1 Gender, Nationalism and 'Nation-Building'
Discourses of Development

> ... the relations between the people and the nation, the nation and the state, relations which nationalism claims to have resolved once and for all, are relations which continue to be contested and therefore open to negotiation all over again.
>
> Partha Chatterjee, *The Nation and Its Fragments*

Introduction

Development[1] has historically been a nationalist project. The edifice of eighteenth-century anti-colonial nationalism, which is a gendered ideology of resistance as well as of power, has included 'development' as progress and civilization sustained by religion, culture and tradition as well as by science and technology, capital and markets. The creation of the nation-state, of 'its world of meanings' – in other words, nation-building – has been the starting point of what has been called 'the developmental state'. In this chapter I examine how nationalism and nationalist struggles have framed discourses and

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1   This emerged as a popular term after the Second World War. It is often used interchangeably with 'modern', especially in an economic usage of the term, and therefore associated with industrialization, urbanization and, in the 1970s, with representative democratic political systems (see Huntington, 1968: chap. 2; Rostow, 1979). During the colonial period many of the ideas central to development were cast in terms of 'progress', which encompassed an understanding of modernity – both economic and socio-cultural.

strategies of development.[2] I argue that nationalist ideology framed the development agendas of elites in post-colonial contexts. Some agendas were prioritized and others were deemed of secondary importance, reflecting the gender, class and ethnic biases of post-colonial elites. Ideology, religion and imaging of the nation-state played a crucial part in setting the development agendas in post-colonial nations.[3] In the process of nation-building, the 'economic man' was the critical player in the development discourse, and his counterpart, the 'political man', was the citizen. 'The citizen's' interests were articulated in a universalist language, that allowed only certain issues of economic development to be addressed.[4] Both women and 'subaltern' men – of lower classes and castes and weaker ethnic groups – were co-opted into the elite nationalist programme despite the local struggles waged by them in their own interests (see Guha, 1982: 1–7). While nationalism provided new spaces for women to mobilize in – and even enabled them to use and endorse the universal construction of 'the citizen' in particular contexts – at the same time, it framed those spaces, landscaped them through rhetoric and language in particular ways. However, many women, themselves part of the national elites, participated in the construction of nationalist imaginings and programmes, even though the process itself led to their simultaneous co-optation within and/or exclusion from these constructions (see Bereswill and Wagner, 1998: 233). I argue, therefore, that the gendered nature of development discourses can be

2   It will be argued later in the book that nationalism continues to play an important role in the promotion of policies loosely defined as either liberalization or, more broadly, globalization. Indeed, some like Crafts (2000: 51) have argued that a nationalist backlash against globalization cannot be ruled out if liberalization does not (and there are many reasons why it might not) deliver high growth rates in Third World countries.

3   Here I argue with the grain of the quite different argument that O'Hanlon and Washbrook (1991) make in their study of approaches to Indian culture. They suggest that the 'political economy' approaches are important to the understanding of culture, whereas I am suggesting that the 'political economy' approach in development would benefit from extending into the field of cultural history to understand some of the important impulses and starting points of national development. Thus, a theoretical framework that is not too narrowly focused on one or the other is perhaps more able to demystify issues of culture and development.

4   It is fascinating to note, for example, that *The Nationalism Reader* (Dahbour and Ishay), first published in 1995, does not include a single feminist piece, not even under the section on 'The Contemporary Debate on Nationalism'. The only woman whose work is included is Rosa Luxemburg.

understood only if we take into consideration the processes of post-colonial state formation, the socio-economic trajectories set by nationalist elites and the struggles of women's movements against these, as well as their complicity in, them.

Gender and Nationalism

Feminist scholars have made an important contribution to the study of nationalism (Jayawardena, 1986; Anthias and Yuval-Davis, 1989; Enloe, 1989; Sangari and Vaid, 1993; Kandiyoti, 1991b; Hall, 1992; McClintock, 1993). They have suggested that women are central to the construction of nationalist discourses as biological reproducers of members of ethnic collectivities, as reproducers of the boundaries of ethnic/national groups, as central participants in the *ideological* reproduction of the collectivity and as transmitters of its culture.[5] They are also important to nationalism as signifiers of ethnic/national differences. Ideological discourses often highlight (symbolic) women to construct, reproduce and transmit ethnic/nationalist categories. Finally, women continue to be important as subjects – participants in national economic, political and military struggles. These different roles that women play means that '[l]iving as a nationalist feminist is one of the most difficult political projects in today's world' (Enloe, 1989: 46).

Gender relations are thus important as a frame for nationalist practices, and nationalism as an ideology is important for the configurations of gender relations within the national space. Biology and culture are key elements in the construction of new political spaces and of new discourses of empowerment. However, as Walby has commented, more work needs to be done on nationalism's *economic* consequences for women's lives such that the division of labour is not simply 'subsumed under biology or culture' but is made visible in the public domains of national development (1997: 182–3). Moving on from Walby, I argue that the gendered ideologies of nationalism framed the ways in which women's labour was configured, counted,

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5   Hobsbawm points out that during the early period of theorizing the nation (1830–80) there were only three criteria that allowed a people to be recognized as a nation: its historic association with a current state or lengthy recent past; the existence of a long-established cultural elite, and a written literary and administrative vernacular; and a proven capacity for conquest (1991: 37). While the later theorizing may no longer see capacity for conquest as essential to the assertions to nationhood, cultural and historical capital remain necessary to the formulations of the yearning for selfhood of nations and peoples.

assessed and rewarded. Masculine pride and humiliation in the context of colonialism had fashioned '(colonized) woman' as a victim to be rescued – first by the colonizers and then by the colonized male elites – and as the centre of the household to be protected and cherished. Thus, she provided a node of self-awareness of a particular kind for men, and hence was made visible in the public arenas in particular ways. As I will make clear below, in decolonized nation-states, policy-making acknowledged some of these complexities only by denying them.

Women's labour and women's citizenship are markers of this confusion that we see repeatedly in liberal nationalist discourses as well as in Marxist ones. Whether it is population policies, human rights, conditions of employment or endorsing of monogamous family structures, nation-states have used the discourses of both nationalism and development to circumscribe women's lives. And because of the history of colonialism, the pain of struggling against the idea of the community, culture and family, women have found it at times hard to oppose the boundaries being drawn around them – sometimes in their own names – by others – largely nationalist, masculine elites. In this way, the power of discourse was systematically used to frame women's role in development[6] – whether as re-producers of the nation and markers of its cultural boundaries, or as participants in its economic life.

The Argument

Nationalism is a much theorized concept, as is development. While feminist scholarship provided a gendered critique of the concept of nationalism, interventions in the post-structuralist mode have opened up new spaces within Development Studies that allow us to examine the discursive power of nationalism in the economic agenda-setting of the nation-state (Crush, 1995; Escobar, 1995a; Marchand and Parpart, 1995; Sylvester, 1999). Building on both these sets of literature, I illustrate the importance of the language of nationalism for the construction of the agenda of development, and suggest that women's particular positionings within the family and society were central to both these projects. I argue that nationalism allowed conversations about development to take place between colonial and nationalist male elites. Women were largely excluded

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6 As it has been used to frame women's role in the state since the birth of nationalism itself in the eighteenth century.

from these conversations, which themselves took place in very different contexts of power. However, I emphasize that these conversations, while exclusionary, were by no means discrete; on the contrary they were untidy, contradictory and allowed spaces for contestation that were utilized by women. The partiality of these conversations and exclusions was also reflected in the unfolding story of development in decolonized states. Nationalism and development, then, were 'Janus-faced' creatures (Nairn, 1981) at once mobilizing and excluding women from the project of 'nation-building'.

After examining the dominant yet unstable gender discourses of the colonial and nationalist elites, I explore the contributions of women activists to national movements and the articulated projects of nation-building, the spaces that women were able to create both within the nationalist movement and within the nationalist discourse, and also the dilemmas that they faced in participating in nationalist movements and discourses of nation-building. I suggest that the trajectory of women's participation within different types of nationalist movements and different political systems had a profound impact on the kinds of citizenships that they were offered, and their ability to be active in the public sphere. Here, it is important to keep in mind the evolving nature of nationalism, of the nation, and of its development. The particularity of political and economic contexts led to ' '"rounds of restructuring" of the nation-state' (Walby, 1997: 190) and posed different issues of evolving social relations for women and for men.

I conclude from this discussion that nationalism and nation-states born of nationalist struggles posed particular challenges for women. While remaining central to the project of 'nation-building', women were made 'invisible' through universalized discourses of citizenship and economic development. Although the new citizenships allowed women to take their place within the political space of the nation as individuals, the ambivalence that surrounded these roles meant that this individuation remained fragile; the social symbolism of 'woman' continued to threaten the civic rights of women. Nation-states as products of nationalist struggles remain fractured and fraught terrains for women. Upon these terrains development was crafted – as means and goal of progressive society and economy, and as emblematic of legitimacy of the new nation-state. I argue that while women remained central to the continuing construction of national identity, they were marginalized in the new discourse of development.

The discourses of nationalism did not disappear with the decolonization of the 1940s to 1960s. They are again with us in complex and

contemporaneous forms in the post-Cold War period – through the seeking of nationhood on the basis of race, ethnicity, religion and economy.[7] The processes of 'othering' communities, populations and groups continues to affect the drawing up of development agendas in Eastern and Central Europe, in parts of Africa and of Asia. Women have had to pay a high price for this new wave of nationalism, and have confronted issues that are very similar to those faced by women during anti-colonial struggles – rape, war, homelessness, insecurity, and being constructed without their consent as threats to, and symbols of, the new nations and national identities.

This chapter is divided into three sections: the first explores issues arising from the 'imaging of the nation' by political and economic elites: the second focuses on the ways in which this imaging was employed in the service of colonialism and nationalism; and the final section explores how feminist and women's groups interacted with nationalism, and with what results.

Imaging a Nation

Remembering and Forgetting

'All nationalisms are gendered, all are invented and all are dangerous ... in the sense of representing relations to political power and the technologies of violence' (McClintock, 1993: 61; see also Hobsbawm, 1991). This quotation raises several important issues. In a substantial amount of literature on nationalism the gendered nature of the concept is neither acknowledged nor analysed. So for Ernest Gellner, 'Men are of the same nation if and only if they recognise each other as being from the same nation' (cited in McClintock, 1993: 62). By using 'men' to mean 'men and women' he eliminates the possibility of discussing gender, since he is eliding the very difference (between women and men) that gender-based analysis studies. The gendered nation thus remains unacknowledged while at the same time important to the constructions of nation. It is, for example, in the public space that men encounter each other and need recognizable markers for the nation to be imagined as home for them all (access to the public space is not automatic for women,

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7   Indeed, some have pointed to this resurgent nationalism as evidence of the continued salience of the nation-state in the face of the forces of globalization (Anthony Giddens, lecture on 'The Third Way' at the University of Warwick, 9 October 2000).

and this fact affects the nature of nationalism itself). It is also the public space in which they encounter men who are not recognizable, or a threat to the recognizable self. This is because to the nation as an invention danger is an important motif – by naturalizing the nation as a recognizable togetherness, the threat to this togetherness can become central to the concept itself.

This threat can be either of physical violence against the national borders, or of psychological violence by challenging the normative values recognized by the dominant male elites of the nation as important to all, or of social and political violence against the institutions of the nation-state. The danger that lurks becomes the cement that binds men of a nation together in its defence. Danger is central also because it is often invented in order to raise national consciousness, which might be thought to be incipient and in need of mobilization. Political rhetoric becomes important in articulating this danger – to mores, customs, religion, which can find safety only within the political borders of a separate nation. Political rhetoric is at its most effective when it is able to harness the power of historical evidence. As the Greek historian Konstantinos Paparrigopoulos commented: 'History is not only a science. It is at once the Gospel of the present and the future of the fatherland' (cited in Ben-Amos, 1997: 129). As Gospel, history provides as well as legitimates accounts of 'the common possession of a rich legacy of memories' (Renan, cited in Ben-Amos, 1997: 129). Surendranath Banerjea, one of the founding members of the Indian National Congress in 1885, put it this way: 'The study of the history of our own country furnishes the strongest incentive to the loftiest patriotism...For ours was a most glorious past' (Kedourie, 1970: 235).

In this context, another/'s history can become a threat to the unity of the nation – 'forgetting, and even historical error are essential for the creation of a nation' (Renan, cited in Ben-Amos, 1997: 129). Memory and nationalism thus are intimately connected and history is crucial to the documentation and erasure of collective memory, to the remembering and forgetting of recognizable commonalties. It is through the writing in or editing out of history that the invention of the nation takes place, and is placed under threat. In the need for creating a commonly (male) accepted history are also the roots of patriarchal compromise between different male elites in order to determine the spaces occupied by women (see below). Political self-determination thus becomes important to the articulation of the self. The growth of republicanism in Latin America, for example, saw struggles over the meanings of the image of 'the Indian' – excavated from the past to provide legitimacy to the political aspirations of the

nationalists. However, by 1850, once this purpose was served, Earle (2001) suggests, '"the heroic Indian...had been converted into a wild beast lacking any capacity for civilisation"...virtually obliterating the brief period when all political factions had fought for the right to present the Indian as their own.' This gendered nationalist self, in its remembering and forgetting, in the articulations of danger and of nationalisms, remains tied to the notions of purity, of authenticity, which in turn are critically attached to the shadowy figure of the woman in the home. Nationalism in its psychological and political formulations thus posed significant problems for women.

Colonial, Nationalist and Feminist Tropes

There are three different discourses through which the figure of the national woman has been defined. The first was that of colonialism, the second of nationalism, and the third of feminism or the women's rights movement. In many ways these three were not discrete; they were overlain with the intellectual baggage and historical knowledges of the others. However, the context of power within which they took shape and were played out meant that the colonial discourse remained powerful even in the resistance to colonialism. This was because of the lack of confidence of nationalist elites in their own cultural histories, and in their desire to find acceptance within the dominant structures of power and ideologies (Fanon, 1990; Said, 1978; Nandy, 1983). The contexts of history, political economy and international politics were important to the development of these discourses, in all of which I find a selective engagement with the 'other'. In the process of drawing new parameters, challenging existing and emerging political forces, and creating visions of future development, nationalism emerges as the dominant discourse in the period of decolonization.

As Hoogvelt points out, 'Not only was the need for...colonies argued in economic terms, [increased trade leading to jobs at home], it was indeed often expressed as a vital national interest' (1997: 19). The competition among European colonial powers in the race for conquest was a competition among nations.[8] To lose this race was seen as a threat to national survival. As in any process of state legitimization of huge economic investment, the economic rationale was insufficient. The threat to the national integrity of Great Britain, for

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8 Western European states had invested in colonial and semi-colonial states more than the entire wealth of Britain (Cairncross, 1975: 3).

example, was made the basis for ever-expanding colonial boundaries by political figures like Joseph Chamberlain and Cecil Rhodes: 'In their speeches and writings they argued that half the population of Britain would starve if . . . ever the British Empire narrowed down to a ''mere'' United Kingdom dimension' (Hoogvelt, 1997: 19). Another aspect of the colonial discourse concerned with threat was that of the barbarity of the colonized. As the English social philosopher Benjamin Kidd wrote at the turn of the eighteenth century: 'The task of governing from a distance the inferior races of mankind will be one of great difficulty. . . . But it is one that must be faced and overcome if the civilised world is not to abandon all hope of its continuing economic conquest of the natural resources of the globe' (in Hoogvelt, 1997: 20). Thus, the 'task of governing from a distance' the barbarian nations, though an economic necessity, was cast as 'the civilizing mission' of the Christian nations – a cultural trope of colonial expansion. Thus religion and nationalism converged in legitimizing economic interests of the colonial states.

The nation-states of the Third World emerged out of their encounter with imperialism. This encounter encompassed struggles over the cultural, economic and political resources of the state and was extremely bitterly fought. Nationalism was the mid-wife of new nations. There are three main nationalist tropes. The first is concerned with imperialist articulations of modernity[9] and the nationalist response to it. This was as much a consequence of political economy – that the insertion of new nations into the world economy required functioning within the international capitalist or (after the Second World War) socialist planning framework – as it was of modernization, of the new nations growing out of the chrysalis of 'traditional' culture to take their place in the modern world. Nation-building needs to be understood in this context: it was a consciously modernist political term that was employed widely during the period of decolonization. The nation – imagined as well as imaged, remembered as well as forgotten, traditional as well as modern – was to be built through the efforts of mobilized 'masses' led by nationalist elites imbued with a vision of the reclaiming of a glorious, if

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9 Modernity, writes Dube, 'may be understood as the common behaviourial system historically associated with the urban, industrial, literate and participant societies of Western Europe and North America. The system is characterized by a rational and scientific world view, growth and ever-increasing application of science and technology, together with continuous adaptation of the institutions of society to the imperatives of the new world view and the emerging technological ethos' (1988: 17).

vanished, past. This was the second trope of nationalism. Nation-building was thus a project that encompassed both the firming up of hegemonic cultural discourses through constitutional and legal arrangements, as well as economic and militaristic infrastructures that allowed the knitting together of disparate populations into one stable political entity – the independent nation-state. This was the third nationalist trope.

Feminist discourses were caught between two impulses, and fractured further as the nationalist movements progressed. One impulse was universalist – the recognition of global patriarchy, which can be witnessed in the writings of many western feminists writing during colonial times, such as Catherine Mayo and Eleanor Rathbone (see Ware, 1992; Liddle and Rai, 1998). Their particularistic, intimate narratives of the lives of women under traditional cultures were, however, often co-opted by imperialist media to reinforce the message of 'the civilizing mission' that was the 'white man's burden'. Women within nationalist movements largely disassociated themselves from these 'imperial maternalist' discourses (see Liddle and Rai, 1993). However, they too were caught between the attraction of a universalist language of citizenship rights, and the particular cultural and historical boundaries within which they knew women worked and lived (Agnihotri and Mazumdar, 1995; Geiger, 1997).

'Recasting history' (Sangari and Vaid, 1993) thus became a potent means of aggression and contestation within each of the three discourses. On both colonial and nationalist sides, the question of legitimacy was tied to that of civilization and civility, which, in turn, depended upon powerful constructions of gender and gender relations.

Colonial Ideologies and Constructions of Gender

Colonial attacks upon civilizations of the colonized countries took different forms to show how relations between men and women were symptomatic of the degeneration of the societies themselves. Colonized men of Aryan races, such as Afghans and Sikhs, for example, were routinely categorized as either 'martial' or boorish and aggressive. This was quite different from the depiction of the African male as 'in a state of barbarism and savagery which is preventing him from being an integral part of civilization' (Hegel, cited in Bayart, 1993: 3). Others, especially Chinese or East Asian men, were 'feminized' by emphasizing their (small) size, and eugenically 'weak' constitutions (Ling, 1997). 'Scientific' studies by colonial doctors abound in racialized descriptions of colonized men (Engels,

1989). All sets of men, however, were presented as brutal towards women, and therefore uncivil. For example, in his *History of India*, J.S. Mill wrote, 'The condition of women is one of the most remarkable circumstance in the manner of nations. Among rude people the women are generally degraded, among civilised people they are exalted' (cited in Kumar, 1989). The colonial project, then, encompassed the rescue of women in the colonies from the men of their own communities by an external authority that had both the force of state power and the legitimizing power of a modernist discourse. Men's relationship to women was used in colonial discourses as a 'means of mediating the West's relationship with the East' (Liddle and Rai, 1998). Women were central to this social construction of the 'civilized people'. The boundaries that were drawn around women constituted the markers of civility. Thus colonized women play a central role in the legitimization of colonialism.

For the colonial powers, ideas of civility were rationalized through tying these to the frame of modernity. Enlightenment formed the backdrop of nationalism in Europe, where capitalist development fuelled by the enterprise of the rational man was valorized. Modern social relations were spoken of in the same breath as capitalist norms of individuation. Capitalism, for its part, became synonymous with progress as it followed a series of stages of human activity – from hunting, to pastoral and settled agriculture, slavery and feudalism. It was the historical mission of colonialism to pass on the tools of progress to the colonized countries. This 'sharing of progress' was either brought about through the recognition of ancient civilizations' indigenous mores and then using these to craft new constitutions, as the Orientalists demanded for India, or through completely new arrangements. As Bayart points out, 'There are some links between the reluctance to recognise African societies as historical and political entities in their own right and their subjugation by the west from the period of the slave trade to colonization' (1993: 2). In the absence of recognition of pre-colonial civilization, for example in the Americas, it was emphasized that economic and social regeneration would be achieved only through the process of colonization itself (Cowen and Shenton, 1995: 42–59; also Earle, 2001). The crafting of modern economic relations thus had a profound impact upon not only the public relations of power between men at different levels but also the symbolic power relationship between the colonial and indigenous male elites. The dominant colonial male order was then able to humiliate the aspiring nationalist male elites in many different ways, perhaps one of the most potent being to recast the social relations among men and women of the colonies.

In the first stages of colonial conquest, humiliation was direct. As Stolcke writes in the context of Latin America, 'For the vast majority of indigenous women, the Conquest meant the loss of material, political and ritual privileges; exploitation of the labour, and sexual abuse by the invading soldiers and priests who crucified them in bed under the pretext of saving their souls' (1994: 8). In many countries and cultures, sexual abuse by the conquerors often meant the rejection of women by their male relatives in the name of 'honour' and 'purity' (Rai, 1996; Butalia, 1998). This was one way of dealing with the humiliation experienced by colonized men.[10] These rejected women were often made part of the political economy of colonial war against their own countries, by becoming the 'servicers' of soldiers' sexual needs. Prostitution, necessary for survival, placed them in a grey zone of society – vulnerable, forgotten and constantly abused; the responsibility of none. However, as the colonial power settled into 'administrative rationality', prostitutes became objects of regulation and confined exploitation, as can be witnessed in the making and implementation of the Contagious Diseases Acts by the British colonial state in 1864. While it is important to note that the prostitute women were also largely from the lower class/castes and therefore not necessarily of immediate concern to the nationalist male elites,[11] their concern about such women perhaps marks the process of formation of national sentiment.

The humiliation of the colonized male social order also took the form of selective refashioning of customary social and legal practices governing relations between men and women. These relations were both economic – regulation of property rights, de-legitimizing of certain forms of social organization of labour – and social – marriage and education. This refashioning emphasized the power relations between colonial and colonized male elites. As McClintock argues, 'All too often in male nationalisms *gender* difference between women and men serves to symbolically define the limits of *national* difference and power between *men*' (1993: 62). Gellner (1997) makes the same point, without the insight of feminist analysis, when he claims that it is the humiliation experienced by men of one national com-

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10   In other cultures, such as Spanish America, this concern with purity was less evident. Indeed, the Catholic priests were continually dismayed by the lack of concepts of honour dependent upon sexual purity of women.

11   Indeed, in India, nationalist Congressmen tried to keep prostitute women and 'Congress ladies' apart from each other on political marches so as not to offend the sensibilities of upper-caste/class women and their male relatives (Desai, 1989).

munity in not being able to achieve communicative equality with men of the dominant national community that gives rise to nationalist passions.

It is important to note, however, that the colonial discourse on gender relations was not always challenged by nationalist movements. Some of it was also absorbed, rationalized and made the basis of the nationalist thinking on gender relations (see Metcalf, 1995: xi; Parpart and Staudt, 1990a). Refashioned property and marital relations in particular were not disturbed in the post-colonial nation-states; indeed in many countries, such as India, as we shall see below, nationalist leaderships participated in this refashioning of gender relations. It was the markings of modernity that were recognized by both the colonial and the nationalist elites in the rationalizing of patriarchal relations in inheritance, and in the quelling of 'uncivil' matrilineal marriage systems by both the colonial and the nationalist elites.

Under colonialism, modern capitalist relations required a 'rational' systematization of property relations; the inclusion of colonized states into the world economy necessitated recognizable property relations that could not be achieved without disturbing the 'alien/ uncivil' social relations. For example, in British India, the *zamindar*, the traditional landholder and tax-collector, was given property rights under the Permanent Settlement Act of 1793. Taking the model of the 'improving landlord' from the English context, the *zamindar* was given the same status and responsibilities. While this was a break with the earlier traditions of the *zamindar*'s position as dependent upon the feudal *nawabs*, the English colonial administration insisted that the Act was 'restoring institutions of the country'. Though even the English establishment soon became disillusioned with the Settlement, as the *zamindars* became the new rentier class uninterested in investing time and money in the improvement of land and continued to depend upon smallholders and their taxes, the idea was not repudiated by the colonial government. This was because it 'concealed a commitment to a European, and Whig, conception of the proper ordering of society.... The ideas of property and ''improvement'' which defined it remained central to the Raj of the nineteenth century' (Metcalf, 1995: 21). The resulting commercialization of Indian agriculture led to profound changes in rural social relations that resulted in the exclusion of women from the economic sphere. The sequestration of common lands meant women had little access to an important means of economic survival. Under the Permanent Settlement, as cash replaced kind in the payment of taxes, the production of cash crops

necessitated changes in the patterns of agriculture production, and the division of family labour between the production of cash-crops and the provision of food (see Sarkar, 1983; Desai, 1989; Shiva, 1989; Mackenzie, 1995). Women's labour became increasingly concentrated in provision of food for the family, invisible and unaccounted for within the new financial arrangements. The male contribution to the family income took on greater visibility.

In Africa, too, the expansion of merchant capital worked against women. In particular, colonial institutionalization of land tenure and usage systems left women tied to the land, unable to take advantage of rural–urban migration, but also deprived of control over land resources (Chazan, 1990: 187). 'Colonial gender stereotypes, which identified men as farmers and women as wives and mothers, exacerbated this inequality by leading colonial officials to provide training and credit to male farmers' in Zambia (Munachonga, 1990: 130).[12] Further, the position of male elders was reinforced through codification of customary marriage laws and therefore underlined the centrality of women for the reproduction of labour, and the need for maintaining control over this resource (Lovett, 1990; Geiger, 1997: 25). In terms of rural–urban migration, women were almost completely excluded. This, argues Geiger, was because of the colonial state's preoccupation with controlling African women's sexuality and their reproductive capacity. In Tanganyika, for example, the 'problem of women' was posed by colonial bureaucrats in terms of 'rights, needs, and responsibilities of men in relationship to their dependants' (1997: 23).

Modern capitalism also required the increased reach of the state in garnering resources, and pushing out the narrow boundaries of market economies in the colonies. The first meant the exploitation of nature – terracing, logging and irrigating became widespread as colonialism became more confident. As Mackenzie points out, 'For the European, political expediency in the promotion of a policy of land alienation demanded both the creation of a conceptualization of African agriculture as ''backward'' and ''inefficient'', and the privileging of environmental knowledge based on Western experience' (1995: 102). Capitalist relations in agriculture led to an increased

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12   It is important to note, however, that the colonial state also provided opportunities for women to register their protest against the traditional social relations in Africa. As Bayart notes, 'Neither ''women'' nor ''minors'' submitted passively to the law of the elders . . . women were feared for the efficiency of the sorcery . . . .' However, 'their actions were not ''revolutionary'', and they were as often individual as collective' (1993: 112–13)

sense of 'improvement' of land through both changes in property relations and increased state intervention. The latter often took the shape of conservation and infrastructural projects – the 'management of nature' through western scientific knowledge to increase the productivity of land. Often these large infrastructural schemes were created and maintained through the forced labour of men and women of the colonies. While resistance to such exploitation of labour was widespread, it was also gendered. In cases such as the *Chipko* movement in India, or the renegotiations around use of the traditional Matengo pit system of cultivation in Tanganyika, 'the boundaries of gendered knowledge altered . . . in the context of changing relations of power' (Mackenzie, 1995: 105; also see Shiva, 1989).

Such refashioning of property relations and land management altered the relations between the peasant and the landholder. It also altered the position of women within agrarian societies. These new social realities were then given a frame of law. For example, the British never abandoned the idea of the 'rule of law' as their central contribution to the 'improvement' of the colonies. Through the codification of laws the colonial states, in particular the British colonial state, were able to combine, on the one hand, the utilitarian principles of liberal philosophy sanctifying capitalist relations and, on the other, 'traditional' sacred texts to ensure that the disturbance brought about through the revolution of economic relations could be contained within recognizable social frameworks, through supporting traditional social hierarchies (see also Liddle and Joshi, 1986; Parpart and Staudt, 1990a; Mackenzie, 1995: 108).

The Nationalist Response

In his book *The Intimate Enemy*, Ashis Nandy, like Frantz Fanon before him, has argued that the reach of colonialism encompasses both the political economy of the colony and the mappings of its culture and its selfhood as expressed by its political elites: 'Colonialism is also a psychological state rooted in earlier forms of social consciousness in both the colonizers and the colonized. It represents a certain cultural continuity and carries certain cultural baggage' (Nandy, 1983: 2). In political terms this translates, as Sartre (1990) so evocatively put it, into an attempt by the colonizers 'to fabricate an indigenous elite: they selected adolescents, branded them with the principles of western culture, stuffed their mouths with grandiose words which stick to the teeth. . . . Their living lies no longer had

anything to say to their brothers.' However, 'all borrowings are also acts of reappropriation and reinvention' (Bayart, 1993: 27). On the one hand, the violation of selfhood that the male elites experience through the process and administration of colonization leads to a '[p]articulately strong...inner resistance to recognizing the ultimate violence which colonialism does to its victims, namely that it creates a culture in which the ruled are constantly tempted to fight their rulers within the psychological limits set by the latter' (Nandy, 1983: 3). The penalty of crossing these limits often is marginalization within the nationalist political process. On the other hand, colonial constructions of dominant modes of civility posed difficult issues for nationalist elites and movements. Chatterjee has called nationalism of these elites 'a project of mediation' (1993a: 72). This involved, as we shall see below, the appropriation of the popular – the innocent and the wise 'common man' rooted in the 'timeless truth of the national culture'; the 'classicization of tradition', which started with colonial disturbance and then fixing of culture as law; and, finally, the 'structure of the hegemonic domain of nationalism...where it sought to overcome the subordination of the colonized middle class' (Chatterjee, 1993a: 72–5).

Nationalism and 'social reform' was a particularly thorny issue for elites in colonial countries; no unified response was available (Parpart and Staudt, 1990a; Uberoi, 1996). These elites, who were significantly to influence the trajectory of post-colonial development, were divided on the question of social reform. To one section the need for social reform tied in with their modernist conviction that the country needed to look 'forward' – westward – to regain its independence and its place in the world, and that ancient customs needed modification, and sometimes to be rejected, if a modern nation-state was to take shape. The liberal modernists found much in common with the Marxists during the early phases of nationalist movements, which secured in many colonial countries the dominance of a linear, structuralist perspective. The alliance between the two was particularly visible during the early twentieth century, when the Leninist intervention in Marxist theory gave legitimacy to nationalist struggles through the trope of 'self-determination'. As Hobsbawm points out, 'Nationalism thus acquired a strong association with the left during the anti-fascist period, an association which was subsequently reinforced by the experience of anti-imperialist struggles in colonial countries' (1991: 148; see also Bianco, 1971; Sarkar, 1983). To the other nationalist section, social reform was part of the discourse of colonialism – an attack on ancient tradition, on the one hand, and a reminder that the peoples of

the country were not free to refashion their own social and political system, on the other. In the hierarchy of issues, independence came before the need to re-examine social mores; social reform should be undertaken in the privacy of the home/national space and not in the glare of colonial dominance and internal discord (Kandiyoti, 1991b).

While there was no unity among the male nationalist elites in responding to the colonialist attacks upon 'rude cultures', for all sections, the nation took shape through nationalism. Nationalism was an essentialist discourse – of empowerment, of inclusion, but also of exclusion. The demarcation of the 'self' and 'other' that had been at the heart of the colonial encounter needed to be sustained for the nation to be secure in its borders. Nira Yuval-Davis has emphasized the need to distinguish between different types of nationalisms – cultural, ethnic and civic – because '[d]ifferent aspects of gender relations play an important role in each of these dimensions of nationalist projects and are crucial for any valid theorisation of them...' (1997: 21). While agreeing that these distinctions were critical to the political projects of nationalist elites, I would argue that whichever form nationalism took, the processes of 'othering' remained central to it (Giddens, 1987: 117). The creation of the nationalist 'self' required a universalist language of self-determination and equality that allowed nationalist elites to stake a claim to freedom. Nationalism could, thus, provide an ideal for anti-colonial elites that was based upon a complex recognition of glories past and the contemporary degradation, but also the promise of resurgence and self-determination (Said, 1978).

The language of idealism was very often used to describe the nation in the making, and frequently this description was imbued with notions of sanctity and sacredness. As the Turkish nationalist Ziya Gokalp asserted, 'This sacredness, even before it has reached consciousness, exists in an unconscious state in the psychological unity of the social group. So far it has remained a hidden treasure... [but] with all its halo of sanctity....The emergence of an ideal means its rise from the subconscious to the conscious level' (Kedourie, 1970: 199). Gokalp speaks of 'hidden treasures' that invest the past with legitimacy while at the same time ensuring that the process of recovery is allowed through the mobilization of nationalists imbued with idealist visions of a sacred homeland. The nation itself became symbolic of familial relations by being called either 'fatherland' or, more generally, 'motherland', 'for whose sake people shed their blood. Why is it that all other lands are not sacred, but only that which is called fatherland?' asked Gokalp. By familializing the nation, the home becomes critical in the discourse of

nationalism. Nothing is more imagined than this community of people subscribing to a singular idea of the home. As Papanek has pointed out, 'certain ideals of womanhood are propagated as indispensable to the attainment of an ideal society. These ideals apply to women's personal behaviour, dress, sexual activity, choice of partner, and the reproductive options. . . . [W]omen [are] the ''carriers of tradition'' or ''the centre of the family'' especially during periods of rapid social change' (1994: 46–7). However, what is also demanded at this time of crisis is that women's 'actions and appearance should alter less quickly than that of men, or should not be seen to change at all . . . [and that they should] conform to prescriptive norms of a *collective* identity that is seen as advancing the goals of the group' as a whole (p. 47). In this context, the ideals of society get attached to notions of appropriate behaviour of women, and the restoration of social order becomes a process of imposition of stringent controls over women rather than addressing the structural issues leading to and arising from conflict.

As Liddle and Joshi (1986) have shown in the context of India, this concept of the ideal home and the ideal woman within the home was very much an upper-caste/class idea of familial space and relations. Systems of social interaction that underpinned the upper classes were made on the basis of a 'national' understanding of social relations through both colonial acceptance and their use by the dominant nationalist elites. So what was a limited, and contested, terrain of social relations was then translated into the norm through the systems of laws and constitutions. Moghadam argues that this move became possible when, in line with Anderson's analysis, nationalism came to be viewed not simply as an ideology but as akin to kinship and religion (1994a: 4). According to Anderson, nationalism allowed the secular transformation of fatality into continuity – something that only religious discourses had articulated before the rationalizing thrust of Enlightenment (1991: 10–11). As continuity demanded reproduction of future national generations, of national/ cultural values, and stability of social forms, as well as the reproduction of the national populations, the family became critical to this new secular articulation of the nation, and the idea of the nation came to be symbolized in the family.

This imagined home/nation symbolized many things – security, familiarity, tradition. It was a space that remained open to the male elites as their domain, untouched, in most part, by the colonizer, who structured public life so ruthlessly. Indeed, the autonomy of patriarch within the home was allowed by the colonial state in the hope of undermining anti-colonial resistance. As Martin Chanock

argues, analysing the cases of Northern Rhodesia/Zambia and Nyasaland/Malawi, the male elders allied themselves with colonial rulers to re-establish control over women through a contrived 'Customary Law' (cited in Parpart and Staudt, 1990b: 7; also Mackenzie, 1995). Some of the bitterest opposition to the British rule in India came from nationalists such as Bal Gangadhar Tilak when the colonial state sought to refashion dominant familial relations through legislation on age of consent or on *sati*. The modernist nationalists, on the other hand, supported these interventions as they became part of the story of the contemporary degeneration of the Indian society and its need for regeneration through secular nationalist revolution (Sarkar, 1983; Uberoi, 1996). The relations within the home, then, were very much part of the nationalist discourse; the home/nation was the authentic space but was under threat. This threat came not only from without – the colonial state – but also from within – the traditionalists who opposed change and thereby endangered the future, or the modernist who argued for a refashioned space without regard to the resultant pollution of authentic culture. Moreover, this authenticity was firmly attached to the body of the woman within the home/nation (Mani, 1993; Kandiyoti, 1991b).

The contours of the woman within the home were very particular: '. . . only the women of the nation are the beautiful ones. Other men's/nation's/state's women . . . are not ''beautiful like the home/national woman is'' ' (Pettman, 1996: 51). National identity was inseparable from notions of boundary, purity and chastity; threat to this identity came if women's role within the boundary of the home/nation was compromised. The woman created the future generations and she ensured continuity of cultural traditions through her own appropriate social conduct and through the religious and cultural education of her children. The woman was thus seen as the stable entity in periods of change. While male elites argued about the need for change to the outer garb of the woman, her inner core was conceded by all nationalist sections to be chaste and immutable, as was the idea of the nation. This double move in imagining the female figure allowed the discourse of modernity to encompass the woman, but at the same time leave enough untouched within the parameters of the home. In this way the nationalist Janus resolved the 'woman question'. The tension between identity/culture and modernity was harmonized by making and endorsing the classical distinction between the scientific/technological and culture/tradition. The Chinese modernizers of the eighteenth century, for example, formulated this tension by distinguishing between *it* and *yong* – the thinking

and doing, the philosophical and mechanical (Grieder, 1981).[13] And in the African context President of Senegal and African poet Léopold Sédar Senghor wrote: 'Negro-African reason is traditionally dialect-ical, transcending the principles of identity, noncontradiction, and the 'excluded middle'. Let us...be careful not to be led astray by the narrow determinism of Marxism, by abstraction' (1995: 269). Whereas western science was needed for the economic sphere, trad-itional national values were central to maintaining the authentic 'self' so important to the stability of the new nation. By this account, while the regeneration of the new nation required the harnessing of western science, it also required protecting the 'traditional' norms and values that were endorsed by history, and recognizable as common to all those who called themselves nationalist. As Stacey (1983) has so powerfully argued in her critique of the Chinese com-munist movement, this distinction allowed a compromise between the communist elites and the peasantry on the 'woman question'. It resulted in the communists pursuing the project of nation-building with the support of the peasantry, and allowed patriarchal social relations to remain stable in a reconfigured space under the com-munist regime. Thus, the modernist discourse was constantly being disturbed from within nationalist movements.

The debates about the characteristics of the new nation and the refashioning of gender relations within its boundaries became ac-cessible to increased numbers of people in the colonies through the spread of print capitalism and the consequent undermining of the earlier administrative languages of the elites with the growth of the vernacular press (Hobsbawm, 1991: 141; Anderson, 1991: 44). The vernacular presses carried the nationalist message across the colonial territories and 'created unified fields of exchange and com-munication' (Anderson, 1991: 44). One of the important currencies of this communicative exchange was the delineation of the woman. Modern or traditional, home-bound or participative in the national-ist struggles, bearer of authentic values or challenging both inherited and imported boundaries and positionings – the vernacular presses of nationalist struggles are full of struggles of meaning around the body of the woman. Vernacular journals also, for the first time, carried the voices of women themselves, and became the vehicles of the first feminist articulations that challenged both the colonial and the nationalist/patriarchal delineations of women's positions in soci-ety (Talwar, 1993; Geiger, 1997). The importance of this feminist

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13   In India the cultural articulation of *ghare/baare* (inside/outside) served the same purpose (Chatterjee, 1993b).

challenge to the nationalist elites' views of the national community and women's position within it varied enormously from country to country. It would, however, be fair to say that in no context did feminist voices gain equality with male agendas within the discourse of nationalism. One of the reasons for this might be that feminist voices needed to keep hold of 'the woman' as a recognizable and stable entity as much as did the nationalist elites. Recognition of diversity was not part of the challenge at this stage. The struggles centred on the constructed woman and the space she occupied. The struggle over the space within was, then, very much a struggle over the contours of social relations with the figure of the woman central to it. However, print capitalism did allow for the voice of women to be heard, and in many cases to be mobilized in the nationalist cause. This mobilization, whatever its premises, became the basis of the first demands that women made in their own articulated interests.

The struggles over meanings within the nationalist movements regarding the place and role of women are important for understanding the alternative visions of post-colonial development that the nationalist elites put forward. These debates also indicate an acceptance by these elites of the powerful rhetoric of modernity that the colonialist powers had thus far monopolized. This acceptance of modernity and fashioning of alternative modern visions for new nations was also the basis upon which a new legitimacy was constructed by nationalist elites. It is by accepting norms of modernity that the nationalist elites asked, first, for the return of sovereign power to the national elites from the colonial centres, and, then, for the trust of the people of the country, and for a recognition of the centrality of political elites to the process of development.[14] I will return to this issue in the next chapter.

In the twentieth century, in most countries, bourgeois liberal nationalist elites became dominant in nationalist struggles.[15] As a consequence, their imaginings of 'the woman's' place in the new

14   In the case of Kenya, for example, the link between nationalism and African socialism was made on the premise that all Africa had a single traditional culture, 'that of communalism. The common colonial experience, it was argued, subdued communalism and exploited resources in Africa for the benefit of non-Africans. To achieve post-colonial economic advancement or progress, rational planning of resources would be required' (Cowen and Shenton, 1995: 316). The role of the state elites thus remained central to the project of African socialism.
15   For analysis of Marxist regimes, see below. The political situation in post-colonial Latin America was also different.

nation-state became dominant; as Jayawardena notes, upon this view, 'the women of the peasantry were…proletarianized, those of the bourgeoisie were trained to accept new social roles in conformity with the emerging bourgeois ideology of the period' (1986: 9). The constitutional reforms that were put forward in the post-colonial period remained largely political: equality for women within the legal processes; rescinding of obviously discriminatory practices; right to the vote, to education and in most cases to property; and laws prohibiting violence against women.[16] As the following example illustrates, both class and gender disturbed the stability of the new social relations that were normalized through nationalist political discourses and later through post-colonial constitutional and legal mechanisms.

In 1938, years before India gained independence, the National Congress set up a National Planning Committee. It was chaired by Jawaharlal Nehru and sought to draw the developmental map of the new India. One of the nine sub-committees established by the NPC was on 'Woman's Role in the Planned Economy' (Chaudhuri, 1996: 211). The sub-committee was to deal particularly with issues of equal opportunities and rights for women and access to the world of economic production, which was identified as key to resolving the unequal status of women (p. 213). The individual (woman) was the central figure for the Committee, while the 'social' largely represented the hindrances, in the form of custom, that prevented the individual from participating as a 'useful citizen' in the life of the new nation (p. 219). The debates within the Committee suggested that the nation was the only social unit that was liberating for the Indian woman and the liberation of the Indian woman was important to the functioning of the modern nation within the global order (p. 223). However, from the beginning there was a tension evident in the discussions of the Committee. While the 'social' as custom was suspect, the Committee was also concerned with maintaining customs and 'traditions': 'It is not our desire to belittle in any way these traditions, which have in the past contributed to the happiness and progress of the individual and have been the means of raising the dignity and beauty of Indian womanhood and conserving the *spiritual attributes of the Indian Nation*' (WRPE, 1947: 32–3, emphasis in the original; also Rai, 1998b). The converging lines of womanhood and the spirituality of the Indian nation within this document reveal

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16   In countries like China where Marxism was embraced by a major part of the oppositional elites, class politics subsumed economic rights of women, while the political agenda was similar to the one outlined above (Evans, 1997).

the fraught nature of the enterprise upon which the Indian modernizing elites were embarked. As I have argued elsewhere: 'There was a constant redrawing of the social and historical map around the body of the woman to keep hold of the convergence that had been created; this was a project which could not reconcile the tensions with the affirmations of culture' (Rai, 1999: 243).[17] Thus, we see nationalism's 'capacity to appropriate, with varying degrees of risk and varying degrees of success, dissenting and marginal voices' (Chatterjee, 1993a: 156). We find, therefore, that the report of the Committee is scarcely mentioned after formal citizenship rights are granted to women in the Indian constitution in 1950.

Nationalism as Development

The successful post-colonial nationalist elites saw themselves as participants in the regeneration of their countries through gaining independence from the colonial rulers and envisioning a 'progressive', 'modern', 'industrialized' state. Indeed the role of the state, of planning, of regulation and of rationality was constantly emphasized in the nationalist rhetoric (see Nyerere, 1973; Nehru, 1990).[18] This was evident in liberal, socialist and Marxist states (Mao, 1965). Such visions of modernity had direct consequences for structuring gender relations in post-colonial states. The emphasis on industrialization, for example, meant that the focus remained on male employment; the acceptance of commercialization and mechanization of agriculture meant the marginalization of women's work in rural societies; and the 'taming of nature' by construction of dams across rivers – which Nehru called the 'temples of modern India' – for the

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17   For an analysis of similar debates on culture and constitution in Algeria, see Bouatta and Cherifati-Merabtine (1994). The arguments about Islamic property and citizenship rights of women are discussed, as is the eventual compromise between the FLN and the Muslim clerics in the shape of the Family Code of 1984. Also see Mehdid (1996).

18   Nehru writes in *The Discovery of India*:

> The very thing that India lacked, the modern West possessed and possessed to excess. It had the dynamic outlook. It was engrossed in the changing world, caring little for ultimate principles, the unchanging the universal. . . . Because it was dynamic, it was progressive and full of life, but that life was a fevered one and the temperature kept on rising progressively. . . . India, as well as China, must learn from the West for the modern West has much to teach, and the spirit of the age is represented by the West. (1990: 384–5)

production of electricity meant the displacement of populations, resulting in particular vulnerabilities for women. The equation of 'modernization' with the preferred political system was at times crude and explicit – 'fertilizers would enable increased agricultural output. [This] in turn, means socialism' (Nyerere, 1973: 46) – and narrowed the spaces from within which women could challenge their marginalization. Indeed as Heng points out in the context of China, 'the ''modern'' and the ''Western'' [were] conflated[, which]...meant that a nationalist accusation of modern and/or foreign – that is to say, Western – provenance or influence, when directed at a social movement, [was] sufficient for the movement's delegitimization' (1997: 32). Other than in the Marxist nationalist states, private property was taken as given. However, women could rarely inherit under recognized or accepted 'cultural' regimes, and this further supported the 'traditional' or modified colonial legal arrangements.[19]

To recapitulate my argument thus far. To the colonized male elites the nation came into view through the lens of anti-colonial struggles. Through these struggles the colonized peoples and elites experienced nationalism. The nationalist elites were able to convey to the colonized peoples the image of the nation (Anderson, 1991) in freedom together; they were able to visualize the possibility of articulating their own norms and rules of governance rather than being humiliated by working to the rules – hated and imperfectly understood – of the colonial state (Gellner, 1983). While all these images of the nation were deeply gendered, there was little acknowledgement of this. There was no recognition of women's interests as different from the constructed nationalist interests: this was considered essentially divisive. In the political hierarchy of issues, nationalism secured primacy, while 'the woman' continued to have a shadowy existence on the periphery of nationalist consciousness – mobilized in its cause but confined within the home that was also the nation. Through gaining independence, a separate identity and a new home/nation would be created upon the foundations of the old, recovered one, said the nationalist message. Within the boundaries of the new nation both men and women would move to a civic nationalism symbolized as much by a new universal citizenship as by a new economy.

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19   While in principle Islam provides women with the right to inheritance in the father's property, in practice the right is often overlooked in favour of male heirs (Ali, 2000).

Nationalist Movements and 'Self-Determination' of Women

Jayawardena has shown convincingly the importance of the link between nationalist and feminist struggles. She emphasizes the link between 'women's participation in feminist movements for emancipation and their simultaneous involvement in struggles for national liberation and social change' (1986: 23). She seeks to discover the roots of Third World feminism in the participation of women in nationalist struggles. She argues that the economic and political challenges thrown up by the anti-colonial struggles allowed women to be constituted by, and to make demands upon the nationalist agendas. The development of capitalism in the Third World brought women into the labour markets; the restructuring of agriculture fundamentally altered their position within the village community and the local economy; the administrative changes that created new political stabilities under colonial rule brought forth questions of local versus national identity for women, especially in the context of increased mobility and migration to urban conurbations. Vernacular print newspapers circulated information and became a vehicle for articulations of discontent and the proposing of alternative visions by women. The nationalist response to the challenges posed by colonialism opened up the debates on women's social status and created new spaces that women could occupy and use. However, nationalism also posed significant challenges to nationalist women.

The biggest challenge posed by nationalism to women's consciousness was that of unity – the fight against imperialism demanded discipline and sacrifice. The nationalist movements – liberal as well as Marxist – spoke not in the name of particularistic groups but for pan-national interests. 'Particular interests' were regarded as threats that would only disturb and dislocate the coalescing of national agendas. As Helie-Lucas has commented, 'This is the real harm which comes with liberation struggles. People mobilize against such a strong, powerful and destructive enemy that there is no room for practical action in mobilizing women at the same time. But worse, liberation struggles erase from our mind the very idea of doing so, which is seen as anti-revolutionary and anti-nationalist' (1991: 58).[20] Second, unity meant keeping all

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20   In China, Mao Zedong wrote 'On Contradictions' (1965), which systematized the Communist Party's demand for loyalty. He stressed that in each context, in each period, each crisis, the role of the communist leadership was to

sections of nationalist opposition on board. Here the element of sacrifice became paramount – if in the interests of unity certain rights of particular groups were compromised, this was not expediency but strategic bargaining. Recognizable social relations were the cement for political unity, and what could be more immediately recognizable than the figure of the woman within the home? For women's groups these issues of unity and sacrifice posed serious difficulties. On the one hand, most groups accepted that the urgency of the nationalist struggle must give it primacy; on the other hand, they were also aware of the particular constructions of the nationalist agendas, which marginalized their interests. On the one hand, the goal of non-gendered citizenship beckoned; on the other was the reality of differentiated experiences of the public and the private lives of men and women. Being cast as victims of their own society, women's groups rebelled against such delineations and asserted their cultural identities; being recast as 'new women' of a new nation-state, they were aware of the gaps between the political rhetoric and social reality. While self-imposed and self-regulated codes of silence (Crenshaw, 1993; Papanek, 1994) protected their communities from the attacks of the imperialist western powers, women's groups also remained uncomfortable with the nationalist leaderships' articulations of women's place within the national movements. In the demands for unity lay the key to future agenda-setting, but often women's groups were unable to intervene in time because of the ways in which the burden of solidarity was placed upon them. '[A] power structure was being built on our mental confusion: a power structure which used the control of . . . women as a means to get access to and maintain itself in power. . . . During this crucial period, women had been assigned a place in society which could not be challenged without questioning both the past and the future . . .' (Helie-Lucas, 1991: 58).

If the demands for unity posed a dilemma for women's movements, this was compounded by divisions within women's groups on two issues: the first was modernism versus culture; the second that of differences among women. Most women who became heard during nationalist movements were bourgeois women – educated and well connected, promoted by their politicized families, symbolic of a new modernity, and even shared more intimate aspects of

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identify the main contradiction, and devote all resources at the command of the Party to its resolution. All other (secondary!) contradictions were subordinate to the primary contradiction. Any disturbing of the hierarchy of contradictions identified by the Communist Party was therefore divisive and unacceptable.

their life experiences: as Geiger comments on the lives of Tanzanian women activists, 'At the time of mobilization, the TANU activists were . . . divorced . . . ''middle-aged'' by Tanganyikan cultural norms . . . were freer than young women . . . had very few children. Many had only one. Several had none . . .' (1997: 68).[21] And yet, the tension between modernity and tradition formed the backdrop of their activism as much as that of the men's. This was because of the need felt by women to rescue cultural practices that could be owned by them, which would be self-representational as well as empowering in the context of colonialism and nationalist struggles. To be defined out of the cultural trope would risk marginalization and delegitimization. Motherhood in this context occupied an important contested place. As Malathi de Alwis has argued within the Sri Lankan context, ' ''Motherhood'' . . . can be defined as not only incorporating the act of reproduction . . . but also the nursing, feeding and looking after of babies, adolescents, the sick, the old and even grown women and men, including one's husband' (cited in Maunaguru, 1995: 160). In this role, women were able to occupy particular public spaces; the acceptance of the place of women within the 'natural' order of family allowed them access to oppositional politics against the colonial state perpetrating violence on their homes and children. In doing so, however, the constructed motherhood of the nationalist discourse allowed a homogenizing and essentializing power; motherhood was contained within the boundaries of recognizable family forms that were validated by the nationalist elites. Issues of class, ethnic diversity and religion therefore became blurred and later emerged as real divisive issues for women's movements.

The anti-imperialist mobilizations led to what Kandiyoti has called 'the era of patriotic feminism' (1991a: 28). In Turkey, Kandiyoti points out, 'no less than a dozen women's associations [were] founded between 1908 and 1916, ranging from primarily philanthropic organizations to those more explicitly committed to struggle for women's rights' (p. 29). The same phenomenon could be seen in other countries engaged in nationalist transformations. However, in many cases women's organizations were established by and with the support of male nationalist elites; in others already existing women's groups were co-opted into dominant nationalist parties. The dilemmas that were posed by these co-options can be illustrated by the example of Turkey under Mustafa Kemal's regime in the 1920s. On the one hand, the 'new woman' of the Kemalist era became

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21 Similar personal characteristics continue to define women politicians today. For India, see Rai (1997), and for Chile see Waylen (1997b).

symbolic of a break with the past; on the other, the paternalist be-
nevolence of the Kemalist regime hindered women's autonomous
political initiatives. Kemal refused, for example, to authorize the
founding of the Women's People's Party in 1923. Instead he advised
women's groups to establish a Turkish Women's Federation – an
association rather than a party. Even this was disbanded in 1935, a
fortnight after it had hosted the 12th Congress of the International
Federation of Women. The official reason given by the president of
the Federation was that Turkish women had achieved complete
equality and full constitutional rights, and that, the goals of the
Federation having been achieved, its continued existence could not
be justified. However, what was also clear was that the Kemalist
regime felt compromised by the pacifist speeches made by the Brit-
ish, American and French delegates to the conference; at a time
when the Turkish army was gearing up for conflict, Turkish fem-
inists' stand on disarmament was seen as a grave embarrassment
(pp. 40–1). Thus Kandiyoti concludes, 'the republican regime opened
up an arena for state-sponsored ''feminism'' but at one and the same
time circumscribed and defined its parameters' (p. 42)

The Turkish example poses questions about the relationship be-
tween nationalism and feminism in two different ways. The first is
about the primacy of the dominant nationalist agendas in contrast to
the concerns of the women's movements. The second, is the difficult
relationship between different feminisms – national, local and inter-
national.[22] As Kandiyoti notes, 'Turkish nationalism could be per-
ceived as divisive in a situation where other ethnic minorities were
restive, . . . for whom the notion of a Turkish nation constituted a
threat to the Islamic *umma*' (p. 33). Similarly, the dominant Brah-
manical codes of social interaction were naturalized as Indian social
codes by the British in India, thus erasing the different regional and
caste-based norms (Liddle and Joshi, 1986). Women who subscribed
to the secularization of social and public life often supported such
hegemonic positions, becoming vulnerable to the charges of cultural
ignorance, insensitivity, class bias and a slavish mentality in
accepting western ideas on religion and secularism. The support of

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22   Bereswill and Wagner, writing on the women's peace movement in Europe
during the First World War, quote the leader of the Federation of German
Women's Organizations, Gertrud Baumer, who said, 'For us it is natural that
during a national struggle for existence we, the women, belong to our people
[*Volk*] and *only* to them. In all questions of war and peace we are citizens of our
country, and it is impossible to negotiate in an international circle . . .' (1998:
236).

women's groups for one articulation of nationalism could be presented as denying other identities, which made the identification of feminisms with western ideologies easier within the context of the home/nation.

Further, feminist interventions from the outside, especially from western feminists, created difficulties for local and national feminisms. Ramusack and Sievers (1999) identify the approach of most western feminists of the time as 'maternal imperialists'. They saw themselves as the agents of civilization and progress; they 'sought power for themselves in the imperial project, and used the opportunities and privileges of empire as a means of resisting patriarchal constrains and creating their own independence' (Liddle and Rai, 1998). While most nationalist feminists rejected such delineations of women in their own countries, their acceptance of the liberal values that western feminists espoused made them easy targets of traditionalists' attempt at delegitimizing their struggles for women's rights. Also, their anger at maternal imperialists' complicity with imperialist discourses of Orientalism meant that fruitful transnational alliances of solidarity were not possible; solidarity of western feminisms came at a price unacceptable to nationalist feminists. The national boundaries thus continued to delimit the space within which nationalist women's groups could organize, mobilize and negotiate. And the tensions within nationalisms and discourses of culture continued to pose significant challenges for women.

Codifying Nationalism

These challenges were, however, least visible at the very moment when a nationalist movement made the transition from being an oppositional movement into being the dominant political force in an independent nation-state. At the cusp of historical change, most women's groups remained convinced of the nationalist transformative agendas and were reluctant to seek 'special' political dispensations from the state. In India, for example, three women's organizations (the All-India Women's Committee, the Women's Indian Association and the Central Committee of the National Council of Women in India) wrote to the Chair of the Minorities Committee on the status of women in the proposed new Government of India Act, 1935, demanding equal political rights with men. They also insisted that they would resist 'any plea that may be advanced by small individual groups of people for any kind of temporary concessions . . . [for] securing the adequate representation of women

in the legislatures.... To seek any form of preferential treatment would be to violate the integrity of the universal demand of Indian women for absolute equality of political status.' Women's groups within most nationalist movements saw themselves as freedom fighters, and as citizens of a free country. Liberal ideas of individual freedom were very attractive to women who participated in the nationalist struggles, even though they were mediated through the ideologies of nationalism. However culturally bounded, the freedom of the individual found its political form in the figure of the citizen.

The early conversations about nationalism helped demarcate the boundaries within which citizenship was operationalized. This concept was translated in very particular ways in order to stabilize new polities. Different visions of the future of the nation-state, and of its citizens, determined where women were positioned within this discourse in different political systems. In liberal political systems, a civic nationalism became the hegemonic political rhetoric. A pan-nationalist discourse of a citizenship tolerant of differences was developed to tie in the various groups, ethnicities and religious communities that formed the new nations. This was important for political stability, which in turn was essential for economic development. In this context, women continued to be regarded as markers of non-secular group identities and at the same time became individualized as citizens of the new nation. The Indian case[23] is a good one to reflect upon here. As citizens women were equal to men. However, as women they were deemed to be markers of identity first, and individuals later. Thus, in the interests of political stability after the trauma of the partition of the country at the time of independence, Muslim women were denied many of the rights that Hindu and Christian women were granted. Thus, the 'traditions' of Islamic family law were accepted, maintained and endorsed through the Indian constitution, whereby Muslim men could marry more than one woman, and divorce proceedings, claims of custody of children, maintenance of the divorced wife and division of property and inheritance were decided according to Islamic rather than 'Indian' constitutional law.[24] As most successful nationalist movements

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23   For a discussion of contradictions arising from the co-existence of African customary law and nationalist, secular legal regimes, see Stewart (1993).

24   The Shahbano case, which involved a Muslim woman seeking judicial intervention to claim an appropriate amount of maintenance at the time of divorce from her husband, opened up the debate on women's rights and cultural rights in the 1990s. It also showed the intractability of this constructed binary on the basis of 'ideal' home/nation (see Pathak and Sunder Rajan, 1992).

were led by urban male liberal elites, the equality legislation fulfilled their commitment to democratizing gender relations. However, the process of reconciling the two impulses of social and political order and ideology and cultural traditions has, for example, resulted in very painful consequences for women in Algeria. The revolutionary state tried to maintain both a 'socialist' and an 'Islamist' identity. Unable to placate the fundamentalists and to deliver economic goods to the people, the political situation careered out of control, with tragic consequences for the country and for Algerian women in particular (see Bouatta and Cherifati-Merabtine, 1994; Rai, 1996a).

In non-democratic political systems, such as Nigeria under military rule, for example, we find a 'strategy of exclusion rather than of unequal incorporation. Until recently,...military rulers (much like colonial administrators) pursued a policy of purposeful female neglect' (Chazan, 1990: 190). The nearly total masculine membership of the military and the army-led public bodies left women marginalized within the formal power structures. Further, owing to the inaccessibility of these formal institutions to women, women were also largely excluded from the patron–client relationships that took the place of more visible political participation (Mba, 1990; Chazan, 1990).

In Marxist states the concept of citizenship became subsumed under the categories of class while cultural nationalism was aligned to the modification of ideology – the state and nation became blurred, with seepage of some of the dominant cultural norms into state policies, and the suppression of others through state power. Evans notes that 'the subordination of gender to the supposedly more substantial matters of economic development and political power has been a recurring feature of the party-state's approach to woman-work since the early days of community control' (1997: 31). Construction of socialism in the 1950s in China required producing children for the development of society, and as a political commentator in 1953 suggested, 'having children was a social duty, failure to observe which ''should be severely criticized by the party''' (p. 44). However, as Stacey has observed in the context of China, the 'new democratic morality linked sexuality not with procreation, but with felicitous marital relations, and, thereby, with the construction of socialism' and the maintenance of a social order where concerns about women's appropriate behaviour within the family were implicitly accepted and given succour through policy-making and implementation (1983: 188). In all three political contexts – democratic capitalist, socialist and non-democratic – the articulations of

nationalist aspirations remained crucial to the setting of political and economic development agendas. In the moment of victory, whatever the ideological framework of decolonized nation-states, women seemed to be shut out of the institutional design.

It is in this context that the ideological framing of women's aspirations – as patriots, nationalists and citizens – becomes important for an understanding of the places they occupied in development agendas. First, while social reform was considered a priority by all post-colonial elites, it was also emphasized that the 'essential distinction between the social roles of men and women in terms of material and spiritual virtues must at all times be maintained. There would have to be a marked *difference* in the degree and manner of westernization of women, as distinct from men, in the modern world of the nation' (Chatterjee, 1993b: 243). Second, the above distinction was made but not acknowledged. This non-acknowledgement took different forms but the assumptions about the social placing of men and women were built into the constructions of these concepts, and then naturalized through law and state policy. As Smart has argued, 'we can begin to analyse law as a process of producing fixed gender identities rather than simply as the application of law to previously gendered subjects....Woman is a gendered subject position which legal discourse brings into being' (1992: 9). The language of equality was used in most post-colonial states to firm up the contours of citizenship, while citizenship remained differentially constructed for men and women. The legitimacy of the state rested upon social and political reform, and upon the assembling of the values of citizenship in constitutional design. The hegemonic language of nationalism made it difficult for minorities and other marginalized groups to challenge this location of citizenship values in a universalized 'citizen' – bourgeois or socialist. Nationalist elites took this universalized (male) citizen as both the agent and target of policies of development agendas, while women remained very much targets and not agents. As we shall see in the next chapter, the particularities of the post-colonial nation-states and this universalized ideological framing of women were a powerful combination in the marginalization of women in development.

In Conclusion

It is perhaps for this reason that increasingly women and feminist scholars have become convinced that the nationalist project is incom-

patible with feminism (Moghadam, 1994a: chap. 1).[25] However, this growing distance did not, and does not, address the painful issue of women's political participation. Disengagement from nationalist movements also has costs. The struggles to shift the meanings of the nation and nationalism have only been partially successful – as much to do with the struggles over these meanings within and outside the women's movements themselves as to do with the contexts in which questions about the form of nationalism are raised. In no contemporary nationalist movements for sovereignty do we find the 'mainstream' programme of national development being systematically gendered in its programme. The story of nationalism is thus not an entirely happy one for women. However, in the first phase of nationalist struggles against colonialism, women did find a place in the public arena, which, in its popular imagery as well as wide participation, was unique. And access to this space allowed the further development of feminism, which has ironically made nationalism more incompatible with women's concerns for equality. In chapter 2 I build on this discussion about gender and nationalism to query the emerging discourses on development from a gendered perspective.

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25   For a 'colonization' of nationalism to women's agendas in the form of the radical idea of a women's nation, see Andrea Dworkin's *The Jews, Israel and Women's Liberation* (2000a). In an interview Dworkin argues, '... women cannot be free of male dominance without challenging the men of one's own ethnic group and destroying their authority. This is a willed betrayal, as any assault on male dominace must be.' She comments: '... it is an incredible thing to overlook as a possibility. We've never dealt with the issue of sovereignty ...' (2000b).