Book Information

Mind and Cognition: An Anthology

Third Edition

Edited by: William Lycan (University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill) and JESSE PRINZ (University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill)

Series: Blackwell Philosophy Anthologies

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Description

First published in 1990, Mind and Cognition: An Anthology is now firmly established as a popular teaching apparatus for upper level undergraduate and graduate courses in the philosophy of mind.

• Brings together the most important classic and contemporary articles in philosophy of mind and cognition
• Completely revised and updated throughout, in response to feedback from teachers in the field
• Now includes 20 new readings
• Each updated part opens with a brief, synoptic introduction to the individual field and a comprehensive further reading list
• Each section also includes three to four of the most influential papers that have been written in the philosophy of mind over the last 40 years

TopTable of Contents

Preface to the Third Edition
Preface to the First Edition
Acknowledgements
Part I: Ontology: The Identity Theory and Functionalism:
Introduction
Behaviorism
1. Excerpt from About Behaviorism: B. F. Skinner
The Identity Theory and Machine Functionalism
2. Is Consciousness a Brain Process?: U. T. Place
Causal and Functionalist Views
3. The Causal Theory of Mind: D. M. Armstrong
4. The Nature of Mental States: Hilary Putnam
5. Troubles with Functionalism (excerpt): Ned Block
Anomalous Monism
6. Mental Events: Donald Davidson
Homuncular and Teleological Functionalism
7. The Continuity of Levels of Nature: William G. Lycan
Part II: Intentionality:
Introduction
Psychosemantics
8. Information and Representation: Jerry A. Fodor
9. Biosemantics: Ruth Garrett Millikan
10. A Guide to Naturalizing Semantics (excerpt): Barry Loewer
Other Approaches to Intentionality
11. Modality, Normativity, and Intentionality: Robert Brandom
Part III: The Computational Theory of Mind and Artificial Intelligence
Introduction
The Language of Thought and Computationalism
12. Why There Has to Be and How There Could Be a Private Language: Jerry A. Fodor
13. Which Language Do We Think With?: Peter Carruthers
Artificial Intelligence
14. Semantic Engines: An Introduction to Mind Design: John Haugeland
15. Can Computers Think?: John R. Searle
Part IV: Eliminativism, Neurophilosophy, and Anti-Representationalism
Introduction
Eliminativism
16. Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes: Paul M. Churchland
Connectionism
17. Neural Representation and Neural Computation: Patricia Smith Churchland and Terrence Sejnowski
18. Connectionism and Cognitive Architecture (excerpt): Jerry A. Fodor and Zenon W. Pylyshyn
Dynamical Systems Theory and Robotics
19. What Might Cognition Be, If Not Computation?: Tim Van Gelder
20. Intelligence Without Representation: Rodney A. Brooks
Part V: Instrumentalism and Folk Psychology
Introduction
Instrumentalism
21. True Believers: The Intentional Strategy and Why it Works: Daniel C. Dennett
22. Dennett on Intentional Systems: Stephen P. Stich
23. Real Patterns: Daniel C. Dennett
Simulationism and the Theory Theory
24. Folk Psychology as Simulation: Robert M. Gordon
25. Folk Psychology: Simulation or Tacit Theory? (excerpt): Stephen P. Stich and Shaun Nichols
Part VI: Mental Causation, Externalism, and Self-Knowledge
Introduction
For and Against Folk Psychology
26. Autonomous Psychology and the Belief--Desire Thesis: Stephen P. Stich
27. Folk Psychology is Here to Stay: Terence Horgan and James Woodward
Supervenient Causation
28. Mental Causation: Jaegwon Kim
29. Type Epiphenomenalism, Type Dualism, and the Causal Priority of the Physical: Brian P. McLaughlin
For and Against Externalism
30. Individualism and Supervenience: Jerry A. Fodor
31. The Argument from Causal Powers: Robert A. Wilson
32. Reference, Causal Powers, Externalist Intuitions, and Unicorns: Gabriel M. A. Segal
Self-Knowledge
33. Knowing One's Own Mind: Donald Davidson
34. Externalism and Inference: Paul A. Boghossian
Radical Externalism
35. The Extended Mind: Andy Clark and David J. Chalmers
Part VII: Consciousness, Qualia, and Subjectivity
Introduction
What Is Consciousness?
36. How Not to Find the Neural Correlate of Consciousness: Ned Block
37. What Should We Expect from a Theory of Consciousness?: Patricia S. Churchland
38. Consciousness and its Place in Nature (excerpt): David J. Chalmers
Conscious Awareness
39. A Theory of Consciousness (excerpt): David M. Rosenthal
40. The Superiority of HOP to HOT: William G. Lycan
41. Perception without Awareness: Fred Dretske
What It's Like
42. Epiphenomenal Qualia: Frank Jackson
43. Understanding the Phenomenal Mind: Are We All Just Armadillos?: Robert Van Gulick
Qualia
44. The Intrinsic Quality of Experience: Gilbert Harman
45. Sensation and the Content of Experience: Christopher Peacocke
46. Blurry Images, Double Vision, and Other Oddities: Michael Tye
Part VIII: Perceptual Content
Introduction
47. Simple Seeing: Fred Dretske
48. Excerpts from The Varieties of Reference: Gareth Evans
49. Non-conceptual Content: John McDowell
50. Experience Without the Head: Alva Noë
Part IX: Animal Minds
Introduction
51. Rational Animals: Donald Davidson
52. The Problem of Simple Minds: Is There Anything it is Like to be a Honey Bee?: Michael Tye
53. Why the Question of Animal Consciousness Might Not Matter Very Much: Peter Carruthers
Part X: Emotion
Introduction
54. Emotions and Choice: Robert C. Solomon
55. Embodied Emotions: Jesse Prinz
56. Is Emotion a Natural Kind?: Paul E. Griffiths
Index

TopAbout the Author

William G. Lycan is Professor of Philosophy at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. He has published widely in the field of philosophy of mind and language. His publications include Consciousness (1987), Judgement and Justification (1988), and Consciousness and Experience (1996).

Jesse J. Prinz is Professor of Philosophy at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. He works primarily in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science. His books include Furnishing the Mind: Concepts and Their Perceptual Basis (2002), Gut Reactions: A Perceptual Theory of Emotion (2004), and The Emotional Construction of Morals (2007).