PART I

Disciplines

Chapter 2

Interdisciplinarity

Mark Gibson and Alec McHoul

Hoggart's Fundamental Departure

Who can guess the full extent of the impact on university English departments, in February 1957, of Richard Hoggart's breakthrough work in what was later to be called "cultural studies" and whose full title reads: *The Uses of Literacy: Aspects of Working-class Life, with Special Reference to Publications and Entertainments*? Even a glance at the table of contents shows a fundamental departure from the routine objects of English literary criticism: the established canon and the works of emergent "serious" writers. In place of the "life and work" of famous authors (an approach which was itself, by the 1950s, already suspected of being too sociopolitical and, so, aesthetically unresponsive), the scene shifts to the working class, the family, the home, the parents, the neighborhood – as all of these touch upon the concrete lives of average everyday workers, men and women. Big literary history is replaced by the detail of the little histories of ordinary life. Instead of serious "literature," we find repeated references to popular art (*Peg's Paper* and "Club-Singing"). And the word "art" itself switches adjectives, away from "serious," "high," and "fine" and towards "popular," "commercial," and "mass." Then perhaps more significantly still, the word "art" is, in the final parts of the book, effectively replaced by "culture." So literary studies comes, chapter by chapter, to be transformed into something else. The something else, though, is not quite sociology or politics. Hoggart's uncompromisingly ordinary prose, his personal attachment to what he is addressing, his overt identifications, make the book almost but not quite social science, even in its "softest" form, and especially by the standards of the 1950s.

No. This is something new and different and something that offers insight into the peculiar interdisciplinary mix that cultural studies has become, should we care to return and look and not shy away from the idea that cultural studies is old enough to *have* a history – an idea that is currently unfashionable, despite the fact that cultural studies equally insists on historicizing many another discipline in an effort to unhinge its authority. And when we make such a return, we find a set of

unique conditions that allow for the possibility of a Hoggart and his nascent interdisciplinary attachment to culture and the popular.

By the mid-1950s, the postwar British universities were just starting to open up in new ways to intakes based on talent and ability as well as those based on class, money, and ancestry. This was on nothing like the scale of the post-Newsome boom of the late 1960s and early 1970s which saw a number of new universities established across the country in such otherwise academic backwaters as Lancaster and Brighton. That second boom was, as is now well known, to become the central impetus behind cultural studies' adolescence, its great period of growth, popularity, and prosperity. It was also to mark cultural studies as a revolutionary curricular alternative to the traditional humanities and social science disciplines; as, in effect, an antidiscipline – for a moment at least. But Hoggart's own earlier decade was the crucial period of infant development and so the initial platform for cultural studies' shaping and uniqueness as an inter-discipline. And true to the pattern of many later writings, Hoggart also, in semi-autobiographical mode, narrates the conditions for this emergence. His famous section on the "Scholarship Boy" tells the story in no uncertain terms.

Cultural studies, in a sense, had to happen, if Hoggart is to be believed, when he tells us that a new type of student was – perhaps for the first time – to be encountered in the British universities. And here we have to remember that until about the time of Hoggart's own university life, most of the academics, the dons, were the social inferiors of their students. Who was this new arrival, the Scholarship Boy? Hoggart includes a particularly telling passage – and one whose sources are impeccable, for what we are reading here is Hoggart's own generalized experience:

> [H]e is not a "creative genius." He is clever enough to take himself out of his class mentally, but not equipped, mentally or emotionally, to surmount all the problems that follow. He is denied even the "consolations of philosophy," of acquiring such comfort as there is, in part at least, from assessing his situation. Even if he achieves some degree of culture, he finds it difficult to carry it easily, as easily as those who have not had to strain so much to get it, who have not known like him the long process of exploitation of "brains." (Hoggart 1957: 248)

Being neither of the "creative minority" (the English dons and their traditional students) nor of the "uncreative majority" (the class from which he comes and with which he cannot but identify), the Scholarship Boy is caught in a paradox, in a version of what Toby Miller (1993) calls the incompleteness of the self. This self is incomplete because it can't disavow "cleverness" or "brains"; all of its training and social-selectedness points to that. Yet at the same time, these "brains" are, surprisingly enough perhaps in an academic environment, insufficient for participation in its own "culture" (or perhaps "culturedness"), stemming as it does from a long and abiding upper-class and aristocratic history of knowing just what to *do* with one's own intelligence. The Scholarship Boy – and here we could be tempted take this figure as standing for nascent cultural studies

itself – cannot, and yet must, exist within an academic environment: striving for a respectability, a disciplinarity, it simply cannot have.

Given this paradox or aporia, the only rational alternative was for him (or it) to find ways in which cultures other than those of the universities themselves could become at least semi-respectable within them. This was, for Hoggart, and in some places still is, an uphill battle. Cultural studies, then, is not interdisciplinary for the *sake* of being so; interdisciplinarity is not its willed departure, the volunteered flag of its curricular radicality – at least not at this moment. Interdisciplinarity, on the contrary, arises out of structural institutional necessity. The primary ingredients of its own mix, literary studies, sociology, and autobiography, then, represent points of a triangle which bound the early form of the discipline. But none of these three alone could easily be adopted by the Scholarship Boy as "his" discipline. Literary studies (in either its aestheticist or historicist mode) simply refers back to the deep and abiding class culture of the "old" academic demographics. Sociology simply affirms the fact of technique or "brains" and uses them to do empirical studies – but without any sense of art, popular or otherwise. Autobiography suggests experience (what we would now call "identity politics"), easier writing from memory and anecdote, the absence of analytic distance and hence of the very "brains" that define the Scholarship Boy's main strength. But at the same time, these are the only equipments he has, at least as far as the humanities are concerned. What he must do is synthesize and combine them into something new, something that can then, as it were, "speak for itself" and, eventually perhaps, wear that interdisciplinarity as a badge of pride, as if it had been purposefully created out of his own volition towards radical institutional reform.

This is Hoggart, then, in 1957, already on the cusp of professional academic success, but still in touch with the process by which he had to struggle for that success as a very different kind of university student. We move now, on a decade or so, to Raymond Williams writing as a fully-fledged university teacher, describing yet another proto-cultural-studies "clientele": adult education.

Williams and Adult Education

The recognition of a new kind of subject in early British cultural studies opened the possibility of developing a new kind of pedagogy, and it is here that a commitment to interdisciplinarity begins to be articulated more explicitly than it was by Hoggart. In Raymond Williams' account, the most challenging context was extramural education – again, a precursor to the expansion of the tertiary system in the late 1960s and early 1970s – where students were held by little more than the interest, or capacity to explain, of the material presented to them:

> These people were, after all, in a practical position to say "well, if you tell me that question goes outside your discipline, then bring me someone whose discipline *will*

> cover it, or bloody well get outside of the discipline and answer it yourself.'' It was from the entirely rebellious and untidy situation that the extraordinarily complicated and often muddled convergences of what became Cultural Studies occurred. (Williams 1989: 157)

This early and embryonically interdisciplinary project of cultural studies was defined not so much by a particular problem or subject-matter as by an understanding of fields of academic specialization being constantly in dialogue with intellectual and practical interests beyond themselves. It was, for Williams, a project of:

> taking the best we can in intellectual work and going with it in this very open way to confront people for whom it is not a way of life, for whom it is not in any probability a job, but for whom it is a matter of their own intellectual interest, their own understanding of the pressures on them, pressures of every kind, from the most personal to the most broadly political. (Williams 1989: 162)

The motivation for interdisciplinarity in this context is, again, a recognition of incompleteness – but this time, and the shift is important, an incompleteness felt on the side of the teacher and a curriculum divided into disciplines. In its encounter with interests, ways of life and ethical practices outside itself, formal academic knowledge is forced into an awareness of its own status as partial, contingent, and distanced from the (literally) extramural world of a very different will to know, a very different set of ''structures of feeling.''

In Williams' case, this proto-interdisciplinary awareness of the incompleteness of the humanities academy was closely related to a particular view of language, most clearly outlined in the introduction to his *Keywords* as ''historical semantics.'' This deliberately counters strong claims to authority made on the basis of specialized disciplinary vocabularies. While, in certain delimited areas, disputes may be resolved by reference to dictionary definitions or ''proper meanings,'' for many of the terms most central to the discussion of culture and society such a procedure is impossible. Meanings, in this field, are more complex than the ideas of ''discipline'' and ''definition'' can allow, for the reason that they may vary according to active life circumstances, to what Williams here calls ''relationships'':

> [I]t is necessary to insist that the most active problems of meaning are always primarily embedded in actual relationships, and that both the meanings and the relationships are typically diverse and variable, within the structures of particular social orders and the processes of social and historical change. (Williams 1976: 22)

There is little justification, from this perspective, for that ''familiar, slightly frozen, polite stare'' which often meets ''improper'' usage. This is not to say that specializations of language are not valuable, ''but in any major language, and particularly in periods of change, a necessary confidence and concern for clarity can quickly become brittle, if the questions involved are not faced'' (Williams

1976: 16). Williams' position is in no way *anti*disciplinary, then (whatever cultural studies may have thought itself to be in later periods), but it is insistent in its emphasis on the *limits and incompleteness* of disciplinary forms of knowledge and their historical formation.

This ethics of knowledge, developed in the context of adult education, is also reflected in one of Williams' most enduring and widely-used concepts: that of "structures of feeling," alluded to above. The originality of the concept lies in its short-circuiting of familiar dichotomies which associate formal institutions, disciplines, and discourses simply with "structures" and areas of life outside them with "feeling" (sometimes identified with "agency"). "Structures of feeling" are not quite fully-articulated forms in the sense of academic disciplines, but more like *proto*disciplines still in the process of formation. In *The Long Revolution*, Williams explains this via the metaphor of the precipitation of chemicals from solution (Williams 1965: 63; see also Pickering 1997: 23–53). In the course of historical change, certain structuring processes are exhausted or become neglected while others assume the solidity of established institutions. The recognized academic disciplines of any period, along with political and social institutions, are clearly among the latter. There is never any question, for Williams, that a certain respect is owed to them as historical achievements, but the project of cultural studies is to cultivate a sensitivity to structures of feeling which have not yet found (and which may never find) a precipitate form. The point in this is not an abstract and critical progressivism or a principled opposition to structure as such; it is a more specific and directed concern for what disciplinary knowledge unavoidably excludes and how it is thereby rendered incomplete in the face of actual social and cultural "relationships." What it excluded, principally, for Williams, was the actuality of class-based (and perhaps regional) experiences – as it was for Hoggart. But something similar (though by no means identical), as we shall see, could apply equally to what is now called "diversity."

Appadurai: Diversity and Discipline Today

Coming closer to the present then – 1996 – and shifting continents, it is significant to find a paper that, in its own historical and political context, echoes at least some of the themes of incompleteness-in-the-face-of-difference to be found (again slightly differently) in the foundational work of Hoggart and Williams. We refer here to a *compte rendu* of the state of cultural studies in the American university by Arjun Appadurai (1996). Indeed the debt is partly acknowledged when Appadurai writes:

> In general, English departments have been the spaces in which cultural studies has grown and thrived. Recalling the origins of cultural studies in England and the work of Richard Hoggart and Raymond Williams (both students of literature), this

> is perhaps understandable. It was also doubtless inevitable that it would be in the space of English that Matthew Arnold's sense of culture (as civilizing process) would encounter the revenge of popular culture as a subject fit for literary study. (1996: 28)

While Arnold's "civilizing process" was the very obstacle that Hoggart's Scholarship Boy's "brains" had to overcome, the new vanguard (which, arguably, Appadurai represents) sees "civilizing" as an essential part of the equally new amalgam of diversity and disciplinarity which, as it turns out, is yet another take on incompleteness. Clearly, then, a sense of class difference is no longer the single driving force. Its place in the overall structure is taken by diversity. In one of many binaries, for example, Appadurai distinguishes between diversity as an effect of sheer numbers – "the presence of students of color, faculty of minority background, and a vaguely international milieu" – and diversity as a real change to the underlying university culture (1996: 25). Again, on the one side (sheer numbers) a "clientele" or demographic from outside the traditional academic habitus and, on the other, an institutional culture faced with the problem of reaching some kind of *rapprochement* with it. The numbers are "there," but the *rapprochement* has not been made; an incompleteness of a new and different (but parallel) kind thus emerges:

> While the American university has managed to put into its official life (job advertisements, faculty and student recruitment, and courses of study) the principle that more difference is better, it has not succeeded in creating a habitus where diversity is at the heart of the apparatus itself. (1996: 26)

This is still slightly redolent of both Hoggart and Williams: the university opens its doors to different social and cultural sectors in larger numbers (in the first case bright working-class boys and adult learners; in Appadurai's case a much broader nontraditional intake), but does not quite know what to do with them once in, does not quite know how to be more "user-friendly" towards them, does not quite know how to alter either its own or its students' traditional "culturedness." If we have here another and altered version of what Williams called an "entirely rebellious and untidy situation," its "solution" again seems to be a relatively similar congeries of "extraordinarily complicated and often muddled convergences" (Williams 1989: 157). But the difference between demographic numbers and institutional culture, in this new case, seems to leave *both* the new entrants *and* the academic curriculum incomplete. And once more, the incompleteness in question has to do with the question of discipline.

Appadurai, then, puts his finger on something that Hoggart and Williams, historically, could not have emphasized. They clearly saw, in their different ways, the disciplinary limits of the English department and its culture. But the newer "minoritarian" is able to complement this with a connection between two finer senses of disciplinarity. After Foucault, perhaps, Appadurai distinguishes between the two "main senses" of disciplinarity: "(a) care, cultivation, habit and

(b) field, method, subject matter" (1996: 30). Appadurai then turns towards the first and more traditional sense of discipline as a site to be won by the new cohort of persons from diverse backgrounds. Accordingly, Appadurai favors the liberal arts college (for undergraduates) over the research schools (for postgraduates). He envisages (in what he refers to as a "utopia") the former as training a cosmopolitan self, with the latter only leading to reliable knowledge and a more restricted and technically competent self (mere "brains" perhaps, to revert to Hoggart).

Appadurai, then, has a new solution to this new version of incompleteness: an insistence upon the minoritarian as part and parcel of a liberal arts education. This idea(l) includes "area studies" along with anything that might count as "'minors,' 'minorities,' and 'minor literatures'" (1996: 34). So his "positive" conclusion is that:

> The critical revitalization of the cultural study of other parts of the world (area studies) is thus at least one way in which to restore the primacy of the liberal-cosmopolitan ideal of discipline over the later, research-driven ideal of disciplinarity. (1996: 35)

Perhaps paradoxically, in the light of the earlier moments of cultural studies we have examined – or perhaps not, because neither Williams nor Hoggart, as we have seen, completely rejected "the liberal-cosmopolitan ideal of discipline"[1] – what appears to have returned with the incorporation of "area" and other "minoritarian" studies is an insistence on an older and more traditional cultivation of the self:

> The idea of discipline in the liberal arts aims to cultivate a certain sort of cosmopolitan liberal self among students. The idea of discipline that underpins the practice of research has very little to do – normatively – with any sense of a morally weighted sense of a liberal self, and has everything to do with the means and techniques for scrutinizing the world and producing knowledge that is both new and valid. (1996: 32)

Here, then, is a "liberal self" not completely dissimilar from that which Williams describes when he writes of "people for whom [intellectual work] is not a way of life, for whom it is not in any probability a job, but for whom it is a matter of their own intellectual interest, their own understanding of the pressures on them, pressures of every kind, from the most personal to the most broadly political" (Williams 1989: 162). Here again, a certain politics of identity and a set of life pressures traditionally disconnected with the academy is met by a humanities curriculum that "aims to cultivate a certain sort of cosmopolitan liberal self among students." This last expression could almost have issued from Arnold's own pen when he defines "culture" as "the disinterested and active use of reading, reflection, and observation, in the endeavour to know the best that can be known" (1889: 137).

Clearly, then, while there are parallels between the formative moments of cultural studies (in Hoggart and Williams) and more recent concerns elsewhere, we must still wonder whether Appadurai's "minorities" are a simple paradigmatic substitution for, say, Hoggart's Scholarship Boy. They may actually be working with quite different models of the relation between the traditional university and its "others." For Hoggart, it's a question of *translation* and the ethics of translation: between the "foreign" world of the universities replete with their "snail-eating Frenchmen" (1957: 183) and the boy from Leeds learning how to communicate on "civil" terms. For Appadurai and the "new vanguard," it's a question of political *representation*: majorities in the academy being forced to make way (first numerically, then culturally) for minorities in what is imagined as a universal and utopian forum.

In both cases however, and for all these important differences, we can notice that the resultant position on (inter) discipinarity – again, qualitatively different in each case – emerges not as a willed and radical curricular choice but as a vital structural response and solution to the *necessary incompleteness* that must arise when any self undergoes the rigors of institutional transformation; whether this self is the one who, for Hoggart, is "clever enough to take himself out of his class mentally, but not equipped, mentally or emotionally, to surmount all the problems that follow," or whether it's Arnold's or Appadurai's "certain sort of cosmopolitan liberal self."

Bennett: The End of Incompleteness?

A contrasting example to Appadurai of the shifting sense of (inter)disciplinarity in cultural studies is a recent series of interventions on the question by Tony Bennett (1993, 1998a, 1998b). The point of difference needs to be set against the background of some basic similarities. Like Appadurai, Bennett sees the new "diversity" of the university as requiring the issue to be thought in different terms from the early work of Hoggart and Williams (1998b: 37). Like Appadurai, he also works with a distinction among rationales for the humanities' academy between a "cultivation of selves" and the development of more abstract principles of theory and method. But where Appadurai favors the first of these, Bennett opts instead for the second. In doing so, he makes what is probably the strongest case to date for a full acceptance by cultural studies of a distinct disciplinary status. Rejecting what he sees as a romantic aversion to "technical competence," Bennett calls for the field "to lay claim to a definite set of knowledge claims and methodological procedures that will be convertible . . . into clearly defined skills and trainings that will prove utilisable in a range of spheres of practical life" (1998b: 52).

Bennett's target, then, is effectively *half* of Appadurai's double sense of the term "discipline." He rejects what Foucault (1970) would call the "transcendental" side of the double: discipline as "care, cultivation, habit" – but he

positively values what Foucault calls the "empirical" (or perhaps, technical) side: discipline as "field, method, subject matter," to repeat Appadurai's definitions. What we might ask – and we will take this up in our conclusion below – is whether this turn to discipline as an empirical-technical mono-concern "solves" the problem of the structural (and, as we shall see, the equally ethical) incompleteness that we have found in various and very distinct forms in the work of Hoggart, Williams, and Appadurai. Before we can do this, however, we need some background to Bennett's intervention.

Bennett's position on disciplinarity emerges out of more general criticisms of an understanding of cultural studies as fundamentally grounded in "marginality" or "resistance" (for which see Bennett 1992, 1998b). Such an understanding, he argues, is both historically inaccurate and an obstacle to any realistic assessment of possibilities for the field. In the British case at least, cultural studies did not develop outside or in opposition to established institutions but within pedagogical spaces marked out by government – in the secondary school system, the extramural sector of the universities, then later within the universities themselves. Drawing on a Foucauldian understanding of governmentality, particularly as mediated through the work of Ian Hunter (1988, 1992, 1994), Bennett concludes that "the enabling conditions of cultural studies are located in precisely that sphere, the sphere of government and social regulation, to which cultural studies has usually supposed itself to be opposed" (Bennett 1998b: 46).

Bringing this perspective to bear on the question of disciplinarity, Bennett detects a certain bad faith in a continuing reluctance of cultural studies to characterize itself as a discipline. If we survey the scene today, he points out, the field has all the expected institutional trappings of a discipline. It has a recognizable and increasingly prominent place in university curricula in Australia, the United States, Canada, and Britain and to some extent also in the Asia-Pacific region and South Africa. There are a number of international refereed journals in the field as well as professional associations, conferences, and research centers: "Viewed in terms of the nature and extent of its institutionalization, then, there is little to distinguish cultural studies from many other areas of work in the humanities" (Bennett 1998a: 532). It is quite normal, Bennett argues, for systems of thought to begin their careers by "creating some elbow room for themselves within the existing array of disciplinary knowledges" (1998b: 41). But to claim a permanent aura of exceptionality – as somehow "outside" or "beyond" the disciplines – is merely evasive: "the need . . . to define precisely how an emerging system of thought draws on and combines the techniques and methods of existing disciplines into distinctive new configurations cannot be indefinitely deferred" (1998b: 41).

The costs, for Bennett, in resisting a disciplinary normalization are twofold. It means, first, that intellectual authority tends to take, in Max Weber's sense, traditional or prerational forms: "The lack of a clear set of methodological precepts and theoretical principles has made cultural studies particularly prone to the organization of forms of authority based on the personal qualities of

intellectuals'' (Bennett 1998a: 533). In his distaste for personalized forms of authority, Bennett is sharply at odds with Appadurai's weaker sense of discipline – which he might even see as *anti*discipline – as a ''cultivation of liberal-cosmopolitan selves.'' But he is also at odds with the senses of interdisciplinarity which emerge from the early work of Hoggart and Williams. This can be seen most clearly in a new interpretation given to the recurrent theme of incompleteness. For Bennett, following Hunter, the relevant context in which to understand this theme is not the structural position of cultural studies (which is how we have looked at incompleteness so far) but a form of romantic aesthetics, a concern with the fully-rounded development of a self that can balance its outward functional duties as citizen and its inward ethical duties towards itself. Implicit in this idea of incompleteness is an ''epistemological norm of totality'' which is established in opposition to the partializing effects of disciplinary divisions: ''the constant demonstration of . . . incompleteness is . . . the means by which the case for wholeness is advanced'' (1998b: 59; see also Miller 1993).

The second cost of refusing a disciplinary status is that it places cultural studies in a double bind. Any move towards such a status appears as a failure, betraying a process of institutional co-option and a consequent loss of critical potential. But as Bennett points out, this comes close to placing the field in a position in which it *cannot* succeed. If nothing is done to specify and consolidate its techniques, principles, and methods then it will also fail. The options become ''institutionalize and perish, don't institutionalize and perish anyway'' (1998a: 534).

Bennett's position is, however, a complex one, for he recognizes a number of ways in which cultural studies has cut across boundaries between the established disciplines. This is partly because of the nature of its concerns: the adoption of a broad definition of culture, the contextualization of cultural forms, and the address to broad themes of power and subjectivity have all involved building bridges, particularly between the humanities and social science disciplines. But there have also been institutional factors: the shift away from an expensive ''researcher-in-the-archive'' model of training in the humanities to a collective, group-based process of deciphering cultural documents has been a response partly to the vast increase in student numbers (1998b: 46). Balancing these observations against his desire to ''discipline'' cultural studies, Bennett suggests that the field might be seen as a kind of ''interdisciplinary clearing house within the humanities'' or, more paradoxically, an ''interdisciplinary discipline'' (1998a: 535). But, for all that, a discipline first and foremost.

Conclusion: Incompleteness as Structure and Ethics

Bennett's intervention into the (inter)disciplinarity debate, then, might help us pause to consider whether the *structural* incompleteness we have located in the developments from Hoggart to the present is not, in fact, related to an *ethical* incompleteness. Hunter (1993) (whose work, as we have seen, clearly informs

Bennett's) has argued for this theme in relation to the history and (perhaps most importantly) the prehistory of cultural studies in and as a form of romanticism. For Hunter, this romantic project involves the development of a post-Kantian self that, ideally, would reach a position of equipoise between its empirical (practical, alio-ethical) and its transcendental (abstract, auto-ethical) capacities, producing "a well-bred, partly sensuous and partly ethicointellectual human being" (Kant 1978: 185). In effect, this self is "man," the "empirico-transcendental doublet" announced as our condition under modernity by Foucault towards the end of *The Order of Things* (1970: 303–43). That condition, particularly after Kantianism, is one of a doublet in eternal ethical imbalance seeking an impossible homeostasis of its two parts. Hence: eternal incompleteness. Although Hunter's use of this figure is complex and too detailed to be rehearsed here, we can readily draw up a table, using "empirical" and "transcendental" as proxies for the many names of this (essentially romantic) doublet, to show how – from a Hunterian perspective – our various forms of *structural* incompleteness could relate to this ethical form (table 3).

One interest of the Bennett–Hunter position, then, is that it shows how the *structural necessity* of incompleteness which prompts a parallel necessity of interdisciplinarity (as argued for in the present chapter) could map onto an *ethical* field of incompleteness, resulting in a particular type of trained subject which Hunter (1993) calls the "critical intellectual." Equally necessarily, then, if the Bennett–Hunter model's only radical intervention is, effectively, to delete one side of this ethical binary (rather in the way that, more than a century ago, Nietzsche deleted the similarly transcendental side of the famous Platonic binary), then, structurally, it is *bound* to return to a version of disciplinarity.

The question that remains – for us, in another paper; for cultural studies, as a pressing matter – is whether this return to disciplinarity, this technical-empirical-governmental exclusion zone, is sufficient to see cultural studies out of its alleged complicity with the post-Kantian "romantic" cultivation of the self and its necessary structural and ethical incompleteness. Is half a binary any more of a radical solution than a full one? Is half a binary even a possibility?

Table 3 Cultural studies: empirico-transcendental doublets

	Empirical	*Transcendental*
Hoggart (Scholarship Boy):	"brains"	"habitus"
Williams (structures of feeling):[2]	"structure"	"feeling"
	"institution"	"agency"
Appadurai (discipline):	"field, method, subject-matter"	"care, cultivation, habit"
Bennett:	"technical competence"	–

What we might argue instead is that cultural studies, historically, empirically, through a series of what we might think of as "genetic" changes and alterations – particularly concerning new and distinct populations coming to inhabit the humanities academy over the course of the second half of the twentieth century – is *structurally overdetermined* to become interdisciplinary.[3] That condition being the case, cultural studies then becomes liable not just to being accounted for *ex post facto* as a variation on a theme of romantic aesthetics but also to being colonized or overtaken by romantic aesthetic discourses in actual institutional practice. However, while this double liability is a matter of historical fact and can be documented, it is by no means (as Bennett and Hunter appear to think) a necessary or intrinsic part of cultural studies as such. Foucault reminds us, in this case, of two important factors. First, if the "man" of modernity is indeed the empirico-transcendental doublet, it is always (at least until after modernity) going to be wishful thinking to keep either side of the doublet pure and alone. (And we should note that any attempt to do so, even in the name of historical contingency and the piecemeal, will always risk its own form of totalization.) Secondly, in all historical and disciplinary scenarios, including the history of cultural studies, things must remain contingent and could always have been otherwise.

Notes

1 As Andrew Milner reminds us, while Hoggart saw cultural studies as fundamentally interdisciplinary in itself, he nevertheless believed, quite contrary to Appadurai, that it should be a field of *postgraduate research* taking in undergraduates with "an initial discipline outside Cultural Studies . . . an academic and intellectual training, and a severe one," preferably in "the social sciences, history, psychology, anthropology, literary study" (Hoggart 1995: 173; Milner 1999: 273).

2 Note that the terms "institution" and "agency" are not Williams' own but our own gloss. Also, as we have pointed out above, Williams refuses an oppositional relation between "structure" and "feeling" by concatenating them.

3 This argument confirms that of Readings in *The University in Ruins* (1996). Readings argues that, to quote Culler's useful summation, "cultural studies is made possible by a recent shift in the governing idea of the university" (1999: 343).

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