Chapter 28

Globalization and Culture

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We live in a moment popularly understood as "the global triumph of the United States and its way of life" (Hobsbawm 1998: 1). Henry Kissinger goes so far as to say that "globalization is really another name for the dominant role of the United States" (1999). The *Wall Street Journal* trumpets this loudly: "the US enters the 21st century in a position of unrivaled dominance that surpasses anything it experienced in the 20th. . . . America's free-market ideology is now the world's ideology; and the nation's Internet and biotechnology businesses are pioneering the technologies of tomorrow" (Murray 1999). For all the misery internal to that country (in 2000, even as 74 percent of college students expected to become millionaires, 44 million people had no medical cover), the US has international influence beyond the reach of other régimes. Consider a mundane expectation of sovereignty – that the modern state make its own stamps, featuring national images. Today, 70 countries, mostly in the Third World, have their stamps produced by the New York-based Inter-Governmental Philatelic Corporation. The dominant images are recycled icons from US popular culture (Mingo 1997). This US cultural imperialism is often understood as the apex of a wider phenomenon – globalization – that sees North American corporations wiping out the state system and obliterating the cultures of the world.

If that is so, it is the outcome of what is known as the "Washington Consensus." Dominant since the late 1970s, the "Consensus" favors open trade, comparative advantage, deregulation of financial markets, and low inflation. It has, of course, presided over slower worldwide growth and greater worldwide inequality than any time since the Depression, with job security and real wages down and working hours up in the industrialized market economies (IMECS). At the same time, the world's richest 20 percent of people earned 74 times the amount of the world's poorest in 1997, up from 60 times in 1990 and 30 times in 1960, as inequalities between North and South increase. The manifold catastrophes of the "Consensus" across the late 1990s – Mexico, southeast Asia, Russia, and Brazil – were explained away as aberrations by its apologists (Palley 1999: 49; Levinson 1999: 21; Galbraith 1999: 13).

The "Consensus" is animated by neoliberalism's mantra of individual freedom, the marketplace, and minimal government involvement in economic matters. This provides the intellectual alibi for a comparatively unimpeded flow of capital across national boundaries, and the rejection of labor, capital, and the state managing the economy together. On behalf of capital, the state undermines the union movement through policies designed to "free" labor from employment laws. (The Keynesian welfare system, which helped to redistribute funds to the working class, is dismantled in the process.) Ralph Nader refers to this as "a slow motion *coup d'état*," with the historic gains to representative discussion and social welfare made by working people and subaltern groups comprehensively problematized and rejected by corporate power (1999: 7).

Where does culture fit here? In an increasingly global division of labor, how cultural citizenship is theorized and actualized matters enormously for working people. Can their participatory rights be asserted in terms of: (i) where they live, were born, or work; (ii) the temporary or permanent domicile of their employer; or (iii) the cultural impact of a foreign multinational on daily life? These concerns form the backdrop to our investigation, and they should transform cultural studies. Why?

Montréal hosted the fourteenth quadrennial World Congress of Sociology in the late Northern summer of 1998. The conference marked the end of postmodernity – in a sense. The postmodern is often taken to include: an aesthetic style that tropes or quotes other forms in a *mélange* of cultural features; an economic turn by the IMECS towards trade and the service industries and away from self-sufficiency and manufacturing; a philosophical discourse that deconstructs existing forms of knowledge by using their own precepts to undermine them; a priority on identity politics that transcends constitutional and class bases for defining political agency; the decline of the major forms of social reasoning of the past century (liberalism, Marxism, psychoanalysis, and Christianity); and cultural theories derived from and informing the above (Collins 1992: 327).

This trope, ever-present four years earlier at the thirteenth Congress, was gone by 1998, erased (or at least rendered palimpsestic) by globalization: "and the postmodern/the postmodern and" saw their status as suffix and prefix written all over. Globalization had arisen from 1960s origins in French and US discussions of the future to a position of great prominence (Held et al. 1999: 1). So polysemous was the term that it included sameness, difference, unity, and disunity – in short, globalization, like postmodernity before it, had come to stand for nothing less than *life itself*. Something similar has gone on in cultural studies. The postmodern was "our" trope, signifying the end of grand narrative, rational expectation, and unitary power. But that very textual, impressionistic term, opposed to common sense in its very formulation, has become, in its own ahistorical way, *passé*. There is a huge array of cultural studies writings on the global, which again offers distinctive features of interest to the humanities left: mobility, hybridity, transnationalism, and chaos (Sinclair et al. 1996;

Mohammadi 1997; Mowlana 1996; Sussman & Lent 1998; Allen et al. 1996; Braman & Sreberny-Mohammadi 1996).

What *The Financial Times* (1997) calls "the G-word" is not the exclusive property of sociologists or cultural studies folks. The concept has great currency in the logics of businesses, unions, and governments – *Forbes* magazine launched *Forbes Global* in 1998 via a full-page social-realist-like advertisement, complete with red flags (which included currency signs), Castro- and Mao-garbed workers, and the slogan "Capitalists of the World Unite!" The avowed intent was to acknowledge and sell "the final victory of capitalism" as embodied in the new 'zine.

Globalization is a knowledge-effect with definite impacts on intellectual, economic, social, and governmental practice. Most accounts of it veer between three tendencies: celebration or lamentation in the face of the supposed universal triumph of the market and decline of the state; skepticism about the degree of change and the reality of a nonstate system; and caution that the fallout from transformations in the relation of private and public is not yet clear (Held et al. 1999: 2). In this chapter, we adumbrate relevant discourses about global economics, the nation-state, and the New International Division of Cultural Labor (NICL), concluding with a case-study from screen culture to exemplify issues confronting cultural studies.

Our analysis takes as its touchstone Bruno Latour's observation that "the words 'local' and 'global' offer points of view on networks that are by nature neither local nor global, but are more or less long and more or less connected" (1993: 122). Such terms are often binarized (and hence all-encompassing) in the globalization literature, where the plenitude of one becomes the lack of the other, and *vice versa*: a graceless zero-sum game between national and international, public and commercial. In place of this logic, we follow the dictum that "if one wants the great systems finally to be open to certain real problems, it is necessary to look for the data and the questions in which they are hidden" (Foucault 1991: 151).

Global Economics

The notion that space and time are routinely compressed under globalization draws on two key events: the Treaty of Tordesillas in 1494 and the Washington Conference of 1884. The first of these acknowledged the emergence of empire, as the Pope mediated rivalries between Portugal and Spain through a bifurcation of the world – the first recorded conceptualization of the globe as a site of conquest and exploitation. The second event, taking place the same year as the imperial division of Africa at the Conference of Berlin, standardized Greenwich as the axis of time and cartography. This development effectively marked the world as a site of interconnected government and commerce (Schaeffer 1997: 2, 7, 10–11).

Capitalism's uneven and unequal development paralleled the trends of Tordesillas and Washington, as mercantilist accumulation and imperialism between 1500 and 1800 were followed by the classical era of capital and its Industrial Revolution, founded on the use of natural resources for manufacturing copper, steel, and fuel. A period of Northern industrial development and agrarian change was partnered by European emigration to the Americas to deal with population overflow, while colonial possessions offered raw materials and enslaved labor (Amin 1997: 1, x; Reich 1999). A key shift occurred between 1870 and 1914 (not surprizingly, Bahá'u'llah coined the phrase "New World Order" in 1873 [quoted in Calkins and Vézina 1996: 311]). During this period, global output and exchange increased by upwards of 3 percent annually – an unprecedented figure (Hirst 1997: 411). In response to these developments, socialists, syndicalists, and anarchists formed large international associations of working people (Herod 1997: 167).

Up to the Second World War, trade focused on national capitals, controled by nation-states. The period from 1945 to 1973 represented an "interregnum between the age of competing imperial powers and the coming of the global economy" (Teeple 1995: 57), while the international régime following the Second World War was based on US hegemony articulated with the expansionary needs of its corporations. As other economies grew, so did the interdependence between nations, and between companies within nations. After 1950, world trade was dominated by the triad of Europe, Japan, and the US, "each with their immense hinterland of satellite states" (Jameson 1996: 2). Between 1950 and 1973, total trade increased by almost 10 percent annually, and output by more than 5 percent, most of it between the triad (Hirst 1997: 411). Whereas modern manufacturing techniques were restricted in the nineteenth century to Europe and the northeastern US, they proliferated across the world, as applied intellect and science deterritorialized (Hindley 1999; Reich 1999). The Cold War constructed a polarized world of two totalizing ideologies, struggling just as empires had done over the previous century. This totality, which obscured other differences, encouraged the view that the future would see the triumph of one pole (Bauman 1998: 58) – hence today's mavens of *laissez-faire* and the supposed demise of the state.

Under the "Washington Consensus," at issue is the extent to which the historic promises made by established and emergent governments after 1945, to secure (*a*) the economic welfare of citizens and (*b*) their political sovereignty, can still be kept. Neoliberalism is the latest lever for these guarantees, and the one that has gone furthest towards breaking them. Governments want to deliver voters ongoing sovereignty and controled financial markets, along with international capital markets – what *The Economist* calls an "[i]mpossible trinity" ("Global Finance" 1999: 4, Survey Global Finance).

The promise of economic welfare initially seemed locally workable, via state-based management of supply and demand and the creation of industries to substitute imports with domestically produced items. The second promise, sovereignty, required concerted international action to convince the colonial powers (principally Britain, the Netherlands, Belgium, France, and Portugal) that the peoples whom they had enslaved should be given the right of self-determination via nationalism. The latter became a powerful ideology of political mobilization as a supposed precursor to liberation. When this second promise was made good, the resulting postcolonial governments undertook to deliver the first promise. Most followed import-substitution industrialization, frequently via multinational corporations (MNCs) that established local presences. But Third World states suffered dependent underdevelopment and were unable to grow economically. Their formal *political* postcoloniality rarely became *economic*, apart from some Asian states that pursued export-oriented industrialization and service-based expansion. With the crises of the 1970s, even those states which had bourgeoisies with sufficient capital formation to permit a welfare system found that stagflation had undermined their capacity to hedge employment against inflation. We know the consequences: "the space of economic management of capital accumulation [no longer] coincided with that of its political and social dimensions" (Amin 1997: xi).

Import substitution of the 1950s and 1960s was progressively problematized and dismantled from the 1970s to today, a tendency that grew in velocity and scope with the erosion of state socialism. We have reached a point where it is said that "the state remains a pre-eminent political actor on the global stage," but "the aggregation of states . . . is no longer in control of the global policy process," a fundamentally non-normative system that is run by banks, corporations, and finance traders (Falk 1997: 124–5, 129–30). In the new system, core and periphery are blurred, the spatial mobility of capital is enhanced, unions are disciplined, the strategic strength of labor is undermined, and the power of the state is circumscribed by the ability of capital to move across borders – a fundamental shift in the bargaining and power relations between capital and labor, facilitated by transportation and information technologies, but still displaying the traces of specific national modes of integration into the NICL (Ross & Trachte 1990: 63; Thompson & Smith 1999: 197).

Because of their mobility, MNCs can discipline both labor and the state, such that the latter is reluctant to impose new taxes, constraints, or pro-worker policies in the face of possible declining investment. Post-state-socialist labor movements are advised on "appropriate" forms of life by the American Federation of Labor–Council of Industrial Organizations, in keeping with the latter's strong opposition to Marxism-Leninism over many decades (Herod 1997: 172, 175). The "uncompetitive" countries of the Arab world and Africa have their labor forces bracketed by MNCs as a reserve army of low-cost potential workers who will be imported to the North if required (Amin 1997: ix), while throughout the world, "household and informal sector activities" increase "to sustain global reproduction" (Peterson 1996: 10).

The global economic system that evolved from the mid-1970s saw Northern class factions support a transnational capital that displaced noncapitalist systems elsewhere (Robinson 1996: 14–15). Regulatory and other mechanisms were set in place to liberalize world trade, contain socialism, promote legislation favorable to capitalist expansion, and aggregate world markets. The latter, which included the formation of the European Union (EU) and other trade groupings, was crucial for the promotion of free trade régimes in the 1980s and beyond (though trade since then has not exceeded that of the postwar quarter century [Hirst 1997: 412]). The growth of corporate power had provided enough strength for corporations to demand the removal of national barriers to trade. The spread of foreign capital and currency markets has meant that economic decisions were taken outside the context of the nation-state, in ways that favored the market. And by 1994, half of the hundred biggest economies in the world "belonged" not to nation-states, but to MNCs (Donnelly 1996: 239). Four hundred of the latter accounted for two-thirds of fixed assets and 70 percent of trade (Robinson 1996: 20). Viewing the market as a deterritorializing movement does not imply a borderless world, but it is transforming the state. Through structural adjustment and liberalization, states adopt policies to manage global, rather than national, economic relations. These policies, with considerable variation, typically facilitate global circuits of money and commodities at the expense of social stability and environmental security within the nation-state (McMichael, forthcoming; McMichael & Lawrence, forthcoming).

Certain critics argue that the promiscuous nature of capital has been overstated, that the nation-state, far from being a series of "glorified local authorities" (Hirst 1997: 409) is in fact crucial to the regulation of MNCs, with regional blocs strengthening, rather than weakening, the ability of the state to govern. Most people continue to look to the latter for both economic sanction and return (Smith 1996: 580). In addition, the US, western Europe, and Japan are really the only key sites of MNC activity, housing more than two-thirds of MNC sales and assets. Direct foreign investment elsewhere is limited (Hirst 1997: 418; Kozul-Wright & Rowthorn 1998). Perhaps one in twenty MNCs actually function globally (Gibson-Graham 1996–7: 7–8). Multinationals look around for marginal utility and then retreat to what is known and controlable – so the explosion of foreign investment in the three years from 1994 saw an increase of 40 percent in MNC money poured into the US, while investment the other way was primarily in Britain, the Netherlands, Canada, France, and Australia ("Trade Barriers," 1997).

The "relationship between capitalism and territoriality" shifted (Robinson 1996: 18) but was still governed by interstate bodies as much as ever, albeit dominated by the G7 (Hirst 1997: 413; McMichael 2000: 177). Capital markets, for example, operated internationally but with national supervision and regulation; all conceivable plans for dealing with their transnational reach still involved formal governance ("Global Finance," 1999). Workers have dealt with these changing conditions via international trade secretariats, with many US unions following the very logic of Manifest Geo-Destiny that animates their bosses.

Transnational worker solidarity has tended to apply only at the grassroots rather than the peak level, and today is severely compromised by an isolationist labor stance that romanticizes national glories in opposition to a globalizing managerialism, while the latter is a gruesome business-leach discourse that has displaced international working-class solidarity as the prevailing international utopianism (Herod 1997: 168, 171, 185; Amsden & Hikino 1999: 7).

Clearly, the capitalist goal of worldwide liberalization has been supported by the institutionalization of market rules, involving the explicit reorganization of states to facilitate the circulation of money and commodities. John Wiseman (1998), for example, has reminded us that nation-states are not "blameless victims" of globalization, but colluders in the creation of policies which have facilitated global integration. Michael Porter's (1990) updated theory of comparative advantage has led many states to adopt policies which favor state-led, quasi-official, voluntaristic, and institutional structures that anchor economic activities for the benefit of transnational capital. The nation-state has embarked upon regulatory policies which have favored an enterprise-focused local state and new systems of local governance (Le Heron et al. 1997; Pritchard 1999) at the same time as they have justified and promoted global integration. Public institutions, many of them international but many also domestic, still provide the framework and in fact much of the investment for the world economy (Atkinson 1997; Gibson-Graham 1996–7: 8).

Nation-states, Past and Present (With a Future)

After the First World War, as national self-determination was proving to be panacea, placebo, and disorder all at once, Ernest Barker outlined three material bases to the nation: race, as a source of human identification; environment, as both a physical border and internal geography; and population, as a set of statistical forms. Now while the first and second terms were conceived as natural divisions (although never encountered as such, given struggles over race and resources) the population was deliberately brought into discourse as an object of care to be quantified, qualified, modeled, and bettered, a concept derived from sociology, biology, and ethnology that then became "real" in the eyes of public policy. Barker almost celebrates the fact that this last category, already muddied, is the only one really applicable to the architectonics of nations (Barker 1927: 2–3, 12). As May Joseph says, "[t]here has never been a pure space within the nation-state" (1995: 3).

The demise of the nation-state and the emergence of international soveriegnty have been routinely – and mistakenly – predicted over the past century. More and more such entities appear, even as the discourse announcing their departure becomes increasingly insistent (Miller 1981: 16–18). The internationalism of new communications technologies and patterns of ownership and control, and increases in the variety and extent of global diasporas, *extend* the significance of the state as a regulatory and stimulatory entity. The corollary has been a developing need for each state to create a national subjectivity from disparate identities. Internationalization is perhaps nowhere better exemplified than in the work done by states to build belonging amongst their polyethnic populations, and the labor performed by those populations to seek new forms of state representation. It is our contention that, while the nation-state is beset with problems caused by the pressure of ethnicity from below and supranationalism from above, pronouncements that nationhood is dead – the signal achievement of globalization – are seriously premature (Hirst & Thompson 1996). Popular managerialist tracts like *The End of the Nation-State* (Ohmae 1995) can be viewed in this context as capitalist conceits, appearing as they have during the era of a supposedly exemplary open-market specimen, the North American Free Trade Agreement/Trato de Libro Comercio Norte Americano, that needs a mere thousand pages of governmental rules to "work" (Palley 1999: 50)!

Forming nation-states requires the establishment of both order and authenticity. The order may be new in its type and operation, but it invokes an older connection to essences as part of its claim to be. The nation becomes a base for this claim. It is "authentic," cannot be superseded, and represents a one, true culture (Smith 1990: 1, 9). Yet the manifestation of fealty to culture is of course in the apparatus of the state. Any sense of the nation-state as a discrete entity selected by persons with a common ethnic and political heritage can be applied to half a dozen cases at most. The rest of us are testimony to massive migration and/or the cartographic fancies of colonial powers. And when groups claim a national identity that is not expressed in existing political arrangements, this is necessarily phrased in terms of the desire to form governments.

As Tom Nairn (1993) paradoxically remarks of the break-up of states and their multiple splits, "[s]mall is not only beautiful but has teeth too (speaking both technically and politically)." This is the difference between the apparently outmoded "medieval particularism" of small nationalism that Lenin derided and the really rather modish "nonlogical, untidy, refractory, disintegrative, particularistic truth of nation-states"; the revolutions of 1989 made medieval particularism the future (Nairn 1993: 157–8). Our contemporary moment equally references intra- and transnationalism, with diasporic subjects and First Peoples gathering political momentum. Most studies of cultural nationalism have seen it as an alibi for state activity, a *raison d'être* for state-building. But the intensity of feeling generated amongst diasporas and nonstate actors has drawn this into question (Hutchinson 1999). Threats to secular modernity through the state come not only from economic change, but from religious opposition to representative government, as recent events in Turkey and India have underscored (Benhabib 1999: 709). Most national communities of common interest have been formed inside the nation-state (Miller 1984: 285n1). Is that, however, sustainable given a global division of labor?

The New International Division of Cultural Labor

Philip McMichael (2000) views globalization as a project driven by transnational capital that produces uncertainty and a crisis of legitimacy for the nation-state, creating a worldwide labor surplus and provoking global migrations. Such processes do not happen automatically or evenly. Differentiation and polarization are as much an outcome as similarity between communities throughout the world. Findings from contemporary studies of social changes have indicated that globalization:

- includes transnational practices which are largely independent of any nation-state via flows of money, ideas, people, and information;
- heralds, via labor market deregulation, the disciplining of the working class, as union strength is weakened by the unregulated movement of capital;
- is catalyzed by the North and finds expression, but also produces resistance, in sites throughout the world;
- has begun to produce global citizens whose identity is based not upon the nation and its history, but upon their status within wider networks of interaction;
- has called into question rights, obligations, and traditional laws in relation to trade, bilateral negotiations, and local social engagement. This has encouraged the development of societies which are no longer coterminous with the nation-state and which form new sociospatial groupings throughout the world (for example, the green movement) (see Lawrence 2000).

This follows a longstanding pattern. In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, a mercantile system arose from business-driven calculations and manipulations of climate, geography, flora, and fauna. The exchange of goods came to be matched by an exchange of labor. As food commodities made their way around the globe, so did people, often as slaves. When machinery was developed, work split into an industrial mode. Cities grew into manufacturing sites and populations urbanized as wages displaced subsistence across the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries. The latter is the moment of Adam Smith's famous text on pinmaking:

> One man draws out the wire, another straightens it, a third cuts it, a fourth points it, a fifth grinds it at the top for receiving the head; to make the head requires three distinct operations; to put it on is a peculiar business, to whiten the pins is another; it is even a trade by itself to put them into the paper. . . . The division of labor . . . occasions, in every art, a proportionable increase of the productive powers of labor. (1970: 110)

As developed countries moved onto the global stage, new forms of labor were institutionalized in empire. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, manufacturing went on at the center, with food and raw materials imported from the periphery. Today, divisions of labor occur via sectoral differences in a national economy, the occupations and skills of a labor force, and the organization of tasks within a firm. Life-cycle models of international products suggest that they are first made and consumed in the center, in an IMEC, then exported to the periphery, and finally produced "out there," once technology has become standardized and savings can be made on the labor front. Goods and services owned and vended by the periphery rarely make their way into the center as imports (Lang & Hines 1993: 15; Strange 1995: 293; Keynes 1957: 333–4; Cohen 1991: 129, 133–9; Evans 1979: 27–8).

The idea of the NICL (Miller, 1990, 1996, 1998a,b) derives from retheorizations of economic dependency theory that followed the inflationary chaos of the 1970s. Developing markets for labor and sales, and the shift from the spatial *sensitivities* of electrics to the spatial *insensitivities* of electronics, pushed businesses beyond treating Third World countries as suppliers of raw materials, to look on them as shadow-setters of the price of work, competing amongst themselves and with the First and Second Worlds for employment. This development broke up the prior division of the world into a small number of industrialized nations and a majority of underdeveloped ones, as production was split across continents. Folke Fröbel et al. (1980) christened this the New International Division of Labor.

What might this analysis do for those working in cultural studies? We turn now to instances from film and TV that embody a crisis of labor, the state, the nation, transnational agencies, and the border-riding rituals that seek to separate culture from commerce and nation from nation. They show the importance of (*a*) the global as discourse; (*b*) the complex specificities of the cultural and the economic; and (*c*) the need for a blend of political economy and cultural studies.

We suggest that just as manufacturing fled the First World, cultural production has also relocated, though largely within the IMECs. This is happening at the level of popular textual production, marketing, and information and high-culture, limited-edition work, as factors of production, including state assistance, lure cultural producers. Obviously, the US film industry has always imported cultural producers, such as the German Expressionists. But this was one-way traffic during the classical Hollywood era. Postwar antitrust decisions and the advent of television compelled changes to the vertically integrated studio system. The decade from 1946 saw production go overseas. Location shooting became a means of differentiating stories, and studios purchased facilities around the world to utilize cheap labor. Between 1950 and 1973, just 60 percent of Hollywood films' in-production began their lives in the US. American financial institutions grew practiced at buying foreign theaters and distribution companies, thus sharing risk and profit with local businesses. This was in keeping with the close historic relationship between the film industry and finance capital: as American banks looked overseas for sources of profit through the 1960s, so they endorsed and assisted efforts by Hollywood to spread risk and investment as widely as possible. By the end of the 1980s, overseas firms were crucial suppliers of funds invested in American film or loans against distribution rights in their countries of origin. Joint production arrangements are now well-established between US firms and French, British, Swedish, and Italian companies, with connections to theme parks, cabling, and home video. Co-production sees host governments working together or with US companies, as when the film *JFK* was funded by a Hollywood studio, a French cable network, a German production house, and a Dutch financier, while *The Full Monty* is of course owned by Fox. Toronto has doubled as New York City in over a hundred films, thanks to the appeal of government subsidies. Labor market slackness, increased profits, and developments in global transportation and communications technology have diminished the need for colocation of these factors, which depresses labor costs and deskills workers. Animation is frequently undertaken in southeast Asia and Europe by employees at lower rates of pay than US workers. The trend towards offshore work is gathering pace: between 1990 and 1998, 31 national film commissions were set up across the globe to secure such business. Many of them are solely concerned with attracting foreign capital. For some critics, this represents a restructuring from the vertically integrated production-line studios of the 1930s and 1940s to a flexible system where finance, management, and production are physically and industrially splintered. To others, the fact that US management prevails is the relevant fact (Christopherson & Storper 1986; Wasser 1995: 424, 431; Buck 1992: 119, 123; Briller 1990: 75–8; Wasko 1994: 33; Miège 1989: 46; Wasko 1982: 206–7; Marvasti 1994; Kessler 1995; "The PolyGram Test," 1998; Wasko 1998: 180–1; McCann 1998; Lent 1998; "Culture Wars," 1998).

Any decision by a multinational firm to invest in a particular nation-state carries the seeds of insecurity, because companies move on when tax incentives or other factors of production beckon (Allan 1988: 325–6; Browett & Leaver 1989: 38; Welch & Luostarinen 1988; Fröbel et al. 1980: 2–8, 13–15, 45–8). The hold on international capital is always tenuous and depends heavily on foreign exchange rates. This too relates to state activity – the UK government's decision to float the pound and free the Bank of England from democratic consultation contributed to a situation in 1998 where a strengthening currency raised costs for overseas investors and encouraged locals to spend elsewhere, with severe implications for offshore film funds. So the late 1990s offshore-production boom in Australia and Canada, driven in part by scenery, infrastructure, language, and lower pay levels than the US, combined with equivalent skill levels, still depended on weak currencies (Woods 1999; Pendakur 1998: 229).

The cultural domination of the US is both facilitated and compromised by the NICL. Localization occurs at the level of the consumer, as international audience targeting becomes increasingly specific: Sean Connery is cast as a Hollywood lead because European audiences love him, while each US film is allotted a hundred generic descriptions for use in specific markets (*Dances with Wolves* was promoted in France as a documentary-style dramatization of Native American life, and *Malcolm X* with posters of the Stars and Stripes aflame) (Danan 1995: 131–2, 137; Wasser 1995: 433).

The American Film Institute is anxious about any loss of cultural heritage to internationalism, critics question what is happening when US drama is scripted with special attention to foreign audiences, and political economists argue that a newly transnational Hollywood no longer addresses its nominal audience. George Quester laments that British costume history crowds out the space for indigenous "quality" television, claiming there is more Australian high-end drama on US TV than locally produced material (1990: 57). But the trend remains for North America to attract talent developed by national cinemas to compete with it. Peter Weir's post production for *The Truman Show* or *Witness* might take place in Australia, satisfying off-screen indices of localism in order to obtain state financing there, but does that make for a real alternative to the US? And what does it mean that Michael Apted, James Bond and *7 Up* series director, can speak with optimism of a "European-izing of Hollywood" when Gaumont points out that "a co-production with the Americans . . . usually turns out to be just another US film shot on location" ("Top," 1994; Apted quoted in Dawtrey 1994: 75; Gaumont quoted in Kessler 1995: n. 143)? Attempts by the French film industry in the 1980s to attract US filmmakers may have the ultimate effect of US studio takeovers, while diplomatic efforts to maintain local screen subsidies continue even as Hollywood producers and networks purchase satellite and broadcast space across Europe (Hayward 1993: 385). AOL–Time Warner, Disney–ABC, Viacom, NBC, and others are jostling their way into the center of the vast and growing western European industry as sites of production as much as dumping-grounds for old material. The new stations throughout the Continent invest in local programing with cost savings from scheduling American filler (Stevenson 1994: 6).

Britain has been a major participant in the NICL recently, as both a foreign investor and a recipient of offshore film and TV production funds. The long-term strategy of successive UK governments since 1979 has been to break up unions within the media in order to become a Euro-Hollywood by default: the skills generated in a regulated domain of the screen would be retained without the "inefficiency" of the so-called "X-factor" – labor. In short, "flexibility" signifies the aim of supplanting wage stability and orienting texts towards export. As a consequence, the UK now has a negative balance of screen trade for the first time in history. Associated deregulation produced a proliferation of networks and the inevitable search for cheap overseas content (Cornford & Robins 1998: 207–9). From the 1980s, it became impossible to recoup the cost of most British feature films domestically. The necessity of finding jobs for skilled workers and their employers made the industry a true welcome mat. In 1991 a British Film Commission (BFC) was formed to market UK production expertise and locations by providing overseas producers with a free service articulating talent, sites, and subsidies and generating a national network of urban and regional film commissions. In 1997, seven Hollywood movies accounted for 54 percent of expenditure of feature-film production in the UK, but Britain faces increasing competition to capture Hollywood production finance. The government opened a British Film Office in Los Angeles in an attempt to normalize traffic with Hollywood by offering liaison services to the industry and promoting British locations and crews, and the BFC announced the Blair government's outlook on cinema: "set firmly at the top of the agenda is the desire to attract more overseas film-makers" (Guttridge 1996; Hiscock 1998; British Film Commission, n.d.).

One key agency, the London Film Commission, was formed in 1995 with a grant from the Department of National Heritage to attract offshore film production (you work out the connection to the portfolio). The Commission promotes the capital to overseas filmmakers, arranges police permits, and negotiates with local residents and businesses. Its defining moment was *Mission: Impossible*, when the Commissioner proudly said of that film's Hollywood producers: "They came up with all these demands and I just went on insisting that, as long as they gave us notice, we could schedule it" (Jury 1996).

In order to keep British studios going, regulations were promulgated in the early 1990s that meant films entirely made in Britain counted as British, regardless of theme, setting, or stars. So *Judge Dredd* with Sylvester Stallone was "British," but *The English Patient* did too much of its postproduction work abroad to qualify. Until 1998, 92 percent of a film had to be created in the UK. At the end of that year, the government reduced this requirement to 75 percent to encourage American companies to make their films in Britain (Woolf).

What do film industry mavens make of this? Michael Kuhn (1998), managing director of Polygram Filmed Entertainment (PEE), the company which dominated the British film industry in the 1990s, considers that "Europe (when you talk about mainstream movies) is almost a vassal state to that Hollywood business." Only "supra-national government institutions" can turn this around, because of the lack of a firm financial base to compete with Hollywood's mix of production and distribution and the United States' cartel-like discrimination against European producers. Ironically, PFE has now been taken over by Seagram, and its interests will merge in some form with another of Seagram's subsidiaries, the Hollywood major, Universal.

In contrast to Kuhn, Rupert Murdoch (1998) welcomes "new joint ventures between the Hollywood majors and both public and private broadcasting" in Europe, citing the numbers of European workers invisibly employed in the making of *Titanic*: "this cross-border cultural co-operation is not the result of regulation, but market forces. It's the freedom to move capital, technology and talent around the world that adds value, invigorates ailing markets, creates new ones." This view finds support in the upper echelons of the EU, which has offered US film marketers unhindered access to the European marketplace.

There are other models of the NICL. Consider the Grundy Organisation. It produced Australian TV drama and game shows from the 1950s that were bought on license from the US. The company expanded to sell such texts across the world, operating with a strategy called "parochial internationalism" that meant leaving Australia rather than exporting in isolation from relevant industrial, taste, and regulatory frameworks. Following patterns established in the advertising industry, it bought production houses around the world, making programs in local languages, based on formats imported from Australia that themselves drew on US models. From a base in Bermuda, the Organisation produced about 50 hours of TV a week in 70 countries across Europe, Oceania, Asia, and North America until its sale in the mid-1990s to Pearson. This is the NICL offshore, utilizing experience in the Australian commercial reproduction industry to manufacture American palimpsests in countries relatively new to profit-centered TV. The benefits to Australia, where a regulatory framework birthed this expertise by requiring the networks to support such productions as part of cultural protection, are unclear (Cunningham & Jacka 1996: 81–7; Moran 1998: 41–71; Stevenson 1994: 1).

In an era when US network television is desperately cutting costs, there are opportunities for outsiders, but only major players. The trend seems to be towards smaller investments in a larger number of programs for television, in the simultaneously splintered and concentrated media domain of North America. Put another way, a huge increase in the number of channels and systems of supply and payment is also producing unprecedented concentration of TV ownership. Some examples of the NICL represent a form of vertical investment, with production processes fragmented across the world. Horizontal licensing and joint ventures that mirror domestic retailing systems may be the wave of the future. The ability to make locally accented infotainment is one way of nations using the NICL (Schwab 1994: 14; Roddick 1994: 30).

To summarize, the screen is back where primary and secondary extractive and value-adding industries were in the 1960s, needing to make decisions not just about export, but about the site of production. Advances in communications technology permit electronic off-line editing across the world, but also enable special effects problematizing the very need for location shooting. The trend is clearly towards horizontal connections to other media, global economy and administration, and a break-up of public–private distinctions in ownership, control, and programing philosophy (Wedell 1994: 325; Marvasti 1994). Screen texts are fast developing as truly global trading forms: the costs of a global market in cultural labor must be monitored across a broad matrix of factors, as must the nationalist or culturalist claims mounted against it.

Conclusion

Globalization stands for something real, a sense from across time, space, and nation, that those very categories are in peril. Our sense of the temporal is questioned – think of the panic generated by the thought of computers dealing with the difference between 1900 and 2000. Space is problematized by the NICL, as jobs are undertaken by folks on the basis of price and docility rather than locale. And nations are threatened by corporate control, as unelected, far-distant elites displace locally accountable politicians. In each category, the cultural corollary is clear. Time is manipulated in concert with the interests of global capital, and space is torn asunder, as traditional social bonds are compromised by ownership based on profit rather than township. At the political, economic, and class level, this can lead to "a sense of social and economic fatalism and chronic insecurity." Democracies seem unable to deal with economic forces (Held et al. 1999: 1).

But counterpower is always at work. The 1999 Seattle and Washington 2000 actions in opposition to "Washington Consensus" hacks illustrated as much. Environmentalists, trade unions, and consumer groups have problematized globalization as defined by neoliberal *nostra*. Textiles, shipping, and agriculture remain massively subsidized across the world. The US, supposedly a poster-child for free trade and true competition, has hundreds of anti-dumping measures aimed at blocking imports where prices have been "unfairly" set, maintains a semi-secret deal with Japan to restrict steel sales, and is serviced by no fewer than 196 public film commissions in generating its putatively *laissez-faire* screen industries, while the EU remains firm on refusing to import bananas and genetically modified beef. All of this leads *The Economist*, a key neoliberal business advocacy voice, to admit "Globalization is not irreversible" ("Storm Over Globalization," 1999).

Pierre Bourdieu postulates a model of world culture that continues the bipolarity of the Cold War, if without its political ramifications, military corollaries, and economic isolations. His vision of the struggle for world culture pits the United States *contra* France – *laissez-faire* dogma juxtaposed against cultural nationalism. This Enlightenment conflict, between anomic monads and collective identities, sets bourgeois individualism and collaborative unity against each other, with reincarnations of the Depression and Sovietism hanging over each model. Bourdieu calls for a pre-Marxist, Hegelian way through the debate, a democratic mode that favors the state not as totalitarian or an aid to capital accumulation, but as the expression of a popular will that contemplates itself collectively, rather than atomistically, and acts under the sign of a general interest rather than singular egotism (1999: 20). That struggle of structure and agency, of capital and the state intricated in the production and symbolism of culture, requires analysis via political economy mixed with cultural studies.

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