Part I

Principles

All nations access and exploit the rural and some of their wilderness realms. Cities expand, mostly unconstrained, and incoherent suburban pods fatten-up.

For the top-third life is good. For the bottom-third the situation is ugly. The catch call is for the middle-third, the majority-commanding group, to heed this plight and target the sensible way ahead.

1

Sustainable and Ethical

Chapters 1 and 2 lay foundations: express definitions, establish theory, explore philosophical understandings. These are precursors to the practical guidelines given in later chapters: the 'Charter' (chapter 3), 'Growth Pattern Management' (chapter 4), and 'Urban Growth Management' (chapter 5). The reader versed in planning theory principles and philosophy, or bent on getting to grips with planning practice, can make direct access to the Practice section.

What impresses the newcomer to the Anglo settler society nations of Northern America and Australasia is how resource discovery, scientific and technological invention, and political force have so powerfully and rapidly imprinted a 'rightness' over the last two hundred years (pastoralism and agriculture as well as plantation forestry, along with urban settlement) and a conjoint 'wrongness' (flora, wildlife and soil evisceration, along with much misery for the indigenous 'first' peoples). What is easily overlooked is that in earlier centuries the Old World was also subjected to resource discovery, inventions and political forces which vastly modified the landscapes of those times – sometimes to a state of disutility.

Hindsight, into the working relationship of the inhabitants of Anglo settler societies – North American and Australasian – is the context for this book. It is a project which derives its rationale from a situation where most developers in OECD settler societies acknowledge environmental issues in the breach, and pursue projects for profit – a circumstance where the outcome for both profit taking and environmental conservation clearly could be more mutually supportive.

This scene-setting chapter focuses attention upon key issues explored in three passages: *first* there is some delving into 'development', 'planning' and 'sustainability'; *second* there is an attempt to deconstruct the meanings of 'property', 'interests' and 'neomodernity'; and the *third* passage provides a foundation understanding of sustainability in the neomodern context of the 'triple bottom line' paradigm – which is an amalgam of growth, community, ethical and environmental factors.

The historical connection between development and planning – that is between pragmatic development and politically led planning – is not a conundrum of the 'chicken or egg' kind, for clearly the development thrust for investment return

Figure 1.1 Anglo settler society nations. 'New Zealand, Australia, and Canada, all with strong frontier traditions, small [low density] populations, and a British-induced cultural dislike of cities, share the American [suburban] experience' (Kenneth Jackson, *Crabgrass Frontier*, 1985).

'Since the mid-eighteenth century, more of nature has been destroyed than in all of prior history.'
Hawken, Lovins, Lovins, *Natural Capitalism*, 1999

has always been dominant. Land-use patterning originated with community conflicts which arose when landowners set out to exercise their property rights unfettered, excluding all outside influence, even in some instances resisting zoning, that most normative of interventions.

At *best*, land policy determinations were arrived at previously with some assembly of data and analytical input as the precursor to either a 'letting out of the belt' or a 'filling in the gaps' pattern based on an expansive 10- to 20-year look ahead, inducing low densities for at least the first ten years. At *worst*, land-use practice was based on expansionist greed, originating with landowners and developers working with 'booster' local government leadership, largely ignoring or overriding planning advice and input. As evidence, the Anglo-settled North American and Australasian nations are adorned with plaques commemorating the frontier intrepidity of surveyors, the project prowess of engineers and architects, and the visionary inspiration of politicians – with few plaques in place or public service medals handed out to commemorate the work of urban planners.

Disclosed on the web by Andres Duany (1999) sourcing Jane Jacobs. 'The pseudoscience of planning seems almost neurotic in its determination to imitate empiric failure and ignore empiric success.'

The reality is that planning, and planners, fell in with exploitation-led and consumer-driven developer trends. Lacking a conservancy ethic, community leaders encouraged the production and use of formula rule books and plans, promoting the commodification of rural land assets into urban sprawl where, as evocatively related in Campoli, Humstone and MacLean's *Above and Beyond* (2002: 197) 'Like a dog chasing its tail we pursue the dream of unlimited space, unrestricted movement and total control (in situations where) What we want is is an unspoiled rural landscape, but in pursuing it, what we get is sprawl.' The way that suburbia exhibits these sprawl characteristics, for different North American and

Australasian situations, is well explained in *Visions of Suburbia* edited by Roger Silverstone (1997).[1]

One contemporary complication is the awesome efficacy of modern technology, another is the insatiable money-doubling expectation of investors. Some benefits can be identified for citizens, like the legal *certainty* enshrined by crude yet clear property rights zoning. There has also been, for property developers, the benefits to them of *departures* (sometimes known as dispensations) from the strictures of zoning and the rule book. There is also the *freedoms* for occupiers to consume and discard.

'The Human psyche can tolerate a great deal of prospective misery, but it cannot bear the thought that the future is beyond all power of anticipation.'
Robert Heilbroner, 'Reflections', 1991

All these 'certainties, departures and freedoms' are at odds with emergent community preferences to establish more socially acceptable environmental behaviour: and in pursuit of that ideal 'zoning based systems' have occasionally morphed into *Flexible Zoning* (Porter, Phillips and Lasser 1991) with pejorative results.

The money-based energy-fired and technologically inspired 'resource exploitation' and 'consumer discard' syndrome (explored more fully in chapter 3) has drawn political leaders and the populations of wealthier societies into a growth-on-growth maze, from which they can find neither the 'central meaning' nor a 'way out'. A socially driven planning function is one instrument of intervention available to communities for coercing, advising and regulating these development forces and consumer preferences. But it is now obvious that the outcomes (the output) are often failing society in terms of the quality and sustainability of

'People became so obsessed by a hatred of government that they forgot it is meant to be their government, and is the only powerful public force they have purchase on.'
J. R. Saul, *Unconscious Civilisation*, 1997

the results being delivered up. This is a matter which calls for consumers to ensure that they win out against destructive producer preferences, pursuing, in a phrase, conservation with development.

Acknowledging the need for conservation with development is not only a matter of seizing the moment, of shifting moral ground. It is also a battle to link business and the profit ethos to the development with conservancy ethic.

With the demise of glasnost and despotic governments most nation-states and their citizens work within the only remaining proven system, democracy. That style of governance cleaves, as it always has, to a business-for-profit and a growth-on-growth ethic, with corporate environmental responsibility now inserted into a wider Corporate Social Responsibility.

In a postscript to their recent *Environmental Discourse and Practice*, Benton and Short (1999) put the view that there is 'one common belief: society must change its attitudes about its use of the earth'. This 'belief' I fully endorse – it is on my wish list. But 'must change'? And 'society'? My own take on the socio-environmental compact is that movements in the direction of corporate social responsibility, which include corporate environmental responsibility, can partly be induced by championing the socio-environmental cause, can be more fully enforced through the use of regulatory instruments, but can only be really effective

'Economic growth has become the bogey of the ecologically anxious'
Felipe Fernandez-Armesto, *Millennium*, 1995

'For most ecologists, big cities are off limits'
Mari Jensen, *Ecology Moves Downtown*, 1999

when socio-environmental responsibility becomes part of profitable business practice.

> 'The complex environmental problems that challenge our future are the direct result of human, political, social and economic judgments exercised by nature *and on other people* during the preceding industrial age.'
> Robert Collin and Robin Morris Collin, 'Sustainability and Environmental Justice', 2001 (Italics added)

I discern three business-style 'certainties' to new-age life in settler societies. The *first* is that new-age technology is certain – the solar-powered car will be followed by the hydrogen-powered car – and these new technologies will be as profitable to new-age business as the steam engine was to George Stephenson and the combustion engine was to Henry Ford. The *second* is that the bottom-line purpose of business will remain business for profit. The *third* is that new-age democratic governments will decree, variously, against energy use profligacy, the exploitative hollowing out of finite resources, the dumping of reusable waste, and the exposure of toxic residues to the biosphere.

Incorporating Fernando-Armesto's epilogic collation (*Millennium* 1995) adds in these additional 'certainties'. *Four*: population growth will be contained. *Five*: totalitarianism will return. *Six*: big states will continue to fragment.[2] *Seven*: cities will wither (!). *Eight*: initiatives will continue to shift.

And here are two more 'certainties' rounding up the set to ten. *Nine:* that domestic investing and government taxation will always outweigh the economic significance of international investments. *Ten:* that settler society governments will always be more powerful than corporations.

LIVING HEAVILY
Economic growth the objective
Dysfunctional suburbanism
Environmentally exploitative
Energy profligate
Waste disposing
Toxic dumping

LIVING LIGHTLY
Social harmony a priority
Balanced growth an ideal
Conservation with development
Energy efficient
Waste reused, reduced, recycled
Toxins closed-off from biosphere
Even-handed standards

My point, the point, is that the means to achieve environmental responsibility and social responsibility – better lifestyles – amounts to considerably more than moral browbeating and polemic grandstanding; what it calls for is a getting from 'here – living heavily' to 'there – living lightly'.[3]

Different administrations of varying complexion have diverse objectives. Different nations, and different regions within larger nations, have varying standards. Business, though, has one objective and one standard – stakeholder profits – and the generation of stakeholder profits conditions their make-up, now and in the future, within every open democracy. Governments can tax and legislate business as they variously see fit – but they will always ensure that legitimate enterprise is never put out of business. Indeed it is the job of government to fashion situations in which business can operate and profit. Business-based laws can be also passed to prohibit the dumping of toxins, to limit rates of non-renewable resource extraction, to achieve efficiencies in the use of renewable resources, and to observe the socio-environmental benchmarks and achieve socio-economic outcomes.

But a dilemma confronts. First there is the morality angle about which we hear a great deal; and then there is the matter of ethics (and philosophy) which has a covert objective, to ensure that the mistakes of a free-for-all past, and the desire

for a harmoniously balanced future, do not get confused. Setting out to reconcile this dilemma enables us to get our heads around the fact that living off the environment, living together in communities, and living from the product of our work, are intertwined activities. It is no longer viable to separately compartmentalize human beings and nature, for it is now clear that if people keep on thinking that same old way they will keep on making the same mistakes. One clear objective is the formulation of 'conservation *with* development' to accompany 'business *with* profit'.

A lesson learnt is that when you pause to think about the consumer maze, frustration is encountered. If you already possess every material utility and have reached what could be supposed to be the 'centre', you will find that in fact nothing of real substance is there. The only satisfaction comes from either 'going back' or 'getting out'; it certainly does not lie with 'going on' as before.

The challenge, which is particularly a consume-and-discard *control* challenge, is for communities to safeguard and regulate the governance of their own habitat, in a phrase, for communities to be locally empowered. This is at base a matter of turning away from the as-of-right attitude to consumer growth and pollution discard which has been the mode of urban expansion since Fordist mass production of the automobile, and to turn away because the pattern is dysfunctional, namely *un*sustainable and ultimately *un*tenable. In short, without discarding established technological benefits from benign processes, the call is to recognize, respect and fit in with cyclical, seasonal, birth–life–death patterns of empowerment, conservation, development and human capacity.

Is this a seeking of the impossible, particularly for settler societies which tend to play down the interventionist role of the state and play up an opportunist role for the market? The challenge is serious, massive and complex, *and* although a World Agency 'mandate' exists in terms of the *Agenda 21* initiatives (Appendix to chapter 5) neither growth-on-growth nor consumerist addictions and discard practices are easily forsworn or overthrown.

The consequences of *not* picking up the sustainability trace induces anxiety in many of those educated in economics, and deeper angst for those educated in the social sciences and the earth sciences. The late twenty-first-century situation for nations which retain access to the sustainable development option – and most nations certainly do retain this option – is that they can either square up to sustainability or gradually decline both materially and morally.

'In the western mind scarcity is an aberration correctable by the appropriate application of capital, technology and labour. The response to scarcity is to apply more of these factors of production.'
Virginia Abernathy, *Population Politics*, 1993

'two forms of confederation . . . the Portland [constrained-conservative] form, and the Orange County [freeflow-liberal] form, will compete for ascendancy. . . . the Orange County model will, on the whole, dominate.'
Robert Kaplan, *Empire Wilderness*, 1998

At the Rio Summit, 1992. 'The American way of life is not up for negotiation.'
George Bush [Senior], US President

Development, Planning and Sustainability

For the wider purpose of this book the definition of growth goes beyond that which is natural and benign. It includes the synthetic (nuclear proliferations and toxic accumulations), the synergistic (multi-millionaires created from opportunism), and the hedonistic (resource depletions and discard accumulations) – all 'growth'! Understood as 'capitalism' the outcome is neatly summarized by David Landes's (1989) favourite cynicism 'that capitalism is the privatisation of gains and the socialisation of losses'.

A capsule definition for **development** is that it is a process which sets out to achieve progressive advancement to the human condition, involving taking action and attaining material growth and social fulfilment over time. Myerson and Rydin (1996) hold that 'development is only "real" if it improves the quality of life', which tends to establish that some development is 'bad' and, indeed, that 'good' development is only that which achieves progressive advancement to the human condition. What is under consideration here is the way the development-through-growth emphasis results in the commodification of land and landed resources, *along with* the generation of solid gaseous and liquid wastes, and an accumulation of irreducible toxins. A complication arises in that in 'new age' terms the process is now also expected to be 'sustainable' in the style of conservation with development – a coupling which has historically been characterized as mutually excluding.

An important point to make is that this matter of sustainability will not be socially acceptable or societally workable if it harps on about less consumption, a reduced economy and reduced profits, and, or also, an economic slowdown. From a Canadian perspective (Lucie Sauvré 2002) there is for sustainability a 'sort of "newspeak" that is spreading throughout the world, superimposed on each culture and reducing the ability to think differently about realities'. The trick is to enhance investment and growth within a sustainability framework. This involves the exercise of a strategic choice – to achieve conservation and development outcomes concomitantly, and consciously to set about creating and maintaining landscapes worth cherishing.

A selection from myriad definitions of **planning** is public forethought (the setting of objectives) and conscious involvement (the empowerment) before taking community-determined public-interest action to effect improved change. Thereby arises a compound definition for planning: a democratic advancement of the overall human condition; connecting public prescience (setting objectives); and conscious involvement (community discourse and empowerment) before action is taken to bring about improved change. This emphasis fits into a larger framework of understanding arising from a North American (Myers and others 1997) set of 'Anchor Points for Planning's Identification' which I summarize, add to, and rerank.

In these terms planning

- Links knowledge and action: connectedness
- Improves the humanized and natural environments
- Holds out for useful interconnections
- Focuses on the future

- Honours cycles: seasons, life patterns, highs and lows
- Designs artfully and redesigns thoughtfully
- Balances socio-economic-environmental outcomes
- Engages in a participatory style of decision-making
- Works for diversity and variety of outcome
- 'Works around' rather than 'pushing through'.

Aside from semantic quibbles, this compound list-phrasing portrays something democratic, spatially applied, and potentially flexible, in the public domain; a public-interest prescriptive matter which, following consultation and discussion, is *done and delivered*. Planning is the actual bringing about of desirable changes for an improved overall future through the medium of predetermined human action. It also involves the interpositioning of design, particularly growth pattern (regional) design and urban physical design.

Within democracies these desirable changes implicate a vast complexity, which can be viewed as part balance with, and part trade-off between, the 'pursuit of material growth', the 'attainment of social wellbeing' and the 'maintenance of an environmental harmony'. Another way to make this point is that *sustainable* planning embroils an all-resources (human, fiscal, physical) management. That context, in accordance with contemporary idiom, is where this writing 'is coming from': reformist in democratic intent within an enabling socio-economic-environmental context; in character 'neomodern' and in emphasis 'sustainable'.

> 'Sustainable development (and conservation?) meets the needs of present generations without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.'
> World Commission on Environment and Development, 1987

Contrasting with depictions of 'development' and 'planning' no consistent capsule definition of **sustainability** can be produced, with each nation and every sector staking out different claims, all normal dictionaries becoming useless in a play where the goalposts are frequently moved. The general notion and discourse about sustainability is not misunderstood, even if it largely figures in tokenist statements and is observed 'in the breach' by most governments, many local communities and most individuals. It is in the urban context that the main blind spot occurs, the settlements where 80 to 90 per cent of the Anglo settler society populations live.[4] Here the population is unreservedly consumerist, and generally considered to be beyond sustainable recovery.[5] Urban places consume resources from without, and discard wastes to the beyond, to a degree which is in fact *un*sustainable!

Of course urban inhabitants could – and many do – live in a more sustainable way by reducing consumption and waste disposal. Over the longer term that kind of progressive outcome might be socially engineered, bringing into being a congruence of social policy and environmental justice – albeit *uneven* social policy and *rough* environmental justice. Along this path 'sustainability', a former 'specialism', is now becoming a core philosophical 'generalism' for urban and regional planning and planning school curricula. Power for the sustainable ideal arises from the fact that nobody now argues openly against it; indeed a problem has arisen

for committed 'green' enthusiasts through a hijacking of their environmentalist lexicon by the likes of genetic engineers and fossil-fuel providers!

An aspect that is frequently misunderstood is that the pursuit of sustainable policies can factually mean more, not less, economic activity – a 'win-win' factor not lost on the automobile industry and some fuel and energy providers. Sustainable planning practice – essentially conservation *with* development – engages more people, takes up benign yet quite complex technologies, and results in more money being spent on both conservation and development.

Principle 8
'To achieve sustainable development and a higher quality of life for all people, States should reduce and eliminate unsustainable patterns of production and consumption and promote appropriate demographic policies.'
The Rio Declaration, 1992

There is a remaining question: how, against the hedonic OECD–GATT–WTO consumer trend, did a worldwide prognosis arise in the style of the *Agenda 21* Rio Declaration (United Nations Conference on Environment and Development 1992: see Appendix to chapter 5) for the imprint of an international protocol? This, from a sceptical standpoint, is something of a contradictory new-age hoax, for 'sustainable conservancy' and 'material development' are for the most part separate and exclusive of each other. *Agenda 21* attempts a radicality: 'sustainable development', vaguely defined. This comes across as blurred imagery because of the diplomatic necessity at the Rio Conference to accommodate the vagaries of the rich and poor nations being courted. The pragmatic challenge, in the phrasing of Robert Fri (1991) is 'to put our practice on a par with our principles'. Quite so: but signatories to the 1992 Rio Earth Summit protocol had not produced their 'Agenda Statements' by the agreed 1997 deadline simply because the decision-taking processes involved were *neither* fully understood *nor* partially fashioned by that date.

'Sustainable development is not a fixed state of harmony, but rather a process of change in which the exploitation of resources, the direction of investments, the orientation of technological development, and institutional change are made consistent with future as well as present needs. We do not pretend that the process is easy or straightforward. Painful choices have to be made. Thus, in the final analysis, sustainable development must rest on political will.'
Bruntland, *Our Common Future*, 1987

The contemporary sustainable basis of reasoning had its genesis within the Brundtland Report (1987) prepared for the World Commission on Environment and Development as *Our Common Future*. That document defined 'sustainability', somewhat tautologically, as comprising three goals:

- *To ensure* that all societies' needs are met.
- *To ensure* that all members of societies' have their needs met.
- *To ensure* that all development and conservation is sustainable over time in a social, economic and environmental sense.

A characteristic of the sustainability narrative is the persistence of emphasis on unimpaired environmental quality over time, with no loss of material wellbeing, yet exhibiting some social gain. This adds up to the impracticality of attempting to both 'have and eat the same environmental cake'! Operationally, that is in the procedural context of neomodern conservancy *with* development, there arises a moral challenge to retain an *ethical* focus, along with a practical challenge to assess and resolve all manner of unacceptable *risk*. This is not merely a matter of obviating

the monetary risk to big-game players. It involves heralding composite risk, social, economic, environmental, for all sectors and individuals within communities of concern – for households, for neighbourhoods, for settlements and for regions.

An intensive and well-balanced attempt at 'Defining a Sustainable Society' is available from a Robinson, Francis, Legge and Lerner (1990) presentation. Their expression reaches beyond sustainable development into cultural neomodernity for a 'sustainable society'. In their collegiate context these four set out to establish 'that there is no single version of a sustainable society'. They 'rule out environmental autocracy' and establish the useful notion that for organized human society, 'sustainability can never be said to be completely achieved'. The neomodern paradigm stemming from their contention gives rise to the view that 'we can usually say more about what is not sustainable than what is sustainable', a position that is not only correct, it is also one that strives to explain what sustainable urban planning entails as well as being a stimulus to bringing it about.

There is also Crosson's (1994) more pragmatic and targeted definition: that a 'sustainable agricultural system (his example) is one that *indefinitely* (American usage) meets demands for agricultural output at socially acceptable economic and environmental costs'. Clearly 'cyclicity' – birth–life–death, climatic seasons, water cycles, and the carbon cycle – is central to the human pursuit of sustainability. Extending from this, it is possible to fashion a parallel neomodern definition of 'sustainable *urbanization*' as that democratic style of urban provisioning which *indefinitely* meets the need for access to employment, education, entertainment and recreation at a socially acceptable environmental cost.[6]

Emphasis will be placed later, in chapter 3 (Charter) on the awkwardness of the 'sustainable management' notion in the sense of its 'environmental only' application, The main point is that the forces of market drift, consumer desires and developer inclination are significant, and have generated compulsions within settler societies, particularly affecting the peoples excluded from, and culturally ambivalent about, the Western development ethos.

It is also important to recognize the place and role of the appeal-hearing agencies (courts or tribunals in some jurisdictions) because of their placement for the delivery of progressive, useful, politically correct and ethically acceptable rulings. These tribunals are custodially and legally significant because, in their absence, the entrenched position of local government has been one of 'leave it to us' (the elected local officials), to the 'landowners' (the holders of development rights), to 'developers' (who presume to provide what they believe citizens want); and above

'Sustainable development recognises that sound economic and social development is not possible without a healthy environment; and conversely that a healthy environment is threatened by development that is not sound.'
Megan Howell, Auckland University, 2002

Legal Principal Three 'States shall maintain ecosystems and ecological processes essential for the functioning of the biosphere, and shall preserve biological diversity, and shall observe the principle of optimal sustainable yield in the use of living natural resources and ecosystems.'
Bruntland, *Our Common Future*, 1987

Sustainable Development has been defined as 'Using, conserving and enhancing the community's resources so that ecological processes, on which life depends, are maintained, and the total quality of life now and in the future can be increased.'
Australian Government, 1992

all else, leave everything to that imperfect accessory to societal wellbeing, the 'market force'.[7] The greatest challenge to neomodern – thus of the twenty-first century – settler society is to retain the ability to achieve capacity empowerment and social wellbeing in a manner which avoids environmentally damaging growth.

Property, Interests and Neomodernity

Development planning and conservancy practice requires, for each individual jurisdiction of concern, a local working knowledge of legal, administrative and regulatory procedures, along with a capability to negotiate ever-improving

'Property', 'Interests' and 'Neomodernity' connect also with the Growth Pattern pragmatics examined in chapter 4 (the Ownerships and Rights passage).

outcomes.[8] An important situational context for this passage is that settler society citizenry has not been greatly moved in the past to organize changes to the way freehold land is occupied or used at the urban edge. This is a situation in marked contrast to much of the Old World, most notably Britain, where even during the prolonged period of right-wing Thatcherism the urban-rural line of distinction was held.

Property

As an introduction, and to portray the significance to individuals of 'property interests', appraise Kevin Wong Toi's construct, presented in box 1.1 **Terra psyche: the land settlement continuum.**[9]

Of integral significance to an understanding of the origins of settler patterns is adherence to *landed* property ownership – so much so that the power of eminent domain on the part of central and local government to intervene in a landholder's title is viewed with widespread mistrust. This cleaving to land and resource

A metaphor for 'land possessed as women' has been identified in Australian and North American literature highlighting the masculine dominance, productive gain and exploitation associated with rural property ownership.
  Schaeffer, 1988, Kolodny, 1975, Byrnes, 1993

For a wider perspective consult Joni Seager's *Earth Follies* (1993).

ownership underlines a basic urge for individuals to attain a sense of security in an uncertain world through an absolute possession of some corner of it. This security-blanket attitude extends to a reluctance to endorse any public rights, to favour the allowance of *private* development works on privately owned land, and to inhibit *public* developments on freehold lands. For those who train in *planning* (community forethought before common-good action) and would *plan* for an improved future, managing the use of freehold lands has been piecemeal and patchy. That pattern has become entrenched because of a fortress attitude to private property rights *and* a community adoption of 'status quo zoning' which, in many ways, is public planning forsaken.

In the New World, demarcation and land-title registration systems, although legally robust, have been applied orthogonally, and in the process failed to adapt to the landscape diversity

Box 1.1 Terra psyche: the land settlement continuum

To better understand human attachment to the land, a qualitative construct, the *terra psyche*, is postulated and cultivated within a developmental frame of reference. In historical terms the continuum of development theory advances from the collective mana of first peoples through to the individual 'rights' of freehold property ownership, and beyond. Ultimately it is 'the beyond' continuum to which planning should be committed. Within the idiom of development theory this is designated as a 'post' or 'neo' modern phase. This phase denotes the transition from a modern to a neomodern mode of development and conservation.

PAST

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?     v. organic              v. organizational mentality        v. organic       ?
  iv. hunter / gatherer     iv. technological mentality      iv. clever and
      iii. primitive        iii. development mentality            soft
    ii. guardianship         ii. ownership mentality        iii. neomodern
      i. spiritual               i. terra psyche            ii. stewardship
                                                              i. balanced

                                i. capital gains
                                ii. absolute
                                   privatization            FUTURE
                                iii. modernist
                                iv. smart and hard
                                v. linear
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
PRESENT

Terra psyche suggests an appreciation for the earth from within the soul of the individual. When considering terra psyche from an etymological perspective, 'terra' embodies the physical and tangible component of land, while 'psyche' represents the abstract perception that every individual possesses. Hence terra psyche is an expression which can be applied as a conceptual medium to embrace the relative qualitative affinity which humanity has with the land.

When applying the terra psyche construct to the development and conservancy experience, it is the prevalent attitude towards the land which is being articulated. The first collective attitude to be depicted is that of indigenous peoples, whose psyche and attachment manifested itself at two levels. One level can be described as a basic material terra psyche, where land is a resource supplying the life-giving needs to humanity. Another level is that of a spiritual terra psyche, evidenced by the infrangible bond between indigens and their homeland. The spiritual terra psyche placed limits on development that advanced beyond the attainment of basic needs, and resulted in a non-teleological 'primitive' phase. Following the pre-European era the New World lands were subjected to the arrival of colonial settlers. Their attitude portrayed an exploitative terra psyche, as land was treated as an economic commodity with land speculation rife. Consolidation of the exploitative terra psyche has occurred up to the present day. The recent circumstance can be defined as a modernist period of development, characterized by capital gains. The present transits into the future phase of neomodern development with conservancy, which promotes a balanced terra psyche propelled by a responsible identity with the land.

This cursory survey of the terra psyche not only reflects intrinsic attitudes towards the land, but also reinforces the priority assigned to particular organizational outcomes. Development rights are aligned with the capital gains psyche, while 'public' rights are associated with the as yet unrealized 'balanced' psyche. There is a conspicuous philosophical rationale in the design of this terra psyche construct. For example, the rectilinear quantification of land, symptomatic of an exploitative attitude, reveals a reductionist disposition in pursuit of its short-term objectives through expedient means; whereas a balanced terra psyche adopts a holistic awareness of land and its dynamic qualities. Land is and will continue to be an indispensable resource for human existence. The terrestrial aspect of human organization has been subject to an evolving state of quantification. Through the cognition of a terra psyche, the qualitative dimension of land can be promoted as an integral constituent of neomodern development.

Source: construct and argument devised by Kevin Wong Toi.

encountered. The system of recording landownership in the manner of a stock-holding facilitated the bartering of land. If boundaries were to be guaranteed (and thereby surveyed) it was found expedient and cheaper to assign large rectilinear (often 'quarter-square' blocks in North America, 1,000-acre blocks in New Zealand, larger for inland Australia) with seldom an allowance for, or fitting in with, the varied land form and its salient topographical features.

> The United Kingdom is also a 'property'-owning democracy. How often North Americans and Australasians returning from a visit to Britain, probably to cement their cultural heritage, comment on the rural landscape's visual order. This experience stands in contrast to the confused shading of suburbia into ex-urbia in the New World. The point is that the British, despite a relatively high density of population for their landscape, have kept apart the urban and rural predicaments.

No effort was made in the Anglo settler societies to set aside the field paths and rural byways of Arcadian Britain and some other parts of Europe. It was a case of geometry beating topography, described in an Australian context (Lines 1991) as identifying surveyors as the principle agents of change, who 'opened the land to invasion, enabling the history of conquest to begin, and transformed the amorphous face (of what was considered to be an unhumanised landscape) into an imperial possession'. The land surveys and the follow-up registration of title facilitated land transaction, but in so doing imposed an unyielding privatization and passed to freeholders the right to exploit landscapes without any further contribution to the public domain. The general public retained no constitutional privilege of general access over the fully 'enclosed' lands. In settler societies, there was an abandonment of the Old World situation where much of the privately owned landscape is a publicly accessible part of the national estate (the situation in Scotland), and neglect of the rights of pedestrian traverse (the footpath system of rural England).

The land capture process is illustrated for the Antipodean context by the Wakefield company settlements, which began with Adelaide in Australia (1836) and moved on to New Zealand, beginning with Wellington in 1840. These early company-formula towns were instrumental in establishing an orthogonal 'militaristic' pattern for urban settlement. The Vertical Social Section approach excluded the indigenous first people and other non-European settlers. Company settlement was systematic colonization, consisting of two important organizational principles: effective regulative power over the on-sale of land at fixed prices *and* subsequent municipal control. Brilliantly entrepreneurial though they were, the Wakefield's social conditioning meant that they could only conceive a stratified social order. Professional 'men' and 'gentlemen' of means were seen to be important in the establishment of a governing gender and a dominating class. In theory, there was to be a hierarchy: professionals, artisans, labourers and native labour on arrival, conveying European notions of breeding and class to the New World. But the settlers were soon realigned into an egalitarian situation, albeit within communities which gave vent to 'racism' and 'settlerism'. It was a melting pot where many an avaricious small-time speculator soon made it rich, simply because the land-stock taken from the indigenous people was obtained virtually free of payment. From Benton and Short (1999) 'The main spoils of imperial expansion into the North American continent was land . . . The basic problem for the (US) Republic was what to do with the Indians.' Settlers of substance and

wealth became an upper-crust citizenry, and a significant propertied sub-set maintained their positions of power privilege and dominance. These 'jump-started' families are present today throughout settler societies in the well-established law firms, business conglomerates, and as patrons of the arts and sport. To many North Americans and Australasians those early settler communities are now glamorized as searching out an actualization of utopian ideals, alluded to by Hunter (1987) as suburban pastoralism, achieving a European sense of urban fulfilment, along with sets of European place names.[10]

Relevant to the wealthier democratic nation context, McAuslan (1980: 2) identifies the presence in Western societies of three commanding property-ownership maxims, much at odds with each other.

- *Firstly*, 'that the law exists and should be used to protect private property and its institutions . . . the traditional common law approach to the role of (land governing) law'.
- *Secondly*, there is law 'used to advance the public interest, if necessary against the interest of private property; this . . . is the orthodox public administration and planning approach to the role of law (in the public interest)'.
- *Thirdly*, certain 'law exists . . . to advance the cause of public participation . . . the radical or populist approach to the role of law.'[11] used for the likes of borrowing to finance 'land banking'.

From the United States *Constitution* – 'Fifth Amendment' 'nor shall private property be taken without just compensation.'

Guilt for land theft from native first peoples, and attempts to assuage that guilt, are reflected historically throughout settler societies by the creation of wilderness areas and National Parks on tracts initially considered useless and worthless. That shame also underwrites the credibility of contemporary Green politics and bolsters the bank accounts of environmental organizations.

Nations of the transpacific settler society kind have elevated the *first*-order laws which protect 'freehold' property rights to a constitutional level where tenural sanctity remains secure and stable against outside claims. This 'bundle of rights' concept shakes out into four strands, in two binary pairs: the 'hold and dispose' entitlements commanded by freeholders; and the 'use and enjoy' entitlements which are to varying degrees influenced by the wider community, there being only one external distraction – 'eminent domain' the governmental right of compulsory acquisition for public use purposes. McAuslan's *second*-order interventionist law, broadly described as administrative law, has an uphill battle against the freehold-rights philosophy. This leaves little opportunity for an application of his *third*-order principle for public participation to secure wider public interests; and/or also my suggestion of a *fourth*-order consideration of the recognition of less tangible community 'interests' (spiritual aesthetic) in private landscapes. Because property rights are legal rights, they confront public values in an exclusionary way, inducing the separation of private property interests from public good interests.

From John De Grove (1984: 396) 'The issue of city (urban) development and redevelopment (can) be seen as the reverse side of the protection of important agricultural, forest and open space land.'

Interests

The more one thinks about the dominance of private property ownership the harder appears to be the battle to turn landowners toward sustainable urban planning, unless this can be fashioned profitably. Shifting from property fixation to the identification of individual and community interests – an interests gaze being a neomodern way of connecting the sustainability concept with the entrepreneurial psyche – the possibility arises that public 'interests' in a wider environmental context could replace narrowly defined 'ownerships' as the basis of planning.

William Fischel in his *Economics of Zoning Laws* (1985) examines the property rights dimension of zoning-as-planning.

THE CONCEPT OF
INTEREST: PROPRIETARY
STAKEHOLDERS
Owners
Tenants
Developers
Infrastructure
providers
Statutory undertakers
First people inheritors
Firms
Institutions

NON-PROPRIETARY
STAKEHOLDERS
Natural heritage
conservationists
Cultural heritage
preservationists
'Third party'
stakeholders
Political advocates
Bureaucratic
organizations
Professional practice
stakeholders

The question often raised is 'who pays' and 'who benefits' from plan making? The symmetrical beauty of an 'interest-based methodology' renders it theoretically possible to have only winners, with some winning more than others, and *no* losers. This happy outcome would derive from an interest-based bargaining process which fairly balanced out the proportions of benefit to all stakeholders.

Community plan-making can be identified as a process for selecting equitably between conflicting and cooperative claims, mediating misunderstandings, and ameliorating the adverse circumstances of the least advantaged – in short, the brokerage of progressive common-interest changes. With her 1997 title, *Collaborative Planning*, Healey edges toward endorsement of an interests-based approach. Interest brokerage identifies a clear role for the planner as assessor and mediator, and passes to the fair-minded and even-handed practitioner the 'power of proposal' *and* a role to play in the important 'power of arbitration'. Looking in objectively, an 'interest' basis to planning would create opportunities for the engagement of owner, community, commercial, conservationist and other attachments to an alliance, enabling beneficial change to be negotiated and mediated.

Neomodernity

A neomodern future is interpreted here as one where the acknowledged excesses of unsustainable modern lifestyles are exchanged for lifestyles which are economically, socially and environmentally balanced – hence the sustainable-in-spirit reasoning. A principal complication throughout Australasia and North America is that the inherited attitude to physical resources is dominantly economic, with little effective consideration for the wider environment or indeed for upholding societal values of a conservationist kind. And a further contemporary difficulty, despite contra-signals from some sections of society and from a 'hurting' envi-

ronment at large, is the way governments stream their administrative conscience into an enabling-now rather than an outcome-later public policy format. The developmental thrust of successive governments in the New World has centred around exploitation of the natural resource capital, and an obsession with fiscal growth-on-growth based largely on an ever-expanding money supply and technological change. As monetized growth has increased in compound fashion to compromise the environment, this generates what is usually described as an 'economic crisis' which, in fact, is also a 'social values' crisis and an 'environmental' crisis. The rallying call is for administrations to pursue life-and-nation practical goals which set out to establish social wellbeing and environmental harmony *as well as* achieving economic growth.

This book takes up the challenge to set out pragmatic development and conservation objectives – *national, regional, community and household*. The policy issues are outlined in chapter 3, where they are collated in box 3.7 as a **Matrix** for conservation with development. The appeal made there is to identify the essential economic-social-environmental public policies in win-win-win terms for growth-community-environment moving from received patterns of 'smart' modernity, to thinking in a 'clever' neomodern way.

> Settler society populations remain mostly ambivalent about environmental protection. People recycle papers and bottles, but will not trade in their automobile for some bicycles; or forgo a jet-plane vacation for a regionally available widerness respite.

This emphasis on within-nation growth management also follows the lead of seven of the United States – Oregon in particular – in the pursuit of a reasonable ambition: that as resource-plundering and ex-urbanization profiles alarmingly, the mandate for urban and rural growth management control should be strengthened and locked on. The thrust lies squarely with socially appropriate conservation with development on a within-nation basis: within regions, within communities and of course within households. The societal preference at the larger scale is for dual-democracy administrations to move toward an opening-up of local government to wider 'powers of general competence' or to the lesser 'subsidiarity' basis of operation. The sustainable concomitant is the application of growth pattern powers which establish firm urban and rural delineations, backed up with incentive-based encouragements and occasional enforcements (use of the 'carrot' and 'stick' approach).

The neomodern emphasis is too important to leave to the vagaries of the open market simply because the market response leads to a 'cash-profit resource-deficit' outcome. Additionally, and importantly, markets 'optimize' by working to a demand immediacy, whereas the longer-term future of every community is dependent on *perpetual* wisdom with regard to the utilization of resources. Communities need to seek out a more clever, value-based future, one which includes custodial regard for the whole of a nation-state as a resource common. It falls to the voters in open democracies to define the clever new 'public interest' and establish goals for the 'common good'.

> 'Landscape guilt' – the setting aside of pristine wilderness areas, the camouflage of environmental damage, and the pocket creation of natural heritage – is a theme explored by Robert Thayer in *Grey World Green Heart*, 1994.

Box 1.2   New-age pragmatics

The issues, objectively, with what is modernist and neo-modernist are complexly epistemological (refer to Urmson and Ree 1989 throughout; see also David Harvey 1989, and Anthony Giddens 1990); yet there is little pragmatic difficulty for settler society citizens with what is modern and, inferentially, with what is *neo*modern. To be 'modern' is to be scientific and improved: accepting almost as a 'truth' that the present is better than whatever went before. Philosophically such modernity has proved disappointing; and the citizens of settler societies are now aware that it creates generational and ethnic disparities and a form of consumerism which is neither improving nor uplifting, *and* an ever-increasing resource degradation where demand exceeds the potential to supply, *and* a level of pollution where dumping exceeds the environment's absorptive capacity.

*Post*modernism by one interpretation is modernism only worse. Planning is the recipient of a much more positive literary tack on postmodernism as it connects to sustainable development – Milroy (1991), Beauregard (1989), Huyssen (1986). Huyssen depicts the web of postmodernism, as a 'shift in sensibility, practices and discourse formations'. This was interpreted by Milroy three ways: (1) 'as adjustments to compensate for failings'; (2) 'as a new stage in the relationship between culture and capital'; and (3) 'as not a replacement [for modernism] as it is both/and'.

The last of these three notions allows a connection between traditional (modernist) techniques and radical (neomodernist) sensitivities, although it is not acceptable to assume that if neomodernism is *in* then modernism is *out*. Pronouncing for planners, Milroy contends that a further theme (4) 'is promoting reflective rather than objectifying theory . . . so as to not feel anything about [an object of study] or to want to manipulate it in anyway, but only to discover the truth about it'. Even more to the planning point, Tett and Wolfe (1991: 199) contend that 'planners increasingly ground their legitimacy on a commitment to encouraging many voices to speak. [And] If planners are to realise their potential the discourse of plans must be understood on all its levels'. The 'traditional' and 'radical' contexts of planning practice are reviewed more fully in chapter 2.

A structural depiction of the sustainability connection within neomodernity acknowledging a 1992 UNESCO–UNEP construct in *Connect*, vol. 18.

Box 1.2 *Continued*

To act in a pragmatic neomodernist manner in the New World context is to behave sensitively and cleverly in relation to ecology, economy and society. This is about cultural survival exercised through political choice. So it is very much a 'political' matter. The call in the twenty-first century is to integrate this preference with practice. Cross-referencing with the expansive Box 3.7 Matrix given in chapter 3, consider the following pragmatic array:

'Was' twentieth-century 'SMART'	'Could Be' twenty-first century 'CLEVER'
Power: Dominion over nature	Wisdom: harmony with nature
Top-down command structures	Bottom-up: knowledge sharing
Material growth	Human fulfilment
Mono-culturalism	Multi-culturalism
Interdisciplinary	Trans-disciplinary
International	Regional and local
External dependency	Within-nation reliance
National intervention	Local action and delivery
Bulk exporting	Niche exporting
Military posturing	Demilitary positioning
Paradigmatic science	Biospheric science
Environmental restoration	Environmental defence
Hard technology	Soft technology
Exploiting resource 'capital'	Living off resource 'interest'
Fordist production	Flexi-production
Land-use zoning	Sustainable planning
Driving a car	Walk–cycle–bus–train
Dump and forget	Repair–recycle–reuse
Trauma entertainment	Role-model entertainment
Urban expansion	Urban revitalization
Sprawl	Consolidation
Rebuilding	Retrofitting
Push through	Work around
Workplace employment	Homeplace employment
Network television	Local radio
Online telephoning	Cellular telephoning
Postal services	FAXing and emailing
Impact assessment	Impact avoidance
Disposable packaging	Reusable packaging

Above all else, acting correctly in a neo-traditional (neomodern) way, invokes humanity and humility. A key pragmatic necessity can be identified as employment. Modernist employment policies engage 'smart' people who can operate sophisticated technologies, leaving vast numbers unemployed. Neomodern employment policies would seek also to 'cleverly' engage a wider spectrum of lesser-skilled workers to operate real-work technologies. The pragmatic litany given above is not directly relevant to low-income nations, which require a specific-to-them construct.

'How then could
individuals possibly
replace government In a
democracy they are
government.'

*The Unconscious
Civilization*, John Ralston
Saul, 1997

In order to test the
pervasiveness of
modern technology
rank this list of
alphabetically ordered
twentieth-century
technological step-
changes in order of
importance – listing
those you could least
do without 'first', and
those you'd be most
ready to give up on
'last'.

Antibiotics
Airplane travel
Automobiles
Birth pill
Computers
Electricity
Food preservation
Genetic engineering
Motion pictures
Nuclear capability
Plastics
Plumbing in the home
Radio
Reinforced concrete
Space travel
Tapwater supply
Telephone
Television
Sewerage disposal
Vacationing

See where, on the list,
you would draw a cut-
off line if it were
imperative to do so!

The fact that the Anglo settler societies confront multiple con-fusions vindicates the introduction of broad-spectrum policies for achieving balance and empowerment. The structural nature of this neomodern spectrum is indicated within box 1.2 in the style of **New-age pragmatics** with an emphasis on sustainable per-formance (see also the Charter **Matrix** detailed in chapter 3, box 3.7).

The basis for conservation practice and development planning was defined during and after World War II in four main ways: in consideration of *environmental, gender, ethical and first-people* verities. It is almost as though the values of nature (for whose sake? does nature have a soul?) have now been added in to the anthropocentric equation. To the 'four ways' listing Beatley (1994) identifies those faced with ethical judgements about land use: namely, landowners, homeowners and landholders, public lands users, custodians of community interests, elected and appointed managers, the land management professionals and their institutions. A deconstruction of their conflicting and often mutually excluding motives informs sustainable urban planning.

There is also a need to understand the motivational forces and the moral and bio-ethical basis for development, conser-vancy and planning interventions; to identify (Hillier 1993) 'whether any form of discursive democracy is actually achiev-able' and or also whether community empowerment, particu-larly urban community empowerment, is deliverable? What we know is that governments – left and right – have clutched at difficult times to social wellbeing; then at other more affluent times to environmental harmony; and most consis-tently to development and growth. Despite adverse social and environmental consequences, one theme has always been around, namely material monetized growth by every means available. This includes the delusion of consuming tomorrow's goods today, mostly using tomorrow's capital! As a conse-quence planners have had to face the reality that individual profits and material immediacy has come before community needs and preferences, particularly in the conscience of elected political representatives working hard to keep their political place.

So confusing and discordant has the growth objective been in relation to the ideals for social wellbeing and environmen-tal harmony that it spawned a school of planning 'thought' offered up in the early post-war decade as the *Science of Mud-dling Through* (Lindblom 1959) involving 'incremental politics and partisan mutual adjustment'.[12] This was a long way from look-ahead socially

reformist planning theory, now also compromised by the con-
temporary just-in-time mode being adopted for the production of
consumer durables and consumables.

> Bolan (1983) has identified and categorized the range of moral obligations as 'self, family, friends, employer, clients, colleagues, profession, community, nation, past generations, and future generations'.

   The underlying values, vested interests and motivating factors
of neomodern development planning and conservancy practice
can be identified as *social secureness with lifestyle diversity and
variety*, *material wellbeing*, and *a healthy habitat*. Considered widely
(at the level of federal government) a significant emphasis for
local conservation and development involves attention to the needs of those not
yet employed, unwillingly unemployed, chronically unemployable, and to those
retired prematurely from employment.

   An evocative way to come to a view about the extent to which a society or its
leadership accepts or declines official intervention in the 'market process' (strictly
not a consciously understood process in and of itself) involves a categorizing of
official leavenings of public policy on a 'doing nothing' basis (approximating to
the 'muddling through' approach), a 'doing something' basis (the 'traditional' *con-
servative* approach), or on a 'doing everything' basis (the 'comprehensive' *socialis-
tic* approach). The 'traditional' and 'radical' construct given as box 2.1 in chapter
2 elaborates this reasoning.

While difficult to pinpoint, it is at least pragmatically acceptable to accord the
recognition in contemporary governments and elected political representatives of
their alignment mostly to the centre-right-or-left; and to identify a 'leftish' liberal
conscience which supports, somewhat separately, 'development', 'conservation'
and 'planning'. Issues of equity, balance and fairness confusedly trip over issues
of competitiveness and profiteering, with 'rightist' administrations allowing
market rationality to hold sway. My view is that nations of an overdeveloped yet
democratic persuasion, which have established the hard-fought privilege of being
able to elect federal parliamentarians, are entitled to depend on them to uphold
societal mores; and they are also entitled to look to them to articulate community
values and hold to the national ethos.

   Parliamentarians and lesser political champions, while they hold elected office,
are expected to think and utter in accordance with a societal, rather than a per-
sonal, conscience – in short to engage their representational minds before opening
their mortal mouths. A guiding theme, in the phrasing of Service (1975: xii) is that
'leadership clearly seems to have a causal priority'. Yet unfortunately, as politi-
cians evolve into 'state persons' they tend to become detached from societal goals.
They are then prone, through 'leadership dominance' (Service 1975) and 'con-
sumer contentment' (Galbraith 1992) to be drawn to vote *against* social reforms,
even against environmental integrity, and most of all *against* distributive justice in
accordance with their slide toward a 'democracy of the contented and the com-
fortable'. This is endorsed by Friedmann (1987: 326) in these terms: 'I have found
that young, educated urban Americans have difficulty accepting the household as
the central institution of civil society. Many have succumbed to the ideology of
individualism to such an extent that they see themselves as history-less atoms.'
Individuals can, and will continue of course, to think and act for themselves 'indi-

vidually' for their material welfare, although within democratic systems they can also be conditioned to act for the wellbeing of society at large, and for a conservation of the natural environment.

A separation of development and conservation outcomes from spatial theory, in the direction of political theory, was the subject of much academic-professional discourse in the closing decade of the twentieth century. What is important in the context of the 'knowledge-power-outcome' sub-plot (chapter 2) is that theory does not remain an 'otherwise' factor, and is recognized to be the core to planning practice.

The pragmatic achievements of the past, such as they are, have been grounded in spatial theories now well understood. Here, for example, is a perspective, with which I concur, from Low (1991: 279):

> Land-use planning was instituted as a result of the perceived inadequacy of the market, not only to produce a socially acceptable physical environment but also to resolve conflicts among landowners. Property in land could not be defined simply in terms of absolute ownership rights over territorial parcels, because the value of a particular parcel of land was tied in with the value of all neighbouring land. Professionalism and bureaucracy eventually came to be employed in conjunction with the land market to form a new hybrid institution for the mediation of interests and the resolution of conflict.

During the closing decades of the twentieth century the conventional link between development theory and spatial theory gave way, in societally receptive contexts, to a connection of planning practice to political theory. In this Low (1991: 257) is 'attached to the shared interest in human emancipation that is the project of all modern societies: modern that is, as opposed to traditional and not to postmodern'. This contention connects politically with the neomodernist reasoning posited here for sustainable urban planning.

Conservancy and Development Ethics

If planned development and conservation is to aspire to a homologous trinity – *equitable material growth, harmonious social wellbeing, environmental balance* – then we can surely search planning theory to garner the societal and individual points of philosophical attachment to that trinity. What emerges is strong evidence in support of Friedmann's (1987: 87) contention that 'profound social reform in the public interest' may be called the central tradition. Does social reform, then, lie at the heart of decisions to intervene, and provide growth management, as part of a government's responsibility? If the answer is in the affirmative, and it surely ought to be, then we should be able to identify the focus of that attention. For the present purposes an assemblage, omitting Marxist perspectives, has been compiled and depicted in box 1.3 as **Connecting philosophy to planning**.

The philosophical basis and ethical nub to intervention in conservancy and development comes down to whether practice translates ideals into worthy out-

Box 1.3   Connecting philosophy to planning

There has never been a clear philosophical basis to planning. Different preferences fell into place in different historical contexts over time. A three-component 'traditional' and three-component 'radical' polarity has been selected for this representation, the principal sources being Thomas Harper and Stanley Stein's 'Centrality of Normative Ethical Theory to Contemporary Planning Theory' (1992), John Friedmann's *Planning in the Public Domain* (1987), and John Udy's *Typology of Urban and Rural Planners* (1991).

Traditional 1   Utilitarian (positivist) theory (consult Smart 1972)

Although remaining in place as the most dominant and readily identified 'philosophical' basis to local development planning throughout the Anglo-influenced world there are many critics and a lesser proportion of defenders of this hedonic style of practice, which sets out to accommodate what landowners, developers and politicians perceive to be good, as good for everybody. Although Utilitarian Theory has its devotees, in community terms it is now viewed by the majority of planning practitioners as reactionary. Yet from Hobbes and Locke to J. S. Mill and Herbert Spencer, those of an empiricist mindset have believed that development policy can be determined and driven according to rules which endorse dollar-style measures of worthiness. This approach still aligns with populist sub-national planning reasoning in peripheral Australasia and North America, on the basis that development outcomes should not be faulted (so the reasoning runs) if an identifiable balance of 'goodness or happiness' is secured. As the twenty-first-century opens out there are few practising defenders of Utilitarian Theory. To my mind there is no great difference in intended outcome between Utilitarian Planning Theory and the popular (imputed to Adam Smith) neo-classicist Libertarian Development Theory, where it is acceptable that individuals simply and directly make what they are conditioned to perceive to be their own choices, solely to optimize what they perceive to be their own wellbeing.

Traditional 2   Negative rights theory (consult Nozick 1974)

Western philosophy 'negative rights' theory identifies with the *ultra vires* doctrine which delineates the community bounds, up to which individuals may do as they wish with their owned property provided this is within the limits of prescribed laws. Negative Rights Theory is aligned to 'utilitarian theory', the essential difference being that the former attaches to individuals, whilst the latter attaches to community. In upholding these 'natural rights of entitlement' the cut-and-dried Negative Rights hypothesis finds favour with most administrators, the established professions, and a high proportion of physical planning practitioners.

Traditional 3   Communitarian theory (consult Sandel 1982)

This approach nests within the 'traditionalist' pattern on the presumption that policy positions 'should' arise via individual discovery of community attachments, legitimated for each separate community of concern, separately. It exhibits liberal attachments, but in practical outcome comes down to endorsing a systematic pact between profiteering developers and property-enhancing political representatives. A tenuous lineage for the underlying principles, from Plato and Kant, has been identified; the North American perspective of Harper and Stein (1993) being that 'while the communitarian view is often associated with liberal political views, it seems (to them) to have very conservative implications'. In other words, it is 'good' as far as it goes, but it is hardly 'good enough' for modern complex societies larded through with minority, marginalized and non-property-owning subcommunities.

Radical 'A'   Conscience-raising theory (Habermas 1979, 1984, 1986)

The Habermasian emphasis on 'communicative action' in association with 'instrumental action' (the Frankfurt School 1951: Adorno and others) is concerned with connecting improved and undistorted communication ('ideal speech') to better social science. This, for planning, means a raising of the level of social conscience for planners, their political mentors, and the participating public. This positions planners, in particular, to operate as both mediators and critics. In the context of the Jungian mantra 'thinking feeling sensing intuiting' to raise the level of participatory conscience (social listening) and to recognize unconscious distortions and mis-communications. A planning (non-philosopher) connection can be traced to the 'advocacy' writings of Davidoff (1965) and Healey (1996).

Box 1.3   *Continued*

Radical 'B'   Liberty–equality theory (consult Rawls 1971)

This is the most 'ethical' of the philosophies which transect with planning, because it incorporates the dominant moral ideals of 'liberty and justice' with transdisciplinary ideals for social opportunity, fairness and equality. Harper and Stein (1993) hold to the view that Rawls 'offers the most promising procedural NET (normative ethical theory) for planners' which practitioners in Australasia should be cautioned to appraise 'regionally' relative to this theory's derivative association with a wider basis of recognition of inequality in the USA. Urmson and Ree (1989) identify a philosophical trace from Locke, Rousseau and Kant through to Rawls.

Radical 'C'   Social transaction theory (consult Popper 1974)

To planners on both sides of the Atlantic (Friedmann, USA, 1987; Reade, UK, 1987) a Popparian transect with 'best practice' for local planning can be identified. Popper's approach is dialectical, involving 'piecemeal social engineering' as a transactive process. And although planners will discern much in common between Habermas, Rawls and Popper, all three found it necessary to disagree, as philosophers are wont. A difficulty presented by Popper's dialectical approach for active planning practitioners is his clear abhorrence of proactive embodiment in preference to an individualized discursiveness 'out of the collective loop'.

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comes for the communities impacted upon. It clearly benefits society to establish such a topology, to forge the ethical and philosophical verities on which actions emanating from the planning, development and conservation statutes are derived and elaborated.

David Harvey notes a 'significant tranche of support [for environmental rationality] from the heartland of contemporary political-economic power. The rising tide of affluence . . . [has] . . . increased middle class interest in environmental qualities.'
'The Environment of Justice', 1995

A source of background support for social reform as the central tradition upholding the ideal of planning for conservation with development is Perry's prescient passage on 'Conscience and Ethics' (1954) which identifies the need for government intervention to achieve perceived social good. Another North American source, profiling a European style of reasoning, is Timothy Beatley's *Ethical Land Use* (1994), expressing the hope that groups of people – communities of concern – will organize themselves to advance social improvement in society, to 'will' it upon governments that they get their say, and uphold their point of view.

Practice ethics

Individuals are of course different one from another, and they can and do vary in the balance of their attachment to community ideals. This also depends on their loyalty make-up, the atmosphere within their household, their employment role and individual ranking, and their levels of contentment and envy. So planning operatives, the 'designers and deliverers' along with the bureaucrats and other technocrats *cannot* be relied upon to attach themselves consistently to acceptable beliefs (community, aesthetics, sustainability). In these terms developers, conservationists and planners, among others, contribute to community decisions; and

'BENIGN'	'WICKED'
Love	Mistrust
Truth	Deceit
Tolerance	Ruthlessness
Service	Exploitation
Justice	Anarchy
Perfection	Disorder
Aestheticism	Brutalism
Meaningful	Chaotic
Safe	Dangerous
Belonging	Footloose
Esteem	Hate
We	Me

The 'benign' column is based largely on Maslow's 'Hierarchy of Needs' (1968, *Toward a Psychology of Being*). For an insight into the 'wicked' hypothesis, consult Rittel and Webber's 'Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning' (1973, *Policy Sciences*, 4 (2)). Refer also to Bolan (1983) Figure 1 'Range of Moral Communities of Obligation *Journal of Planning Education and Research*, 3, 1983.

Figure 1.2 Characteristics of individuals.

on account of the community implications of their decisions they are subject to rather more public scrutiny and criticism than most other contributors.

A prescient review, 'Planning Power and Ethics' (Gerecke and Reid 1991), noted that 'Planning has no equivalent of the grouping styled as Doctors for Social Responsibility [and] . . . planners have been less willing to look at alternatives in a serious way' or indeed to follow through their decision-making with a view to ascertaining how well it works. Planning is a self-conscious service, aligning closely with the conservative, commodifying and consumerist mores of those being planned for.

A relative complication is illustrated in figure 1.2, **Characteristics of individuals**; the left column shows the individual emanations of a saintly 'benign' kind, juxtaposed with those on the right of a Hobbesian 'wicked' kind. One does not have to be all that cynical to accept that some people lead 'benign' lives, others lead 'wicked' lives, and some others live moderately 'Jekyll *and* Hyde' benign *and* wicked lives! The outcome (Reade 1985: 95) 'depends entirely on what we wish to achieve, and these actions, clearly, can be answered in terms of our values, which may change'. Three observations can be made relative to the contemporary *ethical* situation.

First: that 'worthiness, goodness, rightness and liberty' (Rawls 1971) are not necessarily or inherently the kinds of outpouring to be expected from any person wishing to maximize their freedoms and increase the variety of their lifestyle. Individuals within Galbraith's (1992) 'culturally content' situation, the one-dollar-one-vote system of delusional democracy, cannot be relied upon to guide

For reasons of difference between developers, public persons, professional practitioners and politicians it is useful for students of planning, development and conservation to de-construct individual motives and preferences.

development down societally virtuous paths – to embrace conservancy and communitarian values. Some individuals have always stood out against tax-gathering (evasion and avoidance). Others stand against control over plunder-freedoms, and there are others who hold out against the likes of resource quotas (free-range ocean fishing and the exploitation of indigenous forests). Some others opportunistically cruise the commercial cyberspace – namely, the economic buccaneers who plunder societal resources through the use of imperfectly regulated instruments (stock exchange hits, futures leveraging, commodity buyouts, franchise dealings, capital shunting, tax avoidances). Of course many others live a 'to them' higher code, although even they mostly extract from, and fail to restore and regenerate, the resource base they consume.

Second: the family, the household and the individual are best positioned to focus on development and conservation values because it is at these levels that it is possible to identify a connection to social and economic wellbeing, the environmental heritage, and their attachment to the cultural heritage.

Third: the embodiment of socially appropriate development and conservancy principles into the law of the land, as part of a new liberal corporatism, gives rise to the 'sustainability' mode for establishing rules for community involvement and associations of a neomodern kind.

It is the parliamentarians and lesser political figures who provide the legal and operational breath of life for neomodern sustainable conservancy and development, for at base operations of these kinds have a political genesis. One challenge is to wean ourselves away from a populist 'if you cannot beat them join them' conservatism. This is Beatley's (1994: 202) perspective on that matter.

> Frequently officials make decisions about controversial land-use issues by counting and comparing the number of people speaking for and against a proposal. What emerges often in these decisions is a kind of utilitarian logic with public officials seeking, in the crudest of ways, to support the interests of the majority . . . Politics in land-use matters is not inherently bad. Indeed it is essential – no public decisions can be made that are not political, but the ethical content and focus of these policies are inadequate . . . What is desperately needed is to expand the land-use debate, to begin to recognise that ethical and moral obligations extend beyond narrow economic or utilitarian views.

Communities end up with whatever policies politicians form and the guidelines they promote – all a consequence of their example while holding onto their electoral mandate – mindful that the ballot box always awaits them!

Conservation with development practice has at its core one dominant and several accessory value sets. The core is 'social value' which is, of course, diverse and complex, comprising national-level social goals, regional and local community goals, indigenous peoples' pre-ownership values and rights, settler-freeholder

landowner values, developer ambitions, conservancy aspirations, minority and special-interest values and rights, political ambitions, religious beliefs, and cultural values – among others. In the current libertarian, but nevertheless corporatist political climate, governments toy with environmental morality and discuss what is 'right' and what is 'wrong', when the dominant and prevailing value system all along is economic growth. This situation even prevails at a time of change when governments seek out more in the way of social equity and environmental harmony.

Despite the dominance of economic growth-on-growth, it is 'social values' which make up the 'neomodern value system' comprising material growth, the attainment of social wellbeing, and the emplacement of an environmental harmony. This is where skills, technology and resources line up in parallel to create societal benefits. Conservation with development is, simply, an interconnected process comprising a 'balanced trade-out', exhibited by a practical sum:

> Individuals have moral relationships with other individuals, with families, and with their communities – but not realistically, in these contractual times, with the institutions and corporations for whom they work – characterized in former times as a mutually supportive employer – employee undertaking. The relationship of an individual to an institution or corporation is now, more than ever before, merely a service contract.

$$\sum \text{ACTIVITY}^1(a^1, b^1, c^1 \ldots) \quad \text{RESOURCES}^1(m^1, n^1, o^1 \ldots)$$
$$\text{EFFECTS}^1(u^1, v^1, w^1 \ldots) \quad \text{ACTIVITY}^2(a^2, b^2, c^2 \ldots) etc$$

an ever-continuing outcome in the larger sense, between central regional and local objectives.

It remains, in this review of the ethical basis to sustainable urban planning, to run an 'ethical measure' over practising planning specialists and to establish a 'canon'. This is considered important by David Harvey (1985) because of the 'planners commitment to the ideology of social harmony . . . [which] . . . puts them in the role of righter of wrongs, corrector of imbalance, and defender of the public interest'. These are exuberantly put presumptions which position planners, for sure, to acknowledge that they are custodians for some collective interests on behalf of the community they serve, backed up by their local and central government system. The call is to ensure that the battle between environmental ethics and the growth mantra – which, anyway, environmentalists cannot win without an economics connection – does not sideline the social purpose of planning.

> My aim within this passage on ethics is to avoid ascribing a lofty 'professional' quality to planning practitioners, preferring to impute that rating to priests, lawyers and doctors, whom George Bernard Shaw depicted as a 'conspiracy against the laity' – completely *not* the social service ideal for planners!

> Jane Jacobs in her *Death and Life of Great American Cities* (1961), and Ivan Illich in his *Disabling Professions* (1977) are critical of professionalism masquerading as creativity.

One set of North American findings (Howe and Kaufman 1979) indicates that, as would probably also be the case for the rest of the transpacific New World, public planning specialists have a low tolerance for bribery and abhor the distortion of information.[13] But the findings also illustrate that such practitioners are not averse to using trade-offs, or to engage in symbolic appeals

to gain acceptance of 'their' proposals, or to leak information to outside groups who are fighting 'their' agency. Another set of base findings about these situation ethics, and from the same source, indicates that practitioners in public service differ markedly one with another in their level of agency loyalty, in their propensity to express personal values in their work, and also in their willingness to promote political preferences in their job context. Howe and Kaufman (1979) establish that 'aside from a fairly constant ten percent who were undecided' and the somewhat equal 'conservative' and 'liberal' respondents (totalling around 20 per cent) there was a surprisingly high 70 per cent of hybrids 'combining both the technical and political dimensions of role' which outnumbered the conservative and liberal categories.

The tension this finding indicates for North American local government service has its parallels elsewhere in the New World. I can identify, for example, that the Australasian practitioner is as confused by what Howe and Kaufman describe as official 'role orientation' on the one hand and 'personal preferences' on the other, as are their North American counterparts.[14] This ambivalence may be ascribed to deficient education, the absence of an appropriate professional canon, ambiguous employer guidelines, and/or also to a lack of sound political leadership. The largely unintended result is a high proportion of public servants in local government who can be presumed to espouse 'developer' and 'landowner' preferences *personally*, and to express these in their work to the likely disadvantage of the communities they are paid to serve.

A British exploration of the attitudes and self-image of planners (Knox and Cullen 1981) also establishes rapport with the New World circumstance in that 'The average higher-echelon planner is very much a middle-class animal'. This study explores and finds wanting the extent to which planners have the 'public good' at heart. Even more telling, the Knox and Cullen study concludes that British planners 'may be seen as the functionaries of a political apparatus which exercises its power to create a physical landscape in its own ideological image, and to sustain a social environment conducive to its own preservation'.

These American and British indications open out onto a wider plane of ethical concern and education, pointing up concerns about the ideological baggage and the need for urban-rural and regional planners to have a set of guiding ethics.

Ethics is grounded in moral philosophy, and so the conservancy specialist and also the development planner can dip into works as separate over time as Socrates and Foucault. More to the contemporary point, the writings of Popper, Habermas and Rawls (box 1.3) have now been connected into the neomodernist sustainable urban planning ethos. This linkage has been pursued within several subject-specific writings (Thomas and Healey 1991; Howe 1990; Beatley 1984 and 1994) making the connection between philosophy, sociology and planning. In this way, additional to the largely utilitarian thrust of development, it is possible for both students and practitioners alike to fashion a link with deontological (moral duty-

based) concerns, relating actions to effects and outcomes. The point to such a leavening is that those students and practitioners who engage in moral reflection are encouraged thereby to reveal and address their personal shortcomings and ethical limitations. This serves to avert or thwart an inclination to behave incorrectly, dishonestly or corruptly.

Those prepared to translate 'normative-traditional' planning practice into new-way 'radical-ethical' planning practice will find themselves ascending an ever-steepening learning curve, signposted confusingly as 'moral responsibility' *and* 'multiple belief'. This is uphill going, with rewarding perspectives continually unfolding. It is a process of *re*-education and *self*-awareness which Kaufman (1993) describes as a provisioning arrangement that furnishes planning practitioners with an 'ethical compass' at the ambivalent intersection of planning theory and planning practice. Yet the enhancements are not uniquely moral. They come to the practical aid of planning operatives at each and every level of day-to-day operational encounter. Such an ethical compass is also significant within the formalized 11-Step plan-making progression detailed in chapter 2 (figures 2.6 and 2.7) particularly so at the 'formulation of aims and objectives' the 'data evaluation and diagnosis' the 'formulation of proposals' and the 'test' stages of plan-making.

In the terms now established, the planning operative is supplied some moral-philosophical considerations to range and review against, ethically. This positions the practitioners of conservancy and development to weigh up the 'lessons of historical reason' against the 'voice of experiential conscience'. They are then able to appraise and come to a view on such day-to-day philosophical yet practical concerns as 'loyalty to whom?', 'worth and worthiness for what purpose?' and 'should I manipulate this data to attain an uncontentious compromise, fulfil personal belief, or to achieve simple peace of mind?'[15]

In a provocative piece '*To boldly go where no planners have ever . . .*' Hillier (1993) sketches a setting wherein:

> Without substantial political power of their own, planners may feel threatened by political pressures. Politicians may engage in vote-catching to ensure re-election; developers may attempt to push projects through without detailed examination; neighbourhood leaders and identity groups may vociferously make life uncomfortable. As such, planners may succumb to pressure and recommend the policy outcomes which they perceive as the least bothersome for themselves, whilst still appearing to hide behind a neutral, technical facade of rationality.

Each of us differs individually in our make-up, from being 'softies or hustlers', or 'radicals or conservatives'. The neophyte probationer and the hardened practitioner alike needs considerably more than Practice Guidelines in order to fight a fair fight for the development *with* conservancy ideal, the community they serve, and also to guide their own conscience. The overall objective is to be, according to the phrasing of Wachs (1985) 'systems challenging' rather than 'systems maintaining'. Six ethical precepts are offered in box 1.4 as a set of ethical edicts, an **Ethical canon for community transactions**.

Box 1.4   Ethical canon for community transactions

- *First* is the primary need for an 'allegiance to the public interest' and for public participation, independent of the background capital investment, on the grounds that for planning specialists the principal client is the future community, recognizing first-people's rights, gender concerns, environmental needs and religious-cultural diversity. Planning operatives must have the 'space' to dissent and negotiate independently over line-of-command capital and political expediencies when this is found to be necessary, and to seek always to enhance 'variety' and 'choice'.
- *Second* and deferential to the above is the standard 'integrity to client' values which ensure that the employing interests are understood and held in confidence where this is called for, and are not thwarted by the personal values and beliefs of the planner. Adherence to this obligation can become confused in the mind of practitioners in private practice, who often switch daily from individual landowning clients to local government agency clients. That confusion can be overcome by holding to the preceding 'public allegiance' edict.
- *Third* is a societal imperative that the appropriate 'professional' guild must ensure that the persons licensed to practise planning have the skills to do the job on two planes: structurally in that they have the 'functional skills' to attain planned outcomes which exhibit economic social and environmental integrity, and the equally important 'organizational skills' to reconcile ethical values with statutory requirements and agency guidelines. All practising planners should be able to pledge to a 'Planners For Social Responsibility' ethic.
- *Fourth* is an extension of the previous item, obligating practitioners who evolve skills to do their job, to pass on these skills in their workplace to those who are entering their vocation; to disclose their results and promote their findings as research; and to keep up with Continuing Vocational Development.
- *Fifth* is the need to align with the statutory requirements; not necessarily to be 'driven' by those requirements, but to 'keep in line' with them. An ethical corollary also establishes that the planner specialist truthfully ensures disclosure at public hearings, which may implicate disclosure of pre-hearing partisan information when there is a call for this to be part of the public record.

- *Sixth* is the normative and enforceable obligation to adhere to Codes of Conduct prescribed by the behaviour-controlling practitioner association. For more recently emergent vocational governing bodies (as is the case with planning) the evolving nature of their practice renders this easier to establish than is the case for other well-entrenched professionals (priesthood, law, medicine) reliant upon outdated and often protectionist principles.

The *similarities* between Anglo settler societies give way to *differences* when considering ethical standards; noticeably so with regard to variations in the recognition of 'human care' and 'utilitarian rights' for alternate jurisdictions. A widely cast overview is provided in the lead-in to Barrett's *Everyday Ethics for Practicing Planners* (2002) supplemented throughout the body of the text by worked examples (affordable housing, favours, confidentiality *etc.*) as advice to planners on holding out for the observance of ethical principles, and including an interesting pen-picture of the Ethical Planner.

Intervention in market forces for the common good is never value-free at any level of involvement, for even the 'planner as mediator' is also embroiled in 'action for change'. Indeed, the planning practitioner at the meeting-point of individual, community and political contributions to the development and conservancy process is the operative most expected to indicate, on balance, the optimal path to pursue. This is a huge challenge, evidenced by practice at the control agency level on the basis of Nozickian 'negative rights' precepts which only evaluate proposals and objections in terms of the extent to which individual rights are upheld or violated.

Two writings on the obligations of planners (Wachs 1985, and Marcuse 1976) fuel my compilation of the six-point canon (box 1.4). These authors offer ethical guidelines for planners; moral precepts, which although they are not legally

enforceable seek, in the phrasing of Hendler to establish that planners 'speak of ethics while walking the fine line between respecting others in all shapes, sizes and ethical orientations on the one hand, and retaining the right to contribute to the discussion on the other'. All of this is complemented by the sixth item in the canon, a 'thou shall not lie steal or cheat' code of conduct which can, if necessary, be enforced by the behaviour-controlling practitioner guild.

Sue Hendler's *Planning Ethics: A Reader* (1995) contains most of the North American sources quoted throughout this passage.

The top-down 'ethical compass' detailed in box 1.4 incorporates and legitimates the normative moral dynamics and expectations of society. From time to time the need will arise for a professional body to improve and recast its code of conduct, to facilitate access to continuing professional education, to enshrine a planners for social responsibility ethic; and occasionally to also punish bad behaviour.

Another complex moral consideration is that conservancy and development specialists, those who strive to induce improvements for the future of their employer community, are part of the professional manager class in society. These practitioners are of a sector identified by higher educational attainment and higher-level incomes, Over recent decades this professional manager class as a whole has become more self-serving, less liberal, and much more income-focused. Most professional manager personnel are keyed into the income expectations, the lifestyle ambitions, and the consumption values of their class. This serves to embroil them in a 'conspiracy bias' in favour of 'developer client' interests, often against the intrinsic needs and objectives of the 'community' they ostensibly serve. This is *not* acceptable; yet in reality, ethical guidelines are frequently observed 'in the breach' and are often treated by practitioners as an irrelevancy.

Recruiting into training establishments for conservation and development planning practitioners fails society when there is a skew away from the indigenous first-people's rights; or when there is an over-representation of one gender, or some other admissions bias within the vocational body.[16] It is also preferable that the recruiting base for planning operatives is not so much 'like from like' (planning recruits drawn from managerial-professional family backgrounds), as trainees emerging into the service from non-professional and non-planning family backgrounds. In this context it is gratifying to observe the well-balanced ranking structure of conservancy specialists and development planners throughout North America and Australasia, and balanced male-to-female and older-to-younger enrolments in training establishments. Some difficulty arises from the fact that planning attracts to its graduate-training programmes a high proportion of general arts and science people, many of whom get by in planning as 'transactors', but experience difficulty in the pursuit of planned 'transformer' outcomes.[17] A four-kind typology for planners – reformers, systemizers, administrators, synthesizers – is advanced by Udy (1994) as underlying the planning profession's vulnerability.

The emphasis in this book lies with neomodern development – a sustainable context often depicted here and elsewhere as the 'triple bottom line' (social economic environmental). Chapter 3 (*Charter*) sets down sustainability principles; then comes *Growth Pattern Management* (chapter 4); and *Urban Growth Management* (chapter 5).

Figure 1.3 My first plan-making effort (*c.*1960) was for the village of Helensville (a *locus classicus* with port, rail station and highway convergence) an hour from Auckland. This student effort was based on the then usual 20-year 'look ahead' notion. I produced an uninspired zoning-in of the status quo and the gaps between, resulting in four times the length of shop frontage needed for a town of 2,000 persons (3,000 now); with industry gracing the main road entry and exit.

The professional manager values identified by Ehrenreich (1989: 14) as 'home ownership in a neighbourhood inhabited by other members of their class, college (university) education for their children, and such enriching experiences as vacation trips . . . and the consumption of culture in various forms' can be also identified as inducing planners toward a status wherein they become progressively more out of touch with lower-income community values as they mature and gain job seniority. The sub-politics of envy also induces a frustration, in that the likes of practising planners seldom get to wield *real* political power or direct the *actual* investment decisions of the moneyed classes.

To the extent that conservancy and development specialists (typically planners in local government service) are role-facilitators for those who intervene and provide alternative strategic directions, they have not, to any significant degree, been identified with the effective initiation of social reform or economic equilibrium. I concur with Beauregard (1989) that 'practitioners and theorists must rededicate themselves to the built environment as the object of action and enquiry' and that they 'must open planning to a variety of constituencies'. Given a lack of previous understanding about what must be done for the future, a lot therefore confronts planning practitioners in the new 'sustainability' era. In effect there is really only one direction for planning practitioners to go: to become more politically embroiled (in a sustainable and ethical manner) and to become wired in to all manner of community constituencies.

Planners can and should take credit and take heart, for again from Ehrenreich (1989: 260; emphasis added) we can identify, in the work of planners, among others, the 'good and pleasurable and decent work . . . the *pride of the professions* that define the middle class'. This suggests that planning operatives can consider themselves well placed and fortunate, as part of an elite group, those who Ehrenreich identifies as the 'caring, healing, building, teaching and planning professionals'. Planners, then, are among the creative, society-serving specialists privileged to work for broad-church community improvements. But much as socialists, ardent in their youth, tend to fade toward conservatism as they age, development practitioners and conservancy specialists as they 'mature' have to make an extra effort to appreciate minority, disadvantaged and lower-income needs, to be aware that whatever their income-class origins they will be drawn

toward managerial class desires and cohort values. This underscores the case made out earlier for mandatory 'continuing professional development' and the need to join a Planners for Social Responsibility grouping in pursuit of the 'triple bottom line' – equitable growth, social wellbeing and environmental harmony.

With Sustainable and Ethical Intent

New styles of libertarian administration *at worst* cleave to well-intentioned but wrong-footed practices of the past and, *at best* fall in line with the six-point 'community transaction' canon outlined earlier – pursuing triple-balanced outcomes.

   This approach justifies various policy removals (political deviousness, legal obfuscation, fiscal chicanery); policy remedies (real jobs, benign technologies, territorial connectedness, identity clarification); policy additions (management by objectives, political cooperation), and social connectedness (enablement, empowerment and capacity fulfilment). In those terms the crucial issue is to get clever – not always to attempt *smart* ways of 'talking' or 'buying' a way through, but to 'think' 'perform' and 'negotiate' a cleverly informed way around.

Hold to the following:

- Planning for urban and rural settings, and regional purposes, provides a forum for operating strategically within a spatial setting (bounded reality) and in a political realm which has the public interest as its community purpose. It seeks to infuse an improved future quality and diversity of life, and thereby embodies conservation with development, and is trans-generational.
- Planning manages human effects upon the natural environment, and sets out to conserve the natural heritage, to restore impaired ecosystems, to maintain material wellbeing, to preserve the cultural heritage, and to represent and moderate the needs of all interest groups.
- In capsule terms conservation *with* development aspires to a homologous trio: equitable material growth, social wellbeing, environmental harmony – the 'triple bottom line'. It is learned and provided as both a 'transactor' and a 'transformer' activity: a future-shaping delivery process that seeks 'sustainably and indefinitely' to fashion worthy humanized environments and conserve the natural and cultural heritage.
- Development planning and conservation practice are social services which strive to improve the quality of life, respect first people's treaties and international protocols, uphold cultural values and gender emancipation, and to maintain uncorrupted and ethically correct positions.

> Conservation with development seeks a triple-balanced harmony–
> - material growth
> - social wellbeing
> - healthy habitat.

The foregoing involves the concomitant identification and endorsement of socially responsible (enabling-empowering), and environmentally acceptable (sustainable-protective) projects. Yet at any future date a new technology (cheap mass hydrogen production, effective superconductivity), or a new ideology

(liberal theology, capacity building, WTO breakthrough) can overturn previous certainty. Integrated value-based progress must include tangible physiological security and aim for psychological wellbeing; and these factors always prove ultimately more important than a few extra dollars in the pocketbook. The nub of the conservation *with* development issue comes down to one of close-the-gap politics in favour of 'sustainability' pursued 'indefinitely'. The outcomes are, essentially, grounded and transacted as transformation practice. Goals of the grounded-in-reality sustainable kind outlined in this chapter, and in chapter 3, seek incorporation via the planning service into development projects and conservancy practice.