A

abstraction Artworks are abstract, we might think, when they do not represent: abstraction is simply the absence of representation. After all, there is a natural contrast between abstract and representational painting; and music, at least in its "absolute" (i.e., abstract) form, does not clearly represent at all. Absolute music, like abstract painting, *expresses* feelings and perhaps thoughts, but, we suppose, expression and representation are different.

However, there are two difficulties with taking this to capture the nature of abstraction. First, on closer inspection it excludes art that intuitively counts as abstract; and second, the definition is only as clear as the rather murky notion of representation itself.

To illustrate the first difficulty, consider Richard Wollheim's argument (1987: ch. 2) that a good deal of abstract painting in fact represents in the same way as painting of other kinds. In looking at a typical Kandinsky, for instance, while I may not see in it everyday objects such as men and buildings, I do see colored shapes arrayed in three-dimensional space. The red trapezium that breaks a long black line is seen as a red rectangle, tilted at an angle to the viewer, and lying in front of a black strip. I am thus simultaneously aware of how marks are distributed on the canvas and of rather different objects arranged in depth. Since for Wollheim pictorial representation just *is* the deliberate generation of experiences with this twofold nature, he concludes that the Kandinsky represents shapes in three-dimensional space. And although the details of Wollheim's argument invoke his views about pictorial representation, his conclusion has independent appeal. Now, Wollheim does not think every abstract painting can be treated in this way. Certain works of Mondrian and Barnett Newman, he says, resist being seen as other than simply marks on a canvas. Thus he accepts that the traditional definition of abstraction does apply to some paintings. The problem is that it does not apply to most of those we think of as abstract.

We can flesh out the second difficulty by considering either abstract painting or music. It is hardly plausible that these never make any reference to things beyond themselves. The idea that they express emotions and ideas is intended to concede as much, without reintroducing representation. But is it clear that expression is not simply another form of representation? Of course, it differs from some kinds of representing – from the depiction that concerns Wollheim, for instance, or from describing things in language. But the notion of representation is both highly general and resists easy analysis. Until we settle whether expression is itself representing, our definition of abstraction leaves us uncertain whether expressive absolute music, for instance, counts as abstract or not. Of course, there is nothing in itself wrong with a definition leaving boundaries vague. Many phenomena exhibit hinterlands where it is simply unclear whether they hold. The problem is rather that defining abstraction as absence of representation leaves the limits of the latter unclear as those of the former, on our intuitive understanding, are not.

The alternative is to see abstraction, not as the absence of representation, but as a matter of *what* is represented. Wollheim suggests that what marks out the Kandinsky from more traditional painting is that the latter is *figurative*. Traditional works represent things of readily identifiable kinds (dogs, houses, battles, one-eyed giants), and individual members of those kinds (Louis XIV or Polyphemus). Much abstract painting instead represents things which themselves belong only to relatively abstract kinds – red rectangles or black strips, for instance. In similar vein, Kendall L. Walton

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(1988) explores the idea that what marks out abstract works is that what is represented or conveyed is purely general. While a novel may describe a specific locale and specific events that occur within it, abstract works (Walton's focus is music) convey, for instance, only the general notion of struggle, or the dynamics of an emotion. In the context of painting, a natural relative of Walton's thought lies in the idea that abstraction should be understood as the product of *abstracting from* the specifics of visual phenomena. While a nineteenth-century Realist painter might have sought to capture all the detail of some scene, his more abstract successors seek instead to extract from it the bare essentials of form and structure. This idea is familiar from the work of Cézanne, for instance, in which buildings and natural features are stripped down to their basic geometry. But it also runs through a good deal of later work, such as the drawings of Picasso (in almost any of his periods). Abstraction in this sense need not mean abandoning the representation of particulars – Picasso's own portrait of Françoise Gilot as a flower shows that what can be preserved is the form of an *individual's* look, abstracted from the details of her appearance. What it does necessarily involve is abandoning detail in favor of the basic form, structure, or gestalt.

Although it is perhaps not entirely clear quite what any of these suggestions involves, and thus whether there are one or several proposals here, it is clear that they all tend in the same direction. The result is a definition of abstraction that, in contrast to its predecessor, treats it as a matter of *degree*. It also opens up the prospect of making sense of abstraction in arts, such as literature, in which it is unclear what would be left if representation were absent.

A full account of abstraction will need to deploy both definitions now before us. As Wollheim notes, some, if not many, paintings are abstract in virtue of not representing at all; and perhaps there can be musical art that neither represents in any more straightforward way nor expresses anything. (Some indeed, have considered this to be the true mission of absolute music.) So the first notion cannot be dispensed with entirely. But, equally, we have seen good reason not to rely on it alone.

Never far behind questions about the nature of abstraction are questions concerning its value. Abstraction is sometimes itself a source of value (and not a mere accompaniment to other qualities that are valuable). Where abstract art is profound – in the greatest works of absolute music, or the masterpieces of abstract painting – the abstractness of the works is surely central to their achieving what they do. Something like this thought no doubt underpins the persistent tendency to valorize absolute music as the purest form of that art, and the attempts made during the heyday of Abstract Expressionism to do the same for it in relation to painting (Greenberg 1971). Yet it can seem puzzling how abstraction can be of value. How can eschewing representing altogether, or limiting oneself to representing only what is general, help produce art worth caring about?

Where art is abstract in our second sense, there is no real difficulty in understanding how that promotes value. Less abstract art captures the details of particular things, or of specific types: the precise features of a sitter's face, perhaps, or the character of a typical Victorian pickpocket. But why, apart from historical or psychological curiosity, should we care about representations that capture such features? The sitter is available to be studied for herself, and the pickpocket probably never existed. What are either to me, and what does the painting or novel make of either that I could not make for myself? Surely one of the things to want from art is something more universal, something to take away that can be found in other instances of the types, and in life more generally. For that, however, what matters is the more general content of the artworks. That might be present in nonabstract works – they may represent the general by representing the specific. It is also, however, certainly present in works that are abstract in our second sense.

That leaves untouched, of course, works that are abstract in the other sense, those that do not represent at all. Since abstraction here is conceived purely negatively, the prospects for understanding how it contributes to value are limited. We may instead ask a related question: how can the work have value at all, given that it does not represent anything? But puzzlement over that is only in place to the extent that we understand how in general

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representation contributes to art's value. Since I doubt our understanding of that issue goes deep, we should not rush to find it mysterious how art can be successful in representation's absence.

See also DRAWING, PAINTING, AND PRINTMAKING; MUSIC AND SONG; COGNITIVE VALUE OF ART; EXPRESSION; PICTURE PERCEPTION; REPRESENTATION.

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ROBERT HOPKINS

acquaintance principle *see* TESTIMONY IN AESTHETICS

Adorno, Theodor W(iesengrund) (1903–1969) German philosopher; leading figure in the Frankfurt school of critical theory. Born into a wealthy family in Frankfurt am Main, Adorno received his PhD in philosophy in that city in 1924, but spent the following year in Vienna studying composition with Alban Berg. While remaining involved in the music world, he taught philosophy at Frankfurt University until Hitler's advent to power drove him to the US in 1938, where he joined the Frankfurt Institute for Social Research in exile, working in New York and southern California. He returned to a professorship in Frankfurt in 1953, and succeeded his close collaborator Max Horkheimer as director of the institute, also reinstalled in that city, in 1964. His work, which greatly influenced the German student movement of the 1960s, has since the 1980s become an international touchstone for criticism, especially in the visual arts. The majority of Adorno's works are concerned with aesthetic questions. There are studies of Berg, Mahler, and Wagner; essays on literary and musical matters; an *Introduction to the Sociology of Music* (1962); and two central theoretical works: *Philosophy of Modern Music* (1948) and *Aesthetic Theory* (1970). His aphoristic style reaches a high point in the wide-ranging *Minima Moralia* (1951), one of the great books of the postwar period.

Adorno's primary aesthetic interest is in the "autonomous" art that emerged from earlier functional contexts at the end of the eighteenth century. This autonomy "was a function of the bourgeois consciousness of freedom that was itself bound up with the social structure" (1997: 225); thus art expressed the autonomy of the individual subject vis-à-vis society. Art's autonomy means a development of its own structures of meaning, independent of direct reference to the social world; hence Adorno suggests that the concept of art is strictly applicable only to music, since literature and painting always include "an element of subject-matter transcending aesthetic confines, undissolved in the autonomy of form" (1974: 223). Paradoxically, it is the very tendency toward the elaboration of its own formal nature that constitutes art's social meaning. As the expression of a subjectivity engaged dialectically with a social reality at once repressive of its desires and defining its conditions of existence, art represents the demand for freedom from repression. Its autonomy, its functionlessness, allow it to stand as a critique of a society dedicated to the domination of nature in the interests of commercial profit, As an element of the modern society to which it stands in this critical relation, aesthetic form is "sedimented" social content, because "artistic labour is social labour" (1997: 5, 236). Its history follows the pattern of social development generally: that of the progressive mastery of nature by humankind, described by Adorno (following Max Weber) as a process of rationalization. Nature is represented in music by what Adorno calls the musical "material" confronting composers at any given time: sound as organized by historically evolved musical form. The drive to control this material led first to the elaboration of the tonal system by the masters of Viennese classicism and then to the total control over the material achieved by Schoenberg. With the second Viennese school, no conventions force the composer "to acquiesce to traditionally universal principles. With the liberation of musical material, there arose the possibility of mastering it technically . . . The composer has emancipated himself along with his sounds" (1973: 52).

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The emancipation achieved by modern art through its denial of earlier conventions must be paid for. "In the process of pursuing its own inner logic, music is transformed more and more from something significant into something obscure – even to itself" (1973: 19). From the artist's point of view, "the progress in technique that brought them ever greater freedom and independence of anything heterogeneous, has resulted in a kind of reification, technification of the inward as such" (1974: 214). For the listener, music has lost its transparent meaningfulness and the satisfaction it once gave. To grasp its meaning – what Adorno calls its truth content – now requires, beyond "sensory listening," aesthetic theory, which alone makes possible "the conceptually mediated perception of the elements and their configuration which assures the social substance of great music" (1973: 130) – its resistance to the ideological demand that experience be depicted as the achievement of harmonious totality.

Art that does not confront society in this way is condemned by Adorno as regressive, both in the realm of high art, as with Stravinsky's primitivism and neoclassicism, and in that of the popular music mass produced by the "culture industry." Both are adaptations to social reality: in the former by formally modeling the submission of the individual to social irrationality, in the latter by accepting completely the consequences of the commodity form for musical production. "Classical" music as a whole is drawn into the system of commercialization, as its presentation is adapted to a mass listenership no longer capable of "structural listening" but able only to wait for the appearance of beautiful melodies and exciting rhythms. In this, too, music bears a social meaning – that of the increasing domination of individual experience by the needs of industrial capitalism.

It follows from Adorno's conception of artworks as "concentrated social substance" that a critical aesthetics must seek social significance in the formal properties of individual works. This is a difficult prescription to follow, and Adorno's studies of artworks are typically less persuasive than his theoretical generalizations. Attempts at combining formal analysis with sociological decoding, such as the comparison of serial technique to bureaucratization, or of the relation between theme and harmony in sonata form to the dialectic of individual and society, are too often "merely verbal analogies which have no basis in fact but owe their origin and a semblance of plausibility to a generously ambivalent use of words like . . . 'general and particular' " (Dahlhaus 1987: 243). In addition, Adorno does not hesitate on occasion to subordinate matters of fact to his philosophical purposes (see Dahlhaus 1970). His clearly inadequate dismissal of Stravinsky and his inexpert and unsubtle treatment of popular music have also come under much (not unappreciative) criticism. Nevertheless, his work remains important as an aesthetics of modernism, both for its general program, the discovery of social meanings in artistic form, and for its many powerful observations and suggestions.

See also NINETEENTH- AND TWENTIETH-CENTURY CONTINENTAL AESTHETICS; ART HISTORY; MARXISM AND ART.

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PAUL MATTICK

aesthetic attitude The question of what it is to adopt a distinctively aesthetic attitude to objects is important in its own right, but also because of the role attributed to this attitude within wider issues. For example, the difficulties, intensified by developments in "modern art," in defining the term "art" have prompted the attempt to characterize works of art as those toward which it is appropriate to adopt the aesthetic attitude. Some philosophers have also tried to define the notions of aesthetic properties, qualities, values, and experience in terms of aesthetic attitude.

Immanuel Kant was not the first person to associate a distinctively aesthetic attitude with "disinterest." (A similar association seems to have shaped Japanese aesthetic theory over many centuries: see Odin 2001.) But in modern Western aesthetics, it is Kant's discussion that has had a decisive influence. Entirely representative, therefore, is the definition of "the aesthetic attitude" as "disinterested and sympathetic attention to and contemplation of any object of awareness whatever" (Stolnitz 1960: 34–5). (Strictly speaking, Kant himself did not employ "disinterest" to distinguish the aesthetic from the nonaesthetic, but to distinguish, within the realm of what he called "the aesthetic," judgments of beauty and sublimity from those of mere pleasantness or agreeableness.)

Kant explains the "disinterested" attitude as one where the subject is "merely contemplative . . . indifferent as regards the existence of an object," and focusing rather upon its "appearance" (Kant 1966: 43). This is intended to capture the insight that when viewing something "disinterestedly," and so aesthetically, will and desire are in abeyance. When so viewing an object, a person is unconcerned with its practical utility, including its role as a source of intellectual or sensuous gratification. From this Kant draws some questionable conclusions. Not only, he says, is emotion a "hindrance" to "pure" appreciation of beauty but the subject must have no concern with the kind of object he is viewing – that is, with the "concept" under which it falls.

There have been several significant variations on Kant's theme. For Schopenhauer, too, the aesthetic attitude is marked by a withdrawal from our usual practical, willful engagement with things. It is, once again, a type of contemplation, but directed toward the Platonic ideas or forms that lie behind "appearances." In contemplating a building, I am indifferent to its function, attending instead to the ideas of space, gravity, and so on. Edward Bullough characterized the aesthetic attitude in terms of "psychical distance." On a fogbound ship, the aesthete distances himself from the fears and practical concerns of the crew, and concentrates on the strange shapes and forms the fog lends to things. Finally, a number of phenomenologists, elaborating on Kant's talk of "indifference" to actual existence, have argued that the true object of the aesthetic attitude is not an actual object in the world but an "intentional object," existing only for the perceiver. Strictly, therefore, there cannot be a single object toward which both aesthetic and nonaesthetic attitudes may be taken, for in the two cases different kinds of object are being considered.

More dramatic are the implications many twentieth-century artists and critics have drawn from Kant's notion of "disinterest" for the proper ambitions and functions of art. One of these is a marked "formalist" hostility to representational art. In "pure" aesthetic experience, wrote Clive Bell in 1914, a painting must be treated as if it "were not representative of anything" (1947: 32). More generally, there should be no concern for content and meaning since this would contradict the required indifference to matters of existence and conceptualization. A second implication drawn – also in the "formalist" spirit – is that art should not aim to be expressive of emotion. The proper response to art is not an emotional one but something like Kant's "restful contemplation." Finally, "disinterest" has been invoked to support the aestheticist or "art for art's sake" estimation of art. Since people are not viewing something *as* art if they are interested in further benefits to be derived from it, no justification is required for art beyond the satisfaction aesthetic contemplation yields.

It is hard to judge how far Kant would endorse such claims, since the bulk of his discussion is about an aesthetic attitude toward nature, not art. Extrapolation to a Kantian theory of art is uncertain. (What, for example, is the analogue in the case of painting to suspension of interest in a thing's actual existence? Indifference to the existence of the canvas and pigments? Or to that of whatever is depicted?) Some of his remarks indicate that he would not accept these alleged extensions of his idea. Thus, while he indeed insists that judgments of beauty should be "independent of emotion," the feeling of the sublime – itself an aesthetic one – is an "outflow of vital powers" and may be "regarded as emotion" (Kant 1966: 83). And, unlike the aestheticists, Kant offers nonaesthetic justifications for aesthetic experience. Most notably, it is "purposive in reference to the moral feeling," since it "prepares us to love disinterestedly" (Kant 1966: 108; see also Guyer 2005: esp. chs. 8–9.)

The formalist and aestheticist programs are surely not entailed by the bare idea of "disinterest." That my concern with a painting must not be practical (pecuniary, say) nor a "conceptual" one of classification (Pre-Raphaelite, say) cannot entail that paintings should eschew representation. Nor can it entail that I should suspend all inquiry into a painting's "point" or content, representational or otherwise. Nor, except on the crude view that a painting only expresses something extraneous to it (like the artist's mood), is there any reason to proscribe attention to its expressive features, including those which are expressive of emotions. For these features may be discerned as belonging, integrally, to the painting itself.

Finally, the doctrine of "art for art's sake" seems guilty of confusing two questions – that of the proper attitude toward a work of art, and that of why it may be desirable for this attitude to be taken. It is perfectly possible to answer the second question by referring to the moral, psychological, or even religious benefits that may accrue, while insisting that the aesthetic gaze itself must not be *motivated* by such considerations. It is only because it is "disinterested" that, as Kant clearly saw, it can succeed in yielding these further benefits.

Even with these unwarranted extensions blocked, the characterization of the aesthetic attitude as "disinterested" indifference to its objects' actual existence and conceptual type remains implausible. The aesthetic satisfaction yielded when one looks at a cathedral may be due, in part, to a projected sense of its solidity, the coolness of its stone, and the peace that obtains within. This enjoyment could not survive the discovery that the "cathedral" is a cardboard facade used in the latest film about Thomas à Becket, and so cannot be an enjoyment that is "indifferent" to the building's real existence. And while Kant may be consistent in concluding that my appreciation of a cathedral is "impure" to the extent that I am conceiving of it *as* a cathedral, his conclusion betrays a peculiarly restricted notion of aesthetic appreciation. It is my aesthetic sensibility, as much as anything, that is offended by the staging of a circus or bingo competition within the cathedral's walls, and this sensibility is not to be abstracted from my consciousness of the building's spiritual purpose, of the prayers and acts of worship it has housed.

Given such considerations, some philosophers prefer to characterize the aesthetic attitude and disinterest in terms of attention to an object "for its own sake." This would not carry the same connotation of indifference to the object's existence, to the kind of thing it is, and to its representational and expressive features. But the notion of an interest in something "for its own sake" has substance only by way of contrast with other sorts of interest. So the first problem will be to specify these other attitudes and interests. Now, while it is easy enough to exclude such obviously pragmatic interests as those in a painting's monetary value and powers of sexual arousal, there remain many noninstrumental attitudes toward things or people that are not aesthetic. I admire a person of high moral caliber simply for what he or she is; the true scholar seeks knowledge for its own sake.

In some of these cases, it will be said, satisfaction of the interest in question (moral, scholarly, or whatever) does not take the form of *enjoyment*, as it must in the case of aesthetic interest. But if "enjoyment" is understood narrowly, it is hardly obvious that aesthetic satisfaction should always be described as enjoyment. I admire, but do not enjoy, Goya's "black paintings." If, however, "enjoyment" is stretched to cover such instances, it is no

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longer clear that perception of moral quality or the acquisition of new knowledge is not an experience of enjoyment. It might be more promising, then, to employ a variety of criteria for distinguishing these other modes of interest in something "for its own sake" from the aesthetic one. For example, Dufrenne suggests that the difference between love and aesthetic appreciation is that "love requires a kind of union which is not needed by the aesthetic object, because the latter . . . holds [the spectator] at a distance" (1973: 432).

More difficult, arguably, is to distinguish an aesthetic attitude toward, say, a lakeland scene from the simple and utterly familiar experience of passing the time, idly and enjoyably, looking about one, observing the clouds and boats sailing by. This, too, is done for no further reason, but for the mere sake of it, yet "aesthetic" sounds too portentous a term for such a banal occupation.

A further and more radical challenge will question whether "disinterest" or interest in something "for its own sake" is anyway the right place from which to start in trying to characterize the aesthetic attitude. This challenge might focus on the tendency of characterizations like Kant's and Stolnitz's to assimilate the aesthetic attitude to *contemplation*. To begin with, there are paradigm cases of contemplation – "navel-gazing," say – which are not ones of aesthetic appreciation. Second, while some works of art, like Olivier Messiaen's religious works, might reasonably be described as invitations to contemplation, this would be a strange description of, say, the finale of the "Eroica" Symphony. So, at the very least, the contemplation deemed essential to the aesthetic attitude must be contemplation in a very special sense. Third, it has been vigorously argued by Arnold Berleant (1991) that disinterested contemplation is rarely the form taken by aesthetic appreciation of nature. Here, rather, the appreciator is typically participating in and interacting with the landscape, and it is through this engagement, not despite it, that proper appreciation is possible. Berleant goes on to argue that the disinterested contemplation model is a poor one even in the case of art. Typically, neither artworks nor natural scenes are "objects" of detached contemplation, but "occasions" for "active" engagement.

As that final point indicates, much of the problem here has to do with the *passivity* often associated with the contemplative attitude. As one author, echoing many others, puts it, the contemplative spectator "is not concerned to analyze . . . or to ask questions about [an object]" (Stolnitz 1960: 38). But the justification for insisting that this is how spectators should approach works of art is unclear. Typically, they come before works in an active spirit, replete with ambitions to analyze and ask questions, to compare and put into context. "In aesthetic appreciation," Scruton writes, "the object serves as a focal point on which many different thoughts and feelings are brought to bear" (1974: 155). A person looking at *Night Café in Arles* is not looking for the answers to questions about human loneliness available from a sociological tome, but would one dismiss as "nonaesthetic" a response to the painting like "Van Gogh shows what it is like to be lonely, even in the company of others"?

An appropriate comportment toward a work of art requires a certain openness or receptivity toward it, but this point – the element of truth in the idea of "disinterested" contemplation – cannot prohibit approaching a work with active interests, like that of learning how it is to view the world a certain way or how a work embodies the predilections of its creator's times. What matters in such instances – and what makes them instances of aesthetic appreciation, arguably – is the spectator's readiness to employ imagination in attempting to satisfy the interrogative interests with which he or she approaches the work. The painting does not *tell* one about loneliness, nor does a statue *depict* the prejudices of its age. These, rather, are matters an audience must imaginatively reconstruct from the canvas or stone before it.

To understand the aesthetic attitude in terms of a readiness for imagination is, to be sure, to move from one obscure notion to another. But at least imagination incorporates that peculiar blend of will and receptivity, that oscillation between an imposition of structure or meaning and a readiness to be "taken over," which is characteristic of our best moments in the presence of art, or indeed of natural scenes. It may well be that only so much of aesthetic experience can be understood in these terms. And then the conclusion should be that it was mistaken

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to look for a single phenomenon, *the* aesthetic attitude. This conclusion was reached by George Dickie (1974) in his well-known attacks on "the myth of the aesthetic attitude." Not only, he argued, is there no single state of mind one must induce in oneself – through a feat of "psychical distancing," say – in order to appreciate things aesthetically, but it is impossible to understand where "disinterested" aesthetic attention differs from attention *tout court*. People who focus on, say, the cost of the painting or the moral character of its painter are guilty of plain inattention to it, the work itself.

The implication to draw from Dickie's criticism is not, perhaps, that we should eschew all talk of aesthetic attitude. Something, after all, distinguishes the kind of attention we try to pay to paintings from the kind paid, for example, to incoming shells by soldiers in a trench. A more moderate implication would be that we should content ourselves with describing a motley of attitudes, united more by the range of objects or "occasions" – including, of course, works of art – that tend to invite them than by a single, underlying state of mind. If we do so then the ambition, noted at the outset, of *defining* "art" in terms of a particular attitude toward objects must be abandoned, for that would be a circular enterprise.

See also AESTHETIC PROPERTIES; AESTHETICISM; DEFINITION OF "ART"; DICKIE; IMAGINATION; KANT.

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aesthetic education My main aim in this essay is to clarify the concept of aesthetic education, rather than provide an overview of the recent literature on this topic. (See Smith 1998 for an overview.) The concept refers to the theory, content, and practice of teaching and learning related to issues of aesthetic value and aesthetic experience. In educational disciplines it is often used to cover a range of teaching and learning practices that pertain to what we might properly call art education. On the other hand, within philosophical aesthetics, education is largely seen to be an area of application, particularly that of moral education, for philosophical aesthetics. in addition, within the literature more generally, philosophical aesthetics and philosophy of art are often conflated. the point of clarifying the concept of aesthetic education then is to be able to say more clearly what it is, and how it serves toward an education that is not focused narrowly on the creation and appreciation of artworks in themselves. its goal is to educate individuals toward the recognition and enhancement of the role that aesthetics can play in human wellbeing, a role that aesthetics plays in all human activity from cognition, through the development of institutions, to our engagement with natural and built environments. this is not to exclude artworks but to recognize them instead as just one form of human activity that engages us aesthetically.

There is a long history of the role of aesthetics in human development and citizenship education, as in Plato's *Symposium* and *The Republic*, and Aristotle's *Poetics*, within the Western philosophical tradition. Regardless of whether these arguments defend an education in the arts, or argue against them, they rest on the assumption that aesthetic education bears a strong relationship to our emotional lives

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and moral and political development. Within non-Western aesthetics, too, a connection between the arts and the moral and political realms is explicit. For example, drama, within the Indian tradition, as in the Greek, was a key vehicle for the imparting of moral and political values. Not surprisingly, then, in these traditions we see the early development of philosophical aesthetics in the writings of Bratahari and Aristotle. More recently, we see similar attempts at linking aesthetics with ethics and moral education, as, for example, Marcia M. Eaton's *Aesthetics and the Good Life* (1989). Jenefer Robinson (1995), taking a more psychological approach, has argued for an education of the emotions through an engagement with the arts that would facilitate moral education.

While the cognitive value of the arts was addressed by the early philosophers, it is with Kant, building on Alexander Baumgarten, and responding in part to David Hume, that we see the emergence of modern aesthetics. With the development of modern aesthetics we see an increase in the interest of aesthetics as an aspect of human cognition. This interest has grown considerably in significance with developments in neuroscience (Zeki 2000). David Hume's essay "Of the Standard of Taste" is a classic within aesthetic education but it remains strongly rooted in art. For Hume, the question is how we can set a standard for judgments of taste. For Kant, on the other hand, in making aesthetic judgments we make a determination about human cognition rather than about the object itself. Aesthetic pleasure is our *felt awareness* that the appearance of the object conforms to the most basic conditions of human cognition.

Roughly the argument is that there are structures or categories of the mind that affect what we perceive and construct what we know. For example, in the case of vision "seeing" does not entail a passive reception of perceptual information. Rather, "seeing" is an active process that brings our cognitive apparatus and the visual signal together to construct what we see. For Kant, aesthetics, the cognitive organization of perceptual information, is fundamental to human animals. Hence, aesthetic experiences are not limited to those with refined sensibilities as Hume might have it. Rather, they are available to all. What in particular is appreciated is a matter of taste, and hence of culture and education. Much of our contemporary philosophical interest in environmental aesthetics could turn to Kant, with some profit, in thinking about aesthetic education and about human development and wellbeing. Moreover, taking a Kantian view of aesthetics is invaluable in understanding formalism, and as Nick Zangwill (2001) so persuasively argues, providing us with a systematic understanding of the relation between aesthetic properties and experience. Above all, taking a Kantian approach makes us aware of the role that aesthetics, as human cognition, plays in all human activity. This, too, is a relatively underdeveloped area within aesthetic education.

Perhaps there is no single philosopher more important to aesthetic education than John Dewey. His *Art as Experience*, a book based on the William James Lectures that he delivered at Harvard University in 1931, lays out the role that aesthetics plays in the development of humans, as complex biological organisms, adapted to their environment.

Dewey had always stressed the importance of recognizing the significance and integrity of all aspects of human experience. His repeated complaint against the partiality and bias of the philosophical tradition expresses this theme. Consistent with this theme, Dewey took account of qualitative immediacy in *Experience and Nature*, and incorporated it into his view of the developmental nature of experience. It is in the enjoyment of the immediacy of an integration and harmonization of meanings, in the "consummatory phase" of experience that, in Dewey's view, the fruition of the readaptation of the individual to her environment is realized.

These central themes are enriched and deepened in *Art as Experience*, making it one of Dewey's most significant works. Furthermore, the roots of aesthetic experience lie, he argues, in commonplace experience, in the consummatory experiences that are ubiquitous in the course of human life.

Like Kant, Dewey argues against the conceit cherished by some art enthusiasts that aesthetic enjoyment is the privileged endowment of the few. While Kant remains agnostic regarding the prescription of certain aesthetic experiences over others, Dewey thinks that it is

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precisely because humans are aesthetically predisposed that certain experiences should be valued over others, so that individuals do not fill this need through less than worthy artworks. While he does not offer any criteria as such for preferring some works or experiences over others, drawing on his overall philosophy it is safe to say that only those aesthetic experiences would be considered educative that foster more meaningful experiences.

More importantly, for Dewey, an "experience" coalesces into an immediately enjoyed qualitative unity of meanings and values drawn from previous experience and present circumstances. Life itself takes on an aesthetic quality and this is what Dewey calls having an experience.

For Dewey, the creative work of the artist, broadly speaking, is not unique. It is a process that requires an intelligent use of materials, the imaginative development of possible solutions to problems issuing in a reconstruction of experience that affords immediate satisfaction. This process, found in the creative work of artists, is also to be found in all intelligent and creative human activity. What distinguishes artistic creation is the relative stress laid upon the immediate enjoyment of unified qualitative complexity as the rationalizing aim of the activity itself, and the ability of the artist to achieve this aim by marshaling and refining the massive resources of human life, meanings, and values. Although Dewey insisted that emotion is not the significant content of the work of art, he clearly understands it to be the crucial tool of the artist's creative activity.

Dewey's aesthetic theory requires education, both formal and informal, to build up these resources that help create artworks, but requires aesthetic education in this sense to appreciate them too. For Dewey, accounts of aesthetic appreciation that portray the artist as an active creator and the audience as passive receiver are flawed. In his view, both the artist and audience are active in producing and appreciating artworks that afford us aesthetic experience.

It is commonplace to think that the senses play a key role in artistic creation and aesthetic appreciation. Dewey, like Kant, however, argues against the view, stemming historically from the sensationalistic empiricism of David Hume, who interprets the content of sense experience simply in terms of the traditionally codified list of sense qualities. Such qualities are not divorced from an individual's history. Rather, they rely on our mental structures and content gained through experiences. Unlike Kant, however, Dewey highlights the role of education in building a content rich in meanings from past experience. Culture is invaluable to the making of such a fund of meanings.

Ever concerned with the interrelationships between the various domains of human activity and interest, Dewey ends *Art as Experience* with a chapter devoted to the social implications of the arts. Because art has its roots in the consummatory values experienced in the course of human life, its values have an affinity to commonplace values, an affinity that gives the arts a critical role in relation to prevailing social conditions. Dewey's specific target is the conditions of workers in industrialized society, conditions that force upon the worker the performance of repetitive tasks that are devoid of personal interest and afford no satisfaction in personal accomplishment. That is, assembly-line routines of work are impoverished aesthetically. Such impoverishment is not necessarily tied to labor as such, as Dewey demonstrates with examples like that of riveters setting up a rhythm in catching and using hot rivets as they build a skyscraper. It is management that needs to be made aware – educated – toward the role that aesthetics plays in all human activity in order to make it meaningful and worthwhile.

Richard Shusterman (2008) has extended and deepened Dewey's aesthetics through his theory of aesthetics related to the body – "somaesthetics." Furthermore, he has extended the educational repertoire of artworks worthy of producing meaningful experiences by including those we might typically not consider worthwhile even though they carry meaning for vast segments of our society. In this he remains true to Dewey's democratic commitments. Arnold Berleant (1997) and Yuriko Saito (2007), on the other hand, have turned their attention to the aesthetic dimensions of our natural and built environments and to everyday life. Dewey's ubiquitous theory of aesthetics, like Kant's cognitive theory, recognizes the role of aesthetics in all human activity and not only in the making and appreciating of

high art but also nonart like the environment and the everyday. Aesthetic education in this case might mean not only the enhancing of our awareness of this dimension of our activities and experiences but also serving more humbly, but not less importantly, as a reminder of its pervasive presence.

See also AESTHETIC PROPERTIES; AESTHETICS OF THE EVERYDAY; COGNITIVE VALUE OF ART; DEWEY; HUME; INDIAN AESTHETICS; KANT; MORALITY AND ART.

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PRADEEP A. DHILLON

aesthetic judgment There have been a huge number of attempts to understand the nature of aesthetic judgment. These are placed in two broad categories, and called here objectivism and subjectivism.

SIMPLE OBJECTIVISM

According to a simple objectivism, the truth of an aesthetic judgment is wholly determined by whether certain qualities or relations exist in the object. An important corollary of this account is that when a spectator affirms that an object is, for instance, beautiful, his judgment must imply that everyone who judges the object aesthetically ought to find it beautiful. This implication holds because what he is claiming is only that the object has certain qualities arranged in a given way. If the original judgment is correct, it follows that anyone else ought to judge in the same way.

Simple objectivism has been subjected to several criticisms. Many have found it counterintuitive that one can, in theory, decisively settle the beauty of an object by reference to rules of composition alone. Whatever aesthetic rule of composition is proposed, it is never self-contradictory to accept that the object unequivocally falls under the rule, yet deny that it is beautiful.

Second, the analysis leaves no intrinsic role for a spectator's feelings in the determination of beauty. Admittedly, a defender of the analysis can, and very probably will, allow that the judgment is normally *accompanied* by a feeling of pleasure or displeasure, but an object's beauty exists quite independently of any spectator's feelings. Finally, the evaluative force of the judgment is not adequately accounted for: one is not merely judging that the object possesses certain properties disposed in a given way, but also that it *merits* attention.

SIMPLE AND SOPHISTICATED SUBJECTIVISM

According to simple subjectivism, the correctness of an aesthetic judgment is determined by the pleasure or displeasure that perception of the object arouses in any given spectator. This implies that if, under the same circumstances, one individual judges that an object is beautiful and another judges that it is not, they could never be contradicting each other. Yet it seems evident that at least sometimes they could be. Moreover, an aesthetic judgment is made on the basis of our perception of features in the object. We are normally expected to show that the judgment rests on features that render our response a *justifiable* one. This is not consistent with the judgment depending only on feelings of pleasure or displeasure the perception of the object occasions in any spectator.

In the light of these and other criticisms, subjectivists have usually accepted that the aesthetic judgment cannot be a bare statement of personal liking or disliking. A more sophisticated subjectivist account was defended by Hume, and most subsequent subjectivist theories have remained greatly indebted to it. The

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basic idea is often introduced by seeking to draw an analogy between color judgments and aesthetic judgments. Even those who construe an object's color as nothing more than an occurrence in the observer's mind allow that there are standards for assessing the appropriateness of particular color judgments. These standards depend on: (1) similar general principles governing most people's color perception, and our accepting that those within the consensus who can make maximum discriminations between colors have the best color vision; (2) widespread agreement among the maximum discriminators about the precise colors of given objects. Similarly, the sophisticated subjectivist urges, we should think of standards in art criticism as resting on: (1) the same, or nearly the same, general principles governing most people's aesthetic taste, and our acknowledging that those within this majority who are capable of experiencing the fullest and most discriminating range of contemplative feelings have the most perfect taste; (2) a large measure of agreement among the maximum discriminators about the precise feelings that are produced by the particular qualities and relations of objects.

If the subjectivists are to make good this analogy, they will need to defend the belief that the majority of people *are* governed by similar principles of taste. They attempt to do this by pointing to the long-running survival of certain admired works among diverse nations; and by arguing that most disagreements are due to factors like prejudice or lack of suitable education.

Even allowing that the analogy with colors can survive the existence of aesthetic disagreement, it still fails to explain why we should talk of the beauties or blemishes of *objects* (the feelings of pleasure/displeasure manifestly belong to the subjects judging). To meet this objection, the sophisticated subjectivist refers to those features of objects, the awareness of which causes the majority's contemplative feelings of pleasure or displeasure. He insists that the capacity to notice intricate relationships between the parts of a complex work of art or natural object is, as a matter of fact, a causally necessary condition for the fullest experience of the appropriate feelings. Accordingly, we learn that in order to *justify* our responses as aesthetic ones, they need to be grounded in the awareness of such features. These features become denominated the "beauties" or "blemishes" of objects, despite their existence being dependent on the sensibilities of discriminating spectators. On this account, any defensible aesthetic rules of composition will simply be empirical generalizations, based on the discovery that features of a certain kind have been found to please discriminating spectators in a variety of different objects.

Sophisticated subjectivism incorporates many of the properties that have been widely seen as central to aesthetic appreciation. It permits a prominent role to reasoning and the comparison of cases in the justification of aesthetic judgments, at least in the finer arts; yet it gives to contemplative feelings of pleasure or displeasure the ultimate determining ground of the judgment. And since any acknowledged general rules are only contingent, it can explain why it is never self-contradictory to admit that certain features fall under an accepted rule, while also denying that they are beautiful. Furthermore, it can account for why we place such a value on aesthetic appreciation: the discriminating feelings, on which judgments in the finer arts depend, are of an intrinsically satisfying nature. Also they have a strong tendency (together with the analytical skill required for their experience) to civilize a person's attitude toward moral and intellectual matters. Since both these consequences are highly desirable, it is not surprising that aesthetic discrimination should be considered an admirable quality and its objects worthy of appreciation.

On the other hand, a subjectivist cannot allow that an aesthetic judgment about any given object claims the *necessary* agreement of everyone. At best, the aesthetic judgment can lay claim only to a contingent universality, or near-universality, based on an *empirical* generalization concerning the sensibilities of human beings. To those of us whose sensibilities may happen to be governed by totally different principles from the majority's, the judgments of discriminating spectators within that majority can have no logical force.

SOPHISTICATED OBJECTIVISM

This position, which was originally developed by Kant, shares with simple objectivism the view that the judgment of taste lays claim to

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the necessary agreement of everyone without exception, but it shares with sophisticated subjectivism the view that its determining ground must always be the feeling of contemplative pleasure or displeasure. Even if this is, so far as it goes, a correct analysis of the aesthetic judgment, its appearance of having one's cake and eating it raises very acutely the question of whether application of the judgment can ever be justified.

In Kant's case, the justification is intimately linked with his metaphysics. Two people can only be perceiving the same object insofar as they possess the same faculties of understanding and imagination, operating identically in both of them. The feeling of contemplative pleasure or displeasure, by which we determine the aesthetic judgment, also has to arise from the interlocking of these two faculties in an act of perception. We correctly pronounce an object to be beautiful if, and only if, in an act of purely reflective perception upon the relations holding among its formal features, we find – by means of the ensuing feeling – that the imagination is permitted maximum freedom from the rule-governed constraints of the understanding. On this account, it is *impossible* for two people to be perceiving the same object, while making different, equally well-grounded, aesthetic judgments. It is impossible because we make a well-grounded aesthetic judgment on the basis of a feeling that depends on an identical use of necessarily shared perceptual faculties. (Differences in aesthetic judgment arise because people seldom reach a decision solely by allowing the imagination its free play.)

So although we decide upon an object's beauty on the basis of feeling, Kant thinks that what we are thereby estimating is the extent to which the object's mere form or design gives scope to the imagination's free play. But there can be no discoverable general rules for establishing this, precisely because the imagination is here maximally *un*constrained by the faculty of rules (the understanding). Only if we had access to the ground of all experience – the supersensible world – would it be possible to discover the principles governing the free play of the imagination; and, hence, to determine prior to and independently of feeling the extent of an object's beauty. Failing, as we do, to achieve this insight into the supersensible, each of us can only estimate beauty by means of his own individual feeling.

Kant's theory belongs in the objectivist camp because of his insistence that a well-founded aesthetic judgment ultimately rests on (unknown) principles that obtain independently of any spectator's feelings. Arguably, his position rests on an unjustified metaphysical structure; relatedly, it relies on a narrow formalist conception of beauty. Still, Kant's analysis raises a serious problem for the subjectivist, which is to account for the persisting contention that the aesthetic judgment claims the necessary agreement of everyone without exception.

For the subjectivist, any inclination to claim strict universality for the aesthetic judgment arises from explicable delusion: because the exercise of judgment, especially in the finer arts, requires extensive knowledge and reflection, it is easy to be misled into thinking that the judgment depends wholly on factors belonging to the mere perception of the object (especially since the feelings resulting from careful and practiced aesthetic reflection are frequently so comparatively unobtrusive); and, under such a misapprehension, one will naturally take it that the verdict claims strict universality. In reality, the most that can be claimed is a universality covering all who, *as a matter of fact*, possess a similar sensibility.

FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS

How convincing is the sophisticated subjectivist's position? On two counts, it has been strenuously disputed.

First, it has been held that the spectator must be the final authority on what aspects of an object ground his response. It is always the spectator himself, on the basis of his own experience of the aesthetic object, who must willingly authorize any suggestions from others before they can be considered correct. Yet – the argument runs – on the supposition that the connection between object and response is a causal one, no authorization by the person concerned would be required. Second, it has been held that although the spectator is the final authority on the ground of his response, that response can only be justified as an *aesthetic* one if the reasons for it appropriately fall under aesthetic rules. Perhaps the rules themselves

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were first laid down because the features that answered to them satisfied the sensibilities of influential people. Whatever their origins, only judgments in accord with these rules are well founded. They have become a constitutive element in manifesting aesthetic appreciation. Consequently, the connection between response and object, insofar as the response is to be thought of as genuinely aesthetic, cannot be merely contingent. If it were, one could identify that response *independently* of knowing whether its grounds were in accord with aesthetic rules. What is crucial is that there exists a fundamental framework of given rules, within which alone it is possible to talk of the making, defending, and criticizing of particular aesthetic judgments.

This dual attack on subjectivism, which derives from the work of Wittgenstein, evidently has affinities with Kant's position. It defends the strict universality of the aesthetic judgment, and it affirms an internal, and not a merely contingent, relation between the spectator's perception of the object and his making an aesthetic judgment.

Despite its ingenuity, it is doubtful whether the attack's central claim – that the connection between object and spectator's response is essentially noncontingent – should be conceded. Admittedly, it does seem right to say that the spectator must willingly authorize any suggestion as to the precise reason for his satisfaction or dissatisfaction, before that suggestion can be considered correct (as the first criticism of subjectivism contended). At the same time, it also seems right to say that any precise identification by him of the ground of his feeling is subject to a familiar form of causal falsification.

For example, we question whether certain features can be the real reason for a spectator's dissatisfaction with an object (even though he identified them as such) if, on another, similar, occasion, their presence, though noted, did not interfere with his pleasure. So whereas the spectator may be able to *rule out* suggestions as to the reason for his response, he cannot justifiably continue to *affirm* that such and such features are the real reason for that response, if it can be shown that his awareness of them formed an insignificant part of its cause.

Once it is admitted that the features which figure as the real reason for a spectator's pleasure or displeasure do, after all, carry a causal implication, it would be implausible to hold that any currently accepted aesthetic rules form an immovable framework that serves to define the possible justifiable content of aesthetic judgments (as the second criticism of subjectivism contended). For suppose it is discovered that certain features of an object, although fully in accord with an accepted aesthetic rule, are not the cause of the response of discriminating spectators, despite being picked out by them as its ground; and suppose, further, that other features which they also perceived were acting as the cause. Since it is implied that a spectator's awareness of the properties named in an aesthetic explanation cause his response, this discovery would force a change in the rules, so that they did henceforth pick out the object's causally efficacious features. It follows that aesthetic rules are ultimately dependent on the sensibilities of human beings, in the very manner that the sophisticated subjectivist maintains.

The subjectivist has argued forcefully that, without a causal implication to aesthetic reason giving, there can be no conceivable case where the assignment of aesthetic value would be justified. It turns out, therefore, that if the objectivist tries to analyze the aesthetic judgment without the causal implication, he will be in grave danger of having to deny that its application ever entails an evaluation. This is an absurd consequence. It raises, again, a difficulty that we encountered in connection with simple objectivism: namely, whether an objectivist can provide a comprehensible account of aesthetic value. Unless such an account is forthcoming, no persuasive alternative to sophisticated subjectivism appears to be available; and we shall just have to confess that there is an element of delusion, a tendency to affirm a stricter universality than can be warranted, in our application of the aesthetic judgment.

See also AESTHETIC PLEASURE; BEAUTY; HUME; KANT; OBJECTIVITY AND REALISM IN AESTHETICS; RELATIVISM; TASTE; THEORIES OF ART; WITTGENSTEIN.

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aesthetic pleasure When is pleasure in an object properly denominated "aesthetic"? The characterization of aesthetic pleasure is something that almost every theorist of the aesthetic has attempted. For such a characterization to be accounted a success, it should illuminate the relation between aesthetic pleasure and the taking of an aesthetic attitude to works of art, and make intelligible how aesthetic pleasure can be taken in what are usually labeled nonaesthetic aspects of an item – for instance, its cognitive content, moral import, or political message – without thereby turning into pleasure of a nonaesthetic sort.

Before venturing my proposal, I review briefly some of the prominent suggestions that the tradition of aesthetic thought has thrown up so far. In Kant's influential treatment, aesthetic pleasure is characterized as the by-product of a nonconceptual and disinterested judging, whose focus is exclusively the formal purposiveness of the object judged. In being nonconceptual it is distinguished from pleasure taken in an object as good, since such a judgment always presupposes a concept of the object as of some kind or other. In being disinterested – that is, not grounded in the subject's personal desires, needs, or susceptibilities – it is distinguished (or so Kant believed) from sensory pleasures such as those of a warm bath or the taste of raspberry. In deriving from an impression of purposiveness – an impression which, in stimulating imagination and understanding to an unaccustomed free play, directly gives rise to the pleasure in question – aesthetic pleasure is shown to reside in forms or appearances per se, and not in an object's real-world status or connections.

Different strands of this complex conception have been stressed by subsequent writers. Schopenhauer agreed with Kant that the pleasure in beholding an object aesthetically is a disinterested one, but claimed that its focus is not an object's pure form as such in relation to the cognitive faculties, but rather some metaphysical *idea* inherent in an object which, in drawing the subject's attention, lifts him temporarily out of the painful striving to which he, as a spatiotemporally bound individual bundle of will, is ordinarily condemned. In a similar vein, Bullough proposed that such pleasure issues upon the subject's metaphorically *distancing* any object of perception, in the sense of bracketing all of its life implications, thus putting the subject's practical self "out of gear" and clearing a space for rapt absorption. Others in the twentieth century, such as Eliseo Vivas and Jerome Stolnitz, have emphasized the *intransitivity* of the mode of attention that yields aesthetic pleasure, by which is meant its not going beyond the object but instead terminating on it.

The formalist strand in Kant's conception has been taken up in different ways in the twentieth century by Clive Bell, J. O. Urmson, and Monroe C. Beardsley. Bell claimed that pleasurable aesthetic emotion is the result solely of contemplation of an object's *significant form*. It is unclear, however, whether Bell had any intelligible, noncircular account to give of when a form is significant, and so the cash value of Bell's pronouncement seems to be just that form, narrowly construed – that is, the pure arrangement of elements in a medium – is the sole legitimate object of aesthetic experience. More liberally, Urmson has suggested that specifically aesthetic pleasure is pleasure deriving from a concern with appearances

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as such. On such a suggestion the aesthetic includes, but is not restricted to, the narrowly formal. Relatedly, Beardsley has proposed that aesthetic pleasure be defined as pleasure taken in either an object's formal qualities (for instance, balance, unity, tension) or its regional qualities – that is, gestalt qualities of character or expression which attach to structured wholes (for instance, vivacity, serenity, gloominess, grace).

That aesthetic pleasure derives from a wholly nonconceptual engagement with an object, as Kant would have it, has not been as readily accepted as some other parts of his theory. What the balance of thought and feeling in aesthetic experience is or should be was a prominent topic for critical discussion in the twentieth century. Roger Scruton, for instance, has urged that aesthetic experience and the satisfaction inherent in it is necessarily permeated by thought or imagination – that such experience always involves conceptions of objects, of their features, under certain descriptions. An object not consciously construed in one fashion or another cannot, for Scruton, be an object in which one is finding aesthetic, as opposed to merely sensational or instinctive, satisfaction.

I propose the following characterization of aesthetic pleasure. *Pleasure in an object is aesthetic when it derives from apprehension of and reflection on the object's individual character and content, both for itself and, at least in central cases, in relation to the structural base on which such character and content rest*. That is to say, to appreciate something aesthetically is characteristically to attend not only to its forms, qualities, and meanings for their own sakes, but also to the way in which all those things emerge from the particular set of low-level perceptual features that constitute the object on a nonaesthetic plane. We apprehend the character and content of items as anchored in and arising from the specific structure that constitutes it on a primary observational level. Content and character are supervenient on such structure, and appreciation of them, if properly aesthetic, involves awareness of that dependency. To appreciate an object's inherent properties aesthetically is to experience them, minimally, as properties of the individual in question, but also typically as bound up with and inseparable from its basic perceptual configuration.

Especially if a characterization of aesthetic pleasure is to be adequate to our interest in art, it will have to be roughly of the sort I have sketched. Aesthetic pleasure is supposed to be both individualizing and capable of being taken in an object's cognitive and moral aspect, without becoming a fortiori purely cognitive or moral satisfaction. Now, it seems that what is most distinctive about an artwork, and possibly the only thing for which uniqueness might be claimed, is not its artistic character or content per se, but the specific complex of the work's character and content with the particular perceptual substructure that supports it. So, insofar as that is what is attended to, interest in an object carries to what is maximally distinctive about it. And where a work has a prominent intellectual or moral or political content, pleasure in this remains recognizably aesthetic when it results not so much from acquisition of some portion of scientific knowledge or ethical insight or political wisdom per se, but from appreciation of the *manner* in which these are embodied in and communicated by the work's specific elements and organization.

Aesthetic satisfaction in Thomas Mann's *Death in Venice*, for instance, is to be derived from more than its beauty of language, the strikingness of its images, or even the downward curve of its sad narrative; it is had as well in its moral mediation of life and art, and in its symbolism of death and disintegration. But the satisfaction is properly aesthetic in these latter cases precisely when such symbolic or moral content is apprehended in and through the body of the literary work itself – its sentences, paragraphs, and fictive events – and not as something abstractable from it. Aesthetic pleasure in Matisse's *The Red Studio* is not exhausted in delectation of its shapes, planes, and colors; it includes, for one thing, delight in the originality of Matisse's handling of space. But such delight is inseparable from a conception of what that handling amounts to, and how it is based in, or realized by, the particular choices of shape, plane, and color before one.

Aesthetic appreciation of art thus always acknowledges the vehicle of the work as essential, and never focuses merely on detachable meanings or effects. It is a signal advantage of the characterization outlined here that it ensures both that aesthetic pleasure is individualizing or

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work-centered, and that aesthetic pleasure can be taken in what are, on a traditional reckoning, nonaesthetic aspects of a work, without thereby becoming nonaesthetic.

How, though, are aesthetic pleasures differentiated from sensory and from intellectual ones? When is pleasure in a flavor, for example, aesthetic rather than merely sensory? It seems natural to suggest that what is required is some grasp of the flavor for the quality it is, perhaps in opposition to other flavors not then present, and/or of the flavor as itself founded on other discriminable qualities. To appreciate the taste of raspberry aesthetically is to register not only the brute taste, but also, so to speak, its form – that is, its relation to other, simpler qualities in the taste, or to ones it contrasts with in imagination. A purely sensory pleasure in raspberry taste, insofar as this is possible, would neither focus on the flavor for what it distinctively is nor involve awareness of relationships and dependencies within the experience as a whole. On the other hand, as already remarked, since paradigm aesthetic pleasures always involve an appreciation of contents-in-relation-to-vehicles-or-supports, then although necessarily involving thought of a kind, they do not collapse automatically into pure intellectual pleasures, in which satisfaction is grounded in the acquisition of knowledge or insight as such, for themselves, independent of how they are embodied or conveyed.

Turning now to nature, how is aesthetic pleasure in that related intelligibly to aesthetic pleasure in art? I suggest that, with nature as well as art, the pleasure is usually taken in its experienceable aspects, coupled with a vivid awareness both of the interrelations of such aspects and of their groundedness in the object's structure, history, or function. Aesthetic pleasure in natural objects, like aesthetic pleasure in works of art, is typically a multilevel affair, involving reflection not only on appearances per se, but on the constitution of such appearances and the interaction between higher-order perceptions. The shapes, colors, and expressivenesses of natural objects are appreciated in their complex relation to one another and to the concepts under which we identify such objects. For instance, a landscape scene might provide aesthetic pleasure not solely in its appearance but in the recognition of this as resulting from geological forces along with patterns of human use.

Some theorists, such as Arthur C. Danto and Nelson Goodman, have stressed the great difference in kind between aesthetic response to nature and to art, while other theorists, such as Richard Wollheim and Anthony Savile, have even proposed that the aesthetic interest in art is logically prior to that in nature, the latter being properly analyzed in terms of the former. While recognizing that there may be two species of aesthetic response here, I suspect there is no priority either way. In any event, my concern has been only to characterize aesthetic satisfaction in such a way as to cover both.

It is clear that aesthetic pleasure as characterized so far in this article comprises more than pleasure in aesthetic qualities per se – that is, those that Frank Sibley has famously identified – and, equally, more than pleasure in mere appearances. Of course, when one is after aesthetic gratification one is interested in appearances, but usually one is equally interested in how, on a phenomenological plane, such appearances are generated; or, alternatively, how aesthetic qualities emerge from an object's structure. Somewhat legislatively, I have sought a notion which would make aesthetic pleasure, where works of art are concerned, something closer to pleasure proper to something as art – that is to say, art-appropriate pleasure. In this broader, art-conscious sense, the relationship of substructure and superstructure in the total impression that an object affords is necessarily of concern when an object is approached aesthetically.

Of course we may still acknowledge, in a traditional vein, a more basic notion of aesthetic pleasure as pleasure taken in sensory or perceptual properties as such, for example, colors, sounds, or shapes, immediately experienced (see Stecker 2005: 46–7). And indeed I framed my proposed characterization of aesthetic pleasure earlier in this essay so as to allow for such cases at the margin, insisting only that in *central* instances of aesthetic pleasure, attention must carry to relationships of dependence between higher-order and lower-order qualities as experienced. And in line with that more basic notion of aesthetic pleasure, appreciation in which awareness of relationships among experienced qualities at different levels was

wholly absent might yet be accountable as aesthetic, provided there is an element of focusing on such qualities for what they are, so as to prevent such pleasure from collapsing into purely sensory pleasure. But we must not lose sight of the fact that such appreciation, even if minimally qualifiable as aesthetic, is simply too thin to do justice to art and nature appreciation as such, and that it is two-level, and not one-level, appreciation that should be seen as the paradigm of aesthetic appreciation. Accordingly, it seems useful to have articulated a notion of aesthetic pleasure sufficiently rich to respect the complex contents of its primary objects, art and nature.

Two last points. First, in order to have a notion of aesthetic appreciation applicable to artworks and natural phenomena alike, I invoked in my characterization none of the ingredients specific to the appreciation of art, such as concern with style, personality, intention, and design. The result is a notion that seems to fit what goes on when we regard a natural phenomenon as more than just a source of sensation, but without necessarily treating it as artwork *manqué*. The aesthetic appreciation of nature requires not only attention to manifest appearances but a concern with their perceptual and conceptual underpinnings.

Second, my characterization has the virtue, ironically, of preserving a connection between the aesthetic and the formal in art, reminiscent of Kant, but without reducing the aesthetic to the formal narrowly construed – for instance, as pattern in space or time. For in deriving gratification from the unique *manner* in which a work's content and character, whatever they might comprise, are rooted in and emerge from the work's form *sensu stricto* – the particular arrangement of elements (colors, sounds, words, movements, gestures) through which it conveys whatever else it does – one is focused on something which could fairly well be described as formal, in a wide sense.

Pleasure in an artwork is aesthetic when, whatever aspects of it are attended to, be they psychological or political or polemical, there is also attention to the *relation* between content and form – between what a work expresses or signifies, and the means it uses to do so. This relation, which is the *sine qua non* of aesthetic pleasure in art, is quite obviously a kind of higher form – which means that Kant, in an oblique fashion, was right about aesthetic pleasure after all.

See also AESTHETIC ATTITUDE; AESTHETIC JUDGMENT; AESTHETIC PROPERTIES; AESTHETICS OF THE ENVIRONMENT; BELL; FORMALISM; KANT; SCHOPENHAUER.

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JERROLD LEVINSON

aesthetic properties A definition or analysis of aesthetic properties may best be approached by first listing those properties and types of properties that are typically thought to be aesthetic when ascribed to works of art;

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1 pure value properties: being beautiful, sublime, ugly;
2 formal qualities: being balanced, tightly knit, graceful;
3 emotion properties: being sad, joyful, angry;
4 behavioral properties: being bouncy, daring, sluggish;
5 evocative qualities: being powerful, boring, amusing;
6 representational qualities: being true-to-life, distorted, realistic;
7 second-order perceptual properties: being vivid or pure (said of colors or tones);
8 historically related properties: being original, bold, derivative.

This list, especially with its inclusion of (8), takes a broader view of aesthetic properties than the one traditionally adopted. The reasons for including such properties as originality or staleness in the list are, first, that they contribute to the value of artworks qua artworks and, second, that, despite not being directly perceived, they influence the ways knowledgeable viewers perceive or experience the works.

Is there any common characteristic of these various properties by which they are all recognized as aesthetic qualities? Several proposals may seem promising, but may be dismissed by counterexample. It might be thought that these are all perceptible properties of the works themselves. But not all the qualities listed above can be perceived in the works themselves. One could not perceive whether a representational work was true to life without knowing the model or type of model represented; one could not know that a work was original without knowing the tradition. Aesthetic properties have also been called regional qualities (Beardsley 1973), qualities of complexes that emerge from qualities of their parts, but vividness of color and purity of tone are just qualities of single colors or tones. Many of the properties in the above list – for example, the emotion and behavior properties – are ascribed literally to humans and perhaps only metaphorically to artworks. But this is not true of the formal or representational properties.

Another influential suggestion has been that aesthetic properties are those that require taste to be perceived (Sibley 1959). Ordinary perceivers do not see sadness, balance, power, and realism in artworks as readily as they perceive redness or squareness. It seems that they must be more sensitive or knowledgeable to see the former qualities; hence the suggestion that they require taste. But the traditional concept of taste has suggested a special faculty akin to moral intuition. Without some independent description of how the faculty is supposed to work, its existence is no more plausible in the one case than in the other. Furthermore, there are qualities in our list that do not require taste to be perceived (e.g., vividness in color).

Those qualities that do seem to require taste for their appreciation need not lead us to posit a special faculty. The apparent need for taste can be explained, first, by the fact that many of the qualities in question are complex relations. We may require considerable exposure, or training, before we become capable of recognizing such relations in works of art. Second, most of the qualities mentioned in our list are at least partly evaluative. To call an artwork daring, powerful, or vivid is to suggest a positive evaluation of it. To call it sluggish, boring, or drab is to suggest a negative evaluation.

Thus, ascription of these properties expresses some set of aesthetic values. This fact points to a plausible general criterion for identifying aesthetic properties: they are those that contribute to the aesthetic values of artworks (or, in some cases, to the aesthetic values of natural objects) (Beardsley 1973). It has also been plausibly suggested that aesthetic properties are those that make artifacts works of art, or that help to determine what kinds of artworks they are (Sparshott 1982: 478). These two criteria may well be related if "work of art" is itself a partly evaluative concept in at least one of its definitions, so that to call something a work of art is to imply, for example, that it is worthy of sustained perceptual attention. We might conclude that works of art are objects created and perceived for their aesthetic values, and that aesthetic properties are those that contribute to such values. In considering this analysis, we must not forget that there are negative evaluative properties on the list as well. If being ugly, boring, distorted, or dull contribute to an object's value, they normally contribute only to negative value (though not always, e.g., a work's ugliness may contribute to its power or realism).

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There are also qualities, such as emotion qualities like sadness, that seem to be evaluatively neutral. It will be argued below that such properties do contribute to aesthetic value, albeit more indirectly or less obviously than some of the others.

If we restrict attention to the positively evaluative properties, it might seem that artists would intend to build as many as possible into their works, and that their works would be better the more such properties they have. But this idea is too simple, since many of these properties do not blend well in particular contexts. In the case of both positive and negative evaluative properties, it is part of the task of critics to point them out and to justify their claims in this regard.

Most of the qualities listed are both relational and (partly) evaluative. In principle, it should be possible to analyze particular references to such properties (although not the property types themselves) into evaluative and descriptive components. A crucial question concerns the relation between these components. The properties on our list differ among themselves in the degree to which they always include (in their instantiations) specific evaluative or descriptive aspects.

These distinctions can be brought out by analyses of the following form: "object *O* has aesthetic property *P*" means "*O* is such as to elicit response of kind *R* in ideal viewers of kind *V* in virtue of its more basic properties *B*." If *P* is evaluative, then *R* will be positive or negative, often involving pleasure or displeasure. *V* will almost always include characteristics such as being knowledgeable of the kind of artworks to which *O* belongs, being unbiased or disinterested, and being sensitive enough to react to properties of type *B*. *B* may be more broadly or narrowly specified. Although the evocative qualities on the initial list most clearly involve reactions of observers, this analysis views many of the other properties there as having similar structure. Ascribing such properties to an object expresses a positive or negative response, suggests that others ought to share the response (ought to approximate to the ideal viewer), and points to certain more or less specific objective properties of the object.

Beauty, for example, is nonspecific on the objective side, but always elicits a pleasurable response in sensitive observers. Philosophers have not always agreed that the objective side of beauty cannot be specified. Perhaps the best-known attempt to do so was that of Hutcheson (1725), who held that it is always uniformity amid variety. But all such attempts fall to counterexamples, in this case ordered complex objects that do not appear beautiful. Although *B* (from the above formula) is therefore unspecified in the case of beauty, there will always be some properties – usually formal relations – in virtue of which an object is beautiful. Sometimes these more basic properties will themselves be evaluative properties. For example, an artwork may be beautiful in virtue of its grace or power. It may in turn be powerful in virtue of its piercing pathos or graceful in virtue of its smooth lines. A property such as grace, while still generally positively evaluative, is more specific on its objective side. "Graceful" always refers to formal qualities that suggest smooth and effortless movements. Graceful objects will nevertheless differ in their particular formal properties.

Ascriptions of more broadly evaluative and less specifically objective properties, when challenged, are always defended by appeal to less broadly evaluative and more specifically objective properties. Ultimately, a critic or viewer should defend evaluations by pointing to nonevaluative properties of the works in question. These will be formal, expressive, representational, or historical properties of the work (relations of the work to its tradition) that lack evaluative dimensions in themselves. For example, while to say that a painting's composition is balanced may be to evaluate it positively, to say that it is symmetrical is not evaluative; similarly for "poignant" and "sad" when predicated of musical works. Ultimately, appeal may be always to nonevaluative formal properties, but this claim is more controversial.

Sibley (1959) raised the question of how aesthetic qualities relate to nonaesthetic properties, and he claimed that the latter are never sufficient conditions for the former. He did seem to allow for necessary conditions in claiming that aesthetic properties could be "negatively condition governed." His example was that objects with all pastel colors cannot be gaudy (a necessary condition for gaudiness is bright colors). Sibley's question whether aesthetic properties are

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"condition governed" is equivalent to the question whether there are principles governing their ascription, a central question in aesthetics. We may ask it at the level Sibley does, the relation between aesthetic and nonaesthetic properties, or we may ask how the more specific or less broadly evaluative aesthetic properties relate to the more broadly evaluative ones or to overall evaluations of works.

Not only do there not appear to be necessary or sufficient conditions at either level, but properties at one level do not always contribute in the same direction to properties at the next level. In regard to necessary conditions, Sibley's example fails. The art deco facades in South Beach, Miami are pastel and gaudy. Undoubtedly there are trivial necessary conditions for many aesthetic properties: a tragic poem must contain more than the single word "pussycat." But it is much more difficult to think of nontrivial necessary conditions that could not be counterinstanced by a clever and original artist.

Regarding the relation of narrower evaluative properties to overall evaluations, properties that are normally positive, such as gracefulness, are not always so. A graceful performance of *The Rite of Spring* might not be better for it, and arguably the graceful prose of *The Last of the Mohicans* detracts from the excitement of the story.

Something similar can be said of the relation between nonaesthetic properties and aesthetic properties: again there are no principles governing this relation. The same objective formal properties – for instance, gentle curves and pastel colors – that make one artwork graceful might make another insipid. The same harmonies that make one piece of music powerful might make another strident. From the point of view of a single critic, it would seem that evaluative aesthetic properties must supervene on nonevaluative qualities of artworks; that is, there can be no difference in evaluative properties without some differences in objective qualities. This amounts to a constraint on rational aesthetic judgment: given all the same objective properties, evaluative judgment must remain constant, at least for those with fully developed tastes. But the principle of supervenience fails when we compare judgments across equally competent or even ideal critics.

The examples just noted suggest two reasons why we cannot specify interesting principles of aesthetic evaluation. First, aesthetic properties of parts of artworks are altered or transformed, often in unpredictable ways, when juxtaposed with properties in other works. A curve that is graceful in one sculpture may be insipid in the context of another sculpture. Second, there remain irreconcilable differences in taste, even when we consider the aesthetic judgments of only ideal critics. Aesthetic properties are response dependent – relations between objective properties and responses of observers – and these responses are relative to different tastes. That is why there is no supervenience across different critics, at least if we restrict the supervenience base to objective properties of works.

Aesthetic properties have been identified here primarily as those that contribute to the aesthetic value of artworks (or, in some cases, natural objects), and as those that provide reasons for aesthetic judgments or evaluations. Many of these properties are themselves evaluative, consisting in relations between objective basic properties and evaluative responses of observers. Others have been characterized here as nonevaluative properties that ultimately ground evaluations. It remains to explain briefly how and why these basic properties are ultimate sources of aesthetic value.

Complex formal properties constitute principles of order among the elements they structure. They enable perception and cognition to grasp such elements in larger wholes and to assign them significance in terms of their places and functions within such structures. This recognition of order, especially after being challenged by complexity, is pleasing to those faculties that seek it (although, as noted above, it is not always constitutive of beauty). Likewise, representational and expressive properties engage the imagination and affective capacities in satisfying ways free of the costs and dangers often associated with the latter in real life. Of significance too is the way that these distinct aesthetic properties interact in the context of artworks. Formal properties help to determine expressive, behavioral, and representational qualities, which may in turn enter formal structures at higher levels, and so on. Since elements within works are grasped in terms of

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their contributions to aesthetic properties and to such complex interactions among them, this makes for an intensely meaningful and rich experience of these elements as they are perceived.

At best, complexes of aesthetic properties in artworks can so engage all our cognitive and affective capacities as to seem to be distinct worlds, intentionally designed to challenge and satisfy these uniquely human capacities or faculties. Basic aesthetic properties create value ultimately by contributing to the constitution of such alternative worlds in which we can become fully and fulfillingly engaged.

See also AESTHETIC ATTITUDE; AESTHETIC JUDGMENT; AESTHETIC PLEASURE; BEARDSLEY; BEAUTY; DEFINITION OF "ART"; EXPRESSION; FORMALISM; REPRESENTATION; SENSES AND ART; SIBLEY; TASTE.

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ALAN H. GOLDMAN

aestheticism The doctrine that art should be valued for itself alone and not for any purpose or function it may happen to serve, and thus opposed to all instrumentalist theories of art. Historically, the idea of art for art's sake is associated with the cult of beauty, which had its roots in Kantian aesthetics and the Romantic movement, although its potential application is wider than that.

The phrase *l'art pour l'art* (art for art's sake) first became current in France in the first half of the nineteenth century as the rallying cry of the aesthetic movement, and was associated with such names as Théophile Gautier and Baudelaire, and later with Flaubert. The doctrine became fashionable in England in the second half of the nineteenth century under the influence first of Walter Pater and later of such luminaries as Oscar Wilde, Whistler, Aubrey Beardsley, and A. J. Symons (author of *The Quest for Corvo*), among others. The movement is famously satirized in the Gilbert and Sullivan operetta *Patience*, where Wilde appears under the guise of the poet Bunthorne. In its earliest and most uncompromising form, the doctrine asserts not merely that a work of art should be judged only on its internal aesthetic properties, but that any extraneous purpose or function it may happen to serve must be counted a serious defect. Thus, in the preface to his novel *Mademoiselle de Maupin*, Gautier argues that "nothing is truly beautiful except that which can serve for nothing; whatever is useful is ugly." This was in part a reaction to the utilitarian and materialistic values of the new industrial age. It can clearly be seen to be an overreaction – to quote Harold Osborne:

> As we survey the art work of the past from the earliest cave art onwards we find that, various as their uses were, by and large all works of art were made for a use . . . They were essentially utensils in the same sort of sense as a suit of armour, a horse's harness or objects of domestic service are utensils, though the purpose they served was not necessarily a material one. (1968: 13)

The very idea of "the fine arts," arts such as painting, poetry, music, sculpture, and ballet, in which the aesthetic properties are thought to be more important than the utilitarian ones, was largely an eighteenth-century innovation. By Gautier's criterion, beauty in its purest form simply did not exist in art prior to the eighteenth

century. A far more sensible line is that taken by André Malraux, who has argued that by viewing the art of all times, all places, all cultures as pure aesthetic objects, divorced from their original purposes and functions, we have in effect entered into "an entirely new relationship with the work of art," where "the work of art has no other function than to be a work of art." We have, he says, created for ourselves "a museum without walls" (Malraux 1974).

Clearly, to accept this contextless approach to art as a perfectly legitimate and even desirable one, is to adhere to one of the main tenets of the art for art's sake doctrine. The central core of truth in this doctrine can be summarized in the following way: aesthetic values depend on properties which are internal to the work of art on account of which it is valued for its own sake. In other words, aesthetic merit, thus narrowly defined, is a type of final value but clearly distinguishable from all other final values such as knowledge for its own sake, the love of God, and doing one's duty. As the philosopher Victor Cousin said, "we must have religion for religion's sake, morality for morality's sake, as with art for art's sake . . . the beautiful cannot be the way to what is useful, or to what is good, or to what is holy; it leads only to itself" (Cousin 1854).

It is, then, a necessary condition of a work's being valued for its own sake that it be valued on account of its intrinsic properties and not on its relationship to anything external, such as nature, moral and political systems, audience response, and so on. We deem the internal properties of a work to be aesthetic not because they belong to a distinct class, like the class of color concepts, but because of the way they contribute to or detract from its value. Properties commonly identified as aesthetic include beauty, elegance, grace, daintiness, sweetness of sound, balance, design, unity, harmony, expressiveness, depth, movement, texture, and atmosphere. Not all such properties could accurately be described as formal properties – expressiveness, for example. This is important, because most of those who espouse the doctrine of art for art's sake do so on the basis of some sort of formalistic theory. Take, for example, E. M. Forster: "Works of art, in my opinion, are the only objects in the material universe to possess internal order, and that is why, though I don't believe that only art matters, I do believe in art for art's sake" (1951: 104). Since the aesthetic movement owed much of its inspiration to Kant's powerfully formalistic theory in the *Critique of Judgment*, it is perhaps not surprising that the two doctrines should be so closely associated.

A major drawback to a strict formalist approach is that while the form/content distinction is clear enough within the narrow confines of Kant's aesthetics, it has a tendency to break down when applied across the board, especially when applied to the literary arts. For instance, if expression in art is treated as an internal property and not defined in terms of self-expression or audience reaction, then no distinction can usefully be drawn between the particular feeling being expressed and the manner of its expression. Nevertheless, as Scruton has observed, "aesthetic expression is always a value: a work that has expression cannot be a total failure" (1974: 213). Other nonformal aesthetic properties might include brilliance of color, sweetness of sound, texture and felicity of language.

This leads to the question of whether the self-sufficiency of works of art, on which the doctrine of aestheticism depends, is in any way undermined by the presence of affective properties – properties that express or reflect human response, such as those that render works of art moving, exciting, interesting, amusing, enjoyable. Clearly, these properties are not internal in the required sense. The attitude of the aesthete, typified by Oscar Wilde, is to regard their presence as aesthetically harmful, because "all art is quite useless" and has no business with such external effects. As long as a thing affects us in any way, either for pain or for pleasure, or appeals strongly to our sympathies, then it is outside the proper sphere of art.

However, it is a mistake to treat the affective response to art as a specific state of mind that is produced by the object but that might be produced in other ways – as, for example, a relaxed frame of mind might be produced by tranquilizers, meditation, or by reading escapist literature. For the very identity of the affective response depends on the identity of the intentional object, and cannot be independently described. Thus it would be misleading to say that the purpose of a work of art is

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to interest, amuse, or please, because to find it interesting, amusing, or pleasing on account of its internal properties is, in effect, to value it for its own sake. It is, after all, the work itself that is interesting, amusing, or pleasing, and not the state of mind produced by it.

A related problem that more particularly concerns the aestheticist is how to justify the treatment of aesthetic values, not only as final values, but as ultimate values alongside truth and goodness. Some in the aesthetic movement, of whom Walter Pater is a prime example, see aesthetic values as actually overriding all other values, even moral ones. For Pater, the aesthetic quest is the highest way of life a man can follow. The possibility of such a "philosophy of life" was anticipated and attacked by Søren Kierkegaard in his *Either/Or* (1843). Under the influence of Pater, Wilde's humor is sometimes aimed at subverting morality and elevating what may be broadly termed aesthetic values, as when he says that "people will only give up war when they consider it to be vulgar instead of wicked," or, again, that it is better to be beautiful than to be good. Such remarks may sound flippant, but anyone who acknowledges the supremacy of aesthetic values is bound to take them seriously. Not surprisingly, few have been prepared to defend such an extravagant position, which is usually stigmatized as decadent.

Even if one adopts the less extreme position of treating aesthetic values as taking their place alongside other ultimate values rather than overriding them, one encounters difficulties. What grounds the claims of aesthetic values to occupy such a position? It is not enough to say, as Harold Osborne (1968: 202) does, that aesthetic activity is a self-rewarding and therefore self-justifying activity, because many self-rewarding activities, like smoking and billiards, are relatively trivial. The high seriousness of aesthetic value could perhaps be established in two stages: first, by showing that aesthetic preferences are not merely private and personal but may be correct and incorrect; and second, by linking them, if only indirectly, to overriding moral values or some more general notion of the "good life." The second move would run counter to the spirit of aestheticism. However, if the aestheticists are right to claim that aesthetic values are ultimately important in and for themselves, that would in itself place us under a moral obligation to preserve them.

Whatever its other defects, the art for art's sake approach is surely too restrictive. The aesthetic standpoint is not the only possible standpoint from which one can approach a work of art, as is shown by the wide diversity of theories about the nature and purpose of art, all illuminating different aspects. To understand a work of art adequately, one may need to consider it from more than one aspect. For example, if one were to view a piece of medieval stained glass from a narrowly aesthetic standpoint, one would be unable to appreciate it as a *religious* work of art. To refuse to take account of that aspect, on the grounds that it is aesthetically irrelevant, would be to diminish rather than to enrich one's appreciation, and would be a kind of aesthetic puritanism.

See also AESTHETIC ATTITUDE; AESTHETIC PROPERTIES; BEAUTY; COGNITIVE VALUE OF ART; FORMALISM; FUNCTION OF ART; KANT; MORALITY AND ART; ONTOLOGICAL CONTEXTUALISM; RELIGION AND ART; WILDE.

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aesthetics *see* AFRICAN A.; AMERINDIAN A.; CHINESE A.; EVOLUTION, ART, AND A.; FEMINIST A.; FEMINIST STANDPOINT A.; INDIAN A.; ISLAMIC A.; JAPANESE A.; OBJECTIVITY AND REALISM IN A.; PRAGMATIST A.; RACE AND A.; TESTIMONY IN A.

aesthetics of food and drink Philosophical attention to food and drink is a relatively recent but burgeoning scholarly enterprise that manifests striking revaluations of what were previously derogated as merely bodily experiences. The sources for these changes are multiple, including reexamination of the senses in cognition, feminist critiques of the concept of rationality, artistic challenges to fine art traditions, and revisions of the parameters of the aesthetic – all of which converge in attention to embodiment.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The traditional exclusion of eating and drinking from the purview of philosophy has ancient and enduring roots. Though a multimodal sensuous experience, eating chiefly and centrally engages the "bodily" senses of taste and smell, which are considered cognitively limited compared to the distance senses of vision and hearing because they provide relatively little information about the world around (Korsmeyer 1999: ch. 1). (The role of touch – the third bodily sense – is somewhat ambiguous because it coordinates with vision.) The bodily senses are the sources of considerable pleasure, but their brand of enjoyment is often dismissed as merely physical gratification that poses risky distractions and temptations. In fact, food, drink, and sex provide the typical exemplars of pleasures that should be governed or avoided. Philosophers from Plato to Hegel have observed that physical enjoyment should be set aside in preference for the mental and spiritual pleasures of true beauty.

In addition, food and drink have not been considered good candidates for aesthetic attention because of the way taste qualities are usually understood. The saying "There's no disputing about taste" sums up the philosophical neglect of qualities that appear to be mere matters of personal preference, different for each individual, and not important enough to demand standards. Indeed, in the eighteenth century when so much aesthetic theory was being developed, the literal sense of taste was the chief point of both comparison and contrast for analyzing aesthetic taste. As Kant put it, literal taste is merely subjective, whereas aesthetic taste is both subjective and universal.

With the aesthetic status of food so in question, the issue of its standing as an art form was more or less moot. Moreover, eating is a necessity for life, and its practical importance may seem to eclipse any claims for food as art, especially as a "fine art" whose chief purpose is aesthetic contemplation. Nonetheless, in the nineteenth century an enthusiastic group of European writers promoted fine dining for its aesthetic importance and gastronomy as an art form, taking as their models the new aesthetic theories (Gigante 2005). Their efforts were little noted by philosophy at the time, although they are now gaining retrospective interest.

TASTE AND TASTE QUALITIES

If eating preferences are indeed solely dependent on individual inclination and taste qualities admit of no standard, then it would be difficult to defend a robust account of the aesthetics of food. However, there is no reason to conclude that the relative "subjectivity" of taste – understood as the complete taste experience that includes smell and touch (and often vision and even hearing) – entails either idiosyncratic privacy or the absence of standards for excellence. By means of taste one discerns properties that are otherwise inaccessible. Hume made this point long ago in his essay "Of the Standard of Taste" (1757) when he introduced his controversial example of a wine-tasting contest to illustrate what he called delicacy of taste – the ability to perceive fine qualities of objects. Contemporary philosophers have further investigated the complexities of subjectivity to vindicate both an "objective" standing for tastes and the aesthetic significance of eating and drinking.

Tastes are undeniably subjective in that they need to be directly experienced by a perceiving subject. This fact appears particularly troublesome for taste because its causal triggers cannot be easily identified externally in the way that visual qualities can (although recent studies in taste chemistry have greatly illuminated the determinants of flavors). In contrast to

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the "higher" senses of vision and hearing, the objects of taste are never distant; they are literally inside one. Nonetheless, taste registers qualities of food and drink that as a rule normal perceivers are all disposed to detect. In other words, the degree to which taste experience is subjective is consistent with the claim that tastes are also *of* their substances (Sweeney 1999, 2007; Machamer 2007; Smith 2007a; Bender 2008; Shaffer 2007). If there were no objective pole to tasting, there would be no possibility of developing discriminating taste, which entails that there is something out there to discriminate. The possibility of developing expert taste is one dimension of the aesthetic potency of food and drink, one that perhaps has been most recognized with wine (Smith 2007b; Allhoff 2008).

The character of taste qualities extends to include a cognitive dimension to flavors that is often overlooked. Tastes themselves are only fully comprehended when the identity of the substance and its place in culture are in evidence, and this opens the door for claims that tastes themselves impart meaning – meaning that manifests the pervasive and complex roles that eating practices play in ceremonies, rituals, and everyday habits (Heldke 2003). When one attends to the meanings that foods carry, the parameters of aesthetic attention widen to include place of origin and modes of production and preparation. Though at first such matters may appear aesthetically extrinsic, they enter into what might be considered the style of food and drink and their cultural properties. That is, flavor is not just analogous to artistic "form"; it suggests "content" as well. What is more, certain concepts central to art, such as authenticity, are equally relevant to judging food and drink, for taste qualities concern the identity of the sapid substance and how it was made (Jacquette 2007; Gale 2008).

Directing aesthetic attention to food has several implications for the concept of the aesthetic itself, for it erases the traditional distinction between aesthetic and sensuous pleasures. The satisfaction of appetite was for years the paradigmatic "interested" pleasure, and aesthetic pleasure was considered "disinterested' – free from the self-directed concerns that limit judgments to personal relevance. Some of these values linger in aesthetic accounts of food inasmuch as there is a widespread assumption that when eating is worthy of aesthetic attention, it qualifies as fine, gourmet dining rather than the mere satisfaction of appetite. (Indeed, eating when appetite is not acute was for the nineteenth-century gastronomers mentioned above the gustatory equivalent of disinterested contemplation (Gigante 2005).) Nonetheless, the inclusion of eating and drinking in the purview of aesthetic activities still represents an important modification of the old standard of disinterestedness for aesthetic pleasure and an inclusion of bodily experiences in aesthetic practice (Sibley 2001; Brady 2005; Burnham & Skilleås 2008).

FOOD, DRINK, AND ART

While the aesthetic dimension of eating and drinking is a point of agreement among those who theorize on the subject, the standing of food as an art form remains unsettled. Difference on this question pivots around the concept of art and whether or not the values of food and drink are sufficiently similar to the values of (other) art forms. Most disagreement centers on whether culinary art has claims to be considered a fine art, for its qualifications as an applied art are evident.

There are at least two questions that need to be addressed here: Can we approach food and drink in the same appreciative manner as we approach fine arts such as music or painting? And, is it appropriate to consider foods in the category of artworks? To the first question there is a fair degree of assent, for demonstrably one can appreciate the sequence of tastes of a meal or the notes of wine with an attention and discernment that is parallel to the attention and discernment required to listen sensitively to a concert performance (Sweeney 1999; Bach 2007). Frequently the comparisons chosen are from the performance arts, for neither a performance nor a meal endures for more than a short time (Monroe 2007). How far the comparison can be sustained is more disputed, although absent the tradition that emphasizes fine art, foods are more readily accommodated within the concept of art (Saito 2007).

Up until this point the tacit assumption has been that the measure of success in gustatory aesthetics is discriminating pleasure. However,

pleasure alone, no matter how sophisticated, is a limited achievement, especially in comparison to the wider scope of values sought in art. Attention to aesthetic savoring suits approaches familiar from Dewey that accentuate experience (Kuehn 2007). Concepts of art that emphasize their meanings may seem to preclude food and drink, which are widely held to exhibit a paucity of message or expression (Telfer 1996; Sibley 2001). However, as mentioned above, a full investigation of taste qualities extends to the meanings of flavors in history and society, which in turn connect to the significant roles that food and drink play in ceremony, hospitality, and daily practice. Whether or not one categorizes food as art, its aesthetic qualities include its cultural significance and the meanings it conveys.

Not only does the aesthetic exercise of the proximal senses draw attention to embodiment, but our bodies themselves are palpably changed by eating and drinking – and by deprivation and excess. The aspect of food that involves growth, change, and death is foregrounded by some contemporary artists who include foodstuffs or other transient substances in their work. Artists who make use of foods often exploit the meanings implicit in decay and putrefaction, in counterpoint to the emphasis on savoring that is more commonly explored in the philosophical aesthetics of food. The fact that eating is a physical activity with perilous borders – including fasting and starvation, not to mention the destruction of sentient creatures that are eaten – can give it a profundity and risk that some argue bears comparison with the sublime (Korsmeyer 1999'; Weiss 2002; Lintott, 2007). Eating sustains life and vitalizes community, but at the same time awareness of mortality adds depth to the aesthetic dimensions of food and drink, and philosophic reflection on these elements amplifies comparisons with artworks with profound and difficult import.

See also AESTHETIC ATTITUDE; AESTHETIC PROPERTIES; AESTHETICS OF THE EVERYDAY; JAPANESE AESTHETICS; TASTE.

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CAROLYN KORSMEYER

aesthetics of the environment Much of our aesthetic appreciation is not limited to art, but rather is directed toward the world at large. Moreover, we appreciate not only pristine nature – sunsets and mountains – but also our more mundane surroundings: the solitude of a neighborhood park on a rainy evening, the chaos of a bustling morning marketplace, the view from the road. Thus, there is a place for the notion of environmental aesthetics, for in such cases – in our appreciation of the world at large – our aesthetic appreciation often encompasses our total surroundings: our environment. Environments may be large or small, more or less natural, mundane or exotic, but in every case it is central that it is an environment that we appreciate. This fact signals several important dimensions of such appreciation, which in turn contribute to the central issues of environmental aesthetics.

These dimensions follow from the delineation of the field of inquiry. The "object" of appreciation, the "aesthetic object," is our environment, our own surroundings, and thus we are in a sense immersed in the object of appreciation. This fact has the following ramifications. We are in that which we appreciate, and that which we appreciate is also that from which we appreciate. If we move, we move within the object of our appreciation and thereby change our relationship to it and at the same time change the object itself. Moreover, as our surroundings, the object impinges upon all our senses. As we reside in it or move through it, we can see it, hear it, feel it, smell it, and perhaps even taste it. In brief, the experience of the environmental object of appreciation from which aesthetic appreciation must be fashioned is intimate, total, and somewhat engulfing.

This aspect of our experience of the environmental object of appreciation is intensified by the unruly nature of the object itself. The object of appreciation is not the more or less discrete, stable, and self-contained object of traditional art. It is rather an environment; consequently, not only does it change as we move within it, it also changes of its own accord. Environments are constantly in motion, in both the short and the long term. Even if we remain motionless, the wind brushes our face and the clouds pass before our eyes; and, with time, changes continue seemingly without limit: night falls, days pass, seasons come and go. Moreover, environments not only move through time, they extend through space, and again seemingly without limit. There are no predetermined boundaries for our environment; as we move, it moves with us and changes, but it does not end; indeed, it continues unending in every direction. In other words, the environmental object of appreciation does not come to us "preselected" and "framed" as do traditional artistic objects, neither in time as a drama or a musical composition, nor in space as a painting or a sculpture.

These differences between environments and traditional artistic objects relate to an even deeper dissimilarity between the two. The latter, works of art, are the products of artists. The artist is quintessentially a designer who creates a work by embodying a design in an object. Works of art are thus tied to their designers not only causally but conceptually; what a work is and what it means has much to do with its designer and its design. However, environments are paradigmatically not the products of designers. In the typical case, both designer and human design are lacking. Rather, environments come about "naturally"; they change, they grow, they develop either by natural processes or by means of human agency, but even in the latter case only rarely are they the result of a designer explicitly embodying a design. Thus, the typical environmental object of appreciation is unruly in yet another way: neither its nature nor its meaning is determined by a designer and a design.

The upshot is that in our aesthetic appreciation of the world at large we are initially confronted by – indeed, intimately and totally engulfed in – something that forces itself upon

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all our senses, is limited neither in time nor in space, and is constrained concerning neither its nature nor its meaning. We are immersed in a potential object of appreciation, and our task is to achieve some aesthetic appreciation of that object. Moreover, the appreciation must be fashioned anew, without the aid of frames, the guidance of designs, or the direction of designers. Thus, in our aesthetic appreciation of the world at large we must begin with the most basic of questions, those of exactly what and how to aesthetically appreciate. These questions raise the main issues of environmental aesthetics, essentially issues concerning what resources, if any, are available for answering them.

Concerning the questions of what and how to aesthetically appreciate in an environment, there are two main lines of thought. One, which is sometimes characterized as subjectivist or perhaps even as skeptical, holds that, since in the appreciation of environments we seemingly lack the resources normally involved in the aesthetic appreciation of art, these questions cannot be properly answered. That is to say that since we lack resources such as frames, designs, and designers, and the guidance they provide, the aesthetic appreciation of environments, unlike the appreciation of art, cannot be judged to be either appropriate or inappropriate. Moreover, even if it could be so judged, it would remain, in comparison with that of art, at best free and fanciful – or at worst superficial and shallow as opposed to serious and deep. An even more skeptical line suggests that perhaps the appreciation of environments is not genuine aesthetic appreciation at all. Concerning the world at large, as opposed to works of art, the closest we can come to appropriate aesthetic appreciation is simply to give ourselves over to being immersed, to respond as we will, and to enjoy what we can. In contrast to the aesthetic appreciation of art, the aesthetic appreciation of environments is marked by openness and freedom. And whether or not the resultant experience is appropriate in some sense or even really aesthetic in any sense is not of much consequence.

A second line of thought concerning the questions of what to aesthetically appreciate in an environment and how to do so is frequently characterized as objectivist or cognitivist. It argues that there are in fact important resources to draw on in our appreciation of environments, especially the object of appreciation itself, but also the appreciator and the knowledge that the latter has of the former. Thus, in the aesthetic appreciation of an environment, these elements can play roles similar to those played in the aesthetic appreciation of traditional art by the designer and the design. In appreciating the world at large, we typically fulfill some of the roles of a designer and yet let the world provide us with its own "design." Thus, when confronted by an environment, we select the ways that are relevant to its appreciation and set the frames that limit it in time and space. Moreover, as designers creatively interact with that which they design, we likewise creatively interact with an environment in light of our knowledge of it. In this way an environment itself, by its nature, provides its own "design" and can bring us to appreciate it "as what it is" and "on its own terms." In short, the environment offers the necessary guidance in terms of which we, the appreciators, by our selecting and framing, can answer the questions of what and how to appreciate – and thereby fashion our initial and somewhat chaotic experience of an environment into genuine aesthetic appreciation – appreciation that is both appropriate and serious.

As is typical with disputes in aesthetics between subjectivist or skeptical positions and more objectivist ones, the burden of proof falls on the latter. Thus, it is important for the objectivist account to be elaborated and supported by examples. The basic idea of the objectivist position is that our appreciation is guided by the nature of the object of appreciation. Thus, knowledge of the object's nature, of its genesis, type, and properties, is essential for serious, appropriate aesthetic appreciation. For example, in appropriately appreciating a natural environment such as an alpine meadow it is useful to know, for instance, that it has developed under constraints imposed by the climate of high altitude, and that diminutive size in flora is an adaptation to such constraints. This knowledge can guide our appreciation of the environment so that, for example, we avoid imposing inappropriately large frames, which may cause us to simply overlook miniature wild flowers. In such a case, we will neither appreciatively note their wonderful

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adjustment to their situation nor attune our senses to their subtle fragrance, texture, and hue. Similarly, in appropriately appreciating human-altered environments such as those of modern agriculture, it is helpful to know about the functional utility of cultivating huge fields devoted to single crops. Such knowledge encourages us to enlarge and adjust our frames, our senses, and even our attitudes, so as to more appreciatively accommodate the expansive uniform landscapes that are the inevitable result of such farming practices.

The basic assumption of environmental aesthetics is that every environment – natural, rural, or urban, large or small, ordinary or extraordinary – offers much to see, to hear, to feel, much to aesthetically appreciate. The different environments of the world at large are as aesthetically rich and rewarding as are works of art. However, it also must be recognized that special problems are posed for aesthetic appreciation by the very nature of environments, by the fact that they are our own surroundings, that they are unruly and chaotic objects of appreciation, and that we are plunged into them without appreciative guidelines. Both the subjectivist and the objectivist approaches recognize the problems and the potential involved in the aesthetic appreciation of environments. The main difference is that while the latter attempts to ground an appropriate aesthetic appreciation for different environments in our knowledge of their particular natures, the former simply invites us to enjoy them all as freely and as fully as we can and will. In the last analysis, perhaps both alternatives should be pursued.

See also AESTHETIC ATTITUDE; AESTHETICS OF THE EVERYDAY; ARTIFACT, ART AS; EVOLUTION, ART, AND AESTHETICS.

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ALLEN CARLSON

aesthetics of the everyday The discipline of aesthetics has tended, especially for the twentieth century, to focus on encounters with the fine arts and, to a lesser extent, with nature. Much attention has been devoted to the projects of defining art and establishing its ontology, and accounts of aesthetic experience and aesthetic properties have been derived primarily from considerations related to Western artworks. In the last few decades, though, there has been a movement away from the narrowly art-oriented approach and toward recognition of the continuity between experiences of fine art and experiences from other domains of life. This movement has given rise to an emerging subdiscipline often known as "everyday aesthetics" or "the aesthetics of the everyday." Theorists in the aesthetics of the everyday typically claim that objects and activities not essentially connected to art or nature can have aesthetic properties and/or that they can give rise to significant aesthetic experiences. Aesthetic analysis, then, is appropriately extended to virtually all areas of life.

John Dewey's (1934) *Art as Experience* has had a great influence on contemporary work in everyday aesthetics. Dewey suggested that the experiences of aesthetic exaltation associated with art can be traced back to processes that predate art and, indeed, that both humans and other animals partake in. Aesthetic experience,

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according to Dewey, is on a continuum with the deep feelings of fulfillment that arise from interacting with the environment to satisfy one's needs. What distinguishes aesthetic experiences from nonaesthetic aspects of experience, he claims, is not that they involve response to a particular set of objects, as many aesthetic traditionalists would claim, but that they exhibit qualitative unity as well as a sense of closure or consummation. These qualities can belong even to simple experiences like that of lifting a stone, as long as it is done with sufficient attention (1934: 44). Dewey's view is thus highly amenable to the application of aesthetic concepts throughout everyday life.

Despite its significant expansion of the territory of the aesthetic, Dewey's view has been criticized as too restrictive by some aestheticians of the everyday. Mindful of contemporary developments, they observe that many objects in the fine arts lack unity and closure or give rise to experiences that are "disjointed, severed, and jarring" (Novitz 1992: 9), but are nonetheless counted as aesthetic by traditional art-oriented theories. Indeed, their fragmented nature may be precisely what gives them their distinctive aesthetic qualities (Irvin 2008). It cannot, then, be a necessary condition for an experience's being aesthetic that it exhibit unity or closure. This conclusion is in line with recent developments in accounts of aesthetic experience, which no longer tend to claim that an experience must be positive in valence or must have a particular qualitative character to count as aesthetic.

Though particular aspects of Dewey's account may be criticized, the Deweyan strategy of deflating traditional distinctions between the fine arts and other domains of life has remained central to the aesthetics of the everyday. Some theorists have observed that the aesthetic phenomena invoked in traditional discussions of art are also present in other domains of life such as sport, sex, and everyday decision-making (Kupfer 1983). Moreover, aestheticians have increasingly rejected the Kantian notion that the aesthetic attitude involves holding oneself distant from the object of contemplation and remaining indifferent to any nonartistic functions it may serve. Arnold Berleant (1991) argues that the proper attitude toward artworks is one of deep engagement of the whole person, an attitude which, he suggests, is quite naturally taken toward the objects of ordinary life as well. The traditional division of the senses into "higher" and "lower," and the associated suggestion that aesthetic experience must be exclusively the province of the former, has been challenged as arbitrary, with the result that ordinary activities involving taste and smell (Korsmeyer 1999; Brady 2005: ch. 10) or touch (Shusterman 2000: chs. 7, 10) have been rendered eligible for aesthetic consideration.

The sharp distinction between the fine arts and other domains of life has also been challenged by the observation that art emerges out of, and is in many contexts integrated with, everyday practices. Crispin Sartwell (1995) and Yuriko Saito (2007) observe that, particularly in non-Western cultures, works of art and aesthetically oriented design objects are often made to enhance everyday life. David Novitz (1992) notes the implausibility of seeing popular art forms as segregated from everyday life: works of television and pop music often take the mundane as their subject matter, and their consumption is integrated with the ordinary activities of life. Moreover, recent developments within the Western fine arts have arguably brought art and life closer together, as ordinary objects have been exhibited in gallery settings and ordinary sounds have been integrated into avant-garde musical compositions. These techniques seem to invite us to apply to everyday objects and events the same aesthetic regard traditionally reserved for artworks.

While much of the defense of everyday aesthetics has grown out of observations related to art, another important force has been the burgeoning of environmental aesthetics. While taking its initial impetus from the Kantian interest in the sublime, environmental aesthetics has evolved to include consideration of a wide variety of environments and phenomena. An interest in natural science has moved some environmental aestheticians to acknowledge the difficulty of drawing a principled distinction between the natural and the nonnatural: since humans are animals, and their artifacts, behaviors, and environments arise in large part out of evolved capacities, the natural and nonnatural seem to be best thought of as lying along a continuum rather than on opposite

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sides of a sharp divide. If an aesthetic regard can properly be cast on natural objects and environments, then there is no obvious reason not to extend it further. More generally, the attention to environments, rather than isolated objects, has led to the recognition of a mode of aesthetic experience that is complex, immersive, and multisensory, and thus readily applicable to everyday life.

Once the barriers separating everyday life from art and nature have been broken down, a positive case remains to be made for the interest of applying aesthetic concepts to ordinary objects and phenomena. The interest is claimed to be both practical and theoretical. From a practical perspective, the claim is often made that a serious interest in the aesthetics of the everyday promises a richer life, as we attend to satisfactions that are readily available but that we may not have tended to notice or take advantage of. Indeed, Shusterman (2000: ch. 10) suggests that everyday aesthetics should include practical training in bodywork and related disciplines, precisely to secure the benefit of a more satisfying life. The aesthetics of the everyday also has moral implications. Kupfer argues that "the aesthetic dimensions in everyday life are . . . instrumental in developing people into more deliberate, autonomous community members" (1983: 3). Irvin (2008) argues that aesthetic satisfactions in everyday life can be harnessed to support moral behavior. And as Sartwell (1995) points out, in many cultural and, especially, spiritual traditions the moral and the aesthetic are seamlessly integrated within everyday life.

From a theoretical perspective, it has been suggested that the aesthetics of the everyday is of special interest because everyday phenomena may require aesthetic insights and concepts distinct from those needed to account for art and nature (Saito 2007: 5). Many of the aesthetic properties exhibited by everyday phenomena, for instance, may be different from those derived from a prominently art-oriented aesthetics (Leddy 1995). At the same time, the aesthetics of the everyday may be used as a source of insights about the nature of art: Sartwell suggests, based on observations about the continuity between art and everyday life in many cultures, that art should be redefined as "skilled and devoted making" that may eventuate in artifacts that serve a variety of everyday functions (1995: 9).

Attempts to demonstrate the theoretical interest of everyday aesthetics bring out a methodological tension that inheres in the discipline. On the one hand, in order to demonstrate that it really is a subdiscipline of aesthetics, the aesthetics of the everyday must demonstrate that, at some level, it is fundamentally concerned with the same concepts and phenomena that have preoccupied mainstream aesthetics. This is why so much of the discipline has been concerned to break down barriers between art and other domains of life. On the other hand, though, if it is to be of interest, everyday aesthetics must show that it has a distinctive contribution to make to aesthetics by virtue of introducing a distinctive subject matter, methodology, or set of aesthetic concepts. This tension continues to animate the discipline: aestheticians of the everyday continually refer back to and demonstrate connections to traditional aesthetic objects, properties, and experiences, even while suggesting that mainstream aesthetics has been too restrictive in its treatment of them.

The breadth of content and approach advocated within the aesthetics of the everyday leaves the discipline vulnerable to two objections. First, one might suspect that it renders the notion of the aesthetic so broad as to be meaningless. If aesthetic experience can happen at any time, can take anything as its object, and need have no particular qualitative feel, is there really any distinction between the aesthetic aspects of experience and its other aspects? Such a concern is presumably what motivated Dewey to require qualitative unity and closure: these criteria ensure that not every possible experience will fall into the category of the aesthetic, and thus secure the nontriviality of the concept. If such requirements are rejected, it appears that any experience may qualify as aesthetic just by virtue of having a qualitative feel. This is a conclusion that aesthetic traditionalists are likely to find unpalatable, even as aestheticians of the everyday may welcome it. Second, since everyday aesthetics tends to emphasize aesthetic experiences and objects that are not exalted in character, one may wonder if it really warrants our attention. Would it not ultimately be more rewarding to

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focus on great artworks and the natural sublime, which promise more significant edification? The aesthetician of the everyday may reply that the aesthetic pleasures of everyday life are worth acknowledging because they are available to everyone, even those who lack access to art and untouched nature. Moreover, even if the texture of everyday life is such as to yield aesthetic satisfactions that are relatively subtle, continual awareness of these satisfactions may offer a payoff in quality of life that is very much worth having.

See also AESTHETIC ATTITUDE; AESTHETIC PROPERTIES; AESTHETICS OF FOOD AND DRINK; AESTHETICS OF THE ENVIRONMENT; DEWEY; EVOLUTION, ART, AND AESTHETICS; JAPANESE AESTHETICS; POPULAR ART.

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SHERRI IRVIN

African aesthetics Art is a universal human phenomenon. It is the expression of the compulsive innate human tendency toward creativity. It is one of the main engagements and accomplishments of human beings that distinguishes humans from other beings, as the means by which humans are capable of focusing consciousness to achieve and express their perception, comprehension, apprehension, annotation, demarcation, appreciation, and documentation of their peculiar lived realities. It is in this regard that it is meaningful to speak of African art, while being mindful of the heterogeneity of the natural habitats, languages, ethnicities, and cultures of the many African peoples, as there are some common African cultural affinities and identities that have been manifested over many millennia.

African art encompasses visual and nonvisual, tangible and nontangible elements, such that virtually every aspect of living constitutes a veritable domain for art. It can be conjectured that the two tropes that facilitate the understanding of African aesthetics are beauty and pleasantness. Beauty and pleasantness make the object of art and the process or act of creating worthy art special, distinguishing art from nonart objects, because the latter are not deliberately made by humans to be artistic.

At the time of their production, most art objects often reflect a multiplicity of intention, purpose, utility, and appreciation. These may be masked by the search that pervades contemporary consumerist consciousness for the net financial worth of art objects, with the result that their value is misplaced. In most cases, the makers of African art, in its indigenous setting, set no monetary value on their effort, not because they do not understand that they are incurring costs in the production or because they cannot put a value on the effort they have put into the production, but more importantly because they understand that the beauty and pleasantness of what is produced, the truth and meaning it purveys, and the sentiment and social consciousness invested in it, are beyond financial quantification. In this regard, the art object is a gift to the person who has commissioned it, as well as to the society in which it is produced, reflecting and enriching that society's moral, social, spiritual, and other values. The society collectively owns the art

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object, as much as does its individual "owner"; hence the unusual reticence with which most Africans sell art objects.

Some of the areas in which art is manifested, showing the twin consciousness of beauty and pleasantness, are in (1) the architecture of used or inhabited space; (2) the dress, appearance, deportment, and adornment of persons for various occasions and vocations; (3) the content of speech and the manner of speaking as befits the audience and occasion; (4) decorations that emphasize and enhance the beauty and pleasantness of homes, spaces, and the wider world; (5) the capacity to appreciate art in nature – such as when animal, tree, river, rock, celestial appearance, and behavior become narratives underlining an architectonic of beauty and pleasure, leading to formation of cosmologies, cosmogonies, ontologies, metonyms, metaphors, and mythologies; (6) the humble display of the performer's skill and talent; (7) efforts to observe the highest professional and moral standards in whatever is done to capture and enrich truth; (8) the display of good habits and respectful mannerisms in private and public spaces; (9) the care taken to ensure the maintenance of equilibrium and moderation in the various modes of being of the living, the dead, and the unborn; (10) the maintenance of proper and edifying relationships within and outside families; and (11) efforts toward the development of future generations and filial bonding with family members and society.

There are three elements that contribute to African aesthetics. First, there is the skill, dexterity, and consciousness and other mental faculties involved in the production of true artistic forms of life. Second, there is the final outcome of the effort, the extent to which it meets the remit that impelled it in terms of finesse, truth of representation, orientation, and integration. Third, there is the moral or ethical element of art – how far it is morally edifying, truthful, and acceptable, or denigrating and unacceptable; how far it conduces to the interests of society as a whole in affirming and promoting harmony and cultural progress. Any art that is skeptically oriented and infused with cynicism, as in carefully choreographed and intelligently orchestrated critiques of power and wealth, has to be not only beautiful but pleasant, even to those who form the intended target of that critique, in order that the point be properly driven home without alienation or disruption of communal existence.

In Africa, art is the epitome of the culture and civilization of society, representing the human capacity to enjoy the sublime aspects of life, regardless of the wider situation, without leading to a rich/poor divide in cultural consciousness. In fact, most African art functions seamlessly, because it transcends artificial divisions to present itself to every member of society. To this end, it is clear that some artistic expressions record the skepticism of the critical members of society, those who take issue with their society's epistemological, metaphysical, moral, religious, political, and scientific beliefs, its received knowledge. These individuals often find ingenious ways of expressing their alternative views without failing to entertain, regardless of how arcane the views may seem at the time. They may even record their defiance of and nonconformity to the orthodox and popular positions embraced by the majority in various ways, making art not only a means of celebrating the patterns of cooperation of members of society, but also a medium of protest. For example, among the Yoruba certain ways in which men wear their caps and women tie their headgear clearly signal a protest against the norm, reflecting their view that in society certain wrongs need redressing. Yoruba artists also question conformity through stories, practical jokes, songs, sculpture, bodily adornment, hairstyle, dress, and music (using both the language and music itself and their choice of instruments to make the point), and even silence, generated at appropriate moments in conversation and theatrical performance.

Essentially, art is an integral part of the conscience of any society. The way its practitioners carry out their trade will help to determine the epistemological engineering and reengineering that the social fabric must undergo continuously. Even when there is borrowing from others, this has to be done with as much faithfulness and honesty as possible, recognizing the debt (perhaps with tongue in cheek), and acknowledging the reason for the borrowing. Thus there is a tendency to speak of the original artwork by comparing it with copies; even where there are no observable distinctions

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between them, the original is preferred and attracts a higher accolade.

There is also often a clear distinction between artworks and mere tools. One may have to use a very "ugly" tool to perform a task, and may feel repelled every time one uses it, but if it is the best tool, or the only one available or most suited for the job at hand, one is foolhardy to worry about taste, instead of being clear-sighted about the effectiveness and efficiency of the tool in the performance of the task at hand, as no further consideration is relevant. This is not far from the Yoruba understanding of the difference between beauty in character and physical beauty: the wise Yoruba man or woman recommends that one should marry not for physical beauty but for its ethical form and beauty in behavior, for it can be said that "The lady may be beautiful in looks, but spoil her beauty with bad character." But in the absence of the combination of physical beauty and beauty of character, it is better to marry someone who is not (so) beautiful but who is known to have been properly brought up by his or her parents and acknowledged to have good character (i.e., an *omoluabi*, a well-cultured, highly respectful, and morally upright person).

Whenever comparisons are made in Yoruba culture, acuity of observation is emphasized. Language itself embodies this search for subtle points of comparison, and there is a general insistence that the meaning of any comparative claim be clear, as a corollary of the more general requirement that the young be given clear instruction in the virtues. In all instances of comparison in Yoruba culture, for example, acuity of observation is emphasized. It is important to note that there is a combination of an epistemic discernment that has led to a noting and incorporation of comparative ideas into the corpus of language, and to insistence both on understanding the meaning of the message and on the clarity with which the young are instructed in the virtues.

Order and responsibility are important and unavoidable requisites of all aspects of civilized life in any society and any attempt to compromise on them always involves a great human, cultural, and material cost to society. Consequently, the arts to which children and other members of society are exposed should reflect the values that are worthy to be developed, maintained, emulated, and perpetuated. This constitutes a regulatory code of conduct, for leaders and their followers that covers all aspects of life, from dress, eating, and forms of greeting, to games and work ethics, political leadership, relaxation, and festivals. It extends to what can be exhibited in private and public space, how and where they can be exhibited, and so on.

In many African societies, the art of childrearing is suffused with person-affirming and individuality-developing literature, songs, dance, paintings, and other cultural paraphernalia. Also, while the other-regarding aspect of social existence is emphasized, the need for the individual to acknowledge himself or herself as a individual, and as a *person*, with a name, a destiny, a calling, etc., is instilled in the child from the beginning, such that, while he or she shares a common human destiny of being and of responsibility for the survival of the species, his or her ability to make a difference is never disregarded or compromised.

There is a clear relationship between art and morality, as the different arts are educational media for the training of the young in society. In this regard, there is room for academic discourse to the extent that it will lead to an informed decision as to the proper course of action. This is important because bad art can have deleterious effects: (1) people can be deceived by it into false complacency, similar to what happens when religion becomes the opium of the people; (2) it can be responsible for creating unfounded euphoria, especially in untutored and uncultured minds; (3) it can misrepresent reality; and (4) it can lead people to have false impressions of their capabilities, similar to what happens when people relate to their environment under the influence of drugs. In these ways, such art destroys psychic harmony rather than reinforcing it, and stirs up wrong emotions and false beliefs, thus confusing rather than clarifying reality.

We should remember that the workings of art within a culture involve the appreciation of more than artworks alone; it is equally important to recognize that every artist loves applause. African artists, in all walks of life, are appreciated within their various societies. For, as these societies often recognize, praise begets further excellence, while failure to appreciate can stymie creativity, if not totally destroy it.

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See also ART HISTORY.

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JOHN AYOTUNDE (TUNDE) ISOLA BEWAJI

Amerindian aesthetics Franz Boas's (1927: 183–298) monumental *Primitive Art* devotes 115 pages to a discussion of north Pacific coast artistic styles. Boas, as was his method, was largely descriptive in his analysis of Native American aesthetic practices. For example, he writes: "Two styles may be distinguished: the man's style expressed in the art of wood carving and painting and their derivations; and the woman's style which finds expression in weaving, basketry, and embroidery. The two styles are fundamentally distinct. The former is symbolic, the latter formal. The symbolic art has a certain degree of realism and is full of meaning. The formal art has, at most, pattern names and no especially marked significance" (1927: 183). For Boas, the understanding of patterns was the beginning of an understanding of Native American aesthetics. Amerindian aesthetics were not, however, limited to visual arts, but also included verbal arts (song, story, chant, etc.) as well as dance.

Since Boas's early work, anthropologists have been engaged in documenting and understanding Amerindian aesthetic practices. These investigations have been variously termed ethnoaesthetics (B. Tedlock 1986), ethnopoetics (Hymes 1981; D. Tedlock 1983), and ethnomusicology (McAllester 1954). Such approaches have striven to understand what makes various social practices "beautiful." The focus here is on aesthetic practices and the ways that such practices are given value as aesthetically pleasing. In each case, the question of what is and is not considered beautiful becomes an ethnographic question, as does the very question of what it means to say something is "beautiful." What ethnographers have found is that Amerindian peoples often have well-thought-out theories of beauty.

In a short piece it is impossible to cover all of Amerindian aesthetics and aesthetic practices. For the purposes here, I shall focus on three ethnographic examples. They are the Kuna, the Zuni, and the Navajo. I discuss each in turn. I explore the general by way of the particular. In conclusion, I discuss issues of the appropriation of Amerindian aesthetic practices.

KUNA AESTHETICS

The Kuna, who live along the Atlantic coastal region of primarily Panama and Colombia as well as in Panama City, are traditionally agriculturalists, who practice slash and burn agriculture in the coastal jungles. Their aesthetic practices have been most ably described by Joel Sherzer (1983, 1990).

Perhaps the most famous example of Kuna aesthetic practices are the molas. Molas are multicolored appliqué blouses that were traditionally made and worn by Kuna women. A woman made her own mola. The molas were quintessential emblems of Kuna-ness. More recently, molas have been sold to tourists and collectors. The organizing principle of mola design is that of repetition with variation. Molas are often based on three themes: (1) geometrical designs; (2) representations of Kuna life; and (3) representations of the Western world (copied from magazines). Molas are filled. Empty space is to be avoided. The molas are not representations of Kuna "ancestors, mythical beings or scenes, or good or bad spirits of a supernatural nature" (Sherzer & Sherzer 1976: 32). They are decorative emblems of Kuna-ness, but they are not supernatural in nature. Nor for that matter are they meant to be interpreted.

This aesthetic differs in some substantial ways from the verbal art of the Kuna. Among the Kuna, the use of the paradigmatic litany of objects in chants creates lists of the known. For example, in the "Way of the Hot Pepper" (a Kuna chant) the kinds of peppers known to the Kuna are listed through parallelism, that is, repetition with variation. The "Way of the Hot Pepper" then is a statement of Kuna ecology via parallelism. In going through the various paradigmatic relationships, the Way is lengthened. This is also a part of Kuna aesthetic practices. Long chants, as well as verbal proclivity, are considered aesthetically pleasing. Silence, on the other hand, is something to be avoided. Chants can be performed either in public at the central

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congress house or in private, when addressed to the spirits. In the public congress there is also much meta-talk about chants. A Kuna chief gives a speech in the central gathering house, and that speech is then interpreted and translated by a ratified interpreter. Kuna chants and speeches are given in esoteric and metaphoric language. The esoteric and metaphoric languages are considered aesthetically pleasing aspects of the chants. They are meant to be interpreted. Curing chants, done in private, are not interpreted.

The Kuna, then, have two poles on a continuum of aesthetic practice. On the one hand, they have the molas, which are seen as beautiful, but are not meant to be interpreted. On the other hand, they have chants and speeches given in the central congress house, which are also beautiful, but which must be interpreted. The organization of both the molas and chants is based on the principle of parallelism. Both attempt to fill emptiness, either with images or with sounds. Finally, both the chants and the molas are understood as the products of creative individuals.

ZUNI AESTHETICS

The Zuni predominately live at Zuni Pueblo and the surrounding area in western New Mexico. The Zuni language, which is still actively spoken, is a language isolate. This has led some amateur scholars to wild speculations concerning the origins of the Zuni, but all that it really means is that the Zuni language cannot be directly connected with other languages based on the methodology of historical linguistics.

Zuni aesthetic practices have been described most usefully by Barbara Tedlock (1984, 1986, 1995) and Dennis Tedlock (1972, 1983). Zuni have two broad ethnoaesthetic categories, *tso'ya* and *attanni*. For purposes here, we can gloss – though these are in no way adequate translations – *tso'ya* as "beautiful" and *attanni* as "dangerous." These categories cross multiple domains, genres, and media. As Barbara Tedlock explains: "In the visual world of the cultural world, *tso'ya* describes flower bouquets, jewelry, pottery, beadwork, the costumes of Zuni Olla Maidens, kachina dance costumes, the arrangement of kachinas in dance line, and the interior decoration of Sha'lako houses, all of which display a great variety of textures, forms, and colors" (1986: 190). Songs, as well, can be considered *tso'ya*, when they are newly composed, "rich in allegorical meaning . . . sung clearly, and when the basically diatonic melody has a stepped construction beginning low and ending high" (1986: 191).

On the other hand, "*attanni* is a quality of the shaggy, dark, matted hair and costumes of ogres, and of crudely naturalistic designs painted on kiva walls as well as on certain types of ceremonial pottery. In auditory culture, the *attanni* aesthetic occurs in traditional songs of the medicine societies . . . which have relatively simple texts and melodies totally lacking in chromaticism" (1986: 193). Things that are *tso'ya* can be shared. Much of the artistic expressions, the kachina designs sold by Zuni artisans, are understood as *tso'ya* and are, therefore, shareable. The kachina are sacred and *tso'ya* and hence shareable. On the other hand, War God images are *attanni* and because they are dangerous they are not shareable. Understanding Zuni aesthetics allows one to understand that not all sacred items are treated identically, nor are they categorized by Zunis identically (B. Tedlock 1995).

NAVAJO AESTHETICS

Much has been written concerning Navajo aesthetics (see McAllester 1954; Witherspoon 1977; Witherspoon & Peterson 1995). The Navajo were traditionally a Southern Athabaskan-speaking people who resided in what is now the American southwest. Today, Navajos (or Diné) live on the Navajo Nation, a reservation that covers portions of Arizona, New Mexico, and Utah, as well as in urban areas throughout the United States. Navajo is still spoken by nearly 120,000 Navajos. Younger Navajos, though, are no longer learning the language at a rate that will guarantee its continued use.

David McAllester summed up Navajo aesthetics as "beauty is that which *does* something" (1954: 72). The Navajo are famous for their elaborate and complex chantway ceremonies (Matthews 1995). Such chantways as the Enemyway, Blessingway, and Nightway can last many nights and work either as a curative or a prophylactic. *Hózhǫ́* ("beauty, harmony, good") and *nizhóni* ("it is good, it is beautiful") are often used by Navajos to

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describe things that are beautiful. The Navajo are also known for their weavings and for their silver work.

Chantways are marked by long complex chants and by the use of drypaintings or sandpaintings. Sandpaintings are used immediately after they have been completed in a ritual setting. The patient is placed on the sandpainting almost immediately after the sandpainting has been completed and the sandpainting is destroyed. This lack of reification of the sandpainting as an enduring artistic piece had been one of the hallmarks of Navajo aesthetics. This is a focus on the process and not on the product. With changes in economics that have been conditioned by incorporation into a capitalist economy that objectifies and trades in commodities, sandpaintings are now being done by Navajos to be sold to tourists and collectors. Weavings too, in theory never completed, are also now sold as objects of trade and commerce. Many weavers leave a flaw in the rug's border, a gap. This aesthetic, that no design is ever truly complete, keeps the rug as a process, and not as a product.

In chants, weavings, and sandpaintings, repetition and repetition with variation often mark their forms. The use of repetition and of repetition with variation of formulaic expressions is often considered aesthetically pleasing. Repetition in fours or twos is common and appreciated as aesthetically pleasing. The sandpaintings are often a series of figures or designs that repeat and vary. In principle, they often reflect complementary concepts. Male and female are frequently put into complementary dialogue. The sacred mountains and sacred directions are often presented in a formulaic manner. However, while repetition and parallelism are important components of Navajo chantways, they are not enough. A chant must be aesthetically pleasing as well (Field & Blackhorse Jr. 2002). Deities respond to chants because of aesthetic considerations.

Onomatopoeia is common in chantways as well as in songs, place names, and contemporary poetry. Such sound symbolism is aesthetically pleasing because it allows a listener to imagine a particular moment. Through sound symbolism one can imagine the moment in which the event occurred because one can imagine the sounds of the moment. Navajo expressive culture is most aesthetically pleasing when it allows listeners to engage in imaginative coordination. Silence is also valued. Speech is understood as considered action and speaking should be done in a careful and thoughtful manner. There is a link between aesthetic practices and traditional Navajo religious views. One of the things that beauty does is to heal and to protect.

One feature of Navajo verbal art is that it is localized. That is, stories begin at named locales and events take place at named and knowable locations. Place names are often considered aesthetically pleasing uses of language. Such place names are often descriptive and are also associated with the ancestors who originally named those places. I am reminded of a November afternoon in 2000, when a Navajo friend, his elderly maternal aunt, and I stood out at the crest of a ridge on the Navajo Nation near where both my friend and his aunt had grown up. We were talking about place names. The aunt had asked if I knew the name for the place we were. I had offered the conventional term for what I thought was the place. She corrected me: "That's what people call it now." She paused. "But it's *T'iis 'ii'áí'*." "Tree line," offered my friend. She went on to explain how there used to be a series of trees along the ridge, but that the trees were gone now. The beauty of the place name came partly from its brevity and descriptiveness, but it also came from an association with the words of her elders, and finally there was also the ability, through an association with her elders and due to its descriptiveness, to recall an earlier time. Aesthetically pleasing uses of language "give an imagination to the listener" as one Navajo consultant told me. As the language shifts from Navajo to English, such aesthetic practices are also lost.

Much contemporary written Navajo poetry has links with the oral traditions (Webster 2006) and shares their rhetorical and poetic devices. Parallelism is found in Navajo chantways and can be evoked in written poetry as well. Interpretation is not highly valued, but reflection is. A good poem, as it was explained to me, is one that makes someone think or reflect. Nor are chantways or, for that matter, contemporary poetry, considered to be the sole invention of a creative individual. Rather

chantways are considered – given the vagaries of life – to be exact repetitions of prior chants. While the individual is important, this importance is mitigated by acknowledgment of the words of those who have come before.

CONCLUSION

Amerindian aesthetics are not identical across groups or across genres and media. Kuna and the Navajo both value speaking and find displays of repetition with variation to be aesthetically pleasing. Yet Kuna fill the world with sounds, while Navajos appreciate silence. Not every aesthetic practice that Amerindians engage in is sacred or religious. The Kuna mola is an aesthetic practice that is considered beautiful but is not meant for sacred reflection. Zuni War Gods, on the other hand, are sacred and *attanni* "dangerous," and they cannot be removed from Zuni control. Images of kachinas, on the other hand, are *tso'ya* "beautiful" and can be shared and, for that matter, sold by Zuni artisans. Understanding Amerindian aesthetic systems can go a long way in aiding understanding of what is and is not meant to be shared cross-culturally. As the Navajos have learned with sandpaintings and the Kuna with molas, aesthetic practices can be adapted by degrees for Western consumerism. The problem of misrecognizing every Amerindian aesthetic practice as "spiritual" continues, however, as does the appropriation of aesthetic practices as well. These problems will continue as long as Amerindians occupy a "spiritual other" place in the Western imagination.

The aim here has been to suggest something of the variety of Amerindian aesthetics, not to summarize an entire hemisphere's aesthetic practices. In the list of further reading below, I suggest contemporary ethnographic accounts of the aesthetic practices from North and South America. The list is eclectic, but I hope that it allows for a motivated rambling through the contemporary literature.

See also AUTHENTICITY AND ART; CULTURAL APPROPRIATION.

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ANTHONY K. WEBSTER

Aquinas, Thomas (1225–1274) Italian Dominican friar whose philosophy and theology ("Thomism") have decisively shaped Catholic thought. Born into an aristocratic Italian family,

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Aquinas disappointed his relatives by failing to enter the affluent Benedictine order, instead becoming a friar of the newly founded Dominican Order of Preachers. Under the tutelage of St. Albert the Great in Cologne, he began to study Aristotle and later became a major figure at the University of Paris and at the papal court. He died on his way to the Council of Lyons; and in 1323 he was canonized.

Aquinas is generally regarded as the greatest of the medieval philosophers. This estimate is hard to fault when one takes account of the scale and variety of his intellectual achievements, for he was the first medieval thinker to work out at length the new synthesis between Catholicism and philosophy. He believed in the idea of cumulative philosophical and religious wisdom, and sought to integrate Neoplatonist, Augustinian, and Anselmian ideas, as well as Aristotelian ones, with scripture, patristic teaching, and evolving Catholic doctrine.

He was a prodigious writer on a multitude of topics. With a few exceptions (such as Jacques Maritain and Armand Maurer), however, philosophers inspired by Aquinas have had little to say about aesthetics. This reflects the character of his own writings, for while he offers remarks on the nature of beauty and of art-making, he has no treatises or extensive theory on these subjects. All the same, it is possible to extract from his work ideas of enduring interest for philosophical aesthetics.

The two most important sources of these ideas are brief remarks in his *Commentary on the Divine Names* (*De divinis nominibus*) and in the *Summa theologiae*. In the first of these he observes that something is not beautiful because we like it, but that our liking for it is due to its beauty (c.IV, *lectio* 10), having earlier remarked that anyone who depicts a thing does so for the sake of making something beautiful; and that each thing is beautiful to the extent that it manifests its proper form (c.IV, *lectio* 5). In the *Summa*, this notion of manifest form occurs implicitly within the famous Thomist analysis of beauty: "Three things are required for beauty. First, integrity or perfection [*integritas sive perfectio*], for what is defective is thereby ugly; second, proper proportion or consonance [*proportio sive consonantia*]; and third, clarity [*claritas*]" (*Summa theologiae* 1, question 39, article 8; see also *Summa theologiae* 1–2, q. 54, a. 1: "Beauty is the compatibility of parts in accordance with the nature of a thing").

Before commenting on these ideas, it will be as well to introduce another of Aquinas's interesting claims. This is the suggestion that beauty is a *transcendental* quality identical in an entity to that thing's *being*, its *unity*, its *goodness*, and its *truth*. Moreover, according to Aquinas, it is part of what it is to be a transcendental quality that everything possesses it. Thus, "There is nothing which does not share in goodness and beauty, for according to its form each thing is both good and beautiful" (*De divinis nominibus* c.IV, *lectio* 5).

The key to understanding what otherwise appear obscure remarks is Aquinas's notion of *form* – more precisely, substantial form (*forma rei*), that which makes a thing what it is, constitutes its principle of organization and (in the case of something animate) of life. Carbon, cars, and cats all have organizing forms – chemical, mechanical, and biological, respectively. The form of a thing gives it existence, and inasmuch as its being is an object of value for it or for others it has *goodness*. Equally, when that existence is affirmed in the mind of a thinker the thing has *truth*, and when it is viewed as an object of contemplation it takes on the character of *beauty*. In speaking of goodness and beauty (as of being and truth), therefore, one is not speaking of intrinsically different properties but of one and the same quality considered in relation to different concerns. In contemporary philosophical language the difference is one of sense or "intension" and not of reference or "extension."

In short, beauty is only ascribable in the context of actual or potential contemplation of the form of a thing. This introduces an element of subjectivity but relates it directly to an objective ground, the nature of the object being contemplated. The earlier analysis of beauty now emerges as an account of the necessary conditions under which the meeting of an object and a subject gives rise to aesthetic experience. The thing in question must be possessed of the elements or aspects apt to something having the relevant form or nature (*integritas*), these elements must be properly related to one another (*proportio*), and these states must be manifest when the entity is perceived or contemplated (*claritas*).

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This interpretation suggests parallels with Kantian aesthetics. For Aquinas is claiming that the experience of beauty arises directly as a type of intellectual satisfaction taken in the contemplation of elements apt for cognition, when one's present interest in them is neither practical nor scientific. Where Aquinas differs from Kant, however, is in regarding the contemplated forms as being structural elements of a mind-independent reality. On which, if either, of these philosophers this difference reflects greater credit is a matter beyond discussion here. It should be clear, however, that Aquinas has interesting ideas to offer to those who hope to integrate an account of beauty and aesthetic experience within a broadly realist epistemology and metaphysics.

See also MEDIEVAL AND RENAISSANCE AESTHETICS; BEAUTY; KANT.

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JOHN HALDANE

Aristotle (384–322 BCE) Greek philosopher and scientist of immense, enduring influence. After studying in Plato's Academy he founded his own school, the Lyceum. Often regarded as the first philosopher to admit the autonomous character of aesthetic activity and experience, in direct reaction against supposed Platonic moralism. But the full picture is more complex than this. Aristotle's statement in *Poetics* 25 that "correct standards in poetry are not the same as in politics or any other art" asserts a kind of aesthetic independence for individual art forms. But his description of tragedy as "mimesis [i.e., representation] of actions and life" (*Poetics* 6) signals a fundamental link between experience of art and experience of life in general.

The framework of Aristotle's thinking in this area (see *Poetics*, ch. 1) is a classification of certain activities as mimetic, that is representational cum expressive forms of image-making. Each of these counts for him as a *technê*, a specialized expertise subject to conscious, rational control. The group in question includes poetry, painting, sculpture, dance, and even music. The latter is mimetic for Aristotle, as it was for many Greeks, in virtue of embodying what he calls tonal and rhythmic "likenesses" (or correlates) of "movements of the soul" (*Politics* 8.5). It is important, however, to distinguish two Aristotelian principles of mimesis that are often confused. Mimetic representation, as in poetry, involves imaginative simulation of aspects of reality. But the principle that "all art is mimesis of nature" (misleadingly translated as "all art imitates nature": "all art follows the pattern of nature" would be better) is of a different order: it applies to the production of all kinds of artifacts and posits a parallelism of teleology, but *without* conscious imitation, between human craftsmanship and what Aristotle sees as the purposive shaping of form into matter by nature. This second principle (found at, e.g., *Physics* 2.2, 2.8) must encompass the musico-poetic and figurative arts as well, but Aristotle never appeals to it in his discussions of them.

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Aristotle's conception of mimetic representation is seen most fully in his treatment of tragedy (with subordinate treatment of epic) in the *Poetics*. By analyzing the genre's qualitative constituents (plot, character, etc.), Aristotle works out a normative view of the dynamic relationship between a tragic action, in which human lives are exposed to major suffering through the fallibility (*hamartia*: "error" or "fault") of the agents, and the audience's defining emotional response ("pity and fear"). Although recognizing that tragedy is a highly stylized, elevated art form, Aristotle believes that it deals with *possible* events (esp. ch. 9), events that audiences can understand and judge in ways continuous with those they use to interpret life outside the theater. The *Poetics* repeatedly underlines this point by appealing to criteria of "necessity and/or probability," criteria which call *both* for "internal" consistency in the terms of the represented world, *and* for the intelligibility of that world by the standards of the audience's beliefs about reality as a whole.

But Aristotle goes further. In *Poetics* 9 he states: "Poetry is more philosophical and more serious than history, for it speaks more of universals, while history speaks of particulars." Aristotle does not mean by this that poetry offers abstractions or schematic types of people and events. What he appears to mean is that successful poetic plots differ from the contingency of ordinary life (*individual* lives are not artistically unified, he stresses: *Poetics* 8). They have a purer, more coherent intelligibility; universals are, as it were, woven into their dramatic fabric. The achievement of such intelligibility is undoubtedly connected, in Aristotle's thinking, with the principle of artistic unity. "Just as in the other mimetic arts . . . , so the plot-structure of tragedy . . . should be a representation of a unitary and complete action" (*Poetics* 8).

Aristotle's notion of unity is not strictly formalist in character. All order and beauty depend on the nature and function of the objects in which they are realized (*Politics* 7.4). Unity in mimetic art is the meaningful organization of the representational content of a poem or other work; the criteria of wholeness and completeness which *Poetics* 7 sets out, with the formula of "beginning, middle and end," cannot be detached from the significance of the "actions and life" (*Poetics* 6) the poem depicts. Chapter 9's remarks about "universals" follow directly from the discussion of unity: unity, probability, and the universals built into a poetic structure of action are mutually reinforcing elements in a theory of poetry that endows artistic images with a coherent sense of human meaning. Whether this theory entails a rationalization of "the tragic" remains a challenging question about Aristotle's agenda in the *Poetics*.

Form and content are intertwined in Aristotle's account of aesthetic objects; and his conception of aesthetic experience possesses matching features. *Poetics* 4 (cf. *Rhetoric* 1.11) gives a cognitive grounding to the pleasure that arises from contemplation of mimetic works: the viewer seeks to understand and reason out each element in an image or poem. *Politics* 8.5, discussing music but widening the point, confirms this: "habituation to feeling pain and pleasure in the case of likenesses [i.e., mimesis] is close to being so disposed towards the truth." Aesthetic responses are not *sui generis* but correlated with larger structures of experience. That correlation allows, however, for important variations. *Poetics* 4 registers the pleasure taken in the depiction of objects that would be found painful in life; this, implicitly, is pertinent to tragedy. "Art" can transform, as well as capturing the underlying principles of, "life."

Aristotle's model of aesthetic pleasure remains, even so, resistant to any strong version of aestheticism: it combines the cognitive and the affective. He describes the pleasure of tragedy as "that which comes from pity and fear through mimesis' (*Poetics* 14). Grasping the embodied universals of a poetic representation is not a matter of abstract comprehension; it involves sensitive absorption in the world of the play and carries with it an intensely emotional reaction to the imagined characters and events. Plato had feared that such experience could subvert reason by its "bewitching" power over the emotions; Aristotle believes that good mimetic art elicits responses in which reason and emotion are integrated.

While Aristotle diverges from the more uncompromising of Plato's attempts to subject aesthetic standards to a unified framework of ethical and metaphysical value, he does not

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aim to establish an outright autonomy for mimetic art. He allows it considerable freedom of scope (on a scale that runs from realism to idealism: see the start of *Poetics* 25) and denies that artistic standards can simply be equated with those of morality or politics in general. But he nonetheless regards both the making and the reception of poetry, painting, and music as special forms of engaged contemplation (*theôria*) through which the human need to understand the world finds one kind of fulfillment.

See also AESTHETICS IN ANTIQUITY; CATHARSIS; PLATO.

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art *see* ARTIFACT, A. AS; AUTHENTICITY AND A.; COGNITIVE SCIENCE AND A.; COGNITIVE VALUE OF A.; CONCEPTUAL A.; DEFINITION OF "A."; EROTIC A. AND OBSCENITY; EVOLUTION, A., AND AESTHETICS; FUNCTION OF A.; MARXISM AND A.; MASS A.; MORALITY AND A.; PERFORMANCE A.; POPULAR A.; PSYCHOANALYSIS AND A.; RELIGION AND A.; SCIENCE AND A.; SENSES AND A.; TECHNOLOGY AND A.; THEORIES OF A.; TRUTH IN A.; UNIVERSALS IN A.

art and experience *see* SENSES AND ART

"art for art's sake" *see* AESTHETICISM

art history What a history requires is a narrative framework relating what comes earlier to what happens later. A culture could have art, and even a concept of art, without having any conception of art history. That culture might make art, and theorize about that activity, without thinking that its art had a history. Writing a history of art requires thinking of its development as having a historical structure.

The first extended history of European art appears in an odd place, book 35 of Pliny's *Natural History*, between the discussion of medicinal drugs in book 34 and the description of stones in book 36. As modern commentators (Kris & Kurz 1979) have observed, the anecdotes that Pliny presents about various Greek painters recur frequently in accounts of Renaissance artists. Pliny's history of naturalistic art is told in terms of progress. Early, later, latest is good, better, best: such is the story of the development of naturalism. Vasari's history of art of the Italian Renaissance from the time of Cimabue and Giotto to his own era, two and a half centuries later, employs a similar framework. In such a history, once image-making begins, it continues, this model suggests, until the tradition dies.

In one way, beginnings and endings have a certain symmetry. Whatever art comes before the beginning, like what comes after the end of the tradition, is not part of the history of art. In another way, however, endings raise special problems. Vasari explains in 1550 that he judges each artist relative to the standards of that man's time: "Although Giotto was admirable in his own day, I do not know what we should say of him or the other ancients if they had lived in the time of Michelangelo" (1963: iv. 291). Insofar as the claim of his account is that Michelangelo is an absolutely great artist, a figure whose work sums up the whole tradition, it is very hard to see what could come next. At earlier times, of course, great artists had successors, but given Vasari's narrative framework one has difficulty in imagining Michelangelo's successors.

Once the cycle is started, it is hard to see how it can conclude, except in decay which, after some interval, may be followed by a rebirth of the tradition. Vasari's working assumption is that the cycle of development in antiquity, as described by Pliny, repeats in his own time.

That repetition is possible only because medieval art marks a break in the tradition, a gap between the development of illusionism in antiquity and the rebirth of that artistic tradition in the Renaissance. A modern historian of technology might think that indefinite progress is possible; when employing Pliny's and Vasari's organic model, such a view of history is hard to imagine.

Here we encounter an important conceptual complication, the development of which began with Winckelmann's *Reflections on the Imitation of Greek Works in Painting and Sculpture* of 1755. Winckelmann both discusses the tradition that concerns him most deeply, the story of Greek sculpture, and explains its relationship to art of the Renaissance. In some ways, he admits, the modern artists are better: "In the science of perspective modern painters are clearly superior . . . Various subjects . . . have likewise been raised to a higher degree of perfection in modern times, for example, landscapes and animal species" (1987: 59).

Gombrich has argued that "rather than Winckelmann's *History of Ancient Art* . . . it is Hegel's *Lectures on Aesthetics* . . . which should be regarded as the founding document of the modern study of art . . . they contain the first attempt ever made to survey and systematize the entire history of art" (1984: 51). While Winckelmann's account remains focused on Greek art, it is Hegel who provides a way of linking art of antiquity to painting of the Renaissance. For Hegel, it should be added, what constitutes "the entire history of art" is defined by the concerns of early nineteenth-century European scholarship. He did not know much about Chinese and Indian art; he does not discuss Japanese painting or African sculpture.

Unlike Pliny, Vasari, and Winckelmann, Hegel does not focus on the history of the development of illusionistic painting and sculpture within one culture. He explains how the art of quite different cultures is part of one continuous story, a universal history of art. Insofar as each culture possesses its own values, it too may express them in its art. The goal of art history is to identify the relationship between a culture and its art. Thus, to understand Dutch art of the Golden Age, "we must ask about Dutch history" (Hegel 1975: 169). The Dutch struggle against Spanish rule, the feats of their maritime empire, and their pleasure in communal festivities are all expressed in their art. A history of the art of any culture might be written in this way. The Japanese and the Africans can also express themselves in their art.

One consequence of Hegel's approach is to suggest that each culture must have its own independent artistic ideals. Wölfflin develops this idea. The classical and the baroque "are like two languages, in which everything can be said, although each has its strength in a different direction" (1908: 12). Wölfflin's history employs a formalist approach, explaining the development of art as a self-contained process without much reference to the larger culture. Another development of Hegelian art history occurs in the diverse approaches of art historians who focus on the social history of art. As Hegel sees Dutch art as expressing the characteristic political, religious, and social concerns of that culture, so these historians treat each culture as capable of expressing its own values in its art.

Both the formalist approaches and these social histories can describe the art of very diverse cultures. So, for example, American Abstract Expressionist painting of the 1940s can be understood formally as developing the flattened space found earlier in Cubism, and in the early modernist art of Cézanne and Monet (Greenberg 1961). But it may also be explained as an expression of post-World War II American culture. The formalist finds similarities between artists whose work looks different. Thus in Wölfflin's account, not only Rembrandt and Rubens, but also Vermeer and Bernini, must be linked under the rubric "baroque." If the danger of formalism is the need to appeal to such a fiction of a "period style," the problem of a social history of art is that it may link art with the general society in all too facile a fashion. These problems with both formalist and social histories become more pressing as we approach the present. It is difficult enough to identify the common features of the work of Bernini, Pietro da Cortona, Borromini, and all the other artists working in Rome in the era of the baroque. But when we look at the culture of New York during the 1940s, to speak of that as the era of American Abstract Expressionism really is problematic.

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We must connect work of quite diverse painters by reference to a period style; we must exclude from the account painters working in other styles; and we need to explain how American philosophy and the larger culture are related to that art.

Recognizing that both formalist and social histories of art must thus employ fictions is only to acknowledge that they, like any history, have to use such devices in order to tell a story (Carrier 1991). It is important to recognize connections between the literary structures of art histories and those employed by creative writers. When Vasari treats the collective creation of artists from Cimabue to Michelangelo as akin to an organism which is born, develops to maturity, and dies, he is only using an analogy. Vasari's analogy has an important influence on how he thinks about art history. An organism must die, but there is, in principle, no reason why an artistic tradition may not continue indefinitely.

Any story must be selective. The art historian, like the creative writer, chooses to describe those events that he can fit into a plausible narrative. But in one essential way, literature and history are different. The stories of the novelist seek merely to be convincing; the narrative of the art historian aims for truth. Wölfflin wants to understand how Raphael's High Renaissance classicism anticipates the baroque, although Raphael could not think of his art in that way; Greenberg seeks to grasp the relationship between Cubism and Abstract Expressionism, although the Cubists could not imagine that later movement.

Can we both exercise our modern sensibility and simultaneously be aware that the artist whose work we study saw it differently? When, for example, we see a Rubens crucifixion, may we apply to it "some concepts derived from psycho-analysis – some such notions as the release of aggression with the displacement of guilt" (Podro 1982: 214), which, though alien to Rubens's culture, express in our vocabulary how his contemporaries saw that work? These questions are unanswerable. Any translation of Christian ideas into a psychoanalytic vocabulary will be controversial. The best we can do is both understand Rubens's culture in its own terms, and interpret it as best we can in our modern vocabulary.

The development of art history by A. Riegl, Wölfflin, and E. Panofsky out of the legacy of Hegel (Podro 1982) requires pruning that theory of Hegel's metaphysics. For the modern art historian to say that a culture expresses itself in its art is only a manner of speaking, not a theory to be taken literally. Modern art historians work within the general framework established by these founding fathers of their discipline, collecting information about artists and periods not yet intensively studied by the precursors, yet without abandoning this historical framework itself. But when now we collect in our museums not only Greek and Italian Renaissance art, the Dutch painting that Hegel discusses, and the baroque works Wölfflin deals with, but also Chinese and Japanese painting, Hindu sculpture, African artifacts, weaving and other decorative work from many cultures, and modernist and postmodernist art, then the claim that it is possible to write a general history of art seems increasingly questionable. Insofar as a history is a story in which all of these artworks are to be set within one narrative framework, the claim that there can be some general interpretative framework adequate to all art now seems highly problematic (Elkins 2002).

Until relatively recently, the best-known English-language survey histories have focused on the story of Western art. Chinese scrolls, Hindu sculpture, and Islamic decorations make only cameo appearances. And while there are elaborate specialist histories of art in China, India, and the Islamic world, and also in Africa and the other cultures without writing, as yet this material is not integrated into these general histories. But it starts to become apparent that we need a world art history (Onians 2004; Elkins 2007). We need it because we have to do justice to art from all cultures, and also because of the legitimate political demands raised within our multicultural societies. How is it possible, then, to develop narratives that take account of art from all cultures without imposing a bias based on the traditional studies of European art (Carrier 2008)? Answering this question is the central concern facing the profession right now.

See also MEDIEVAL AND RENAISSANCE AESTHETICS; AFRICAN AESTHETICS; CHINESE AESTHETICS;

GADAMER; GOMBRICH; HEGEL; INDIAN AESTHETICS; ISLAMIC AESTHETICS; MODERNISM AND POSTMODERNISM; TRADITION.

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artifact, art as Until recently, everyone had assumed without question that art is artifactual – that is, that a work of art is a humanly created object. Traditional philosophers of art attempted to defend their claims that art is expressive, symbolic, or of some other nature, but it never occurred to them to defend their common view that art is artifactual. An object need not be physical in order to be humanly created; for example, a poem or a theory are humanly created and hence are nonphysical artifacts.

Why, then, have philosophers of art become concerned in recent times with the question of whether artifactuality is or is not a necessary condition for being art? One reason has its origins in certain developments within the philosophy of language: namely, Ludwig Wittgenstein's view about how certain words apply to their objects. These words apply, Wittgenstein maintains, in virtue of "family resemblances" among the objects to which they apply, rather than in virtue of the objects possessing properties that satisfy necessary and sufficient conditions.

Paul Ziff (1953), Morris Weitz (1956), and William Kennick (1958) were the first to attempt to apply this linguistic thesis to the philosophy of art. These three and subsequently other philosophers claimed that "art" (or "work of art") does not have any necessary and sufficient conditions that must be satisfied in order for something to be a member of the class of works of art. Rather, they maintain that the members of the class of works of art belong to that class in virtue of the "family resemblances" that obtain among the members. Thus, work of art *A* is a member of the class of artworks because it shares a property with work of art *B*, and work of art *B* is a member of the class because it shares a property with work of art *C*, and so on. Work of art *A* and work of art Z, however, may not share any property and do not need to. Although work *A* and work Z do not share any property, they are related to one another through the property-sharing of other members of the class of works of art. Every member of the class of works of art will share a property with at least one other work (and probably many more), but a given pair of works need not share any property. If the members of the class of works of art do not need to share *any* property, then they do not need to share the property of artifactuality. And, in fact, these philosophers claim that there are works of art that are not artifacts, these nonartifacts having become works of art by sharing a property with a prior established work of art. Weitz, for example, claims that a piece of driftwood can become a work of art when someone notices its resemblance to some

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sculpture and says, "That driftwood is a lovely piece of sculpture." Driftwood, sunsets, and other nonartifacts can become works of art in this way. Thus, according to Ziff, Kennick, Weitz, and company, the traditional assumption that every work of art is an artifact is shown to be false.

There are several difficulties with this way of conceiving of art. First, if resembling a prior established work of art is the basic way that something becomes a work of art, it is going to be virtually impossible to keep everything from becoming a work of art, for everything resembles everything else in *some* way. Second, "the new view" gives the impression that sharing a property with, or resembling, a prior established work of art is the only way that something can become a work of art. If, however, every work of art had to become art by resembling a prior established work of art, then an infinite regress of works receding into the past would be generated and no work of art could ever have come into being. Some other way of becoming a work of art would be required to block the regress, and the only plausible way would be that the regress-blocking work or works came into being as a result of an artifact's being created. Thus, this new view requires two distinct and different kinds of art – art as conceived of by Ziff, Weitz, and Kennick, which may be called "resemblance art," and what may be called "artifactual art."

Artifactual art has a temporal priority. Of course, it is not just that artifactual art is required to block the regress. Even given the new way of conceiving of art, much of the art that has been created has come into being as artifactual art. Thus, artifactual art, with its one necessary condition (artifactuality), forms an unacknowledged basis or core of the new conception of art. The two kinds of art required by the new conception have two very different bases: the one derives from acts of human creativity and the other from acts of noticing similarities. This striking difference suggests that it is the members of the class of artifactual art that we have in mind when we speak *literally* of works of art, and that the other class of objects is a metaphorical derivative.

Suppose, however, that both classes are literally art. This just means that it is and always was the class of artifactual art that philosophers have been interested in theorizing about. Traditional philosophers of art have sought to discover the essential nature of a particular class of human artifacts, and even if the members of this class of objects do not have any other interesting property or properties in common, they are all artifacts. Artifactuality is built into the philosophy of art because philosophers have always been interested in theorizing about a set of objects that are produced by human creativity. The fact that another class of objects can be generated by means of resemblance to the members of the class of artifactual art provides no reason to divert philosophers of art from their traditional task.

There is another reason to challenge the artifactuality of art that is quite different from those based on a Wittgensteinian conception of language. How are philosophers of art to deal with things such as the urinal that Duchamp entered in that now famous art show under the title *Fountain*? The urinal is an artifact of the plumbing trade, but is *Fountain* Duchamp's artistic artifact? Driftwood and urinals are the materials of a class of artworks that can be called "found art." In some instances the material basis of a work is already an artifact when found (the urinal), in others it is not (the driftwood), but in both cases, something further is done by the artist in addition to finding the item. The most minimal thing that could be done is presenting the item as art to an artworld audience by showing it in some manner or other. Assume that this (possibly along with some other conditions that may well be present) is sufficient to make these items artworks. Is it sufficient to make these items artifacts? In the case of the urinal, since it is already an artifact, we can assume that the artwork it becomes is also one. But what about the driftwood? This seems at best a borderline or minimal case of artifactuality, if it is a case of artifactuality at all.

There are at least two other kinds of artworks that might be regarded as good candidates for being nonartifactual artworks: some works that are ontologically abstract and some conceptual works. Ontologically abstract artworks are not those that are nonrepresentational but are those that have more than one instance or occurrence. Musical works are instanced in their performances, novels in their copies. There

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are some who claim that even ontologically abstract works are artifacts, since they are humanly created entities (such as Levinson 1980; Thomasson 1999). However, there are others who deny this (such as Kivy 1993; Dodd 2000). They claim that musical works, for example, are abstract sound structures that exist eternally and hence are discovered, not created. Some even deny that abstract objects can be created (Dodd 2000). If this view is right, musical works are not artifacts. Of course, this is a conditional claim. It depends on the correctness of a controversial and highly contested view about the ontology of art. So we do not yet have an unchallenged example of clearly nonartifactual art.

Some conceptual artworks provide another set of possible examples. Consider the famous piece by Robert Barry entitled or specified by: *All the things I know but of which I am not at the moment thinking – 1:36 pm, June 15, 1969*. It is not clear just what this piece consists in. Is it the very beliefs referred to by the specification? The set of beliefs is not an artifact. Is it the act of referring to those beliefs or the inscription or utterance of the words? Would any of these be more plausible candidates for being an artifact?

From the first sentence of this entry, it has been assumed that an artifact is anything that is humanly created. Nor have we been very careful to define the extension of the humanly created. Does it include things we do, as well as the products deliberately made in the course our doings? In any case, we have looked for counterexamples to the claim that artworks are necessarily artifacts in things that are not humanly created, such as driftwood, abstract structures, beliefs, or concepts.

Some argue, however, that "artifact" has a much more narrowly circumscribed meaning. According to Randall Dipert, an artifact is something intentionally modified to serve as a means to an end whose modified properties were intended by their maker to be recognized as having been altered for that, or some other, use (1993: 29–30). Stephen Davies claims that an artifact in the primary sense is something modified by work, which, he thinks, implies that it is an object that is manufactured via the direct manipulation of a material item that preexists the creation of the artifact (1991: 123–4). Dipert's and Davies's definition of artifact seem, at first sight rather similar. They both involve reference to modifying something or other. Dipert, however, requires that a genuine artifact has to communicate something, viz., that it is a thing made for some specific use. Davies has no such requirement. Davies claims that artifacts must result from the manipulation of a material object and are themselves material objects. Dipert does not claim this. He thinks some actions are artifacts. It is not clear whether he thinks there are also abstract artifacts.

For someone who agrees with Davies's understanding of "artifact," or who decides to adopt this conception for more pragmatic reasons such as greater precision, the issue of whether all artworks are artifacts becomes crystal clear. Even if all artworks are humanly created, they are not all artifacts.

See also CONCEPTUAL ART; DEFINITION OF "ART."

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GEORGE DICKIE & ROBERT STECKER

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"artworld" A term that has both a philosophical and an ordinary meaning. Philosophically, the idea of an "artworld" serves as a device for analyzing "art" and the "aesthetic." Artworld theory makes these concepts the products of certain social practices so specialized that persons engaged in them appear to be operating in an autonomous world. In the vernacular, the "artworld" is the actual society of persons whose interactions affect the valuation of works of art. What these meanings have in common is an understanding of art as being the consequence of institutionalized activities.

That art should be thought of as situated in a special world of its own is a notion of somewhat recent fabrication, and one quite alien to antiquity's robust idea of art as central to practical human life. Plato and Aristotle located artistic activity and appreciative experience among practices meant to promote the goals of cognition and conduct. But, subsequently, at least two lines of thought converged to drive art from this central location.

The first was triggered by Plato's reasons for doubting how effectively art can realize vital practical functions. In response, art's apologists have tended to isolate it from everyday activities or experiences as a stratagem for defending its value. They typically define art (or the appropriate experience of it) as autonomous, arguing that art characteristically induces unique ways of feeling or thinking, or is the product of a unique kind of activity, or is at least a unique product of ordinary activities. The result is to construe art as independent of practical contexts, and aesthetic value as irreducible. This strategy blunts Plato's complaints by removing art from the constraints usually associated with cognition and conduct, but it also threatens art's place in the everyday world.

A second line of thought which makes the notion of situating art in an environment of its own attractive is fuelled by a widespread skepticism about finding an essential property internal to all artworks. If there is no such property, then whatever warrants the identification of some objects as art must be found in the contexts in which these objects are situated. But if to recognize something as art is also to accept it as independent of contexts occasioned by the everyday world, its being art must be conditional on circumstances that obtain in a special artworld. Several late twentieth-century theorists, notably Arthur C. Danto and George Dickie, develop this thought by arguing that objects qualify as art in virtue of being the subject of practices characteristic of a special world exclusive to art.

In brief, the contemporary philosophical conception of the artworld locates what is definitive of art in the application of some set of practices, whether these be activities which treat art organizationally, historically, or theoretically. To hypothesize an artworld is to explain that objects qualify as art by being "institutionalized' – that is, by operating or being operated on within a definitive institutional framework.

But the relevant institutions need not constitute an all-encompassing world that embraces all the kinds of human activities. So such questions as whether the artworld is democratic or elitist are not automatically relevant; they are germane only where there is reason to construe artworld systems as political. On the one hand, it seems parochial for philosophers to posit unique aesthetic practices when so wide a range of explanations of institutionalized phenomena is available in the work of other disciplines. The more thoroughly the artworld is conceived in terms of principles which operate also in the world of practical life, the more misguided seems the drive to separate these worlds. On the other hand, to operationalize the artworld in social scientific terms is to accept reductionism.

In the vernacular, to speak of the artworld is to refer to networks of persons engaged either vocationally or avocationally in activities that affect the buying and selling of art. But to recognize the power of such persons by no means solves the problem of whether their actions determine, or are determined by, aesthetic or other values. This brings us finally to the question of whether the conception of the artworld is simply another relativizing notion.

To what kinds of systematized circumstances is the identification of objects as art to be tied, and may these encompass, or must they exclude, systems that also are constitutive of the practical world? Are the art systems of different times and places frameworks to be thought of as begetting separate worlds?

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Fragmenting aesthetic contexts in this way makes it hard to explain the undoubted ease with which cultures adopt and appreciate each other's art. Or are the divergent systems to be incorporated into one complex artworld scheme so as to account for art's demonstrable ability to diffuse transculturally and transhistorically? If this latter alternative is the case, then how are we to decide which systems' values are to be marginalized? Thus, the most vexing disagreements about the interpretation and evaluation of art reappear, unresolved, within artworld theory.

Attempts to define art as the product of the artworld, which is characterized as an informally structured institution, are controversial in ways already indicated. But the idea that identifying and appreciating artworks involves seeing them in relation to art practices and traditions that they continue, develop, or rebel against – which was always an important strand in the accounts of the artworld proposed by both Danto and Dickie – is now widely accepted by philosophers of art and plays an important role in theories of art interpretation and of the ontology of artworks.

See also ARISTOTLE; DANTO; DEFINITION OF "ART"; DICKIE; FUNCTION OF ART; INTERPRETATION; ONTOLOGY OF ARTWORKS; PLATO.

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ANITA SILVERS

attitude, aesthetic *see* AESTHETIC ATTITUDE

authenticity and art Works of art stand in multiple complex relationships to their originating contexts. Some of these relationships are grouped together as matters of authenticity and inauthenticity. Broadly understood, a work of art possesses authenticity when it is "true" to its authorial and/or cultural origins by reflecting beliefs and values held by its creator and/or creator's community. However, different eras, artforms, and critical traditions emphasize distinct relationships between art and its sociohistorical origins, so prominent species of authenticity display considerable variety.

Individual and cultural authenticities are associated with competing artistic values. Cultural authenticity generally requires conformity with established cultural norms. In contrast, authorial or individual authenticity requires some degree of originality and therefore tends to involve departure from established norms. Evaluating literary texts for authenticity relative to authorial intentions, we can ask which edition of James Joyce's *Ulysses* is most faithful to his intentions. Viewing *Ulysses* relative to contemporaneous cultural practices, its radical innovations are more authentically modernist than Irish. As this example suggests, the same work can be authentic relative to one classification and inauthentic relative to another.

Three important uses of "authentic" fall outside the scope of this entry. The first involves inauthenticity due to forgery. The second involves the degree to which works remain intact following restoration. The third derives from functional accounts of art, where authentic art advances art's proper ends and inauthentic art does not. This broad category is emphasized in Continental philosophy and plays a prominent role in, for instance, writings of Martin Heidegger and Theodor Adorno.

Questions about artistic authenticity seem to have arisen when philosophers and artists began to question eighteenth-century expectations about artistic beauty (Trilling 1971: 92–100). As art came to be valued as a vehicle for self-exploration, standards of beauty came to be regarded as cultural impositions that restricted self-fulfillment and expression. A poem or painting achieved expressive authenticity by challenging prevailing taste. By the end of the nineteenth century, it was commonly thought

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that authenticity was diluted by any concessions made for the sake of commercial viability. Thus, to experience "authentic" Beethoven we turn to his late string quartets, which baffled his contemporaries, rather than to *Twenty-Five Scottish Songs* (Op. 108), his piano arrangements of existing folk songs undertaken for commercial profit. However, this tradition prioritizes authenticity relative to self-expression – a standard that applies to Beethoven's music but not, for example, to bronze statutes of Buddha produced in seventeenth-century Tibet, which are authentic or not relative to established iconography. Applied to "traditional" and non-Western art, the opposition of commerce and authenticity introduces questionable assumptions about cultural purity and cultural change (Shiner 1994). The opposition of commerce and authenticity is also challenged by the fact that multiple issues about expressive authenticity arise within the commercial marketplace of popular culture, as evidenced by blues music (Rudinow 1994).

The performing arts highlight additional issues of authenticity as issues of work authenticity are supplemented by questions about performance authenticity. Debates about the possibility and desirability of authentic performance of "early" and "period" music have become an especially rich arena for exploring the tensions between different modes of authenticity. Different performances of the same work can be evaluated as more or less authentic by reference to distinct goals and performing styles of different performers, which can, in turn, be evaluated by reference to (and conflict with) goals indicated or presupposed by the work's composer. Hence, the ideal of authentic self-expression puts a performer's expressive authenticity at cross-purposes with the goal of authentically rendering all the work's contemporaneous properties (Kivy 1995:138–42).

These issues have also enriched discussion of the ontology of art. For example, an intuitively simple ontology of the performing arts regards works as structural types. On this model, performances occur in order to make these types accessible to audiences. However, different expressive and aesthetic properties are present in different performances of a common type. Is a musical performance authentic if the musicians play the correct notes but fail to realize the composer's expressive goals? If musical works are pure sound structures, then such questions are trivialized, because expressive authenticity in performance is unrelated to the work's identity and provenance. Alternatively, if we construe authenticity as a matter of the work's essential relationship to its origins, then the variety of questions that are posed about authentic musical performance suggests a corresponding variety in the historically contingent properties that belong to various musical works. Let us explore three of these issues.

First, a sound structure can be performed with different timbres, as when the same piece is played on a harpsichord and then on a piano. Many composers constrain timbre choice by specifying instrumentation. So we do not think that a string quartet receives an authentic performance if the four string parts are performed with a tuba, a kazoo, and two tin whistles. However, a simplistic adherence to composer-specified instrumentation can generate its own sonic inauthenticity. Because Mozart wrote for valve-less horns, the use of modern horns for performances of his horn concertos yields horn lines that are audibly different from those that Mozart expected to be derived from his scores. The violin parts of these concertos also sound different (and louder, altering the balance of instruments) when played with modern synthetic strings in place of historically correct animal-gut strings.

So are performances of Mozart's horn concertos more authentic when performed on valve-less horns and gut-strung violins? Since he wrote with those sounds in mind, it would seem so. Yet he did not specify these expectations. We surmise what Mozart expected the audience to hear by determining what was available to him. Hence, we must consult historical practices in order to combine explicit instructions (e.g., a musical score) with contemporaneous performance conventions in order to achieve authentic realization of a composer's music (Davies 2001: 103–7).

It does not follow that authenticity is fully achieved through sonic authenticity, i.e., by producing the sounds that the composer would anticipate hearing under the best circumstances. Many opera arias in the soprano and alto range in Italian *opera seria* were composed

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for male castrati. In the nineteenth century, moral qualms led audiences to reject this performance practice. The music can be transposed for tenors, or sung at pitch by male countertenors or by female singers, though none of these reproduces the combination of power and high pitch for which castrati were renowned. More recently, electronic manipulation has been used to duplicate a castrato's unique combination of range, timbre, and volume. Although sonically authentic, this electronically created sonic facsimile is rejected as too inauthentic for actual opera performance. It obliterates the *performance* art that made the best castrati singers into international stars. Human performance, even if not sonically faithful to what the castrato could achieve, is still regarded as more desirable than sonic mimicry.

Second, a musical sound structure is always interpreted by its realization in a performance style. For example, eighteenth-century violinists appear to have used vibrato quite sparingly. In the twentieth century, continuous vibrato became fashionable. Haydn's violin concertos can be played with continuous vibrato or with very little, but either approach will present audiences with the notes and structures that are actually stipulated in Haydn's scores. Hence, performance technique introduces another facet to authenticity.

Although it might seem obvious that a performance always has greater authenticity by virtue of utilizing contemporaneous performance practices with instruments of the intended type and from the composer's era, there are competing considerations. It is tempting to say that historically appropriate instrumentation is authentic because it reflects the composer's intentions. However, it is easy to find examples of composers who recognized the deficiencies of the available instruments. It is unlikely that Beethoven desired that the "Appassionata" piano sonata (Op. 57) should only be played on fortepianos of the sort available to him in 1807, whose strings broke when he played its most tumultuous passages. Hence, some performances might be more authentic by virtue of being performed as the composer would have wanted them had later instruments been available. Extending this line of thought, authenticity of aesthetic or expressive effect might demand radical departures from the instrumentation specified. Bach's idea of massed musical forces was puny by our standards, so realizing Bach's intentions requires rearranging his music (Kivy 1995: 53). However, in the same way that a work composed for strings yields a different, derivative work when played on a mellotron or on wind instruments, it can be argued that sacrificing explicit instructions (e.g., the score) in light of an interpretation of overall intentions results in a substitution of a derivative musical work (Davies 2001: 223–4).

Additional complications arise when we emphasize that music is a performing art. Consider the performer's role when performing the "Appassionata" piano sonata. Pianists engage in a skilled activity and Beethoven wrote piano sonatas that exploit and sometimes challenge that skill. In a word, his sonatas are meant to provide occasions of musicianship. Hence, authentic performances require performers who employ and display the proper technical skill, which in turn requires the right *sort* of instrument, if not the make and model that Beethoven had available. Pianists are ultimately the best judges of the proper balance of innovation and conservatism when performing those works (Godlovitch 1998: 61–78).

Third, recognizing that musical works are more than mere sound structures invites extended debate about which *other* composer-intended features of performances are equally relevant. For example, J.S. Bach intended that particular religious cantatas be performed in a Lutheran church on specific Sundays of the liturgical year. Given his clear intentions, a Friday performance of "Wachet Auf" in a concert hall cannot be authentic. One response is that most music is multifunctional. Secular presentations are authentic whenever a composition is meant to be "an object of interest in its own right" (Davies 2001: 216). Because Bach intended this function for all of his music, our secular performances are authentic in *one* of the ways sanctioned by his intentions. A parallel argument can be made about modern museum displays of religious "art," such as altarpieces and Byzantine icons.

However, the concept of aesthetic autonomy is foreign to many artistic traditions. Although secular performances of Bach's religious cantatas can be defended on the grounds that he intended them to be judged for their aesthetic

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merit, the same intention does not equally guide all indigenous and traditional "art" (Shiner 1994). Many cultural artifacts are site and event specific. Despite their significant aesthetic value, reproducing or preserving them violates cultural tradition. Their public or "aesthetic" display may be prohibited. Hence, cultural exportation of ceremonial objects often renders them inauthentic. In other cases, the process that makes such "art" available for aesthetic appreciation introduces new values and practices into the originating culture, reducing cultural authenticity.

For example, Navajo sandpaintings are created as part of a healing ritual. These colorful, crushed rock designs are destroyed at the end of the ceremony. Navajo tradition prohibits their preservation or fixed replication. Although these ceremonial artifacts are aesthetically complex and rewarding, they are not produced as works of art. Hence, a sandpainting produced for display or sale is inherently inauthentic with respect to Navajo tradition. Respecting this tradition, Navajos who create sandpaintings for nonritual display will intentionally alter them from their "authentic," ritual-specific counterparts. These "inauthentic," fixed-form sandpaintings can be evaluated for authenticity by regarding them as displays of traditional Navajo symbolism and design principles. However, many collectors and art dealers believe that stylistic authenticity is insufficient. Authenticity requires "traditional" intentions. Seeking authentic indigenous art, they reject the very artifacts that the Navajo produce as works of art, namely, artifacts created to be objects of aesthetic appreciation.

Paradoxically, cultural changes introduced to accommodate foreign expectations and exploitation are challenged as inauthentic whenever the artists evolve new practices as a result of these cultural interactions (Shiner 1994). Yet works rejected as inauthentic may scrupulously adhere to the originating culture's own standards of creativity and authorship (Coleman 2005).

See also MUSIC AND SONG; ADORNO; AMERINDIAN AESTHETICS; CONSERVATION AND RESTORATION; CULTURAL APPROPRIATION; FORGERY; NOTATIONS; ONTOLOGICAL CONTEXTUALISM; ORIGINALITY; PERFORMANCE.

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