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action and agency Someone performs an action when what he or she does can be described as intentional (see Davidson, 1977). Actions are practical conclusions drawn from intentions and beliefs; ‘action’ and ‘rationality’ are interrelated. Sociological action theories from the time of Max Weber build on this relation in analysing action into components and types. Social actions are always part of larger systems and of processes of intersubjective understanding, and this raises the question of the role of the acting subject (‘human agency’) in the processes by which actions are coordinated.

Rationality of action

Aristotle, in his *Nicomachean Ethics*, saw the rationality of an action as lying in the conclusion which leads from intentions or norms and from assessments of the situation and of the available means to immediate consequences in terms of action. Action is rational in so far as it follows premises which ground and justify its performance. A minimal rationality must therefore be presupposed in any action, in any bodily movement falling under this definition. Aristotle emphasized that even undisciplined actions which escape rational control, such as the excessive consumption of sweet things, can be formally at least fitted into the model of rational justification (cf. Davidson, 1980; Wright, 1971).

Will formation

A simple example of purposive-rational will formation is provided by Kant’s technical imperative, the ‘imperative of capability’, in which intentions are extended from ends to means (cf. Wright, 1971). Someone who wants something and knows how it is to be obtained must want to obtain it by these means. Even the complex process of social will formation, coming to a decision as a consequence of collective deliberation, can be described as a process of practical inference. This involves a

union of many (at least two and at most all) actors concerned with a common purpose or problem. If this union is not brought about through force, threat or propaganda, it must be through the free compulsion of argumentative inference, that is through convincing reasons (cf. Habermas, 1971; Apel, 1973, 1979). Practical discourses are not concerned with the extension of intentions from ends to means, explaining to the actor why it is rational for *him or her* to take certain decisions, but rather with whether it is possible to generalize the ends and make clear to all why *they* should follow particular norms (see NORMS). In what Hegel (*Logic*) called the ‘conclusion of the good’, in which means and end are identical and the act is good in itself, it is a question of what is legitimate and justifiable in the light of shared and freely accepted principles (Wellmer, 1979, pp. 25ff.).

Consequences of actions

The conclusion of a practical inference is an action. From the observer’s perspective, the choice of available means to given ends *explains* the action. Such an explanation also has prognostic relevance, since institutional and normative contexts ensure that intentions and beliefs remain stable and are regularly reproduced (cf. Wright, 1971). But since one can never exclude the possibility of actors changing their intentions, forgetting the best way to do things or unexpectedly finding new ways to solve a problem, the link between intentions and beliefs and future behaviour is a contingent one. But we can only identify a given behaviour *as* a specific action if we succeed in interpreting it, in the perspective of a participant, as the consequence of rationally understandable intentions and beliefs. ‘To interpret behaviour as intentional action is to understand it in the light of an intention’ (Wellmer, 1979, p. 13).

The participant’s perspective, and only that perspective, opens up a similar logical-semantic relation between intentions and actions. For the actor,

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the practical conclusion *means* an obligation to perform a future action. It is not empirically guaranteed that someone who promises to come on time will in fact do so, but someone who has given that undertaking will need to offer an apology if he or she is not punctual. The expectation that in normal circumstances someone who has promised to be on time very probably will be is not only inductively supported by observed behavioural regularities; this expectation is based even more on the fact that we can usually rely on one another. The Other will probably be on time because the agreement has reciprocal validity (cf. Apel, 1979). This is not an empirical and contingent relation between intentions and activities but a logical-pragmatic one. We recognize the seriousness of the intention by its consequences for action; we call someone who does not do what he or she wants to do and can do, inconsistent. This is not unlike the case of someone who asserts that snow is all white *and* all black. Just as we suspect weakness of will as the cause of inconsistent action, we may infer that someone who unintentionally utters contradictions is weak in the head. Like evidently contradictory statements, evidently inconsistent action has 'something essentially irrational' about it, so that such actors might find it hard to recognize themselves in their actions (cf. Davidson, 1980).

Types of action

Disturbances of action through such massive inconsistencies that we cannot understand our own action ('I don't know how I could have done it') bring us up against the internal connection between action and self-understanding. Max Weber and Sigmund Freud drew opposite conclusions from this relation. Whereas Freud is interested in the unconscious causes of self-deception, Weber bases his sociology on an IDEAL TYPE of meaningfully oriented action intelligible to the actor; his well-known typology of action is founded on this relation of self-evidence.

Social action is 'behaviour which is meaningfully oriented to the behaviour of others' (Weber, 1921–2). One limiting case of social action is the completely self-evident, conventional, habitual and almost mechanical course of traditional action based on 'internalized habit'. This 'dully habitual everyday action', quietly adapted to the normative background of the life-world, is pushed into an affectual or emotional reaction when the conven-

tionally meaningful background of everyday action suddenly collapses and confronts the actor with unfamiliar and exceptional demands, problems and conflicts. This is the other limit case of social action. To speak of *action* which is governed by 'present affects and emotions' means that, even in uninhibited reaction to an exceptional stimulus, the actor retains scope to decide how to react, or whether not to react at all and to swallow his or her rage. But Weber reserves the description 'rationally intelligible' for social behaviour which is fully conscious and based only on reasons which the actor considers to be valid and conclusive; this corresponds to the ideal types of purposive-rational and value-rational action. With this distinction Weber looks back, via NEO-KANTIANISM, to the Aristotelian theory of action. Whereas value-rational action follows what Hegel called the 'conclusion of the good' and identifies means and ends in 'the unconditioned value in itself of a specific behaviour', in purposive-rational action all that counts is the effectiveness of means to a given end. In Weber's conception, only this type of action can be fully rationalized; it is therefore the true ideal type of meaningfully oriented behaviour that expresses Hegel's 'conclusion of action'. Only here can one say 'that *if* someone were to act in a strictly purposive-rational manner, they could *only* do it this way and no other way' (Weber, 1921–2).

For Weber, the rational understanding (see VERSTEHEN) of action advances methodically from this universal and counterfactual rationality assumption. This makes it possible to explain actual actions as a deviation from an ideal standard. Freud's interest in explaining irrational action is therefore complementary to Weber's interest in understanding the rationality of consistent action. In a world shaped by causal reasoning, rational action of this kind is only possible when the actor's reasons for a particular action are causally effective *as intentions*, and *cause* the action (cf. Davidson, 1980). If a real action is to be understood as the consequence of a rational inference (for example, rational argumentation), the reasons must have a causal, that is, rationally motivating, force as causes of the action-event. The causal force which a grounded will, transforming reasons into intentions, gives to our actions is of course, as Davidson (1980) and Apel (1979, p. 189) have shown in their criticisms of C. G. Hempel, a causality without causal laws. What Kant called the 'causality of freedom', in which the will or the intention which causes the action counts

as a valid justification for it, involves not causal laws, but normative-universal principles of rationality (Apel, 1979). The case of unconscious self-deception with which Freud is concerned is one in which an action or speech-act is caused as an event without being justified by its causes (cf. Löw-Beer, 1990). In this case the action or speech-act is not rationally motivated, by a valid sequence of symbols, but only empirically, by way of 'split-off symbols' (cf. Habermas, 1968, pp. 246ff.; 1981, pp. 8ff.). But because this explanation in terms of merely empirically effective motives presupposes the possibility of rational action, Freud can combine his methodological interest with a therapeutic interest in emancipation and the critique of action which is not brought about by reasons.

This interest does not of course come near to satisfying Weber's criterion of ideal purposive rationality. The irrational action with which Freud is concerned is caused by the latent force of distorted, compulsively integrated communication. To explain it as action which is no longer intelligible to the actor it is not enough to postulate an ideal type of purposive-rational action and to measure its divergence. What must be presupposed is rather an ideal criterion of *undistorted communication* (cf. Habermas, 1968; Apel, 1979). What the actor who needs the help of a therapist finds unintelligible about his or her own action is the breaks in the system of reasons which would appear acceptable to a community of autonomous subjects. The motives which cause the action and speech of the neurotic, without justifying and grounding it, are causes which cannot count as reasons because a free communication community could not accept them as reasons.

Action, system and subject

Weber's theory of action appears inadequate in another quite different respect. It underestimates from the start the complexity of the *double contingency* (cf. Parsons and Shils, 1951, pp. 14ff.) in the meaningfully oriented reciprocal perspectives of ego and alter, as well as the hypercomplexity of any meaningful orientation. The improbability of a meaningfully guided act, related to an unlimited and inconceivable multiplicity of alternative possibilities which might have been realized, is further increased by the improbability in *social* action that everyone knows that everyone can act or not act as expected. Without mechanisms for the re-

duction of this monstrous and in principle ungraspable complexity of meaningfully oriented action, mechanisms which functionally integrate the individual actions independently of the will and consciousness of the subjects, social order seems impossible (cf. Luhmann, 1970–90, vol. 2, pp. 204ff.; 1981, pp. 195ff.). The question is then whether social order can be envisaged entirely without collective will formation and whether actions can be separated from a notion of agency produced by subjects themselves by means of acceptable reasons.

Reading

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aesthetics In its modern meaning aesthetics is most frequently understood as a philosophical discipline which is either a philosophy of aesthetic phenomena (objects, qualities, experiences and values), or a philosophy of art (of creativity, of artwork, and its perception) or a philosophy of art criticism taken broadly (metacriticism), or, finally, a discipline which is concerned philosophically with all three realms jointly.

Aesthetic reflection is much older than the term itself. The history of Western aesthetics begins usually with Plato, whose writings contain a systematic reflection on art and a speculative theory of beauty. Neither Plato nor his great disciple Aristotle, however, treated these two great themes of aesthetics in conjunction.

The term 'aesthetics' was introduced to philosophy as late as the mid-eighteenth century by a German philosopher, Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten (1714–1762). Baumgarten, a disciple of Leibniz's follower Christian Wolff (1679–1754), concluded that the system of philosophical disciplines was incomplete and required a science parallel to logic which was a science of clear and distinct cognition achieved by the intellect. The new science should be aesthetics, a science of clear and confused cognition realized by the senses. This view was expressed for the first time by Baumgarten in his dissertation *Meditationes philosophicae de nonnullis ad poema pertinentibus* (of 1735) and in a completed form 15 years later in his *Aesthetica*.

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Contrary to the expectations which the etymology of the word *aesthetica* might suggest (Greek *aïstheticos* = perceptive), this work did not concern itself with the theory of sensory cognition but dealt with the theory of poetry (and indirectly of all the arts) as a form of sensory cognition for which the main object of perception is beauty. The combination of the two – the reflection on art and the reflection on beauty – defined the subsequent development of the newly emerged branch of philosophy, but this has become the source of both its accomplishments and never-ending theoretical and methodological difficulties. Without doubt it was an event of historical significance, marking the beginning of a new period in the development of the philosophy of art, particularly in that it coincided with a summing up of the longlasting search for the common denominator of all the arts which was achieved by a French theorist of art Charles Batteux in his *Traité des beaux arts réduit à un même principe* (in 1746). Batteux recognized that the common feature of the fine arts is the beauty proper to them all, and therefore they may be termed *beaux arts*.

The name aesthetics took some time to be accepted. Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) began with a criticism of Baumgarten for his lack of consistency, and in his *Critique of Pure Reason* (of 1781 and 1787) used the term transcendental aesthetics to mean a philosophical science of sensory perception. However, in his *Critique of Judgement* (of 1790) he used the term aesthetics to define the reflection on beauty and judgements of taste. The traditional meaning of aesthetics became popular in the nineteenth century through the influence of Hegel (1770–1831), whose lectures on the philosophy of the fine arts in 1820–9 were posthumously published as *Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik* (in 1835).

Kant, Schelling and Hegel were the first prominent philosophers for whom aesthetics constituted an inherent part of their philosophical systems. For Kant aesthetics was first and foremost the theory of beauty, of the sublime and of aesthetic judgements. For Hegel aesthetics was mainly the philosophy of the fine arts. The two models of moulding aesthetics either as a philosophy of beauty (and later of aesthetic values) and of aesthetic experience, or as a philosophy of art become dominant in the aesthetics of nineteenth century and at the beginning of the twentieth century. Most frequently, the two variants were joined together and the results were varied.

In the course of years, however, the idea of aesthetics as philosophy of art appeared to be more popular. In the nineteenth century there was the first attempt to go beyond philosophy in aesthetic considerations and to create a scientific aesthetics. In his *Vorschule der Aesthetik* of 1876, the German psychologist Gustav Theodor Fechner attempted to create an experimental aesthetics on the basis of psychology, and the twentieth century also witnessed attempts to create a psychological aesthetics by the representatives of gestalt psychology (Rudolf Arnheim and Leonard Meyer) and of depth psychology (Ernst Kris and Simon Lesser). Other developments have included mathematical aesthetics (George Birkhoff and Max Bense), informatics aesthetics (Abraham Moles), semiotic and semiological aesthetics (Charles Morris, Umberto Eco, Yuri Lotman), and sociological aesthetics (J. M. Guyau, P. Francastel, Pierre Bourdieu, Janet Wolff). In the philosophical domain the project of creating a scientific aesthetics was attempted by Etienne Souriau and Thomas Munro. Aesthetics, however, has not ceased to be a branch of philosophy.

Since the turn of the century there has been a growing interest in the methodological difficulties of aesthetics, which began to take into account doubts and arguments directed against the scientific status of aesthetics and the very sense of creating aesthetics theories. Of particular relevance here are the still popular ideas of Max Dessoir (1906) and Emil Uitz (1914–20). These thinkers introduced a distinction between aesthetics and a general science of art and emphasized that the two disciplines cross but do not overlap: the functions of art cannot be reduced to aesthetic functions only, whereas aesthetic merits are to be found in objects which are not works of art at all, such as natural phenomena and extra-artistic man made products. They also claimed that the general science of art differs methodologically from aesthetics and should evolve into an independent branch outside philosophy. Aesthetics, too, should go beyond the borders of philosophy and make much greater use of the results produced by other sciences, in particular psychology and sociology (see also ART; SOCIOLOGY OF).

The first aesthetician who not only systemized the objections against aesthetics but also attempted to overcome them was Edward Bullough, in his lectures of 1907 on '*the modern conception of aesthetics*' (in Bullough, 1957). He ordered the objections

raised against aesthetics into two groups: popular and theoretical, both kinds being reducible to assertions that:

- 1 Attempts to create a theory of such specific, relative, subjective and mutable phenomena as beauty, aesthetic effects and the pleasure and displeasure connected with them are futile. These phenomena cannot be rationalized and verbalized, they can be only experienced.
- 2 The definitions of beauty and other aesthetic phenomena are too abstract and general and thus are completely useless and practically unnecessary. They do not help anyone to enjoy beauty and art.
- 3 Both the artists and the enthusiasts of art are worried and annoyed by the fact that the rules of creation and reception are defined and imposed on artists and the public, and presented moreover with absurd and insolent pedantry.

Bullough's work was the first self-examination which summed up the actual internal methodological difficulties of aesthetics, and the objections raised from outside, which, if not always fully justified, were not without reason.

According to Stefan Morawski (1987), Bullough's work began the third period in the history of aesthetics, the period of critical self-knowledge of its research status, and of the development of its methodological self-reflection. This process reached its peak in 1954 with the publication of W. Elton's famous anthology *Aesthetics and Language*, and the equally famous papers by M. Weitz 'The role of theory in aesthetics' (1956) and W. E. Kennick 'Does traditional aesthetics rest on a mistake?' (1958), which continued and developed the ideas set out in Elton's collection. These three works were inspired by the ideas in Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations* (1953), and they criticized traditional philosophical aesthetics sharply and thoroughly for its lack of linguistic precision, conceptual vagueness and mistaken theoretical and methodological assumptions which were most apparent in the unsuccessful attempts to create a philosophical theory of art. Wrong assumptions led naturally to the failure of the hitherto proposed philosophical theories of art.

The first mistaken assumption identified was the essentialist claim that art possesses a universal nature, or an absolute essence, which it is the task of aesthetics to dig out and define. Art, it was now

claimed, is an incessantly mutable phenomenon, lacking any universal essence, and the notions 'art', 'work of art', 'aesthetic experience', and so on are therefore open concepts (Weitz, 1959) and cannot be defined. Secondly, the representatives of traditional aesthetics missed another basic truth that every work of art is valued for its uniqueness and unrepeatable originality, and therefore there is no place for any general rules of creation and evaluation of such work. The aestheticians, however, were persistent in their attempts to discover or make such general rules, even though any generalizations about art are unjustified and dubious. The aestheticians' arguments were analogical to those in ethics, but any analogies appeared to be misleading. Generalizations in ethics are possible and necessary, whereas in aesthetics the situation is quite different. 'When in aesthetics one moves from the particular to the general, one is travelling in the wrong direction' (S. Hampshire in Elton, 1954). Thirdly, aesthetics followed philosophy in its mistaken assumption that facts can be disclosed and interpreted, whereas in fact its proper task is not disclosing facts but clarifying the meanings of words. Words, concepts and expressions are used in a number of ways which are not always proper. A solution of philosophical problems consists in recognizing how given words are properly used. The basic problem of aesthetics is not answering the question 'What is art?' but 'What kind of concept is "art"?' (Weitz).

The criticism of aesthetics by analytical philosophy, however, did not result either in the death of aesthetics or in a lasting victory of cognitive minimalism, and the abandonment of new attempts to create a theory of art. One might even defend the view that anti-essentialist criticism of aesthetics resulted in its recovery and revival in the 1970s and the 1980s. At the same time, however, aesthetics continued to be criticized from outside and the aestheticians continued their methodological self-reflection which in part answered the external criticism and in part resulted from aesthetics' inherent needs. Nonetheless, the aestheticians rejected all the basic objections articulated by the analytical philosophers. Aesthetics should and indeed can be practised with a greater logical and linguistic precision, but at the same time it cannot be reduced to the analysis of concepts and the ways they are used. In this respect the situation of aesthetics does not differ substantially from the other branches of the humanities. It is a misunderstanding if one applies

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to aesthetics the requirements applied to science or mathematics. Moreover, even in natural sciences there is no single and universal paradigm of scientific exactness.

One has to realize that any generalizations concerning such diverse and mutable phenomena as art and the aesthetic experience are very risky but there is no need to abandon such generalizations altogether. Avoiding essentialist and anti-historical definitions of traditional aesthetics does not mean abandoning attempts to create a theory of art and of aesthetic phenomena. Normative considerations which jeopardize the freedom of creation and which are notoriously ascribed to aesthetics are by no means characteristic of aesthetics and occur much more frequently in art criticism. It is true, however, that the majority of aesthetic theories do contain elements of evaluation. But then again, axiological aspects are typical of any discipline and form an organic part of cognition, they cannot be, and do not have to be, eliminated from science. At the same time it is possible to create purely descriptive theories of art (Dickie, 1971).

Rejecting far-reaching criticism of aesthetics by analytical philosophers, aestheticians themselves periodically take note of criticisms and reservations directed against their discipline, and express their own doubts as to its research status. In most cases, however, they defend its value, though some would like to pursue it in a fully or partly modified form. At least three attempts to balance the arguments pro and contra made by aestheticians themselves in the last three decades are worth noting.

The first was made in 1960 by Jerome Stolnitz in *Aesthetics and Philosophy of Art Criticism* (pp. 7–19). The second was made by Stefan Morawski in two works published in Polish (1973, 1987). Morawski's conclusions differ in the two works, however; in the first he defends the significance of aesthetics, while in the other he abandons this defence and argues that it is now in decline. The third author who listed the objections raised, and defended aesthetics against them, is Göran Hermeren, who devoted the final chapter of his *Aspects of Aesthetics* (1983, pp. 224–60) to this question.

A considerable number of the doubts and reservations about aesthetics repeat themselves. There are also new criticisms which have arisen in the course of development of modern culture and in particular of avant-garde art, mass media and mass culture. Recent criticism has two main aspects. In the first place, the main reservations still concern

the status of aesthetics as a field of research. The critics assert that aesthetics is cognitively futile, anachronistic and inadequate, its methods old-fashioned and based on mistaken methodological principles. Consequently, even if it did make some sense in the past, it appears to be completely helpless when faced with the latest avant-garde in art and the most significant phenomena of mass culture. So it ignores them (a disqualifying attitude) or tries to describe them, interpret them and evaluate them using its traditional methods and traditional, quite irrelevant categories, which leads to its failure and humiliation.

This mode of criticism is to be found in the papers by T. Binkley, in Michael Kirby's *The Art of Time* (1969), and in the latest works by Stefan Morawski. Kirby holds that traditional philosophical aesthetics should be rejected in favour of historical or situational aesthetics. Binkley claims that aesthetics could survive if it reduced the scope of its interest to a reflection on aesthetic phenomena and abandoned creating theories of art, since aesthetics cannot explain avant-garde art, which as such rejects the aesthetic paradigm of art, if it keeps assuming that the nature of art is aesthetic. Morawski claims that aesthetics is declining not only because of avant-garde art but also because art 'has lost part of its significance and its further existence is jeopardized'. Aesthetics, then, should give the floor either to 'poietics' as the theory of creativity or to anti-aesthetics understood in terms of 'a critical reflection on the crisis of the culture and art of our times' (1987, p. 77). It is not the methodology that is responsible for the decline of aesthetics; it is the disintegration of its main object: art.

Aesthetics however, is criticized not only for its helplessness in the face of avant-garde art, but also because of its ahistorical attitudes, 'aspirations for totality' (Werckmeister, 1971), essentialism and making abstract rules irrespective of the fact that 'art is a dynamic syndrome' (Adorno, 1984), and that art itself and its reception are produced by a historical process (Bourdieu, 1979). If aesthetics wishes to survive it has to transform itself and become a dialectical aesthetics (Adorno) or a sociological aesthetics (Bourdieu).

The other kind of argument against aesthetics consists in suggesting that no-one really needs it. Aesthetics does not help ordinary recipients of modern art to find their way about in the chaos of the latest artistic phenomena. Someone with a serious interest in aesthetics would do better to refer to

works on the history and theory of particular realms of art, or on the psychology of art, sociology of art, philosophy of CULTURE, the theory of mass communication, semiotics, and so on.

It is hard to foresee the future of aesthetics. The theses about its death or decline, however, are just as weak as the theses about the death or decline of art. But aesthetics has to change, taking account of the transformations of its subject and the achievements of other disciplines concerned with art and aesthetics phenomena. Perhaps one should come back to the idea of two disciplines, in the vein of Dessoir and Uitz: the philosophy of art and the philosophy of aesthetic values and experiences. There is no doubt, however, that the development of psychology, sociology, semiotics and other disciplines concerned with art does not eradicate strictly philosophical (axiological, methodological, cognitive and ontological) problems of art and of aesthetic phenomena. This is the unquestionable *raison d'être* of aesthetics.

See also ART, SOCIOLOGY OF; LINGUISTIC PHILOSOPHY; MODERNISM AND POSTMODERNISM.

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affluent society A society in which there is sufficient wealth to ensure the continued satisfaction of the privately serviced basic needs of the majority of the population (such as food and clothing) with the result that individuals employ their disposable incomes to gratify ephemeral and insatiable wants, while insufficient funds may be directed to the satisfaction of publicly serviced needs (such as health care and education).

The term was made famous by Kenneth Galbraith in his book *The Affluent Society*, first published in 1958. This is a powerful critique of the

pattern of resource allocation then prevailing in the United States (and, by extension, in some individual national economies of Western Europe) and involves three main claims. First, that increases in productive capacity and efficiency have resulted in an economy capable of providing a great and unprecedented affluence for the majority of people. As Galbraith observes, in the contemporary United States many goods are 'comparatively abundant', a point which he illustrates by pointing to the fact that more people die each year from eating too much food than from eating too little (p. 102).

Secondly, he argues that conventional economic wisdom has failed to take this development into account, continuing to embody the earlier and anachronistic assumption that further annual increases in production are necessarily to be desired. What, in particular, is outdated is the priority accorded to the ever-increasing production of goods in the private sector, which leads to a situation where 'private affluence' is matched by 'public squalor'. The 'great and comprehensive contrast between the care and encouragement which is lavished on the production of private goods and the severe restraint which it imposes on those that must emerge from the public sector' is for Galbraith 'the most singular feature of the affluent society' (p. 155).

Thirdly and lastly, the stimulation of artificial wants through advertising coupled with an excessive provision of credit is required in order to maintain a high level of demand, now that there are no longer any urgent needs to be satisfied.

The term Galbraith introduced is still widely encountered, having entered into popular use. The critique of conventional economic thought is usually missing from this usage, however, as too is the implied contrast between private affluence and public squalor, while the harsher economic climate of the 1980s also resulted in the phrase being used in a more ironic manner than Galbraith ever intended. The kernel of meaning which therefore remains is the suggestion that citizens of such a society experience a state of widespread and unprecedented abundance with the consequence that economic resources are predominantly employed in the wasteful gratification of trivial wants rather than in the necessary satisfaction of fundamental needs.

Galbraith's claims have been extensively criticized. His third thesis in particular has been fiercely attacked on the grounds that he denigrates consumer choice, fails to distinguish between the

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general cultural conditioning of wants and the specific influence exerted by producers, and ignores the empirical evidence concerning the effects of advertising (Hayek, 1967; Riesman, 1980). His famous contrast between private affluence and public squalor has also been criticized, largely on the grounds that his approach involves a misunderstanding of the declining marginal utility of goods while underestimating the natural profligacy of governments (Rothbard, 1970). Despite this, even his fiercest critics tend to accept that it is accurate to describe modern North American and Western European countries as affluent societies (Friedman, 1977, p. 13). Hence Galbraith's central thesis can be said to have found widespread acceptance and to have exerted a major influence on modern social and economic thought. In this respect it is particularly important to note that his exposure of the taken-for-granted nature of the wisdom of striving for ever-increasing levels of production and his attack on the conventional view that supremacy should be accorded to market values has undoubtedly assisted the subsequent emergence of environmental and anti-growth critiques of modern society.

See also CONSUMER SOCIETY; ECONOMIC GROWTH.

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age See OLD AGE

agency See ACTION AND AGENCY

aggression While almost all current theories of aggression have been developed in the twentieth century, the underlying conceptual issues and major debates have much earlier roots. Recent arguments concerning the extent to which aggression is biologically rooted in human nature revive themes from Thomas Hobbes's *Leviathan* and the liberal philosophies of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Freud (1920), for example, recasts many of Hobbes's original ideas on the inherent brutality of man towards his fellows in a psychoanalytical framework, providing a model subsequently emulated

in the very different field of ethology by Konrad Lorenz (1966) and the neo-Darwinists.

Such approaches, focusing on rather simplistic assumptions of instinctual mechanisms, while still reviewed extensively in the major text books, are now seen as largely excluded from current accounts of aggression. The aspect of Freud's work which focuses on aggression is viewed, with the benefit of hindsight, as a rather hurried attempt to patch up apparent weaknesses in his theoretical approach, which relied heavily on the *pleasure principle* to explain psychological processes and human behaviour. The bloody catastrophe of World War I required some quite different model, and so *thanatos*, or the death instinct, appeared: 'As a result of a little speculation, we have come to suppose that this instinct is at work within every living creature and is striving to bring it to ruin and reduce life to its original condition of inanimate matter.'

A particular difficulty with these early instinct theories was the central notion of 'spontaneity'. Not only was aggression genetically preprogrammed, and therefore ineradicable, it took the form of a drive which must be consummated, channelled or displaced. Expressions of aggression, whether in the form of interpersonal VIOLENCE or in some less direct form, were thus inevitable. Emphasis was placed on the need to direct this hydraulic force, rather than on ways of reducing it. Energetic sports and physical competition were seen as essential ingredients in the control of 'natural' male aggression, providing much of the rationale of the British public school system.

While such views, like aspects of many early psychological theories, have been incorporated into lay 'social representations' of aggression and violence, modern accounts of aggression in the social sciences eschew virtually all notions of genetic factors and biological substrates. The vast majority of published works since the 1950s lay emphasis on the role of learning, social conditions and deprivation. The essential assumption is that aggression is a form of *behaviour*, rather than a primary psychological force, and that, like any other behaviour, it can be modified, controlled and even eradicated. This is equally evident in the laboratory-based work of psychologists such as Bandura (1973) and in the sociological approaches of writers as varied as Wolfgang and Weiner (1982) and Downes and Rock (1979). We find a similar emphasis on 'liberal' understandings of aggression in post-war social anthropology with much effort

being devoted to finding totally peaceful societies in which aggression does not, or did not, exist – thus firmly nailing the false assumption of a genetic determinant. Such attempts were, by and large, unconvincing. Indeed, as Fox (1968) has pointed out, naive views of the Kalahari Bushmen as a people free from aggression were a little wide of the mark since evidence existed to show that they had a homicide rate higher than that in Chicago.

To some extent the rejection of biological theories of aggression is due not only to the manifest inadequacies of those theories but also to the gradual introduction of ‘political correctness’ into academic debates in the social sciences. People cannot be said to be naturally aggressive because that would mean that violence and destruction could never be eradicated, and that, unlike in the early decades of the century, does not fit at all with the contemporary intellectual Zeitgeist.

This new polarization, and the heated nature-nurture debate which has occupied most of the century, has probably detracted more than anything else from a ‘sensible’ understanding of aggression. Marsh (1978, 1982) has argued that whether aggression has a biological root or whether it is learned is a largely irrelevant argument since (a) it is undoubtedly both, and (b) the prognoses for the modification of behaviour are not much different in either case. An analogy can be made here with sexual behaviour. It would be foolish to assume that human sexuality does not have genetic, biological and hormonal bases. But sexual behaviour is largely controlled through cultural and social rule frameworks. People do not, in the main, consummate their sexual drives in random and spontaneous fashion – they are obliged to follow social conventions and observe ritual requirements. All cultures develop ‘solutions’ which maximize the advantages of sexuality and inhibit its potentially negative consequences.

It has become increasingly unfashionable in the social sciences to suggest that aggression has any positive value. Indeed, many current definitions of aggression exclude such a possibility. In psychology the most dominant definition is ‘Intentional behaviour intended to harm another person who is motivated to avoid it.’ In other social science fields it is most frequently viewed as ‘maladaptive’ behaviour or an unfortunate response to pathological social conditions (see also CRIME AND DEVIANCE). Only in fields such as Marxist sociology do we find the view that aggression is a rational and justified form of conduct.

In everyday discourse, however, it is clear that aggression is seen as having positive as well as pejorative connotations. In the world of sports we regularly praise the athlete for running an aggressive race, or hold in esteem the gutsy and aggressive quarter-back. In these arenas aggression is not only permissible, it is an essential ingredient of excellence. Similarly, aggression in the business world is the hallmark of the valued entrepreneur, without whom both post-Thatcherite Britain and the twentieth-century American Way would wither and die.

It is no wonder that writers such as Bandura (1973) have called the field of aggression a ‘semantic jungle’. With several hundred definitions of aggression extant in the social sciences, it is inevitable that confusions reign and unnecessary arguments dominate the debate. The more promising approaches are those which have left the nature-nurture debate behind and focus on the understanding of specific forms of aggressive behaviour and the factors which influence them. Analysis of social frameworks which encourage or inhibit displays of aggression has also proved fruitful in explaining social phenomena such as football hooliganism (Marsh, 1978), female violence (Campbell, 1982), extreme political violence (Billig, 1978), etc. Work concerned with the role of specific physiological mechanisms (such as Brain, 1986) has also contributed to a more rational debate in which there are fewer obstacles to examining the complex interplay between biological and social factors. Whether we view aggression as an avoidable pathology or as an inevitable component of the human condition, our understanding of the phenomena will only increase if the focus is on why certain individuals in certain social contexts display extreme antipathy towards each other in order to achieve specific goals, whether these goals be the injury of others or the development of social prestige and status.

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PETER MARSH

alienation In the writings of Marx, this is the historical process whereby human beings have become successively estranged from Nature and from the products of their activity (commodities and capital, social institutions and culture) which then come to confront subsequent generations as an independent, objectified force, that is, as an alienated reality. He focused in particular on the deleterious effects of alienated labour in capitalist industrial production (see LABOUR PROCESS). Secondly, it refers to a sense of estrangement from society, group, culture or the individual self that people commonly experience living in complex industrial societies, particularly in large cities. Alienation evokes experiences such as depersonalization in the face of bureaucracy; feelings of powerlessness to affect social events and processes; and a sense of lack of cohesion in people's lives. That alienation in this general sense constitutes a recurring problem in contemporary societies such as our own is a prominent theme in the sociology of the modern urban experience (see MASS SOCIETY; URBANISM; ANOMIE).

In Europe between the wars the predicament of humankind in modern secular societies was widely discussed by existentialist philosophers, psychoanalysts, theologians and Marxists as the problem of alienation. The debate was further fuelled by the publication in 1932 of Marx's analysis of alienation in his *Economic and Philosophic (Paris) Manuscripts* (1844). The term is often linked with REIFICATION, which was not used by Marx but by the Marxist writer György Lukács in his influential *History and Class Consciousness* (1923), which anticipated the theme of human 'objectification' discussed in the *Manuscripts*. For Lukács, reification is the extremity of the alienation of humans from their products which arises from COMMODITY FETISHISM in developed capitalist societies.

In Britain, the concept of alienation came into currency in sociology and adjacent fields in the 1960s and 1970s via Marxism. A controversy subsequently raged about the significance of Marx's early writings on this subject for our understanding of his work as a whole. Some Marxists, for example Louis Althusser (1965), argued that Marx abandoned the humanistic concept of alienation in his early writings in favour of a scientific analysis of modes of production, while others, such as István Meszáros (1970) and David McLellan (1980) argued that the concept was integral to all his works, both early and late.

In Marx, the historical process of alienation has transformed human beings increasingly from creative subjects into passive objects of social processes. Hegel had already described, in a metaphysical framework, such a process, but Marx insisted that the end of alienation had to be achieved in practice by real people and not apparently solely in the realm of consciousness or self-awareness, as in Hegel (see PRAXIS). Marx's secular humanism relied heavily on Ludwig Feuerbach's materialist theory of religion in which he claimed that human beings have projected their own essence and potentialities into God, who then confronts them in an alienated form. In the *Manuscripts* Marx claimed that religious alienation was only one aspect of the propensity of human beings to alienate themselves in their own products, which could all be explained as aspects of economic alienation.

This analysis was then fused with the politics of communism, into which future society Marx projected the 'complete return of man himself as a *social* (i.e. human) being – a return become conscious, and accomplished within the entire wealth of previous development' (Marx, 1844). History is thus the simultaneous loss of human beings in their own products and their subsequent recovery of themselves, a real process that Hegel had simply perceived in a mystified manner. In Marx's theory of history the developing forces of production (content) progressively outgrow their relations (forms) in a series of historical modes of production as the realization of this process. With the social formation of capitalism 'the pre-history of human society accordingly closes' (Marx, 1859). Marx's social-scientific theory of the historical genesis of alienation and its overcoming in practice was thus burdened with the same teleology as that of the metaphysical theory it was trying to supplant.

In common with Feuerbach and with echoes of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Marx assumes that the essence or 'species being' of humankind is – unlike that of animals – inherently sociable and cooperative. Also, that labour too should have a communal character as the productive and creative life of the species as a whole in their necessary appropriation of Nature. Labour not only creates wealth, but is also its own reward and the means by which humankind has raised itself above the animal world and created human history. For Marx, therefore, the organization of large-scale commodity production and the individualistic wage labour contract of the early capitalist factories of his time constituted a

travesty of the species character that labour should have if it were to be organized in a way truly congruent with the assumed nature of man. Alienation is thus a 'critical' concept, used as a measuring rod calibrating the human costs of capitalist civilization.

Alienated labour alienated workers from (a) their product, which did not belong to them; (b) work itself, because it was only a means of survival, something forced on them in order to live; (c) from themselves because their activity was not their own, resulting in feelings of self-estrangement; (d) from other people in the factory because each was there individually selling their labour power as a commodity. For Marx, human egoism was a product of alienated labour, as was private property, which was not founded on a collective relation of humans to Nature. Hence neither represented enduring characteristics of human beings and their lives together, but were a product only of class societies in the capitalist phase. The abolition of alienated labour would mean that labour would acquire its true species character.

Two problem areas have dominated discussions of alienation. Firstly, the status of the model of human beings at the heart of the theory. In today's terminology, Marx's analysis is an example of philosophical anthropology because he posits, *a priori*, a timeless picture of HUMAN NATURE. His model of *homo laborans* takes labour from the dominant experience of factory work of his time and instates it as the universal defining human characteristic. Around this idea are then hung a number of further assumptions about human sociability, freedom and control, self-realization and collective labour as its own reward. Like all models of its kind, it is open to the charge of arbitrariness.

Secondly, controversy has continued about the feasibility of de-alienation. Existentialists have suggested that while alienation may be exacerbated under capitalist production, it is basically symptomatic of something perennial in the human social-natural condition. Marx thought that economic alienation was the basis of all other aspects, so the supersession of private property would mark the end of expropriation by the capitalists and hence all alienations. But, as Axelos says, 'Marx was unable to recognize the will to power' (1976, p. 305), so did not foresee the emergence of new forms of expropriation and the exploitation of people by each other and, hence, further alienation. The existence of powerful communist establishments in the socialist societies of Eastern Europe

and the former Soviet Union, where private property was effectively abolished, would seem to bear this out. Also, eliminating alienation at the point of production by workers' self-management (as in the former Yugoslavia) leaves the spheres of distribution and exchange untouched as further sources of alienation.

The issue of the extent to which alienation can be eliminated ultimately turns on whether it is feasible to abolish the DIVISION OF LABOUR in a complex society. In the *German Ideology* Marx anticipates its utopian abolition under communism, which also dissolves the distinction between mental and physical labour. Thus would arise the universal human being who is able to 'hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticise after dinner . . . without ever becoming hunter, fisherman, shepherd or critic' (Marx and Engels, 1845–6). Whereas later, in the *Grundrisse* and in *Capital*, he more cautiously says that in any society, even a socialist one, nature as a 'realm of necessity' cannot be eliminated nor can the superintendence, coordination and regulation of work, in short some kind of division of labour and, hence, alienation.

For Emile Durkheim (1858–1917) in the *Division of Labour* and other writings, the negative, alienating aspects of the division of labour are counter-balanced to some degree by the increased opportunities for individual self-realization made possible by its extension. He advocated developing occupational associations to promote solidarity and a new morality that acknowledges people's increasing dependence on each other that also accompanies it. Robert Blauner (1964) broke the concept of alienation down into the four testable dimensions of powerlessness, meaninglessness, isolation and self-estrangement in the workplace. In a study of various industrial settings in the USA he found that alienation and freedom were unevenly distributed in the modern productive process. Alienation was at its greatest in mass production and at its least in craft production. Some have argued that this kind of empirical approach misses the critical-philosophical intention of Marx's concept, whereas others have said that it is the only way to give any kind of precision to a concept which is quasi-metaphysical and inherently indeterminate.

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12 ANARCHISM

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RICHARD KILMINSTER

analytical philosophy See LINGUISTIC PHILOSOPHY; PHILOSOPHY

anarchism Repudiation of rulers is at the core of anarchism. In developing this negative notion, modern anarchists, broadly classifiable as either individualist or socialist, reject the state, hold that social order is possible in its absence and advocate moving directly towards 'society without a state'. The first to elaborate a theory of anarchism was Godwin (1793) but Proudhon (1840) was the first to call himself, defiantly, an anarchist. As a social movement, anarchism, in a revolutionary form, crystallized in opposition to Marxism in the period of the First International 1864–72, partly over the issue of whether socialists should seek the immediate 'abolition of the state'. In the twentieth century, as socialism became increasingly statist, the anarchist movement has declined but its ideas have influenced other movements and contributed to the critique of statist theories and practices. Anarchism also remains of interest because it raises issues fundamental to social and political theory.

One such relates to authority. 'Philosophical anarchism', a component especially of the individualist variety, rejects the idea of legitimate authority in the sense of the right of anyone (state official or not) to command the obedience of another. Individual autonomy, conceived morally, as by Godwin and by Wolff (1970), requires individuals to act according to their own judgements. Conceived egoistically, as by Stirner (1845), it implies that 'the unique one' who truly 'owns himself' recognizes no duties to others; within the limit of his might, he does what is right *for him*.

Since 'philosophical anarchism' makes cooperation and formal organization problematical, anarchists are often less radical. Although generally suspicious of authority, they may recognize the rational authority of experts within their fields of competence and the moral authority of basic social norms, such as 'contracts should be kept'. And in

the sense in which 'politics' occurs in all organized groups when unanimity is lacking, they may recognize even political (but not state) authority. Thus, decisions taken participatorily by members of a commune or workers' cooperative may be deemed morally binding. But they reject authority backed by coercive power – the kind institutionalized, pre-eminently but not exclusively, in the STATE.

Anarchists reject the modern state because, within its territory, it divides people into rulers and the ruled, monopolizes the major means of physical coercion, claims sovereignty over all persons and property, promulgates laws held to override all other laws and customs, punishes those who break its laws, and forcibly appropriates through taxation and in other ways the property of its subjects. Further, with other states, it divides human society against itself into national societies, and periodically wages war, thereby authorizing mass murder. For anarchists, even a democratic state lacks legitimacy since it is not based on consent in any strict sense and the ruler–ruled relationship is merely masked. Anarchists may admit that sometimes the state performs useful functions, such as protecting – as well as also violating – human rights, but argue these could and should be carried out by voluntary organizations.

In rejecting the state, anarchists deny the widely held view, classically expressed by Thomas Hobbes (1651), that in its absence there is no society and life is solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short. Humans, they believe, are naturally social, not asocial; and until the first states developed some five thousand years ago all humans lived in stateless societies. Anarchists take John Locke's view that 'the natural condition of mankind', in which all are free and equal, no-one having the right to command obedience of others, does constitute a society. They do not accept Locke's justification in terms of consent of the limited state, an agency for protecting natural rights, especially the right to property – the night-watchman view of the state associated with *laissez-faire* liberalism, which reappears in the libertarian work of Nozick (1974). But they endorse Locke's view, later vividly expressed by Paine (1791–2, pt 2, ch. 1) and recently restated by Hayek (1973, ch. 2), that social order exists independently of the state – an order spontaneously generated, a product of human sociability. What distinguishes anarchists from such liberals is their belief that this natural order does not need supplementing by order imposed from above. In the language of rational choice

theory, although social order is a 'public good', a good characterized by indivisibility and non-excludability, people – under conditions envisaged by anarchists – will cooperate voluntarily to provide it themselves (Taylor, 1982). For anarchists, unlike classical liberals, the state is not a 'necessary' but a 'positive' evil – a major source, as in war, of disorder in human society. They champion, therefore, the idea of 'natural society', a self-regulated, pluralistic society in which power and authority are radically decentralized.

In distinguishing sharply between society and state, both individualist and socialist anarchism build on liberal foundations. The former may be seen as liberalism taken to an extreme, or logical, conclusion. The individual is the basic unit, 'society' is a collective term for aggregations of individuals, FREEDOM is defined negatively as absence of coercion, and the aim is to maximize individual liberty in ways compatible with the equal liberty of others. Against the state's claim to sovereignty is pitted the principle of 'the sovereignty of the individual'. On the economic side, individualists have usually insisted on the importance of private property or possession, favoured individual production, condemned all monopolies, and praised the free market. In the belief that their proposals would secure to persons the fruits of their own labour and not lead to accumulation of possessions through the exploitation of the labour of others, nineteenth-century individualists sometimes thought of themselves as socialists. But their successors today, such as Murray Rothbard (1973), having abandoned the labour theory of value, describe themselves as 'anarcho-capitalists'. Their programme amounts to complete privatization. They argue that the free market can supply all goods and services, including protection of persons and property, now allegedly provided by the political monopoly called the state.

Socialist anarchism may be seen as a fusion of liberalism with socialism. High value is placed on individual liberty but freedom is defined not only negatively but also as the capacity to satisfy needs. Insisting on social and economic equality as a necessary condition for the maximum liberty of all, it rejects capitalist private property along with the state. Social solidarity, expressed in acts of mutual aid, is emphasized. Society is thought of as a network of voluntary associations but, more importantly, as composed of local communities. Communal individuality is the ideal.

Socialist anarchism was largely shaped by Proudhon's ideas: liberty is the mother, not the daughter, of order; all political parties are varieties of despotism; the power of the state and of capital are synonymous; the proletariat, therefore, cannot emancipate itself by the use of state power but only by (peaceful) direct action; and society should be organized as autonomous local communities and producer associations, linked by 'the federal principle'. However, his successors, Michael A. Bakunin and Peter A. Kropotkin in Russia, substituted for his 'mutualism' first 'collectivism' and then 'communism' – the latter implying 'everything belongs to everyone' and distribution according to needs.

Also, under Bakunin's inspiration, anarchists adopted the strategy of encouraging popular insurrections in the course of which, it was envisaged, capitalist and landed property would be expropriated and collectivized, and the state abolished. In its place would emerge autonomous, but federally linked, communes: a socialist society organized from below upwards, not from above downwards. To foster the spirit of revolt among the oppressed, anarchists adopted the tactic of 'propaganda by the deed' in the form of, first, exemplary local insurrections and, then, acts of assassination and terrorism. Faced with the consequent repression of their movement, other anarchists adopted an alternative strategy associated with SYNDICALISM. The idea was to turn trade unions into revolutionary instruments of class struggle and to make them, rather than communes, the basic units of a new society. It was through syndicalism that anarchists exercised their greatest influence on socialist movements in the period 1895–1920. The influence lasted longer in Spain where, during the civil war of 1936–9, anarcho-syndicalists, with some shortlived success, attempted to carry through their conception of revolution.

In Spain, as earlier in revolutionary Russia, anarchism continued its quarrel with Marxism, even though anarchists often accepted much of Marx's economic analysis, while Marxists agreed that the coming classless, communist society would be stateless. The differences were in part about means to this end. Anarchists opposed the Marxist idea that workers should organize themselves into a distinct political party to win concessions from the bourgeois state as a prelude to its overthrow. And they opposed the idea of a workers' state – 'the dictatorship of the proletariat' – which, supposedly,

would 'wither away' as capitalist property relations were abolished. Anarchists argued that the first would lead to the degeneration of the workers' movement and its cooption by the bourgeois state, and that, even if it did not, the second would lead to a dictatorship *over* the proletariat and hence to a new form of class rule. But underlying these differences, there are others, notably about the nature of the state. While anarchists agree that dominant economic classes use the state to maintain their dominance, they see the state as embodying political power which cannot be reduced, even 'in the last analysis', to economic power. Because political power has independent roots, the state is an organization with its own dynamics and 'logic'. Unless resisted, that logic leads to the complete domination of society by the state: TOTALITARIANISM.

Sharply contrasting with revolutionary anarchism in its methods but not in its vision of a new socialist society is anarchism that derives from the pacifist tradition (see PACIFISM). 'The law of love', expressed in the Sermon on the Mount, led Leo Tolstoy, the Russian novelist, to denounce the state as 'organized violence' and to call on people to disobey its immoral demands. The call influenced Gandhi in developing his philosophy of non-violence in India. He popularized the technique of mass non-violent resistance and originated the key notion of anarcho-pacifism: 'non-violent revolution', described as a programme not for the seizure of power but the transformation of relationships. For him, national independence was only the first step in such a revolution which Vinoba Bhave, campaigning for voluntary villagization of land, continued in an effort to realize Gandhi's dream of an India of self-sufficient, self-governing village republics (Ostergaard, 1982).

In a century that has witnessed everywhere a vast increase in the power of the state, its further militarization and its general acceptance as the normal political organization of national societies, anarchism has clearly been 'against the current'. But it survives and shows a notable ability to outlive specific anarchist movements. A generation after the eclipse of ANARCHO-SYNDICALISM, anarchist ideas reemerged, sometimes spectacularly, in the context of the New Left movements of the 1960s. Their influence is still discernible today, notably in movements for peace, feminism, lesbian and gay liberation, radical social ecology, animal liberation and workers' self-management. Direct action, the clas-

sical anarchist alternative to conventional political action, has also become popular. At the other end of the political spectrum, individualist anarchism, reborn as anarcho-capitalism, is a significant tendency in the libertarian New Right.

The anarchism that survives and fertilizes other movements does not call, as Bakunin did, for the immediate abolition of the state. It calls, rather, for 'anarchy in action' here and now and for changes that promote the 'anarchization', not the 'statization' of human society. Beyond that, it survives as a permanent protest against all coercive power relationships, however disguised, and all theories that deny the fundamental insight of liberalism: human beings are naturally free and equal.

See also LIBERTARIANISM.

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anarcho-syndicalism As the prefix suggests, this is the anarchist variety of syndicalism – *revolutionary* trade unionism. The core idea of the latter is that the organizations developed by workers to defend their interests *vis-à-vis* employers should become the instruments to overthrow capitalism and then constitute the basic units of socialist society. Through 'direct action' in the form, principally, of strikes culminating in the social general strike, the unions would take control of the means of production and all other necessary social functions, dispossess capitalist owners and displace all bourgeois institutions, thereby establishing genuine 'working-class socialism'. In the French labour movement, where these ideas gained wide currency in the period 1895–1914, anarchists, notably Fernand Pelloutier (1867–1901), pioneered their propagation. But in France, as in other countries such as Italy, Russia, the USA, the UK, Sweden and Argentina, where syndicalism became a lively tendency in labour movements, not all syndicalists accepted anarchist ideas – the abolition of the state

and radically decentralized organization based on 'the federal principle'. 'Pure' syndicalists regarded their movement as sufficient unto itself, saw anarchism as one of several competing political ideologies and left open the question of whether a syndicalist society would be organized as a political entity. On the other hand, anarchists adopted one of three attitudes towards syndicalism. Some regarded its ideas as too limited or mistaken, and therefore remained aloof. Others, seeing syndicalism as essentially a *means* to achieve an anarchist society, encouraged participation in the movement but warned against identifying anarchism with it. Yet others – the anarcho-syndicalists – took the view that syndicalism was essentially the expression of mature anarchism in contemporary capitalist society. It was in Spain with its strong anarchist tradition that anarcho-syndicalism became a significant force in the shape of the CNT (Confederación Nacional de Trabajo), an organization embracing by 1936 one million members, in which militants of the FAI (Federación Anarquista Ibérica) exercised a preponderant influence. It was in Spain, too, in the region of Catalonia, that anarcho-syndicalists during the early months of the civil war, 1936–9, attempted with some initial but short-lived success to establish a system of 'workers' control' of industry.

Except in Spain, syndicalist tendencies in Western labour movements were weakened by the nationalist fervour unleashed at the outbreak of war in 1914. They were further seriously weakened following the success of the Bolsheviks in Russia in 1917 which led many syndicalists to abandon their conception of revolution centred on the unions in favour of the Leninist model with its emphasis on the 'vanguard' role of communist parties. Those syndicalist unions and groups which refused to follow the communist path then formed in 1922 the International Working Men's Association, in which the Spanish CNT until 1939 was the largest national section. Later retitled the International Workers' Association, its 14 national sections (including a revived but weak and divided CNT) remained into the 1990s the vehicles for promoting anarcho-syndicalist ideas – but voiced now only in the margins of labour movements that are over-whelmingly reformist.

See also ANARCHISM and SYNDICALISM.

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Annales school This 'school' of historiography, if school it may be called, may justly lay claim to being the most distinctive twentieth-century contribution to historical writing. Its origins are usually traced to the founding of the *Revue de synthèse historique* by Henri Berr in 1900. It arose out of discomfort with, indeed protest against, the idiographic thrust that had come to dominate European historiography since the Rankean 'revolution' – the call to write history empirically 'as it really happened', based on primary sources. Idiographic history had become institutionalized in France at the Sorbonne and in the *Revue historique* (founded in the 1870s). Much later, in 1953, Lucien Febvre would suggest that this French historiography, as exemplified by such figures as Gabriel Monod and Emile Bourgeois, was 'history as written by those defeated in 1870'. He argued that their emphasis on diplomatic history was sustained by a kind of sub-text that read: 'Ah, if we had studied it more carefully, we should not be where we are today' (Febvre, 1953, p. vii).

It was not that there was objection to the search for empirical data in so-called primary sources. It was the sense that there was no history worth writing that was not 'synthetic' – hence the title of Berr's journal. Or as Febvre formulated the issue later, one should practice a *histoire pensée* organized around *histoire-problèmes* as opposed to engaging in *histoire historisante*.

Henri Berr sought to break the narrow confines of a presumed 'discipline' by opening his journal to other 'disciplines', especially the new social sciences. This tradition was renewed, reemphasized and deepened when, in 1929, Lucien Febvre and Marc Bloch joined together in founding the journal which gave this group its name. There are two main things to be noted about the journal. First of all, there is its name. It was called *Annales d'histoire économique et sociale*, which was a direct (and deliberate) translation of the title of the German review which incarnated the Schmoller school of 'institutional' history, the *Vierteljahrsschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte*. (See also METHODENSTREIT.) The title was not merely a means of identification with a parallel anti-idiographic current in German; it was also a programme. It said that the journal

would emphasize the economic and the social, implicitly because they were more enduring, more important and more fundamental than the political and the diplomatic, the normal focus of the most historical writing.

The second thing to notice about the review is its locus, and that of its authors and readers. The journal was located not in Paris, but in Strasbourg where Febvre and Bloch were then teaching. This was symbolic of their institutional marginality, which continued even when Febvre was appointed to the Collège de France and Bloch to the Sorbonne. The number of subscribers was small, only several hundred. But the authors and readers were international from the beginning, as were the themes of the journal. In particular, there were strong links with Italy and Spain.

After World War II, the influence of the *Annales* movement grew dramatically, with an important institutional expansion. Bloch had been killed by the Nazis, but Febvre continued to lead the movement until his death in 1956. Febvre chose as his associate a younger historian, Fernand Braudel, who would come to symbolize the so-called 'second generation' of the *Annales* movement. Febvre would lavish praise on Braudel's great work, published in 1949, *La Méditerranée et le monde méditerranéen à l'époque de Philippe II*. He proclaimed it the 'image of history' as *Annales* had been calling for it to be written, marking 'the dawn of a new era' (Febvre, 1950, p. 224).

Although Braudel was refused an appointment at the Sorbonne, he received one at the Collège de France, as had Febvre, which in the politics of the French university system was to be given an honorific but to lack institutional power. Febvre and Braudel were determined to create an alternative power base and, with the aid of a senior civil servant, Gaston Berger, were able to implement an idea from the 1870s, the creation in 1947 of a VIe Section (for economic and social sciences) of the Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes. The Ecole was a peculiar institution, invented in the nineteenth century to offer 'adult education' outside the university system. But, very quickly, Febvre and Braudel were able to transform the VIe Section into a vibrant locus of graduate studies and scholarly research in history and the social sciences. The journal too was revitalized in 1946 under a new name, *Annales: Economies, Sociétés, Civilisations*.

It was Braudel who developed most explicitly and most theoretically the position of the *Annales*

movement on the social construction of time and temporalities. He divided his book on the Mediterranean into three parts corresponding with what he considered the three social times of *structure, conjoncture* and *événement*. In the revised edition of *The Mediterranean*, he cast the challenge of his famous *boutade*, 'Events are dust' (Braudel, 1982 (1966), vol. 2, p. 223). In 1958, he published what is probably the theoretical centrepiece of the *Annales* movement, 'History and the social sciences'. It was in this article that the case is made for the third great theme which has distinguished the *Annales* movement. In addition to 'synthesis' and to 'economic and social history', there is the emphasis on the *longue durée*, the time of the slow-moving structures of social life. Braudel is however careful to spell out in this essay that the *longue durée* is not the eternal and unchanging universal. He calls this latter time the 'very *longue durée*' and says of it: 'if it exists, [it] can only be the time of the wise men...' (Braudel, 1958).

Suddenly, that is, between 1945 and 1970, the epoch of the second generation, the *Annales* movement moved from the wings to centrestage, and not only in France. By the time the VIe Section was rechristened the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales in 1975, it had become more prestigious to have an appointment there than in the now multiple Paris universities. *Annales E. S. C.* had become one of the world's major scholarly journals. It seemed that almost everyone, or at least very many scholars, were considering themselves *Annalistes*.

For the *Annales* movement, as for so many other currents of thought, 1968 was a breakpoint. It was only after 1968 that the influence of the *Annales* movement moved beyond what might be called the 'extended' French cultural zone – Latin Europe, Quebec, Poland, Hungary and Turkey. (For an analysis of this phenomenon see the special issue of *Review*, 1978, which also includes articles explaining why Great Britain showed a certain early receptivity as well.) It began to have an important influence in zones that had been hitherto resistant – the United States, Germany and finally the USSR. (For many years, the official Soviet position was one condemning the *Annales* movement. There were nonetheless many closet *Annalistes* in the USSR. It was only in 1989, with *glasnost*, that the Institute of Universal History of Academy of Sciences could sponsor an international colloquium on '*Les Annales – hier et aujourd'hui?*')

In 1972, Braudel retired both as editor of *Annales E. S. C.*, and as president of the VIe Section, to be replaced by the so-called 'third generation'. The year 1970 marked the official launching of the last great institutional construction of the *Annales* movement, the Maison des Sciences de l'Homme, of which Braudel would remain the administrator until his death in 1985. The Maison has as its *raison d'être* the intellectual collaboration of French scholars with everywhere else in the world, pursuing the same hope of synthesis that had inspired Henri Berr in 1900.

The events of 1968 opened up new intellectual horizons everywhere. In some parts of the world, it made scholars (and students) receptive for the first time to the *via media* of *Annales*, struggling simultaneously against IDIOGRAPHIC history and universalizing social science. On the other hand, it was precisely in those parts of the world where *Annales* influence had already been strong that the scholarly community was entering into a 'post-Marxist' mood, and was hence somewhat suspicious of the great emphasis on economic history of the 'second generation'.

The 'third generation' shifted the emphasis noticeably from the economic to the social (even including in the latter political culture). This translated itself into a renewed concern with *mentalités*, an extraordinary expansion of empirical research on a wide range of sociocultural phenomena, and an important blending of interest with those anthropologists who were themselves putting new emphasis on the symbolic sphere.

The *Annales* movement in its 'third generation' has pursued the spirit of 'inclusiveness', of studying any and all aspects of social reality, that was a central part of the *Annales* ethos from the beginning. The third generation has used the social to expand the economic in the same way as the previous generations had used the economic to expand the political. But while it is clear that they have been more 'inclusive', it is less sure that they have been holistic, as 'synthetic'.

The third generation has tried to bring back the importance of the political arena by seeing it as a central part of the *mentalités*. In doing so, they have had to come closer to a consideration of 'events', even if under the guise of symbolic occurrences.

As the 'third generation' came to occupy more and more place in the world of knowledge – in the double sense of being more numerous and concerning themselves with more empirical issues – they

have inevitably begun to lose the sense of being a movement. Most *Annalistes* refuse today outright the expression, 'the *Annales* school'.

Is there then a spirit of *Annales* which remains? It seems so, in the sense that the extremes of idio-graphic narrative and ahistorical generalizing are still rejected. What might be said is that whereas, for the first and second generations, the *via media* was a very narrow passageway between two highly menacing and very large schools of Scylla and Charybdis, for the third generation, the *via media* became a wide highway between two highly diminished extremist positions. It is the difference between having a self-image of David versus Goliath and having the sense that what one does is not merely normal and respectable, but thought of as such.

In 1989, the journal changed its name again, becoming *Annales: Histoire, Sciences Sociales*. The name change marked the assumption of the heritage by the so-called fourth generation. They seem to wish to restore the place of economic history in the journal, which had been largely evicted by the third generation, without however dispensing with the new paths opened up the third generation. Some see this as a compromise path. They have also opened the journal to contributions by the new microhistory of Italian origin. Whether this is a new distinctive approach and whether these new thrusts will enable the *Annales* to continue to play the central, innovative role it has played in the past is yet to be seen.

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IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN

anomie The term derives from the Greek *anomia*, meaning: without law and connoting iniquity, impiety, injustice and disorder (Orru, 1987). It reappeared in English in the sixteenth century and was used in the seventeenth to mean disregard of divine law. It reappeared in French in the

writings of Jean-Marie Guyau (1854–1888) who gave it a positive connotation. An anti-Kantian, Guyau looked forward to an ideal future of *moral anomie* – that is, the absence of absolute, fixed and universal rules – and *religious anomie*, freeing individual judgement from all dogmatic faith.

Anomie's sociological career began with Emile Durkheim, who criticized Guyau's ideas but appropriated the term, giving it once more a negative connotation, first in *The Division of Labour in Society* (1893) and then in *Suicide* (1897). It was subsequently taken up by Robert Merton in the 1930s, after which it achieved its greatest diffusion in the 1950s and 1960s among American sociologists studying SUICIDE, delinquency and deviance (see CRIME AND DEVIANCE). Thereafter anomie came to signify a personality trait or set of attitudes (increasingly indistinguishable from ALIENATION) for the measurement of which various scales were devised. Subsequently its meaning became increasingly indeterminate as its use spread more widely among sociologists and extended to psychologists. In this process, anomie became 'psychologized' and detached from any wider theory of society. The story of its transmutation from Durkheim's initial usage to those of Merton and his successors is interesting. As Besnard observes, anomie which, with Durkheim, 'characterized a state of the social system was later applied to the situation of the individual actor, or even to his attitudes or state of mind'. Furthermore, Durkheim's 'concept critical of industrial society was transformed into a conservative notion designating maladaptation to the social order' (Besnard, 1987, p. 13).

In Durkheim's *Division of Labour* the 'anomic form' of the division of labour is 'abnormal'. This consisted in the absence of a body of rules governing the relations between social functions; it was to be seen in industrial and commercial crises and the conflict between labour and capital; and its chief cause lay in the rapidity with which INDUSTRIALIZATION occurred, such that 'the conflicting interests have not had time to strike an equilibrium.' As the market extends and large-scale industry appears, the effect is to 'transform the relationship between employers and workers'. Urbanization caused 'the needs of workers to increase'. With mechanization and the replacement of small workshops by manufacturing, 'the worker is regimented' and removed both from his family and his employer. Finally, work is made less meaningful, reducing the worker to 'the role of a machine'

unaware 'of where the operations required of him are leading' (Durkheim, 1893, pp. 305–6).

In *Suicide* anomie constitutes one of the social causes of suicide, a state of the social environment as a function of which suicide rates rise. It is a state of deregulation leaving 'individual passions... without a curb to regulate them'. He distinguished two kinds of anomie, economic and conjugal. The former consisted in the breakdown of an accepted normative framework that stabilized expectations; it was manifested in economic crises, whether booms or slumps. But he also thought such anomie was chronic in contemporary societies in the industrial and commercial world, resulting from the decline of religious, political and occupational controls, and the growth of the market and of ideologies celebrating acquisitiveness, a malady of infinite aspiration, 'daily preached as a mark of moral distinction', elevating 'to a rule the lack of rule from which [its victims] suffer' (Durkheim, 1897, pp. 258, 256, 257). Conjugal anomie, he thought, was also chronic, consisting in a 'weakening of matrimonial regulation' of an accepted normative framework that reined in desire and controlled passions, of which divorce was both an expression and a powerful contributory cause (*ibid.*, p. 271).

Robert Merton's anomie shares neither Durkheim's view of human nature nor his project of diagnosing the social and hence personal ills of a rapidly industrializing capitalism. For him anomie was conceived 'as a breakdown in the cultural structure, occurring particularly when there is an acute disjunction between the cultural norms and goals and the socially structured capacities of members of the group to act in accord with them' (1949, p. 162). Merton thought that aspirations to 'succeed' (mainly though not wholly in material terms) were universally prescribed in contemporary US society. Socially structured strain, or anomie, resulted where institutionally permitted means to succeed were unavailable. There were four ways of adapting to this strain, apart from conformity to both goals and institutionalized means – all of them forms of deviance:

Innovators (e.g. professional thieves, white-collar criminals, cheaters in examinations) adhere to the goals but reject the normatively prescribed means. Ritualists (e.g. bureaucrats who slavishly follow the rules without regard for the ends for which they were designed) make a virtue of over-

conformity to the institutionalised norms at the price of underconformity to the culturally prescribed goals. Retreatists (e.g. tramps, chronic drunkards, and drug addicts) withdraw from 'the rat race' by abandoning both goals and means. Rebels (e.g. members of revolutionary movements) withdraw allegiance to a cultural and social system they deem unjust and seek to reconstitute the society anew, with a new set of goals and prescriptions for attaining them. (Cohen, 1966, p. 77)

This focus on shared cultural norms and goals and on blocked possibilities of legitimately realizing them set an agenda for deviance research which lasted several decades. Yet, as Besnard has observed, it was, in effect, an inversion of the Durkheimian notion, for 'where Durkheim described individuals uncertain of what they must do as the horizon of possibilities expands, Merton proposes actors sure of the objectives to be attained, but whose aspirations are blocked by a situation of closure with respect to the possibilities of success' (1987, p. 262).

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STEVEN LUKES

anthropology Broadly considered to be the scientific study of man, this orthodox definition highlights a number of problems that help to illustrate both the diversity of anthropology today and its unifying features. First among these is that while the origins of anthropology as a coherent discipline lie in the Darwinian revolution of the middle of the nineteenth century, and hence were part of the general interest in EVOLUTION, much of its subsequent development has been a reaction against evolutionary and in particular progressionist notions of human society and behaviour. The fragmentation of anthropology into distinctly *social* and *biological* branches reflects not only different responses to the development of evolutionary ideas, but also a rejection by much of social anthropology in particular of the feasibility of a purely scientific approach to the problems of the study of humans. Secondly, the rise of feminist critiques has led to caution about, if not an outright rejection of, the use of the term 'man' to

designate the human species as a whole. Although it is possible to see the term 'man' as an all-embracing reference to the species as a whole, it is at least a reminder that much of the reconstruction of human evolution and diversity has historically been seen largely from a male perspective.

Given this fragmentation into social and biological elements, not to mention yet further subdivisions, it is questionable whether there remains any coherence to the term anthropology at all, and furthermore, whether the growth of a whole range of life, human and social sciences, not to mention more humanistic approaches, has not led to a redundancy in which there is no clear niche for anthropology nor a distinctive character to an anthropological approach. A positive answer can be provided by considering what is unique or predominant in anthropological investigations. More than any other part of the human or social sciences, anthropology is characterized by an emphasis on comparative approaches, on variation rather than norms in behaviour and societies, and a rejection of Western societies or populations as a model for humanity. This comparative framework is of paramount importance. Traditionally social anthropologists have focused on non-Western societies, and although there has been an increasing interest in applying similar methods and concepts to societies that lie within the European sphere, what has always been the case is that the human social experience is best viewed as a range of variations, each with their own cultural logic, and in particular that Western society does not provide a yardstick against which these other cultures should be assessed. The range of cultural variations provides this distinctly comparative framework for social anthropologists.

Equally, biological anthropologists, or physical anthropologists as they have previously been known, use biological principles and methods to provide another comparative framework. This may be an explicitly evolutionary one, comparing humans with other primates, or it may be the examination of the extent and nature of human biological variation today. If, following American usage of the term anthropology, archaeology is included, then the comparative framework is provided by time – the way in which human societies have varied through prehistory and history. Underpinning all the branches of anthropology is this concern with mapping human variation – biological, behavioural and cultural – and attempting

to explain, interpret and understand the patterns in ways that do not make any unwarranted assumptions about directions of development or human uniqueness. The anthropological project is ultimately characterized by these global perspectives.

This comparative framework has provided the basis for anthropology's impact on twentieth-century thought.

Primitive societies

The discovery by Europeans of the enormous variation in human societies occurred primarily during the period 1500 to 1900, and brought with it the need to understand how and why this diversity occurred. The adoption of evolutionary (although not necessarily Darwinian) perspectives during the late nineteenth century provided the first coherent basis for such a perspective. Evolution was viewed by many thinkers who were influenced by Darwin, such as Herbert Spencer, as a progressive ladder of change, from primitive organisms through to humans (see SOCIAL DARWINISM). Other species represented cases of arrested development in a *scala naturae*. In similar vein, human societies could be ranked on a ladder of progress, from the primitive to the advanced. European, and particularly industrial, society stood on the top rung. Primitive societies could therefore be seen as both the stages through which humans and their societies had passed, and examples of a lack of evolutionary progress. The first anthropological syntheses, such as those developed by E. B. Tylor and L. H. Morgan, provided such a model, with various stages of development identified – primeval hordes, barbarism, civilization, for example, or matrilineal and patrilineal, or through economic concepts such as hunting and farming.

Although this evolutionary paradigm provided the basis for modern anthropology, the primary contribution of anthropologists to the ideas of the twentieth century have paradoxically derived from the rejection of this view. For a number of reasons ranging from the pursuit of exotica to the need to administer empires, anthropology paved the way for direct observation and interaction between European observers and the societies involved. It was direct and intimate contact, leading to the development of the methods of participant observation, by anthropologists such as B. Malinowski, A. R. Radcliffe-Brown and E. E. Evans-Pritchard that overturned the evolutionary perspective and

led to a rejection of notions of progress in human societies. Experience of the detailed workings of non-European societies showed first that they were far from simple and could not be neatly classified in evolutionary terms. For example, although economically simple, Australian aboriginal societies possessed among the most complex kinship systems and cosmologies known among humans. Furthermore, by replacing evolutionary concepts with functional ones, it became clear that non-European societies were not primitive attempts at economic organization and social structure, but instead functioned well as integrated systems in particular social and environmental settings. For example, the acephalous society of the Nuer of the Southern Sudan studied by Evans-Pritchard, far from being a primitive and anarchic system, was a multilayered society where the institutions of kinship lineages, marriage patterns and livestock herding dovetailed neatly together.

Although many of the tenets of FUNCTIONALISM have since been abandoned, the notion that the variety of human social and economic organization should be seen in terms of specific ecological circumstances, cultural traditions and alternative responses to unique conditions has remained of central importance, and beyond anthropology has led to the abandonment of a sense of evolutionary hierarchy among human societies. In its place has come a greater sense of independent cultural traditions and alternative social strategies. This has had practical consequences for attitudes towards development, with less willingness to impose change for change's sake and an awareness of the dangers of economic change independent of cultural considerations. It has also revolutionized attitudes towards aesthetics and art, apparent in the interchange of icons between Western and other art forms.

Culture

The central anthropological concept that underpinned these changes was that of CULTURE. This term is multilayered and has itself changed meaning over the years. At one level it refers to those characteristics of behaviour that are unique to humans, relative to other species. It also carries with it the notion of behaviour that is learned and taught, rather than instinctive. Developments in ETHNOLOGY have somewhat undermined this aspect as it has become clear that the learned/instinctive dichotomy in animal behaviour is invalid and that

other species share characteristics that were formerly thought to be uniquely human (such as tool-making). Another level is that of the human capacity to generate behaviour. Although specific behaviours may not be unique to humans, nonetheless the human mind's ability to generate an almost infinite flexibility of response through its symbolic and linguistic potential sets humans apart. Recent interpretations of culture stress the cognitive source of human behaviour. At another level is the view that such behaviour is deeply imbedded in social relations and other social characteristics. And finally, the outcome of these processes is the empirically observable phenomenon of human cultures – the separate identities of distinct human societies, characterized by specific cultural traditions.

The recognition of the diversity of human cultures and subcultures is a major conceptual step that has arisen out of the practice of social anthropology – the detailed study of specific societies (ethnography). Principal among the implications of studies of peoples in cultural units and contexts is the recognition that they are bound together not by genetic or biological identity but by social traditions, and that ETHNICITY is a major factor in relationships between people and societies.

Furthermore, culture is not just the accretion of social traditions, but is deeply enmeshed with the entire cognitive system such that a person's view of the world is constructed and constrained by cultural experience. Given the independence of cultural traditions this has enormous implications for the intercommunicability of concepts and values between societies.

Cultural relativism

The problem of translation across cultures has led in one direction to cultural relativism. In one sense this is an extreme reaction to the progressive notions of evolutionary approaches, which held that societies and cultures could be ranked from primitive to advanced. Cultural relativism has developed within social anthropology as a means of emphasizing both the difficulty of making comparisons between cultures and the absence of any independent criteria for making judgements about the relative merits of different social traditions. At its most extreme, cultural relativism espouses the view that a culture can only be considered within the context of its own cultural traditions and logic. At a practical level this has had important and positive

consequences for the way in which racial and ethnic problems have been considered, and has led also to a much deeper understanding of values, knowledge systems and cosmologies around the world. More negative effects have been the abandonment of the comparative approaches that underpin anthropology, a tendency towards historical particularism, and an ambiguity about the universality of human rights.

Unity of the human species

While social anthropology has rejected evolutionary approaches that are based on a progressive view of human society, a rather different trend can be found in biological anthropology. Recent work on the history of Darwinism have shown that while many of Darwin's followers were keen to see a progressive element, he himself was aware that this was not the case and that his strongly selectionist arguments (see NATURAL SELECTION) predicted adaptational diversity rather than unilinear change. Indeed, it was for that reason that most evolutionists in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century abandoned selection theory while maintaining an evolutionary perspective. However, Darwin's key evolutionary concept – descent with modification – did provide a simple solution to a major problem, that of monogenesis or polygenesis. The discovery of diverse peoples in the Americas and other parts of the world raised the question for pre-Darwinian scientists of whether these peoples all had a single origin or creation, or whether they were the product of several different acts of creation. Monogenesis implied a unity of all humans, polygenesis opened up the possibility that some human forms were not really part of the specifically human creation of biblical history. The establishment of the fact of evolution, regardless of the mechanism of change, meant that anthropologists were able to show that all humans are descended from a single common ancestor, and that all humans belong to a single species. Subsequent biological work showed the inter-fertility of all humans. Thus biological approaches to anthropology paved the way to the predominant view of this century that humankind is unified, united by a biological heritage that is far greater than any of the differences. The acceptance of the unity of the human species is now a fundamental consensus that forms the basis for many ideas that go beyond the strictly biological.

Human diversity

In the same way that social anthropologists have focused on the diversity of human cultural forms, so too have biological anthropologists looked at biological diversity. An implication of the tree-like structure of the evolutionary process when looking at humans was that human populations could be divided up into discrete units, representing either geographical isolates or evolutionary stages. The apparent diversity of humans, particularly in features such as skin colour and face shape, lent credence to this view, and became the basis for the analysis of human variation in terms of RACE. For most of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century race was the central concept in the study of human biological diversity. Most anthropologists took the view that human races represented ancient divisions within mankind, that they could be viewed also as stages of development, and that biological race was linked to the other social and cultural characteristics. Races provided both a horizontal (i.e. geographical) and a vertical (i.e. through time) categorization of humans. A principal aim was therefore to document this process historically through the study of archaeological and fossil samples. Furthermore race was also used as an explanation for the differences in patterns of development. In the early part of this century physical anthropology lent a biological foundation to more widespread ideas about race and an underpinning to theories of EUGENICS and NATIONAL SOCIALISM. Until World War II race was the central concept in the study of human biology from an anthropological and evolutionary perspective.

This situation was completely transformed after the war, and even before, biologists such as A. C. Haddon and Julian Huxley were highly critical. In recent anthropology, race has been completely rejected as a useful biological and analytical concept. Part of the reason for this was no doubt a reaction against the way in which biology had been used to justify political action. Equally important was the development of NEO-DARWINISM which showed that there was no biological basis for treating variation within a species either as evolutionary stages or as discrete categories. Moreover, the increasingly direct study of genetic rather than physical variation showed that the geographical variation was continuous and extremely complex, thus demonstrating that selective features such as pigmentation did not provide the criteria

for distinguishing races. As a result recent work in biological anthropology has shown that race is not a useful biological concept. Biological anthropologists turned instead to elucidating the functional and adaptive basis (disease, climate, ecology) of human variation.

Human evolution

The development of modern genetics has shown above all that the human species is an extremely young one, that all modern humans share a recent common ancestor, and therefore that any geographical patterns that can be seen do not signify deep divisions among humans but the recent and superficial product of migration and local adaptation. The contribution of anthropology to the ideas of this century thus do return to its original concerns with evolution, but with a rather different emphasis. Evolution does not show a ladder of progress but a source of diversity, and instead of tracing humans further and further back in time it emphasizes how young our species is, and thus the unity of human populations. Against this background, though, specialists in human evolution have also documented the antiquity (more than five million years) and complexity of the diverse lineages that have led to modern humans appearing in the last 100,000 years.

Modern anthropology

With the growth of anthropology during the twentieth century and the shift away from a programme of documenting historical patterns, anthropologists have turned to questions that range far more widely and have increasingly practical applications. Among social anthropologists there has been a greater focus on the links between cultural processes and economic, political and sociological ones, leading to an increasing emphasis on cultural aspects of cognition. Furthermore, the marked changes in the traditional societies that anthropologists have studied has led them to become deeply involved in the problems of their development and survival, and anthropology has contributed to a much greater awareness of the indivisible links between culture and other aspects of development. Equally, biological anthropologists have worked increasingly with the problems of disease and nutrition in the Third World, providing especially a greater understanding of the populational aspects

of the ecological problems that face vast portions of the human population.

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ROBERT A. FOLEY

anti-Semitism Originally a term popularized by political movements in Germany in the 1870s and 1880s which were campaigning for the reversal of the newly achieved social and political emancipation of the Jews, the term is, strictly speaking, inaccurate because it does not concern itself with opposition to 'Semites' but is confined to all forms of hostility to Jews. As such it has a long history going back to the pre-Christian era when Jewish monotheism and exclusiveness led to suspicion and mistrust. With the advent of Christianity, the Jews became a 'problem' in that their continued existence seemed to belie Christian concepts of a 'new covenant' and the rejection of the Jews by God. Throughout the history of Europe, as Christianity spread, Jews were segregated, forcibly converted or expelled. In the course of time they were also increasingly restricted to commercial and money-lending activities, which added the fear of the usurer to the already well-established images of deicide and other offences against Christianity. As the power of the 'Christian state' declined, the economic hostility to Jews became the greater concern and was, with the rise of German idealist philosophy, linked to the 'essence' (*Wesen*) of Judaism, which was said to be inimical to the interests of European states. It was but a short step from the concept of an 'essence' to the notion of the Jews as a 'race'. While Christian Wilhelm Dohm opened the debate (in 1781) on the emancipation of the Jews by arguing that their 'bad' characteristics were the result of persecution, his contemporaries took the view that it was more likely to be the other way round, that Jewish characteristics were the 'cause' of their persecution. Neither Dohm nor the phil-

osophers approved of the persecution of Jews, but their conceptualizations laid the foundations for a debate on, and for the most part against, the Jews, which focused on the *reasons* for hostility to Jews, thus elevating it into a rational issue. This led to the identification of different forms of anti-Semitism – social, economic, religious and racial, according to the perceptions of the initiators. All are united, however, on the basic foundations of anti-Semitism which propounds 'theories' of a Jewish quest for world domination and the collective guilt of the Jews.

The unrestrained expressions of hostility towards the Jews which marked the early decades of this century led to a deliberate or apathetic acceptance of the racial doctrines of NATIONAL SOCIALISM in Germany and culminated in the systematic destruction of six million Jews during World War II. The 'holocaust' was followed by a considerable reduction in 'Jew-baiting' but has been itself drawn into the debate about Jews by those who wish to minimize the extent of the crime or those who deny that it ever took place. The strongest issue of the post-war period, however, has been the emergence of the state of Israel and with it the 'anti-Zionist' lobby, which insists on a sharp division between anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism. Nevertheless, the real divide in the anti-Zionist camp, like that in the anti-Semitic camp, is between those who oppose the Jews and the state of Israel *per se* and those who object to specific acts and policies of some Jews and some Israeli politicians. The literature on anti-Semitism is extensive and continues to grow, with the holocaust and the state of Israel developing their own very substantial literatures. A useful starting point would be the bibliography in the *Encyclopedia Judaica* (1971, col. 160). For a detailed historical survey see Leon Poliakov (1965–85). A conceptual history is offered by Jacob Katz (1980) and a political analysis by Paul W. Massing (1967).

See also JUDAISM.

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JULIUS CARLEBACH

Archaeology and prehistory Both these disciplines – the study of the human past through its material remains, and the part of the subject concerned with the period before written records – are relatively recent. The term ‘archaeology’ came into use in the eighteenth century to describe the study of the material culture of the ancient world, especially that of Greece and Rome. It denoted a form of art-historical scholarship which was closely associated with connoisseurship and collecting, and largely dependent on the existence of textual evidence for explanation. The timescale of biblical chronology allowed little scope for an extended period before written records. Although Enlightenment philosophers discussed broader questions about the remote past, such as the origins of farming and civilization, they did so largely on the basis of comparative ethnography and without reference to archaeology. It was only with the Romantic movement that the remains of preliterate cultures came to be of interest in their own right, often in the context of nationalistic concerns for the origins of the northern European nations. The accumulation of material evidence allowed Scandinavian antiquarians to postulate a succession of technological stages characterized by the use of tools of stone, bronze and iron; although these ‘three ages’ were believed to be largely contemporary with the literate civilizations of the Mediterranean.

The scope of archaeology became evident in the later nineteenth century with the development of geology and the rejection of a biblical chronology, and the respectability of evolutionary ideas in biology (see EVOLUTION). The idea of prehistory is thus a relatively recent development, closely related to the growth of ANTHROPOLOGY. Classical archaeology continued as a largely separate discipline, although excavations in Greece and Turkey (at sites such as Mycenae and Troy, famous in ancient mythology) revealed the existence of Bronze Age predecessors to the classical civilizations there. The Stone Age was recognized to be a period of considerable length, corresponding to the earlier phases of human evolution during which humanity had been dependent on hunting (the Palaeolithic or Old Stone Age), and to the early stages of farming

(Neolithic or New Stone Age). Comparative ethnography could now be related to the material record, and the new subject was called (somewhat unhappily) ‘prehistory’, with equivalent terms in other European languages (*préhistoire*; *Vorgeschichte*). Its methods were potentially global in application, but the subject was dominated by European evidence.

The liberal scientific and evolutionary interpretation of early human history, however, gave way in the earlier twentieth century to a renewed nationalistic emphasis which was accompanied by a divorce of archaeological from anthropological thought. Prehistory (in Germany often termed *Urgeschichte*, to stress its continuity with historical peoples) was interpreted either in terms of the migrations of particular peoples, or the diffusion of culture from centres such as Egypt. Anthropology turned from historical reconstruction to firsthand observation and description, with an interest in functionalist interpretations. Although the archaeological exploration of other continents produced a wealth of new evidence, the study of each individual area tended to develop as an introverted specialism. One of the few archaeologists to maintain a broader view was the prehistorian V. Gordon Childe (1892–1957), whose studies of European and Near Eastern prehistory were motivated by a desire to escape from the nationalistic emphasis of much contemporary German scholarship through the exploration of Marxist models. He revived the nineteenth-century (and, indeed, Enlightenment) interest in the origins of farming and civilization, which he saw as economic revolutions comparable in importance with the Industrial Revolution, and termed the Neolithic and the Urban Revolution respectively. These ideas were expounded in two classic works, *Man Makes Himself* (in 1936) and *What Happened in History?* (in 1941), which were among the few books which succeeded in bringing archaeological evidence to the attention of social theorists outside the subject at this time.

Despite Childe’s political espousal of Marxism and his emphasis on historical materialism, his theories differed from those of contemporary British Marxist historians in their consensual rather than conflictual interpretation of these events. Childe saw a managerial role for early secular elites, with religion as a major force impeding technological progress. He combined a Hegelian vision of the successive roles of Oriental, classical and Western civilization with a diffusionist view of the history of

technology, to produce a sophisticated social model in which the innovations that produced early urban societies were stifled by political centralization there, but nevertheless provided the basis for further development in societies which acquired these techniques without paying the social cost. This model (which was influenced by more recent examples such as the industrialization of Japan) explained for him the unique characteristics of West European societies, and set the divergence of 'Western' from 'Oriental' culture back into the Bronze Age. Although many aspects of these ideas have a rather nineteenth-century flavour, they nevertheless marked a great advance on the inherently metaphysical explanations of national or racial genius which abounded in contemporary archaeological discourse; and they were a remarkable achievement by the subject's lone intellectual.

One factor inhibiting archaeology from exploiting the potential of its evidence to contribute to wider bodies of social theory was its marginal position in the universities. Most practitioners of the subject in the first half of the century were either attached to museums and bodies concerned with ancient monuments, or freelance excavators raising money for their expeditions. The expansion in higher education since World War II therefore had a major effect on the nature of archaeological discourse, which for the first time included a substantial methodological and theoretical component as well as excavation reports and discussions of primary material. Since the archaeology of those areas and periods where textual evidence was available was largely conducted from departments of history and classical or Oriental studies, the major impetus to comparative analysis came initially from prehistory, which was often (and in the United States almost entirely) conducted under the aegis of anthropology. The movement in the later 1960s which came to be known as the 'new archaeology' was thus largely a North American and British phenomenon, echoed in other parts of the English-speaking world and northern Europe, though conspicuously absent in Germany (and Japan) where intellectual adventurism was inhibited by wartime experience; and it was scarcely reflected for at least a decade in classical archaeology. Some similar innovations occurred in the USSR, although constrained by the changing needs of political orthodoxy; and comparable new thinking in France took a rather different form which was initially less sympathetic to the wider movement.

The new archaeology was characterized by an opening up of the subject to a broader range of interests from neighbouring disciplines, and an eagerness to participate in their debates. While it was associated with some important methodological advances (often from areas of new technology quite outside the subject, as with radiocarbon dating from nuclear physics), it tended to absorb and reproduce theories rather than generate its own; and it shared many of its enthusiasms with contemporary movements in history and economics – for instance its concern with ECOLOGY and DEMOGRAPHY. Computers and SYSTEM THEORY provided its *lingua franca*. Like Braudelian history (see ANNALES SCHOOL), it concentrated on process rather than event – hence its alternative name of processual archaeology. Avoiding the unique and the particular (and especially the production of 'pseudo-history'), it claimed that more rigorous – and especially quantitative – methods could reconstruct social as well as simply technological or stylistic information about prehistory. Among its methodological and conceptual innovations were the ideas of numerical taxonomy for the classification of artefacts, spatial sampling to reconstruct settlement patterns from field survey of surface scatters of material, the reconstruction of environment and diet from animal and plant remains, trade patterns from the identification of raw materials, and social structures from the different kinds of artefacts deposited in graves.

While each of these endeavours produced copious new information, its interpretation was often naive, and strongly constrained by the prevailing paradigms of neo-evolutionary anthropology which owed much to Herbert Spencer (1820–1903). Explanations typically stressed population pressure and agriculture intensification (echoing Esther Boserup's ideas in development economics), settlement colonization and expansion, economic specialization and the formation of social hierarchies, and the emergence of central places (echoing themes in the 'new geography' – see also HUMAN GEOGRAPHY). These common themes were found to underlie the emergence of farming and cities, and the general development of human societies worldwide – an evolutionary succession from bands to tribes, chiefdoms and states.

Despite their high technology, novel statistical sophistication and wealth of new information, these interpretations show a great similarity to the views of Enlightenment writers such as Adam Smith

(who knew no archaeology at all). In espousing a comparative model, based on the idea of evolution, such work produced a series of case studies which assumed an autonomy of local development and were insensitive to larger structures of the kind postulated by Gordon Childe. Diffusionism was effectively outlawed by this framework, since it was both hard to quantify and had no place in the paradigm. In this respect new archaeology resembled much of 1960s development economics; and during the 1970s such work was criticized in a way similar to that in which modernization theory was challenged by Marxist theories of underdevelopment and world-systems, associated with the names of Andre Gunder Frank and Immanuel Wallerstein (see DEVELOPMENT AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT). Although the concept of underdevelopment proved inapplicable to earlier contexts, the idea of core and periphery gave new life to the study of relationships between urban populations and their illiterate hinterlands, and especially to the asymmetrical trading relationships between them – for instance the Roman wine trade with their Celtic neighbours. The very concept of ‘prehistory’ was seen as misleading for the later metal ages, since ‘civilized’ and ‘barbarian’ societies formed parts of the same economic system. Chiefdoms, even tribes, might be contact phenomena rather than evolutionary stages.

More fundamentally, material culture itself came to be seen during the 1980s as important in its own right, rather than simply reflecting underlying ecological differences and abstract social structures. The desire to possess goods can be as powerful a motivation of change as population pressure or soil deterioration. The ‘prestige goods’ of European origin which circulated in sub-Saharan Africa were an active component of the power of native chiefs who monopolized their supply and used them to legitimate their authority. So, too, perhaps the intensification of agrarian production in later prehistoric Europe might have been stimulated by the availability of Mediterranean trade goods. Far from being benevolent providers or economic managers, chiefs could be seen as exploiters and monopolizers; and not just in contact situations, but in the genesis of crafts such as metallurgy which involve the supply of rare and costly materials. But if social structures are not abstract hierarchies, and instead consist in various kinds of illusions which minorities succeed in persuading their followers to accept, how is comparative study possible? Surely

each social ‘structure’ is unique, both in its relationships, symbols and materials? If interpretations are so volatile and contextually dependent, what certainty is possible? Do archaeological theories say more about the present than the past? In this way archaeology has tracked the cycle of the social sciences, from the confident comparativism and determinism of the 1960s to the relativism and deconstructed postmodernist introversion of the later 1980s (see MODERNISM AND POSTMODERNISM).

Such *angst* is by no means universal. All across the world, men and women sit in trenches recording stratigraphies and recovering artifacts and environmental evidence for laboratory examination, refining datings, noticing correlations, having ideas that help to make sense of what they find. Some of these ideas are new, some of them are old: classical archaeologists have now discovered central place theory, and are playing the games that prehistorians played in the 1960s. If there can be no final understanding of the present, there can certainly be none about the past; but we have yet to know less in one decade than we knew in the one before.

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aristocracy In its oldest sense, aristocracy denoted a political system. The ancient Greeks took the term to mean a regime where power and merit went together; this usage predominated in the West during two millennia. But at the time of the French revolution, aristocracy, and the new coining ‘aristocrat’, moved into the realm of social analysis (and polemic). Now the focus was on aristocracy as an elite within the community: an elite in which accumulations of wealth and political authority were concentrated, marked out by privilege, and passed on by hereditary transmission. These are the terms in which ‘aristocracy’ is now most likely to be invoked by social scientists or historians.

Study of a wide range of contexts and problems has led essentially to a more precise understanding

of these characteristic features of aristocracy. The *hereditary transmission* of aristocratic rank has rarely meant anything approaching the total exclusion of newcomers: not least because of the hazards of natural extinction. The scale and character of recruitment into aristocratic status may themselves provide insights into the values and material conditions of a society. In traditional societies, aristocratic *wealth* was likely to be based on a dominant share of landed resources, and Marxist analysts in particular have linked the transition from an agrarian economy to concomitant weakening of aristocratic power. But the source of wealth may have been less important than the leisure it afforded for the exercise of general pre-eminence in the community. There may indeed be circumstances where new forms of wealth creation proliferate so rapidly that a hereditary elite loses its capacity for decisive economic influence. Students of Europe's commercial or industrial development have nevertheless provided striking evidence for aristocratic adaptability alongside emerging business or manufacturing classes: an adaptability often eased by financial (and family) links between new wealth and old. In traditional societies, again, the *political* role of aristocracy made it more or less co-extensive with the ruling class, or at any rate the class from which civil and military leaders were more or less exclusively drawn. More complex and impersonal systems did something to displace this relationship between public authority and a hereditary ruling elite, with power increasingly exercised in the name of king, state or people. But here again aristocratic adaptation proved striking, and strikingly longlasting: whether as royal ministers, or parliamentary managers, or local bosses.

Some social scientists have seen elites in the contemporary world as displaying yet further stages in the evolution of these aristocratic characteristics: the *nomenklatura* of Eastern Europe, for instance, or the Bostonian notables of New England. Here power and family interests are certainly to be found in concentrated and revealing fashion: privilege flourishes. But the privilege of traditional aristocracies was defined and proclaimed in terms of a distinctive, often formally 'noble', status; and those claims were in some sense accorded recognition by the community at large. Where we can translate 'privilege' merely as 'advantage', there we might say aristocracy no longer exists.

See also ELITE THEORY; SOCIAL DIFFERENTIATION.

Reading

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JONATHAN POWIS

art, sociology of This attempts to understand the production and consumption of art as the effect, reflection or representation of a general social process. Without being a clearly defined discipline or having a unitary methodology, the sociology of art is best seen as either dispersed among or as the tool of a number of disciplines and areas of enquiry. These may include historical writing as well as art history, social anthropology or the study of subcultures, the historical and sociological study of social classes and groups, the SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE, linguistics and art criticism. Although such a linkage may be considered contentious (Wolff, 1981), the sociology and the history of art practised as a form of social history will here be grouped together. Indeed one of the undisputed pioneers of both, Pierre Francastel, did this in the 1940s. He also argued (Francastel, 1965, p. 16) that the subject in itself is characteristic of the modern period of self-conscious historicist thinking, and pleaded for it not to be developed as little more than a 'function of exhausted values'.

The expression 'sociology of art' articulates two terms with completely separate histories. If the word 'sociology' emerged in the last century as the name for various methods of enquiry into human society, 'art', on the contrary, has been in use since antiquity. Over this period it has denoted or qualified a range of phenomena from practical, conceptual or erotic skills to easel painting, from 'gallery art' to lifestyle. The modern, commonsense definition of 'art' as being painting, sculpture, print, etc. accepts art as being a non-artisanal form of production combining manual work with ethical and aesthetic value, and performed by a specially endowed kind of person (Wittkower and Wittkower, 1963).

This category 'art', as it is consolidated and reproduced through the practices of connoisseurship, curating and art history among others, functions retroactively. It groups together for sale, display or formal criticism materials from origins that are both temporally, geographically or socially disparate and discontinuous. Major national galleries or collections of the type configured in the last century or since, such as the Louvre in Paris, include under

the rubric of art many objects which were not recognized as such either at the time or in the place of their production. By implication, then, the sociology of art is liable to be dealing with an object of knowledge that needs constantly to be problematized in the light of a complex series of historical specificities. Such a sociology tends to be in principle opposed to accepting a Kantian ideal of art as the object of any disinterested and categorical aesthetic judgement, just as it is committed to explain rather than to agree the idea of artistic creativity and personality as transcending social conditions. Both must be seen as specific manifestations of the social, which is why, as Pierre Bourdieu (1980, p. 207) has put it, 'Sociology and art make a bad household.'

It is useful, then, to think in terms of a line of development that leads from Marx and Engels's (1845–6) reflections on the political economy of culture to Bourdieu's systematic critique of Kantian judgement, the feminist deconstruction of creativity as a historically gendered category, or the post-colonial rejection of 'Western' artistic values (Bourdieu, 1979; Nochlin, 1989; Pollock, 1988; Said, 1978; Tickner, 1988). An important aspect of the sociology of art has been its oppositional relationship to what it sees as conservative AESTHETICS, whether they be articulated through philosophical rationalism or the demands of the art market. Working from a complex and highly differentiated political terrain, sociology of art is committed to showing that 'art' as a category is always and in many ways overdetermined. At the same time it has continued to be concerned with or reserve the problem of the specificity of art and the questions that this presents for any totalizing explanation of art's meanings (Wolff, 1981; Francastel, 1965; Duvignaud, 1967; Raphael, 1968).

The fractured character of the subject is further emphasized if *art* is taken to include MUSIC and LITERATURE. Now the paradigmatic basis for the sociology of art is seen to be inseparable from the more general problematic of how to theorize the ensemble of modern cultural forms. Commentaries on and theories of modern cultural formation from the poet Charles Baudelaire in the nineteenth century to the writings of Kracauer (1937), Bloch (1985) and Adorno (1963) have focused on musical form as a model of artistic discourse. The work of Lukács (1970) and Goldmann (1967) has provided methods for the contextual framing and analysis of literature from which the sociology of art has de-

rived many of its basic principles. Thus an art historian like T. J. Clark (1973) who, in his influential work on Manet and Courbet, has put critical theory at the top of the art-historical agenda, draws on a theoretical field in which the visual arts have been largely marginal.

The conception of 'art' is also stratified by such notions as 'popular art', 'art for the people', 'traditional art' or 'ethnic art', not to mention 'political art' or 'women's art'. Understanding all or any of these and the relations between them may call for a variety of methods of enquiry that might combine ethnology, psychology or psychoanalysis with different aspects of sociological method. 'Art' as a ritual element in peasant labour, or of *longue durée* religious practices, in the work of social historians is a different object of analysis from the 'art' that forms the point of accession to or exclusion from social values in the group sociology of Bourdieu (1979) and Moulin (1967). Indeed it is difficult enough to conceive of a traditional art form such as the *ex-voto* (an image offered in gratitude) of the eighteenth century in France (Cousin, 1980) as belonging to the same cultural formation as its contemporary salon art let alone to think of it in the same terms as modern, avant-garde painting. Significantly, however, we must assume that the sociological study of any of these will treat aesthetic value as part of the system of beliefs that frame the individual work.

In the work of the social art historians Antal (1948) and Klingender (1968) understanding art has required a radical and subtle differentiation of public, patronage and conditions of production for different works or types of art. Antal's *Florentine Painting* and Klingender's *Art and the Industrial Revolution* suggest as much a new form of social history as a history of art – one in which art is to play a role as a signifier rather than as an illustration. The practices of art in fourteenth-century Florence or nineteenth-century Britain become primary evidence of processes of social formation and representation.

With Baxandall (1980), in his work on fifteenth-century German sculpture, even the author function comes to be seen as an effect of the complex and uneven conditions of production and the contention of interests between artist and patron to which they give rise. The sculptor signs the work to establish his position in an unequal relationship with a patron who owns the means of production. The signature signifies an attempted appropriation of

power rather than the locus of creativity. Baxandall's work thus suggests ways in which the theoretical propositions of Foucault (1969) can be rethought through a long-term historical process. Yet it also suggests that historical and sociological critique of the idea of the 'artist' requires a variety of carefully inflected techniques of enquiry. A fifteenth-century sculptor cannot be framed in the same terms as a late nineteenth-century 'mad genius' such as Vincent van Gogh. Even if both come to be framed within a modern system of beliefs about art, the specificities of their history, as of this system itself, need to be carefully differentiated.

It may also be argued that a broadly sociological concern with art precedes the emergence of the word sociology and the modern idea of the artist. This prehistory can be exemplified in the discussions of the French Royal Academy where, in the eighteenth century, it was common to explain the supremacy of ancient Greek art by the representation of Athens as a healthy and successful society. Academic arguments that had recourse to extra-aesthetic categories, such as climate, the coherence of social order and the wisdom of patronage, to explain and define artistic quality flourished alongside cultural relativism and materialism in Montesquieu or Diderot. At the end of the century the theocratic apologist Louis de Bonald was also able to suggest an explanation of artistic change that was in its turn appropriate to the justification of a need for social continuity (Reedy, 1986).

In the 1840s, when the idea of the individual, expressive artist was on its way to becoming current, single works of art came to be read as socially symptomatic, whether redemptive or critical. Proudhon, with his *Du Principe de l'art et de sa destination sociale* (1865), was pre-eminent in constructing a history of modern art in which his interpretation of the work of artists such as Jacques-Louis David and Gustave Courbet articulated a general political and social theory. By the mid-century in both France and England one can commonly read histories of art, art criticism or essays on folk art, as well as discussions about industrial progress or Universal Exhibitions, that deploy some system of social reference in understanding art as a sign of its times. It is arguable that a concept of art as inherently social was, in effect, thoroughly diffused by the 1850s. As Thoré-Burger put it in his review of the Parisian Salon of 1855, 'Do not the arts themselves represent the historical traditions, the real life of the peoples?'

However it should be emphasized that many texts which explain art in broadly sociological terms do not have the elaboration of a sociology of art as a primary or even as a conscious objective. Thus the work of Champfleury (1869) on French folk art or of Wagner (1849) on the origins of artistic feeling and expression are focused around the problem of defining a national CULTURE. A preoccupation with art as part of the formation of national consciousness emerges once again on both sides of the political camp in the 1920s and 1930s. In Italy Gramsci (1985) understood the popular consumption of detective comics and opera as indicating a weakness in proletarian class formation, while in Germany the idea of modern art as a symptom of decadence was elaborated. At any point in its development the sociology of art is overdetermined by a variety of discourses on the sociability of art.

A potentially systematic sociology of art is generally understood to emerge in the writing of Marx and Engels and with Hyppolite Taine's histories of art and literature. While Taine became notorious for his deterministic formula 'environment, race and moment' (Taine, 1853), with its echoes of the previous century, its influence in professional sociology or in social history has been less significant than that of Marxism. In the *German Ideology* Marx and Engels attempt to explain the power and significance of a Renaissance artist such as Raphael in terms of a complex historical process which alone made his painting possible:

Raphael as much as any other artist was determined by the technical advances in art made before him, by the organisation of society and the division of labour in his locality, and, finally, by the division of labour in all the countries with which his locality had intercourse.

Marx and Engels were here arguing against the idea of a 'unique' individual as propounded by Max Stirner, but in so doing they begin to map out a frame of reference made up of social and economic relations that form part of the conceptual structures of the sociology of art up to our own time.

They also attempt to define art as specific to its mode of production, pointing to the sales pitch of the capitalist press of the 1830s and 1840s as the condition for the emergence of the serial novel. In *Theories of Surplus Value*, where this discussion is developed, they laid out two further lasting parameters. One of these is the concern with the artist as a

particular type of worker who is essentially an 'un-productive labourer'. The other is the preoccupation with the 'commodification' of art itself and its conversion by capitalism from its previous historical statuses into no more than an item of exchange value, whether this notion is construed as monetary or ideological (Marx and Engels, 1976). Here again is a starting point for discussions on the relation of art and society as distinct as those of György Lukács, Theodor Adorno, Walter Benjamin or Pierre Bourdieu. The sociology of art may turn out to be at the centre of twentieth-century Marxism. But the concept of alienation will fuel both Benjamin's willingness to accept the popular and Adorno's definition of art as necessarily the negation of the social forces that produce it.

Recently, in the writing of Jacques Rancière, Adorno's negativity has been used to revalue the Kantian aesthetic. If the transcendent and the negative can be read through each other, then the desire for art must be understood in terms of the negation of the social structure (Rancière, 1983). From this point of view, Bourdieu's elaboration of the production and consumption of art as the confirmation and reproduction of social status turns out to be a wholly inadequate framing of the complexities of social identity, the sociology of art a hollow enterprise. Analogously both feminist and post-colonial discourses frame the social in such a way as to suggest that much of what has been taken as adequate sociology, and by implication, sociology of art, needs to be radically rethought. The construction of art as either a form of domination or as a means of accession to social value is polymorphous and inexhaustible, ever constrained and continuously reworked in historically specific conditions.

In his essay of 1923, 'On the interpretation of *Weltanschauung*', Karl Mannheim presciently outlined these problematics in a sociology of culture (in Mannheim, 1952). Rejecting a reductive procedure of cultural analysis derived from the model of natural science, he tried to demonstrate how an understanding of the 'objective', 'expressive' and 'documentary' meanings of a cultural object would lead to a complex mapping of the parallel, but not necessarily causal, relations of a sociocultural totality. Arguably the flow and interweaving of methods in Mannheim's disclosure of a cultural whole requires the same kinds of skill as do the iconological analyses of the Warburg school of Art History. The study of a painting by Botticelli

(Wind, 1958), for example, calls for a knowledge of the sociability of different levels of culture from banal and everyday phenomena to humanist commentaries on classical texts. The exceptional artwork becomes one point at which disparate forms of knowledge and cultural practice find a relatively total articulation.

But despite the value of approaches that either deduce the meaning of a work of art from social data or induce the fabric of the social from the reading of the artwork, the notion of cultural objects as expressive of totality or as 'total social facts' has fallen into disrepute. The work of art may belong to any one or more than one of a series of knowledges. Thus the construction of the public for a painting may be as one of the psychoanalytic category of voyeur, implicated in the modes of scopophilia, without a primary regard for social stratification. Or it may be as a social group with access to the art market and an eye to figuring its own prestige through purchase. Two contemporaneous paintings may share a position in a commonly accepted, historical language of visual signs and yet belong to quite different sites in the development of art education and the systems of production and distribution. Art criticism may as well be read in terms of its relation to literary and political discourse as in terms of its declared object of attention. The future development and configuration of the social history and sociology of art alike will necessarily depend on the recognition of this diversity as of the problems that it presents. To be truly fruitful, interdisciplinary work may well have to accept that difference is more structuring than totality.

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ADRIAN D. RIFKIN

artificial intelligence The term describes what is shown by a machine when it emulates cognitively sophisticated human performances. Mechanical calculators (beginning with the 'calculating clocks' of the seventeenth century) and even mechanical robots of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries could be seen as early vehicles, but it is in the programming of computers in the twentieth century that artificial intelligence began to be identified as a field of study (Pratt, 1987).

The term came into currency following its use in the title of a conference convened in 1956 at Dartmouth College, New Hampshire, by John McCarthy (MacCorduck, 1979). It served to define a collection of projects which attempted to exploit the potential of the electronic computer, which had been born in World War II and, in the early 1950s, was emerging into the civilian world.

Leading projects at that time included attempts to get the machines to play draughts and chess, to solve geometry and logic problems, to recognize patterns and to 'understand' ordinary English (Feigenbaum and Feldman, 1963). These reflected two types of interest which came together in the formation of the new field, and which have persisted to the present day. One is an interest in human psychological processes, the other in getting the machine to do ever more sophisticated (and therefore to human users, more convenient) things. Some of the earliest Artificial Intelligence (AI) programs, for example ones that generated proofs in logic, were devised as a way of studying human decision-making. Others, programs playing chess and draughts particularly, were conceived as studies in learning. Latterly, the perspective that looks on the brain as an 'information processor' has created *cognitive psychology* (not so much a new branch of an old subject as a proposal to replace it), and from this point of view trying to achieve emulation of human behaviour or performance by programming the machine is a powerful research technique (Anderson, 1980).

Pattern recognition studies began with the other motivation – with programmers wanting to equip their machine with the capacity to read typescript, so that programs could be fed into it using that medium. They discovered that, for example, a letter of the alphabet is not to be defined by a coordinate-definable configuration of dots, but that an indefinite number of such configurations can be identified by the human eye as the *same* letter; what the computer had to be got to pick out

was the *pattern* the different configurations all fall under. This particular project has since come to fruition (in optical character-recognition devices of great human significance), but the problem of pattern recognition in a variety of other domains remains significant and taxing (Fischler and Firschein, 1987).

The project of teaching the computer English (that is, natural language) similarly began its long and as yet uncrowned career as an attempt to make the machine more user friendly to the programmer. It is one that has gained in perceived significance even as its difficulty has been borne in upon those who have worked at it (Allen, 1987; Gazdar and Mellish, 1989). There is a view that visual perception is mediated through the concepts of natural language, and it is also quite possible that knowledge is articulated and memorized using linguistic structures (Winograd, 1983).

To a striking degree most of these foundation projects have continued to absorb interest and defy complete solution. New ones have also been embraced. During the second decade of AI's existence great attention was focused on robots, with the attempt to equip mechanical devices with refined motor controls and with the ability to use visual data obtained from the surroundings to enable them to move about or manipulate objects or both. This work issued in the automated assembly lines that have now become commonplace (Engelberger, 1980).

Latterly, the great preoccupation of AI has been with understanding how human knowledge might be stored in the machine, in such a form as to make that knowledge, and any implications it might have for the solution of everyday problems, easily accessible. This is the effort to construct 'expert systems' which would take the place of or at least assist human experts of various kinds (teachers, solicitors, financial consultants).

The future will probably see a developing revival of interest in the learning potential of 'nerve nets', a plurality of processors linked multiply together (Hinton and Anderson, 1981). Breaking with the structure that has become the norm for a computer, which funnels all the action through a single processor, the 'nerve-net' alternative attempts to get closer to the structure of organic nervous tissue (an idea pursued without success by a forerunner of AI, cybernetics, in the 1950s). The present hope is that the new structures may be got to provide guidance as to the future behaviour of complex systems, not

by working out the various laws which together govern it but by getting the net to pick up the pattern of past behaviour and project it into the future. 'Connection science' is sometimes used as a label for this perspective (Rumelhart et al., 1986; Zeidenberg, 1989).

The notion of a 'heuristic', originally applied in the realm of seeking mathematical proofs, is one important idea that has been developed in the course of a number of AI projects. Solutions to certain problems can be discovered in principle by going through a finite list of possibilities. For example, in a game like chess there are at any point a finite number of moves open to a player, and moreover each possible sequence of moves will issue at some point in one of three endings: a win for one or other of the two players, or a draw. One approach theoretically therefore would be to work through a complete set of 'what if' conjectures. Unfortunately (or fortunately – chess is a nice game), even a machine taking no more than a millionth of a second to calculate each possible position in a 40-move game, would require 10^{95} years to work out a first move (Shannon, 1954).

Needed for a practical chess-playing program are ways of improving on the systematic but blind generation of candidate moves, ways of ruling out without consideration unlikely possibilities if not of positively picking out likely ones. One might, for example, ignore all moves to unprotected squares. The merit of generating all possibilities systematically is that if you carry on long enough, you cover them all. It is this merit that such short-cuts, or 'heuristics', sacrifice: in place of certainty in the long run you have something less than certainty within a more acceptable timespan.

Even with the help of heuristics, AI problem-solving frequently involves checking through large numbers of possibilities, and has thus highlighted the need to store information in such a way as to maximize the efficiency of searching through it. A branching 'tree' structure has been one influential outcome here. Another technique, not exactly new with AI, but receiving in AI work the precise articulation that programming demands, is to resolve the problem that has to be solved into component simpler problems, and those problems into even simpler ones – and so on until a level is reached where solutions can be found (Newell and Simon, 1972).

AI has also given, particularly in its early years, substantial sponsorship to the idea that concepts

and propositions are to be treated as lists of symbols, the members of which could be got at and manipulated. A computer language, LISP (LIST Processor) was invented to facilitate the carrying out of such processes on the machine, and has turned out to be so generally useful for the projects pursued by the AI community that the use of it almost serves to define the field (McCarthy, 1963).

From the earliest days AI workers have seen the relevance of LOGIC to their concerns. Being able to reason seems to be an aspect of possessing intelligence, and one way of thinking of logic is as the attempt to articulate the rules of valid reasoning, the rules which allow us to conclude, from a list of things we know to be established, that certain other things must also be true. If the machine could be got to manipulate propositions according to these rules (supposing we knew what they were) it would not only eliminate the role of the human logician and mathematician (for their occupation is showing that such and such a proposition can be proved) but represent a considerable aid in all kinds of human endeavour where reasoning from established knowledge plays a part.

For a certain type of reasoning, as a result of the labours of logicians down the centuries, the rules have been worked out (Prior, 1962). They are straightforward to represent on the computer, and so representing them was one of AI's earliest projects. Applied to the particular domain of medical expertise, for example, the computer implementation of this part of logic yielded a program which offered a diagnosis of medical conditions. Medical knowledge is incorporated into the program in the form of rules which express the known links between symptoms and possible illnesses. The patient is prompted to add in the symptoms they are actually suffering from and the program then uses the rules of logic it has been given to work out what diagnosis is implied (Shortliffe, 1976).

Systems of this kind are not without practical value, though the fact that they can emulate only a restricted type of reasoning is a severe limitation. It is the type formulated in what is known as the *propositional calculus*, and the limitation is that it cannot represent reasoning that hangs on the *internal structure* of propositions. For example, the propositional calculus treats the doctor's reasoning 'If Tom has a high temperature, he must be ill' as having the form 'If p then q', where p stands for the proposition 'Tom has a high temperature' and q for 'he must be ill'. But a great deal of reasoning does

hang on the internal structure of propositions (for example: 'If every number has a successor, then there is no number such that it is larger than every other number').

Logicians have, however, been successful with these other types of reasoning too, inspired by the work of Gottlob Frege towards the end of the nineteenth century, developing what is known as the *predicate calculus* (Kneale and Kneale, 1962). For reasons uncovered in famous mathematical work by Kurt Gödel and others (Davis, 1965), there can be no certainty in advance that a mechanical representation of the predicate calculus will issue in a determination of every legitimate enquiry put to it. In completing, the machine is giving the answer 'Yes' to the enquiry put (essentially, does such and such a proposition of the predicate calculus follow from the information available?). But *before* it has completed the user doesn't know whether this is because the answer is 'No', or because the answer will never be determined. This creates an unwelcome degree of uncertainty, but ways of coping with the limitation have been devised which leave predicate calculus machines nevertheless with a good deal of utilitarian potential (Shepherdson, 1983).

One fruit of this work has been the construction of a computer language called PROLOG (from 'programming in logic') which applies the rules of the predicate calculus to work out what propositions follow from the facts put into the system, considered in conjunction with the 'knowledge base' it has previously been provided with (Kowalski, 1979).

Another has been the construction of a new generation of expert system programs, the promise of which at the present time still however outstrips accomplishment.

See also COGNITIVE SCIENCE.

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VERNON PRATT

Asian values 'Asian values' is an expression that straddles two meanings. On the one hand, it denotes a subset of human values in general, purportedly discerned by anthropologists during close ethnographic encounters or identified by sociologists and economists investigating the Asian path to modernization. In this context, 'Asian values' aspires to be a scientific concept seeking to explain Asian cultural and economic exceptionalism. Typically, debate turns on how Asian values are especially conducive to consistently high rates of economic growth, an argument that inverts earlier claims that, for instance, Confucianism was a stubborn cultural obstacle to modern capitalism. On the other hand, and in recent times most prominently, 'Asian values' is inseparable from the highly charged, polemical set of assertions of some Asian leaders designed to deflect criticisms of their human rights record and to affirm, with various degrees of triumphalism, that Asian societies are better – more ethical, cohesive and disciplined – than their decadent counterparts in the West.

The term 'Asian values' gained particular salience in the 1980s and 1990s to highlight the success of the Asian 'Tiger' economies (Singapore, Malaysia, Taiwan, Hong Kong and South Korea) in promoting high rates of economic growth and development. In good measure, however, the term was defensive. Spearheaded by two very different personalities – Lee Kuan Yew, Singapore's elder statesman, and Mahathir bin Mohamad, the prime minister of Malaysia – 'Asian values' was a way of turning the tables on critics of authoritarian Asian regimes. For Lee and Mahathir, espousing a kind of Orientalism in reverse, Asian values do not simply explain the Tigers' post-war economic success but are also evidence of a superior mode of society (Mallet, 1999). The Asian cultural valorization of hard work, discipline and thrift; the commitment to family and community; the willingness to defer to authority and to prioritize duties over rights; all of these 'values' are contrasted invidiously with the high levels of crime, divorce, one-parent families, drug abuse and – the source – rampant individualism typical of Western societies (of which the United States is the archetype).

Since the Asian financial meltdown of 1997, and the continuing, if mitigated, travails of south-east Asian and Pacific Rim economies, 'Asian values' are flaunted less confidently than hitherto. But the concept was always problematic and not only for the obvious reason that it excluded the Indian sub-continent from its purview. A key objection to it is that it caricatures a region notable for its rich religious (Buddhist, Taoist, Hindu, Shintô, Christian) diversity; its heterogeneous political systems – democratic (Taiwan), semi-democratic (Hong Kong), state socialist (e.g. PRC), junta centred (Burma) etc; varying stages of development (Schwenker, 1998); and interethnic rivalries: for instance, between Chinese, phenomenally successful in business, and ethnic Malaysians and Indonesians (Landes, 1999, pp. 475–80). Other objections centre on the argument that East and West have been far more porous entities, historically, than is often imagined (Goody, 1996); that Asian societies have strong traditions of tolerance and religious scepticism (Sen, 1999); and that there is something racist in the implication that a 'real' Asian could not be a supporter of individual freedom and democratic governance.

Is the concept of 'Asian values', then, a simple fraud, code for institutionalized cronyism, lack of transparency, corruption, authoritarian government and rubber bullets? The real situation is more complex. Although internationalization ('GLOBALIZATION') increasingly breaks down cultural boundaries, the societies of Asia are still very distinctive from Western societies and from each other. The nuclear family, for instance, is more stable in Korea and Japan than it is in America; crime rates are also much lower (Fukuyama, 1999, pp. 130–9). Few peoples in the world, Asian peoples included, work harder than the Chinese of the diaspora. In short, cultural distinctiveness, peculiar habits and mores remain strong in Asia. The point is to recognize and explain these factors while avoiding the simplifications of politicians for whom, in Warren Christopher's bracing phrase, cultural relativism is the last bastion of repression (Patten, 1998, p. 150.)

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PETER BAEHR

Austrian economics The label connotes both a distinct mode of economic reasoning and a research agenda. During the 1970s and 1980s Austrian economics came to the fore as one among several contending streams of economic thought suspicious of mainstream economics (see POST-KEYNESIANISM). It is called 'Austrian' because it traces its pedigree to the original triumvirate of Carl Menger (1840–1921), Eugen Böhm von Bawerk (1851–1914) and Friedrich von Wieser (1851–1926), who taught in the University of Vienna during the twilight of the Habsburg Empire.

The Austrian, or Viennese, school constituted one important strand – along with the English (Marshallian) and Lausanne (Walrasian) traditions – of what became subsequently known as NEOCLASSICAL (as opposed to classical political economy) or MARGINALIST ECONOMICS. While in broad agreement with these other streams of thought with respect to general outlook, theorists in the Austrian tradition distinguished themselves from the outset by a more relentless elaboration of the subjectivist turn in economics. The Austrian theory of value is a case in point: in contrast to classical notions, value was not deemed to be measurable in an intersubjectively valid way on the analogy of the length of a table; it did not turn on some material property intrinsic to goods, rather it was seen to be at the heart of a relationship obtaining between appraising decision makers and the objects of their appraisal. Conceiving of value as a subjectivist concept paved the way for a redirection in the focus of economics. In line with a general shift away from problems of production and technology, i. e. wealth creation, to issues of consumption and demand, the choosing, economizing agent began to occupy centre stage in economic analysis. The move entailed a concern with (a) individual decision processes enveloped in the vagaries of time and ignorance; and (b) linking those decisions up with an explanation of the emergence of the complex web of interconnected exchange relationships constituting the market order.

The identity of the Austrian contribution came into sharper focus as a result of several fierce controversies: with the German historical school in the

so-called *METHODENSTREIT*; with the theorists of *AUSTRO-MARKISM*; in the debate with the champions of market socialism over the possibility or impossibility of efficient economic calculation under socialism (see *SOCIALIST CALCULATION*); and with the adherents of the new *KEYNESIANISM*.

By the late 1940s the intellectual and political ascendancy of the Keynesian revolution, in particular, had discredited Austrian economics to such an extent that it seemed as if it had become a closed chapter in the history of economic thought. Apart from Ludwig von Mises (1881–1973) and his students Israel Kirzner (born 1930) and Murray Rothbard (1926–95) in the United States, and Ludwig M. Lachmann (1906–90) in South Africa there was hardly anyone during the 1950s and 1960s – F. A. Hayek (1899–1992) had by then abandoned economic theory for social and legal philosophy – who espoused an explicitly Austrian position. The situation changed drastically, however, when the widely felt dissatisfaction with the drift of post-war economics which had begun to assert itself in the late 1960s and early 1970s encouraged a lot of soul-searching among economists and the resurgence of once discredited ideas, tendencies and traditions. The revival of Austrian economics, spurred by the joint award to F. A. Hayek of the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Science in 1974, began gradually as a diminutive genre in the United States (with the Austrian Economics Programme under Israel Kirzner’s aegis at New York University playing a pivotal role); it then spread to Britain (with think-tanks such as the Institute of Economic Affairs acting as a catalyst) and parts of the Continent, and even to South America. During the 1990s it was in the intellectual vanguard of the Czech and Polish economic reform movements.

There is an overriding research agenda that informs Austrian contributions to economics and that can be phrased in two questions: first, what are the institutions most conducive to the dissemination of dispersed knowledge in a disequilibrium economy? And, second, what are the conditions most hospitable to the generation of new knowledge? Such issues of economy-wide coordination can be traced back to classical roots.

At the level of the individual agent, Austrian economics may be viewed (see O’Driscoll and Rizzo, 1996) as a way of coping with the problems posed by historical, novelty-bearing time (i.e. time

that cannot be spatialized) and structural, ineradicable (‘utter’) ignorance (i.e. ignorance that cannot be removed by buying oneself out of it). While agents are not seen as being mesmerized by – in J. M. Keynes’s memorable locution – ‘the dark forces of time and ignorance’, there is no reason to assume that the problems posed by time and ignorance will somehow go away or that they can successfully be evaded. Thus Austrian economics occupies a middle ground, giving due weight to the knowledgeability and competence of agents in their daily dealings and goings-about, while at the same time insisting on the inherent limits to their knowledgeability. And it is this middle-range predicament which provides the background for entrepreneurial processes and market institutions to unfold. The focus of Austrian investigations is on the nature of entrepreneurially driven, rivalrous market processes rather than on the contemplation and comparison of equilibrium states. It is in this sense that ‘Austrian’ has rightly become synonymous with ‘market-process’ economics and with an emphasis on the discovery aspects of markets (see *COMPETITION* and *ENTREPRENEURSHIP*). Writers in the Austrian tradition set great store by a theory of the emergence of social institutions as spontaneously evolved, undesigned outcomes of individual pursuits guided by general, abstract rules, and not by ‘the common good’.

Given the humble base from which Austrian economics started in the early 1970s, its success – epitomized by the number of students attracted, study programmes and publications, seminars and conferences – has been nothing short of phenomenal. While it would be a gross exaggeration to claim that it has taken mainstream economics by storm, there is a growing sense that it occupies a precious ecological niche. The *samizdat* years are definitely over for Austrian economics. Nagging questions of self-identity can be put behind: Austrian economics at the turn of the millennium presents itself as a self-confident subset in the academy. It has entered a new stage in its evolution, an age of probation, as it were, and the question is no longer ‘Where do we come from?’, but rather ‘Where do we go from here?’. Again, history comes as a reliable ally. Given its historic research agenda, Austrian economics seems exceptionally well placed to respond to the intellectual challenge posed by the ubiquitous touting of the ‘knowledge society’.

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STEPHAN SOEHM

Austro-Marxism One of the earliest distinct schools of Marxist thought, which developed from the work of a group of thinkers in Vienna at the end of the nineteenth century, the most prominent among them being Max Adler, Otto Bauer, Rudolf Hilferding and Karl Renner. This new form of MARXISM, according to Bauer (1927), was a response to new philosophical doctrines (neo-Kantianism and positivism), to developments in economic theory (Austrian marginalism) and to the issues raised by the problem of nationalities in the multinational Habsburg Empire; but it was also influenced by the revisionist controversy in Germany (see REVISIONISM) and by the remarkable flowering of Viennese cultural and intellectual life at the turn of the century, as a result of which it was innovative in many different fields.

The first public manifestation of a new school of thought was the creation in 1904 of the *Marx-Studien*, a collection of monographs edited by Adler and Hilferding and published irregularly until 1923, and this was followed by the publication, from 1907, of a theoretical journal, *Der Kampf*, which soon came to rival Kautsky's *Die Neue Zeit* as the leading European Marxist review. The Austro-Marxists were all active in the leadership of the growing Social Democratic Party (SPÖ), and they devoted themselves particularly to the promotion of workers' education.

The philosophical and theoretical foundations of Austro-Marxism were developed mainly by Adler, who conceived Marxism as 'a system of sociological knowledge . . . the science of the laws of social life and its causal development' (1925, p. 136). In his first major work (1904) he analysed the relation

between causality and teleology, emphasizing that there are diverse forms of causality and that the causal relation in social life is not a mechanical one, but is mediated by consciousness; this was a view which he later expressed by saying that even 'economic phenomena themselves are never "material" in the materialist sense, but have precisely a "mental" character' (1930, p. 118). Adler regarded as the basic concept in Marx's theory of society, 'socialized humanity' or 'social association', and treated this in neo-Kantian fashion as being 'transcendentally given as a category of knowledge' (1925), that is, as a concept furnished by reason, not derived from experience, which is a precondition of an empirical science.

This conception of Marxism as a sociological system provided the framework of ideas which directed the studies of the whole Austro-Marxist school, as is particularly clear in Hilferding's economic analyses. In his criticism of marginalist economic theory (1904) Hilferding opposed to the individualist 'psychological school of political economy' Marx's theory of value, which is based on a conception of 'society' and 'social relations', while the Marxist theory as a whole 'aims to disclose the social determinism of economic phenomena', its starting point being 'society and not the individual'. Elsewhere, in the preface to *Finance Capital* (1910), he referred directly to Adler in asserting that 'the sole aim of any [Marxist] enquiry – even into matters of policy – is the discovery of causal relationships', and went on to investigate the major causal factors in the most recent stage of capitalist development, concluding with an analysis of imperialism which was the basis of later studies by Bukharin and Lenin.

Another major field for sociological investigation was that of nationality and nationalism. Bauer's classic study (1907) set out to provide a comprehensive theoretical and historical analysis, from which he concluded:

For me, history no longer reflects the struggles of nations; instead the nation itself appears as the reflection of historical struggles. For the nation is only manifested in the national character, in the nationality of the individual . . . [which] . . . is only one aspect of his determination by the history of society, by the development of the conditions and techniques of labour.

From a different perspective, concentrating on the legal and constitutional problems of the different

nationalities in the Habsburg Empire, Renner (1899, 1902) also contributed important studies, in the course of which he advanced the idea – original in its time and not without relevance to the present development of Europe – of a transformation of the empire into a ‘state of nationalities’ which might become a model for the socialist organization of a future world community.

Renner is best known, however, for his pioneering contribution to a Marxist sociology of law. In his study (1904) of the social functions of law he set out to show how the existing legal norms change their functions in response to changes in society and more particularly to changes in its economic structure, and then raised as major problems for a sociology of law questions about how the legal norms themselves change and the fundamental causes of such changes. In this discussion, as in other writings, it is clear that Renner attributes an active role to law in maintaining or modifying social relations and by no means treats it simply as an ideology reflecting economic conditions, citing as consonant with this view Marx’s comments on law in the introduction to the *Grundrisse*. Another important contribution to formulating the principles of a Marxist sociology of law was made by Adler (1922) who, in the course of his critique of Hans Kelsen’s ‘pure theory of law’, which excludes any enquiry into either the ethical basis of law or its social context, examined in detail the differences between a formal and a sociological theory of law.

The Austro-Marxists also undertook major studies in other fields. They were among the first Marxists to examine systematically the increasing involvement in the economy of the ‘interventionist state’. Renner (1916), writing on the effects of pre-war capitalist development and the ‘war economy’, noted ‘the penetration of the private economy down to its elementary cells by the state: not the nationalization of a few factories, but the control of the whole private sector of the economy by willed and conscious regulation’, and he continued: ‘state power and the economy begin to merge . . . the national economy is perceived as a means of state power, state power as a means to strengthen the national economy . . . It is the epoch of imperialism.’ Similarly, in essays published between 1915 and 1924, Hilferding developed, on the basis of his analysis in *Finance Capital*, a theory of ‘organized capitalism’ in which the action of the state begins to assume the character of a conscious, rational structuring of society as a whole (see SOCIALIZATION OF

THE ECONOMY). From this situation two lines of development were possible: towards socialism if the working class were to gain state power, or towards a corporate state if the capitalist monopolies maintained their political dominance. In Italy and Germany the latter possibility was realized in the form of FASCISM, and Bauer (1936) provided one of the most systematic Marxist accounts of the economic and social conditions in which the fascist movements were able to emerge and triumph. Subsequently, Hilferding (1941) began a radical revision of the Marxist theory of history, in which he attributed to the modern nation state a more independent role in the formation of society, arguing that in the twentieth century there had been a profound ‘change in the relation of the state to society, brought about by the subordination of the economy to the coercive power of the state’, and that ‘the state becomes a totalitarian state to the extent that this subordination takes place’ (see TOTALITARIANISM).

The changing class structure, and its political consequences, were other subjects to which the Austro-Marxists devoted much attention. Bauer made an important contribution in his comparative account of the situation of workers and peasants in the Russian and German revolutions, in his detailed analysis (1923) of the Austrian revolution, and in his critical writings on the emergence of a new dominant class in the USSR as the dictatorship of the proletariat was transformed into the dictatorship of an all-powerful party apparatus (see especially Bauer, 1936). Adler (1933), writing in the context of the defeat and destruction of the working-class movement in Germany, analysed the changes in the composition of the working class in capitalist society; while noting that ‘already in Marx’s work the concept of the proletariat displays a certain differentiation’, he argued that more recent changes had been so extensive as to produce a ‘new phenomenon’, so that ‘it is doubtful whether we can speak of a single class’. In this new proletariat there were several distinct strata which had given rise to three basic, often conflicting, political orientations: that of the labour aristocracy, comprising skilled workers and office employees; that of the organized workers in town and country; and that of the permanent or long-term unemployed. But even among the main body of workers, he argued (in a manner reminiscent of Roberto Michels’s account of OLIGARCHY), the development of party and trade union organizations had created a fatal division between

the growing stratum of salaried officials and representatives, and the largely passive membership. The weakness of the working class in the face of fascist movements was largely due, he concluded, to this differentiation of socioeconomic conditions and political attitudes (see WORKING CLASS). After World War II, as the class structure continued to change even more rapidly, Renner (1953) focused his attention on the growth of new social strata – public officials and private employees – which he referred to collectively as a ‘service class’ of salaried employees whose contracts of employment did not create ‘a relationship of wage labour’. Many Marxists, he considered, had adopted a superficial approach to ‘the real study of class formation in society, and above all the continuous restructuring of the classes’. In particular, they had failed to recognize that ‘the working class as it appears (and scientifically was bound to appear) in Marx’s *Capital* no longer exists’.

The ‘golden age’ of Austro-Marxism was the period from the end of the nineteenth century to 1914, when the seminal writings of these thinkers were published and the work of the school as a whole had a wide influence in the European socialist movement. After the Russian revolution, however, it was overshadowed first by Leninist and then by Stalinist versions of Marxism; the course it followed, ‘between reformism and Bolshevism’, in expounding an undogmatic Marxism open to revision and development in response to new historical experience and to critical questions posed by other approaches to social analysis had little international influence. But in Vienna, where the SPÖ was continuously in power from 1918 to 1934, Austro-Marxism still provided a coherent framework of ideas for an ambitious and effective policy of social reform, until it was finally overwhelmed by the rise of Austrian fascism and the incorporation of Austria into the Third Reich. Since the late 1960s there has been a notable renewal of interest in the Austro-Marxists, not only in Austria where their ideas still have a significant influence on the development of socialism, but in other European countries. In the conditions created by the disintegration of ‘official Marxism’ throughout Eastern Europe, it may be that these ideas, and further elaborations of them, will have an even greater impact on the organization of the economy, the construction of democratic institutions, and attitudes to the persisting problem of nationalities, in a new European system.

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TOM BOTTOMORE

authority Although authority can conveniently be defined as the right, most often by mutual recognition, to require and receive submission, there is endemic disagreement among social theorists about its nature. This is not surprising, since different conceptions of authority tend to reflect different social and political theories and worldviews. However, the various conceptions of authority seem to have two components in common. One is the non-exercise of private judgement; the other is the identification of the authorities to be recognized.

This leads to some useful distinctions. If somebody submits to the judgement of authorities by reference to a set of rules prevalent in a society, we speak of a *de jure* authority. However, if somebody submits to the judgement of others because he or she accepts their claims to be the rightful authorities, it is an instance of a *de facto* authority. Parents typically have both *de jure* and *de facto* authority over their children. It is conceivable, however, that they have the former kind of authority without having the latter, and vice versa. If authority is identified and recognized over belief, we speak of *an* authority (such as a doctor advising a patient). If it is, on the other hand, identified and recognized over conduct, then it is a case of somebody being *in* authority (such as a policeman directing traffic).

Perhaps the best way to elucidate the concept of authority is to describe different solutions to three problems about it.

In the first place, why is there a need for the concept? While Hannah Arendt and Bertrand de Jouvenel give different accounts of authority, they agree (with most other social theorists) that the cohesion and continuity of social life cannot be adequately explained in terms of coercion, LEADER-

SHIP or rational discussion. Arendt (1960) believes that authority implies an obedience in which people retain their freedom. She distinguishes it from POWER, force and violence, and also from persuasion, because in persuasion people are equal. The rise of totalitarianism in the twentieth century was preceded by the loss of authority, she believes: the lonely crowd seeks comfort in political mass movements and feels a need for leaders.

According to Jouvanel (1957), authority is the ability of somebody to get his or her proposals accepted. It is different from power, because it is exercised only over those who voluntarily accept it. However, the people in authority, or the rulers, may have authority only over a part of their subjects, but over a sufficient number that they may coerce the rest; this would be power over all by means of authority over a part, or an authoritarian state. It is a mistake, Jouvanel believes, to oppose authority to liberty, because authority ends where voluntary assent ends: the dissolution of human aggregates is the worst of all evils, he says, and police regimes come in when prestiges go out.

Secondly, how do people in authority come to have it? Max Weber (1921–2) distinguished between three types of authority, or ‘legitimate domination’. Legal authority rested on a belief in the legality of enacted rules and the right of those elevated to authority under such rules to issue commands. Police officers are obeyed because the authority conferred upon them by the legal and political order is accepted. Traditional authority rested on an established belief in the sanctity of immemorial traditions and the legitimacy of those exercising authority under them. This kind of authority is also defined in terms of a set of rules, but the rules are mostly expressed in traditions and customs. Finally, charismatic authority rested on devotion to the exceptional sanctity, heroism or exemplary character of an individual person, and of the normative patterns or order revealed or ordained by him (see CHARISMA). The best example is Jesus, who spoke ‘with authority’ in the Temple, though only 12 years of age, and whose utterances were of the form, ‘It is written, . . . but I say unto you.’

According to Weber, these three types of authority are ‘ideal types’. They almost always exist in a mixed form. Peter Winch (1967) has pointed out that, in the final analysis, all three rest on tradition. Even charismatic authority presupposes tradition, since the charismatic leader always reforms an

existing tradition and his actions are unintelligible apart from it: indeed Jesus said that he had not come to break the law, but to fulfil it. It should also be pointed out that the difference between legal and traditional authority on the one hand and charismatic authority on the other, in Weber’s theory, is somewhat similar to the difference between Jouvanel’s arbitrator of existing and conflicting claims and aims, *rex*, and his leader or originator of new policies, *dux*.

The third question is why people should defer to authority. Radical political thinkers, notably anarchists and Marxists, believe that they should not. Marxists contend that authority is asymmetric, masking the class nature of the capitalist state and the imposition of a legitimating ideology. Jürgen Habermas (1973) believes, for example, that the state in ‘late capitalism’ faces a legitimization crisis. Modern anarchists, like Robert Paul Wolff (1970), fasten their eyes on the alleged conflict of individual autonomy and authority. According to them authority necessarily implies the private surrender of judgement.

Conservatives and liberals reply that an extensive intellectual division of labour is necessary in today’s complex social order. They also point out that a certain kind of law structures rather than restricts individual liberty, and that it therefore serves as a condition, not a constraint, of autonomy.

Modern liberals typically distinguish between the authority of the law, which they regard as necessary for facilitating social cooperation, and the power of individuals, which they tend to distrust. They differ, however, on how they derive the authority of the law. For John Rawls (1971) and James M. Buchanan (1975), it derives from a SOCIAL CONTRACT. People defer to authority, because it is in their interest; they would choose (a certain kind of) authority if provided with the relevant information or if placed in the appropriate setting. For Friedrich A. Hayek (1979), authority emerges from a long historical process of the mutual adaptation of individuals, as expressed in statutes, traditions, conventions and customs: except where the political unit is created by conquest, he argues, people submit to authority not to enable it to do what it likes, but because they trust somebody to act in conformity with certain common conceptions of what is just. For Robert Nozick (1974) the authority of the state rests on its non-violation of individual rights.

On the other hand, some modern thinkers, Michael Oakeshott (1962), Hannah Arendt and

others, taking their lead from Aristotle, Rousseau and Hegel, do not refer to interests or rights, but to social identities. They replace the unencumbered (and to them enervated) selves of liberal theory by situated selves, partly constituted by their social roles, practices, places and times. The reason we accept authority, these ‘communitarian’ theorists contend, is that it expresses our common will or that it reflects our common identity, our shared values and beliefs. While some communitarian arguments against liberalism are similar to those put forward by conservatives (especially British Tories) in the early nineteenth century, they usually lead to more egalitarian policies. But when the selves are situated in an individualist culture, communitarians can become quite libertarian, Oakeshott being one example.

Finally, political ‘realists’ believe that authority does not come into existence by shared beliefs or by convention, but by imposition. Vilfredo Pareto described politics as the competition among elites trying to pursue their own aims by the manipulation of mass support: ‘All governments use force and all assert that they are founded on reason’ (Pareto, 1916–19, sect. 2183). According to Gaetano Mosca (1896), the governing class dominated the unorganized majority, legitimating its power by a ‘political formula’. Marxists and anarchists agree to some extent with the political realists about the nature of authority, although the two groups, unlike the realists, find it unacceptable and want to replace it by something else about whose nature, however, they do not agree. But most political philosophers and political sociologists alike believe that authority is an inevitable and ineradicable feature of social life.

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automation In describing a system in which machines are used to control processes and perform sequences of tasks that previously required human attention, activity and intervention, the term does not refer merely to using machines to carry out single tasks (mechanization), a capability humans have long possessed, but to the method of harnessing electronic sensing and control devices in order to model, replace and, increasingly, outperform human senses, minds and bodies in repeated operations.

Automated systems have distinguishable aspects:

- 1 A source of power to carry out the task;
- 2 Action, for instance, drilling, heating, spraying, treating with chemicals;
- 3 Positioning, which may involve moving, turning, aligning, transferring, conveying from one place to another;
- 4 Control, referring to the means of carrying out decisions, e.g. a valve that can be made to open and close;
- 5 A computer program, with instructions for carrying out a process, as in (2) to (4) above;
- 6 A computer program in command of the whole operation, that is, of the sequence of processes;
- 7 A means of sensing (identifying and measuring) and reporting the qualities of what is being processed, such as size, optical properties, weight and heat; and
- 8 Decision-making elements, which compare reported information with a required state and make appropriate corrections of deviations.

These aspects working together form a feedback system capable of operating with minimal human intervention.

Automation made its initial impact on manufacturing (especially automobile) industries in the 1950s. It was intended to increase production, productivity and reliability, improve efficiency, relieve humans of unpleasant or hazardous tasks, reduce operating costs and carry out procedures that were beyond human capabilities. Industrial robots, in the form of reprogrammable, jointed manipulators designed to carry out a variety of tasks, made possible greater flexibility in manufacturing. As computing power, both in software and hardware, rapidly expanded, the field of robotics emerged, specializing in the creation of sophisticated machines with some human-like functions.

At the same time, automated controls became widespread, invisible and taken for granted by the public, in many environments and applications, such as housing, domestic appliances, information, communication, entertainment and transport.

Since automation is now so firmly embedded in the fabric of every technologically advanced country, there can be no easy conclusions about the outcome of the complex relationships involved. In the early years, speculation about the likely economic, social and cultural consequences for societies and individuals tended to draw on what was known about the precursor of automation in industrial production – the mechanization of production lines. This split production into subprocesses, each aided by a machine. Since workers were treated as adjuncts of the machine, the effect was to degrade and limit workers' skills. At the level of the individual production worker, deskilling, involving a reduction of craft knowledge and a loss of freedom, was foreseen as a major direct consequence of automation. Deskilling as a concept depended on the idea that individuals have specific fixed skills, in a stable industrial environment. It did not anticipate the emergence of completely new manufacturing jobs, requiring more skills and training, not less, in such areas as CIM (computer-integrated manufacturing), including CAD/CAM (computer-aided design and computer-aided manufacturing).

At the level of the organization, greater size and complexity would evidently require new management skills, stressing information and control. At the level of society and economy, inequality and unemployment were expected to grow, and overall a shift was predicted, away from industrial production and towards service industries. Nevertheless, the fundamental changes now being brought about by the growth of the knowledge-based economy and by the expansion of information and communication networks were hard to imagine, even at the end of the twentieth century.

The supposed causal relationship between automation and unemployment has proved not to be a simple one. Common-sense arguments which saw the obvious effects of replacing workers by industrial robots, for example, led to simple conclusions about the disappearance of jobs and the growth of a so-called 'leisure society', which failed to materialize. Despite the destruction of traditional jobs, devastating to old industrial communities (such as those based on coal, dock labour or steel) there has

been an increase in new types of nonrepetitive, skilled jobs. Whether trends in unemployment were ever due to automation as such, or whether they reflected the dislocation of traditional labour markets in a changing world economy, is open to question.

The impact of automation on the shift from manufacturing to service industries has also not been clear-cut. Even in countries with an apparent decline, the fortunes of manufacturing industry fluctuate, reflecting changes in domestic and export demand as well as government policy, so that a link between the manufacturing-to-services shift and automation is not directly demonstrable. In any case, the shift was established before automation took its modern form. Furthermore, although automation first affected manufacturing industries, it is having widespread impacts on all activities, including office management, communications, transport, distribution, clerical and administrative work, banks and financial services, retail trade, printing and publishing, health and public services, design and the information technology industry itself. As the use of 'intelligent' knowledge-based systems spreads in professional activity, automation affects work and decision making in almost every occupation. Consequently, successful knowledge management has become crucial to effective organizations. Once it is accepted that knowledge is a primary commodity in the economy, the distinction between manufacturing and service industry no longer seems as fundamental as it was taken to be in the last half of the twentieth century.

The impact of robotics raises new questions about automation, the individual and society. Some see 'intelligent', mobile, autonomous robots as desirable and achievable. Others deny the possibility of emulating or exceeding human capabilities, as cognitive science reveals the complexity of human intelligence. Still others predict the evolution of ever more powerful robots, but fear the emergence of unexpected, threatening properties. Nevertheless, the need for policy decisions about the applications of robotics still lies some decades into the future.

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avant-garde This French term literally means the vanguard or foremost part of an army. Its metaphorical uses date roughly from the last quarter of the nineteenth century, though the idea, that of political or cultural LEADERSHIP by an enlightened, self-appointed elite, is in one sense at least a century older, and in another as old as the human race. In Anglophone usage the English term 'vanguard' is generally reserved for political leadership (as in Lenin's idea of a 'vanguard party'), and its French equivalent for cultural and artistic leadership (our present concern).

The expression 'avant-garde' presupposes or implies the following:

- 1 A condition of permanent cultural or aesthetic revolution, to be initiated, articulated or directed by an 'advanced' minority, usually in accordance with some allegedly immanent historical process (cf. PROGRESS);
- 2 Reluctance on the part of the 'led' (variously the proletarian 'masses' or the bourgeois 'philistines') to be so 'led' (see MASS CULTURE);
- 3 A non-mandated right on the part of the avant-garde to 'lead' them, or at least to goad, insult or irritate them by offering to do so;
- 4 This right to be justified, if at all, by the avant-garde's claims willy-nilly to represent the inner, unacknowledged aspirations of those excluded from it (cf. the Marxist doctrine of 'false consciousness', to the effect that under imperfect social arrangements the unenlightened are kept ignorant of their 'real' needs and desires, which only the 'vanguard' can perceive).

An avant-garde is constituted not by conventional status determinants such as wealth, birth or administrative function, but solely by personal merit or aesthetic talent (as assessed by itself). It stands to the surrounding culture in the ambivalent

relation of simultaneous dependency and ALIENATION.

Though they have both ENLIGHTENMENT and Romantic roots, avant-gardes are essentially a modernist and proto-modernist phenomenon, one which to a great extent overlaps with another, that of INTELLECTUALS. Even when culturally and politically conservative (as in the case of T. S. Eliot and many other modernists), avant-gardes are radical in their expressive techniques, which will be self-consciously obscure, mannered, ironic, erudite, allusive, or even (as in the Dadaist movement of Tristan Tzara and others in the early twentieth century) deliberately meaningless.

Like modernism generally, avant-gardes are in part a reaction to bourgeois democracy, an aristocratism of the déclassé. Hence they have often depended on the traditional aristocracy for their support. However, their chief clientèles nowadays are precisely (a) democratic governments anxious, when commissioning public buildings, appointing curators and funding arts organizations, to parade their 'progressive' credentials; and (b) the seriously rich but still culturally status-hungry bourgeoisie. This has led to the so-called 'institutionalization of the avant-garde', and has done much to damage the credibility (though not the profitability) of avant-gardes. It seemed lately that a revived traditionalism (especially in architecture) might eventually dominate the cultural scene, but this has not so far happened. Of all the arts, literature, which more than the others depends on a flourishing popular market, has for some decades been the least avant-garde, yet, unlike the wilder varieties of contemporary visual art, has certainly not ceased to develop in interesting and unpredictable ways.

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