

PART I

Creation and World-Making

CHAPTER 1

Global Dynamics and the Integrity of Life

Aristophanes' World

“Whirl is King, having driven out Zeus.”¹ This line from the Greek dramatist Aristophanes seems strangely current. Recall the myth behind the poet’s verse. Zeus escaped the fate of his siblings, all of whom were swallowed by their father the Titan Chronos, whose name means “time.” In his maturity, Zeus tricks Chronos into freeing his siblings – “time” heaves forth his children from his belly – and these same children wage war against the father and the Titans. Victorious, Zeus is enthroned on Olympus as the sky god, the high governor of the world. Order triumphs over chaos. The world is born in violence and warfare. But now, Whirl – the primal titanic force of reality – has returned with the power of the repressed. Whirl has vanquished the order of the world.

No matter what the story meant to the Greeks, this ancient myth resonates deeply in our age.² “Globality,” an intensive awareness of the world as a whole, was lately born from the bloody political, ethnic, economic, and colonial conflicts of the twentieth century. We know all too well that modern, Western politics has given us not only democracy, but also gas chambers. Science and technology have discovered new medicines for old diseases, but bequeathed an ecological crisis. The spread of global capitalism is not just about fantastic economic productivity, but also grotesque, deadly poverty for untold numbers of people. Little wonder, then, that many theorists of globalization focus on these shifts from “modernity” to “globality” within political relations, economic systems, and the spread of technology.

Sadly, too often theorists fail to take seriously the profound impact of the world’s religions on globalization, or they fasten on the extreme expressions of religion, say worldwide fundamentalism. This is odd. Buddhism, Islam, Christianity, Judaism, and other traditions are the oldest and yet still most

powerful operative forms of global civilization on this planet. These religions cross through nations, languages, cultures, economies, and races, reworking (for good or ill) those human processes and also being changed by them. The religions have been “globalizers” for a very long time indeed. Furthermore, theorists who do consider the cultural dimension of globalization, and thus give at least passing reference to the religions, usually define culture in decidedly non-moral terms. This too is odd. “Culture,” as John Tomlinson has noted, can be defined as “the order of life in which human beings construct meaning through practices of symbolic representation.”³ Yet any “meaningful” way of life entails beliefs about how one should live and also norms of human actions and relations. Whatever else we say about human beings we are, come what may, valuing creatures. Whoever defines what is valued, what kinds of life a culture esteems, has a unique social power.⁴ Within any exploration of culture, even global cultural flows, moral matters are present.

In this light, we can unfold *cultural* dynamics of globalization mindful of religious and moral matters as well as an ancient cosmogonic myth, a story about the origin of the world.⁵ The myth is used for heuristic and diagnostic purposes, but one could show in detail how close it is to basic conceptions of social existence found among a host of Western theorists. Thinkers no less than Thomas Hobbes, at the dawn of the modern world, and as recent as political realists during the Cold War era, saw the sociocultural world created by conflict and the struggle for power. Marxist social analysis, built on class conflict, no less (oddly enough) than neoclassical theories about the nature of markets, insists that struggle is at the root of social life. The story of Zeus and Chronos nicely captures an idea basic to much modern Western social theory. And insofar as globalization can be seen, in the apt terms of Arjun Appadurai, as “modernity at large,” then attending to this “myth,” a product of the moral imagination, might aid us in understanding and responding to global dynamics and cultural flows.⁶

At issue in this chapter is, then, the working of the moral imagination within culture creation, world-making. “Central to the moral imagination,” writes Jonathan Glover, “is seeing what is humanly important. When it is stimulated, there is a breakthrough of the human responses, otherwise deadened by such things as distance, tribalism or ideology.”⁷ Later, we will try to reclaim different stories than the myth of the Titans in order to enliven our moral imaginations. The intent in making this kind of argument needs to be grasped, however. This argument is not an appeal to confessional resources aimed at showing Christian uniqueness against the violence of the “world.” That kind of argument, quite popular among conservative, postliberal North American theologians, fails to grasp the complexity of the social situation we inhabit.⁸ It assumes that a community’s “identity” can be shaped in ways free from the pressure of global dynamics. But the idea that any community, any tradition,

can remain pure from reflexive interactions with other cultures and communities is not tenable in the time of many worlds. Even to reject or to deny those reflexive relations is to be implicated in global processes. Roland Robertson has astutely commented: “the idea of tradition is a modern phenomenon – a form of *countermodernity* that became a feature of modernity itself.”⁹ So one makes the hermeneutical move to engage the moral meaning of various “myths” of origin and moral order not out of the desire to remain within the comfortable walls of one’s own “tradition.” Any perception of the world is informed by some tradition and this fact allows us openly and critically to explore the religions. The moral challenges posed by this age mean that an ethicist *must* engage the religions and their reflexive relation to global cultural flows.¹⁰

One further introductory comment is in order. Besides the experiential resonance of Aristophanes’ words, the line is a banner for our inquiry in this chapter for another reason. In 1929, Walter Lippman, an eminent newspaper columnist, wrote a famous book titled *A Preface to Morals*.¹¹ Lippman took this very same line from Aristophanes as the focus of his work. He argued, in brief, that the modern world is one in which the erosion of traditional social order has led to a loss of religious belief and social cohesion. Whirl has returned. Lippman set out to praise the genius of modernity and the possibilities of life in an age of unbelief. Our world is no longer Lippman’s modernity. The time of many worlds is one in which the fate of all forms of life – from molecular structures to rain forests – is intimately bound up with the expansion and use of human power and cultural forms. What is threatened is the integrity of life.¹² Can the religions respond to this new situation, advance human flourishing, and protect the earth?

To meet this challenge to the integrity of life, the remainder of this chapter sketches a new preface to the ethics developed in the rest of the book. The first step is to clarify the meaning of globalization as one element of the time of many worlds.

Global Dynamics and World-Making

The term “global dynamics” signals the simple but important fact that we are concerned with sociocultural and economic processes and structures and not something called “Globalization” with a capital “G.” Alfred North Whitehead had a nice term for the penchant of academics to use words beginning with capital letters, words like “Modernity” or the “Enlightenment” or “Globalization.” He called this the fallacy of misplaced concreteness.¹³ We have to avoid mistaking an abstract idea, like globalization, for an actual concrete thing. And we should avoid other forms of reductionism as well, say, believing that one

form of analysis – economic, political, cultural, theological, or ethical – alone says it all. Like many phenomena, so too with globalization: miss the complexity and you have missed the thing. “Globalization” in this chapter is a complex reality uncovered through descriptions of interlocking social and cultural dynamics and structures.

One can be more precise. Globalization is “the rapidly developing and ever-densening network of interconnections and interdependence that characterizes modern social life.”¹⁴ Robertson rightly insists that globalization denotes a “compression of the world.” The world seems smaller, and, increasingly, we imagine it as one world. In this respect, “globality” is “an enlargement of modernity, from society to the world. It is modernity on a global scale.”¹⁵ The compression of the world can be characterized, first, by the increasing socio-cultural density of life brought on by the migration of peoples and economic developments. It is no longer the case – although some groups around the world would like it such – that societies are in any simple sense homogeneous entities. The mass movement of peoples in our time has made multiculturalism a fact in most places. When social density becomes reflexive, that is, when we begin to understand ourselves in and through our relations to those who are really different or other than ourselves, then we have what can be termed “proximity.” “Proximity” does not mean simply that people who were at a distance are now close at hand, either by the media or migration. “Proximity” is a moral challenge: how to live with others amid powerful forces shaping one’s own society and identity.¹⁶ It is as if other people’s worlds and minds enter into our own and we enter their minds and worlds.

A clear example of social density and proximity enlivened by economic forces is globalized cities. Saskia Sassen, in her volume *Globalization and its Discontents*, notes that the “city has indeed emerged as a site for new claims: by global capital which uses the city as an ‘organizational commodity,’ but also by disadvantaged sectors of the urban population, which in large cities are frequently as internationalized a presence as is capital.”¹⁷ Anyone who watched recordings of the 2000 New Year’s celebrations had to be struck by the way the event focused on events in cities: Paris, London, Moscow, New York. Large cities are one crucial site or location of globalization as a heterogeneous and yet coherent economic and cultural process. International cities are a “place” in which people’s identities, sense of self, others, and the wider world, as well as values and desires, are locally situated but altered by global dynamics.¹⁸ For example, a nightclub in Jerusalem features music that fuses traditional sounds and rhythms with rock and jazz. This can lead, as sociologists note, to social anomie and conflict, seen, for instance, in the debate raging in Israel over who is a Jew. The compression of the world found in massive cities is thus a boon for the formation of new self-understandings, especially for dislocated peoples. Yet “proximity” – a traditional Israeli confronted with global music – is the

problem of how to relate to those who are “other” and yet enter into our lives. This is especially pointed when those “others” are implicated in histories of suffering. The compression of the world confronts us with the problem of how to live amid others, even enemies. Globality is a space of reasons marked by violence as much as creativity and discovery.

The world is compressed because of social density. But, second, the very same compression of the world means that human consciousness is expanding to see the world as a whole. There is a long history to this expansion of consciousness. In the West, ancient Greek historians tried writing “world histories” even as early Christian thinkers and Roman Stoic philosophers spoke about the “ecumene” or the whole civilized “world.” The idea of “world-making,” that is, a conception of human coherence beyond local identities, is an old idea. The temptation to understand the movement of “globalization” as somehow solely the product of Western imperialism or capitalism seems to miss the historical complexity of the reality we are trying to understand. And yet we should not deny the novelty of our situation. Pictures of the earth as a blue-green orb floating in a silent dance about the sun have only been available to the human imagination during the so-called space age. The spread of global capital has also bound people in a complex web of interdependence. It is not simply that we now have access via TV, radio, the Internet, and the market to information about other parts of the world, although that is important. Much more, the “compression of the world” means a new moment within the imaginative project of world-making. People are increasingly living in a mediated and yet simultaneous present. World-making, like proximity, is a reflexive process: to understand the world as one is to relativize all places in it, or, as often is the case, to claim that one’s own culture, religion, and nation is the *axis mundi*, the center of the world. But with so many cultures and societies, can there really be just one center to the world?

From a cultural perspective, globalization is a complex, interrelated dynamic: compression and so the proximity of peoples as well as the expansion of consciousness and world-making. The paradox is that at the very time when people can imagine the world as one, the reality of social density confronts one with the problem of proximity, with otherness. How we see the world and others, and even the perceptions of us by others, bends back to shape our actions, relations, and identities. There is a host of ways to respond to those who are other, different, than ourselves. Sometimes, say in the face of massive destruction by terrorists as with the World Trade Center, revulsion over the event is morally right and required.¹⁹ But one also knows that there are some ways of life, some belief systems, which we would like to enter but really cannot do so.²⁰ Global reflexivity comes with massive moral challenges in responding to others.

Let us be clearer about the meaning of reflexivity. It can be found in economic as well as cultural forms. Ponder the link between imagination and worldwide consumption. Through the circulation of commercials, people's consumption patterns are being shaped and transformed by what is other, what is different. The image of Michael Jordan endows Nike shoes with increased market value wherever that "image" can penetrate a culture. Even the Dalai Lama was used by Apple to sell computers! Appadurai has noted that "consumption is now the social practice through which persons are drawn into the work of fantasy."²¹ The ways in which communities and individuals fashion meaningful lives out of the welter of images and ideas that mediate global reflexivity can be a way to resist economic powers. This is also the means to participate in those structures and processes. Consider another example of reflexivity that is distinctly religious and cultural: a Hindu temple recently built in Atlanta, Georgia. The difficulty arises from what Thomas Thangaraj has called Hindu "bio-piety."²² Piety demands that the Hindu community in Atlanta attempt to reduplicate a specific "space" in India, but now obviously within a radically different physical-social-cultural context. Building the temple is an expansion of consciousness wherein members of the community see their lives differently in the global scene. Yet it also refashions piety. Caste and arranged marriages are breaking down in these "American" Hindu communities. There is a loss of traditional identity.

Many theorists think about global dynamics primarily in economic terms or through international relations. One reads, for instance, about the "McDonaldization" of the world wherein cultural differences are crushed under the weight of economic standardization, rationalization, and consumerist sameness.²³ Similarly, the development of international tribunals, accords, NGOs, and political organizations ranging from NATO to the EU, the UN to the World Court, signal forums for the meeting and interaction of nations aimed at cooperation and the minimization of conflict. Whether justice is served by these developments remains a question. Other thinkers rightly point out that behind the supposed "sameness" of international law and spreading market capitalism are actually profound forces of difference. This dialectic of sameness and difference, homogenization and heterogenization, global and local, seems to be a lasting mark of the reflexive dynamic of "globalization" in the time of many worlds.

It would be very odd indeed to deny the fact that we must explore the economic forces and international relations driving and impeding globalization. These are undoubtedly operative in the present "concrete structuration of the world as a whole."²⁴ We will return to economic matters later in the book (see, for instance, chapter 3). And yet, as it has already been shown, globalization in whatever form (economic; political) is a cultural dynamic. Nike shoes, as a commodity, are the same material objects everywhere, but they have

a different cultural significance and meaning on a New York City basketball court than in a shanty-town in South Africa. And this is partly why they have different market value in diverse cultural contexts. Even the meaning and working of democracy are more culturally dependent than some political theorists previously believed. And further, there is, no doubt, a complex interaction among these factors, namely, desired commodities (Nike shoes) used within social practices (athletics) amid political aspirations (democracy) and economic interaction (international trade). Whether one considers the formation of new identities by dislocated peoples in postcolonial social and economic situations or the worldview of information technology, the symbiosis of social structure and cultural labor shapes how we think and live. "Culture" – which is not a unified thing (remember Whitehead's warning) – is the human work of rendering life meaningful through practices of symbolic representation. Cultural forms have impact on social life insofar as *representations* always entail *valuations* and *motivations* that, taken together, create a space of reasons for human conduct.²⁵ Cultural labor in all its forms is one of the forces forging globality; it is part of the dynamic behind the sameness and differences found in the reflexivity and the compression of the world.

We now have before us some dynamics of globalization: (1) the movement of money and people epitomized in gigantic cities, a movement that breaks down homogeneous social realities and poses the problem of "proximity"; (2) the expansion of consciousness via media and market so that we increasingly picture the world as one and in a unified "time" but in doing so relativize our lives; and (3) the dynamic of reflexivity in economic, political, and cultural dynamics that changes identities through what is other, manifest precisely in the expansion of consciousness and the compression of the world. In some respects none of this is new. People have always been on the move for a variety of reasons; there has always been an economy of money and images; divergent peoples and traditions have long interacted, often violently. And yet global dynamics uniquely mark this age. One dare not be naive about these developments. We ought to expect that social density – the problem of proximity – and the expansion of consciousness will lead to systemic conflict and psychic dislocation, especially around scarce natural resources and legacies of hatred and suffering. Disintegration and conflict reign within the dynamics of globalization as much as powers of integration and increasing interdependence. Whirl and Zeus contend with each other.

The global dynamics now isolated, i.e., proximity, expansion of consciousness, and reflexivity that works in and through social systems (economy, media, politics), are deeply bound to cultural matters, that is, representation, valuation, and also motivation. As a space of reasons, globality is actually a representational space, an emergent cultural and imaginary reality. We see ourselves and others and the world in specific ways that shape a sense of self, other, and

world. Global dynamics are driven by and also challenge deep cultural valuations, a fact manifest in widespread ethnic and religious conflict. Cultural forces, along with economic and political ones, are clearly motivating peoples to enter the global scene. These global social and cultural “dynamics” must be grasped as forming a moral space if we are to understand the force of the religions in the worldwide scene. Thus we turn to a second and more controversial step in this new preface to ethics.

Globality as a Moral Space

A moral space is any context in which persons or communities must orient their lives with respect to some ideas about what are higher and lower, better and worse, ways of conducting life.²⁶ In this “space” we are concerned with *reasons for actions* rather than causes of events; one wants to *explicate* human conduct, not *explain* natural phenomena. So defined, every culture – and globality itself – is a moral space; it is a space of normative reasons. This insight into moral spaces requires that we conceive of agents (individual or social) having capacities or powers to act knowingly, to give reasons and guide actions, with respect to some orienting ideas about what is good. If there were no agents (say, persons or larger social entities like corporations or nations) or they were subjected to unbending determinism, or these agents lacked powers of action and decision making, or there were in fact no orienting ideas about what is better and worse held by agents who did have the power to act knowingly, then the very notion of a moral space would make no sense. But while it might be philosophically tempting to argue that there are no agents, in our actual practical existence there can be little doubt about their reality. The current dynamics of globalization in fact rest upon and radicalize the emergence and influence in the West of the unitary nation-state from the late fifteenth century onward as well as developing concepts of the individual and even “humanity” during the same period.

One can bemoan this development, of course. One can see the modern idea of the individual and nations as alienating and destructive. Thinkers have tried to redress fundamental flaws in the modern, Western conception of the individual by focusing on the reality of interdependent, internal relations.²⁷ Yet the fact remains that from these modern agents – individuals and nations – globalization in its current form has emerged. Equally clear is the fact that these agents act in a space with respect to reasons about what counts as good, say, national self-interest or maximizing utility or moral values like human rights and economic justice.²⁸ Come what may, the global scene is one in which agents of various sorts (corporations, ethnic groups, nations, individuals) act and orient themselves in ways that further or destroy life. To understand this

scene requires exploring reasons used to explicate behavior. Insofar as the dynamics of globalization are intrinsically bound to representational, evaluative, and so motivational forces working on and in these agents, then globality is a moral space, a space of perception, motives, and choice.

In this light, recall a previous example. The massive international cities that dot the face of the earth are “spaces” in which persons must orient their lives. Sassen has shown that through the Internet and labor by persons in their homes, the “household” has become a key analytic category in global economic processes. The household as a site of global economic activity linked by the media to others is a place of global reflexivity. We see “new forms of cross-border solidarity, experiences of membership and identity formation that represent new subjectivities, including feminist subjectivities.”²⁹ The city, the household, and even cyberspace are contexts in which persons orient their lives with respect to some idea of what is good. They are moral spaces.

There is one more facet of globality we must isolate. This “facet” shows why the time of many worlds must be seen as a moral space, that is, a space of normative reasons about actions and relations. Nothing so much characterizes the age of globality as the fantastic, even terrifying, expansion of the human capacity to respond to, shape, and even create reality, that is, the explosive growth of human power. Globality is about the titanic power of human beings, a power that increasingly is beyond our capacities or desire to control and orient. From genetic technology to space exploration, from ongoing massive deforestation around the world to atomic power in all its ambiguity, from hideous economic inequality to high-tech warfare, we live within a space of human power. Cultural processes increasingly intervene and restructure natural processes. The genetics revolution and the ecological crisis have pressed this fact upon us. Are we able to sense the moral challenge which the vulnerability of planetary life puts to human power? Do we have the ears to hear the “cry of mute things,” as Hans Jonas so beautifully put it?³⁰ Whirl and Zeus are symbolic of this all too human power. The fantastic growth of human power was simply missed by Lippman in his “preface to morals.”

At this juncture we can grasp the deeper reason for insisting that globality is a space of reasons. The massive growth and uneven distribution of human power means that various agencies – individuals no less than corporations, nations no less than international NGOs – are shaping life and also the very conditions necessary for future life. Given the radical increase of human power in the so-called First World, we need to think about how the future is presently imagined and how it ought to be imagined. It is as if human power is about to swallow Chronos, planetary time. Part of the rhetoric of global technology, it seems, is that one can imagine a radical discontinuity between the past and the present and the future. Many fantasize about a day in which disease, age, fertility, and hunger will be under human control and thus discontinuous with

previous biological constraints. Ideas about cyborgs or genetic engineering and “fabricated man” to improve our species represent a future that orients action in the current space of life. Some theorists, blindly enthusiastic about these ideas, speak of the “reinvention of nature.”³¹ These forces and ideas are emblematic of what was called “overhumanization” in the introduction to this book. The difficulty in addressing this new reality is that traditional forms of Western ethics assumed a limited reach of human power. The determination of the distant future was always thought beyond the touch of human action. How then are we to think ethically about the new reach of human power?³²

Importantly, it is at this point that the religions have resources for ethics too long banished in modern moral philosophy. The idea that human power can exceed its usual spatial and temporal limits is not foreign to the religions. Images of heavenly realms and beings, transformed and perfected souls, heaven and hell, journeys to other worlds, and other images of the future have informed the moral outlooks of peoples. The religions are wildly complex imaginary and ritual forces that shape life and courses of action by picturing time and eternity beyond the usual limits on human power and thereby transform human consciousness.³³ But when the fate of future life is in our hands, how much novelty should we imagine in representations of the world, selves, and others? In a moment we will have to return to this question and with it the place of myth within ethics.

The expansion of human power and with it dreams of reinventing nature or securing a world order means that what is valued most profoundly in “modernity at large” is the never-ending maximization of human power. Things gain value (they matter and are good in themselves) with respect to the extent they derive from or actually increase human power, the ability to respond, shape, and create reality. Of course, this has always been the case. As creatures that seemingly cannot escape the realities of death, want, and frustration, any means to stave-off death, answer want, and secure fulfillment is grasped intuitively as valuable, as mattering. Here, too, the religions are illustrative. From magical rites to beliefs about immortality, from ascetic practices to hope in divine help and fulfillment, the religions are in part about access to power or powers that will enable human beings to face inescapable realities of existence. But the assumption that human power alone is at the root of all moral value is a dangerous one in an age when future life is at our mercy.

The increase of human power is profoundly uneven, held mainly by the so-called First World nations. The inequality of power threatens global stability and just might swallow the future in unending violence between the “haves” and the “have-nots.” The very same power bears on the compression of the world and the moral challenges it entails. It is easy to see how this is the case. The increasing social density of life fosters the problem of proximity. How are very different people to live together, especially when their lives and histories

are marred by legacies of mutual violence and hatred? The Balkans, the Middle East, Northern Ireland and racial conflict in the United States all manifest the ways in which the remembrance of injustice continues to permeate human time. With the increase of communicative power working through global media, hatred is becoming globalized as well as access to weapons – including nuclear, chemical and biological weapons – that continue the suffering. At issue is not simply justice or respect for the other, but forgiveness as the power to enact mercy, thereby reconstituting human community after ruinous violence. Proximity as the reflexive presence of enemies in one's own life means that the logic of retributive justice must be curtailed by mercy. But to love mercy as the context for any viable idea of justice is to limit human power, limit the power of retaliation. Can we so limit power or will the fires of hatred merely increase until they engulf the world?

The question of the proper limit on human power exposes the most pointed moral meaning of the myth about Chronos and Zeus. Human technological power can swallow the future, destroy the conditions needed for future life, even as memories of suffering and violence, how the violent past is inscribed in the present, threaten to engulf us in unending hatred and retribution. We need to learn to hear the cry of mute things and also to love mercy as well as justice. But immediately upon saying this, the ethicist typically confronts a blank stare. The profound differences in moral outlooks and convictions makes everyone skeptical about whether a global ethics is really possible. Can one really imagine that any set of moral values, Christian no less than Islamic, Eastern no less than Western, Indigenous no less than transcultural, will suffice for everyone? And yet without some such shared moral convictions, it is not at all clear how we might escape the destruction of future life or the fires of hate and violence. The world of globality seems born in violence and warfare, and, sad to say, it might well die as it was born. Our new preface to ethics appears, ironically enough, to force us into a rather tragic judgment, namely, that we are at the mercy of powers and processes beyond control, swept along by titanic forces of our making but which might swallow lives and dreams.

Myth and Global Ethics?

We have been pursuing a rather complex and disturbing journey in thinking about globalization and the integrity of life in the time of many worlds. The present age confronts us with challenges and possibilities that global dynamics cannot answer. Globality cannot help us escape legacies of violence, since social density and global reflexivity accentuate memories of suffering and hatred even as they open new possibilities for understanding and forgiveness. Surely in the wake of the attacks on the World Trade Center this

has become abundantly clear. Global dynamics will not limit human power, simply because they are the children of that power no less than the nation-state or ideas about humanity. The very same power that produces immense wealth and relieves much misery also creates suffering and unjust poverty. Globalization shapes the future even as it drags a violent past along with it. The “myth” about the origin of the world in violence and warfare – the Olympians against the Titans – seems to mean in its most profound reach that the world is caught, dreadfully trapped, in a never-ending cycle of destruction and wrath.

Of course, it is true that this myth has never been the sole operative belief system of Western, let alone Eastern, peoples. This is so even though cosmogonic myths about the birth of worlds through destruction are exceedingly widespread. The very idea of “modernity,” and globalization as “modernity at large,” feeds on the idea of a new time, *Neuzeit* as the Germans call “modernity,” of human freedom born from the religious and cultural violence of the past.³⁴ But the fact that Aristophanes’ myth is not our myth is utterly beside the point. Sometimes we understand ourselves best through others’ eyes; sometimes we must use others’ stories reflexively in order to know our own situation. The point is that we need to think about how to imagine the world if we are to meet the challenges of the day. The ethicist can and must draw from and yet refashion inherited myths under the demand of moral necessity.³⁵

It is time to pull together this argument and to show the contribution of Christian convictions to a global ethics. Among thinkers concerned with the challenge of global ethics, two different approaches can be noted that are closely related to the present argument. Some, like Hans Küng and the “Declaration Toward a Global Ethic” by the Parliament of the World’s Religions (1993), try to isolate common values, standards, and attitudes found among the religions.³⁶ Critics have rightly noted that the Declaration looks suspiciously like a version of the Ten Commandments and thus expresses Western, Jewish, and Christian values. Yet it is interesting that all of the religions endorse some idea of truth-telling, prohibitions of murder, sexual morality, and similar values and norms. By signing the Declaration, the representatives of various traditions affirmed those standards, but also, and this is important, relativized their own traditions in light of human commonalities. Here is found at the level of moral norms and value the dialectic of the local and global that characterizes globalization as an element of the time of many worlds.

This is true of another major option in developing a global ethics, namely, the turn to human rights.³⁷ Of course, it is often argued that the very idea of “rights” is incurably Western. In religions and cultures with a different conception of what it means to be a self or a human being, does the idea of

“rights” inhering “naturally” in an individual as a free decision maker have any plausibility? Many thinkers doubt it. Jeremy Bentham insisted that the idea of natural rights was “rhetorical nonsense, nonsense on stilts.”³⁸ Yet it is important to note that virtually no nation, culture, or tradition wants to proclaim before the world that it is against human rights. And this once again makes the point about global reflexivity, proximity, and the expansion of the consciousness: the dynamics of globalization are changing (for good or ill) local moral values and beliefs about humanity. In the face of poverty, legacies of hate, and the environmental crisis, peoples around the world understand themselves in a shared moral space and are finding commonalities while insisting on human rights.

There is much to endorse in these strategies for developing a global ethics. Yet the force of our inquiry is to suggest that what is at issue most basically is how we “picture” or imagine the moral space of life. It is not enough to isolate common standards, values, and attitudes, even those about human rights, if we leave in place a construal of the world that foils moral aspirations. The contribution the religions can make to global ethics is not only about common norms and attitudes as well as beliefs about human dignity. The contribution is also in terms of what has been most suspect in religion during the modern age, namely, the moral significance of myth. Modernity, at least in the West, has been in large measure about demythologization in the face of the triumph of scientific knowledge. Religious beliefs and the stories, or myths, which encompass them have been seen as projections, fantasies, or simple lies. The very idea of “myth” carries a negative meaning. This is one reason why, incidentally, many non-Western cultures find globalization threatening. Globality seems a wholesale demythologizing, a relentless cleansing of cultures of all inherited beliefs and sacred stories.

Ancient myths like that of Chronos and Zeus can be a goad to moral understanding. The point, first recognized by Plato, is that there is neither “mythless” morality nor any “myth” that fails to inspire and require ethical interpretation. The kind of hermeneutical moral inquiry practiced throughout this book engages the dialectic of myth and morals in the labor of construing and orienting life. What is needed is an ethical reinterpretation of stories about the world and others so that we might escape or at least curtail the globalization of hate and the annihilation of the future. Of course, ethical inquiry comes at a cost; it does not leave inherited religious beliefs and practices in place. We can now take the final and most controversial step in this inquiry by practicing just that form of moral reflection with respect to Christian faith. The wager is that there are parallel insights in other traditions that could be explored and engaged by further comparative study.³⁹ The argument offered now will be expanded in other chapters of the book, both in terms of the theory of value and in terms of the norm of choice it entails.

The Enemy and Creation

The most basic challenge facing global ethics, as we have seen, is how to understand and value the created order (the cry of mute things) and also the other, even the other as enemy, in a way that can guide moral action beyond the celebration of human power that now threatens the integrity of life.⁴⁰ Beliefs about the origin of the world in warfare and violence simply do not help us. These beliefs too easily warrant just the kind of world we find: “modernity at large,” where overhumanization has been too often violent and destructive of others and the natural world. Claims made by some Christian theologians that the world is wrapped in sin and destined to divine destruction are also morally dangerous. Naive convictions among critics of the West about ecological wholeness strangely blind to human distinctiveness and suffering are below the complexity of the world in which we actually live. Thankfully, Jews, Christians, Muslims, and others have different mythic and conceptual resources. These mythic resources can be explored precisely along the lines of inquiry outlined in this “preface” to ethics. We can explore the “moral meaning” of religious myths. When we do so, we find resources (not answers) for considering the connection between power and value important for the time of many worlds, as well as claims about the worth of finite life and even how to respond to the enemy.

The Genesis story in the Christian and Jewish Bibles is a creation myth that can be read along a number of lines. Two are important for the present inquiry. They show the ways in which “creation” is a construal of the interaction of natural processes and cultural dynamics. First, this story depicts through the “days” of creation human beings set amid a complex reality of different times, forms of life, rhythms, and patterns of nature. There is the time of light and dark, day and night, but also the span of mortal life distinct from the time of God’s action. The divine blessing is poured out on creatures, human beings, and even the Sabbath. Michael Welker writes that creation is “the differentiated structural pattern of reciprocity of natural and cultural forms of life and events, oriented and ordered toward the human capacity to experience.”⁴¹ Creation is the interaction of nature and sociocultural processes (e.g., night and day no less than naming creatures) with their own distinctive dynamics. Chronos, that is time, in the rhythm of day and night, does not swallow all else; it too is a creature of God.

Second, this complex reality is called “good” by the divine. “And God saw that it was good.” Worth is written into the nature of things recognized by God wherein God’s act of recognition is creative. The goodness of finite being is not simply an expression of divine power. God blesses creation and then rests in its completion. The creation story is about world construc-

tion in which blessing, not warfare, is the key to understanding reality. This insight culminates in the narrative of Noah and the Flood (cf. Genesis 6–9). After destroying the world because of human evil, God the warrior hangs his bow in the heavens and makes a covenant ever to sustain life. Throughout the biblical texts in their canonical form is an ongoing tension between God as righteous but wrathful judge and God as the sustainer and redeemer of life.

What is surprising, and little noted, is that deep within the Christian and the Jewish mindsets is a connection between creation as good, and thus worthy of our care, and the problem of the enemy. The ethicist responding to the time of many worlds must use this connection in reclaiming beliefs about creation and also ideas about forgiveness. Hans-Dieter Betz notes:

The human being as rebel and enemy is what God has to deal with. The command of Torah in Leviticus 19:18 says: "Love your neighbor as yourself." Now, how do you love your neighbor? Look at creation: this is the way God loves the neighbor. God provides the bounty of life even to the enemy, to the rebellious and ungrateful humans . . . The Sermon on the Mount says, provocatively, that he wastes all these goods like rain and sunshine on the undeserving folks. Why doesn't he take any retributive action against evildoers?⁴²

Within the Bible there is a moral interpretation, a midrash, of the creation story in the light of the problem of the enemy. Love of neighbor, even the enemy, is given content by the thematic of a good and yet complex creation; creation is drawn into the depths of the moral life through its interpretation by the love command. Creation overcomes chaos not through Zeus-like coercion or conflict, but through an ordering that brings forth life. God can no longer be seen as responding to enemies by destruction and violence (the "Flood"), but in the bounty of creation aimed at conversion and reconciliation. This deep linking of creation and care for the other continues in the stories of Jesus healing the sick and feeding the hungry.⁴³ The feeding stories manifest a logic of abundance and reconfigure communities so that all might partake of God's reign. Healings transform social boundaries beyond traditional social markers; they include the stranger, the outcast. Jesus challenges the line between clean and profane. Creation and God's rule is a moral space that is imagined as abundant and merciful. From this insight flows other convictions about the connection between God's creative and sustaining activity. The challenge is to live rightly within this space committed to creation, justice, and also mercy. It is this insight that will be continued and yet deepened in the remainder of this book.

Rather than engaging at this point in further biblical analysis, what is the point? Will the problems of globalization be answered if we simply read the Bible? Hardly! The challenge before us is the mighty task of overcoming

the ways in which proximity can devolve into continuing violence and global technological power endanger the viability of planetary life. We need ways of understanding and picturing reality, ways to engage in the imaginative, cultural task of meaning-making, that link forgiveness with respect for the worth of finite, natural life. There are resources for engaging in this work buried within religious texts, narratives, and symbols.⁴⁴

Those very same resources are operative within the cultural memory of civilizations shaped by these religious traditions.⁴⁵ This is why Aristophanes' line about Chronos and Zeus is in some primal way foreign to most Western peoples. At a profound level, it is hard for anyone touched by the symbolic power of Judaism and Christianity and Islam – and that is, after all, very many people – to see reality arising from murder and warfare and also to believe that the “enemy” is a virtual principle of a moral order (creation). But the fact that Zeus and Whirl now resonate in our experience shows us a possible shift in moral worldviews. In fact, the time of many worlds may just be an experiment in the plausibility of this Zeus-like outlook for actual life. But one is not without resources in making a response. The ethicist has an inexhaustible wealth of symbols, metaphors, and narratives that have in fact shaped the moral consciousness and sensibilities of a civilization. The task is to articulate, to bring from the oblivion of forgetfulness, resources for orienting life.

One can make the point in the language of responsibility ethics and thereby move between symbolic and conceptual matters. The symbolic contribution of biblical thought to an ethics of responsibility requires that one wed claims usually torn asunder: one claim is a regard – even love – for the enemy that reestablishes justice on the other side of retribution, thereby breaking cycles of violence (cf. chapter 6); a second claim is the primal affirmation of the goodness of creation that warrants responsibility for future life, the cry of mute things (cf. chapter 2). The affirmation of creation backs *respect* for life, regard for the enemy, as the extreme form of the other in one's midst, and grounds the struggle to *enhance* life beyond the logic of retribution. These two convictions permeate the symbolic and ritual resources of Christian faith and can be formulated as an imperative for the responsible direction of human power: *in all actions and relations respect and enhance the integrity of life before God*. Later in this book the imperative of responsibility will be specified in Christian and Jewish terms, namely as the double love command (chapter 5) and the Golden Rule (chapter 9) to address problems of conflict. Yet these norms are themselves warranted by the goods of creation.

The task of an ethics for the time of many worlds working with these distinctly Christian sources is to show how the imperative of responsibility expresses what has already shaped a view of the world and life, but which, when formulated as an imperative, resonates with deep moral sensibilities and can provide guidance for meeting the moral challenges of globalization. An

ethics can do so at two levels. First, the ethics specifies the central moral value, the supreme good, as the integrity of life and so a good creation. As we know from the introduction to this book, the integrity of life curtails the maximization of power as necessarily the central human aspiration. Second, the ethics functions as a directive for action within the distinct, but related, social subsystems in a society or even globality: economics, politics, law, media, etc. A global ethics must show, in other words, how an understanding of the integrity of life and the imperative of responsibility can inform character and conduct amid the complex and reflexive dynamics of global processes. The basic insight is that the conjunction of creation and the enemy in biblical, symbolic discourse serves as one resource for meeting the moral challenge of today, namely, the threat to future life and the problem of proximity.

We conclude this chapter not by recalling a classic myth or the moral resources of biblical texts, but with a real life story. It captures most of what has been said about the moral challenge of globalization. And it shows us the way in which religious sources can and must shape lives. While deeply personal, similar stories have been lived out in untold ways by morally sensitive persons.⁴⁶

In the Eyes of the Enemy

Near the end of World War II the allied forces attacked Okinawa, the largest of the Ryukyu Islands off the southern tip of Japan. Okinawa was one of the most brutal battles of the Pacific campaign, a foretaste of any actual invasion of Japan. The invasion of Japan was never undertaken; atomic bombs ended the war. And even to this day, the presence of the United States military in Okinawa is disputed and troubled. A legacy of suffering endures. Yet amid these past and present global realities, life is lived out in the concrete, in flesh and blood.

Several days into the actual landing on Okinawa and after the initial flush of brutality and blood, a young Marine captain, son of devout Methodists back in Iowa, took his platoon on routine rounds.⁴⁷ They came to a cave and entered it in search of the enemy. Near the back of the cave on the floor lay a Japanese soldier who was dying. The American soldiers wanted to finish the job. As the captain later told the story, the men were determined to cut out the Japanese soldier's teeth for the gold fillings and take anything else of value. The captain was morally outraged. He ordered his men to leave the cave while he remained behind. He stooped down and cradled the dying man in his arms. They looked into each other's eyes. The Japanese man, knowing that he had been spared violation, torture, and further agony, smiled and uttered a few words. In that moment, the American soldier felt the claim and depth of

shared humanity. The enemy he held, who died in his arms, had entered him and yet remained other. In the eyes of an enemy whom he had been compelled to protect out of religious conviction came a glimpse of shared humanity, a common dignity and destiny.

The task of ethics in the time of many worlds, an age too easily trapped in legacies of hatred and too ready to forsake future life, is in good measure to make sense of stories like this one. For in these acts of goodness, the world is born not of violence and warfare but remade from within the bounty of life.

NOTES

- 1 This chapter was originally given as “A Preface to Ethics: Global Dynamics and the Integrity of Life” for the Religious Studies Forum, Bucknell University, February 2000.
- 2 One could, of course, draw on psychological categories, especially Freudian ones, to examine this myth of the struggle between children and father! Part of the point of this chapter is to engage in the complex dialectical relation between sociocultural patterns of thought and the interpretation of religious discourse. Given this, psychological categories, while important, are not exclusively deployed in what follows. Yet it should be noted that throughout this inquiry the titanic myth is overturned by a different vision of creation rich in psychological import.
- 3 John Tomlinson, *Globalization and Culture* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1999), p. 18.
- 4 This is the profound and enduring insight of Friedrich Nietzsche. See his *On the Genealogy of Morals*, translated by Walter Kaufman and R. J. Hollingdale (New York: Vintage Books, 1989).
- 5 Problems of definition beset “myth” no less than “culture” and “globalization.” Without entering those debates, I have been informed by work in the history of religions and also hermeneutical theory. On this see Wendy Doniger O’Flaherty, *Other Peoples’ Myths: The Cave of Echoes* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1995) and Paul Ricoeur, *Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences*, edited and translated by John B. Thompson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).
- 6 See Arjun Appadurai, *Modernity at Large: Global Dimensions of Globalization* (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1996).
- 7 Jonathan Glover, *Humanity: A Moral History of the Twentieth Century* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000), pp. 408–9.
- 8 For the originating statement of this perspective, see George Lindbeck, *The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a Post-Liberal Age* (Philadelphia, PA: Westminster Press, 1984).
- 9 Roland Robertson, “Globalization and the Future of ‘Traditional Religion’” in *God and Globalization* vol. 1: *Religion and the Power of Common Life*, edited by Max L. Stackhouse with Peter J. Paris (Harrisburg, PA: Trinity Press International, 2000), p. 58.

- 10 Put otherwise, I am, in this chapter, submitting to the demands specified by Immanuel Kant and most modern philosophy, as well as amending them. Recall that in recognizing and insisting on the limits of human reason, Kant, in the *Critique of Pure Reason* and elsewhere, nevertheless granted that we *may* engage in speculation about matters that continually preoccupy the human heart, like the origin and end of things or even death and immortality. Added to this, I am suggesting that the problem of globality means that we *must* ponder these things and draw on the symbolic resources of traditions to do so. All of this remains within the context of moral reflection, however. Thus for the sake of this discussion, I am making a fully public argument about the contributions of the religions to ethics. In another context, say my own religious community, other arguments would be germane. But the concern now is with what H. Richard Niebuhr called “Christian moral philosophy.” See his *The Responsible Self: An Essay in Christian Moral Philosophy*, introduction by James M. Gustafson and foreword by William Schweiker. Library of Theological Ethics (Louisville, KY: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1999).
- 11 Walter Lippman, *A Preface to Morals* (New York: Time, 1964).
- 12 A fuller account of the idea of the “integrity of life” is found in chapter 2 and also the introduction to this book.
- 13 Alfred North Whitehead, *Science and the Modern World* (New York: Macmillan, 1948).
- 14 Tomlinson, *Globalization and Culture*, p. 2.
- 15 Roland Robertson, *Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture* (London: Sage, 1992), p. 142. Also see Anthony Giddens, *Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1991) and U. Beck, A. Giddens, and S. Lash, *Reflexive Modernization* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994).
- 16 Some theorists, like Tomlinson, speak of “complex connectivity” rather than social density and understand “proximity” in geographical terms. This is to miss the moral challenge of social density. See Tomlinson, *Globalization and Culture*, esp. chs. 1 and 5. In speaking of “proximity” I mean to signal the moral challenge nestled in connectivity itself. For a thinker who does explore “proximity” as the challenge of the “other,” and yet without attention to matters of globalization, see Emmanuel Lévinas, *Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence*, translated by Alphonso Lingis (Boston, MA: Martinus Nijhoff, 1981).
- 17 Saskia Sassen, *Globalization and Its Discontents: Essays on the New Mobility of People and Money* (New York: New Press, 1998), p. xx.
- 18 David Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990).
- 19 The point, obviously, is not to demonize other people, cultures, and religions. The point is that toleration has its justified limits and that it is important to make moral judgments about actions and events. On the complex connection between toleration and judgments about the intolerable, see chapter 6 below.
- 20 For a sensitive discussion of this issue see Lee Yearley, “New Religious Virtues and the Study of Religion” (Tempe: Arizona State University Press, 1994).

- 21 Appadurai, *Modernity at Large*, p. 82.
- 22 M. Thomas Thangaraj, "Hinduism and Globalization: A Christian Theological Perspective" in *God and Globalization* vol. 3: *Christ, The World Faiths and the Civilizational Dominions*, edited by Max L. Stackhouse, et. al. (Harrisburg, PA: Trinity Press International, 2001).
- 23 See B. Barber, *Jihad vs. McWorld* (New York: Time Books, 1995) and G. Ritzer *The McDonaldization of Society: An Investigation into the Changing Character of Contemporary Social Life* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge Press, 1993).
- 24 Robertson, *Globalization*, p. 53.
- 25 For an instructive account of debates about culture, see Kathryn Tanner, *Theories of Culture: A New Agenda for Theology* (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1997). For a brief, if somewhat controversial, account, see also Tomoko Masuzawa's "Culture" in *Critical Terms for Religious Studies*, edited by Mark C. Taylor (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1998), pp. 70–93. The old idea of economic substructure and ideological/cultural superstructure – which was, in any case, never adequate – must surely be overcome in thinking about global dynamics. The importance of these factors (representation, valuation, motivation) was always noted by the giants of classical sociology. Karl Marx, for instance, tried to understand the development of capitalism with respect to class struggle as a representational space underwritten by ideologies that together move worker and capitalist in the toil of economic life. The same could be shown of Max Weber's analysis of the rise of modern capitalism.
- 26 I borrow the term "moral space" from Charles Taylor, but develop it in a distinctive way. See Charles Taylor, *Sources of the Self: The Making of Modern Identity* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990). Also see William Schweiker, *Power, Value and Conviction: Theological Ethics in the Postmodern Age* (Cleveland, OH: Pilgrim Press, 1998).
- 27 See Douglas Sturm, "Identity and Otherness: Summons to a New Axial Age (Perspective on the Earth Charter Movement)" (Lewisburg, PA: Forum on Religion and Ecology, Department of Religion, Bucknell University, October 1999). One should note that theorists as different as Alexis de Tocqueville, J. S. Mill, Karl Marx and Friedrich Nietzsche, as well as others, already in the nineteenth century challenged certain ideas of the "individual" in relation to the rise and spread of modern democracy.
- 28 I want to leave aside debates about whether claims about national interest *à la Realpolitik* or utility and rational choice made by neoclassical economists require a more deterministic account of social and individual agents. Without arguing the point, the force of my position is that any attempt to understand global dynamics, and with this its main "actors," from a unitary perspective – say economics or politics – is inadequate. That is why I have insisted on not only social scientific but also cultural analysis in trying to understand globalization.
- 29 Sassen, *Globalization and Its Discontents*, pp. 84–5.
- 30 Hans Jonas, *Morality and Mortality: A Search for the Good after Auschwitz* (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1996).
- 31 See Donna J. Haraway, *Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: The Reinvention of Nature* (New York: Routledge, 1991). For a critique of such positions, see Paul Ramsey,

- Fabricated Man: The Ethics of Genetic Control* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1970).
- 32 See William Schweiker, *Responsibility and Christian Ethics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) and also Hans Jonas, *The Imperative of Responsibility: In Search of an Ethics for the Technological Age* translated by Hans Jonas and David Herr (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1984).
- 33 What is meant by “religion” is hotly debated. Yet any account of religion would want to include some dimension of experience, say the experience of transcendence, as well as symbolic, ritual, and ethical elements. As Theo Sundermeier has noted, “Religion ist die gemeinschaftliche Antwort des Menschen auf Transzendenzerfahrung, die sich in Ritus und Ethik Gestalt gibt.” See his *Was ist Religion? Religionswissenschaft in theologischen Kontext. Ein Studienbuch* (Gütersloh: Chr. Kaiser/Gütersloh Verlagshaus, 1999), p. 27.
- 34 See Stephen Toulmin, *Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda of Modernity* (New York: Free Press, 1990).
- 35 Honesty is needed. Some beliefs simply are not up to the task of our age; some worldviews, some myths, are below the level of the complexity of the world in which we in fact live. Put differently, the reality of globality is relativizing even the religions; it is forcing us to ask about what contribution they can make to a realistic response to the threats to the integrity of life on our planet.
- 36 See *A Global Ethic: The Declaration of the Parliament of the World’s Religions*, edited by Hans Küng and Karl-Josef Kuschel (New York: Continuum, 1995).
- 37 See John Kelsay and Sumner B. Twiss, *Religion and Human Rights* (New York: The Project on Religion and Human Rights, 1994).
- 38 Jeremy Bentham, “Anarchical Fallacies” in his *Works* vol. 2 (Edinburgh: William Tait, 1843), p. 523.
- 39 For instance, one might explore how Hindu ideas about Karma imply both a journey of salvation, and thus answers problems of hatred and suffering, and connect persons to the rest of reality and even the future. Similar explorations could be undertaken with respect to craving and suffering and the Buddhist response to these in universal compassion. Comparative inquiry along those or other lines is not possible in this chapter.
- 40 Recall a previous note. I am making the move to distinctly religious concerns within the ambit of ethical reflection. It is important that this move arises in the light of the problem of suffering and violence. As Kant knew, the problem of evil rightly provokes reflection beyond the limits prescribed by philosophical method. This also relates to the note above about a mimetic or explicative hermeneutics. I have made some of the argument of the following pages in other writings. See William Schweiker, “Verantwortungsethik in einer pluralistischen Welt: Schöpfung und die Integrität des Lebens” in *Evangelische Theologie* 59: 5 (1999): 320–34, or chapter 2 below.
- 41 Michael Welker, “Creation: Big Bang or the Work of Seven Days?” in *Theology Today* 52: 2 (1995): 183–4.
- 42 Hans-Dieter Betz and William Schweiker, “Concerning Mountains and Morals: A Conversation about the Sermon on the Mount” in *Criterion* 36: 2 (1997): 23. Also see his *The Sermon on the Mount* (Philadelphia, PA: Fortress Press, 1997).

Of course, we ought not to assume that God is all “sweetness and light” in the biblical texts. Quite the contrary: God is also depicted as destroyer and slayer. The argument is that there are the means within the text for the moral critique of such accounts of the divine. Ironically, it may well be important in some domains of moral and political existence to insist that God’s ways are not our ways, that God is the slayer of human purposes.

- 43 On this see John Dominic Crossan, *Jesus: A Revolutionary Biography* (San Francisco, CA: HarperSanFrancisco, 1994).
- 44 Not surprisingly, theologians have been drawn into long discussions about the relation between creation, redemption, and providence. Without entering the details of these dogmatic issues, the force of my remarks is to link much closer than usual claims about God’s creative action with beliefs about redemption and providence. My interpretation might not be as novel as it seems, although the full ethical implications of this move have not been traced by others. Consider other analogous arguments. Karl Barth, in his *Church Dogmatics*, insists that divine election, God’s decision to be God for us, is the primal reality and this sets creation in the context of redemption. Thomas Aquinas, in the *Summa Theologiae*, argues that the “logos” is the paradigm in the divine mind for the creation of the world, but this is the logos that is incarnate in the redeemer. More recently, Jürgen Moltmann argues for a connection between eschatology and creation and thus ideas of new creation. See his *The Coming of God: Christian Eschatology*, translated by Margaret Kohl (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1996). My point is that the old division between an “ethics of creation” and an “ethics of redemption” must be rethought in the global context by Christian thinkers and that there is some precedence for doing so.
- 45 While some skepticism is in order about the power of religions actually to shape the moral beliefs, attitudes, and actions of persons, we should always remain open to the evidence. In this light, the recent work of Robin Gill on the ways in which religious membership does in fact help foster moral outlook and action is extremely important. See his *Churchgoing and Christian Ethics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
- 46 I am of course mindful of the many ambiguities that surround any moral encounter amid the terrors of war. Granting that fact, this story, I believe, manifests some basic features characteristic of when, in the midst of those terrors, responsibility and moral sensitivity remain undefeated. For an insightful account of this point, and one that includes other stories like that to follow, see Jonathan Glover, *Humanity: A Moral History of the Twentieth Century* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000).
- 47 That captain was my father. I have long pondered over his story and what it has taught me about the power of human care. In love and gratitude I owe so much to Dad, now lost to me.