s,
9		and if you nominate me for this position
10		I'll put a hundred percent ef-effort towards it,
11		I mean I have **nothin'** else to do 'cept **fuckin'** school work.
12		and the fraternity.
13		and uh and uh like uh like you guys said um this:
14		we need a change because we're **goin'** down?
15		A:nd I know I don't have a lot of experience?
16		In like position-wise?
17		But when this fraternity first started (0.5)
18		back in uh April of of nineteen eighty-nine,
19		um the guys that were elected for positions then didn't have too much (0.9) uh: experience in positions either.
20		So just keep that in mind when you vote.
21		Thank you boys.
22		Remember I'm the I'm the ice ma:n. ((*final two words said in an emphasized whisper as he walks out of the room*))

(Numbers in parentheses represent silence in seconds; text in double parentheses are comments; colons represent lengthening of the preceding sound; a dash represents an incomplete morpheme. The four coded (ing) tokens are in bold; *anything* and *everything* are not bold because a secondary stress on the -*ing* morpheme in trisyllabic words makes them categorically G, similar to monomorphemic *thing*; see Houston 1985.)

Since Waterson cannot perform an "electable identity" based on his experience in the fraternity, or on past offices he has held, he must construct some other kind of electable identity suitable for the authority of this office. He does this by presenting a "hard-working" stance, where hard-working means giving time to the fraternity to perform often mundane and tedious chores requiring stamina and consistency. His use of N helps create this stance, through its social significance indexing of the working class, which in turn indexes stances (through social group norms) of tough physicality. Below I explore this connection more fully.

3.2   Linguistic norms, linguistic ideology, metapragmatics: Standard versus non-standard

I have already characterized N as non-standard and G as standard. So we might say that Waterson is simply a non-standard speaker and leave it at that.

But the non-standard is sometimes equated with a covertly prestigious form, a term which suggests that a speaker will gain something in their use of it. So we should ask what specifically Waterson gets by using N – how it builds his status. The answer is that it helps build his *ability*-oriented authority rather than a *structurally* oriented authority. Speakers who use more G tend to iden-tify themselves with the established age hierarchy of the fraternity, which Waterson is trying to circumvent since he is low down on that hierarchy. He is relying on his audience's linguistic ideology to help create his stance: G is indexed to an establishment hierarchy, while N is indexed to an anti-establishment hierarchy. I have shown elsewhere (Kiesling 1998) that the other men who use a high N create similar stances through similar indexings. So here we find that the linguistic feature N actually indexes an entire ideol-ogy, but crucially, it is still used in interaction as a resource to create a stance. This indexing is the kind of indexing referred to by Silverstein (1993, 1996; see also Morford 1997) as a second-order indexical, because it relies on speakers' knowledge of the social distribution and evaluation of linguistic forms.

   This perspective suggests a picture of indexicality in which both direct and indirect indexicality are at work, but one in which the stance of the speaker is still central. In this case, the speaker is relying on a social significance relation-ship between a social group and a linguistic feature, and then using that value to help create a stance through a social group norm. This kind of indexing is found in other studies of language and gender, but only when there is existing metalinguistic and metapragmatic knowledge in a community such that the linguistic feature itself has some social value. This is more typically the situa-tion for instances of bilingualism (and of course diglossia), as well as many cases of stable sociolinguistic variation (such as the (ing) case) and changes from above the level of consciousness (Labov 1972).

3.3   Cultural models/figured worlds: Rocky and the lawyer

Another way of making the concept of (covert) prestige more powerful is to explore the kinds of cultural models or figured worlds that Waterson may index, in a similar way as he indexes a linguistic ideology (see Holland and Quinn 1987; D'Andrade and Strauss 1992; Holland et al. 1998 for discussions of these terms). Here I want to suggest that he is doing more than indexing a shared social hierarchy – rather, he is indexing a shared narrative: cognitive schemas known as cultural models (and the related and more recent term, figured worlds). An example of such a model is Holland and Skinner's (1987) study of how college students talk about gender types, particularly derogatory terms. They show that the women they interviewed categorize men based on their conformity to a shared prototypical narrative of how intimate relation-ships proceed. Other ways of organizing their data did not work for Holland and Skinner (1987: 104): "Without knowledge of the [cultural model] scenarios,

we would have been at a loss to explain why respondents thought some terms for gender types could be used as insults whereas others could not."

We can apply this "scenario" approach to the fraternity case, by appealing to cultural models of masculinity. We can identify one cultural model for men that follows a trajectory of technical, intellectual, and eventually structural attainment and expertise. We might call this model the corporate lawyer model, as such people are structurally powerful, have established hierarchies and ideologies in their interest, and as a prototype are assumed to come from families that already have societal structural power. Opposing this model is what I call the Rocky model, after the movie character who wins a world boxing title through hard work, physical power, determination, and stamina, and who also comes from a working-class background. Waterson's N use helps bring this underdog scenario to mind (or something like it; I'm not claiming this is the specific scenario), and helps Waterson create an electable identity of the underdog who works hard and in the end does a good job.

Cultural models have been shown by cognitive anthropologists to provide the most rich and reliable descriptions of cultural norms: knowledge, shared by people in a culture, which gives rise to patterns of behavior. I have been concerned in this chapter with what knowledge speakers use to make decisions about what language forms to use, and how they "subjectively" understand their decisions. Cultural models are a powerful resource in this endeavor, and I want to encourage researchers to use the concept more widely than has been the case, as well as the methods of cognitive anthropologists (see D'Andrade 1995; Bernard 1994), in order to come to a richer understanding of the gender patterns we find in talk, and the speaker knowledge that leads to these patterns (and how talk helps to build this knowledge).

Eckert (2000), while not using the cultural model concept in her discussion, seems to make a similar point. She explores the local, "subjective," meanings associated with different variables in vowel shift in Detroit. In her ethnographic variation analysis of a suburban high school, she shows that the variables have meanings such as "urban" versus "suburban," and are understood in terms of rich cultural models of the social landscape. These cultural models help Eckert explain with precision the kinds of social forces and meanings at work in the variation patterns in the school, particularly those relating to gender. Rather than discussing the variables in terms of prestige (or power or solidarity or politeness), Eckert shows, for example, that girls are evaluated against a particular narrative which includes sexuality, urbanness, and school engagement. In addition, girls' orientations to that narrative are displayed through behavioral symbols, including linguistic variables. Boys play a different role in this model, one focusing more on athletics and "toughness," so that we find that differences among boys are better explained by relating them to this role in the model, and that gender differences can be ascribed to their qualitatively different roles in the cultural model. (Other studies that use a cultural-model-like perspective are Bucholtz 1999; Gal 1978; Kendall 1999; Mendoza-Denton 1997; Meyerhoff 1999; Morford 1997.)

Cultural models thus give the researcher an important explanatory tool which does not exclude traditional explanatory terms such as prestige, power, and solidarity, but rather renders these terms more specific to the speakers being investigated, and thus more thickly explanatory. Researchers must use ethnographic methods to discover what models exist, then determine how different speakers relate themselves and others to these models (whether they follow them or deviate from them in some way). Then these relationships to models can be correlated with various linguistic features such as sociolinguistic variables or discourse strategies to find the motivations for the speakers' choices.

3.4   *Institutional norms: Experience and hard work hierarchies*

On the institutional level, we find yet more specific realizations of cultural models, so that norms in the institution to some extent mirror those of society as a whole. This "fractal recursivity" (Irvine and Gal 2000: 38) can be found in the hierarchies the men construct within the fraternity. These can be seen as institutional cultural models, in that they construct normative paths and categories of members through their stories. They are similar to the institutional categories identified by Eckert in her study of the school in two ways. First, they reproduce with local meaning "objective" categories found by social scientists looking at the larger society (e.g. socio-economic class). Second, they represent not just abstract categories, but entire life (institutional) trajectories and styles of behavior.

In the fraternity, I found multiple interacting hierarchies in play. The most obvious was the age hierarchy, with probationary members (pledges) at the bottom, and senior members and alumni at the top. This hierarchy in many respects paralleled the formal offices of the fraternity such as president and treasurer, in that older members tended to hold the higher offices. As I have suggested, however, there isn't a perfect correlation between the two hierarchies, in that members are evaluated for an office based on experience, past "hard work," and intellectual or leadership abilities specific to performing a certain office. These competing evaluative hierarchies can be seen as competing cultural models of how a member moves up both the age and office hierarchies. In the first model, one comes in to the fraternity ready-made with certain abilities, and "naturally" moves up as one gets older. In the second model, one comes to the fraternity as a *tabula rasa*, and one learns the ropes and proves oneself to other members through hard work. (These themes are elaborated in Kiesling 1997.) In the meeting, a speaker's orientation to these kinds of hierarchies helps explain why some used N more than others. The three speakers who did so are all oriented more to the hard work model than the experience model, whereas the G users focused more on the experience (and natural ability) model. These models help us connect the wider, global

indexings to the narrower, local social indexings, and account for institutional variants of dominant patterns of gender behavior.

3.5 Speech activity norms and indexing: Markedness and contrast

Speech activities also have norms: norms for the kind of language expected, the kind of stances expected, and generic structure. These norms have been called *frames* in the discourse analysis literature (see Tannen 1993a). In general, speakers use such norms to help them make sense of meaning in a speech activity (for instance, whether someone is following or flouting Gricean conversational maxims), and many misunderstandings have been shown to be based on a mismatch of frames (Tannen and Wallat 1982). However, the norms can be broken, or, viewed another way, more marked linguistic forms can be used. In this case, the marked form in fact may index another speech activity. For example, note that in the style-shifting picture for the fraternity presented in figure 22.1, the Socializing speech activity (which is broadly conceived, from hanging out in dorm rooms to conversations in bars) has a high N use by all speakers (Waterson actually has the lowest N use in Socializing, but the individual differences here are not statistically significant). So in the Socializing speech activity, the use of N is unmarked in the sense that its use is the "rule" for the speech activity. We might suggest that a similar rule holds for the Meeting speech activity, although in this case the G variant is unmarked. The high N users in the meeting are therefore using a marked form to index the Socializing speech activity within the Meeting speech activity (i.e. momentarily reframing the speech activity).

This reframing is thus done in order to help the men create a stance similar to that typically created in the Socializing activity. What is it from the Socializing activity that these men would want to bring into the Meeting activity? We can see this in Waterson's speech, more so in the second half, when he begins to try to take a stance of *casual* hard work (line 11): *I mean I have nothin' else to do 'cept fuckin' school work*. He also seems to be relying on his less formal (hierarchical) relationship with the men, as evidenced by his reminder of his fraternity nickname (*I'm the Iceman*) and by addressing the men with the term *boys*. In this case, using aspects of a speech activity in which stances of casual confidence and non-hierarchical relationships prevail (as in the Socializing activity type) helps to create such a stance. (This activity type is of course a creation of the analyst, but it need not be the emically veridical activity type to allow the argument to go through. One focus of future research might be to what extent speakers do rely on such speech activity norms for creating stances.)

This approach is not always successful. In the discussion following the speeches for the vice-president office, Pete, the current vice-president, broke frame and began boasting in a way more typical of Socializing situations. The

other members shouted him down until he focused his topic on the issue at hand (see Kiesling 2001b).

This indexing of other speech activities is related to gender patterns in a somewhat subtle, but important, way. First, we are likely to find a different style-shifting pattern for women in similar situations in terms of overall percentages, and, more importantly, we are also unlikely to find any high N users in the meeting. I make this prediction because there really is no high-status parallel to the Rocky cultural model for women, so women would be less likely to appeal to hard work through this variable. In essence, I'm suggesting that women would not create the kind of stance that Waterson creates in a similar situation, which means they would not index the Socializing situation. Moreover, stances in the corresponding female Socializing activity type are likely to be different, especially for this population. What's important to notice is the centrality of stance and its relation to gender performance: an activity type has an unmarked stance which can be created in another activity type by using a linguistic feature associated with the "embedded" speech activity. And again, we can find a parallel in these frames to the more global cultural models discussed above: Socializing is related to the Rocky cultural model, to less concern for formal hierarchy, and to non-establishment linguistic ideologies.

3.6   The interaction of different cultural models: The web of indexicality

I do not want to say that any one of these kinds of norms is necessarily primary in indexicality; in fact, I want to argue that they create a web of underlying norms that it would be unwise to try to pull apart. Far from being a Gordian knot, these norms have intricately related relationships which reinforce and inform one another. Of course one level may come to the fore depending on other aspects of context, such as the topic. We can observe some structure in these indexical webs in the fractal recursivity noted at various points above. A speaker's stance does emerge as the central construct, however, since it is mostly on this level that speakers will experience language and interaction, especially when we are dealing with probabilistic features such as (ing). That is, as Silverstein (1985) points out, even if speakers evaluate N and G differently when asked, they don't consciously keep track of their and others' percentages. Rather, they take a stance to their interlocutors, and it is in the service of this stance-taking that other levels of social organization and indexicality come into play. I want to be clear here that I am not claiming that stance (or footing or framing) is the "prime indexicality" (in fact I would say there is no such thing); I do claim that speakers' experience of social meaning is primarily stance-focused. Stance is primary interactionally but not indexically.

How does all this relate to the notions of prescriptive/descriptive norms, prestige, networks, power, solidarity, and accommodation, summarized above? It suggests a way of connecting these generalizing concepts to the ways that

speakers actually experience interaction. By focusing on stances and different kinds of schemata (cultural models and frames), we have a way of accounting for the way speakers "subjectively" feel interaction to happen. We can then connect these subjective explanations with the "objective" terms discussed above. Cultural models also give us a more specific way of formulating concepts such as norm, prestige, power, solidarity, accommodation, and peer pressure.

An identity, and Eckert's personal style, can therefore be seen as a repertoire of stances in particular speech events, and an orientation to one or more dominant cultural models, whether that be following the model or indexing some kind of deviation from it. Furthermore, things like masculinity and femininity can be seen as cultural generalizations of these stance bundles, so that masculinity as a social trait becomes recognized through confrontational, hierarchical, or "tough" stances, for example.

Where do norms come from and how are they reproduced, especially if they are not conscious? This is accomplished through interactions, and by repeated use of the kinds of indexings explored above. Thus, a performance of indexicality reinforces that indexical relationship, much the way the use of a particular neural pathway in the brain strengthens the connection between neurons. Sidnell (this volume) illustrates other interactional processes in which gender norms, especially the rules for speech activities, can be reinforced through interaction. However, interlocutors must share a particular cultural model or schema with the speaker for these social meanings to be successfully created. It is through this sense-making that indexicality occurs, and thus the reinscription of these underlying norms. These webs of indexicality are perhaps another way of thinking about the ideological Discourse as discussed by Foucault (1980, 1982) and used by Critical Discourse Analysts in their work (see Wodak, this volume).

3.7   Norms and perception

I want to mention one other relationship of underlying norms to language, and that is how these norms form a context which predisposes our perception of them. Very little work has been performed in this area, but it is potentially very important for an understanding of language and gender. It seems that our knowledge of a speaker's identity changes how we perceive his or her speech at a very low level. This means that we could actually perceive what is physically the "same thing" (word, sentence, pitch, vowel formants) as different depending on gender. These perceptual "inconsistencies" go beyond simply normalizing for differences in voice quality. Strand (2000) is the starkest example of such work. She showed that when speakers were shown stereotypically feminine faces which spoke in a stereotypically feminine way, phonetic processing was significantly faster than when a male face was matched with a female voice. This shows that speakers rely on schemata of prototypical speakers at an extremely early stage in language processing, and that the distinction between

prescriptive and descriptive norms is even more difficult and entangled than previously thought, as prescriptive norms may in fact distort how we perceive descriptive norms at a very basic level. Social information and norms are thus not something that is added on to language after we have "decoded" the denotational meaning of an utterance, but rather a central and basic part of our knowledge of language.

4   Conclusion

In this chapter, I have tried to survey and synthesize a rather wide array of views on how underlying norms are used by speakers to create social meaning, especially gender meanings, and how hearers use these norms to interpret the meanings (in the broadest sense) of utterances. I have tried to square the "objective" norms described by linguists, anthropologists, and psychologists with the "subjective" experience of speakers. In that vein, I've argued that a speaker's stance is their primary concern, and that linguistic features index social meanings in the service of the speaker, creating or performing a certain stance. Schemata in the form of cultural models have figured prominently in this discussion, and I hope that researchers continue to widen their use of these constructs in the future. Using such constructs requires more effort on the part of researchers, since one needs to triangulate an in-depth linguistic analysis with a number of different kinds of social analyses. However, I believe that by using these underlying norms and concepts, we can arrive at a more faithful picture of the relationship of language to gender identity.

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