

Chapter 5

Sociology, Cultural Studies, and Disciplinary Boundaries

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Introduction

Thirty-seven years ago Richard Hoggart delivered his inaugural lecture at the University of Birmingham university.¹ He presented it as a Professor of Modern English Literature, and he well deserved this title, having published a book-length study of the poet W. H. Auden a decade earlier.² But even before he began to address his audience there in 1963 it was clear that Professor Hoggart did not fit the orthodox mold of literary scholarship. Though still only in his early forties, much of Hoggart's reputation rested on achievements other than the Auden book, and these marked him as one who moved outside the boundaries of literary criticism. Let me signal just three of these:

1) His memorable role in the much-publicized trial, late in 1960, of Penguin Books (under the terms of the then new Obscene Publications Act) over the publication of *Lady Chatterley's Lover*. In this trial, and in face of hostile cross-examination which turned time and again to sexually explicit passages from the novel, Hoggart's defense of D. H. Lawrence as a "British non-conformist Puritan" whose concern was profoundly "decent," was widely regarded as crucial to the acquittal of Penguin Books.³ Hoggart's sincerity, dignity, and calmly reasoned responses to the Prosecution marked him out as an especially effective advocate for the Defense (there is a notable exchange when Hoggart compares sexual expression in *Paradise Lost* with that in *Lady Chatterley's Lover*).

2) At around the same time as this, Hoggart had served as a member of the Pilkington Committee, the Royal Commission on broadcasting which had been examining the record of commercial television (ITV) and the BBC since the mid-1950s, and which was pivotal in the allocation of the new third channel to the BBC.⁴ In the production of this landmark report (which marked, I think, the high point of public service broadcasting), it is widely acknowledged that Hoggart played a decisive part.⁵ Those familiar with Hoggart's writing will easily enough recognize his distinctive formulations in sections of the finished report,

notably the critique of advertising and the resistance to commercial television's claim that TV ought to "give the audience what it wants." From another direction an anecdote tells of Hoggart's contribution. A year or two after Pilkington's completion, T. S. Eliot, who had given evidence to the Commission, observed that of its members he recalled only Hoggart and the "glass manufacturer." Hoggart had distinguished himself already beyond the realm of literature.

3) Most prominently, in 1957 Hoggart had published, after working at it for most of the decade, *The Uses of Literacy: Aspects of Working-class Life with Special Reference to Publications and Entertainments*. The book is still in print. It had been very widely reviewed and debated, though it was very difficult – indeed impossible – to categorize in terms of any discipline. Hoggart himself recollected that "Many people I knew in internal departments of English kept fairly quiet about it, as though a shabby cat from the council house next door had brought an odd – even a smelly – object into the house."⁶ Sociologists recognized that it addressed their interests, but felt it was something of an intrusion onto their turf, and they were also suspicious of its autobiographical emphasis.

The Uses of Literacy was divided into two parts. The first examined pre-Second World War working-class life in and around Leeds, in a deeply felt and personal way. The second half contained an onslaught on various new phenomena such as juke boxes, pop music, "spicy" magazines, and sex and violence novels which were allegedly undermining working-class ways of life. There was little of orthodox sociology in this exercise, since so much of the account was recollected and reconstructed from Hoggart's own experiences and memories and filtered through a decidedly judgmental frame – yet the subject itself, as was the whole of the book, was undoubtedly sociological in its concerns. (Incidentally, and not surprising given that Hoggart, orphaned early, was reared by his grandmother, there was, to the sociologists of the time if not today, an unexpected concern for the domestic and feminine aspects of 1930s working-class life in Hunslet. This feature is especially evident if one contrasts *The Uses of Literacy* with what has become a sociological classic that appeared just the year before Hoggart's book. *Coal is Our Life: An Analysis of a Yorkshire Mining Community*, is so much more decidedly male in orientation – the pit, the club, the union, and the family in that order form that study. And this, be it noted, a book whose subject is life in Featherstone, scarcely ten miles from Hoggart's Hunslet.)

The Uses of Literacy remains, unmistakably, the product of a literary critic, yet its subjects were much wider matters than fiction, being working-class characteristics, mass media, consumerism, youth, and so on. I think that, if we cannot place it readily in any disciplinary sense, we can agree that, *from* literature, it was breaking out into new areas, areas which were having a palpable effect on everyday life in postwar Britain. For all this, and while it was obviously grappling with social change (the central concern of Sociology), *The Uses of Literacy* was not Sociology. It disqualifies itself at least because there is an absence of theory

and the method is decidedly inappropriate for Sociology. (And yet here I am moved to cite a wonderful student whom I came across very early in my career, in 1975. Frank McKenna, was not long out of the labor movement adult education center, Ruskin College, Oxford, which he had attended, in his mid-forties, after working on the railways from the age of 15. He later wrote a marvellous book, *The Railway Workers*, based on studies he undertook at Ruskin.⁷ I was talking to Frank about working-class life and we were exchanging views about sociological studies of this subject that was so close to us. Hoggart's name, and his *Uses of Literacy*, came into the conversation. Frank's eyes lit up and, learning forward while cupping his ear, he told me that, with Hoggart, "you can hear it," you can hear the voices of flesh and blood people and feel their presence, you can *be there* in a way in which most Sociology sadly misses.)

In view of these aspects of Hoggart – upright opponent of prudish censorship, the advocate of public service broadcasting, the analyst of working-class life before and after the War – it comes as no surprise that, in his inaugural lecture at the University of Birmingham, he "set out his stall" for what he wanted to accomplish as a Professor, and this wasn't to plot a career straightforwardly *inside* English Literature. What Richard Hoggart proposed was the formation of a Center for Contemporary Cultural Studies (actually he called it, revealingly, "Literature and Contemporary Cultural Studies"), and he urged that this be a locus for studying "popular arts" such as pop songs, photography, fashion, advertising, and television shows (for the nostalgic, his examples included *Candid Camera*, *Z Cars*, and *This is Your Life*).

And yet it should be noted that this project was to remain decidedly literary in orientation. The Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies was to come *out of* literature since, as Hoggart himself put it, he was "for widening the boundaries of English as it was offered at universities,"⁸ not for abandoning them. In this respect it is interesting to see that Hoggart's inaugural was published in volume 2 of his essays, *Speaking to Each Other*, which carries the revealing subtitle *About Literature*.⁹ CCCS, as the Centre became known, opened in the Spring of 1964 with two staff, Richard Hoggart and Stuart Hall. This was a formidable combination, with the latter himself also an English Literature graduate, from Jamaica via Oxford, who had started a doctorate on Henry James before abandoning it in favor of editing *New Left Review*. (And even with Hall, who led CCCS to the heights during the 1970s, the literary legacy was telling. Listeners to *Desert Island Discs* on Radio 4 Feb. 18, 2000 will know that the one book he chose to take with him to the desert island was Henry James's *The Portrait of a Lady*.) Later that decade this duo was joined by Michael Green, who remains with us to this day, and he too came out of Literature, having studied the subject at Cambridge.

I would emphasize the ambition to extend the field of literary criticism during these early days of CCCS. Richard Hoggart argued that in the CCCS enterprise literature constituted "the most important"¹⁰ element for at least two reasons. First, it was in literature and the literary approach that one found "absorbed attention to the detail of experience": in literature one could get beneath surface

appearances, beyond the superficial, and into the rich texture of life as it is actually lived. As Hoggart put it in that lecture of 1963, “how well would we be able to apprehend, let alone express, the complexity of personal relations, if it were not for literature working as literature? I do not mean that we all need to have read the best books; but what has the fact that they have been read, and their insights . . . to some extent passed into general consciousness, contributed to our understanding of our own experience?”¹¹ Second, in the literary critical approach, in what one might call a literary sensibility, a place could be found for key terms such as “significant” and “illuminating” when one tried to come to terms with the meanings of contemporary cultural expression.

It will not come as much of a surprise to many people to hear this said. The critic F. R. Leavis (and his wife Queenie¹²), important but embattled during their lives (in death largely forgotten and, where remembered, dismissed as naive, dogmatic, and authoritarian¹³), were an obvious influence on Hoggart at this time. Indeed, it is commonplace to regard Hoggart (as with the early Raymond Williams) as “Left-Leavisite,” to highlight in their work a concern for close reading of texts, for a supposition that literature had some special claims of access to how we live and how we might better understand life, and for a willingness to judge that which one examines, not in some hurried or thoughtless way, but as a serious responsibility which ought not to be shirked.

If Hoggart wanted to move literature into the study of contemporary culture, and in the process to retain important aspects of a literary approach, he was aware that this involved a trespass onto the terrain of Sociology. In his inaugural he acknowledged the significance of the “sociological” to his concerns, though he felt there was only limited value in the discipline of Sociology. To be sure, Hoggart saw a need for studies of audiences, of authors’ circumstances, and the like, and therefore some sociological contribution was necessary, but when he looked at the work then available in the Sociology of Culture and Literature, he concluded that Sociology was reductive and external to literature, thereby a dismal science of limited use to CCCS.

I review these concerns and characteristics of Hoggart to provide a context for my own observations. In what follows I want to reflect more on Hoggart’s – and his successors’ – moves from Literature to Cultural Studies, and on the connections of Sociology with this. More particularly, though in no neat order, I want to comment on:

- i) the issue of evaluation and judgment in the enterprise of social and cultural analysis.
- ii) aspects of the recent history of Sociology in Britain.
- iii) the emergence and development of Cultural Studies, especially in terms of its relation with Sociology.
- iv) the character of academic disciplines and the closing (and opening) of boundaries that this implies.

Preliminary: The Necessity of Discrimination

I now want to be more personal in my comments. In the human sciences we have learned that too often the author's voice is disguised. So I will bring out my own directly, though I shall endeavor to situate these thoughts in a wider context. I took a first degree in Sociology and immediately followed this with a master's in Social History, but then moved into the Sociology of Literature for my doctorate during the mid-1970s. I have often wondered why I made this shift, though I wondered much more, and with anguish, while I was doing the Ph.D.! One reason was undoubtedly that I had come to Sociology steeped in literature – my imagining of social relationships, past and present, was deeply influenced by immersion in fiction. Another was, I suppose, that I was Leavisite, and had been so since school days in which I had been taught by a passionate, but undeclared, Leavisite. Above all, that meant I was drawn to literature because it seemed to speak to me about the society in which I lived and which I yearned to better understand, because I was attracted by the emphasis on close textual analysis, and because such criticism also offered sensitivity to the social milieu of cultural works.

1974 was not a propitious time for a novice Sociologist to come to literature, especially one with Leavisite dispositions. This for at least two reasons. One was that Sociology at this time had reacted sharply against “empiricism” of all kinds (“positivism” was then a term of abuse, and remained so for far too long). In these terms, any concern for empirical materials on literature (say, sales, costs, readerships, literacy rates, and so forth) was of little interest to the by then dominant mode of thought in Sociology of Literature. Thus far, one might suppose, with the literary critics, since they didn't think so much of such things either. But against this must be set the fact that the reaction of Sociology to dull empiricism was accompanied by a call to put Theory above all else. On this ground, it wasn't only empirical sociologists who were to be pushed aside; it was also the atheoretical literary critics – notably F. R. Leavis and his acolytes – who were to be jettisoned. Leavis, famously unwilling and perhaps incapable of theorizing (how we ridiculed his rhetorical declarations that “it is so, is it not?”), was readily pigeonholed as an anachronism, left with nothing to offer we the theoretically empowered.

Looking back, it seems to me that just about everything was Theory then, anything but engagement with the substantive, whether a literary text or even something as mundane as the preferences of readers. We moved in the heady company of Georg Lukács, Pierre Macherey, and above all, Louis Althusser, whose “theoretical practice” had great appeal in (and far beyond) the Sociology of Literature. There one theorized everything, doing anything but engage with the work itself (that was far too gauche, as if one could seriously presuppose theoretical innocence). I might add that an important instigator of this “theoretical turn,” Perry Anderson, editor of *New Left Review* for many years, was

himself a judicious assessor of Leavis. Anderson, in the process of castigating British intellectual culture for its lack of theoretical sophistication, nonetheless declared that “Leavis’s personal achievement as a critic was outstanding, his rigour and intelligence establishing new standards of discrimination.”¹⁴ The trouble was that most of us were carried away with the prioritization of theory: we missed Anderson’s nuance, we rushed to theorize, and thoughtlessly jettisoned Leavis and his ilk.

In my view, this was an especially barren time for Sociology. Personally, I completed a doctorate late in 1977, but it wasn’t on literature. It was on Theory. And what strikes me now about this Theory was that it was always so smugly “correct” and “superior,” always at the ready to tease out the hidden or tacit theory of those thinkers who might write substantial accounts of Joseph Conrad or Charles Dickens, but because they failed to theorize were laughably “simplistic.”

Here one may also note that one of the commonest targets of Theory was “reductionism.” We intoned, over and again, that it was folly to reduce a text to a particular socioeconomic relation. But the irony was that Theory itself was reductionist with a vengeance, since everything was “read off” *from* Theory. This was theoreticism at its worst: Theory being the alpha and omega of analysis, to which everything must defer.¹⁵

Looking back, I wish that I had had the determination to stay closer to Leavis (which is not of course the same as endorsing the Leavisite project – I have no desire to rehabilitate that). This for several reasons, including:

- i) the concern with close attention to the substantive (to texts and subjects), which can be a strong counter to theoreticism (of which more below).
- ii) the prioritization, in all things educational – in universities especially – of the question “what we are and what we might be.” This may seem to be a simple question, but it is a bold and essential task for the human sciences, and one which Leavis posed recurrently.¹⁶ I think that keeping this question to the fore of our minds, the pursuit of which is the primary task of universities, can be of inestimable help to us when we get into difficulties of disciplinary boundaries (of which more below).
- iii) the unavoidable responsibility of intellectuals to discriminate in what they study.

I want here to say a little more about the latter since it seems to me a principle that is especially difficult to uphold in recent times, when evaluation is readily dismissed as a manifestation of prejudice. At the outset I want to say that my own journey through the Sociology of Literature and Theoreticism was not so singular as my preceding comments may suggest. Michèle Barrett, a graduate of the same university department as myself, took a similar trajectory, and, though both of us were well away from Birmingham University, it is clear that many similar influences were being felt here. Michèle went on to Sussex where

she took a doctorate on Virginia Woolf. In her recent and important book, *Imagination in Theory* (1998),¹⁷ Michèle – who during the 1990s became President of the British Sociological Association, and one of the very few world-ranked British sociologists¹⁸ – records difficulties she had in undertaking her thesis on one of the twentieth century’s most important British writers and critics. A recurrent dissatisfaction was the inability of Sociology to engage with matters of art, aesthetics, and the imagination (matters close, of course, to Virginia Woolf herself). Michèle observes that Sociology still has to come to terms with these issues, ones which are inextricably connected to questions of evaluation. And on the way she observes in Cultural Studies, the rise of which she generally celebrates, the same inability to deal with the questions of value and discrimination. I share Michèle Barrett’s concerns. It is also, for me, sobering that Professor Barrett moved recently from her Chair in Sociology to join Lisa Jardine in a Department of Humanities in another university, I suspect exasperated with Sociology’s continued failure to come to grips with art and the imagination.

One can certainly adduce reasons for avoiding making judgments. In some Sociology circles the emphasis may be on the nonjudgmental because this is seen as being in accord with the value-neutrality that must accompany a properly scientific attitude. There is, of course, much to be said in favor of this, and Max Weber¹⁹ expressed it a great deal better than I might do.²⁰ I would agree unhesitatingly that detachment is a requisite of doing Sociology, but I do not think this means Sociology ought not to be asking serious questions of what it examines, and that amongst those questions should be matters of quality. Again, the admirable impulse to be inclusive can encourage us to avoid making judgments. Hoggart elsewhere posed the problem of the “ungifted taxi-driver”²¹ in this regard. What he meant to highlight was that, while is pleasing, to the good-hearted at least, when the ordinarily excluded – such as taxi drivers – gain entry to restricted arenas – perhaps to literary or scholarly circles, the question of the quality of their output in those circles cannot be ignored because of delight in doors having been opened. More generally, there is the pervasive insistence that judgment is all a matter of disposition, of “each to his or her own,” in these postmodern times. A corollary is a deep-seated relativism which finds expression within and without the academic realm.

Nevertheless, I do feel that the bypassing, for whatever reason, of the question of judgment is a weakness. I would not want to see Sociology or Cultural Studies lining up to announce “one true way” about the things that they study, but I do insist that we try to make reasoned arguments (on grounds of logic and of evidence) about the better and the worse. This also seems, I must say, a key ingredient of *critical* work, which surely must move beyond asking questions about a particular approach or phenomenon, towards identifying strengths and weaknesses. In this regard I am glad to be able to quote the following authority:

In the end we are . . . back to a qualitative definition based on critical judgement of individual pieces of work. Such judgements are often dismissed . . . as “subjective” or “impressionistic”; but there is a difference, surely, between vague opinion and the considered view based on close analysis which presents itself for debate or discussion controlled by “evidence” from the work in question.²²

It is commonplace nowadays to shy away from making judgments between the serious and the trivial, the worthy and the unworthy, the enduring and the ephemeral, the beautiful and the ugly, as it is from making the necessary discriminations that lie somewhere in between these poles. I concede that it is a difficult task, and today it is much easier – so much more inclusive – to bypass the responsibility to discriminate. And yet I do not feel that the issue should be shied away from since it is a task of life, indeed a duty of thinking beings. It is also a central responsibility of any university insofar as a university is charged with thinking especially hard about what goes on in the world. For sure, it ought not to be something which we do only in the privacy of our own homes (though, sadly, this is indeed often the case), while in public we gain easy assent by advocating “each to his own taste.” Making judgments can seem contemptuous when done insensitively, but it is also a particularly insidious form of contempt to refuse judgments of any kind – I think here of the contempt evident in those who say that “your taste is for the *Oprah Winfrey Show*, mine for *Newsnight*; they’re different but equal.”²³ In this regard, I can only praise the candor of Mr. Gerald Ratner, who in 1991 came clean to a conference of businessmen when he announced that his firm’s profits came from selling “crap” to people with no taste for anything better. I do not condone Mr. Ratner’s conduct of his business, but there is something about his directness and ingenuity which must embarrass today’s relativists who rarely if ever practice what they preach.

The Recent History of Sociology

At this point I should like to turn more directly to my own subject area, Sociology, to make some observations on the course of its history over recent decades. During the late 1960s Sociology in Britain began to break out of its dependency on US scholars – in the form of the structural functionalist theory and quantitative methodology which were so often its professional accompaniment²⁴ – that had been manifest for at least two decades. Clearly, the onset of political radicalism influenced this development, though it ought to be said that more tentative conflict theorists had already made the case for drawing on European traditions of thought.²⁵

An intriguing development of this time was that two dominant paradigms emerged to face one another in British Sociology, namely Weberian versus Marxist approaches. There were, of course, heated exchanges between these schools of thought, but it does seem to me that, broadly, we can now see that

there was a general consensus in British Sociology that the subject was fundamentally about *class* (closely followed by work and production). These were the key organizing concerns of the discipline, to which most writers returned. *Class analysis* predominated – one may even say it was hegemonic – in British Sociology, and, though definitions varied quite widely (from an occupational hierarchy, position in terms of ownership of property, to location in the labor market), there seemed to be agreement that class analysis was the prime concern of sociologists. Frank Parkin’s wry observation at the time, that “inside every neo-Marxist there seems to be a Weberian struggling to get out,”²⁶ hints at the consensus beneath what were often heated debates. Incidentally, it is worth adding that class analysis was both singularly male at this time (class was typically taken by sociologists to be a quality of and from men), and there was a broad “leftist”²⁷ consensus amongst sociologists that class inequalities were a bad thing (it took the New Right in the 1980s to surprise British sociologists with the claim that class inequality was present but was also by and large just).²⁸

Simplifying perhaps too much, one can say that, during much of the 1960s and the 1970s, class was the major relationship drawn by sociologists between matters such as educational attainment, voting behavior, leisure pursuits, and social mobility opportunities. What was offered was an account of Britain in which phenomena were apparently “read off” from one’s social class. Looking back, it seemed that just about everything of significance could be understood in terms of a great divide between (that gross simplification) the “middle class” and the “working class” (though it was the latter which was much the most observed by sociologists). The working class had opportunities stacked against them, their marital relationships, political dispositions, and leisure habits were expressive of their class location, and even their tastes in food and entertainment were reducible to their class.

We can see that this consensus around class analysis came under attack during the later 1970s because of substantive developments and conceptual criticisms. The assault has continued throughout the past generation, culminating in Ray Pahl’s dramatic assertion in 1989 that “class as a concept is ceasing to do any useful work for sociology.”²⁹ Let me signal some aspects of this:

- Changes in the *occupational structure* became increasingly evident as traditional industries rapidly declined. There was nothing “natural” about this development, and it should be remembered that the destruction of the miners, a momentous event in British twentieth-century history, in the 1980s was an outcome of their being attacked by Mrs. Thatcher and the organized might of the state.³⁰ Ralph Miliband interpreted this as “class struggle from above,”³¹ and it is a salutary reminder when we hear commentators referring to an “evolution” to an “information society” and “knowledge economy.” But the outcome of the decline of male, manual jobs, and the parallel spread of service occupations, have had an important influence on the feel and experiences of inequality and much else besides. Today over 70 percent of jobs are in the

service sector, and the shape of the stratification system has markedly changed (though, contrary to some presumptions, there is a greater degree of inequality at the extremities). With jobs becoming increasingly white collar and information based, then there are, to put it mildly, difficulties in continuing with established forms of class analysis. At the least the older division of “middle” and “working” class, always crude, is problematized.

- Closely associated with this has been the much observed *feminization* of the workforce which, in combine with the spread of *feminist thought*, has posed serious problems for those wanting to hang on to class analysis categories.
- There has developed an *increased concern for consumption* as a close corollary of sustained rises in living standards for the majority. Since the start of 1970 these have risen, on average, and in real terms, by about 100 percent, and results are evident all around us – in large-scale car ownership, in entertainment equipment in people’s homes, in home furnishings and facilities, in styles and ranges of dress . . . Combined, this expansion of consumption has acted as a counter weight to the one-time centring of analysis on production and work (and the classes which were presumed to stem from this).
- Relatedly, there has been an *explosive growth of media*, especially of the television, but also of course including video games, PCs, and teletext.
- This is integrally connected with the huge expansion of the *symbolic realm* and the import of “signs” that is continuing. Television is now around-the-clock and there are multiple channels available, and added to this must be the increase in music, in fashion and style, in design (from trainers to electric kettles, from T-shirts to mobile phones), as well as in advertising and marketing.
- We need to add to this the *growth of leisure*, notably in time off and in the relative ease of travel that has been an accompaniment of rising living standards and declining costs of transport, helping vault tourism into a major employer in many areas.³² This demands attention from sociologists, though of a kind that, at least in important ways, defies earlier forms of class analysis.
- The growth and experience of what one might call, uncomfortably and clumsily, *cultures*, evident in, for instance, the development of variegated youth cultures, and also amongst multicultures which have come about through migration, ease of travel, and globalization. This is in evidence pretty well everywhere, whether in cuisine, in the supermarket, in street talk and styles, or the football squads of English soccer clubs.
- The increase in *new social movements* and what have been called lifestyle or identity politics (animal rights, environmental protests, feminism) which are unclearly connected with class relations.

These are very diverse phenomena, but together they promote the significance of culture and, as this more and more emerged as something important in its own right, so rose a chorus of denial that culture could be explained by Sociology’s

master concept, class. And so, of course, did class analysis's hold in Sociology begin to loosen its grip, many sociologists becoming convinced that it could not do justice to the complexities of these new forms of relationship.³³ It ought to be said that sociologists at Nuffield College especially have fought a powerful rearguard action to retain class analysis, and their findings, supported by meticulous conceptual thinking and empirical data, remain salient.³⁴ Such accounts insist that there was little or no increase in relative social mobility opportunities over the twentieth century. But they can sustain this only because they measure, not what is most striking about inequality today (i.e. the remarkable changes in its overall shape), but only the *relative* opportunities of people to move from one class category into another (i.e. they show that origins have remained, *relative* to one another, a huge effect on one's life chances). In short, the Nuffield research demonstrates and emphasizes that kids from the bottom of society still have a very hard time compared to those from the top, but they underplay – but do not deny – that the overall shape of society has radically changed. I cannot go along with the claim of two postmodern sociologists, that we have witnessed the “death of class,”³⁵ but it does seem to me difficult to refuse the view that we need to reassess the prioritization it had during the early 1970s. Class analysis does have very considerable difficulties in accounting for important issues such as sexualities, identities, lifestyle choices, race and ethnicity, as well as the conduct of everyday relationships in a thoroughly mediated world.³⁶

The Emergence of Cultural Studies

A good deal of the discontent that was expressed against class analysis from within Sociology was echoed in the emergence of Cultural Studies. Indeed, while this has a complicated and wide-ranging genesis, the refrain of the Sociology of Literature – that reductionism of art to class relationships should be spurned – merged with the antireductionist insistence that was so much a part of the rise of Cultural Studies. Hoggart's legacy was important in this, but pride of place must surely go to Stuart Hall and the remarkable group of postgraduates who gathered in Birmingham in the 1970s.

I shall say little about this here. It is sufficient to observe that the Birmingham School took culture very seriously, and as such was at the forefront of path-breaking studies of youth, race, ethnicity, and gender (in addition to Hall, the names of Paul Willis, Angela McRobbie, Dick Hebdige, David Morley, and Paul Gilroy merit special mention in this context, but there was a host of very impressive others). Birmingham also promoted analysis of media to great effect. It was not alone in this, and scholars at Leicester and Glasgow especially played a key role, but it can scarcely be denied that *Policing the Crisis*, when it appeared in 1978, was a compelling read. It brought together politics, race, and a close account of the operation of media in Britain. Birmingham also insisted on the importance of ideas in politics, and from this emanated influential work on

the “authoritarian populism” of Margaret Thatcher, work which refuses to “read off,” to reduce, politics to class.³⁷ As Stuart Hall insisted,³⁸ ideology had to be seen as a power in itself, the struggle for ideas in civil society being a prelude to political change. Here we had the sphere of ideology taken very seriously indeed – and who cannot but acknowledge Hall’s prescience in conceiving the phenomenon of Thatcherism *before* her electoral victory in 1979?³⁹

There was much more than this to the Birmingham School of this time, and it is easy enough with hindsight to see that some intellectual blind alleys were entered. For myself, I cannot but feel that the dalliance with Althusserianism was such an alley, however useful it seems to have been in allowing scholars at Birmingham to reflect on an autonomous sphere of ideology.⁴⁰ Nonetheless, what cannot be ignored is the significance of the “cultural turn” and the Birmingham School’s central part in that tendency. It fed into the rise of Cultural Studies itself as an independent area of study (and the subject has soared in the United States especially, where it responds to different, and more propitious, circumstances), but it also had a profound influence on Sociology as it penetrated much of the mainstream through the efforts of the journal *Theory, Culture and Society* as well as those of Birmingham School members. The “cultural turn” helped fill an absence in British Sociology. I like to think this has been recognized by the wider community of Sociology. The award of a chair in sociology to Stuart Hall himself in 1979, his inclusion in a recent textbook on “key sociologists,”⁴¹ and the distinction of being chosen as a recent President of the British Sociological Association, all suggest that this is so.

I shall return to the influence of the “cultural turn” on Sociology, but would now make some further remarks about the recent history of Cultural Studies. This developed as a hybrid subject, as we have seen drawing heavily on Literature, but happily raiding and contributing to anything which helped it better understand what was going on. As Hall put it, much of the strength of Cultural Studies stemmed from its being “a focal point for interdisciplinary studies and research.”⁴² There is much to be said for this, even for regarding Cultural Studies as consciously *antidisciplinary*, for insistently working on the frontiers of more fixed subject areas, for being what Michael Green calls “resolutely ‘impure.’”⁴³ However, a price of success, especially in the United States,⁴⁴ has been Cultural Studies’ institutionalization and – its corollary – the formation of disciplinary borders, which brings with it attendant risks. In this formation classic texts become identified (Hoggart, Williams, Hall, and so on) and core concepts and methods come to be taught as part of a canon. There have been dangers here for Cultural Studies, on which many critics have seized (though it should be noted that the Birmingham scholars themselves seemed acutely aware of them⁴⁵). These include:

- The risk that antireductionism becomes translated into an uncritical celebration of diversity (difference) which is devoid of any emancipatory and evaluative elements. In this, particularly where postmodern approaches

predominate, concern for material factors as well as for structured inequalities can be lost sight of.

- Enthusiasm for the creativity of people, so much a part of Cultural Studies' antireductionist ethos, runs a risk of underestimating the influence of constraints on actors.
- This emphasis on agency often comes associated with a mantra of "pleasure" in some quarters, a term which can easily slide into unthinking and indiscriminate celebration of the most superficial of cultural products.⁴⁶
- The notion of a "cultural circuit" that has been developed by Hall and colleagues at the Open University has much to commend it. The division between Production, Representation, and Reception has found its way into many accounts of how Cultural Studies might proceed. I like very much the tacit notion here that some form of integration of all of these elements – some conception of totality – is needed if we are to make sense of the world. Yet it is striking that, in Cultural Studies, the realm of production appears still to be underexamined, relegated in favor of the remaining two elements of the "cultural circuit."⁴⁷
- An excess of theory risks rekindling the sort of theoreticism which was so much in evidence in the mid-1970s. As Cultural Studies has been institutionalized, so there has been an invasion of theory which can become excessive and self-engrossing.⁴⁸ As I have said, Sociology itself has had a surfeit of this, especially that which is overconcerned with epistemology and with getting the theory right *prior* to engaging with the substantive. Here I would mention the old chestnut of political economy versus the active audience, which can be debated until the cows come home without getting anywhere nearer a resolution. At the back of this lies the old saw, objectivity versus subjectivity, which had been theorized to death. We really do need to get beyond these tired arguments and dualisms, perhaps into thinking, like Castells, of "disposable theory"⁴⁹ which we may jettison when it stops helping us better reveal what's going on in the world, and – here I am with Andrew Tudor⁵⁰ – we might acknowledge that Tony Giddens⁵¹ has made a good fist at overcoming the dualism and move on.

The Discipline of Sociology

I have already commented on some of the ways in which Cultural Studies influenced Sociology. I think that one other important lesson for Sociology that has been underlined in this encounter is that knowledge itself is an outcome of negotiation. The authorities we revere, and the issues we address, are not self-evidently *there*, but express changeable priorities and concerns. On one level this is an easy point to concede: after all, the "holy trinity" of founding fathers in Sociology – Marx, Weber, and Durkheim – are a relatively recent creation. Marx was not much more than a shadowy presence before the late 1960s, and even

Durkheim became established only a few years earlier.⁵² The process of negotiating over the canon continues to this day – one of my colleagues, David Parker, only recently and pointedly asked (in the journal *Sociological Review*), “Why bother with Durkheim?”⁵³

Another way of putting this is to say that academic disciplines, while they are essential insofar as they provide us with tools of analysis, concepts with which to think, and points of orientation, cannot be set in aspic. They are, in intricate but inescapable ways, products of culture themselves and, as such, have no guaranteed right of existence.⁵⁴

This may be an easy point to admit on an intellectual level, but on the ground disciplines are powerful factors in the distribution of resources and the location of academic identities (think for a moment of the influence of the British government “Research Assessment Exercise” here). In this light, consider a response – one that I have encountered often – to the “cultural turn” in Sociology and to Cultural Studies with which this is closely associated. This regards interest in culture, especially when it mentions the word “postmodern,” as a *threat* to the professionalization (and associated respectability) of Sociology, a discipline which ought to work only with “verifiable conjecture” and “testable propositions,” in which a key requirement is a capability to undertake “social arithmetic” and handle the log linear analysis which promises to allow Sociology to provide definitive answers to questions that are empirically examinable.⁵⁵ From such a perspective the work of Zygmunt Bauman, Bruno Latour, Ulrich Beck, Hall, even that of Anthony Giddens (in my opinion Britain’s most important sociologist since Herbert Spencer), scarcely qualifies as Sociology (it may appear speculative, untestable, even journalistic), and Cultural Studies itself is a diversion from more important tasks of professionalization.

What we can see here is an attempt to establish foundations for a discipline of Sociology which has strongly policed boundaries. In this vision there is a strong core to the discipline – to caricature, a dose of the classical thinkers, rational choice theory, and a strong technical training especially in quantitative analysis. I have little doubt that this provides for a sense of group identity amongst those practitioners who seek to have a proper discipline of Sociology. I also have little doubt that it is deeply exclusionary of those who might dare to trespass into Sociology or even lay claim to the title.⁵⁶ In practice, proposals for a strong core are a minority position, since the majority of Sociology departments are more pragmatic in forwarding, at least in their undergraduate curriculums, a “weak core” in their courses – some classical theory, a range of methods, and some substantive analyses. This is also the welcome recommendation of the recently published *Benchmark Statement for Sociology*.⁵⁷

Nevertheless, and with Cultural Studies in mind, I want to make a number of warnings against endeavors to erect boundaries in Sociology, against those who would have us identify disciplinary borders that might be patrolled by accredited professional agencies.

First off, I would urge Sociologists to “lighten up” out of respect for colleagues in other university departments. The exclusionary language one occasionally hears – “they can’t even conduct multivariate analysis in ‘x,’” “they wouldn’t recognize a null hypothesis if it jumped out at them” – is offensive, perhaps on occasion deliberately so.

Second, I would remind the disciplinarians that it is not just a foible that leads government to encourage *interdisciplinary* work. I well appreciate that we often feel most comfortable speaking to people like ourselves, but the fact is that – recalling that the primary purpose of the human sciences as a whole is to understand and explain what’s going on in the world – reality is intrinsically interdisciplinary. To make sense of it is not the prerogative of any single discipline or even a particular version of the discipline. If one seeks for an instance of this, I would urge as an exemplar Manuel Castells’ great trilogy, *The Information Age*, interdisciplinary through and through, yet remarkable in its achievement.⁵⁸

Third, Sociology has always been a markedly “fuzzy”⁵⁹ subject that has been easily entered by outsiders (historians especially, but there are plenty of others) and which happily incorporates the contributions of outsiders when it suits. It is as well to recall here that many of the classics refused the title sociologist (one thinks especially of Marx, but Weber himself – the one undisputed “master” – was trained in Law, and did his doctorate in the legal framework of medieval business organizations). To be sure, one could insist that this is an outcome of their writing prior to disciplinary formation (a scarcely persuasive argument), but I would reply that some of the most productive contemporary Sociologists come from outside the discipline (for example, Hall from Literature, Martin Albrow and Michael Mann from – or with Mann perhaps to – History, Gary Runciman and Ralph Dahrendorf from Classics). Moreover, some of the most interesting contributions to Sociology have come from those working outside the subject. There are many examples, so I simply highlight a couple of my favorites – E. P. Thompson’s *Making of the English Working Class* (1963) played a key role in debates within Sociology throughout the sixties and seventies on a host of issues, from class analysis and conceptualization, to the causes and character of change; Barrington Moore’s (another Classicist) *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World* (1966) was central in the thinking of sociologists about the part played by the peasantry in bringing us to where we are today.

Fourth, I would encourage us to stay with a conception of Sociology which emphasizes its openness by referring to the Gulbenkian Commission’s *Report on the Restructuring of the Social Sciences*. This commission, chaired by Immanuel Wallerstein,⁶⁰ and whose report was published in 1996 as *Open the Social Sciences*, is at once an analysis of the development of knowledge and an advocate on new directions for the social sciences. In brief, it argues that, up until the 1960s, there were three branches of knowledge, one was the natural sciences, another the humanities, and – pitched in the middle of these “two cultures” –

were the social sciences, though these were disposed towards emulation of the natural science model (since this gave disciplinary credibility). But what has happened since then is that these boundaries have become markedly less clear, due to developments that have come from different directions. On the one hand, there has been, within natural science, an ongoing assault on what one might call Newtonian presuppositions, powered essentially by the difficulties that were being encountered by older scientific theories in solving problems concerning ever more complex and unstable phenomena. An upshot has been a developing stress on nonlinearity, chaos theory, and complex systems analysis. Relatedly, there has been the continual questioning of natural science from the social constructionists who, while they may have instigated the “Science Wars” backlash, have I think succeeded in raising serious questions about the practices of natural science.⁶¹ On the other hand, the Commission suggests that Cultural Studies, especially in the United States, has pulled the Humanities into the Social Sciences, evidenced in, for instance, the promotion of once-excluded matters like gender, sexuality, and ethnicity, and non-Eurocentric issues, not to mention (in what one might call the strong program of postmodernism) the problematization of just about all kinds of knowledge. In the US we have had, in response, vigorous “Culture Wars,” but few can deny there can be no turning back from this social scientization of the Humanities, to days when “Literature was Literature.” All this is not to claim that we all meet in a muddy middle. Not at all, but with Wallerstein, I would celebrate the genuine fruitfulness of knowledge production that can break out of fixed borders. If one seeks an example of what I mean, just let me instance Edward Said’s wonderful book, *Orientalism: Western Conceptions of the Orient* (1978), a work that is impossible to categorize by any established discipline, yet indispensable for those seeking to understand how we live today. In particular, I would commend here just two of the Gulbenkian’s recommendations – encourage research programs that cut across traditional disciplinary boundaries and work for compulsory joint appointments of staff across departments (in this respect it is worth noting that Castells, to whom I have just referred as the author of what is indisputably one of the best analyses of late twentieth-century civilization, has long held a position at Berkeley of Professor of Sociology and Planning).

So it is clear that I am drawn to an open conception of Sociology. I have a bit more to say on that, but this reference to Wallerstein allows me to make another point which is more programatic. The Gulbenkian Report stresses that, to understand the world of today, a world of connectedness, of migration without historical precedent, a world of multiculturalism and hybridity, social scientists must become more linguistically able. It may frighten some of us (it frightens me!) that Wallerstein⁶² suggests, in all seriousness, that our graduate students should aim to become adept in five or six of the major languages of the world today if they are going to be equipped to make sense of it (it is the extraordinary good luck of native English speakers that theirs is the world’s *lingua franca*).

I am not quite sure what to make of this suggestion, but it does lead to observe that Sociology to a large extent, and Cultural Studies still more, predominate in particular locations, in the USA, the UK, and Australia (i.e. the English-speaking and Western centers of publishing). There are a number of ironies about this, but observing them is insufficient. I would urge that we make special efforts to extend the reach, appreciatively and sensitively, of Cultural Studies and Sociology into areas previously sidelined, usually in preference to the United States. This is not an easy task because of our linguistic deficits, and because resources are not likely to flow from places such as China, India, and Africa. That this is so makes particularly gratifying that the Department of Cultural Studies and Sociology at Birmingham, if small, has such a reach of expertise – having colleagues working on (and often coming from) Latin America, North Africa, India, and China is a great asset.

I would add that it is important for British Sociology and Cultural Studies to reach deeper into the continent of Europe. We in Britain suffer as a nation in being what Norman Davies describes as always “semi-detached”⁶³ with regard to our closest neighbors. Davies puts Poland at the center of his history of Europe, and here Warsaw, Prague, and Kiev are as prominent as Paris, London, and Rome. Last year I read Mark Mazower’s disturbing book, *Dark Continent: Europe’s Twentieth Century*.⁶⁴ I commend it to anyone who might mistakenly believe, “democracy” and “civilization” having been cradled in this arena, that in consequence intellectuals can leave out of their scrutiny a region which is comfortably “settled,” devoting their energies instead to more obviously “troubled” or even “exciting” areas. But this – Europe – is the arena in which the greatest conflicts of the twentieth century were waged, where communism and fascism faced one another and went to the limit, where the ideologists fought between themselves in appallingly and unprecedentedly bloody ways, where genocide was conceived and implemented. Still today there are issues here in Europe, perhaps especially in central and eastern Europe, which command the urgent attention of Cultural Studies and Sociology – ethnic hatreds, the reemergence of fascism, the turmoil of socioeconomic restructuring, cultural differences, political integration, variable identities, changing informational environments, forced and unforced migrations, “fuzzy” nationhoods (to adopt Judy Batt’s apposite terminology).

Conclusion

In conclusion, let me restate my conviction that Sociology ought to work with the “cultural turn” in thought, welcoming rather than resisting the emergence of Cultural Studies. I have little sympathy for those Sociologists who feel that Cultural Studies has left them by, still less for those who would expel it from the academy. We are currently enjoying pretty good times in social sciences in general, and Sociology in particular. Of course, resources are tight,

but Sociologists should remember the cold years of the 1980s, when there were abusive attacks from people in power (remember Sir Keith Joseph and his abhorrence as regards the SSRC, accusations of “marxist bias” at the Open University, and fevered talk of the “decomposition” of Sociology?⁶⁵). Today Sociology is at the heart of “Third Way” debates, while conceptions and issues such as “information society,” “families of choice,” social inclusion and exclusion, “globalization,” “identity,” “welfare,” and “multiculturalism” find a ready ear in influential circles which recognize the value of social research. The Chair in Sociology at Birmingham University, lost in the 1980s, has even been restored! Being in this positive position, I would urge Sociology not to turn its back on Cultural Studies. The latter has made too many contributions to sociological thinking, and has so much more to give, to deserve this.

To this end, Sociology needs to resist the temptations of disciplinary closure and the exclusions that readily accompany such a move. Of course, to do anything requires that some frontiers be established, but it needs to be remembered that these are always subject to change and we need to keep them as open as we possibly can. Having open access to Cultural Studies is a crucial element of this. We need to insist on the primacy and collective endeavor of the human sciences to “tell it like it is.” There is no royal route to that end. Hoggart set the style of breaking disciplinary boundaries back in 1963 when he announced the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies. Hall and his colleagues continued with that tradition, along the way opening areas and asking questions that too much Sociology appeared incapable of addressing. But Birmingham was not alone in welcoming the “cultural turn.” From a different direction came John Urry, a sociologist at Lancaster since 1971, and long the lead in what is one of only two 5* Sociology departments in the UK. Back in 1981 Urry⁶⁶ advocated Sociology as a “parasitic” discipline, one happy to be informed by social movements such as feminism and environmentalism and open to contributions from other disciplines. This is a Sociology with no core, or at least if it has a core it is a protean one. But what we can be sure about is that Lancaster has led the way in British Sociology in being open to the “cultural turn.” The proof of this is in the pudding. Skeptics may want to reflect on some of the work that has come out of that department in recent years – pioneering studies on tourism, on Heritage industries, on the culture of places such as the Lake District, on economies of signs and space, and on the development of “dis-organized capitalism.”⁶⁷

Cultural Studies can also learn from Sociology, not least to resist unthinking celebration of the popular as well as to critically address questions of the validity and reliability of evidence.

Finally, both disciplines can, I hope, return to a concern with evaluation. I have no doubt that this is a fraught task, moving dangerously between elitist dismissal and banal populism, maintaining a commitment to the disinterestedness that is crucial to good academic work while still being willing to criticize and

discriminate what is being examined. Nonetheless, I believe this to be an essential ingredient of the human sciences for the twenty-first century.

Notes

- 1 Thank you to Ann Gray, David Jary, and Liz Chapman for comments on a first draft of this chapter, which was originally my inaugural lecture as Professor of Sociology at the University of Birmingham.
- 2 Richard Hoggart (1951), *Auden: An Introductory Essay*, London: Chatto and Windus.
- 3 C. H. Rolph (1961), *The Trial of Lady Chatterley: Regina v. Penguin Books Limited*, Harmondsworth: Penguin, pp. 91–104.
- 4 Postmaster-General (1962), *Report of the Committee on Broadcasting, 1960*, Cmnd 1753, London: HMSO [Pilkington Report].
- 5 See, for example, Michael Tracey (1983), *A Variety of Lives: A Biography of Sir Hugh Greene*, London: Bodley Head, p. 189; Anthony Smith (ed.) (1974), *British Broadcasting*, Newton Abbot: David and Charles, p. 117.
- 6 Richard Hoggart (1990), *A Sort of Clowning, Life and Times, 1940–1959*, London: Chatto and Windus, p. 147.
- 7 Frank McKenna (1980), *The Railway Workers, 1840–1970*, London: Faber and Faber.
- 8 Richard Hoggart (1992), *An Imagined Life, Life and Times 1959–1991*, London: Chatto and Windus, p. 93.
- 9 Richard Hoggart (1970), *Speaking to Each Other, vol. 2, About Literature*, London: Chatto and Windus.
- 10 *Ibid.*, p. 255.
- 11 *Ibid.*, p. 249.
- 12 Her book (1932), *Fiction and the Reading Public*, London: Chatto and Windus, 1965, was in several respects a forerunner of early CCCS concerns.
- 13 David Hamilton Eddy (1992), “A Forgotten Embarrassment of Riches,” *Times Higher Education Supplement*, April 24, p. 15.
- 14 Perry Anderson (1992), “Components of the National Culture” [1968], in *English Questions*, London: Verso, p. 97.
- 15 Those who recall E. P. Thompson’s magnificent essay, (1978), *The Poverty of Theory*, London: Merlin, which demolished the Althusserian theoretical edifice, may appreciate the liberatory feelings this engendered.
- 16 F. R. Leavis (1943), *English and the University*, London: Chatto and Windus, (1969), *English Literature in Our Time and the University*, London: Chatto and Windus.
- 17 Michèle Barrett (1998), *Imagination in Theory*, Cambridge: Polity.
- 18 Anthony Giddens (1995) wrote that “British sociology . . . can offer a clutch of individuals with a worldwide reputation, such as John Goldthorpe, Steven Lukes, Stuart Hall, Michèle Barrett, Ray Pahl, Janet Wolff and Michael Mann”; “In Defence of Sociology,” *New Statesman and Society*, April 7, p. 19.
- 19 Max Weber (1949) [1917], “The Meaning of ‘Ethical Neutrality,’ and ‘Objectivity’ in Social Science and Social Policy,” in *The Methodology of the Social Sciences*, trans. and ed. E. A. Shils and H. A. Finch. New York: Free Press.

- 20 See also Alvin Gouldner's contrasting essays, "Anti-Minotaur: The Myth of a Value-Free Sociology" and "The Sociologist as Partisan: Sociology and the Welfare State," in A. W. Gouldner (1973), *For Sociology: Renewal and Critique in Sociology*, London: Allen Lane, pp. 3–68.
- 21 Richard Hoggart (1980), "The Crisis of Relativism," *New Universities Quarterly* 35(1): 21–32.
- 22 Stuart Hall and Paddy Whannel (1964), *The Popular Arts*, London: Hutchinson, pp. 35–6.
- 23 Richard Hoggart (1995), *The Way We Live Now*, London: Chatto and Windus.
- 24 Though this is an oversimplification. See Jennifer Platt (1996), *History of Sociological Research Methods in America, 1920–1960*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- 25 For example, John Rex (1961), *Key Problems of Sociological Theory*, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul; Ralph Dahrendorf (1968), *Out of Utopia*, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- 26 Frank Parkin (1979), *Marxism and Class Theory: A Bourgeois Critique*, London: Tavistock, p. 25.
- 27 John Rex observes "an almost complete absence in Britain... of a systematic conservative sociology" (p. 1007) which must have contributed to this orientation, as did an interpretation of Max Weber which downplayed his pro-capitalist and conservative characteristics. John Rex (1983), "British Sociology 1960–80: An Essay," *Social Forces* 61: 999–1009.
- 28 See David Marsland (1988), *Seeds of Bankruptcy: Sociological Bias against Business and Freedom*, London: Claridge Press; Peter Saunders (1990), *Social Class and Stratification*, London: Routledge; (1995), *Capitalism, A Social Audit*, Buckingham: Open University Press; Peter Berger (1987), *The Capitalist Revolution*, London: Gower.
- 29 Ray Pahl (1989), "Is the Emperor Naked? Some Questions on the Adequacy of Sociological Theory in Urban and Regional Research," *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 13(4) Dec.: 709–20.
- 30 See Seumas Milne (1994), *The Enemy Within: The Secret War Against the Miners*, London: Verso.
- 31 Ralph Miliband (1980), "Class War Conservatism," *New Society* 19 June, pp. 278–80.
- 32 See John Urry (1990), *The Tourist Gaze*, London: Sage.
- 33 Cf. Harriet Bradley (1996), *Fractured Identities: Changing Patterns of Inequality*, Cambridge: Polity.
- 34 Cf. Gordon Marshall (1997), *Repositioning Class: Social Inequality in Industrial Societies*, London: Sage.
- 35 Jan Pakulski and Malcolm Waters (1996), *The Death of Class*, London: Sage.
- 36 Though see the insightful piece by David B. Grunsky and Jesper B. Sorenson (1998), "Can Class Analysis be Salvaged?," *American Journal of Sociology* 103(5) March: 1187–234.
- 37 Though the class analysts at Oxford responded thoughtfully to this (and other) claims with their usual blend of rigorous argument and empirical evidence. See Anthony Heath, R. Jowell, and J. Curtice (1985), *How Britain Votes*, Oxford: Pergamon.

- 38 Stuart Hall (1988), "The Toad in the Garden: Thatcherism among the Theorists," in C. Nelson and L. Grossberg (eds.), *Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture*, Basingstoke: Macmillan, pp. 35–73.
- 39 Stuart Hall (1979), "The Great Moving Right Show," *Marxism Today*, Jan., pp. 14–20.
- 40 Stuart Hall (1986), "Cultural Studies: Two Paradigms," in N. Garnham et al. (eds.), *Media, Culture and Society: A Critical Reader*, London: Sage, pp. 33–48. Cf. E. P. Thompson (1981), "The Politics of Theory," in Raphael Samuel (ed.), *People's History and Socialist Theory*, London: Routledge, pp. 396–408.
- 41 Rob Stones (ed.), (1998), *Key Thinkers in Sociology*, London: Macmillan.
- 42 Stuart Hall, "Race, Culture and Communication: Looking Backward and Forward at Cultural Studies," *Rethinking Marxism* 5(1): 11–18.
- 43 Michael Green (1996), "The Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies," in John Storey (ed.), *What is Cultural Studies?* London: Arnold, p. 53.
- 44 Rick Maxwell (2000), "Cultural Studies," in Gary Browning, Abigail Halcli, and Frank Webster (eds.), *Understanding Contemporary Society: Theories of the Present*, London: Sage, pp. 281–95.
- 45 See David Morley (1998), "So-called Cultural Studies: Dead Ends and Reinvented Wheels," *Cultural Studies* 12(4): 476–97.
- 46 See Angela McRobbie (1991), "New Times in Cultural Studies," *New Formations* (13) Spring: 1–18.
- 47 See Jim McGuigan (1992), *Cultural Populism*, London: Routledge.
- 48 Terry Eagleton observes that Stuart Hall has often objected to abstract theorization himself, but adds that this is a bit rich given the flirtation of Hall with high theory – Althusser, Gramsci, deconstruction – through the years. See Terry Eagleton (1996), "The Hippest," *London Review of Books*, March 7, pp. 3–5.
- 49 Manuel Castells (2000), "Materials for an Exploratory Theory of the Network Society," *British Journal of Sociology*, 51(1) Jan./March: 5–24.
- 50 Andrew Tudor (1999), *Decoding Culture: Theory and Method in Cultural Studies*, London: Sage.
- 51 Anthony Giddens (1984), *The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration*, Cambridge: Polity.
- 52 R. W. Connell (1997), "Why is Classical Theory Classical?," *American Journal of Sociology* 102(6) May: 1511–57.
- 53 David Parker (1997), "Why Bother with Durkheim? Teaching Sociology in the 1990s," *Sociological Review* 45(1) Feb.: 122–46.
- 54 See Steven Seidman (1998), *Contested Knowledge: Social Theory in the Postmodern Era*, Oxford: Blackwell.
- 55 The quotations are from the present head of the ESRC, Gordon Marshall, and A. H. Halsey, the doyen of Oxford/Nuffield Sociology.
- 56 Joan Huber, in her Centennial Essay in the *American Journal of Sociology*, would expel from the discipline "antirationalists" (postmodernists, constructivists, and the like) who threaten the disciplinary center of Sociology. See Joan Huber (1995), "Institutional Perspectives on Sociology," *American Journal of Sociology* 101(1) July: 194–216.
- 57 Quality Assessment Agency (2000), *Benchmark Statement for Sociology*, Bristol, HEFCE, Jan.

- 58 Manuel Castells (1996–8), *The Information Age*, 3 vols., Oxford: Blackwell.
- 59 T. Becher (1989), *Academic Tribes and Territories*, Buckingham: Open University Press.
- 60 Gulbenkian Commission (1996), *Open the Social Sciences: Report on the Restructuring of the Social Sciences*, California: Stanford University Press.
- 61 There is a huge literature on this. My favorite is Donald McKenzie (1990), *Inventing Accuracy: A Historical Sociology of Nuclear Missile Guidance*, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press; (1996), *Knowing Machines*, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
- 62 Immanuel Wallerstein (2000), “From Sociology to Historical Science: Prospects and Obstacles,” *British Journal of Sociology* 51(1) Jan.–March: 25–35.
- 63 Norman Davies (1996), *Europe: A History*, London: Pimlico, p. 13.
- 64 Mark Mazower (1998), *Dark Continent: Europe’s Twentieth Century*, Harmondsworth: Penguin.
- 65 Irving L. Horowitz (1993), *The Decomposition of Sociology*, New York: Oxford University Press.
- 66 John Urry (1981), “Sociology as a Parasite: Some Virtues and Vices,” in Philip Abrams et al. (eds.), *Practice and Progress*, London: Allen and Unwin. Reprinted in John Urry (1995), *Consuming Places*, London: Routledge, pp. 33–45.
- 67 One might consult the Lancaster Sociology Department’s website: <http://www.comp.lancs.ac.uk/sociology/> See also John Urry (1990), *The Tourist Gaze*, London: Sage; (2000), *Sociology beyond Societies: Mobilities for the 21st Century*, London: Routledge; Scott Lash and John Urry (1987), *The End of Organized Capitalism*, London: Sage; (1994), *Economies of Signs and Space*, London: Sage; Phil Macnaughten and John Urry (1998), *Contested Natures*, London: Sage.